




COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

BULLETIN

Inside China's Cold War



Featuring new evidence on:

Mao, Stalin, and the Road to
the 1950 Summit

Mongolia and the Cold War


The 1954 Geneva Conference

North Korea in 1956

Sino-Albanian Summits
1961-67

Romania and the Sino-US
Opening

Edited by Christian F. Ostermann



The Cold War International History Project

EDITOR:
**Christian Friedrich
Ostermann**

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:
**Ryan Gage
Mircea Munteanu
James Person**

ADVISORY EDITORS:
**Chen Jian
Christopher Goscha
James G. Hershberg**

ASSISTANT EDITORS:
**Timothy McDonnell
Kristina Terzieva**

DESIGN:
Lianne Hepler

CWIHP was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history.

Among the activities undertaken by the Project to promote this aim are a periodic Bulletin and other publications to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc countries to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; and international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars.

At the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Project is part of the History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian Friedrich Ostermann. The project is overseen by an advisory committee that is chaired by William C. Taubman (Amherst College) and includes Michael Beschloss; James H. Billington (Library of Congress); Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland, Baltimore County); John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University); James G. Hershberg (George Washington University); Robert S. Litwak (Woodrow Wilson Center); Samuel F. Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center); and Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University)

Interns at the Cold War International History Project: Fall 2004 – Spring 2008

Emiliano Alessandri (Fall 2004); Lindsey Batchman (Fall 2006); David Brown (Spring 2005); Jessica Butorac (Summer 2007); Kian Byrne (Summer 2007); Sean Callaghan (Fall 2004); Solomon Chang (Summer 2006); Yiqing Chen (Summer 2007) David Childs (Fall 2005); Kristin Coyle (Spring 2007); Madalina Cristoloveanu (Fall 2005); Rachel DeHart (Spring 2008); Moritz Deutschmann (Summer 2007); Vitalie Diaconu (Summer 2006); Sidhartha Deka (Fall 2007); Irene Dokko (Fall 2005); Tara Marie Egan (Fall 2006); Kenneth Eliason (Fall 2004); Ariel Farrar-Wellman (Spring 2007); Joan Gabel (Spring 2006); David Gallagher (Spring 2005); Nick Garcia-Mason (Summer 2006); Eliza Gheorghe (Fall 2007); Sara Giardina (Spring 2007); Justin Grosnick (Summer 2007); Michael Haack (Spring 2005); Rebecca Harris (Summer 2006); Richard Helke (Fall 2007); Marketa Jenesova (Summer 2007); Nate Jones (Spring 2008); Ahreum Jung (Fall 2005); Jeffrey Kahn (Summer 2005); Kalin Kanchev (Fall 2005-Spring 2006); Stephan Kieninger (Spring 2005); Eun-mi Kim (Spring 2008); Jooeun Kim (Spring 2008); Natella Konstantinova (Summer 2007); Sung Lee (Summer 2007); Caroline Lemelin (Summer 2007); Peter Matuszewski (Summer 2004); Timothy McDonnell (Spring 2007); Monika Gorzelanska (Spring 2006); Sonoe Nakasone (Spring 2007); Stacy O’Neill (Summer 2005); Ewelina Pach (Fall 2007); Prashanth Parameswaran (Summer 2006); Ji-young Park (Spring 2007); Mircea Popa (Summer 2006); Rene Schneeberger (Spring 2006); Sara Schwerin (Spring 2007); Timothy Snyder (Summer 2004); Inyoung Song (Summer 2005); Eftim Stojanov (Spring 2005); Ashley Tacub (Spring 2007); Kristina Terzieva (Summer 2007); Ewa Topor (Spring 2007); Joseph Trevithick (Spring 2005); Darren Tromblay (Fall 2004); Josephine Vu (Spring 2006); Heather Williams (Fall 2004); Volodymyr Valkov (Spring 2008); Matthew Woelfle (Fall 2005); In Jeong Yoon (Spring 2005); Yuliya Zeynalova (Spring 2007).

Junior Scholars at the Cold War International History Project: Fall 2004 – Fall 2007

Juliane Graf (2006); Mareen Herda (2006); Lu Ning (2007); Tommaso Piffer (2006-2007); Michael Quaas (2007); Oliver Schmerbauch (2007); Patricia Wiegmann (2006).

Senior CWIHP Scholars

Hope Harrison (George Washington University); Chen Jian (Cornell University); Bernd Schaefer; Vladislav Zubok (Temple University); David Wolff (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido)

DIRECTOR'S NOTE

Archival Thaw in China

By Christian F. Ostermann



This issue of the *Bulletin* marks an important point in the long march towards access to government documents from all sides of the Cold War. In 2004, the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China began the systematic declassification of its records—ending more than half a century of precluding scholarly access to archives critical to analyzing PRC foreign policy. This opening should have profound impact on the study of China's Cold War.

To be sure, since Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening in the mid-1980s, a number of valuable historical materials, including party documents, former leaders' works, memoirs and oral histories, have become available to scholars. The Chinese government has also adopted several archival laws and regulations since the early 1980s, providing—on paper—for a thirty-year rule for the declassification of archival records. Official document editions greatly improved over earlier government publications produced largely to justify the historical legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Revolution and mobilizing the party's rank and file—not to provide historians with authentic sources. In a recent example for the much-improved official collections, the CCP's Division of Central Archives and Manuscripts published in 2005 a four-volume collection of *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao*, the manuscripts of Liu Shaoqi, the No.2 man behind Mao prior to the Cultural Revolution.¹

In the 1990s “neibu” document compilations and histories compiled for internal party and government use became increasingly available to scholars, though often unofficially; they in fact constituted a major source for much of the new scholarship on China's Cold War experience. The unexpected wealth of Russian and East European archival sources that became accessible after the disintegration of the USSR and the Eastern European revolutions—along with an unprecedented spike in declassification of US government documentation in the first post-Cold War decade—added to a rich new historical database on PRC foreign policy. Moreover, ingenious and often courageous Chinese scholars—and a few undeterred and adventurous Western doctoral candidates and researchers—managed to exploit various local and provincial archives, such as those in Jinlin, Liaoning, Fujian, Guangxi, Yunnan and

Jiangsu. Somewhat more relaxed in their access policies, these archives made available CCP Central Committee documents on foreign relations that had been relayed to regional party committees or government organs. The documents reflected the implementation of foreign policy decision-making in Beijing. As such, they provided important new insights on subjects ranging from China's aid to Vietnam to border conflicts, from the impact of the Western China embargo to Sino-Soviet relations. Similarly, the archives of ostensibly less politically sensitive central ministries have proved lucrative in terms of new information on PRC foreign policy.²

But the dramatic changes in the former Soviet and East European communist party and state archives also highlighted the troubling deficiencies of the “selected document” publications and, more generally, the lack of access in the PRC to those archives central to an understanding of Chinese diplomacy. As thousands of internal party and government documents—from local party organs and embassies all the way to the Politburo—replaced, or rather supplemented, *Pravda* and the occasional document smuggled out from behind the Iron Curtain as sources for the analysis of Soviet bloc behavior, China scholars remained dependent on the selective release and publication policy of the CCP to go beyond *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily). It remained uncertain, moreover, to what extent “neibu” histories were reliable and could be cited. Access to the archives on the periphery, uneven at best, could substitute for research in the central archives only to a very limited degree: after all, regional archives provided precious little information on the internal dynamics of the foreign policy process. China effectively remained on the sidelines of the post-Cold War revolution in archival openness.

The opening at the Foreign Ministry is therefore an important moment. Since 2004, the Foreign Ministry has reportedly declassified more than 40,000 items from its diplomatic records for the period from 1949 to 1960. To be sure, the declassified documentation includes much material available from other sources and hence of lesser interest to scholars interested in foreign policy analysis: published pronouncements and agreements, official congratulatory notes, even translations of Western newspaper articles or press clippings.

Christian F. Ostermann is the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program and has headed CWIHP since 1997/98.

(This is nothing new for scholars who started working in the Russian archives in 1992. The declassified files included hundreds of translated *New York Times* articles.) But the newly declassified materials also contain more significant materials: directives and speeches drafted by Premier Zhou Enlai, who also served as foreign minister from 1949 to 1958, as well as directions from the Politburo and memoranda of conversations between Chinese leaders and international interlocutors; of course, diplomatic dispatches from embassies, but also intelligence and other records that did not originate with the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry has proceeded chronologically, hence the first set of declassified materials concern the establishment of official diplomatic relations between China and other countries in the 1950s; the formation and development of the Sino-Soviet alliance; and China's participation in two international conferences: the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference; Sino-American ambassadorial talks in the 1950s; and the Polish and Hungarian crises in 1956.³

The decision to open up the Foreign Ministry archives, no doubt taken at the highest levels, and its timing, likely stems from a complex set of motives. Certainly the decision reflects a desire on the part of the government and party to continue to shape how China's (international) story is told, both internally and externally. After all, declassification and access remain tightly controlled, and the selection—though qualitatively far superior and quantitatively far broader than prior practice—reflects political exigencies and national security concerns. Beijing, moreover, is aware that a certain degree of archival transparency has become an international standard for any government intent on projecting the image of a modern world power (though the limits of openness remain contested, not just in China, but in Russia, the United States, and even within the transitional societies of Eastern Europe: witness the recent debate about access to the records of the former East German or Romanian state security files).⁴

The opening at the Foreign Ministry is also a result of the persistent efforts by Chinese and international scholars—including CWIHP—in the 1990s to bring the persistent imbalance of archival sources to the attention of the authorities, in part by making freely accessible copies of declassified US, Russian and East European documents on China. These collections underlined the fact that until the PRC opened its files for research, China's history would be written based on Russian, Mongolian, Hungarian or Albanian documents! Within the span of just a few years, several new centers for Cold War research emerged in China, most prominently at Beijing University and East China Normal University (ECNU) in Shanghai. In 1999, entrepreneur-turned-historian Shen Zhihua, an adjunct professor at Beijing University and specialist on Sino-Russian relations, and Li Danhui, a former CWIHP fellow (1998-1999) and expert on China's border conflicts, founded the *Beijing Daxue Xiandai Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin* (Modern History Research and Archives Center, Beijing University). The Center, run by Beijing University's History Department in conjunction with the International



Signing of the March 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive, CWIHP, and Cornell University

From left to right, Chen Jian (Cornell University), CWIHP Director Christian Ostermann, Ambassador Chongli Guo, the director of the FMA

Studies Department, has published *Guoji lengzhanshi yanjiu zhiliao* (*Cold War International History Bulletin*), a journal of declassified and translated documents. The Center also launched a series of excellent scholarly workshops that provided a forum for the discussion of new research on China's Cold War history. Barely two years later, ECNU set up a new Center for Cold War International History Studies, which now publishes an academic journal, *Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu* (*Cold War International History Studies*), and has attracted leading and emerging scholars to its faculty, including Chen Jian, Dai Chaowu, Li Danhui, Yang Kuisong, Yu Weimin, and Shen Zhihua. The Center has created a website (www.coldwarchina.org) as a central outlet for the dissemination of research by Chinese scholars and has proactively promoted collection, collaboration and exchanges. Its collections now boast more than 20,000 declassified Russian documents as well as documents from the United States, East Europe, Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan. In December 2006, ECNU (and CWIHP) hosted a major international conference on "Transforming the Cold War." Due to their increasing activities, the two centers have joined the ranks of other leading international research projects.⁵

This new institutional capacity reflected the emergence of Cold War history as an important and dynamic field of scholarly inquiry in China. But it also signified the government's increased role: both centers host larger research and publication projects that have either been recognized as prestigious "national projects" (such as Beijing University's project on "The Cold War and Great Powers Relations") and/or obtained substantial government (Ministry of Education) support (such as ECNU's "Studies on Major US Foreign Policy Decisions during the Cold War"). At ECNU alone, over \$1 million has been committed to buying new source materials and supporting research projects and conferences.

Shortly after the archival opening at the Foreign Ministry,

a CWIHP delegation discussed with officials at the Foreign Ministry's Department of Archives the need to make the newly declassified materials available to a broader international community. Subsequent discussions by Professor Chen Jian (Cornell) and myself in Beijing (in close coordination with Shen Zihua and other China-based scholars) led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 2005 between the Department and CWIHP, providing for the release, translation, and publication of a first set of materials on the 1954 Geneva Conference. Confirmed in an exchange between then-Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Wilson Center President Lee H. Hamilton, the agreement launched a series of conferences, publications and other activities, including an international conference at the Wilson Center on "The 1954 Geneva Conference and the Cold War in Asia" (February 2006). A follow-up memorandum of understanding was signed in March 2007 to cover the publication of documents on the Bandung Conference (1955).



Coincidental to the "China opening," several other opportunities for new archival evidence on China's role in the Cold War have emerged that complement the documents being made available in Beijing. New releases and publications in Moscow—introduced in this issue of the *Bulletin* by Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff—document the difficult road to the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. Many of the Russian documents featured in this issue originate in the still largely inaccessible Presidential Archive in Moscow and only recently became available in Russia.

As a result of six years of cooperation between the Albanian Cold War Studies Center, led by Prof. Ana Lalaj, and the Project, CWIHP is pleased to present the first set of Albanian documents in the pages of the *Bulletin*. Obtained following a CWIHP visit to Tirana in November 2004, the transcripts of discussions between the Albanian Labor Party leadership and their PRC counterparts chronicle the rise of possibly the most



CWIHP Director Christian Ostermann meets with PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Zonghuai (March 2007).

unlikely and idiosyncratic alliance during the Cold War. Yet for both China and Albania the other's allegiance was crucial at the moment it occurred: ideologically, psychologically, strategically and economically. Both sides went to considerable lengths to accommodate the other's needs; and to assure each other that neither would desert the other during a crisis: "Albania is not Cuba," as the Chinese reassured their Tirana counterparts.

McGill University-based historian Lorenz Luthi documents North Vietnam's efforts to maneuver the Sino-Soviet split based on an unprecedented array of sources sampled in this issue of the *Bulletin*. In a second article for this issue, Sergey Radchenko looks at Mao's China through recently released Mongolian and other documentation. CWIHP Associate Mircea Munteanu rounds out the collections of new evidence on China by looking at the short-lived Romanian channel in the Sino-American rapprochement in 1969-1972. Documents from the Romanian foreign ministry detail the ambitious but flawed and ultimately futile attempt by Nicolae Ceausescu to propel his regime from pariah status in the Soviet bloc to the center stage of world politics.



Documenting North Korea's foreign policy through the archives of the DPRK's erstwhile communist allies remains a focal point for CWIHP and its new partner project within the Wilson Center's History & Public Policy Program, the North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP). Launched in January 2006 in partnership with the University of North Korean Studies (UNKS) in Seoul, the NKIDP presents a major new set of communist archive documentation in this issue of the *Bulletin*. James Person, who succeeded Kathryn Weathersby as NKIDP coordinator in early 2007, and Japanese scholar Nobuo Shimotomai discuss the international and domestic dynamics that led to the near coup d'état against North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in the volatile months after the Twentieth CPSU Congress. The collection follows the publication of German, Hungarian and other sources on North Korean foreign relations during and after the Korean War in *Bulletin* 14/15 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004) and a series of CWIHP Working Papers and online publications on the subject. NKIDP has launched a new website (www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp), which contains an online archive with historical documents, scholarship, and publications related to North Korean history. Additional documents (and translations) from Albanian, German and Russian archives will appear on the NKIDP and CWIHP websites in the coming months. These publications and other NKIDP activities are made possible with generous support from the Korea Foundation (Seoul).



CWIHP activities since the publication of the last issue of the *Bulletin* go far beyond those represented by new documentary findings in this issue. CWIHP continues in its role as a

clearinghouse for research in the archives of the “other sides” of the Cold War. The Project facilitates the discussion of new findings through sponsoring and co-sponsoring international conferences. These included conferences and workshops on “*Mongolia and the Cold War*” (Ulaanbataar, March 2004); “*China and Eastern Europe*” (Beijing, March 2004); “*Towards an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988: A Critical Oral History Conference*” (Washington, D.C., July 2004); “*The 1960-1961 Congo Crisis and the Cold War: Towards an International History, A Critical Oral History Conference*” (Washington, D.C., September 2004); “*The Impact of Cold War Broadcasting*” (Stanford, CA, October 2004); “*The International History of the Bandung Conference and the Origins of the Non-Aligned Movement*” (Sveti Stefan, Serbia and Montenegro, May 2005); “*The Warsaw Pact: From its Founding to its Collapse, 1955-1991*” (Washington, D.C., May 2005); “*The Carter Administration and the “Arc of Crisis”: Iran, Afghanistan, and the Cold War in Southwest Asia, 1977-1981: A Critical Oral History Conference*” (Washington, D.C., July 2005); “*The 1954 Geneva Conference and the Cold War in Asia: New Evidence and Perspectives*” (Washington, D.C., 17-18 February 2006); “*From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar “Confrontation”*” (Artimino, Italy, April 2006); “*Europe and the End of the Cold War 1985-1991*” (Paris, June 2006); “*The Quest for Self-Reliant Security in the Two Koreas, Then and Now*” (Washington, D.C., September 2006); “*Indochina between the Two Geneva Accords, 1954-1962*” (Montreal, October 2006); “*Transforming the Cold War: China and the Changing World, 1960s-1980s*” (Shanghai, December 2006); “*North and South Korea: System Formation and Foreign Relations*” (Beijing, May 2007); “*Forty Years Later: New Interpretations of the 1967 Six-Day War*” (Washington, D.C., June 2007), and “*Revisiting Stalinism*” (Washington, D.C., November 2007). Further information on these meetings is available in this *Bulletin* as well as the CWIHP website (www.cwihp.org).

Two CWIHP conferences centered on newly declassified US National Intelligence Estimates on China and Yugoslavia. Leading international scholars reviewed Cold War era national intelligence estimates on Mao’s China released by the National Intelligence Council for an October 2004 CWIHP conference on “*Tracking the Dragon*,” which featured a keynote by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. A similarly illustrious group of experts—including former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger—discussed declassified NIEs on the former Yugoslavia at a December 2006 CWIHP conference entitled “*From National Communism to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990*.” Together with the National Security Archive, CWIHP also hosted the third conference in the Cambridge History of the Cold War series (March 2007) and a workshop on “*New Scholarship on the Truman Administration*” (April 2007, co-sponsored by the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum). Often webcast live, CWIHP also sponsored over 100 Cold

War seminars, book launches, conference panels, declassification workshops and press briefings, from Washington D.C. to Algiers, from Ulaanbataar to Dakar, just in the last few years.

Though much of the Project’s recent efforts have focused on the PRC foreign ministry archive, new archival ventures (and adventures) were not limited to the “Middle Kingdom.” CWIHP is contributing to several new projects that explore the archives and Cold War dynamics in Southeast Asia. Together with Christopher Goscha (UQAM) and Martin Thomas (University of Exeter, UK), CWIHP has been exploring other archives in the global South. An exploratory trip to Algiers in May 2005 allowed for first findings in the Algerian National Archives, such as documentation on the Algerian Revolutionary Government’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia and transcripts and notes of conversations with world leaders from John F. Kennedy to Mao Zedong. Similarly, the Senegalese archives in Dakar proved an important side view into hotspots in Africa and a rich source for the interaction between decolonization and the Cold War (as became evident during a CWIHP meeting in Dakar in May 2006). The Cold War International History Project is committed to bringing sources and perspectives from the global South into the larger debate about the international history of the Cold War.

Building on CWIHP’s long-standing and fruitful collaboration with the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) and the National Security Archive in organizing a series of conferences on the Rise and Fall of Détente, the Project and CIMA (along with several partner institutions) recently launched a new initiative on the international history of proliferation. This new initiative seeks to further understanding of the dynamics of one of the most pressing challenges of our time by working towards a global history of nuclear proliferation.⁶

Other CWIHP projects include larger documentation initiatives on the former Yugoslav archives (with particular emphasis on the now accessible personal papers of longtime Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito); the Non-Aligned Movement (spurred in part by the recent releases in Beijing and Belgrade but also by new sources ranging from Lebanese to Japanese documents; and the Warsaw Pact’s records recently declassified by the Polish government. CWIHP activities include a prospering Romania Initiative that will bring a new generation of young Romanian historians to the Wilson Center and exploit archival opportunities in Bucharest. At the same time, CWIHP is nearing completion of a decade-long research effort in collecting and translating Stalin’s conversations with foreign leaders between 1944 and 1953.

With support from the Project, the Cold War Group Bulgaria continues to mine the Bulgarian national, military and intelligence archives, producing major document collections on Bulgarian foreign intelligence as well as Bulgaria and the Middle East. The latter is part of an expanding CWIHP effort to use the former Communist-world archives to shed new light on the Cold War in South and West Asia. Critical oral history conferences organized by CWIHP on the 1980s Iran-Iraq War and the Carter Administration & Iran (see above) as well as

research trips to Tehran (February 2004) and an international source workshop (June 2007) have begun a process of bringing into the international research agenda authentic documentation and voices from a region that has dominated international attention and concern in recent years.

The Cold War International History Project has been actively involved in making the results of scholarly research accessible to high-school and college students since it first co-hosted a NEH summer school and developed an online teaching tool with its Cold War Files website (www.coldwarfiles.org). Not only do entire classes of college and high-school students participate regularly in CWIHP's Washington seminar series, the Project is planning future summer schools (with the Gilder Lehrman Institute for American History). Internationally, CWIHP has worked closely with leading Romanian civic activists Romulus Rusan and Ana Blandiana of the Sighet Memorial for the Victims of Communism and Resistance in Sighet, Romania, to participate in the Memorial's 2006 summer school and develop a special Cold War exhibit, funded by the Fundatia Academia Civica (Bucharest).



This issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* as well as the many activities that generate new archival findings and research would not be possible without the Project's global network. This network involves a growing number of partner institutions around the world, such as GWU's George Washington Cold War Group (GWCW); Harvard University's Project for Cold War Studies, the LSE Cold War Studies Centre, the University of California-Santa Barbara Cold War Center, the Cold War Museum (Fairfax, VA), the John A. Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute, the Institute for National Remembrance (Warsaw), The Gramsci Foundation (Rome), The National University of Singapore and the Singapore Defense Institute, the German Historical Institute as well as the Goethe Institute, Mannheim University's Project on the History of the CSCE, The Ratiu Democracy Center (Turda, Romania), the Czechoslovak Documentation Center (Prague), the International Spy Museum (Washington, D.C.), Syracuse University's Center for Technology and Information Policy, Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli (Rome), the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow), the Boudiaf Foundation (Algiers), The Hungarian Cold War Studies Center at the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest), the Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw), Hong Kong University's Department of History, The Slavic Research Center (Sapporo), the Zikic Foundation (Bonn), Tampere University, Peking University's International Relations and History Departments, The Hamburg Institute for Social Research; Erfurt University's Chair for North American History, Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies (Seoul), the Truman Presidential Library and Museum (Independence, MO), The China and Asia-Pacific Studies Program at Cornell University (Ithaca, NY), the Cornell Cold

War Project, The Universite Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), The Hoover Institution (Stanford University, CA), and the Parallel History Project for Cooperative Security (Zurich)—in addition to those named above.

As has been the case since its inception, the project and its flagship publication depend on the intellectual, archival and logistical contributions from numerous individuals. In addition to my colleagues at the Wilson Center, in particular Lee Hamilton, Michael Van Dusen, and Robert Litwak and the Project's Academic Advisory Committee (William C. Taubman, Michael Beschloss, James Billington, Warren Cohen, John Gaddis, James G. Hershberg, Samuel F. Wells, Sharon Wolchik), which remains deeply involved in the Project's manifold activities, I am deeply indebted for advice, support and contributions to Amitav Acharya, Ang Cheng Guan, Jordan Baev, Oliver Bange, Tom Blanton, Frederic Bozo, Gregg Brazinsky, Bill Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Joseph Chan, Chen Jian, Michael Cox, Elena Danielson, Enkel Daljani, Lubomir Dimic, Ilya Gaiduk, Gary Goldberg, Christopher Goscha, Massimiliano Guderzo, Jussi Hanhimaki, Hope Harrison, Paul Henze, A. Ross Johnson, Sulmaan Khan, Lukasz Kaminski, Noam Kochavi, Mark Kramer, Ana Lalaj, Melvyn P. Leffler, Li Danhui, Lian Zhengbao, Liu Xiaoyuan, Lorenz Lüthi, Pawel Machcewicz, Jürgen Martschukat, Sergey Mazov, Joe Mocnik, Malcolm 'Kip' Muir, Lise Namikas, Niu Dayong, Leopoldo Nuti, Sue Onslow, Krzysztof Persak, Merle Pribbenow, Sergey Radchenko, Svetozar Rajak, Hannu Rautkallio, Marie-Pierre Rey, Priscilla Roberts, Kihl-jae Ryoo, Bernd Schaefer, Shen Zihua, Jong-dae Shin, Jounyung Sun, Jeremi Suri, Martin Thomas, Vladimir Tismaneanu, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Radina Vucetic, Dong Wang, Kathryn Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, David Wolff, Louise Woodroffe, Sulin Zhang, and Vladislav Zubok. Last but not least, my dedicated staff, Mircea Munteanu, James Person, Ryan Gage, Kristina Terzieva and Timothy McDonnell, as well as a group of talented interns (named in the masthead) have been invaluable in bringing this *Bulletin* and so many other projects to fruition.

I owe a very special debt of gratitude to two individuals: Dr. Kennette Benedict, our longtime partner at the MacArthur Foundation, where she served as the director of the International Peace and Security Program until 2005, and to Lisa Katchka, who makes it all worthwhile—and fun.

Last but not least, this *Bulletin* would not be possible without the generous contributions of The Henry Luce Foundation (New York), The Korea Foundation (Seoul), and The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago) as well as other institutional and individual donors.

Notes

1. Four volumes (Beijing: *Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe*, 2005)—For further information, see Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, “The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs,” A Field report of the New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems,” *China Quarterly* No. 122 (Summer 1990), pp. 258-72; Michael Hunt, “CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp 129, 136-43; Steven M. Goldstein and He Di, “New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp.4-6; Chen Jian, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s “New Cold War Documentation,” Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History (College Park, 1998), <http://www.archives.gov/research/cold-war/conference/chen-jian.html>; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Introduction; Chen Jian, “Questions Concerning China an the International Cold War,” *Journal of East China Normal University*, December 2001; Shen Zhihua, “To further Promote the Opening and Publication of China’s Historical Archives—Remarks on Reading of ‘Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the

PRC’,” see www.shenzhijhua.net/wszt/000165.htm; this introduction also draws on an excellent recent review of Chinese Cold War scholarship see Yafeng Xia, “The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 10:1 (Winter 2008), 81-115.

2. See, for example, Chen Jian and Shuguang Zhang, *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* (Chicago: 1996), Zhai Qiang, “Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources,” *CWIHP Working Paper #18* (1997), and Dong Wang, “The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962,” *CWIHP Working Paper #49* (2006).

3. Curiously there is very little material on the Korean War in the first set.

4. See “Romanian Government passes Emergency Executive Order Governing Access to Securitate Files after Romanian Constitutional Court declares CNSAS Unconstitutional,” on www.cwihp.org.

5. See Yafeng Xia, “The Study,” 83-84.

6. For further information contact Dr. Leopoldo Nuti at the University of Roma Tre or CWIHP director Christian Ostermann.

Table of Contents

Inside China’s Cold War

The Geneva Conference of 1954	p. 7
Russian Documents on the 1954 Geneva Conference	p. 85
To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949	p. 105
“Albania is not Cuba”	p. 183
Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split	
New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War	p. 341
Twenty-Four Soviet-bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964-1966	p. 367
Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1971: New Evidence from the Bucharest Archives	p. 403
New Evidence on North Korea in 1956	p. 447
Research Notes	p. 528

The Geneva Conference of 1954

New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

Introduction by Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua

These Chinese documents, translated below as the result of an agreement between the Foreign Ministry Archive of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center, are of major importance for two basic reasons. First, following the formal declassification of China's diplomatic documents, a first in the history of the People's Republic, the records are being made available to scholars and students. Secondly, they shed new light on the causes, proceedings, and results of the 1954 Geneva Conference, especially on Beijing's policies as well as the considerations underlying them.

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the process of China's "reform and opening to the outside world," scholars of Chinese Cold War history have gained new access to source materials unavailable in the past. However, until recently, the PRC's diplomatic archives remained closed to researchers. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese experience of the Cold War had to rely upon officially or semi-officially published documentary collections. These documents were released selectively and are often incomplete. In the past ten years, many scholars—including the two of us—have also tried to access documents kept at provincial and local archives. However, the documents at these archives usually are the ones that had been "relayed" by the Chinese Communist Party leadership to party organs at lower levels, so they were inevitably limited in their significance, reflecting only part of the overall picture of China's policymaking and implementation.

China's laws on archival declassification have established that government documents, including diplomatic papers, should under normal circumstances be declassified after thirty years. In 2003-2004, the Department of Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started the formal process of declassifying the documents in its holdings. The first group of documents was made available for public use (including by researchers from *both* China *and* foreign countries) in January 2004, covering the period of 1949-1955. In July 2004, the Archive further declassified another 5,000 documents from the 1949-1955 period, including documents relating to the 1954

Geneva Conference. According to the Archive's administration, the documents that have been declassified account for about 65-70% of the documents that are held by the Archive for the period.

Differing from the common practice of most Chinese archives in discriminating between Chinese and foreign researchers—oftentimes documents were only made available to Chinese researchers, while scholars with foreign passports were denied access—the Foreign Ministry Archive carries out a new and much fairer practice by treating all users, Chinese and foreign alike, in the same way. All documents have been digitized and can be accessed at the computer monitors in the Department of Archives' reading room at the Foreign Ministry. Researchers are allowed to take notes of the documents and, in most cases, make copies of the documents for a fee (after going through certain approval procedures).

Among the documents now declassified, the ones on China's participation at the Geneva Conference of 1954 are among the most impressive and important. These documents cover a wide range of issues. In addition to records of sessions of the conference, there are some documents touching upon internal discussions among Chinese leaders—including telegraphic exchanges between Zhou Enlai in Geneva and Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other Chinese leaders in Beijing—and between Chinese leaders and their Vietnamese and Soviet counterparts concerning how to form, implement, and, when needed, adjust the strategies and policies of the communist side toward the conference. Among the documents are also transcripts of meetings between Chinese leaders and the leaders of Western powers, such as Britain and France, and non-socialist and non-Western countries, such as India, Laos, and Cambodia.

Scholars of Cold War history have long believed that the 1954 Geneva Conference occupied a critical position in the evolution of the global Cold War. Most important of all, the conference ended the First Indochina War while, at the same time, prepared conditions for the unfolding of the process leading to the Second Indochina War (or, as it is more widely known, the Vietnam War).

These documents shed new light on the Chinese experi-

Chen Jian is Michael J. Zak Professor of History for US-China Relations at Cornell University and Zijiang Distinguished Visiting Professor at East China Normal University; Shen Zhihua is Professor of History and Director of the Cold War History Studies Center at East China Normal University.

ence at the Geneva Conference, revealing some key aspects of Beijing's decision-making and policy implementation before and during the conference. The documents indicate that, from a Chinese perspective, the conference provided the PRC with a valuable opportunity to appear at a major international forum. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in particular paid special attention to using the conference to announce that the "new China" had emerged as an important actor and prestigious force in international affairs. Zhou Enlai thus repeatedly emphasized internally that Beijing had to do everything possible to make the Geneva Conference a success.

The Chinese documents also show that the alliance relationship between China and the Soviet Union was quite intimate in 1954. Indeed, the Chinese experience at the Geneva conference was first and foremost characterized by high-level cooperation and mutual support between Beijing and Moscow. It was Moscow that used the Berlin Foreign Ministers' meeting several months before to propose that China should attend—as a central participant—the conference on how to conclude the Korean War and the First Indochina War. Prior to the conference, the Soviet leaders provided the Chinese with all kinds of advice, assisting Beijing's leaders to be ready for the PRC's debut at a major international gathering. The Soviet and Chinese leaders also conducted extensive discussions on how to coordinate their strategies at the conference, which resulted in a joint Chinese-Soviet strategy, especially toward the settlement of the Indochina issue.

During the conference, when the discussions on settling the Indochina issue nearly deadlocked largely because of the Viet Minh's unyielding attitudes toward such issues as zones of troop concentration, handling the conflicts in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia separately, and withdrawing all foreign troops from Indochina, the Chinese and the Soviets closely consulted with each other, and jointly exerted great pressure upon their Vietnamese comrades. Consequently, the young Vietnamese communists had no other choice but to follow Beijing's and Moscow's advice to accept a peace accord that would divide Vietnam—albeit temporarily, it was intended—along the 17th parallel.

While cooperation and mutual support remained the main theme of Sino-Viet Minh relations at Geneva, the Chinese documents also confirm that disagreement and, at times, tensions developed between the Chinese and the Vietnamese comrades over their aims and strategies. As indicated by the documents, the differences were mainly over the issues of whether or not to adopt a "dividing zones" approach toward settling the Indochina issue, and, if so, along which parallel to establish the demarcation line. The Vietnamese, especially in the wake of their hard-won military victory at Dien Bien Phu, were unwilling to accept a solution that would divide Vietnam, even if such division would only be temporary. When a demarcation solution seemed inevitable, they persisted in demanding that the demarcation line be drawn as far to the south as possible. It was primarily because of great pressure from China—with the full backing of the Soviet Union—that the Vietnamese com-

rades finally accepted the 17th Parallel.

One of the most important reasons underpinning Beijing's eagerness to reach a settlement on Indochina was, the records reveal, the profound concern that the United States would otherwise intervene directly in Indochina. Indeed, both in Beijing's discussions with Moscow and the Chinese leaders' meetings with the Viet Minh, the possibility of American military intervention in Indochina loomed large on the agenda.

A large number of the declassified documents demonstrate that Beijing's leaders actively used China's appearance at Geneva to establish direct contact with Western powers such as Britain and France. Among the documents are the transcripts of meetings Zhou Enlai held separately with Anthony Eden and Pierre Mendes-France, as well as the telegraphic communications between Zhou and Beijing reporting on these meetings. These documents make it very clear that Beijing's leaders viewed these meetings not only as useful for driving a wedge between London and Paris on the one hand and Washington on the other, but also regarded them as highly valuable for the PRC to be regarded by the whole world as a rising great power. The documents also clearly indicate that Zhou Enlai, head of the Chinese delegation to the conference, played an extremely important role in shaping and handling Chinese policies at the conference.

While there is no doubt that the declassification of Chinese diplomatic documents represents an encouraging development for scholars of Cold War international history in general and of China's Cold War experience in particular, gaps between scholars' expectations and research needs and the reality of the archival opening in China continue to exist. The documents now made available to scholars are still limited in content and scope.

Some of the limits are caused by the special nature of the documents held at the Foreign Ministry Archive. Most of the documents kept by the FMA are papers related to the Ministry's own operations and activities. Although not without exception, the documents held at the FMA are generally the ones about policy-implementation, rather than about policy-making at the highest level. Therefore, for scholars to construct a more comprehensive perspective of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process, it is essential that they should be given access to other archives in Beijing—the Chinese Communist Party Central Archive in particular.

The documents declassified and made available to scholars by the Foreign Ministry Archive only account for 70% of the Archive's holdings. Among the remaining 30% are many highly valuable—indeed, compared with what has been made available to scholars, more valuable—documents. For example, a careful reading of the documents translated and published here indicates clearly that there are more documents on China's dealings with Western powers such as Britain and France than on China's dealings with its communist allies. Also, among the telegraphic exchanges between Zhou (China's premier and foreign minister) and Mao, Liu Shaoqi and other leaders in Beijing, most of the documents containing critical analyses and strategic and policy deliberations have yet to be made

available to scholars. It is apparent that further declassification of these documents is much needed.

In all these senses, the declassification of Chinese documents on the Geneva Conference, while an exciting development by itself, should be regarded as a hopeful point of departure. It is our sincere hope that continued declassification of

Chinese documents—not only by the Foreign Ministry Archive but also by other branches of archives of the Chinese party and government—as well as declassification and access to archives in other countries (such as Vietnam and Russia) will allow Cold War historians to study the rich and diverse history of the global Cold War from a more comprehensive vantage point.

New Working Papers available at CWIHP

All Working Papers can be downloaded from the Project website at www.cwihp.org.

Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal

CWIHP Working Paper No. 55

By Guy Laron

Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution

CWIHP Working Paper No. 54

By Peter Vamos

North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives

CWIHP Working Paper No. 53

By Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko

“We Need Help from Outside”: The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956

CWIHP Working Paper No. 52

By James F. Person

Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979

CWIHP Working Paper No. 51

By Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy

Rudolf Slansky: His Trials and Trial

CWIHP Working Paper No. 50

By Igor Lukes

The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962

CWIHP Working Paper No. 49

By Dong Wang

1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy

CWIHP Working Paper No. 48

By Niu Jun

The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives

CWIHP Working Paper No. 47

By Sergey S. Radchenko

Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949

CWIHP Working Paper No. 46

By Laurent Rucker

Poland and Vietnam, 1963: New Evidence on Secret Communist Diplomacy and the “Maneli Affair”

CWIHP Working Paper No. 45

By Margaret K. Gnoinska

North Korean “Adventurism” and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972

CWIHP Working Paper No. 44

By Bernd Schaefer

Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989

CWIHP Working Paper No. 43

By Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu

The Soviet's Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split

CWIHP Working Paper No. 42

By Sergey S. Radchenko

The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Documents

A Brief Introduction

By Zhang Sulin

In January 2004, a large set of archival materials, which had been kept in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive since 1949, were made available to the public. While the eventual declassification of all Chinese Foreign Ministry documents will come in stages, the first group of documents now available includes over 40,000 items dated between 1949 and 1960. According to the Archival Law of China, documents should be declassified 30 years from their drafting date. The initial opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive is based on the relevant articles of the Archival Law of China.

About the Foreign Ministry Archive

The Foreign Ministry Archive is a national archive, serving as a permanent depository for archival materials associated with the activities of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and all agreements made with foreign countries (except those of a military nature) as well as materials from six subsidiaries of the Foreign Ministry: the China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, China Foreign Affairs University, the World Affairs Press, the Beijing Service Bureau for Diplomatic Missions, and the Bureau of Administration for the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. While most archival materials are in paper form, materials increasingly come in the forms of photographs, records, videotapes, microfiche, and compact discs. Every year the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive receives around 20,000 items. At present, the archive contains some 360,000 items, with the total shelf length of archival materials being around 2,500 meters. Archival materials such as the "Supplementary Speech Given by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Asian-African Conference (hand-written draft)" and "The Chinese-Drafted Joint Declaration by Chinese and Indonesian Premiers as Revised by Premier Zhou" are included in a special list, entitled, "Heritage of Chinese Archival Materials."

Declassification Procedures for Foreign Ministry Archival Material

Since the archival documents at the Foreign Ministry Archive are numerous and vary greatly in date, the amount of work involved in declassifying them is enormous. To deal with the challenge, the Archive declassifies all documents in steps

based on a general timetable. Documents of a single five-year period are grouped together. In practical terms, this meant that the second group of documents to be declassified were those dating 1956-1960. The first group of documents, covering the years 1949-1955, was an exception to the general principle of five-year groupings.

Procedures for declassification at the Foreign Ministry Archive are outlined in the document entitled "Provisional Regulations on Declassification and Use of Archives at Various Levels." Specifically, the Foreign Ministry Archive organizes personnel appointed by supervisory departments to examine the documents and manage the process of declassification strictly in accordance with this regulation. Every document that meets the standards of this regulation shall be declassified. The goal is to ensure the highest level of objectivity, accuracy, and speed.

After completion of the declassification, the Foreign Ministry will make a detailed report to the State Council. Upon obtaining approval from the State Council, documents are made available to the public.

The First Group of Declassified Archival Materials and Their Contents

Preparations for the initial opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive began at the end of the 20th century, with the establishment of a division tasked with declassification. Studies and preparations were carried out in order for the project to be implemented smoothly. During the preparation process, the Archive has thankfully received assistance from the Foreign Ministry as well as Chinese embassies abroad. The Archive has also benefited from the experience and technological skills of archivists from various countries as well as a number of foreign government departments that supervise archives, especially those of foreign ministries.

The first group of materials made publicly available contains over 10,000 items, including directives signed or drafted by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, directives issued by the Foreign Ministry, as well as telegrams, letters, and reports sent by Chinese embassies around the world. These documents illustrate three main guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy in the early history of the People's Republic of China: *leaning to one side*, *inviting*

Zhang Sulin is Chief of the Division of Declassification and Publication and a Senior Research Associate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive of the People's Republic of China, as well as a former CWIHP scholar.

guests only after the house is cleaned, and starting another stove. Between 1949 and 1955, China established diplomatic relations with 26 countries (including two at the chargé d'affaires level) with varying systems of government and differing historical relationships with China. Documents from this period provide vivid and detailed information on the complex process of establishing relations with these countries.

Another important topic addressed by the newly available documentation is the process by which the PRC established its diplomatic corps. The documents show that this development was very much shaped by the domestic and international environment. Because most early diplomats were former military personnel with no experience in diplomacy, and also because their stated guiding principle was that *nothing is too trivial in diplomacy*, all events, significant or not, were recorded in scrupulous detail. As a result, we now have rich primary sources documenting the appointment and training of personnel, the establishment of rules, the establishment of embassies, as well as the assumption of office of diplomatic envoys.

It is also worth mentioning that many documents from this period concern the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference of 1955. As these two conferences occupy important historical places in Chinese diplomatic history, these documents can be quite valuable to historians.

Take the Geneva Conference for example. The Chinese delegation, headed by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, attended the conference which attempted to find solutions to conflicts in Korea and Indochina. Geneva was the first time that the PRC participated in an important international conference as an equal party in discussing international issues. During the conference, Zhou's exceptional diplomatic skills helped introduce Chinese foreign policy to the world. China's bilateral relations with countries such as the United Kingdom and France improved. With the help of the British, China and the United States also initiated official dialogue regarding the return of overseas personnel and students. Even though substantial progress was not made on this issue, it provided the opportunity for negotiations between the two countries that had no diplomatic relations theretofore, and laid the foundation for future ambassadorial talks between the two countries. The implications of the talks were therefore probably farther-reaching than the talks themselves.

Among the archival materials now available, 1,200 documents already relate to the Geneva Conference, in the form of meeting minutes, telegrams, etc. For the convenience of researchers, the Archive compiled a summary entitled *Select Archival Material of the People's Republic of China, Volume One: The Geneva Conference of 1954*, which contains 219 documents. The Foreign Ministry Archive has cooperated with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project in translating some of the most critical documents into English.

Despite the great value of the primary documents made available to researchers, this group of documents has certain flaws. There are two reasons for this. First, in the early years

of the PRC, archival methods were relatively unsophisticated, resulting in problems with collecting and organizing documents. As a result, many documents were unfortunately not preserved. Second, a complex documentation system in China left many documents relating to the same historical event in different departments. As such, materials at the Foreign Ministry are often not complete, as the archive only has materials related to inter-governmental exchanges. For example, with the 1954 Geneva Conference, minutes of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese party meetings between leaders were not deposited at the Foreign Ministry Archive.

About Archive Serial Numbers

The foreign ministry archives, collected and kept by the ministry, follow the serial number system decided by the ministry itself since there is no uniform system for archive serial numbers in China. These archives are sorted by department, such as the Department of Asian Affairs, the Department of European Affairs, etc. The archives of each department are sorted chronologically. A few files of the early period archives are sorted by topics, such as the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Asian-African Conference, the Korean Issue, etc.

The serial number of a declassified foreign ministry archive file is made up of three parts. The first part is the code number of the department or the topic, the second part is the sequence number of the declassified files of the department, and the third part is the content sequence of the particular file. Taking 109-0446-01 for example, 109 is the code number of the Department of European and Central Asian Affairs, 0446 is the sequence number of the declassified files of the department, and 01 is the content sequence of this file.

When the first batch of documents from the foreign ministry archives of 1949-1955 were declassified, no electronic copies existed. This prevented us from declassifying certain documents with unsuitable content. But, in compiling the document collection *1954 Geneva Conference* in book form, we have selected some additional documents, which readers will not find in the declassified archives reading room. Documents of this kind have only two parts of the serial numbers, such as 206-Y0054.

In any case, the opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive offers the public access to a large number of formerly classified documents for the first time. This historic step had positive resonance within and outside China, especially in the field of history. We are very encouraged by the positive feedback and feel the hard work over the past few years has been rewarding. We believe that the opening of Chinese foreign relations archives will continue to move forward with support from all parties. As such, more objective and detailed primary sources will be made available for historical research.

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive
2 Nandajie, Chaoyangmen, Chaoyang District
Beijing 100701, People's Republic of China
Tel: +86-10-65961114*

DOCUMENT No. 1

Telegram, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee [CPSU CC] to CCP [Chinese Communist Party] Central Committee, via [Soviet Ambassador to the People's Republic of China (PRC)] Comrade [Pavel F.] Yudin, 26 February 1954

[Source: Department of Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRCFMA) 109-00396-01. P26. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

CCP Central Committee:

We request that you convey to [Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Prime Minister] Comrade Ho Chi Minh the process of the discussion at the foreign ministers meeting in Berlin¹ of the representatives from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United States, Britain, France, and other related countries holding a conference in Geneva on 26 April 1954 (which, in addition to discussing the Korea question, will also discuss the question of restoring peace in Indochina). Previously we already informed you that "other related countries" in Indochina, according to our understanding, should be the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the three puppet states: [Chief (*Quoc Truong*)] Bao Dai's [State of] Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

We know that the Vietnamese friends are concerned about the convening of the Geneva Conference, and whether they will attend the conference. We believe that the CCP Central Committee will agree to our opinion.

As far as the position of France at the Geneva conference, as well as that of the United States and Britain, is concerned, we do not have much material at the present time. As for how we should use this conference to make it favorable to the Vietnamese people, we are very much willing to learn the opinions of the Vietnamese friends.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

1. *Editor's Note:* The 1954 Berlin Conference, between the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France, and the USSR, was convened on 25 January 1954. It was intended to address questions regarding East-West tensions and the reunification of Germany. The announcement to hold the Geneva Conference was made in a quadripartite communique of 18 February.



DOCUMENT No. 2

"Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference," Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) and Approved in Principle at a Meeting of the CCP Central Secretariat, 2 March 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0054. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Reaching agreement to convene the Geneva Conference was a great achievement by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Four Powers in Berlin. The People's Republic of China's participation in the [Geneva] conference alone has already marked a big step toward relaxing international tensions, and therefore has won widespread support by peace-loving peoples and countries all over the world. However, the bloc of imperialist aggressors, and the US government in particular, has been intentionally underestimating the significance of the Geneva Conference, predicting that it, as happened at Berlin on Germany and Austria, will not achieve any result. But the opinions of the United States, Britain, and France on the Korea issue and especially on the Indochina issue and many other issues of international affairs are far from identical. Sometimes, the contradictions among them are very large, and they are facing many internal difficulties too.

In accordance with the above understanding, we should adopt a policy of actively participating in the Geneva Conference, of enhancing diplomatic and international activities, in order to undermine the policy of blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations by the US imperialists, and of promoting the relaxation of the tense international situation. Even though the United States will try everything possible to sabotage reaching all kinds of agreements favorable to the cause of peace, we should still go all out at the Geneva Conference to strive for some agreements, even agreements only temporary [in nature] and limited [in scope], so as to open the path to resolving international disputes through discussions and negotiations by the big powers.

(2) Regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korea question, our side should tightly adhere to the slogan of peaceful unification, national independence, and free elections, and oppose [Republic of Korea President] Syngman Rhee's [policy of] armed unification, the US-South Korea treaty of defense, and the so-called free elections held when the people have no freedom at all...

(3) Regarding Indochina... we must try our best to make sure that the Geneva Conference will not end without any result; even [if] no agreement can be reached, we still should not allow the negotiations for restoring peace in Indochina to be undermined completely, and should create a situation characterized by "negotiating while fighting," thus increasing

the difficulties inside France and the contradictions between France and America, so that it will be beneficial for the people in Indochina to carry out struggles for liberation. ... On the specific questions related to restoring peace in Indochina, an on-site ceasefire is not as good as a division along a demarcation line between the south and north, such as the 16th parallel. However, only through many struggles can such a favorable situation be achieved.

(4) The agenda of the Geneva Conference is set for discussing the Korea and Indochina questions, but it does not exclude discussion of other specific questions possibly to be raised [at the conference]. At the conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favorable to relaxing the tense international situation. ... Therefore, apart from the Korea and Vietnam questions, we must prepare other materials and opinions concerning China, the Far East, and peace and security in Asia. In particular, [we must prepare for] effusive measures toward the development of economic relations, trade exchanges between various countries, and for further relaxing the tense international situation and breaking up the blockade and embargo by the US imperialists. Outside the conference, the mutual relations between China and Britain, China and France, and China and Canada will be touched upon, and we should make some preparations in this respect.



DOCUMENT No. 3

Telegram, PRC Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian to the PRC Foreign Ministry, Zhou Enlai and the CCP Central Committee, "Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side," 6 March 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048. P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)

Foreign Ministry, and Report to Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee:

I called upon [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov this afternoon, conveying to him the preliminary opinions of and preparation work on our side for the Geneva Conference. He says that all opinions are very good, and he will forward them to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the [Soviet] Foreign Ministry for discussion. He also welcomes the delegations from China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam to visit Moscow in mid-April, to have discussions and consultations on various issues before (the Geneva Conference). Concerning Ho Chi Minh's plan to visit Moscow, he will report to the Central Committee immediately and will then give us a reply.



The 1954 Geneva Conference (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

During the conversation, Molotov touched upon several questions, and they can be used as reference for us at home.

- (1) At the Geneva Conference, apart from discussing the Korea and Vietnam questions, should such questions as relaxing tensions in Asia (including the Taiwan question, opposition to rearming Japan, and opposition to the US-Pakistan pact) also be discussed? He says that these issues should be considered.
- (2) Concerning plans for settling the Korea issue, should the issue of North Korea and South Korea "organizing a provisional government for the whole of Korea on the basis of equal rights" be raised? This should be given further consideration. He says that prior to 1950 the Soviet Union had used [the principle of] "on the basis of equal rights" with regard to the German question, but has not used it since then. This is because this statement is likely to cause many new and difficult problems. He says that he has heard that [Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Prime Minister] Kim Il Sung does not welcome free elections.
- (3) Concerning the participation of foreign ministers from various countries, this [issue] was not clearly defined by the Berlin Conference. Molotov has consulted with several foreign ministers, and they have shown an interest in attending the conference. But they have attached a condition to this: it is possible that they may only attend the conference's opening ceremony, or may attend only part of the conference.
- (4) At the Geneva Conference, the countries which will be invited to participate in discussions of the Korea question have been agreed upon by all in advance. However, the countries which should be invited to participate in discussions of the Indochina question have not been worked out. It is likely that there will be disputes on this issue. As to whether India should be invited, Molotov says that he is not interested in this matter at the moment, as India's participation may weaken the role played by China at the Geneva Conference.
- (5) Concerning the organization of the conference, according to [United Nations (UN) Secretary General

Dag] Hammarskjold, the institution of the United Nations can be used. However, Molotov emphasizes that the United Nations should not be allowed to get involved and that members of various delegations should be able to use their own institutions, just like the situation during the Berlin Conference.

- (6) Molotov says that the Soviet Union will start the preparatory work in the near future, and those involved will probably include [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko, [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov, [Soviet Foreign Ministry Collegium Member Nikolai T.] Fedorenko, and [K.V.] Novikov, head of the Southeast Asian Department [of the Soviet Foreign Ministry].
- (7) Concerning the procedure question of the conference, he believes that there will be many disputes over it after the beginning of the conference.
- (8) Comrade Molotov will ask Comrade Gromyko and others to make presentations to us on matters needing attention in attending an international conference.

Zhang Wentian
6 March [1954]



DOCUMENT No. 4

Draft Memorandum, "A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina," Prepared by the Vietnam Group of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Geneva Conference, 4 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00055-04; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

In order to end the war in Indochina, to restore the national independence and rights of freedom of the peoples in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to establish lasting peace in Indochina, a comprehensive solution on restoring peace in Indochina is presented here as follows:

- (1) The two sides involved in activities of hostility in Indochina have agreed to an armistice. In order to implement the armistice and to guarantee its stability for the purpose of further restoring peace in Indochina, the two sides agree that negotiations should be held immediately, and necessary and proper adjustment will be made to the current zones of military operations.
- (2) The United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China will jointly guarantee:
 - (a) That from the day of the armistice, no combat plane, armored vehicle, weapons or ammuni-

tion, other military materials, or any armed force and military personnel should be allowed to enter Indochina.

- (b) No measures should be taken to harm the implementation of the armistice in Indochina.
- (3) Within six months after the armistice, all foreign navy, ground force and air force, and military personnel should complete withdrawal from Indochina.
 - (4) The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the government of the State of Vietnam, the resistance government of Laos and the government of the Kingdom of Laos, the Committee for National Liberation of Cambodia and the government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, with the participation of democratic parties and organizations in the three countries, should establish a provisional joint committee, which should be in charge of the preparatory work for achieving peaceful unification, national independence, and democracy and freedom in the three countries in Indochina. The tasks of the provisional joint committee should be:
 - (a) To guarantee that the people in the three countries of Indochina [Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos] should be able to have the rights of democracy and freedom, including the right for all democratic parties to conduct activities freely in the whole territory of the three countries;
 - (b) To discuss and decide on plans for achieving disarmament in the whole of Indochina;
 - (c) To discuss and decide on plans for restoring transportation, trade, cultural relations in all of Indochina;
 - (d) To hold, respectively in each country, general elections in the whole of Indochina after the completion of the foreign troop withdrawal, and to establish a unified government in each country.
 - (5) The French government recognizes Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as three sovereign states with full independence; the three countries enjoy full power of self-determination in politics, economics, military [affairs], diplomacy, and culture.
 - (6) After the establishment of unified governments in the three countries in Indochina, they are entitled to carry out consultations and, in accordance with the desire of the people in the three countries, to form a Federation of Indochina.
 - (7) The unified governments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, sign agreements on economic, cultural, and technological cooperation with France for the purpose of developing the economic and cultural relations between the three countries in Indochina and France.



DOCUMENT No. 5

Telegram, Zhang Wentian to PRC Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong, Concerning the Soviet Suggestion on Propaganda Work at Geneva, 6 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-04; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Top secret

Comrade (Li) Kenong at the Foreign Ministry:

When Vice Minister of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov received me on the 3rd, he expressed the hope that our delegation at Geneva would make better efforts to carry out additional propaganda work and coordinate diplomatic activities for the purpose of expanding the influence of New China. Such work could include showing movies, organizing speeches, small-size exhibitions, and cultural performances. The Premier instructs that you should immediately consider work on this.

Zhang Wentian
6 April [1954]

**DOCUMENT No. 6**

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to CCP CC Chairman Mao Zedong, CCP CC Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee of the CCP, Concerning Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov's Conversation with Zhou Enlai about the Vietnam Issue, 23 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-08; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Top secret

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) Yesterday Malenkov, Molotov, [CPSU First Secretary Nikita S.] Khrushchev, and [CPSU Politburo member Mikhail A.] Suslov discussed the Vietnam question with Comrade Ding,¹ as well as me and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang] Jiaxiang.
 - (a) They express complete agreement to "Opinions on the situation in Indochina and our strategies and policies," and they believe that the opinions expressed in this document are all correct. Comrade Khrushchev emphasizes that the document should be made confidential, and that when explanations are made to our cadres, they should be conducted in a way that is as undis-



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006
Ambassador Lian Zhengbao, former director of the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivers the keynote.

guised as in the document, and should be made more skillfully.

- (b) The requests of Comrade Ding can be satisfied.
- (2) They agree to inform us about their opinion of China's draft constitution in four months.
- (3) Comrade Ding will return to Beijing in two days, and he hopes to go back to Vietnam immediately after meeting with the Chairman and Comrade Shaoqi.

Zhou Enlai
23 April 1954

1. *Editor's Note:* "Comrade Ding" is an alias for Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

**DOCUMENT No. 7**

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Speeches at the Conference and the Situation at the First Plenary Session, 26 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-01; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) We have agreed with the Soviet comrades in the last two days that we should let the Korean delegation speak first. Moreover, in their first speech the Korean delegation should present the plans to reunify Korea by peaceful means, withdraw all foreign troops, and oblige major countries (who are directly involved in the war) to ensure and help to bring about Korea's

peaceful reunification. China and the Soviet Union should, in turn, express their support for the Korean delegation's positions one day after they speak. Therefore, I should also make a comprehensive statement myself. Right now I am reorganizing the drafts of the opening speech and two statements supporting the Korean delegation, and making changes based on several suggestions from the Soviet comrades. We will also present the principles for an Asian peace charter. However, we will not emphasize the Indochina issue for the moment since we hope to concentrate on the Korean issue in the first discussion. It will also demonstrate that we are not the people who are eager to negotiate.

- (2) Regarding the issue of the chairman of the conference, we have already consulted with the Soviet Union and Britain in advance and decided that Thailand, the Soviet Union, and Britain should take the chair in turn. Thailand already acted as the interim chair when this afternoon's meeting started at 3:00 p.m. Afterwards, the United States proposed that the above three countries take turns as chair. It was instantly put to vote and adopted. The meeting was adjourned thereafter. This meeting took only 15 minutes. Speeches and discussion will start tomorrow.
- (3) Today Molotov introduced [British Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden to me at the meeting. He shook my hand and greeted me.

Zhou Enlai
26 April [1954]



DOCUMENT No. 8

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding a Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Eden, 1 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-03; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

Comrade Molotov invited me to meet with Eden yesterday afternoon, and we discussed the following questions:

(1) The Korean issue. There is no meeting today on 1 May, and the conference will reopen on 3 May. Only the Turkish and Thai delegations made speeches yesterday morning. The meeting was adjourned in less than thirty minutes. Eden suggested holding a restricted session and said that “[the members should be] the five of us plus North and South Korea.” Eden said that he had already talked to [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles about this, and he assumed that [French Foreign

Minister Georges] Bidault would not oppose it either. Molotov and I both agreed to hold the restricted session. We also asked what subjects would be specifically discussed in the restricted session. However, Eden did not answer this question. It is the British and Americans who are taking the initiative and sounding us out, and we should not react too positively except to agree to hold the meeting. Based on the general situation, I assume that Eden's proposal for a restricted session is related to Dulles' return to the US next week. Until now, no North Atlantic¹ country except Turkey has spoken yet to support Dulles during the discussion of the Korean issue. Although the United States fired many blanks on the Indochina issue, they could not scare anyone but themselves. The United States is attempting to form an alliance of invaders of Southeast Asia. However, Britain is still hesitating. On the other hand, France's request for more air support is being refused by Britain and the United States. In sum, it is now impossible for the United States to stop negotiations on the Indochina issue. Eisenhower's recent words showed his retreat and embarrassed Dulles. Therefore Dulles decided to run away [from the conference] and leave the problems to the Under Secretary of State, [General Walter Bedell] Smith. Eden said that Dulles had already decided to return to the US next week. Molotov responded that “it will increase the responsibilities of the four of us.” The current situation shows that Eden will stay, and so will Bidault since [French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States² Marc] Jacquet of the de Gaulle group and [French Foreign Ministry Political and Economic Affairs Assistant Director Roland Jacquin de] Margerie, who insists on the ending of the Indochina war, came to Geneva from France to pressure him. However, it is still not clear whether or not an agreement on the Korean issue can be reached.

(2) The Indochina issue. Eden said that “I will not use this as a condition for the issue of membership [of countries which should be invited to join the discussion], nor do I require you to answer me. I just want to ask if the Soviet and Chinese sides can push for the withdrawal of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu.” Molotov said: “It can be solved if you discuss this with the Vietnamese delegation.” I said: “It is better to have the two belligerent parties discuss this directly. The two belligerent parties in the Korean War used to discuss directly the issue of exchanging wounded and sick POWs before the armistice in Korea.” Regarding the issue of membership, I said: “Five countries have already been invited to join the discussions on the Indochina issue. It is odd that the decision on the invitation of related countries on both sides has not yet been made. Obviously someone is preventing both sides from attending the negotiations.” Eden said: “I am not preventing it.” It seems that it will take another two days to solve the problem of membership.

(3) The issue of Sino-British relations. When Molotov mentioned that China was complaining about unfairness in international affairs, Eden said: “Britain does recognize China. However, China does not recognize us.” I said: “It is not China which does not recognize Britain. It is Britain which does not

recognize us in the United Nations.” Eden said: “Britain is also dissatisfied with China on some [other] things, but I do not want to mention these things when we are dining together today.” Talking about the improvement of Sino-British relations, Eden said: “I brought the British Chargé in the People’s Republic of China, [Humphrey] Trevelyan here this time [to let him] meet with the Chinese delegation.” I said: “I also brought the Director of the Department of West European and African Affairs, Huan Xiang, here.” Eden said: “Well, we have some thoughts in common.” Trevelyan came to see us immediately after the meeting and had already arranged to invite Huan Xiang to dinner next week.

(4) The issue of British-American relations. Molotov said: “The United States is intentionally creating tensions, and it makes the American people very jittery. This kind of situation does not exist in the Soviet Union. I assume that Britain does not like that either.” Eden said: “Although the United States [government] talks a lot, the American people are peace-loving.” Molotov then said: “Britain is an influential country in the West, and shares the same language with the United States. Britain should not underestimate its role in improving relations between East and West.” Eden said: “You are flattering me. Industrial development in the United States exceeded ours after World War II. It also replaced Britain as the world’s leader. Although we are not jealous, the United States is too impatient.” Eden then cited a playwright [to the effect of]: “We have nothing in common with the United States except the same language.” I said: “Since the United States is not reconciled to the loss of China, it uses every means at its disposal to threaten and massacre people, especially the Chinese people. However, the Chinese people are not afraid of these threats. The American way of doing things only made its own people nervous.” Eden said: “The Americans have some reason to be dissatisfied. The Americans kindly helped China during its war against Japan. However, China repaid kindness with ingratitude.” I said: “The United States helped [Republic of China (ROC) President] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] oppress and kill Chinese people. How could it not lead to the resistance of the Chinese people?” Eden said: “In fact, the British loss in China was greater than that of the United States.” I said: “If we do accounts in history, Britain did not lose anything.”

(5) The issue of the Five Powers.³ Eden said that he does not care if it is Four or Five Powers, the subcommittee should be composed of seven countries. Molotov said: “This is a good attitude. However, some people do not want to talk about the Five Powers.”

Foreign journalists spread the rumor after the dinner that Eden had met with Dulles before his meeting with me. It was said that Dulles was very dissatisfied with Eden’s action. Trevelyan invited [PRC Vice Trade Minister] Lei Renmin for dinner last night. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the British Foreign Office, [Harold] Caccia, and the Assistant Under Secretary [for Foreign Affairs, William Dennis] Allen, were also present at the dinner. Trevelyan stated that three British trade organizations were willing to do busi-

ness with China. Lei said that the representatives of the three organizations could first come to meet with [the Chinese delegation] at Geneva in order to find out detailed information. Trevelyan agreed with him. Trevelyan also invited Lei to come to Britain and visit the industrial exhibition. The Indian ambassador to Switzerland [Yezdi D. Gundevia] came to see me yesterday morning and asked for information about the Geneva Conference.

Zhou

Enlai

1 May [1954]

1. *Editor’s Note:* The Chinese text literally says “North Atlantic,” probably referencing NATO.

2. *Editor’s Note:* The Associated States of Indochina were Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

3. *Editor’s Note:* The Five Powers were the UK, the US, France, the PRC, and the Soviet Union.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation of the First Plenary Session, 9 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-07; P5-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) The nine-country meeting¹ on discussing the Indochina issue was finally convened yesterday. Bidault took the lead to speak at the conference. The main points of his speech were to deny the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an opponent in the war and to regard it as a rebelling force. Bidault’s proposal, similar to the proposals that Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] used to deal with us [in the Chinese civil war], concentrated exclusively on a military ceasefire. Bidault also favored supervision by an international committee and a guarantee provided by the participants of the Geneva Conference. The essence of this proposal represented a preparatory step by the United States toward measures of collective security in Southeast Asia, and it is apparent that it had been made in accordance with America’s ideas. This proposal, of course, should not be treated as something that deserved further discussion and bargaining. But still it revealed the great role that America’s intrigues on intervention played for the warlike factions in France. This French proposal did not mention anything about the

political issue in Indochina. It is possible that Bidault intentionally left the political issue for Bao Dai at the next session, thus [allowing Bao Dai to] discuss it [while] pretending to be independent.

- (2) After Bidault's presentation, [DRV Foreign Minister] Comrade Pham Van Dong spoke, introducing the question of inviting the representatives of the two resistance governments in Laos and Cambodia to attend the conference. A debate immediately followed at the conference. For details [please see] the report of the Xinhua News Agency. Lastly, Eden, as the chair of the session, announced that the questions under debate should be left for discussion and solution outside of the conference.
- (3) Considering the situation of the debate at the conference today, it is not proper to raise again the question of asking the conference to listen to the opinions of the representatives of the two resistance governments of Laos and Cambodia at formal sessions. Therefore, I plan to convey the proposal [inviting the representatives of the two resistance government to Geneva] to the Soviet side by letter, and let the Soviet side put forward this question in discussions outside of the conference.
- (4) Comrade Pham Van Dong plans to speak next Monday, introducing the eight-point proposal that has already been prepared. In addition, a note on organizing a committee of supervision by neutral countries will be added to the conditions of ceasefire, so as to help the implementation of a ceasefire, as well as to counterbalance Bidault's proposal on international supervision. The discussion with the Soviet and Vietnamese friends after the session reached the decision that for now we will not name which countries should participate in the committee of supervision by neutral countries. When it becomes necessary we will propose that India, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia [be members of the committee]. If the other side insists that five members [of the committee] are needed, we may choose one more from Indonesia and Burma. We wait for the instruction by the Central Committee whether or not such a proposal is proper.
- (5) The whole text of the French proposal is as follows. (omitted)

Zhou Enlai
9 May 1954

1. *Editor's Note:* The "nine-country meeting" is the Geneva Conference itself.



DOCUMENT No. 10

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Reply to Zhou Enlai's 9 May 1954 Telegram, 9 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-07; P8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Comrade [Zhou Enlai]:

The telegram of May 9 [above] has been received. We agree to adding one note on organizing a committee of supervision by neutral countries to the conditions of ceasefire; we also agree with your opinion concerning how the committee should be composed.

Central Committee
9 May 1954, 12:00 a.m.



DOCUMENT No. 11

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Second Plenary Session, 12 May 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) There is no session on the 9th (Sunday). The specific proposals raised by Comrade Pham Van Dong in his comprehensive presentation at the first plenary session on the 8th have caught the attention of many. The English language text of Pham's presentation has been dispatched to Beijing. At one point, the spokesperson of the French delegation rejected the proposal on the afternoon of the 8th. However, on the 11th, he took it back and said that the proposal should not be completely rejected. At the second session on the Indochina issue, convened on the 10th, [the fact] that Pham Van Dong took the initiative to raise the issue of sick and wounded prisoners has produced much impact. Eden and Smith spoke in support of Bidault's proposal, contending that it should be taken as the basis of further discussion. Although Eden's tone was relatively moderate, he still favored stationing military forces by dividing zones and taking measures to guarantee a ceasefire. Smith followed Dulles's stance as expressed in the statement of the

7th and threatened to do everything possible to support France and the three countries in Indochina in resisting outside “aggression.” He also supported France’s proposal for a ceasefire and favored effective international supervision. However, he only said that he had noticed France’s point on guaranteeing a ceasefire by participants of the Geneva conference, and did not make a clearer statement [about this]. Smith also stressed that the United States was willing to help the development of collective security in Southeast Asia. Toward the end of the session, the representative of [State of Vietnam Chief (*Quoc Truong*)] Bao Dai stated that the release of sick and wounded prisoners should not be restricted to French prisoners but should also include prisoners of [the State of] Vietnam. Pham Van Dong had no time to make a response then. After the session, the spokesperson of the Vietnamese delegation issued a statement to the effect that the releasing of sick and wounded prisoners would also include prisoners from Bao Dai’s [troops]. I plan to make a comprehensive presentation to support Pham Van Dong’s proposals and to rebut Bidault’s proposal at the third session on Indochina this afternoon. The presentation notes were completed on the night of the 9th, and were agreed to by the Soviet side on the 10th. After repeated revision of the language and text, the notes have been finalized.

- (2) [*Excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs*]

Zhou Enlai
12 May 1954, 12:00 p.m.



DOCUMENT No. 12

**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Plenary Session, 14
May 1954**

[*Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-08; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.*]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(I) The British and French delegations spoke for the first time yesterday at the tenth session regarding the Korean issue. Bidault and Eden not only reacted to our criticism, but also defended the United Nations and affirmed their positions to the United States. In addition, Bidault made detailed proposals. He emphasized two things:

(1) The unified government must be proportionally elected based on the number of citizens in both North and South

Korea;

(2) The elections must be monitored and certified by observers from neutral nations who have supervisory authority. The selection of members for the international supervisory body should be based on the most balanced conditions in order to guarantee the objectivity of their opinions. Only United Nations organizations are eligible to choose such observers. Elections as well as the withdrawal or movement of [foreign] troops should also be placed under international supervision. In his speech, Bidault attacked the [North] Korean and Soviet delegations by name. However, he did not refer to China.

Eden said that the POW issue had already been resolved (we plan to let our spokesman denounce this declaration in a written statement). Afterwards he referred to the British attitude toward the Asian issue. Eden disagreed with the argument concerning “the tendency of Western countries to ignore or oppose Asian nationalist sentiment.” He boasted that India and Pakistan both decided to stay in the British Commonwealth of their own free will. Eden made five proposals on the Korean issue:

1. Elections must be held. It is necessary to establish an all-Korean government.
2. Elections should consider the population distribution in both North and South [Korea].
3. Elections should be based on universal adult suffrage and confidential ballots. [Elections] should be held as soon as possible under conditions of true freedom.
4. The international supervision under the United Nations should be conducted by countries that are acceptable to this conference.
5. Conditions that will enable foreign troops to withdraw should be created. The United Nations forces will withdraw after they achieve the establishment of peace and security in Korea.

The main issues of Eden’s statement were international supervision, elections based on the distribution of population, and the subject of how to withdraw foreign troops. However, his speech was ambiguous. It is obvious that he is attempting to bargain with us.

(II) After yesterday’s meeting, Eden took the initiative in sounding us out through his secretary. He proposed coming to see me this morning at the villa. I agreed to see him. I have already consulted with the Soviet delegation about how to deal with him. I will report the result of the meeting later.

Zhou Enlai
14 May 1954, 10:00 a.m.



DOCUMENT No. 13

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 14 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00091-02; P2-8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Location: Premier Zhou's Residence

British Participants: Anthony Eden, [British Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Administration] Harold Caccia, William D. Allen, [British Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing] Humphrey Trevelyan, Ford (interpreter)

Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, [PRC Foreign Ministry West European and African Affairs Department Director] Huan Xiang, [PRC Geneva Conference Delegation Chief of Translation and Interpretation] Zhang Wenjin, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Eden: Thank you for allowing me to come to visit you. I have not had the opportunity to talk with you. Today I came to see you before my visit with Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov, mainly to discuss with you as co-chairman how the conference should be carried on. I am more concerned with the Indochina issue. I am afraid that it is dangerous for everybody to be delivering speeches accusing each other. Therefore, I suggest that we have some restricted sessions to get down to actual negotiations. I have raised five questions. If you think these five questions are valid, then we can discuss them in the restricted sessions. If you think that these questions are not valid, I wonder whether there are other ways to conduct our talks.

Zhou Enlai: At the beginning of the conference, both sides need to state their positions. On the Korean question, if all sides have a common wish for the peaceful reunification of Korea, then the issue could be resolved peacefully. The Chinese delegation supports the proposal by [DPRK] Foreign Minister Nam Il. We are currently studying the five questions that you raised yesterday. On the Korean question, we have tried a restricted session, and we can try some more.

Eden: I'm more concerned with the Indochina question, for at least we are no longer fighting in Korea. But I agree with what you have said about trying another restricted session on the Korean question. The reason why I am concerned with the Indochina question is not because of some local problems—I'm not familiar with these problems—but because I'm afraid that the major powers would insist on their positions



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

Scholars Balazs Szalontai (Hungary) and Sergey Radchenko (LSE) discuss newly declassified documentary evidence.

on the Indochina question, which would lead to international dangers.

Zhou Enlai: China has stated its opinion regarding the Indochina question. As you know, we support the proposal by Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, because we believe that the proposal is comprehensive. On the Indochina question, many people want peace, but some people want to continue the war. That would lead to dangers. On this point, Mr. Eden, you know more than I do.

Eden: So far as I know, everyone wishes that the war would cease.

Zhou Enlai: Of the five questions that you raised, we are not exactly clear about one question, and that is the one regarding the concentration of all troops on both sides in pre-determined areas. I would like to ask you to explain it.

Eden: I am willing to discuss it. Our thought is to concentrate the troops on both sides in pre-determined areas so as to avoid conflicts. These areas shall be worked out by commanders-in-chief on both sides, and then approved by our conference. This is for the purpose of avoiding conflicts.

Zhou Enlai: As I have said before, the solution to the Indochina question must be fair, reasonable and honorable for both sides. We believe that in its present position, the United Kingdom could do some more work to make both sides understand that the negotiations must be conducted on an equal basis. The current circumstances are that the other side does not think this way, and wants to impose some things on this side.

- Eden: Where do you find inequality?
- Zhou Enlai: In that the French have not discussed the political questions of the military armistice.
- Eden: Oh, you are referring to this question. On this point, both sides have some accusations.
- Zhou Enlai: No, I am not referring to that. I meant that France had not answered Mr. Pham Van Dong's political proposal, while only recognizing Bao Dai as representing all of Vietnam and unifying Vietnam under him. This is a completely unreasonable thought.
- Eden: France would like to let the members of the Associated States speak first. My understanding is that France might speak first this afternoon. We hope to achieve military armistice first and then discuss the political questions. Perhaps military armistice can be the first practical question to be discussed in the restricted sessions. The restricted sessions perhaps could be held next week, for the general debate will be continued this afternoon.
- Zhou Enlai: Regarding the proposal for restricted sessions, we will have to discuss this with the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations.
- Eden: Certainly, certainly.
- Zhou Enlai: I would like to know what your plans are for the restricted sessions.
- Eden: I am thinking that besides the heads of the delegations, the sessions would consist of only two or three advisors from each delegation. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. We tried this method during the Berlin Conference, and it was very useful. The agreement to have the Geneva Conference was reached this way.
- Zhou Enlai: I would like to add something. China wants peaceful co-existence with all of its Asian neighbors. The recent agreement that China signed with India on trade in Tibet is sufficient to demonstrate this point. In the preamble, China and India stated mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, reciprocity on an equal basis, and peaceful co-existence.
- Eden: Right.
- Zhou Enlai: On the Korean question, we have also proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops, including the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Only so can peace and security be guaranteed.
- Eden: I would like to say a few things as the British Foreign Secretary. We very much hope to see the four great powers, excuse me, I made a mistake. We very much hope to see the five great powers, that is, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, and the Soviet Union, work together to decrease international tensions and to conduct normal negotiations. But before this can be achieved, a resolution must be reached on the Indochina question. Indochina is important in itself, but what is more important is that this question not affect the relations among the five great powers.
- Zhou Enlai: China deserves the status of a great power. This is an existing fact. We are willing to work with others for world peace, particularly for peace in Asia. But I must say candidly that this must not be made a condition.
- Eden: No, I am not saying that it should be made a condition at all. I am only stating my opinion regarding this question. I am worried that Ho Chi Minh might be asking too much. He might be able to get it, but if he were to do so, it would affect the relations for the great powers.
- Zhou Enlai: I think that the person who is asking too much is not Ho Chi Minh but Bao Dai. In their proposal, the delegates from the State of Vietnam not only asked that Bao Dai be recognized as the only leader of Vietnam, but also that the United Nations guarantee Bao Dai's status as Vietnam's only leader after the elections. Ho Chi Minh has made no such demands.
- Eden: What I was thinking just now is not the contents of the speech, but the thoughts behind the speech.
- Zhou Enlai: I wonder if Mr. Eden has studied the proposal by Mr. Pham Van Dong. He mentioned in the proposal that before unification, both sides separately manage the areas currently under their respective control. This is equitable.
- Eden: Our hope to concentrate the troops of both sides into determined areas means exactly this. It seems that the French proposal does not reject this point, and thus we have something in common with France on this point.
- Zhou Enlai: France asked Bao Dai's representative to respond to the political section in Mr. Pham Van Dong's proposal. But his response was absurd. His response is very familiar to us. Jiang Jieshi once made such a demand: one government, one leader, one army, and the rest are all to be eliminated. I believe that Mr. Allen and Mr. Trevelyan would be fully familiar with these. But we all know how Jiang Jieshi wound up.
- Eden: Our wish is to reach military armistice first, and then discuss the political issues. The question of armistice could be the first practical point for discussion in the restricted sessions.
- Zhou Enlai: Political issues must be discussed along with military armistice at the same time.
- Eden: I would like to thank you again for allowing me to come to visit you. If you think there is any-

thing I can do for you, I would come to visit again.

Zhou Enlai: We welcome you. If you welcome me, I will go to visit you.

Eden: Welcome. I would also like to thank you for sending your staff to talk with Mr. Trevelyan. They had a very good talk, and they both felt satisfied.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Trevelyan raised some questions during his talk with Mr. Huan Xiang, many of which can be resolved. In a few days, Mr. Huan Xiang will have a talk with Mr. Trevelyan again.

Eden: That would be great.

Zhou Enlai: We should both work to improve Sino-British relations.

Eden: Yes, and then we should bring other countries along, too.

Zhou Enlai: Yes! (pointing to Eden)

Eden: Right, that would be my task. Now I will go to meet with Mr. Molotov. I don't know if we can come up with some good ideas after our talk.



DOCUMENT No. 14

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Requesting Instructions on the Korean Issue and Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Plenary Session on the Indochina Issue, 15 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-09; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Eden came to see me in the morning yesterday. He mostly wanted to gauge my opinion on the Indochina issue and said that he hoped to hold a restricted session. I did not answer his five questions on the Indochina issue directly except to give my support to Pham Van Dong's proposals. I simply asked him indirectly to explain what he meant by "all forces should be concentrated in the determined areas." He said that it meant that troops of both sides should be withdrawn to areas determined by their respective commanders, and that this plan should then be ratified by the Geneva Conference. I therefore perceived that Britain does have a plan to delimit [the country]. However, it is still not clear that the British want to delimit [the country] between North and South, or to handle Haiphong differently. Nevertheless, it is obvious that France and the United States do not want to withdraw from the Red River Delta. I have already cabled the summary of my conversation with Eden separately. I agreed to hold a restricted session after consulting with the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese delegations.

(2) Molotov spoke first at the fourth session on the



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

Conference participant James G. Hershberg (GWU)

Indochina issue this afternoon. He attacked both Bidault's misrepresentation of history and Bao Dai's legal status, and supported Pham Van Dong's statement on anti-colonial rule and colonial war. The main point of Molotov's speech was to make the commission of neutral nations' supervision of the armistice a supplementary proposal. He said that he could not completely agree to the international guarantee stated in France's proposal. Specifically, he agreed to guarantee jointly collective consultation and collective action, but refused to agree to individual actions. Please refer to TASS's broadcasts to see the full text of Molotov's speech. Bidault and the Laotian delegation also made speeches at the session. Bidault still behaved like a colonialist. He refused to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expressed his support of Bao Dai and the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. Although Bidault still repeated his unreasonable arguments, his tone was relatively milder than on the two previous occasions he spoke. He accepted Pham's basic position on peace, independence, unification and democracy. However, he said that all these had already been accomplished. Bidault also responded one by one to Pham Van Dong's eight proposals, besides explaining three of his own. Bidault said that France had already recognized Vietnam's autonomy and independence throughout the country as well as the independence of Cambodia and Laos. Cambodia and Laos had already signed agreements with France and became members of the federation. Therefore, Pham Van Dong's first and fourth points became unnecessary. Concerning Pham's second point, Bidault said that French troops in a country which is an ally of France cannot be considered as typical "foreign" troops. However, France, on the advice of interested governments, should be prepared to recall its own forces if invading troops will also be withdrawn. Bidault believed that the Laos and Cambodia issues could be resolved simply by withdrawing the Viet Minh troops. However, he argued that in discussions the Laos and Cambodia issues should be separated from the Vietnam issue. Regarding Pham's third point, Bidault said

that elections must be supervised. A political solution will only be possible after a military settlement. The process of negotiating a political solution will only delay the implementation of a military settlement. On Pham's fifth point, Bidault stated that since Vietnam had already consulted with France about the economic and cultural interests of France in Vietnam, these would never be conditions [to concluding hostilities].

Bidault agreed to the sixth and seventh points that Pham had raised. On the eighth point, Bidault said that 8(a) was ambiguous since it did not clarify whether or not the agreement on political conditions should be reached before the armistice. He emphasized that the ceasefire in Vietnam should be extended gradually from one region to another to reach a complete armistice. Bidault stated that Pham's proposals on concentration areas (for stationing troops) and readjustment areas were basically the same as the first point of the first section of the French proposal. Regarding the armistice in Laos, Bidault believed that it wouldn't be a problem as long as the Viet Minh withdrew its troops. He pointed out that 8(b), on transporting weapons across the border, needed additional and clearer regulations. On 8(c), on the issue of supervision, Bidault believed that international supervision is essential. Bidault also said that it was obvious that the Soviet delegation made the same argument in their speeches. He then proposed to disarm the irregular forces and once again raised the issue of the guarantee [of all these agreements] ensured by participants of the Geneva Conference. The speech of the Cambodian delegation still focused on the same old story of the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops. It was announced at the end that there would be no meeting on the 15th, and a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held next Monday.

(3) In yesterday's meeting, Molotov took the initiative and proposed to let the commission of neutral nations supervise the armistice. His speech had a great impact on the meeting and was believed to have carried the meeting one step forward. Eden's visits to the Chinese and Soviet delegations and the agreement on holding a restricted session on the Indochina issue were also regarded as real progress. Thus the general discussion of the last three weeks finished. Discussions on substantial problems will start next week.

(4) The Chinese and Soviet delegations exchanged opinions on the Indochina issue after the meeting. We also decided to prepare to discuss on the 15th and 16th the commonalities and differences in both sides' plans. We will also discuss what part can be agreed to and what part should be held or worked on. I will report the result after the discussions.

(5) After the meeting between the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations, we concluded that the current situation on the Korean issue is this: it will come to a deadlock if our counterparts cannot make new proposals except to emphasize repeatedly elections based on the distribution of populations under the supervision of the United Nations, and the withdrawal of the United Nations forces after achieving peace and security in Korea. As the next steps, we plan to make a compromise on the international supervision of elections. We will agree to

let neutral nations supervise the elections, but not the United Nations. In addition, we will also emphasize two things: first, although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission [NNSC]¹ should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. This compromise can carry the meeting one step forward. However, we presume that our counterparts will make no concessions on the issue of equal rights. We plan to let the Chinese delegation propose this compromise. We would like to request the Central Committee's instructions on whether or not to raise the issue of the neutral nations supervising the Korean elections and also on how to raise this issue.

Zhou Enlai
15 May 1954

1. *Editor's Note:* The NNSC, comprised of officers from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, was created to monitor and ensure compliance with the Korean War Armistice Agreement.



DOCUMENT No. 15

Telegram, Reply from the CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai's Telegrams of 15 May [and] 17 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-09; P5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Comrade Enlai:

Received your telegram of 15 May. Regarding our next steps on the Korean issue, after discussion, we agree to your suggestions. Specifically, that we should let neutral nations supervise the elections, not the United Nations. In addition, that we should also emphasize two things: first, that although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, that the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission] should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. If the Soviet and Korean sides believe that it is appropriate to let the Chinese delegation make this suggestion, then the Chinese side should do so.

CCP Central Committee
17 May 1954

DOCUMENT No. 16

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Second Restricted Session, 19 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) The second restricted session on Indochina, held yesterday [18 May], devoted all its time to the discussion on whether the question concerning Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. The United States, Britain, and France and three... [original unreadable] countries stood together to emphasize that the Cambodia and Laos questions should be dealt with separately from the Vietnam question. There are no French troops in Cambodia and Laos, so only after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese People's Army will the issue be resolved. We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov, and I all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore an armistice means that a ceasefire should occur on the territory of their own motherlands. There exists no such "issue" of withdrawing from Cambodia and Laos. Peace should be restored in all of Indochina, and peace should not just be restored in Vietnam. The questions involving the three countries cannot be discussed by separating them. The two sides debated for three hours and [the session] was adjourned without any result. The other side attempts to use this issue as the first issue to test our attitude. Before the end of the meeting, Molotov as chair [of the session] proposed that next day the Korea issue should be discussed. However, Eden said that he was afraid that an impression would be created that the discussion on the Indochina issue failed immediately after its beginning, so he contended that discussion should be continued on the Indochina issue on the 19th. Our side has agreed to this.
- (2) In the previous several days the other side has used the sick and wounded soldiers at Dien Bien Phu as a means for political blackmail and has conducted a series of slanderous propaganda [activities]. To deal with this, [DRV Ambassador to the PRC] Hoang Van Hoan hosted a press conference on the 18th to publicize the facts and to expose the plots of the other side. Then the French delegation was questioned [on this issue] at a press conference it hosted. In particular, [the fact] that the French military resumed bom-

bardment on the 18th and killed fifteen French prisoners has caused heated repercussions. Consequently, *Pravda* has published commentaries about this in the past few days. We are also organizing the reporters of the Xinhua News Agency to cooperate in our propaganda [efforts] and expose [the French]. In the propaganda battle, so long as we are able to command the material in a timely manner, we should be able to expose continuously the plots of the other side and to master the initiative.

- (3) The French delegation has appointed a person to contact the Vietnamese delegation. The contact will begin today.

Zhou Enlai
19 May 1954



DOCUMENT No. 17

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Third Restricted Session, 20 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-13; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) On the 19th, the restricted session on the Indochina issue continued to discuss whether the Cambodia and Laos questions should be dealt with separately. After three hours of debate, no progress was achieved. Bidault proposed that the Cambodia and Laos questions be discussed by a committee appointed by the whole conference, yet he also stated that he did not intend to regard the resolution of the Cambodia and Laos questions as a precondition to a resolution of the Vietnam question. I pointed out that a ceasefire needed to be carried out throughout Indochina, and that I would not agree to a separation of the Cambodia and Laos questions from the Vietnam question. Before yesterday's session Eden proposed to Molotov that the meeting be adjourned on the 20th for activities outside of the conference, that the restricted session on the Indochina issue be resumed on the 21st, and that the plenary session on the Korea issue be held on the 22nd. Our side agreed to this plan. There is a rumor [going around] that Eden and Bidault plan to make a trip back to Britain and France during the weekend.
- (2) On the Korea issue I plan to take the lead in speaking on the question of having neutral countries supervise the election. The speech notes have been drafted and are in the process of revision. The other side has not

introduced any plan for resolving the Korea issue. Probably they are discussing with Syngman Rhee and are waiting for Rhee's response.

- (3) I plan to pay a return visit to Eden on the morning of the 20th. The result of the conversation will be reported separately.

Zhou Enlai
20 May 1954



DOCUMENT No. 18

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Restricted Session, 22 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-15; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) At the restricted session on Indochina yesterday our side insisted that the Cambodia and Laos questions should not be dealt with separately. As a result of the discussion, the other side agreed to two points:
- a. First, to discuss the general principles regarding a ceasefire throughout the entire territory of Indochina related to the three countries, and then discuss the implementation of these principles, namely, how the questions concerning each of the three countries will be taken care of.
 - b. The discussion will begin with the first and fifth clauses of the French proposal as well as the first item in clause eight of the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, although other suggestions can be considered at the same time.

After back-and-forth discussion, Molotov, as chair of the session, in summarizing the opinions of all, put forward five main issues as follows:

1. The question of achieving a ceasefire in the whole territory of Indochina.
2. The question of [defining] zones for troop concentration.
3. The question of whether or not to allow troops and ammunition to be imported from outside of the region.
4. The question of having an international institution supervise the implementation of the agreements.
5. The question of guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov also stated that if there were questions apart from the above five, they could also be raised for dis-

ussion. Laos and Cambodia continuously insisted upon their uniqueness. Bidault proposed to establish a special committee to draw up agendas, and our side immediately expressed disagreement to this. Eden raised the question of the representatives of the military commands of the two sides dispatching representatives to Geneva, and Pham Van Dong stated that this conference should only discuss matters of principles, and that the concrete issues could be discussed by the commanders of the two sides on site, although the representative of any country might call upon his own military advisors for providing assistance to his work, and this question would be discussed continuously next week.

- (2) On the 20th Eden already expressed the willingness to search for compromise while having dinner together with Molotov. On the 21st, the other side made a step toward compromise on the agenda issue. However, they will be persistent with regard to the question of dealing separately with Cambodia and Laos. After the session, the Western press was of the opinion that the conference had made progress. They said that the Cambodia and Laos questions had been tabled, but the reality is that they made concession on the procedures of discussion on this issue.
- (3) Regarding the question of arranging a ceasefire and zones for troop concentration, on what principles (and their scopes) should be determined here, and how the discussions here and the discussions by the commanders on site should be defined, we will work out a plan and then report it to the Central Committee.
- (4) Regarding the plenary session on the Korea question today, it is our prediction that the other side will put forward the issue of having the United Nations supervise the election and the issue of "the Chinese communists withdrawing first." So I plan to take the initiative to speak first, breaking up [the plot of the other side] by raising the point of having the neutral countries supervise the elections throughout all of Korea. Bidault returned to Paris on the evening of the 21st, and Eden will be returning to England today. [Indian Delegation to the United Nations Chief V.K. Krishna] Menon will be arriving here today, and I am preparing to have a meeting with him.

Zhou Enlai
22 May 1954



DOCUMENT No. 19

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eighth Restricted Session, 30 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) At the restricted session on the Indochina issue yesterday, the three-point proposal concerning the meeting between the representatives of the two military commands at Geneva (see previous telegram [not printed]) was passed.
- (2) During the discussion, the other side continuously stressed that they preserved their own different opinions toward the Laos and Cambodia issue, stating that “the concentration of formal forces in Vietnam should not be detrimental to the political and economic integrity of Vietnam.” [US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell] Smith particularly stated that the conference should have the right to make new decisions over the proposals put forward by the military representatives of the two sides on the Vietnam and Laos questions.
- (3) Pham Van Dong pointed out in his presentation that for the purpose of reaching a ceasefire it was absolutely necessary to adjust zones, and he exposed that America’s opposition to division of zones and America’s emphasis upon unification were actually excuses used for its attempt to block progress of the conference. Pham requested that the conference adopt our comprehensive proposal, as the conference would have to achieve agreement on the general principles concerning terminating all hostile activities. Pham also explained the importance of the on-site contact between the military representatives of the two sides, taking the on-site agreement reached at Dien Bien Phu on the issue of retrieving sick and wounded soldiers as an example. He pointed out that, despite the fact that the other side unilaterally tore up the agreement and bombarded Route 41, due to the efforts of our side, altogether 858 wounded soldiers (of 21 nationalities) of the French Expeditionary Army had been retrieved by 28 May. Thus Pham delivered a satisfactory explanation on the wounded soldiers issue at the conference.
- (4) Molotov affirmed in his presentation the items on which the conference had reached agreement to a different degree. He began with explaining that the first step toward restoring peace in Indochina should be that all troops of both sides in the confrontation should stop fighting simultaneously throughout all

of Indochina, and that this was the exact spirit of the communique from the [1954] Berlin Conference and the task of this conference. Molotov explained the six points—point by point—introduced in my comprehensive proposal, and expressed his support to them.

- (5) Toward the end of the discussion, as a resolution was about to be passed, Smith outrageously stated: “The government of the United States authorizes me neither to accept nor to object to the principles of the British proposal.” And he also said that he reserved the right to explain to the press the attitude of the US delegation. However, because the atmosphere in the conference hall favored passing the resolution, and also because Molotov’s handling of the session was very good, Smith’s statement only embarrassed himself and also revealed contradictions between Britain and the United States. Eden expressed then and there that he was not happy with Smith’s statement.

Zhou Enlai
30 May 1954



DOCUMENT No. 20

Minutes, Director of the Staff Office of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Bingnan’s Meeting with President of the International Federation on Human Rights Joseph Paul-Boncour, 30 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-03; P1-7. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 30 May 1954, 5:30 p.m.

Location: Gleystt Mansion (Home of Paul-Boncour’s mother-in-law)

Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Paul-Boncour, [Counselor to the French delegation, Colonel] Jacques Guillermaz, and [French Ambassador to Switzerland] Jean Chauvel

- (1) Arrangement for Foreign Minister Zhou to meet Bidault

Paul-Boncour: I had a long conversation with Bidault after our last meeting. He expressed that since it is possible to meet, the earlier, the better (because he will probably attend the Congress of the Popular Republican Movement [*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*] soon). He suggested next Monday or Tuesday.

We are concerned about ways to keep the meeting secret.

If Foreign Ministers Zhou and Bidault invite each other and have dinner together, the Swiss security would know. All the Swiss policemen communicate through their network, and the information [about the meeting] would leak to the public. So our suggestion is that the two foreign ministers have a meeting after sunset, about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. in the evening. Therefore, the foreign ministers can have a long conversation. If they would like to, they could talk until midnight or even 1:00 am. Regarding their meeting location, we suggest this mansion. The mansion is close to where both foreign ministers are staying. It is convenient for all of us. There are no neighbors around so there won't be any disruptions from outside. [We'd like to know] if Foreign Minister Zhou agrees [with the arrangement].

Wang Bingnan: What is your security plan?

Paul-Boncour: If we use Swiss security guards, the information will leak. So we suggest Foreign Minister Zhou use his own bodyguards. They may come to the mansion about 9:00 p.m.

Wang Bingnan: How is Mr. Bidault coming here?

Paul-Boncour: He will come here himself. The Swiss security guards as usual will notice that he has left his place. They won't, however, know where he is going. During the conference hours, the Swiss security guards always escort [Bidault] as they do for all the heads of the delegations. But, outside conference hours, Bidault goes out quite often by himself. On Sundays, when his chef took time off, he and Chauvel went to the countryside by themselves and ate at local restaurants. If Foreign Minister Zhou wants to use the Swiss security guards, we don't have a problem. We just don't feel it is the best way.

Wang Bingnan: Has Mr. Bidault ever come to this place?

Paul-Boncour: He has never been here before. However, his wife has been here several times. I still have to repeat one of the points we discussed at the last meeting, that is, to keep the meeting absolutely secret before it starts. The two foreign ministers can decide themselves whether a press release or other documents may be necessary after their meeting.

(Chauvel arrived at this point.)

Chauvel: We can decide whether the Swiss security guards will come or not. If they don't come, they may just guess. If they do come, they will definitely know the whole arrangement. So it is better not to have them here.

Regarding the issue of who will attend the meeting from the delegations, the French participants will probably include Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz. We consider it proper not to have many participants from each delegation.

(After the meeting, Guillermaz said that it may be appropriate to add Paul-Boncour [to the list], since he is the host.)

Wang Bingnan: I will report all of your suggestions to the head of our delegation.

(2) The Issues at the Indochina Conference

Chauvel: At the last meeting, Mr. Molotov summarized and outlined the opinions from all sides. Mr. Smith suggested discussing the supervision issue only. The French delegation considers supervision a very complicated issue. If it can be resolved

first, the conference is certainly making good progress.

The two specific but important issues at the present are to reach a military agreement on troop regroupings, and to reach a political agreement on supervision. If these two problems are solved, other problems can be dealt with easily.

All of the six points proposed by the Chinese delegation should be discussed. We suggest discussing supervision, which we believe is a central issue. It doesn't mean that any other issues could not be discussed. If a positive result derives from the solution of the central issue, it will help the discussions on other issues.

We are very much impressed by the recent talks. Especially at the meeting yesterday—we saw genuine progress.

Wang Bingnan: I would also like to talk about our positions. We believe that:

1. The first task is to stop the bloodshed and resume peace in Indochina.
2. Different problems should be dealt with by adapting different methods.
3. Discussions must follow the importance of each issue and then decide which issue should go first.
4. A cease-fire can be achieved after all the issues are discussed satisfactorily.

The composition of the supervisory commission must be specifically discussed by both sides. We believe that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has two tasks:

1. Domestically, to prevent civil conflicts from occurring again.
2. Internationally, to stop entry of foreign troops and war materials into [the region].

We also have concerns about some specific problems of supervision. Our position is that a supervisory location can be identified either inland or in territorial waters to impose a supervision. In short, what we hope for is to establish effective supervision.

The nine nations attending the conference¹ should play a role in guaranteeing the implementation of the agreed settlement. A neutral nation should be among other proper nations besides these nine conference nations. The six points proposed by our Foreign Minister Zhou on the 27th are not for restoring a temporary peace in Indochina, but necessary for establishing a lasting peace in the region. This peace will benefit Asia, France, and the world. We have pointed out during the previous meeting that this war should not become complicated and internationalized. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that some French people intended to make the war more complicated by transferring the war issues to the United Nations. We believe that this doesn't fit into [serve] the national interests of France.

Mr. Pham Van Dong had said that France could still maintain its economic and cultural enterprises in Vietnam. After peace is reinstated, Vietnam will consider joining the French Union and build friendly relations with France.

The delegates from Laos and Cambodia also indicated that the Free Laos and Kampuchean Liberation Movements are not

strong forces. If this is true and their people support them, they won't worry any more after a peaceful order is established.

Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai stated that the United States had to accept a peace in Korea. It should not stop France from accepting peace now in Indochina. At the meeting yesterday, most of the delegates agreed to reach a settlement. It was said that the attitude of the American delegation would be neither supportive nor opposed. This is not helpful for the conference to reach an agreement.

Paul-Boncour: Please allow me to repeat to Mr. Chauvel what I said to Mr. Wang Bingnan at the last meeting. I had said that, if France was forced to accept terms that it had no way to cope with, it would have to ask for external assistance. After Dien Bien Phu fell, the situation changed drastically. If a similar incident takes place in Hanoi, France has no choice but to hand the war over willingly to the others in order to save the lives of its own people.

Chauvel: I am in full accord with what Mr. Wang Bingnan said. The tasks of the supervisory commission of the neutral nations are to prevent internal conflicts from re-occurring and prevent foreign troops and war materials from getting into the country. We also agree that locations for land and offshore supervision can be found, and the debates over the definition of a neutral state can be settled. According to Mr. Menon's activities at Geneva, he seems interested in this issue and has talked to the press about his opinions.

Mr. Zhou Enlai has a systematic view of the problems of Indochina. He said that each of the three member countries in the Associated States has its own characteristics. Mr. Bidault is not quite familiar with Mr. Zhou Enlai's points of view because they don't know each other. Since there is now an opportunity to exchange their opinions, hopefully Mr. Zhou Enlai can talk to Mr. Bidault about any issue.

At this conference France considers some of the countries as its friends. It must give enough attention to their opinions. It can't agree with any settlement they disagree with. Among these countries friendly to France is the United States. If the US distrusts the conference settlement, it will not endorse its implementation. This is dangerous. America's attitude toward the conference is not much different from that of France. But America attracts more suspicions. We should pay attention [to it].

Talking about handing over the war to others, there are two ways: handing it over to the left or to the right. If France hands the war over to the United States, then the other people will worry; if France hands it over to the other side, then the US will worry. It is the hope of France that solutions can be reached and agreed to by all sides. When we say to you that a certain problem will cause danger, please believe us, it is true. It must be avoided.

Wang Bingnan: A peaceful solution is beneficial for everyone. Handing the war over to the others doesn't fit into French national interests. We believe that our current efforts to strive for peace are justified. Problem solutions will arrive one by one. This has been proven by the agreement made yesterday—our efforts have achieved some success. As long as both

sides are sincere, the difficulties can be overcome. Our goal is to restore Indochina's peace. Our desire is to reach that goal through common efforts by all conference delegates. It is not our intention to exclude any nation from the conference agreement. We need to overcome the obstacles, instead of being disrupted by them. Any solution should be based upon a nation's own interest so that the result will bring about satisfaction.

With regard the discussions of the supervisory commission between Mr. Menon and our Foreign Minister Zhou, they did not touch the specific matters as far as I know. Who are these neutral nations besides the nine nations? What are the French suggestions?

Chauvel: I can't answer that question at this point. The French delegation will listen to the suggestions from all the delegations at the meeting tomorrow. Then, it will make its statements.

If there is any opportunity from now on, I hope to exchange our opinions anytime. I am very interested in China's issues. I lived in Beijing for three years and have been in charge of Asian affairs in Paris for five years.

1. *Editor's Note:* Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), France, Laos, the PRC, the State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA.



DOCUMENT No. 21

Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with Bidault, 1 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-01; P1-7. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 1 June 1954, 10:15 p.m. - 11:20 p.m.

Location: Gleystt Mansion

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Georges Bidault, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: We are sorry for arriving a little bit late.

Bidault: Thank you very much for coming. We can discuss the future of this conference together. By now the conference has entered a critical juncture. It can't be delayed, since [a delayed conference would] not bring any positive result.

I consider the following two specific issues need immediate solutions:

(1) The meetings of the military representatives from both high commands should determine the regrouping areas for their troops.

(2) The restricted sessions should arrive at an agreement on

the supervision issue.

Since there is no one else around, hopefully we can exchange our opinions sincerely on these two existing and imminent problems in order to reach our common goal—peace. I think that time is running out. If the quarrel continues, the situation [in Indochina] will get worse and will aggravate the international situation seriously. Thus, my desire is that the commanders quickly determine the areas on their maps within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped, and that the [restricted] sessions can reach an agreement on the supervision issue as soon as possible. The danger of a worsened situation could only be prevented by solving these problems. Nobody wants to see a deteriorating situation, but that is almost inevitable. I believe an enlarged war will hurt everyone.

Zhou Enlai: The reason for us to come to Geneva and attend the conference is to restore peace in Indochina. Our participation shall help make the conference a success, not cause its failure. As long as we have the same determination, the conference will make genuine progress toward a settlement. We are in the position to push the meeting forward. Hopefully solutions will soon develop to deal with these problems. Certainly it needs our common effort.

Mr. Bidault said a little while ago that the military representatives from both high command headquarters have met and discussed the troop regrouping. We consider such a direct meeting as the best way. Mr. Pham Van Dong pointed out in his proposal of 25 May that discussions on these specific matters can start as soon as the principle issues are settled. So far, the commanders from the two sides have been enabled to fully exchange their opinions. Both sides were separated in the past. They have established their contacts so it is now easier to solve the problems.

Mr. Bidault again mentioned a risk of the war's expansion. In our opinion, the war should be ended according to the interests of the Indochinese people and the national interests of France. Speaking as a neighboring state and for international affairs, we believe that the war can be ended and should be stopped. We should not anticipate a possible enlargement of the war.

If China can make any contribution to the conference at this stage, we must try our best to bring this war to an end and by all means prevent an internationalization of the war. Based upon Mr. Pham Van Dong's proposal, the opinions from both sides are approachable. The basic requests in his proposal do not go beyond the reality [on the ground]. He doesn't want to get from the conference table what he didn't get on the battleground.

In our opinion, the risk exists—America's intervention. It will hurt France, Indochina, and Southeast Asia; and will threaten the security of Asia and China. That is what we are concerned about.

Bidault: I am in full accord with Mr. Zhou Enlai's statement. The purpose for our coming to Geneva is to restore peace in Indochina. Nevertheless, we must recognize the fact that, if the conference fails, it is inevitable that the situation will take

a turn for the worse. We are a country with a long military tradition, and we don't like failure. Leaving aside America, our common interest [is] a need to end the Indochina war, and to eliminate all the possibilities for the war's expansion. Our desire is a reasonable settlement. But if we can't obtain this, I have to suggest to my government a *laissez-faire* policy. I believe that your government does not want to see this happen. Thus, we should think reasonably and realistically about the problems.

Zhou Enlai: I remember Mr. Bidault's statement that France shall achieve a glorious peace. We agree that a glorious peace can be achieved. The restoration of peace is glorious for both sides. So there is no need to mention the *laissez-faire* policy. Mr. Pham Van Dong emphasized in his speech that after Vietnam receives its independence, it will consider joining the French Union. In his proposal, Mr. Pham Van Dong also accepts the Bao Dai [regime]. These [statements] are based upon the spirit of mutual equality. Our expectation is that both sides can make their common efforts on an equal ground. The French people are peace-loving. To restore peace is the hope of the French people.

Bidault: As Mr. Zhou Enlai said, the French people love peace. We, however, have to live with our history and tradition. Hopefully, this is understood.

Currently, our specific requests are: (1) The two commands conclude their negotiations in a timely fashion on troop regrouping, otherwise the war will continue. (2) The conference soon reaches an agreement on the International Supervisory Commission issue in order to avoid additional delay.

Zhou Enlai: These two problems should be solved. With respect to your first issue, the military representatives from both sides have their meetings. Direct contacts are the most efficient approach. Regarding your second issue, the conference is discussing the problem, and it will be solved. What I am saying is that we should think about ways to reach an agreement, but should not worry about the contingency of there not being a settlement, or ways to reinforce the military and internationalize the war. If the war broadens, it will not help with the glory of France. Its outcome would be nothing but just what our Chinese saying characterizes as another "fisherman's catch." The peoples of Indochina and France will suffer miserably, and the traditional glory of France will be damaged. I think this is obvious.

Bidault: Of course, it is obvious. All we ask for is peace, nothing else. What I have brought up are the facts that are evident to anyone. If the problems are not solved reasonably and promptly, a worsening situation could be imminent. As you know, I don't want to see an internationalization of the war. Mr. Zhou Enlai's points will be taken well into our consideration.

Zhou Enlai: Therefore I see that Mr. Bidault has a responsibility to prevent such a risk from occurring.

Bidault: The newspapers always say, even though I never read them, that I came to Geneva to prepare World War III. This is so naïve. While asking for an agreement, we can't accept [just] any kind of agreement. We want a reasonable

settlement, not a preparation for war. I have experienced two world wars, and I am really tired of war. During the first war, I served as corporal. During the second war, I was a sergeant. I don't want to be promoted to staff sergeant in the third war. I'd like to repeat one more time here what we request: (1) to conclude an agreement promptly, at least a reasonable, temporary agreement; (2) to have the commanders of both sides draw a map of regrouping areas; and (3) to solve the supervision problem.

Zhou Enlai: All of these three points are for peace. We fully support any suggestion that is favorable for peace. Peace is our goal. Hopefully, we can cooperate in order to arrive at a point where our common goal can be achieved. A worsening situation is unfavorable for either side. Thereby, the three main problems pointed out by Mr. Bidault need to be and can be solved soon.

Bidault: We will be very happy, if [these problems] can be solved. Thank you very much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your being willing to spend time here tonight and exchange our opinions. I'd like to take this opportunity to present Mr. Zhou Enlai with my precious book as a gift in order to show my respect.

Zhou Enlai: To achieve peace, we are willing to make additional efforts and work harder with you. But there are indeed some people intending to use threats. I hope that Mr. Bidault can stop the attempt of destroying peace so that it can be achieved faster in a more practical way.

Since we have established our contact by now, this kind of contact should continue in order to make our efforts for peace together. I have been to France and know a lot about the wonderful traditions of the French. The French people have a strong sense of national pride. I hope to see that the national status of France in the world rise through your peace efforts.

Bidault: Thank you so much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your wonderful memories and praise of France. We hope not to mention the threat, but follow the reality, when we work out solutions for the problems later on.

France hopes to achieve a Southeast Asian settlement that can be accepted by all the parties. Thereafter, the people in this region can be eventually released from disastrous war conditions, breathe freely, and hopefully the entire world won't be disturbed by either the Cold War or a hot war.

Zhou Enlai: The Cold War and any hot war should end. What we want is peace.

Bidault: As long as we have trust, we can achieve peace and enjoy a relaxation.

Zhou Enlai: This needs our joint efforts. China and France getting closer will help improve the situation.

Bidault: I firmly believe this. Hopefully, Sino-French closeness, which depends on the conference's progress, will advance forward. I hope there will be other opportunities to see you again. Regretfully Mr. Zhou Enlai arrived this evening after the sun set. Otherwise, you could have enjoyed the beautiful view of the lake here.

Zhou Enlai: There are plenty of opportunities. We are neighbors; it is very convenient to see each other.

Bidault: Our opinions have already gotten pretty close, just like next door neighbors.

Zhou Enlai: The proximity of our residences can also bring our opinions closer.



DOCUMENT No. 22

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Ninth Restricted Session, 1 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-02; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Comrade Molotov flew back to Moscow on the morning of the 30th [of May 1954]. He has already arrived today. On the afternoon of the 30th, the Chinese and the Soviet sides discussed their estimation of general situation of the conference. Molotov had met with Eden before he left. Regarding the Korean issue, Eden is inclined towards holding small meetings, to present proposals on general principles. Molotov did not accept that, nor did he refuse immediately at the time. He said that there should be a conclusion of the Korean issue so that it could consolidate the situation of the armistice in Korea to benefit peace. Eden agreed with that. We believe that we can hold restricted sessions. [We should] put aside [Republic of Korea Foreign Minister] Pyun Yung Tai's proposals and solely discuss basic principles for the peaceful resolution of the Korean issue and seek common ground for both sides so that we can reach some agreements. [We should present our proposal] as we presented the six-point proposal on the Indochina issue in order to make it more difficult for our counterparts to reject it completely. If our counterparts reject it completely, they are obviously unreasonable. After that it will be natural to let Nam Il present the second plan from our side. The Soviet friends basically agree with our opinions, and we also discussed them with and obtained approval from Comrade Nam Il. We have already formulated our own draft agreement for our side's principled agreement (see attachment).

Concerning the Indochina issue, Molotov told Eden that after the six points of our proposal reached principled agreement or after discussing some political issues, the foreign ministers can return first and let the delegates stay to supervise and urge on the negotiations of the representatives of both sides' commanders. Eden agreed with that as well. He has already let the media know. We believe that it will take at least two weeks for the conference to accomplish the above tasks. Eden believes that the first two points of our six-point proposal regarding the principles of complete ceasefire and delimitation have already

been solved through the resolutions passed on the 29th. Our counterparts want to discuss in particular the following four points, especially the issues concerning international supervision and international guarantee.

(2) At the ninth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 31st, our counterparts presented the issue of international supervision, as we expected. [Although] Smith did not present the issue of United Nations supervision at the meeting, he emphasized that the experience of the NNSC on Korea was not good and argued that our side did not act in good faith. He said that Poland and Czechoslovakia obstructed the NNSC's work and made it impossible for the NNSC to carry out its work in communist[-controlled] areas. Smith especially emphasized that communist countries could not be neutral and cited several paragraphs from the letters that Switzerland and Sweden sent to the Military Armistice Commission on 4 May and 7 May to prove his argument. I immediately spoke to refute Smith's statement. I first explained that the [North] Korean and Chinese sides do follow the armistice agreement, and Poland and Czechoslovakia are impartial. Several reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission are agreed to by Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. The biased ones are the other two members: Switzerland and Sweden. I affirmed that the work of the Korean NNSC had been basically successful, although they had met difficulties, and their difficulties came from the side of the United Nations forces. I used facts listed in Poland's and Czechoslovakia's two reports on 15 April and 30 April to prove that the United Nations forces created [those] difficulties for the NNSC. My conclusion is that we can use the experience of the Korean NNSC for reference. I also made it clear that when we discuss the issue of supervision it should be done in relation to other points. Also, we should have a joint commission consisting of members of both belligerents to supervise [the ceasefire] and to take charge of the implementation of the provisions of the [armistice] agreement. Gromyko spoke to support China's six-point proposal and explained and affirmed it point by point. In speaking of the membership of the organization of neutral nations' supervision, Gromyko suggested that India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan [should be the members]. Our counterparts did not respond to this on the spot. Bidault's statement had two main points:

- 1) The main task of the international supervision in Laos and Cambodia is to ensure the withdrawal of the invading Viet Minh troops, not to supervise the armistice.
- 2) The representatives of both sides join the work of the international supervision committee. However, the Neutral Nations Commission should have supreme authority over and lead the joint commission.

Bidault also presented the issues of the composition of the NNSC and the authority to which the NNSC should be responsible. He hinted that the NNSC should be responsible to the United Nations. In addition to giving his support to Smith's proposal, the Cambodian delegate also repeated his

shibboleth that regrouping zones do not exist in Cambodia and that the Chinese delegation's proposal applies only to Vietnam. Pham Van Dong spoke to refute Smith's argument that only non-Communist countries could be neutral countries and gave his support to the Chinese delegation's conclusion on the supervision issue. Pham Van Dong claimed at the meeting that he had already appointed [DRV Vice Defense Minister General] Ta Quang Buu as representative of the command. He also proposed that Ta Quang Buu's assistant meet with the French military representative on 1 June to discuss and decide technical questions, such as the date by which representatives of the commanders of both sides start working.

(3) After the meeting, the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Chinese sides agreed to draft some principles concerning the joint commission, the NNSC, and the international guarantee in order to unify the understanding of the three delegations of our side.

(4) There is no meeting today and we had outside conference activities. Eden invited me for dinner tonight. Bidault said that he wanted to meet with me outside the conference. However, he was afraid that the Americans would find out about this and asked [us] not to let the journalists know in advance. I already agreed with that and agreed to visit him tonight at 10:00 p.m. after Eden's banquet.

Zhou Enlai
1 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 23

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Regarding Contact with Eden and Bidault, 2 June 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

1. [Excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]
2. Yesterday, military representatives from both sides began contact. Preliminary agreements have been reached regarding the date and other procedures of formal talks by the representatives of commanders-in-chief of both sides. Formal talks will begin today.
3. Last night I attended the banquet held by Eden. Eden mainly mentioned four issues:
 - a. Eden informally expressed [his opinion] that he did not support the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. He said that it would be better if the supervision was carried out by Asian countries. I said that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea consisted only of European countries, and that some peo-

ple opposed it. A commission consisting entirely of Asian countries would have disadvantages (I gave the example that it would be inappropriate for China as an Asian country to have supervision of the Kashmir problem). This time around it would be best if the commission could include both Asian and European countries, as proposed by Gromyko.

- b. Eden expressed the wish that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides would open the maps and solve some specific problems.
 - c. Eden asked whether the conference would come to a conclusion in ten to fifteen days. I replied that it would depend on the efforts by both sides to reach an agreement.
 - d. Eden said that since the United Kingdom has [British Chargé d' Affaires in Beijing Humphrey] Trevelyan in Beijing, he hoped that China would send its counterpart of Trevelyan to the United Kingdom. I have agreed.
4. I visited Bidault at 10:00 yesterday evening. On the one hand, Bidault explained that he wanted to reach an agreement and not fight World War III; on the other hand, he threatened that if an agreement could not be reached, there would be danger. I pointed out that the danger would be intervention by the United States and the threat to China's security—these are the things that concern us the most. Bidault expressed his hope that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides could resolve some specific problems. He also emphasized that the issue of international supervision should be addressed as well. Although Bidault had said beforehand that he wanted to discuss some problems, he did not go deeply into the problems yesterday evening, nor did he bring up specific questions.

Zhou Enlai
2 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 24

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Restricted Session, 3 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-04; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) Yesterday morning, the Soviet, [North] Korean, and

Chinese sides met and agreed that we should try to hold a plenary session on the Korean issue this week. [We will] let Nam Il refute [South Korean Foreign Minister] Pyun Yung Tai's proposal and statements by the other delegations that supported Pyun. Although I will also speak to refute Pyun, I will emphasize the necessity and effectiveness of the neutral nations' supervision of the all-Korean free elections. As I reported in a previous telegram, we are planning to let the Soviet side present the "draft agreement regarding basic principles for the peaceful resolution of the Korean issue by the participating countries of the Geneva Conference."

(2) Yesterday, at the tenth restricted session on the Indochina issue, Bidault presented a comprehensive plan regarding the issue of the neutral nations' supervision. Its major points are as follows:

- ① The NNSC has five functions:
 - (a) to supervise the regrouping of troops;
 - (b) to supervise the movement of troops;
 - (c) to investigate incidents that violate the armistice agreement in non-military zones;
 - (d) to supervise the prevention of new troops and arms being introduced across the borders of Indochina. However, this point is still not quite clear;
 - (e) to supervise the issue of the release of POWs and civilian internees.
- ② The NNSC should set up local commissions and *ad hoc* sub-commissions; the decisions of all levels of international commissions should be taken by a majority;
- ③ The joint commission of both sides should function under the authority of the NNSC;
- ④ Regarding the issue of the composition of the NNSC, Bidault disagreed with Gromyko's proposal and said: ["Communist countries cannot be neutral"]. He also quoted from Chairman Mao's *On New Democracy* that "neutral is simply a deceiving word." However, he did not say that he agreed with those countries. Bidault especially emphasized that what he had said should only apply to Vietnam since the mission and organizational style of neutral nations' supervision in Laos and Cambodia is different from that in Vietnam. Smith spoke and cited Switzerland and Sweden's letter to the Military Armistice Commission on 4 May (the original letter was distributed after the meeting) to explain that the United Nations forces did not violate the armistice agreement. The Korean NNSC was unable to carry out its work because of the two communist members' obstruction. He said that none of the communist countries could be considered neutral countries, nor could they take charge of supervision. Therefore, he opposed Poland's and Czechoslovakia's participation and was [only] willing to accept India and Pakistan [as members of the NNSC]. I spoke immediately to refute Smith's statement and cited Poland's and Czechoslovakia's letters dated 15 April, 30 April, 8 May, and 20 May as proof (the original letters were distributed after the meeting). I expressed my support for Gromyko's proposal and pointed out that [we] should not

confuse the non-neutrality of political thoughts with neutral nations that have not participated in the [Indochina] war. Eden made a statement and insisted that we should use Bidault's plan as a basis for discussion. He suggested that we should set up a technical committee to discuss the issues of functions and structure of the NNSC. Eden also suggested that the NNSC should be composed of Asian nations and emphasized that the joint commission of both sides should be subject to the command of the NNSC. Molotov spoke to refute Smith's statement[:] "if Smith basically opposes communist countries joining the NNSC it means that he does not want to settle the problem. This attitude hampers the settlement. Such an attitude that denies all non-capitalist countries a role in the NNSC is close to the thoughts of the anti-communist league." Molotov also cited documents signed jointly by four member countries of the Korean NNSC acknowledging that the United States violated the [armistice] agreement. However, [he] explained that the NNSC was still effective despite these weaknesses and that the four countries could reach an agreement. The four neutral countries that the Soviet Union proposed included two Asian countries and two European countries. Among those countries, two of them had diplomatic relations with France and the other two with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. They will be able to reflect the opinions of both sides.

(3) Our counterparts have not yet reached a consensus on the issue of the composition of the NNSC. They were unable to make any suggestions at the meeting. Based on newspaper [accounts], it seems that France does not agree with the Southeast Asian countries completely.

(4) I will report the situation at yesterday's first formal meeting of the representatives of commanders of both sides in a separate telegram.

Zhou Enlai
3 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 25

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session, 4 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-06; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Bao Dai's delegate said at yesterday's eleventh restricted session on the Indochina issue that only the United Nations could take charge of the task of supervising. Bidault spoke to support Bao Dai's delegate and said: ["the NNSC should be responsible to the United Nations."] In addition to repeating that the organization of the joint commission of both sides cannot apply to

Laos and Cambodia, Bidault also emphasized that the joint commission should function under the authority of the NNSC so that the NNSC can serve as a judicial [organization]. However, since [the members of] the joint commission are parties concerned [in the war]; parties concerned cannot act as judges at the same time. Therefore, the joint commission can only function as a tool and cannot take major responsibilities for supervision. Smith stated the US preference for the United Nations as supervisory authority. However, he said that he probably will not assert this. Smith said: ["four countries, Switzerland, Sweden, India, and Pakistan are suitable to take charge of supervising, however, [China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam] must disagree ["]]. He suggested that the two chairmen should discuss the issue of composition in private. I made statements not only resolutely opposing the United Nations supervision, but also pointing out that the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission should be equal. The NNSC was by no means to be over the joint commission. Since the two belligerent sides are the main parties concerned, whether or not the armistice agreement can be carried out depends on both sides' sincerity. The joint commission of both sides should take major responsibility. The division of work between the two is: the function of the joint commission is to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the armistice; meanwhile, the function of the NNSC is to supervise and inspect whether or not the two sides have violated the provisions of the armistice agreement. The NNSC's functions either inside or outside Indochina will be two-fold: one is to supervise demilitarized areas; the other is to supervise throughout Indochina and along common frontiers with other countries the prohibition of introducing new troops, military personnel, and arms and ammunition, whether by land, sea, or air. Thus within Indochina there would be two kinds of organizations working together. However, the NNSC will be directly responsible for supervising along the borders. Regarding the issue of to whom the NNSC should report, I pointed out that I agreed with Bidault's original proposal to let the nine [conference] participants guarantee. Chairman Eden agreed to discuss the issue of the composition of the NNSC in private. He stated that a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held today and a plenary session on the Korean issue on the 5th. The 6th is [Sunday]. A restricted session on the Korean issue will be held on the 7th and a plenary session on the Indochina issue on the 8th.

(2) The Soviet, Vietnamese, and Chinese sides are discussing issues concerning the functions of the members of the joint commission and the NNSC, the relationship between the two committees, and the international guarantee. We are also drafting detailed provisions now. I will report later after we have made decisions.

Zhou Enlai
4 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 26

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session, 5 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-08; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Our counterparts did not refer to the issue of United Nations supervision at yesterday's twelfth restricted session because of our resolute opposition on the 3rd. What I referred to on the 3rd concerning the issue of the functions and authorities of the joint commission, of the NNSC and of the international guarantee [commission], and the issue of the relationship among these three bodies have already caught our counterparts' attention. Eden said yesterday that my proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants who have the task of guaranteeing the agreements is worthy of careful consideration. Eden also suggested that the participants should set up a permanent [supervisory] organization. Bidault stated that the French proposal has something in common with mine and hinted that he agreed with Eden on the establishment of a permanent organization. Bidault said that impartial arbiters are needed. He emphasized that the neutral organization must have the authority of supervision and a great number of staff. Bidault also reiterated his two original opinions[:] the joint commission should be subordinate to the NNSC; the current proposal concerning supervision should only apply to Vietnam and the supervision of Laos and Cambodia needs to be decided separately. See attachment for Bidault's original proposal. Smith spoke next and did not oppose the conference participants joining in [the international] guarantee. However, he still emphasized that the NNSC should have superior authority over the joint commission. Regarding my proposal, Smith said: [it] simply will be a framework for agreements that this conference might reach. However, we must solve two problems first:

- ① the impartial composition of the international supervisory commissions;
- ② the nature of the obligations of the countries who participate in guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov spoke and agreed that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva [Conference] participants who join in the international guarantee. He also pointed out that the agreement by both belligerents has decisive meaning in solving the conflict. The joint commission can also play an important role. Therefore, it should not be subordinate to outside power. In addition, no such subordination exists [in case of the joint bodies representing the belligerents] in Korea. Molotov also refuted three points of [our counterparts'] arguments:

- ① If, as [our counterparts] said, communist countries cannot be neutral and can only constitute one side [of the negotiations], then capitalist countries cannot be neutral either. This

argument violates the United Nations Charter since the UN Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice are all composed of different countries of different political and economic systems.

- ② The United Nations has nothing to do with this conference. China, a country of half a billion people, and the majority of the participants of this conference are not members of the United Nations. Therefore, the United Nations should not take charge of international supervision.
 - ③ The NNSC must cover not only Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia.
- (2) Molotov put some pressure on our counterparts at yesterday's meeting since they delayed the establishment of contacts between the representatives of the two commands in the field and expressed hope that these would be established in the near future.
- (3) Eden went back to Britain last night. [The conference will] discuss the Korean issue today and next Monday. We will use these two, three days to revise our detailed proposal on the issues of the joint commission, the NNSC and the international guarantee. I will send another telegram to report again after the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides have made a decision.

Zhou Enlai
5 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 27

Minutes, Wang Bingnan's Meeting with Jean Chauvel and Counselor to the French Delegation, Colonel Jacques Guillermaz, 5 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-05; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 5 June 1954, 12:15 p.m. - 13:15 p.m.

Location: [Joseph] Paul-Boncour's Mansion

Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz

Chauvel: Thank you for coming here to exchange opinions. Now I would like to discuss the current situation at the conference.

It is our opinion that the conference has not made much progress in the past several days. The discussions went around and around at the same place. We are running out of time, and we should move faster for genuine progress toward a settlement.

[French Minister of Foreign Affairs] Mr. [Georges] Bidault

said to Mr. Zhou Enlai there are currently two critical issues: (1) a decision on troop regrouping areas, and (2) supervision. Regarding the regrouping issue, military representatives from both sides have held three or four meetings. The Vietnamese commanders, however, only addressed principles but not specific issues. Therefore their meetings arrived at no useful result. We are worried about this situation.

The Vietnamese delegation insisted on holding the negotiations at the local level. When Molotov made this suggestion, the French delegation agreed. We, however, think it unnecessary for the two delegations to discuss the same issue at the two different locations before any agreement on regrouping has been reached. It was a problem between France and Vietnam. But, since there is a situation at the present, I'd like to raise the issue for the Chinese delegation's attention.

Regarding the issue of supervision, we have addressed much in principle, but have not yet reached an agreement on the membership of the supervisory organization. The French delegation states that an objective neutral nation should not be impartial to the nations on both sides. A neutral nation must be one that has no special relationship with any side. Its task is to closely supervise the implementation of the settlement and correct mistakes made by either side. India may be an example. India has relations with France, the Soviet Union, and China. It, however, has not yet recognized Vietnam, and its relationship with France is not very friendly. [Chief of the Indian delegation to the United Nations] Mr. [V.K. Krishna] Menon met delegates from the three member countries of the Associated States a few days ago. It shows that Mr. Menon knows little about these three countries, and he has even raised questions as to whether they have any constitution. France, however, still considers India a neutral nation and is willing to see India play an important role in the International Supervisory Commission. France is also willing to accept other nations from Asia and Africa as neutral nations. What is China's opinion?

Wang Bingnan: In order to assist the conference in solving the problems smoothly, we agree to stay in touch and exchange our views on all aspects.

Chauvel: This is exactly what I agree to.

Wang Bingnan: We have similar concerns on the slow progress of the conference. It should have [produced] useful results at a faster pace. But the development has been delayed and is still [delayed]. The reason is that the conference has gone through unnecessary detours. This doesn't help the conference, and instead it slows the settlement development.

Mr. Chauvel mentioned the problems of military meetings and supervision. We are fully aware of that the conference made detours on these two issues.

As far as I know, at the military staff talks, the French presented the Laniel Proposal,¹ like a request for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's surrender. It shouldn't be [tabled] at all. It is said that the proposal has been withdrawn. However, it delayed the talks. In our opinion, rapid progress can be made through new, equal, and fact-based negotiations. The

military staff contacts on the spot have not materialized by this point. According to experience [gained] from past conferences, military representatives should meet at Geneva and on the spot at the same time. Principles are discussed at Geneva while details are discussed at the local level. If you need to deal with the problems of badly wounded and sick prisoners, direct talks should be held on the spot. The earlier local contacts take place, the faster problems will be solved. As a neutral state, we want to see an improved relationship between the two sides through the meetings, which may normalize the relationship between the French people and the Vietnamese people.

With regard to the supervision issue, someone brought up the United Nations. They want to complicate the issues and do not really want to solve the problems. All of the parties have been debating the definition of a neutral nation. If we say a communist state is not a neutral nation, a capitalist nation cannot be a neutral state either. If so, there is no neutral nation at all in this world. When China fought against Japan in the past, the United States helped Japan with steel and iron to kill Chinese people. At that moment, the United States considered itself a neutral state. Therefore, the problem can't be defined by ideological debates. We believe that a neutral nation is a non-belligerent nation in the war and acceptable to both sides. Someone even nominated Japan. Such a proposal certainly does not help the conference.

Our suggestion is that the supervisory organization includes the following three committees: (1) a joint committee; (2) a supervisory committee of neutral nations; and (3) an international guarantee committee. Working together, the joint committee from the two sides should be responsible for an efficient implementation of a cease-fire. For example, both sides recently worked together to directly deal with the evacuation of seriously wounded soldiers from Dien Bien Phu. Even though some violations of the agreement occurred, all the problems were solved eventually. The task of the supervisory committee of neutral nations should be[:] domestically, to prevent a civil war from breaking out, and, internationally, to prevent foreign troops and materiel from being shipped into the country. Our [vision] for total supervision includes air, land, and sea. Someone said that the supervisory agreement doesn't apply to Laos and Cambodia. In our opinion, however, if it were true, the United States could establish its military bases in these countries. So their point is not very thoughtful. The task of the international guarantee committee [of the nine Geneva nations²] should be to identify the unsolved problems that remained at the joint committee and neutral nation committee. The nine-nation committee should have further discussions on these problems submitted by the joint and neutral committees.

Mr. Bidault proposed some solutions toward the supervision issue yesterday. We are now studying his proposal. We will deliver the Chinese delegation's response after our study.

I am in full accord with Mr. Chauvel's suggestion on speeding up the conference progress. Nevertheless, I'd like to know Mr. Chauvel's ideas about how to avoid interrup-



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

Former DRV diplomat and conference participant Luu Doan Huynh (Vietnamese Institute for International Relations)

tions and even regression at the conference, and how to push the conference forward practically and realistically.

Chauvel: I don't have much time now. Hopefully, [we can] continue our conversations tomorrow and the next day. In short, I want to add several points. At the military meetings, the French staff presented the Laniel Proposal. Our purpose, however, was not to make the Vietnamese accept it, but to hope that the Vietnamese would tell us why they couldn't accept it and to let them provide detailed critiques on our proposal. Although the two sides have been fighting the war for eight years, we have no understanding of each other. Therefore, a mutual understanding is desired at the present.

We believe that the most urgent problem at the present is the composition of the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission. If this problem can be solved, other technical problems will be dealt with easily, and the conference will make much progress. During today's conversation, I present the French opinion. At our next meeting, hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can talk about China's opinion on India and other countries. A conversation may take a detour in front of fifty people, but a face-to-face conversation between two persons should be much easier for problem-solving. At least I believe so.

I must also emphasize my point on the local contact of military representatives. Although the past international agreements stated that principles were discussed at Geneva, and the details were discussed at local levels, they didn't say these meetings would begin at the same time. We still believe that an agreement of the bottom-line principles has to be reached at Geneva, before any local talk can possibly start on the spot. Anyway, Paris has already notified Saigon, asking them to promptly send the French staff to contact the Vietnamese.

Wang Bingnan: Over eight years the war has hurt feelings on both sides. A local contact may be the best way to heal the wounds and change the situation for the better.

Regarding the composition of the neutral nations commission, the Soviet Union has nominated four nations. We support

the Soviet proposal. Mr. Chauvel, could you tell me about the French opinion on the other neutral nations besides India?

Chauvel: I mentioned India because it is a very typical example of a neutral nation. Among other Asian nations, for example, are Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. None of them has a [diplomatic] relationship with Vietnam. Besides the nations in Asia, there are only Switzerland and Sweden in Europe. They may not be willing to accept the membership. Thus, it may be a compromise proposal to invite Asian nations only to implement the supervision. It will probably guarantee a balanced stance to cope with the problems. This is what Mr. Bidault has stated at the meeting. [We are] not looking for our allied nations, but inviting the [neutral] nations that could make their own independent judgments.

1. *Editor's Note:* French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel had demanded five conditions for a ceasefire: withdrawal of all communists from Cambodia and Laos, creation of a demilitarized zone around the Red River Delta, relocation of communists in Vietnam into predetermined standing zones, removal of all Viet Minh troops in south Vietnam, and guarantees against reinforcements from abroad.

2. *Editor's Note:* Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), France, Laos, the PRC, the State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA.



DOCUMENT No. 28

Minutes, Wang Bingnan's Meeting with French Ambassador to Switzerland Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz, 6 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-06; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 6 June 1954, 5:30 p.m-6:40 p.m

Location: Mansion of the French Consul General to Geneva

Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz

Chauvel: Mr. [Georges] Bidault just made a trip to the lake. Has Mr. Zhou Enlai gone for some outings?

Wang Bingnan: No, Foreign Minister Zhou has no time now for an outing.

Guillermaz: [You] should suggest Mr. Zhou Enlai go out.

Wang Bingnan: [He] could be interested in an outing only had the conference achieved some of its goals.

Chauvel: Mr. Bidault is planning a return to Paris for two or three days. Before his departure for Paris, he intends to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai one more time after the dinner on Monday. [We

are] not sure if Mr. Zhou Enlai has time [for the meeting].

Wang Bingnan: Mr. Zhou Enlai is very glad to meet Mr. Bidault.

Chauvel: Wonderful. Let's say 9:00 p.m. tomorrow [Monday]. We talked about the problems of the military staff meetings last time. It was said yesterday that their meetings have made some progress. Both sides have reached an agreement on tactical methods of regrouping their troops. Since both sides have further clarified their intentions, it should be easier for them to work out a solution.

I would like to add a few more words now about the supervision issue. The Chinese side seems not fully understanding of the French opinion [on supervision]. We did not mean that Laos and Cambodia do not need any supervision. Instead, our opinion is that these two countries have different situations, so that supervisory terms should be accordingly different. Our request is to talk about Vietnam first, and then Laos and Cambodia. We don't intend to facilitate the establishment of any military bases in Laos and Cambodia, or to prepare for a war in this region. Our fundamental goal is to solve the problems.

If my understanding is correct, Mr. Wang Bingnan proposed three types of committees for the supervisory machinery last time: an international guarantee committee, a neutral nation supervisory committee, and a combined [both sides] committee. We think that an agreement based upon this proposal can be reached.

However, in order to make fast progress, the composition of the neutral nation commission should be discussed first. I expressed the French stand last time. I believe Mr. Wang Bingnan has thought about this issue. [I'd like to] now know about Mr. Wang Bingnan's opinion.

Wang Bingnan: [I am] glad to hear from Mr. Chauvel that the military staff meeting has made some progress.

Chauvel: Not much yet, only a little bit.

Wang Bingnan: This is a very positive sign, and it doesn't matter how small the progress is or on which subject. In the spirit of avoiding any delay, we must make vigorous efforts to arrive at further results.

Regarding the supervision of Laos and Cambodia, we have stated that, as long as principles [on supervision] are agreed, implementation methods may be different [from that on Vietnam] according to their specific conditions.

In respect to the composition of the neutral nation commission, I have reported Mr. Chauvel's opinion to the head of our delegation. Currently, we are carefully studying Mr. Bidault's proposal, so we can't answer this question. We are endorsing the four nations suggested by the Soviet delegation. Nevertheless, we believe that, as long as all sides do their studies objectively, the problems can be solved.

Talking about the entire [Geneva Conference], there are some difficulties. However, we should overcome the difficulties and strive for settlements. We'd like to draw French attention to [the fact] that, on one hand, the meeting makes slow progress; on the other hand, it also has impediments. It is not

impossible to settle the Korea problem, and all sides have many common points. But someone stubbornly asked for an election [to be] conducted under UN supervision. This unnecessarily impeded the progress of the meeting. In their speeches yesterday, the [North] Korean, Chinese, and Soviet delegations all fully expressed a conciliatory spirit. But Mr. Smith didn't. Throughout the meeting, not only did he not present any solid proposals, but also did not offer any help for any agreement at the meeting. It was just like his attitude at the Indochina meeting on the 29th, "no objection, but no acceptance." This continuing negative attitude against the meeting doesn't do any good to the conference. Our expectation is that the delegates should share their similar opinions first. Then, they can overcome obstacles and solve the different opinions in order to make the conference a full success.

Chauvel: We have noticed recently that Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov, Mr. Zhou Enlai, and Mr. [Anthony] Eden all look for our common position as what we are doing. This is a good approach. The United States shows their most distrustful attitude toward the conference. Nevertheless, talking about Indochina's issues, we have some alliances, such as the United States and the three [French] Union member nations. We can only accept solutions accepted by our alliances. It is not easy to convince an allied country. Hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can give [his] attention to it.

Wang Bingnan: With respect to solving the Indochina problems, France is one of the key players. Restoring peace is an advantage to France. Extension or internationalization of the war is a disadvantage to France. Hopefully France can fully play its initiative role, and function as a powerful nation.

The Chinese delegation does not have any selfish purpose in its efforts to strive for peace in Indochina. What we want to see is not a continuous bleeding of France and Vietnam, but a normalization of French-Vietnamese relations and a friendship between the two countries. What we want to see is not the reduced international status of France, but the increasing status of France in the world. We believe that France has the same goal of a successful conference.

Chauvel: I really appreciate it that Mr. Wang Bingnan has such a remarkable opinion of France. In the past years, the Indochinese War was a problem for France and Vietnam. Now it has become an international problem. France seeks an internationalized peace, not an internationalized war. Even though France has difficulties in making its allies accept certain agreements, it is not impossible. We hope to eventually reach our common goal—peace—that is our common interest.

With regard to solving the Indochinese problems, France recognizes China's role among Asian countries. Therefore, we are glad to exchange our opinions with the Chinese delegation on a regular basis for more help from China.

Regarding the neutral nation issue, France is not satisfied with merely signing an agreement on paper. It wants to see the supervisory organization be truly effective. Mr. Bidault did not enjoy criticizing the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal could only make the supervisory commission impotent. This

is what all of us try to avoid. Mr. Bidault is going to meet Mr. Molotov tomorrow morning. They will talk about this issue. That the delegation heads can meet under good conditions is helpful for reaching an agreement at the conference. As long as the atmosphere changes for the better, any distrust between the two sides will disappear.

Wang Bingnan: I have the same feeling.

Chauvel: Peace is like the Pyrenees. Sometime they look dark, sometimes bright. As long as we have confidence, we will eventually see the bright Pyrenees.

Wang Bingnan: The [Chang] Bai Mountains always stand tall without any change. Clouds and rain are only temporary conditions.

Chauvel: I don't know if Mr. Bidault has any other issues on his mind besides the conference topics when he talks to Mr. Zhou Enlai. I am sure, however, he is willing to talk about every issue that Mr. Zhou Enlai is interested in.

Wang Bingnan: Can you tell me the participants at the meeting?

Chauvel: It's just like the last meeting, Mr. Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz.

The two foreign ministers did not release any information on their last meeting to the media. It is desired to keep [things] this way in order to exchange opinions frankly.

I met the Swiss foreign minister at Bern two days ago. He said that it was astonishing that some people could question the neutrality of Sweden. Sweden's neutrality is not only a fact, but also legally recognized. Anyway, I explained [it] to them, and it is over.

It is said that a general meeting will be held on Tuesday, isn't it?

Wang Bingnan: That is the plan, as far as I know.

Chauvel: Currently, the French Assembly continues their debates on the Indochina issue. Mr. Bidault is going to speak at Geneva on Tuesday, and at the French Parliament on Wednesday. He hopes for some good news that he can report to the French Parliament.

Wang Bingnan: I hope that he can report some conference progress at the Assembly. This is also what the French people have been waiting for.

Chauvel: This is our common hope.



DOCUMENT No. 29

**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Thirteenth Plenary Session,
6 June 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-09; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) At yesterday's plenary session on the Korean issue, we took steps to make the meeting a restricted one in which we could solve the problem. In order to do this, we took the initiative in adopting a conciliatory attitude and seeking subjects on which agreement could be reached. The Korean, Chinese, and Soviet delegations all spoke in the session. I have already sent back all three texts of the speeches. Nam Il stated that the DPRK was not opposed to the phased and proportional withdrawal of foreign troops. He cited the examples of the United States and Switzerland in order to refute his counterparts' arguments concerning the organization of an all-Korean government based on the proportional representation of populations. I spoke to emphasize that we could find common ground on which to settle the Korean issue peacefully. At the meeting, Molotov submitted his draft concerning "basic principles and agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue." Although I have already cabled the text of his draft, I need to add three more sentences to one of the sections. Specifically, "elections should be held within six months after the conclusion of this agreement. Elections should be conducted by secret ballot based on the laws of universal suffrage. Representation in the all-Korean legislature should be in proportion to the population of Korea as a whole." Since three statements from our side all indicated that we tried to seek common ground, the Dutch delegation said in their speech that they would examine Molotov's proposals immediately after he spoke.

Smith and [ROK Foreign Minister] Pyun Yung Tai were afraid that our efforts to reach an agreement would have a positive influence on the conference. Pyun Yung Tai therefore made a special speech refuting Nam Il's arguments. Smith also spoke to attack my proposal for neutral nations' supervision [on elections in Korea]. He emphasized that elections must be supervised by the United Nations. He even hinted at last that he would use public opinion to threaten us. I immediately made a brief statement saying that we could not agree to Smith's explanation for the NNSC's role in the Korean issue. I also reserved my right to reply to other parts of Smith's statement to which we could not agree in the future.

(2) According to the media, the 16 countries of the other side held a meeting yesterday in the morning. The United States intended to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue. However, other countries did not agree. Obviously, it is the United States that intentionally creates tension both inside and outside the conference. The Americans are trying to win support under the signboard of the United Nations. They are afraid that our side will undermine the United Nations' prestige, and that we will desperately oppose the exercise of veto over the issue of neutral nations. They are afraid that an organization of neutral nations on a footing of equality with both sides will be unfavorable to the United States.

(3) In order to expose America's plot to sabotage [the conference], our side is preparing to provide further specific materials that affirm the achievements of the NNSC on the Korean issue and the effectiveness of the Four Nations' Agreement.

We will also provide materials to prove that the United States violated the armistice agreement and disrupted the NNSC. Concerning the propaganda issue, we plan to compare our conciliatory attitude and America's disruptive one during the conference. It will show clearly that our side is trying its best to seek common ground. However, the United States is still insisting on United Nations supervision and is not willing to look for other channels beyond the United Nations to solve the problems.

Zhou Enlai
6 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 30

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Concerning Consultations among the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

- (1) I hereby send for your examination the twelve terms on the united committee (the committee on military armistice), the supervision committee by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee that had been decided upon by the three parties of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam yesterday (see attached). It is planned that these terms will be raised by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the open session on the Indochina issue on the 8th. At the session on the 8th, I plan to make positive explanation of the six points concerning the basic principles in the military aspect that I put forward on 27 May, rebutting the mistaken points of the other side, and, in particular, criticizing the United States for blocking the progress of the conference. Pham Van Dong in his presentation plans to highlight the stand of our side on the political issue.
- (2) The telegram of the CCP Central Committee and the reply of the Vietnamese Workers Party have been conveyed to the Soviet Party Central Committee by Comrade Molotov yesterday. The three parties of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China exchanged opinions on these two telegrams yesterday.

Zhou Enlai
7 June 1954

Attachment [omitted]



DOCUMENT No. 31

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Replying to Zhou Enlai's 7 June 1954 Telegram, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Zhou Enlai:

The telegram of 7 June has been received. We agree to the twelve terms on the united committee, the committee of supervision by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee.

Central Committee
7 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 32

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the Chinese Delegation's Meeting with the Delegations of Various Popular French Organizations, 9 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00121-02; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

During the 32 days from 6 May to 6 June, the liaison team of our delegation has hosted 256 delegations of Frenchmen, totaling 2,015 visitors.

(1) The French popular delegations consisted of many social groups and various professionals. Some of them belonged to the French National Labors Federation and came as worker representatives from many regions (provinces, cities, and towns) and from different industries, factories, or shops. Some were local citizen representatives. Some belonged to the French Peace Movement Committee and came as local branch committee members. Some were local representatives of the French Women's Union. There were also representatives of students, teachers, veterans, disabled veterans, city council members, farmers, journalists, and missionaries. The workers' delegations had the largest number among the others, about 36.5 percent of the total; the citizen delegations as the second, 21.1 percent; the women delegations, 14.6 percent; and the Peace Movement Committee delegations, 14.2 percent. These four groups totaled 86.8 percent. Most of the citizen representatives were the local organizers of the Peace Movement Committee, using the name of the local citizen delegation. They included the local political parties (mostly the Communist Party, Social Party, and Progressive Social Party) and many professionals. They had a very broad representation. Most of these delegations came from cities like Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and their surrounding towns. Each delegation had no more than ten rep-

representatives at the most, and two or three at the least.

(2) During the meetings, all the delegations usually first expressed their full understanding and trust of China's policy for peace, and then showed their appreciation of China's efforts at the Geneva Conference. Some of them presented certain gifts (for example, candies and books on New China by the French Communist Party). Two of the delegations found the 1920 photos that the Chinese students celebrated the "Double Tens" at St. Etienne. They said the premier [Zhou Enlai] was there. One of the delegations presented us the receipts of French donation and aid to China during the Anti-Japanese War. They said that the receipts had been buried underground during Hitler's occupation, and were retrieved after the war and kept well until now. Since many of them had been ignored by the French and American delegations, they complained loudly and called Bidault an American lap dog, not French. They also complained of the French government's corruption and the people's suffering. They hope that we understand the French government and that Bidault by no means represents the French people. They appreciate our reception and hospitality during their visits. They also asked us to pass on their respects to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Some of them were touched with tears (mostly the workers and women who were harmed by the war). The journalists from the *Marseille Daily* headlined their visit in their newspaper, emphasizing China's sincerity for peace. During their visits, they also raised some questions. Mostly, they asked about the conference's progress and requested that China make all efforts to quickly stop the Indochina war. They hoped to see an establishment of a Sino-French diplomatic relationship in the near future and an expansion of the economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. Some asked for the information on the development of New China. A few visitors, however, asked if China had ever provided military aid to Vietnam; whether China would also intervene if the United States wanted to internationalize the Indochina war; and if China had religious freedom, etc. Some stated that they knew the American and French governments [started] rumors that China aided Vietnam with war materiel. But they still asked for further explanations since they did not have any strong evidence to convince the public. In meantime, we also hosted two North African worker delegations (ten people) who were visiting France. They were so excited about the Chinese people's achievement of their liberation. They complained about the suffering of the North African people under French imperialist exploitation and expressed the North African People's strong desire for immediate independence.

(3) The French Communist Party works with the French Labor Union and the Peace Movement Committee, which initiated and organized the French popular delegations' visits. Their efforts will be continuing according to the ongoing visits (an average about 70 to 80 visitors everyday). Their visits to a certain extent promote the development of the peace movement in France, and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and French peoples. The

visitors expressed particularly their hatred toward America and their complaints about the French government. They trust peace-loving and democratic nations' sincere efforts for peace. Therefore, [they] should have our attention.

(4) We have appointed certain persons in charge of these meetings. The reception room is decorated with Chinese carpets, palace lamps, traditional paintings, and other artistic displays. Chinese wine, tea, and cigarettes are served and propaganda materials and other souvenirs are offered. By 6 June, 398 Chairman [Mao]'s buttons have been given (mostly to the workers), 300 pigeon buttons, and 5,370 pictorial or literature materials (including the English publications of the 1953 National Game, *People's China*, *New China's Children*, *New China's Women*, *China Reconstruction*, *Chinese Folk Arts*, *Chinese Literature*, and *New China in the Eyes of Children*; and the *Journal of China* in French). There have been thirteen photo pictures taken, 600 feet of film made, and twelve news reports published. Usually, as soon as the visitors arrived, they were met with kindness and enthusiasm. All of their questions during the meetings were answered. The delegations received adequate information on New China according to their different backgrounds. So far there have not been any problems. Since the buttons and propaganda materials were not stocked enough beforehand, they have to be shipped in again and again. Only one publication is in French (but only a few visitors speak English). In the meantime, the other shortcomings include the lack of systematic reading materials on various aspects of New China, and not enough news coverage on these meetings. These need to be significantly improved.

Li Kenong
9 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 33

**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding Zhou's Conversation with Bidault, 10 June
1954 [Excerpt]**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

In the evening of the 7th, Bidault visited me and discussed mainly the issue of neutral nation supervision. He stated that the nature of the Korean issue was different from that of the Indochinese issue so the precedent case of Korea did not apply to Indochina. He didn't agree that Poland and Czechoslovakia join the supervision of Indochina. Regarding the membership, he said that only India and Pakistan were neutral nations, and that a neutral nation should be identified and accepted by all sides. But he didn't mention any specific nation for a probe. During our conversations, Bidault expressed his willingness for peace, and he also hinted at us



Anthony Eden and Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives)

not to apply any military pressure. He said, "Don't worsen the military situation to slow progress. A military situation will cause negative political reactions. Do not continue the war while discussing peace, and do not use the war to antagonize the public feeling of the other side." On one hand, Bidault said that he hoped to obtain a cease-fire under the condition that the historical relationship between France and the three countries, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, was kept in mind. On the other hand, however, he said that he is opposed to mixing together discussion of military and political issues. Bidault also tried to find out [whether] a better chance for an agreement [would exist] if the Korean and Indochinese issues were discussed together or separately; and a possible result on the entire Asian issue if the discussions were conducted behind closed doors. I told him that the two issues certainly had impact on each other. They all should be solved, not just one, while leaving the other unsolved, or even trying to block any solution. Bidault said that he could avoid the impact of the development of the Indochinese issues on his government and media. He also said that, if necessary, he may have to mention his conversation with me in his speech that would be sent to the Assembly on Wednesday (the 9th). But he didn't state definitely that he would publicize this matter. He may want to use his contact with China to calm down the complaints in the Assembly, but he was afraid of upsetting America. Bidault also told me that he may have to talk aggressively and offensively at the public meeting on the 8th. He wanted to make a statement ahead that it "won't be a problem for me to continue the communication with the Chinese delegation thereafter." During the conversation, Bidault emphasized that my opinion was very close to his. His conversations with me were more constructive than those with other people. I talked about the issues of neutral nation supervision, the experience of the Korean Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and veto rights. I also emphasized that both sides should follow the conciliatory spirits and look for their common points.

[15 characters excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

Zhou Enlai
10 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 34

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Seventh Plenary Session, 11 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-12; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) At the open session on the Indochina issue on the 10th, Pham Van Dong put forward the five-point proposal (the whole text has been dispatched back). Molotov rebutted in his presentation the attacks by Smith on the Soviet Union, pointing out that the United States on the one hand had produced all kinds of excuses to block and delay the reaching of an agreement, and on the other had held discussions in Washington for intervening in the war in Indochina. Finally he requested that all participants of the conference acknowledge the interest of firmly establishing sound and reliable peace in Indochina while resolving military issues, and he also requested that resolving the political issue should first of all be the question of guaranteeing the independence and freedom of the three countries in Indochina and restoring each country's unification under the condition of holding general election. In his presentation, Eden, apart from repeating the proposal by the five countries in Colombo¹ opposing the veto power, especially emphasized that the Viet Minh's "aggression" in Laos and Cambodia was just like the means that Hitler had used to invade Czechoslovakia. He further threatened that "unless we are able to reduce our differences without delay, our task will fail." The representative of Cambodia emphasized in his presentation that Cambodia was different in national culture, religion, and many other aspects from Vietnam and had already achieved independence, and that the main problem [for Cambodia] was the Viet Minh "aggression."
- (2) The open session on the Indochina issue has achieved no result after debates lasting for three days. How the conference will continue will depend on the discussions by the Soviet Union and Britain as the two chairs [of the conference] outside of the conference.

Zhou Enlai
11 June 1954

1. Editor's Note: The "Colombo Powers" were Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

DOCUMENT No. 35

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourteenth Plenary Session, 13 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-14; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

The delegations of six countries of the Western camp spoke at the open meeting on the Korean issue on the 11th. Six countries (France, with Britain and Canada taking the initiative among the other five countries and New Zealand, Belgium, and Thailand giving their support) stated unanimously that if the conference cannot reach any agreement on the Korean issue, it should be returned to the United Nations. Although Bidault is usually the least interested in the Korean issue, he suddenly became active at this meeting in order to obtain more votes when the French Parliament decides on the motion of confidence on the 12th. He returned from Paris and intentionally showed the spirit of conciliation in proposing five ambiguous principles at the plenary session on the Korean issue. In his proposals, Bidault briefly mentioned that elections should be held throughout the territory of Korea, and also raised the issues of the withdrawal of foreign forces and international supervision. However, instead of emphasizing the necessity of the United Nations' supervision, he simply said that "once the unification has been carried out under legitimate conditions, the UN should be called upon to give their sanction [to this settlement thus reached]." From our side, both Nam Il and I spoke and expressed our complete support of Molotov's five-point proposal presented on the 5th. We also proposed that the conference should adopt this proposal as the basis for further discussion. I not only fought back Smith's threatening statement on the 5th that he would appeal to world opinion, but also focused on exposing his plot to interrupt the negotiations. I pointed out that since both sides had already achieved agreement on several points and agreement might be possible on some other points, there was no reason for the conference not to continue. The current situation is that the United States and South Korea want to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue, however, other countries who attended the sixteen countries' meeting on the 4th did not agree. Since Molotov's five-point proposal on the 5th was full of the spirit of conciliation, it made it difficult for our counterparts to reject it completely. Therefore, the United States cancelled the planned restricted session on the Korean issue on the 7th. At the same time, the US is attempting to mold public opinion and is preparing to end the negotiations at the right moment. At the plenary session on the 11th, the United States therefore instigated the six countries to distort our arguments recklessly and to emphasize that the differences could not be resolved, and attempted to end the con-

ference by proposing to return the Korean issue to the United Nations. However, through the six countries' delegations' statements, we perceived that there were still differences among them. Although all six countries defended the United Nations, five of them did not support Pyun Yung Tai's sixteen-point proposal directly. Neither was their support of the United States enthusiastic. Bidault's proposals were not quite in step with the other five countries' statements. Neither did he raise the issue of the United Nations' supervision. Bidault simply said that [the settlement of the Korean issue] should be reported to and obtain ratification from the United Nations. Therefore, it is still difficult for them to end the meetings on the Korean issue immediately. Our side plans to let Nam Il propose our second original plan in next week's meetings on the Korean issue.

Zhou Enlai
13 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 36

Minutes, Meeting between Wang Bingnan and French Delegation Member [Jean] Paul-Boncour (Summary), 14 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-07; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 14 June 1954, 7:30 p.m.

Place: Paul-Boncour's office in the United Nations Building

Interpreter and Recorder: Dong Ningchuan

Paul-Boncour: Today I would like to discuss two issues:

(1) The Korean issue.

As we have discussed previously, if the Korean issue is to be discussed at the United Nations, China will be invited. However, Mr. Wang said that China was willing to enter the United Nations only through the front door and therefore had no intention of taking this opportunity. Meanwhile, since the situation is newly changed, I would like to give some personal opinions:

Regarding the issue of the All-Korean Commission, please pay attention to one paragraph in Bidault's statement. Bidault pointed out that Molotov's proposals must be revised to: under the guarantee of international organizations, the existing North and South Korean governments should get on well with each other so that they can await free elections. This proposal is not new. I proposed at the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 1948 that relations between North and South Korea must be improved. It should start with cultural and economic relations, and then gradually realize the political unification. The United States at the time suggested that it should be discussed later. India also knew about this since I used to ask for

the Indian delegation's opinions.

Fifteen days ago, [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru also stated publicly that North Korea's political system should not be forced on South Korea. Neither should South Korea's political system be forced on North Korea. They must seek a way to coexist with each other peacefully. They should begin with cultural and economic issues, and solve their political problems thereafter.

Not long ago we anticipated that the French government would face a crisis, therefore we asked Bidault to present this proposal so that the conference could note it for the record. This is France's claim on the issue of peace in Korea. It was simply a personal proposal before, however, now the French government is using it for the first time as a proposal of its own. The United States is preparing to invite the other fifteen countries to join it to sabotage the conference on the issue of international supervision. If other countries decide to do so, France will agree with them.

(2) [Paul] Ramadier wants to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai.

Former French Prime Minister Ramadier is a member of the Socialist Party. He is currently attending a conference of the International Labor Organization in Geneva and is also the chair of the conference. He is a good friend of my uncle Mr. [Joseph] Paul-Boncour (former prime minister from the Socialist Party), my wife and I are all very familiar with him. He will return to Paris after the conference and therefore wants to take this opportunity to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai. If Mr. Zhou Enlai agrees, I will arrange a lunch or dinner in a restaurant in the countryside so that two of them will be able to meet there. For the time of the meeting, we prefer next Sunday.

Wang Bingnan: As far as we know, a session on the Korean issue will be held tomorrow. Now I would also like to express some personal opinions:

(1) We have stated many times that this conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. Although this issue was discussed many times in the United Nations before, no result was reached there. Therefore, the Berlin Conference decided to hold the Geneva Conference.

(2) Discussing the Korean issue at the United Nations is completely different from the issue of restoring China's status at the UN. They should not be confused.

We believe that the Geneva Conference should reach a conclusion on the Korean issue. Since the delegations have all agreed on some basic issues such as unification, free elections, and the phased withdrawal of foreign troops, it made it easy to solve specific problems. We cannot understand why anybody would say that the conference will not succeed.

We constantly insist at the Geneva Conference that we only want the conference to be successful, and we do not want it to fail. It is obvious that the Americans' attitude is the opposite of ours. They want the conference to fail and do not want it to succeed. If the conference is to be sabotaged on the issue of supervision, our side does not have any responsibility for that. We hope to call the French delegation's attention to this.

If we share opinions on matters of principle, we should not



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

Conference participants (l-r) Melvyn Leffler (University of Virginia), Gregg Brazinsky (GWU), and Fredrik Logevall (Cornell University)

have any problems dealing with specific issues. For example, if we have decided on the principle that we will hold the Geneva Conference, then there is no need to argue about whether the delegations should come here by plane, train or ship. We cannot say that you will not come to Geneva if you do not take the train. If anybody wants to sabotage the conference by using the issue of supervision, it means that they are intentionally preventing the conference from reaching any solutions.

Paul-Boncour: It sounds very reasonable from the point of view of the Chinese delegation and Chinese public opinion. However, China cannot prevent the other sixteen countries from [considering these issues] from the perspective of the United Nations. To them, their statements are as well-founded as those of China. They have the right to decide whether the Korean issue should be discussed in Geneva or in New York. Therefore China's attitude should be flexible.

I need to clarify one thing. Mr. Wang Bingnan just said that he wanted to get the French delegation's attention. I am not speaking as a representative of the French delegation and am simply giving some personal opinions as a good friend of China and the secretary general of the sixteen countries.

Wang Bingnan: We believe that since related countries could not reach any solution at the Geneva Conference, and [some countries are now] talking about how the United Nations can actually solve the problems, isn't it intentional sabotage?

What does Mr. Paul-Boncour think about the sessions, especially today's session, on the Indochina issue?

Paul-Boncour: I haven't yet had a chance to exchange opinions with the French delegation. However, my own opinion is that today's session made important progress at the end. Mr. Molotov had already agreed to let India take the chair of the Commission of Neutral Nations. It thus denied Mr. Eden's argument a few days ago. He said at the time that although the conference was still ongoing, it was already hopeless. Therefore, we should be prepared to end the conference. Of course the United States also wanted to sabotage the Indochina

session. However, France is different. France wants the conference to succeed, not to fail.

We have problems translating Mr. Molotov's detailed proposals. Our two translators have been working on them since three o'clock and still haven't finished yet. Therefore, Mr. [Jean] Chauvel cannot make any clear statement, simply depending on what he heard from the session. Nevertheless, Mr. Wang Bingnan should pay attention to one thing about which Smith is going to make a disappointing reply. He said that Molotov's proposals did not contain anything new. However, Chauvel expressed that he was willing to consider them carefully. He did not want to easily put Molotov's proposals aside before they are discussed.

Wang Bingnan: Although Mr. Paul-Boncour said that these were his personal opinions, I believe that they are similar to our own.

As far as I know, the military session also made great progress, and the atmosphere of the session was very good, too.

Mr. Molotov's important proposals paved a new way for the conference. We welcome Mr. Chauvel's attitude of careful consideration. The United States said that there was nothing new in the Soviet proposals. It shows that the Americans' purpose is to let the conference fail. They obstruct [the conference] immediately every time it makes progress. France is an important concerned party. We hope that, as you said, France wants the conference to succeed. Then we believe that the conference must reach a conclusion.

Paul-Boncour: Unfortunately, France does not have a government anymore.¹ However, the French delegation and I all hope to be able to organize a technical committee, which will discuss the issue of supervision. This committee can discuss issues of the membership and authority of the NNSC. After the discussion, it should submit its report to the conference like the session of military experts does. According to the French constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the three armed services. Although he has no authority to talk about political issues, he can take responsibility for the military issues of the armistice. The expert who is doing research on the issue of supervision in France is [Counselor to the French delegation] Colonel [Jacques] Guillermaz.

Wang Bingnan: Do you think that the restricted sessions or the expert sessions should be continued?

Paul-Boncour: I still cannot answer you now, because we have to discuss Mr. Molotov's proposals first.

Wang Bingnan: How long will it take to set up the new French government? How many chances does [French National Assembly Member Pierre] Mendes-France have to form a cabinet?

Paul-Boncour: I think it is difficult to form a new cabinet. It will take longer. I hope that Mendes-France will be successful, however, I think he will fail.

Currently, the French delegation is responsible to the president. The negotiation of the armistice issue is led by Chauvel, [French Chief of the Special Staff of the Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, Colonel

Michel] de Brebisson, [Counselor to the French delegation, Colonel Jacques] Guillermaz, and others.

Russia just joined the International Labor Organization. The meeting between Mr. Zhou Enlai and Mr. Ramadier will be beneficial.

Wang Bingnan: I will answer you after I report to the head of our delegation.

1. *Editor's Note:* Joseph Laniel's government fell on 12 June after Pierre Mendes-France led a vote of non-confidence in the French National Assembly, which passed by a vote of 306 to 293. Mendes-France formed a new cabinet on 19 June.



DOCUMENT No. 37

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, 15 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-01; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 15 June 1954, 11:15 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the British side: Caccia, Ford (interpreter)

Caccia: Yesterday Mr. [Anthony] Eden and Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia issues. We assume that Mr. Molotov had already informed the Chinese side because the current arrangement is to let every chair inform his partner respectively. However, this time Mr. Eden is especially eager to let the Chinese and Soviet delegations know the British delegation's position on the Laos and Cambodia issues so that [he could] remove all possibility that might cause suspicions.

Mr. Eden has already stated at the meeting that our basic position is that we insist that the Viet Minh troops should be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia. Whether all the troops in these two countries are Viet Minh troops or a part of them are is a controversial question. However, it is confirmed that there are Viet Minh troops in these two countries. For us, the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops is a matter of principle. We have already made arrangements here so that we can reach an agreement on this issue and thus solve the Laos and Cambodia issues in Geneva. The Ambassador reads newspapers as we do, you must have already known that Cambodia had already made an appeal to the United Nations several weeks ago. And now Laos is also considering taking the same action. We believe that it is much better to reach the solution here.

I will repeat again that we believe that it is much better to reach the solution here. If we can reach an agreement on the withdrawal of the invading troops, we cannot imagine that any participating countries will use such an agreement to establish

[military] bases in Laos and Cambodia. On the contrary, Mr. Eden said that if we could reach an agreement, this agreement will be guaranteed by all participants. Now I will get back to the instructions from Mr. Eden. We definitely cannot compromise on the withdrawal of all invading troops. Mr. Eden asked me to explain to the ambassador, and also to inform the prime minister, that tomorrow's meeting on the Laos and Cambodia issues might be a very important one. If we can solve the problem on which we cannot compromise, Mr. Eden hopes that we will thereafter be able to solve the Laos and Cambodia issues and to let all participants guarantee this solution.

The advantage of our current conference is that it is a place of discussion, and in fact the Chinese delegation has already been here. I think that the ambassador must understand what I mean by this. We are glad to have the Chinese delegation here, and the Chinese delegation is already here. If [the conference] were held in another place, we would have had an undesirable situation.

My mission is to clarify the above points. I hope that I have accomplished it.

Zhang Wentian: We understand Britain's attitude. Mr. Eden has said that before at the meeting. What Mr. Caccia said today is the same.

You understand China's attitude as well. Foreign Minister Zhou [Enlai] stated it several times at the meetings.

I will report to Foreign Minister Zhou what Mr. Caccia said today.

At tomorrow's meeting, the Chinese delegation will present its own proposal concerning the Laos and Cambodia issues. This proposal will take into account Mr. Caccia's statement today.

Caccia: If Prime Minister Zhou wants to meet with Mr. Eden before tomorrow's meeting Mr. Eden will completely agree with that.

Zhang Wentian: I will also report to Foreign Minister Zhou about this.

Caccia: Please excuse me. I have to leave in a hurry because I need to accompany Mr. Eden to visit Mr. Molotov. Also, I borrowed Mr. Eden's car when I came.

Zhang Wentian: We don't need to be too polite with one another. We welcome your visit.



DOCUMENT No. 38

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session, 17 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-20; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations discussed our strategies on the Korean issue on the evening of the 14th. We assume that our counterparts will not accept the five-point proposal that Molotov presented on 5 June since they have already spread rumors outside the conference that the conference will be ended at the plenary session of the 15th. It will be difficult to present easily our side's second original plan (regarding the consolidation of peace in Korea) as well as the supplementary proposals that we originally planned to use as last steps. We must try to play every card we have at the last session. Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference. In addition, it will force our counterparts to take greater responsibility for ending the conference. Therefore we have decided that at the plenary session on the 15th, our side should: let Nam Il present proposals on the guarantee of peace in Korea; let me speak to support Nam Il's proposals and recommend that the conference should go into a restricted session of seven countries [China, the USSR, the UK, the US, France, the DPRK, and the ROK]; and let Molotov submit a [draft] declaration to guarantee that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. We assume that our counterparts will accept none of these proposals. Therefore, at last, I will make a minimum proposal. Specifically, I will express our common desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and propose to discuss the issues of time and place for the reopening of the negotiations. We presume that our counterparts will not even accept this minimum proposal since the United States' policy is basically not to reach any agreement.

(2) At the fifteenth plenary session on the Korean issue on the 15th, Chairman Eden intentionally let our three delegations speak first. Nam Il made a six-point proposal on the guarantee of peace in Korea. I spoke to support Nam Il's proposals and suggested that the conference go into a restricted session of seven countries. Molotov proposed that the nineteen countries should publish a joint declaration assuring that no action will be taken to threaten the peace in Korea. It seems that Molotov's proposal for a joint declaration was beyond our counterparts' expectations. Thus, Eden immediately called for a short recess after our three delegations finished our speeches. The sixteen countries held an extraordinary meeting [during the recess] and requested an extension of the intermission. Although our counterparts did not reach a complete internal agreement at the time, the United States had already decided to sabotage the conference. Following the recess, our counterparts opposed discussing our side's proposals, and the Thai delegation presented the 16-nation joint declaration. They then declared the end of the conference. Molotov then made an overall statement on the Korean issue and pointed out that our counterparts should take the responsibility for sabotaging the conference. I spoke next and expressed my great regret that the 16-nation declaration announced its determination to end the conference. I then pre-

sented our minimum proposal. Specifically, that the nineteen countries should issue a joint statement indicating a common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic country of Korea. I pointed out that if they rejected this proposal, their rejection of negotiations could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences. This minimum proposal obviously threw our counterparts into confusion. After debating back and forth [among themselves], the Belgian delegate stated that he was not opposed to the spirit of my proposal and was ready to accept it. Eden agreed with the Belgian delegate's statement and asked the delegations if he could conclude that the conference had already accepted China's proposal. Nobody was responding at the time. Smith panicked and immediately took the floor himself with a statement against us. Eden then reversed himself and said that the conference had no procedure for voting. He pointed out that the conference would not be able to reach agreement on any of the proposals, and it was only possible to note the proposals as part of the record of the conference. I immediately praised the Belgian delegate's spirit of conciliation and said that it was also worth noting that Chairman Eden asked the delegations to consent to China's last proposal. At the same time, I criticized the opposition and obstruction of the US delegation and pointed out how the US delegation had been preventing the Geneva Conference from being able to arrive at even a minimal agreement. At the end Eden declared that the conference would note all proposals and statements as part of the record and that the meeting was adjourned. In sum, the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations' repeated efforts disrupted our counterparts' arrangement and completely exposed America's decision to sabotage the conference.

(3) At this point the sessions on the Korean issue ended. We are considering whether or not the Soviet Union, the DPRK, and China, the three countries of our side, should issue a joint statement or issue statements separately after we return to our countries summarizing the discussions on the Korean issue at the Geneva Conference and explaining them to the whole world.

Zhou Enlai
17 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 39

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou's Conversation with Bidault, 18 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-22; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

At noon on the 17th, I visited Bidault. He emphasized the purpose of his return to Geneva was to ask everyone not to adjourn the conference too early. He said that since the conference has made some progress because of the constructive suggestions by Molotov and me, it should discuss the possibility of how to achieve some specific results. The conference should not be ended at this moment. I said that I agree with the French opinion to continue the conference because our stance is always to work with the conference to achieve a settlement. Since the British and American foreign ministers are now planning to leave the conference, we hope that the conference may reach certain, if not final, agreements before the foreign ministers' departures. Bidault said that Eden and Smith are willing not to leave Geneva until next week. He also believed that during their absence their representatives should be at least at the ambassadorial level, not only the experts, in order to continue their work. He hoped that the military representatives from each side should not ask unreasonable or unanswerable questions during their work of exchanging maps. Then I repeated to Bidault what I had told Eden about the Laos and Cambodia issue. I also added a few points especially for France:

The suggestions made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are reasonable and proposed for reaching a glorious peace for both sides. To fulfill the reasonable requests by Laos and Cambodia the reasonable suggestions by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam need to be met. The problem could be solved much easier as long as France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the two major belligerent countries, agree on the issue. We are willing to see Laos and Cambodia become two of the Southeast Asian type countries while they become member countries of the French Union. The cease-fire should take place on site in Cambodia, and both sides should reach a political solution through their negotiations there. In Laos, however, since the forces were relatively large, it may be acceptable to use regrouping areas to solve the problems. These areas are along the borders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China. At the end, Bidault said that he won't allow anyone to disrupt the meetings in order to have the military negotiations to obtain a fruitful result.

Zhou Enlai
18 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 40

Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary), 18 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206- 00008-07; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Time: 18 June 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, [PRC Foreign Ministry American and Australian Affairs Department Director] Ke Bainian, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the Australian side: Casey, Lauren (staff of the Australian legation at Saigon)

1. Regarding the Korean issue:

Casey first assured us that he had never thought about excluding China in the future from the discussions on the Korean issue. He then said that the Korean issue is currently a mess. It therefore proved difficult for such a big conference as this one to solve the problem. He said that he originally thought that even if North and South Korea could not be unified shortly, at least some temporary measures could be taken. For example, [measures on the issues of] trade, communication, and so on between the North and the South. However, now the North and the South are like oil and water [and] do not mix.

Foreign Minister Zhou said we also hope that the North and South will not continue fighting each other. Instead, we want them to get closer. However, as Mr. Casey knows, South Korea's attitude is very unreasonable on these issues. After the sixteen countries published the joint declaration, the South Korean delegation immediately made a statement saying that it would no longer be restrained by the Korean War Armistice Agreement. This statement not only embarrassed the other members of the sixteen countries but even Smith.

Casey said that that was right and they were very angry about that, too.

2. Regarding the issues of the recognition of China and the United Nations

Casey said that currently there were still various difficulties to overcome. Therefore, it was still too early to discuss the issues of recognition and the United Nations. He said that he believes that Foreign Minister Zhou understands political issues and other issues in the world.

Foreign Minister Zhou said: It does not matter. However, Mr. Casey should know that we have complaints about these issues.

Casey asked, what did you mean by "complaint"?

Foreign Minister Zhou said that China was deprived of the authority and status to which it was entitled at the United Nations.

Casey said that, nevertheless, the improvement of Sino-British relations achieved at this time was very profitable. If [we] take a little bit longer, and use time to 'heal,' [I] believe

that the situation will get better. He said, he understands that the Chinese people know about "the time cure."

Foreign Minister Zhou said that the improvement of Sino-British relations was an achievement. I believe that it can also help to deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China through the improvement of Sino-British relations. Mr. Casey just said that the Chinese people know about the 'time cure,' this means that Mr. Casey has some understanding of the Chinese people.

Casey said that he believes that the improvement of Sino-British relations will deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China as well.

3. The Indochina issue.

Casey said that as far as he knows the discussion on the Indochina issue made progress because of Foreign Minister Zhou's proposals.

Foreign Minister Zhou briefly repeated to Casey what he had discussed with Eden. For example, [we] hope that Laos and Cambodia become countries of the Southeast Asian type; the two [different] situations of Laos and Cambodia should be recognized; although [Laos and Cambodia] should keep their own defense forces, foreign troops must be withdrawn; and no foreign countries should establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia, and so on.

Casey asked whether holding elections in Laos and Cambodia would be the best way to test the size of the local defense forces. Since a war is ongoing in the region, and the situation is confusing, the elections should therefore probably be held a while after the armistice. He then asked, ["what do you think about holding an election within twelve months after the armistice?"]

Foreign Minister Zhou said that elections should eventually be held in the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Although the elections would probably need to be held a while after the armistice, we hope that the shorter this period of time is the better. However, the current problem is to end the war.

Casey asked whether Foreign Minister Zhou had met with the two foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia. They would be glad to know about what Foreign Minister Zhou had discussed with Eden.

Foreign Minister Zhou said that he had not yet had a chance to talk with the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia.

4. Issue of the military bases.

Casey said that if a certain arrangement could be made in Indochina, Australia would definitely respect and not sabotage it. He also said that Foreign Minister Zhou did not have to be afraid of anything. They [the Western countries?], including Australia, will not conduct an invasion. He said he believed that "international communism" can peacefully coexist with "international democratic countries."

Foreign Minister Zhou said China is willing to coexist peacefully with all the countries of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific Ocean. This certainly includes Australia and New Zealand. This is China's policy toward India. However, China also applies this policy to all other countries. These are not empty words. It is the policy that we have been following for the last

five years. The People's Republic of China will not conduct an invasion, nor should Mr. Casey have any doubts about that.

Casey said that he was glad to hear that. He also said that he believed that it will not be difficult for both sides to reach an agreement as long as China does not establish military bases.

Foreign Minister Zhou asked: Did you mean that if China establishes military bases in Indochina? How could China go to Indochina and establish military bases there? We believe that no foreign countries should establish military bases in Indochina.

Casey said that what he just meant was that China should not establish military bases inside the Chinese territory near Indochina. Then he said, they [the Western nations], including Australia, establish military bases for the purpose of defense, not aggression. However, it was probably difficult for Foreign Minister Zhou to accept this explanation.

Foreign Minister Zhou said, it will be difficult for us to imagine that Australia would go and establish military bases everywhere alone if the United States had not established military bases in the western Pacific Ocean and all over Asia. We believe that only the military bases established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military bases established in other countries' territories are for aggressive reasons. This is our definition.

Casey said, you should not think that the United States is that bad.

Foreign Minister Zhou said, it is the United States that has been taking a hostile attitude towards us for the past five years. Foreign Minister Zhou continued, although Mr. Casey and I can discuss all other issues, we have different understandings of the United States. However, this will not affect relations between China and Australia.



DOCUMENT No. 41

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning the Meeting at Nanning, 20 June 1954, 11:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Enlai:

Your telegram of 3:00 p.m., 20 June has been received.

- (1) We approve that you leave Geneva for India by flight on the 23rd. The two telegrams (from you) to Ambassador Yuan (Zhongxian) have been conveyed to him.
- (2) We approve that you and Comrade Ding, [Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP) General Secretary] Truong Chinh, [Viet Minh General] Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as Comrades [chief PRC advisor to the VWP] Luo Guibo and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Zhang Hanfu hold meetings and discussions at Nanning. We have

telegraphed the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and [Chief PRC military advisor to the VWP] Wei Guoqing, so that they will be rushing to Nanning to await you there by the 28th.

- (3) We will order the Military Commission to dispatch a special plane to wait (for you) in Guangzhou, and to conduct test flights between Guangzhou and Nanning in advance.
- (4) The [CCP] Nanning Bureau Branch and Guangxi Provincial Committee will be posted of related developments.
- (5) We approve that our delegation [at Geneva] will be led by [PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Comrade Li Kenong, who will remain [in Geneva] and will lead the negotiations on military affairs. [PRC Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Wentian and [PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Wang Jiaxiang will go back to Moscow.
- (6) On such related information as the date, time (of the flight), and the mark and type of the plane (for your trip), and the flight route from India to Guangzhou, please make an early report, so that we at home will complete due preparation in a timely manner.

The Central Committee
11:00 p.m., 20 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 42

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee, Regarding the Meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding, 20 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrades Wei Guoqing and Qiao Xiaoguang, and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee:

After an agreement was reached at the Geneva Conference on 19 June, the foreign ministers from the main countries have left Geneva one after another. Comrade Molotov went back to Moscow on the same evening, and Eden and Smith left on the morning of the 20th. Comrade Zhou Enlai will return home around the 23rd. During the three weeks that the foreign ministers are absent, the conference will discuss military issues related to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Therefore, our side must quickly decide upon a plan on the division of zones. Comrade Zhou Enlai has consulted with and gained the agreement of Comrades Molotov and Pham Van Dong, and he believes that it is necessary for him to meet with Comrades [President of the DRV] Ho Chi Minh, [General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' Party

(VWP)] Truong Chinh and [General] Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as Comrades [Chief PRC advisor to the VWP] Luo Guibo and Wei Guoqing to discuss the situation related to the negotiation and the question of the division of zones, so that consensus will be reached and that progress will be made in the negotiations at Geneva. We are of the opinion that this meeting is necessary, and we agree with Comrade Zhou Enlai's opinions. Please ask Comrades Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap, together with Comrade Wei Guoqing, to rush to Nanning, Guangxi, by 28 June to wait for Comrade Zhou Enlai. Please give the above with consideration and reply as soon as possible.

Central Committee
20 June 1950



DOCUMENT No. 43

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Sixteenth Restricted Session, 21 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-23; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) The four delegations from our side came to our place for dinner on the evening of the 18th to say farewell to Comrade Nam Il. On that evening we discussed the two proposals presented by the delegations from Laos and Cambodia. We presumed that we could reach an agreement on the Laos and Cambodia issues at the meeting of the 19th with our counterparts. On the morning of the 19th, Eden came to see me (see the other telegram for details) after the French delegation brought us two draft proposals by our counterparts. [Harold] Caccia went to see Gromyko, and [Jean] Chauvel's assistant met with [Director of the Staff Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry] Wang Bingnan. [The delegations] exchanged views separately. [We] put together points in common between the Chinese proposal and the two proposals of Laos and Cambodia, copied the Vietnamese Resolution on 29 May and made three principles. Through repeated discussion back and forth between both sides, [we] obtained agreement outside the conference first and then held the meeting. We reached an agreement on three points at the sixteenth restricted session. See the communique for details.

(2) Three points of the agreement need to be explained:

- ① The word "and" in "the representatives of commands of two sides shall meet immediately in Geneva and on the spot" was changed to "or." This was proposed by the Cambodian delegation with the support of Americans (the process will be reported separately) to the Soviet

Union. Molotov agreed with that. Cambodia does not want to negotiate here. They emphasize that [the parties to the negotiation] should be the Cambodian Royal Command on one hand, and the command of the Viet Minh on the other. They do not want to recognize France as chief representative. It therefore showed the contradictions between France and Cambodia. Now, [the] only [solution is] to enlarge the ongoing negotiations between the representatives of commands of both sides of Vietnam. It will require more days until the delegations of Laos and Cambodia show up and negotiate directly the issues of the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos.

- ② It was the Western countries that suggested jointly that we should first discuss the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces.
- ③ Our side added 'and foreign military personnel' after ['armed forces']. We meant the Vietnamese Volunteers. The Cambodian delegate stated that Cambodia needed the service of foreign military personnel. The Laotian delegation claimed that the French military personnel in Laos were dispatched there based on agreements between France and Laos.

(3) We originally thought that the meeting would need a recess. However, since France did not want the conference to be interrupted, "the conference will continue" was added to the communique. In fact the foreign ministers of major countries have already left. A special commission discussing detailed plans for international supervision could possibly be established after one or two more meetings.

(4) During the absence of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and the United States, in order to push forward direct contact between France and Vietnam, I met with the Cambodian delegation on the 20th (see the other telegram for details), and I plan to invite the delegations of Laos and Cambodia to have dinner with Comrade Pham Van Dong on the 21st. [I will] introduce them to each other [so that] they can have more direct contacts in the future. Also, I told Chauvel that I was willing to meet with [French Prime Minister Pierre] Mendes-France if he comes to Geneva in two days. Chauvel has not yet answered me. Even if Mendes-France does not come, I still plan to push Chauvel to contact the Vietnamese side directly. In order to influence France, I also met with two members of parliament from the French Socialist Party. They both insist that [France] should establish diplomatic relations with China (see the other telegram for details.)

Zhou Enlai
21 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 44

Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 22 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-04; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 22 June, 11:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

Location: The Chinese delegation's hotel

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, [Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the PRC Foreign Ministry] Chen Jiakang, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Chauvel: I visited Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France in Paris yesterday. I have conveyed to him your willingness to meet him. He is very glad. However, since his new cabinet has just formed, he has a minister meeting this morning, and a cabinet meeting in the afternoon. Therefore he will be able to arrive in Bern tomorrow. Right now we have arranged his schedule as the following. He is visiting the officials of the Swiss government at 11:00 am tomorrow morning. He is having a banquet at 12:30 pm. He can meet you at 3:00 p.m. at the French embassy. [We would like to know] if it is convenient for you.

The media and press have broadly publicized the news of this meeting. Some of [the reports] are distorted propaganda. We guess they are cooked by the Americans. I received many early phone calls this morning, asking for my comments on the news. I told them that I didn't have much to say, and that they should ask Paris for comments directly. In order to avoid any rumors, we need to have a formal announcement. Mr. Mendes-France is planning to announce his meeting with you to his cabinet members at today's cabinet meeting. After the cabinet meeting, we will issue a news release. Its words may be like this: French Prime Minister will visit Switzerland and meet the officials of the Swiss government. He will make a stop and meet Mr. Zhou Enlai, China's premier and foreign minister. Are you happy with the news release?

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for Mr. Chauvel's effort. I know you have many difficulties so that I delayed my schedule for one day. The street news is obviously made by the Americans. They spread the news everywhere. For example, about my trip to India. India and our government have not yet released the news, [but] they already found out [about it] in the airport.

Regarding your news release, I don't have any problems. It is all right to meet at 3:00 pm.

Chauvel: It is best if the Chinese and French governments can issue the news release at the same time.

Zhou Enlai: After you decide the release time, please ask Col. Guillermaz to inform [Director of the Staff Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry] Mr. Wang Bingnan.

Chauvel: Regarding the contents of tomorrow's meeting,

even though Mr. Mendes-France does not have any particular topic, he will listen to everything you'd like to say. His mission is to quickly reach a peaceful solution over the Indochina problem. By the deadline he has set for himself he has to report the result to the National Assembly.

The problems we face now in the negotiations are the difficulties between France and its alliance. We think we will work out something with them. We are very glad to see that China and France can make common efforts together. After your departure, who is in charge here?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, will stay in charge here. Also, Mr. Chen Jiakang, head of the Asian Division, will stay here. We hope that the French and Chinese delegations will maintain their contacts inside and outside the conference in order to make genuine progress through their efforts. I met the foreign ministers of Cambodia and Laos yesterday and the day before yesterday. I also invited the foreign ministers of Laos, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to dinner here last night. I have told them that our hope is to see the three countries establish a friendly relationship with France. After peace is resumed, they will develop better relations with France on the new foundation. Our goal is to support both sides to achieve a glorious cease-fire. We support and promote the conference, [and are] not derailing it.

Chauvel: This is exactly what we believe. We really appreciate your great efforts and personal contribution to the restoration of peace in Indochina.

I think the main task for the next few weeks will be conducted in the military committees. However, we can't give the public an impression that the conference of the nine-nations¹ has gone [away]. Thus, we feel that the conference should meet and show the media from all the countries that the nine nation conference is continuing. I talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning about this. He said that we don't need to give this kind of optimistic impression. I think it may not be just an impression, this conference still has certain impact. If [there is] not much business, we can meet two or three times a week, and for one hour each time.

The special meetings can report the result of their discussions to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: I think Mr. Chauvel has a good idea. But we need to discuss this with the delegations of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

It is better for the conference to have some business to work on. And each person doesn't need to talk a lot, that might [only] intensify the atmosphere.

Chauvel: We will find some business for the conference to work on.

Zhou Enlai: It is important that the military staff meeting should have some achievement.

Chauvel: This is our common basis. I said to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning that the discussion on the supervision [commission] and its membership does not have any foundation until the map [for regrouping] is drawn. It doesn't matter to you and us if the conference continues or adjourns. But it

means a lot to some other people. Thus the conference must continue to meet.

We are planning to present two documents at today's meeting. The first document is about establishing a special committee on the supervision issue. The Americans are not very happy to accept this document. They worry that the conference may not be able to take control after such a committee is established. The members of this committee can be decided later according to its tasks. The second document is drafted according to Mr. Zhou Enlai's six-point proposal. We intend to use it as the meeting agenda in order to make the conference progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that we should add the issue of local troop deployment to this document. Although [Republic of Vietnam Vice Defense Minister Ta Quang Buu] hasn't given any specific replies, he doesn't oppose it. We want to know now about China's opinion. We can cooperate like we did last week.

(Chauvel presented an original copy of the two documents.)

Zhou Enlai: We will let you have our reply before the meeting and after our discussions.

Chauvel: Regarding the special committee suggested in the first document, we consider it the best if a delegation, such as the Chinese delegation, can make a proposal for establishing a special committee on supervision. Then we will endorse it.

Zhou Enlai: We need to study the document.

Chauvel: We hope that the French and Chinese delegations can maintain their active, careful, and secret cooperation during the next three weeks.

Zhou Enlai: This is to our own advantage.

1. *Editor's Note:* The "conference of the nine nations" is the Geneva Conference itself.



DOCUMENT No. 45

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Talks with Eden, 22 June 1954 [Excerpts]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Comrades Chairman, [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee,

Eden came to visit me on the morning of the 19th, mainly to discuss the proposal on the issues of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to reaching an agreement on the same afternoon. In addition, he mentioned that the Viet Minh forces should not engage in large-scale hostilities while the negotiations were under way, and that if an agreement could be reached here, the hostilities should be ceased on the spot. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.] He said that he had recently heard the news that the Viet Minh forces had attacked a place on the Cambodian border. I said that we were in favor of an agreement as soon as possible so as to achieve the cessation of all hostilities, that the new French cabinet also wished for a ceasefire, and that we had not learned of any attack on Laos or Cambodia. I said to him, "You understand the nationalist movement sentiment in Southeast Asia," the hostilities are mutual, and so the French must restrain their forces from large-scale campaigns. There was no major campaign to speak of in Dien Bien Phu, but French airborne troops turned it into a major one. I also told him that so long as reasonable demands were met in Vietnam, no unreasonable demands would be made on the issues of Laos and Cambodia. Eden then raised the issue of adjourning the conference. He said that the foreign ministers would return when the military representatives had prepared a report, and that they did not wish to resolve the issues of the jurisdiction and members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission before the conference was adjourned. I suggested that the foreign ministers return on a regular basis, so that a deadline could be imposed on the work of the military representatives of both sides. Eden agreed. In the end, Eden mentioned that what pleased him most was the improvement of Sino-British relations.

Zhou Enlai
22 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 46

Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre] Mendes-France, 23 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-06; P1-11. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 23 June 1954

Location: French Embassy, Bern

Chinese participants: Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Minister Li Kenong, [Chinese Embassy in Switzerland Minister] Feng Xian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (secretary), and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Ambassador [to Switzerland Jean] Chauvel, Luwin, Jacques Guillermez, and one translator

Mendes-France: It is said that [you,] Mr. Premier[,] postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.

Zhou Enlai: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.

Mendes-France: It is very good to make this meeting happen quickly. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I'd like to solve all of the problems concerning us quickly. Mr.

Premier knows under what kind of circumstance our new national government was established. The French National Assembly has decided on a date and hopes that a settlement will be achieved before this date. This settlement of course must bring about peace.

Zhou Enlai: It is for this reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this [will be] helpful in making conference progress from now on.

Mendes-France: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn't participate in the conference before. But I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I'd like to know more about Mr. Premier's observation and opinion on what measures we should take in order to achieve peace in Indochina.

Zhou Enlai: In the past meetings I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Chauvel. Nevertheless, I'd still like to talk to the new French prime minister and foreign minister now about the Chinese delegation's opinion on the conference.

The Chinese delegation's purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we do not ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do not help negotiations. China, however, is not afraid of threats, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

It is because of this common spirit, we'd like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first [requirement] is a cease-fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The military issue is being discussed presently, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first [step] is to stop the war. As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desire, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all three countries are involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. The French government has shown its willingness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country also intends to establish a friendly and peaceful relationship with France.

The three countries, however, have different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each country. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and then [the new national government] decides on the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive of their current royal governments, our government will be very happy to see

these two countries become part of the normal Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. [Georges] Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don't want to see that these three countries become military bases of the United States, or that the United States builds up a military pact with them. This is what we are against. If the United States establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can't just let it go without checking.

I talked to the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few days ago. They all assured me that they don't want any American military base in their countries. I said that was good and encouraged them to make friends with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between them and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.

Politically, the three countries face different situations. Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn't [require] a [political] division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can't intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on this point. The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resistance movements in their countries, and unite with the resistance governments in order to achieve their national unifications. The Bao Dai government should approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his [Bao Dai's] political proposal aims exactly at opposition, hegemony, and at inviting the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the military representatives from both sides are negotiating the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistance forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the Royal government should talk directly to the resistance forces about cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So it should in Laos. In the meantime, the royal governments should also join France in the negotiations of both sides to determine the regrouping areas for the local forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed forces and military personnel should withdraw from these two countries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from all of Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have

reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desire is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement [to be reached] soon. All the nations at the conference, including China, are willing to make contributions to genuine progress, and [are] firm to oppose any obstruction or destruction.

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendes-France: The Premier's points help me realize that the Premier's thoughts on the issues are very clear. Of course, I can't respond to every point, but some particular points should be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close on the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leadership of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don't have any unsolvable problems between us over the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

As the Premier mentioned, coping with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also requires international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don't think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is different. The Premier just said that it is tougher. And then the situation is not optimistic because the war has been [going on] in that country for so long. Moreover, as the Premier said, the two governments there have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the war for many years. One of the points mentioned by the Premier needs to be noticed[:] that many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly welcome [direct contact]. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is difficult to contact and to obtain any result, we will make our vigorous effort to arrive at this goal. Nevertheless, we agree on this direction. The Premier also said that the goal in this region is unification, and that the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach any agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. The time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be stalled immediately, and that procedure will not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedures. Generally speaking, [our] goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more final point. I am glad the Premier made such a suggestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree for the same reasons the Premier stated. For genuine progress, the first step is to concentrate our attention and energy on the cease-fire issue, including the determination

of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be reached quickly. I'd like to ask the Premier if you agree that we have many points in common?

There is another important point. The Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree on this point. I want to make it clear that we don't intend to establish any American bases in that region. We don't have such a plan.

Zhou Enlai: I'd like to explain regarding your points:

You had a very good answer to my last point. France has no intention to establish any American bases. This is very good not only for the three countries, but also good for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful co-existence and for building a common foundation for the future.

You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. Our opinions are the same on this point.

The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. It should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confrontational. If the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk to each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that you have found that the Chinese delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to approach not only France, but also Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the Bao Dai government to make contact with the others. The Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel knows [it] even better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we should meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the military meetings between both sides may reach an agreement more easily.

Mendes-France: I don't have a whole package of opinions. We have the same opinion on some of the issues. Let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help to put the two Vietnamese governments together. The French government really wants to use its influence to facilitate their cooperation. It is, however, very difficult. We just talked about the long war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult for them to come together psychologically and politically. But [they] need to follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. It is better for them to set up some kind of foundation for implementing a cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still ongoing. Even though they do not seem to be having any major problems, the direction of their meetings is unclear. If we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So far the French-Vietnamese meetings haven't yet made any

important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong made contact with Mr. Chauvel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the conference is on military issues, but there is not much progress. I am returning to Paris tonight and will meet [French Commander in Chief and Commissioner General for Indochina] General [Paul] Ely. I will surely discuss this issue with him in order to further instruct our military representatives here and push the negotiations forward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy to reach an agreement. Could [you, Mr.] Premier[,] use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Once the military experts have made progress in their discussions, arrived at an agreement, and created a foundation, it will be easy for diplomacy to proceed.

I have one more point to make. If we go with the Vietnamese government's proposal on 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, only the military experts can provide us a foundation for diplomatic discussions.

Zhou Enlai: To avoid misunderstanding, I'd like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Dai government should establish their "contact," not "cooperation." Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influence Bao Dai and make his government contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to reduce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enter the phase of discussing specific matters. My opinion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The current discussions should get into specific matters. We know that the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also intend to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to hear that Mr. Mendes-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that General Ely will give specific instructions to the French military representatives at Geneva. The agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for further diplomatic negotiations. I agree with Mr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, [I'd like to know] whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If you have not decided on this point, [we] don't have to talk about this issue right now.

Mendes-France: To avoid any misunderstanding, I'd also like to give an explanation. When I said "cooperation," I meant using "cooperative" methods to solve problems.

I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai's point. We really hope that the military staff meetings can move into practical phase quickly, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be used as the foundation for diplomatic negotiations. It seems that the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding particular ideas on the main regrouping areas, I can't make any suggestion right now, because I don't know



Pierre Mendes-France and Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference
(courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives)

how the military staff negotiations are going. They are planning to draw a horizontal line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is much more to the south than the real situation [reflects]. Our experts, who know the field situation, have taken note of all the points proposed by the Vietnamese on 25 May. I think it is possible for them to provide a basis for further diplomatic negotiations. Another [piece of] evidence is that the negotiations on supervision currently are about practical methods. We think that, if the objectives of supervision are known in particular, the problem of supervision could be solved easily. Thus, we should push the negotiations on the regrouping forward and quickly in order to advance the discussions on supervisory issues.

Zhou Enlai: That's right. We should resolve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister's stance on these issues. We believe that, after the military staff of both sides detail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts should help [the military staff of] both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent sides their glorious peace, and realize the desires of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the foreign ministers can return to Geneva earlier.

Mendes-France: Three weeks should be the maximum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they should inform their delegations. Thereby, there will be a few days for the foreign ministers to return to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: The sooner, the better. After my departure, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong.

I am very glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

Mendes-France: This is for our common task for peace.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Mendes-France said in the Parliament

that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendes-France: This is our first meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I'd like to express my appreciation here. Although I am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendes-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: "We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desire that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress." It seems that not too much besides this can be said.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not to say too much.

Mendes-France: Hopefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendes-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think such a direct contact beneficial.

Mendes-France: Mr. Chauvel already met Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I'd like to meet him. But it is not clear when and where the meeting can take place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of the meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can happen.

Zhou Enlai: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister's idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

Mendes-France: This is also our hope. Mr. Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced premier and foreign minister. I am a new and inexperienced prime minister and foreign minister. So there are too many things to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.



DOCUMENT No. 47

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and CCP Central Committee, "Arriving in Nanning on the 29th," 23 June 1954, 3:00 a.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01 P7; original record number: 206-Y0055. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Top secret

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) [PRC Embassy in India Counsellor] Comrade Sheng Jian will be arriving here on the evening of the 22nd.
- (2) According to the current schedule, by the earliest I will be arriving in Nanning is on the 29th. Please convey this to Comrade Ding and others.

Zhou Enlai
23 June 1954, 3:00 a.m.



DOCUMENT No. 48

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Meeting with [Laotian Interior and Foreign Minister Phoui] Sananikone, 23 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

[I] invited Foreign Minister Sananikone, head of the Laotian delegation, to come and meet with me on the 21st. Sananikone first stated that the Laotians came from the Tibetan plateau, and that he had been to China himself. There are also a great number of overseas Chinese merchants in Laos. I said that the peoples of the East are all somehow related. Therefore we should expect each other's independence, sovereignty, and unification even more. Sananikone said[:] "Laos is a small country and has a very small population. We need peace more than any other country. France has [military] bases in Laos based on military agreements between France and Laos. However, there are very few French troops here and their number can be supervised by the supervision commission. If the Viet Minh troops are to be withdrawn, we will ask the French troops to withdraw. We do not have direct aid from the United States. The aid that the United States provides to the French Union is through France. We will not need such aid any more after peace is restored. We hope to establish

diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China after peace is restored. It is not difficult to solve the political problems of Laos. People of the liberation movement can vote and organize a reconciliation government. If the parliament agrees, we can revise the constitution and even establish a republic after the elections. [Prince] Souphanouvong is the brother of the current prime minister. He does not want to overthrow the king. He only wants to join the government. Problems can be solved if we can discuss them directly." I told the Laotian delegation: ["We are trying our best to facilitate the rapprochement among the three countries. [We] respect the independence of the three countries and oppose the United States establishing [military] bases in these countries. We believe that it is understandable that Laos presented its needs for maintaining armed forces for its own defense. We respect other countries' security and independence ["]]. I told him that they do not have to worry about their borders, and that we are willing to join the guarantee by the nine countries. I emphasized that the current French government wants peace, and Vietnam and Laos want peace as well. No one can prevent the realization of peace if the parties concerned demand it. I also warned him to be on the alert so that the Americans cannot sabotage [the peace]. The Laotian delegation hoped to reach an agreement first on the military issues in Laos. I said that we will come to a conclusion in these three weeks and will wait to make a final decision until after the foreign ministers come back. The Laotian delegate expressed his appreciation for introducing him to Pham Van Dong directly.

Zhou Enlai
23 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 49

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PLA [People's Liberation Army] General Staff and PRC Foreign Ministry, Regarding the Trip by [DRV Ambassador to the PRC] Hoang Van Hoan and his Six-Person Group, 24 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

The General Staff and the Foreign Ministry:

Ambassador Hoang Van Hoan and his group of six will be leaving Geneva by flight today for Beijing via Moscow, and will need to rush to Nanning by the 28th. Please arrange a special plane for them after they have arrived in Beijing. This is important.

Li Kenong
24 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 50

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PRC Foreign Ministry, 24 June 1954

[Source: 206-00049-01; P9. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Foreign Ministry:

[PRC Foreign Ministry American and Australian Affairs Department Director] Comrade Ke Bainian and a messenger are scheduled to fly from Geneva back home tomorrow (the 25th), and they are carrying three bags of top secret documents. Please take the following actions immediately after receiving the documents:

- (1) The bag for the premier must be delivered to Nanning by a specially arranged plane before the premier arrives in Nanning, waiting to be delivered to the premier at the time of his arrival.
- (2) The other two bags should be specially delivered to Director Zhang (Zhen) of the Military Operation Department and Comrade Li Qi at the Premier's Office, and should be accepted by them in person. Please inform us when the above documents have been received.

Li Kenong
24 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 51

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, 23 June 1954, 3:30 a.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Comrade Enlai:

Comrades [Chief PRC advisor to the Vietnamese Workers' Party] Luo Guibo and [PRC military advisor to the VWP] Xie Fang will travel from Beijing to Nanning, and will be arriving in Nanning before 29 June.

Central Committee
3:30 a.m., 23 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 52


Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, and Convey to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Wang Jiaxiang, Concerning the Content of a Meeting between the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese Delegations, 26 June 1954¹

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-34; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, and convey to Zhou, Zhang, and Wang:

At 5:30 this afternoon, the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese delegations met to study the plan prepared by the Vietnamese side concerning division and adjustment of zones in Vietnam and Laos. Concerning Vietnam, the plan introduced by Comrade Pham Van Dong is that the enemy will withdraw from the northern plain and [PingZhaoTian], and that our troops in Quang Nam area will withdraw from the southern and central region. Our maximum [goal] is the line from Tuy Hoa, [JiaoYao], and Pleiku, along Route 19, to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border (between the 13th and 14th parallels); the medium goal is the 15th parallel, and the minimum is the 16th parallel. At today's meeting with the chief military negotiators from the two sides the French side already introduced the principles that its government would follow concerning the dividing line in Vietnam (that is, withdrawing completely from the north, dividing the line along the 18th parallel, and (using Haiphong only for the purpose of withdrawal); France's military negotiator [Henry] Deltiel will go back to Paris to get instructions today; and the two sides have agreed to discuss the situation in Vietnam next Monday (the 28th). Considering these three developments, the Vietnamese side should not delay putting forward the maximum plan. But in order for negotiations to be carried out smoothly, it is necessary to combine introducing the political, military, and economic situation in the three countries of Indochina with the settlement plans, and present them simultaneously, as this will be more advantageous. Concerning Laos, the division of zones plan presented by Comrade Pham Van Dong focuses on pursuing Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and such new liberation zone as [MengKe] and [MengWei] in upper Laos, and strive to expand the [NanHuHe] area (toward the west expand to Muong Souei, and toward the south to Nam Bac), and in the Sam Neua area expand to [PanPan] and [TaTong] and to be linked with the liberation zone of Central Laos. In central Laos, strive to maintain the liberation zone on Route 12 neighboring Vietnam, and toward the south expand to Route 9. In lower Laos, at the beginning raise the question of maintaining the liberation zone here, but only in this area concessions can be made. In order to maintain the integrity of the liberation zone in upper Laos, at the last stage concessions can also be made regarding the



The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

CWIHP Advisory Committee member Warren I. Cohen (UMBC)

liberation zone in central Laos. In the meantime, Pham [Van Dong] contends that in Laos the question of a division of zones should be solved in connection with the political questions there. If a coalition can be established, then it is not necessary for adjustment or withdrawal to be conducted in various zones, and for special system to be maintained in the administration of our zones. Then Comrade [K.V.] Novikov of the Soviet Union [Foreign Ministry Southeast Asian Department] pointed out that Pham says that he has no mature ideas; in the meantime, he has no clear ideas on the plan for division of zones. (It seems) as if he agrees to Premier Zhou's opinion, that is, the bottom line is to adhere to maintaining a part of upper Laos, neighboring on Vietnam and China (the whole of Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and a small part of Luang Prabang); however, Pham also wants to expand the liberation zone in upper Laos in exchange for withdrawing from middle Laos. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss to make decisions, so he asks Pham to have further studies and then come up with concrete ideas, and three sides will have another discussion at 11:00 am of next Monday. Before the military affairs conference gets down to discussing the zone division issues in Laos, the two sides should first examine and correct the maps reflecting the current status, and will then enter the discussions about a settlement. This way, (1) we will know more about the situation and thus put forward adjusted plans, and (2) we will get more time to wait for the decisions of the meetings in Nanning.

Li Kenong

26 June 1954

(dispatched on the 27th)

1. *Editor's Note:* Many of the Chinese names for locations used in this document are unknown. They have been placed in brackets and rendered phonetically from the original Chinese.





The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

Participants Pierre Grosse (Science Po), Odd Arne Westad (LSE), Pierre Asselin (Chaminade), Qiang Zhai (Auburn), and Christopher Goscha (UQAM)

DOCUMENT No. 53

Telegram, PRC Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry, “Preparing a Plane for Delivering Documents to Nanning,” 25 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P10. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Foreign Ministry:

The Premier instructs that the documents carried by [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Shan Daxin must be delivered to Nanning by the 29th. The Shan group of two will leave Moscow and fly to Beijing on the 26th. Please prepare a special plane to wait for Shan to arrive in Beijing, and he will immediately be flown to Nanning, so that it will be guaranteed that the documents will be delivered on time.

The Embassy in the Soviet Union
25 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 54

Telegram, Wang Bingnan to PRC Foreign Ministry Administrative Office, 25 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P11. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

The Administrative Office of the Foreign Ministry:

(1) The important telegrams from the delegation [in

Geneva] to the Central Committee should be conveyed to Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] in Nanning.

- (2) The Ministry does not have a military station of our own to communicate with our embassy in the Soviet Union. In the future the telegrams from the delegation [in Geneva] to [PRC] Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zhang Wentian and [PRC] Vice Minister [of Foreign Affairs] Wang Jiayang temporarily should be conveyed by the Ministry.

Wang Bingnan
25 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 55

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, Concerning Hoang Van Hoan’s Arrival in Beijing, 26 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P12. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li:

Comrade Hoang Van Hoan and another have arrived in Beijing today. The plane to Nanning has been arranged.

The Foreign Ministry
26 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 56

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry Administrative Office to Li Kenong, 27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P13. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li:

Messenger Comrade Shan Daxin has just arrived. The three bags of documents have been delivered respectively to Li Qi and Director Zhang Zhen of the Department of Military Operations by specially arranged personnel and automobiles. [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Xiao Qing and Shan Daxin will take the plane to send Hoang Van Hoan and his seven-person group to Nanning, and will deliver the other bag to Premier Zhou Enlai. So this special report.

Foreign Ministry Administrative Office
27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.



DOCUMENT No. 57

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, 27 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P17. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Vice Minister Li:

Because of the sincere invitation by the prime minister of Burma, Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] has decided to stay one more day in Burma and will not return home until the 30th. The meeting at Nanning thus will also be postponed for one day. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
27 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 58

Telegram, PRC Department of Military Operations Director Zhang Zhen to PRC Military Advisor to the PRC Geneva Conference Delegation Lei Yingfu, 28 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P14. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Lei Yingfu:

The documents (those top secret) from you have been conveyed to us by Comrade Wang Yin of the Foreign Ministry today.

Zhang Zhen
28 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 59

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee, "Briefing on the Meeting by the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations," 29 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-37; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Record number:
(top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, Zhou [Enlai], Zhang [Wentian], and Wang [Jiaxiang]:

The Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations, following the usual practice, held a joint meeting at 11:00 a.m. on 29 June. The main points of the meeting are reported here as follows:

- (1) Comrade [Vasily V.] Kuznetsov mentions that he had a meeting yesterday afternoon with [Jean] Chauvel, head of the French delegation. Chauvel said that the proposed solution put forward by the Vietnamese side at the meeting by the chief military representatives of the two sides on the 28th was much too demanding, which made him very uneasy. Chauvel further said that as this was the first meeting, it is natural that they [the Vietnamese] asked for a higher payout of debts, and this... [the sentence ends abruptly]

Kuznetsov said that you [Chauvel] proposed the 18th parallel, and that would not work.

As a matter of fact, the central part of Vietnam has a small population and is not so much of value, why do they want to have it? Kuznetsov then asked: If it is not of high value, why do you not mention it? Kuznetsov further says: I hope that you will give a comprehensive presentation about the situation of the three countries, so that the question will be settled.

- (2) At today's meeting, Comrade Pham Van Dong at one point introduced the idea of discussing economic interests further, and discussing about the zone division issue less. Kuznetsov does not say much about this issue, only says that they will give further consideration to it. Our delegation then had an internal discussion, and we are of the opinion that at the present time the zone division issue remains a key issue concerning Vietnam and Laos, to ask for too little

will be disadvantageous, and to ask for too much will block the realization of an overall agreement. Therefore, we hope that the meeting at Nanning should make an early decision on this issue and inform the Vietnamese delegation as early as possible, so that the negotiation process will be pushed forward.

Li Kenong,
29 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 60

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Zhou Enlai, 29 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P15. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Premier Zhou:

Hoang Van Hoan, his seven-person group, and the [PRC] Foreign Ministry messengers Xiao Qing and Shan Daxin, who are carrying top secret documents for you to receive personally, have left for Nanning by plane this morning at 7:30 a.m. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
29 June 1954



DOCUMENT No. 61

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li Kenong, 10:30 a.m., 2 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-02; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Ministers Zhang and Wang, and Vice Minister Li:

The meeting with the Vietnamese comrades has been relocated to Liuzhou. [PRC] Premier [and Foreign Minister] Zhou [Enlai]'s plane will take off this morning in Guangzhou and will arrive in Liuzhou at 12:00 p.m. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
2 July 1954, 10:30 a.m.



DOCUMENT No. 62

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twentieth Restricted Session, 3 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou [Enlai], Zhang [Wentian] and Wang [Jiaxing]:

At the twentieth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 2nd, Kuznetsov spoke and summarized the discussion of these two weeks on the issue of supervision. Kuznetsov pointed out that the opinions in the Soviet proposal of 4 June and the French proposals of 25 and 29 June concerning the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission became closer. In addition, the other delegations now no longer insist that the joint commission should work under the direction of the NNSC. Opinions on definition of the functions and duties of the two commissions and the lack of need for armed forces for the NNSC became closer as well. Kuznetsov also suggested that we should make a draft resolution on the functions and duties of the two commissions that can be accepted by all the participants. However, there are serious differences over the issues of composition and the voting procedures concerning severe violations of the agreement that may cause the recommencement of hostilities. Regarding [Jean] Chauvel's previous proposal that the decision of the NNSC should have binding power for both sides, Kuznetsov asked Chauvel by what means we can guarantee the implementation of binding power. After Kuznetsov spoke, Chauvel claimed that the conference can only reach an agreement on a certain document, but does not have the right to make a decision. Concerning the issue of the compulsory nature [of the recommendations] of the NNSC, Chauvel said that the NNSC should have the right to explain the agreement, and such interpretation has legal mandatory power over both sides. Regarding the voting procedure on serious problems, Chauvel said that it was not a simple question, and he could only respond to it next time. The British delegate, Lamb, stated that Britain has not changed its original position. He said that although he had not made any statements at the two previous meetings, it does not mean that Britain agrees that the two commissions should not have subordinate relations. Bao Dai's delegate repeated the same old story that communist countries cannot be neutral countries, and only the United Nations can guarantee effective [supervision]. The next meeting will be held on 6 July.

Li Kenong
3 July 1954, 3:00 a.m.



DOCUMENT No. 63

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee, “A Brief Report on the Meetings at Liuzhou,” 3 July 1954, 1:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman, Comrade Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] and Minister Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li [Kenong] in Geneva:

I arrived in Guangzhou on the morning of 30 June. Because of the change in the weather and careless eating I suffered from an upset stomach. I took a day of rest in Guangzhou, and flew and arrived in Liuzhou at noon of 2 July. On the same day I met with Comrades Ding [Ho Chi Minh], [Viet Minh General] Vo [Nguyen Giap], Hoang [Van Hoan], Luo [Guibo], Wei Guoqing, [Guangxi Province Governor] Chen Manyuan, and [PRC military advisor to the VWP] Xie Fang, and had a brief conversation with Comrade Ding. I have read the telegrams from the Central Committee via the Provincial Committee. Those telegrams that are conveyed to the friends are being read by them in turn.

This first meeting was held this morning, and Comrade Vo made a comprehensive presentation. The meeting will be continued in the afternoon, and Wei Guoqing will make a supplementary presentation. It is planned that at the meeting in the evening, I will report on the experience at the Geneva Conference and also on the current international situation. The important issues should wait to be resolved (at the meeting of) the 4th. As to the various issues that have been inquired about in the telegrams from Geneva, I will probably reply this evening.

Zhou Enlai
3 July 1954, 1:00 p.m.

**DOCUMENT No. 64**

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee, “A Brief Report on the Meetings at Liuzhou,” 4 July 1954, 6:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P2-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman, Comrade Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] and Minister Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li [Kenong] in Geneva:

On the morning of the 3rd, we listened to the report by [Viet Minh General] Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap; and in the afternoon, we listened to the supplementary report by [Chief PRC Military Advisor to the VWP] Comrade Wei Guoqing.

Yesterday evening and today I made a report on the experience at the Geneva Conference, and I have raised some questions that are awaiting solutions. The report is composed of six parts:

- (1) The current situation and our tasks;
- (2) The question concerning peace and war;
- (3) Peaceful settlement plans for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
- (4) The question of negotiation—including policies, procedures, timing and supervision;
- (5) The policies and tactics of the Vietnamese Workers Party in the future and the tendencies that are in need of attention;
- (6) The question of arranging work for the future.

About the above questions, [we] have had individual conversations and have had preliminary exchanges of opinions [with the Vietnamese].

Comrade Ding says that regarding plans of settlement, arrangements for future military operations, and arrangements on other work, the Vietnamese comrades and Comrades Wei [Guoqing] and Luo [Guibo] will work to make preparations, and we should be able to reach decision after another day of meeting tomorrow. Regarding the various inquiries from Geneva, the responses should be made after tomorrow's meeting. The return to Beijing has been postponed for one day, and the date is changed to the 6th. So this special report.

Zhou Enlai
4 July 1954, 6:00 p.m.

**DOCUMENT No. 65**

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang, 6 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li and Vice Ministers Zhang and Wang;

Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] has returned to Beijing safely on the afternoon of the 6th.

The Foreign Ministry
6 July 1954





The 1954 Geneva Conference & the Cold War in Asia, Woodrow Wilson Center, 17-18 February 2006

CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann

DOCUMENT No. 66

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-First Restricted Session, 7 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao [Zedong], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, Comrade [Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

I spoke first at the 21st restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 6th. I explained our position on the issue of the relationship between the joint commission and the NNSC, the issue of the compulsory nature of [the recommendations of] the NNSC, the issue of voting procedures and the composition [of the NNSC], and the issue of [armistice] supervision in Laos and Cambodia. I did not present anything new. I intentionally drew France over to our side and referred to [Jean] Chauvel many times. For example, I noted that his statement deserves attention from the conference. [I also said that] the Soviet proposal of 14 June and the French proposal of 25 June could provide the basis for deciding the functions and authorities of the two commissions. Lastly, I once again expressed my support for Kuznetsov's proposal of 25 June. I also said that we can push the discussion on the issue of supervision one step forward if we could use the Soviet proposal of 14 June as a basis for discussing proposals from all delegations in the spirit of conciliation. Chauvel spoke next. He said that he had listened to my speech carefully and believed that my speech made a contribution to the conference. Chauvel raised the question of supervising the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. He asked the Chinese delegation to explain point three in the Chinese proposal concerning the issues of Laos and Cambodia[:] "the question regarding the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and

Cambodia for reasons of self-defense should be the subject of separate negotiations." The Cambodian delegate stated his reason for opposing the prohibition of the introduction of military equipment and personnel [into Cambodia] and said that point three of the Chinese proposal failed to consider the issue of military personnel. He said that Cambodia needed military experts, and the limitation on the amount of imported arms and military personnel should not damage the effectiveness of ordinary defense. The Cambodian delegate also asked us questions such as how these negotiations will be organized and who will participate. The Laotian delegate also stated that Laos wants to organize its own defense after the withdrawal of foreign troops. However, French [Union] troops that are stationed in Laos cannot be reduced. Also, Laos needs French technicians. I did not respond to the French and Cambodian delegations' request to clarify [point three of our proposal]. The meeting had a relaxed mood. The next meeting will be held on the 9th.

Li Kenong
7 July 1954



DOCUMENT No. 67

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-Second Restricted Session, 10 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou [Enlai] and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow:

At the 22nd restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 9th, the American and Cambodian delegations once again created difficulties on the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. The American delegation made a statement and emphasized the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia and their requirements for self-defense. He [Smith] said that China's proposal regarding the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia had not recognized Laos and Cambodia's rights to seek foreign aid and employ foreign military advisors whenever it is necessary to the development of their defensive position. He also required China to clarify its position on French military facilities established in Laos. I spoke and made three points in response:

- (1) I emphasized that the prohibition on the introduction of military personnel, arms and ammunition is one of the most important conditions that guarantees the ceasefire. I pointed out that the delegations of Laos and Cambodia had already agreed to introduce weapons for self-defense only on 6 July.
- (2) [I stated that] the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons should be discussed based on the principles of prohibiting the establishment of foreign military bases. I also

pointed out that the Cambodian delegation stated on 8 June that Cambodia had no intention of allowing foreign countries to establish bases within its territory.

(3) In consideration of the relationship between Laos, Cambodia and the French Union, [I said] that we can discuss Laos' and Cambodia's needs for French [military] instructors and technicians. At last, I said that issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons should also be included in discussions between the representatives of the two commands based on agreements.

Pham Van Dong made an overall statement on the issue of supervision. [Jean] Chauvel spoke to support the American delegation. He disagreed with what I said about letting military representatives discuss issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons. Regarding Pham's statement, Chauvel said that Pham mistakenly stated that we had agreed in areas where in fact there was no agreement. He denied that he had agreed that there should be a single armistice agreement for all Indochina. He believed that not one single commission, but three commissions [dealing with problems in each of the three countries] are necessary. Also, that there should be three armistice agreements and three different organizations. The Cambodian delegation claimed that Cambodia has no intention of allowing foreign bases to be established on its territory when it is not threatened. This means that [Cambodia] will allow the Americans to establish bases during a war. He also emphasized that Cambodia has the right to choose the origin and quality of military personnel and equipment, meaning that only the quantity [of the equipment] could be limited, not the origin and type. That is, there will be American personnel [in Cambodia] during peace time. Regarding Pham Van Dong's statement, the Cambodian delegate said that he shared the reservation expressed by Chauvel today, and emphasized that supervision could not be ineffective and the sovereignty of Cambodia should not be violated. Kuznetsov spoke to support my statement and pointed out that allowing foreign countries to build up military outposts in its own territory is, itself, a loss of sovereignty. Kuznetsov referred to the French delegation's efforts to discuss the issue of supervision in the past three weeks and warned the participants that we should continue these efforts and should not create any problems on issues on which agreement is almost reached.

The next meeting will be attended by the foreign ministers, and the two chairmen will decide the date for the meeting.

Li Kenong
10 July 1954



DOCUMENT No. 68

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 13 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00005-07; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 13 July 1954, 11:35 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.

Location: Foreign Minister Zhou's Residence

Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Bingnan, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)

British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, William D. Allen, Ford

- Eden: I came to visit you this morning before I depart for Paris, mainly to learn your understanding of the prospects after your talk with the French.
- Zhou Enlai: After I had a talk with Mr. Mendes-France, I felt that we shared many common points on many issues and our opinions were quite similar. Now the specific issue is the question of demarcation in Vietnam. I said to Mr. Mendes-France that France needed to advance further southward from the 18th parallel. So far as I know, the Vietnamese side is willing to make more concessions for a French move. I understand that Mr. Pham Van Dong is meeting with Mr. Mendes-France today. I hope that their opinions will come close together.
- Eden: I hope so, too. Thank you for your message through [British Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing] Mr. [Humphrey] Trevelyan. In that message you mentioned that you had had met with [Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)] Chairman Ho Chi Minh and that you had had a very good talk. Could you tell me more about this interesting talk?
- Zhou Enlai: After I talked with you on the 16th of last month, I met with Mr. Mendes-France on the 23rd, and we discussed many things. Afterwards I visited India and Burma, and had talks with the prime ministers of the two countries. I discussed with Chairman Ho Chi Minh the issues covered in these talks. I exchanged with Chairman Ho Chi Minh our opinions on the issues of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and peace in Southeast Asia, and in the end we achieved a common understanding. I trust that Mr. Eden would be delighted to hear this. Regarding the issue of peace in Indochina after my return this time, I believe that from the perspective of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, from the perspective of France, and from the perspective of the British

- Royal government as well, a common solution could be found. Likewise, our wish and policies on restoring peace in Indochina have won support from India, Burma, and some countries in the Colombo Conference.¹ Mr. Eden must have read the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese joint statements. I believe that these two statements would promote peace in Indochina. In these statements, we have also said that we would not reject the participation of any country in the effort for peace.
- Eden: After Mr. Premier's visit to India, Mr. Nehru told me about your visit in a telegram. I believe your talk was useful. Everyone hopes for a resolution, and when I say this I include Washington. We very much hope that our arrangements will not only be supported by the participating countries like us, but also involve the Colombo Conference countries in some way.
- Zhou Enlai: Yes, I did what I could in this regard during my visit to India and Burma this time. I am especially grateful to Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu for their enthusiastic support. It was a pity that I only had such a short time that I could not visit Indonesia.
- Eden: You are truly a tireless traveler. On the issue of Laos and Cambodia, is everything going all right? The reason I am asking this question is that I have met with Mr. Molotov, and so far as I know, the Viet Minh has presented a map according to which they demanded large portions of Laotian territory.
- Zhou Enlai: I believe that the question of Cambodia will be resolved after some further contact. As to the question of Laos, I have discussed it with both you and [French Prime Minister] Mr. Mendes[-France], and I believe that such a resolution could be achieved. As to the talks by the military representatives, it is possible for their demands to be a little more or a little less, but that is not non-negotiable. Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu both would like to see Laos and Cambodia become Southeast Asia-type countries ("Southeast Asia-type" is my terminology; Prime Minister Nehru used the word "neutral," i.e. countries like India and Burma), therefore this is our common wish. We do not wish for Laos and Cambodia to become military bases for any foreign countries, nor do we wish for either country to participate in any military alliance that is hostile to the other.
- Eden: These could all be agreed upon. Of course both countries must remain unified.
- Zhou Enlai: Not only unified, but they also have to be free countries.
- Eden: Neither country's territory should be snatched away.
- Zhou Enlai: We both agree that the determined areas in Laos are only temporary, and that unification must be achieved after the elections. Now that we only have a short [amount of] time [left], everyone must make an effort, and we must not let anyone impede us.
- Eden: We all hope that Mr. Mendes-France can succeed. Should he fail, it would be very bad for all of us. This would have great implications.
- Zhou Enlai: But some people are hoping that he will fail.
- Eden: I know what you mean, but my opinion is not exactly the same.
- Zhou Enlai: Mr. Eden should know a little more since you have been to Washington.
- Eden: I found that there is much mutual suspicion. The United States thinks that China has ambitions in Southeast Asia, not for now but in the long run. I have found that you also think that the United States has ambitions in Southeast Asia, claiming that the US is trying to establish military bases in Southeast Asia and so forth. It would be good to achieve an agreement amidst such mutual fear.
- Zhou Enlai: We have issued joint statements with India and Burma, and we have expressed a willingness to issue the same statement with any Southeast Asian country and accept to be bound by such a statement. This proves that not only now do we have no ambitions, but even in the future we will have no such ambitions. However, the US still would not relinquish its plans for military bases and alliances in Southeast Asia. On this issue, the United Kingdom should be able to make a fair judgment.
- Eden: As I said just now, each side is suspicious of the other. Our American friends said that we had been deceived, but we are willing to take the risk.
- Zhou Enlai: Time will prove everything. Both Mr. Eden's report to the House of Commons on the 23rd of last month and [British Prime Minister] Mr. [Winston] Churchill's statement in Washington referred to peaceful co-existence among countries. We welcome this. This is conducive to easing international tension.
- Eden: After we left Washington, the US president also used the expression "peaceful co-existence."
- Zhou Enlai: This shows that Mr. Churchill had some influence on him.
- Eden: Yes, we had a long talk with him. Let's discuss these interesting questions after I return from Paris. Mr. Molotov and I agreed to a procedure where we would hold private talks without

formal meetings, and I believe you must have known [about that].

Zhou Enlai: Yes, but we will have to hold a session at the end to conclude the conference.

Eden: Yes, if there is something to make public, of course, a plenary session will have to be held. I must say good-bye now, for Mr. Molotov is going to see me soon.

1. *Editor's Note:* The Colombo Conference, held 28 April—2 May 1954, was convened by Ceylonese Prime Minister John Kotelawa, and included Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali.



DOCUMENT No. 69

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 17 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0006. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 17 July 1954, 11:30 a.m. to 12:40 p.m.

Location: Eden's residence

Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)

British Participants: Anthony Eden, William D. Allen, Anthony Rumbold, Ford (interpreter)

Eden: Last night we had a talk, and I think you have learned the contents of it. It seems that the biggest questions are those of demarcation and the date of the elections. Other issues can all be resolved.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, Mr. Molotov has notified me. The three of you had a long talk on these two questions, and I believe a solution can be found in the end. Therefore, I would like to discuss another question with you today. It is the question of a Southeast Asian defense pact. Since the Paris talks, there has been much information from various sources, as well as a lot of publicity. Does the United States intend to sabotage the reaching of an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina with this question? Rumor has it that the three Indochinese states [Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam] will be included in this pact. If this were to be so, then peace would have no meaning other than preparation for new hostilities. So

I would like to ask Your Excellency directly, for I could obtain first-hand information from Your Excellency.

Eden: There has been no sudden change regarding this question. As I have said in Parliament, two issues are involved here.

First, to be honest with you, the US might not like any agreement that could be possibly reached here. But we are hoping that they will at least like it enough that they will issue a statement. This is what we are trying our best to urge them to do. Then every one of us will likewise issue a statement to support the agreement. Your Excellency mentioned that you would like the Colombo Conference countries to be involved, and perhaps they can issue a statement, too. Thus the arrangements made here could be reinforced.

Secondly, our Southeast Asia pact with the US [SEATO]: this is a defensive arrangement. A research group is evaluating it in Washington. This is an arrangement that is symmetrical to the Sino-Soviet alliance, and it is defensive just like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with duties exactly like those in NATO.

As to the other point you asked about, I can only give you a personal answer. So far as I understand, there has been no proposal for the three Indochinese states to join in the Southeast Asian pact, but as sovereign states they are free [to do so]. They can issue statements for the conference to notice.

Many things will depend on how we solve the questions here. If an arrangement could be made that is acceptable to all of us, then the atmosphere will improve and confidence will increase. I hope that Laos and Cambodia could become a "buffer" for both of us. So I hope that Your Excellency could help us obtain a guarantee that Laos and Cambodia will be independent. This way, confidence will grow.

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] It is precisely for this reason that I am delighted to hear the Premier say that the introduction of arms should be allowed into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense. This illustrates that the two countries can be independent. This has been greatly influential.

I can say with much confidence that the US has no intention of establishing military bases in either of the countries.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you, Mr. Eden, for your explanations. In order for an agreement to be reached on the issue of restoring peace in Indochina, this question needed to be clarified at this important

stage. All efforts must come from both sides.

First of all, regarding Laos and Cambodia, our attitude has not changed since I spoke with Mr. Eden on 16 June, and we will keep our promises. During the three weeks while I was away from here, my activities also highlighted this point and proved that I am making an effort in this regard.

We have had Mr. Eden's repeated assurance; as Mr. Eden just said, it would benefit both sides for Laos and Cambodia to become a peace zone. In order for these two countries to become a peace zone, they must be made peaceful, independent, and friendly to all countries. The two countries must not have any foreign military bases, must not establish military alliances with other countries, and they should have guarantees from both sides, or even from various sides. If the circumstances remain unchanged as Mr. Eden and Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France have promised and as [Indian] Prime Minister [Jawaharlal] Nehru, Prime Minister [of Burma] U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh have witnessed, then our attitude will not change. Thus, peace in Indochina will have a basis. This is the first situation.

Another situation would be that the US includes the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asian Defense Pact, and the United Kingdom, France, and the three Associated States have agreed to the US requests or have made promises. In such a situation, circumstances would be different. Peace would have no meaning other than to diminish the battlefield of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for American purposes, and to prepare for new hostilities. In that case we would have to be concerned, for it would differ from our 16 June talk.

Eden: If I remember correctly, the Americans themselves have said in past meetings that they had no intention to establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia. If you do not object, I will raise your concerns with General Smith when I see him this afternoon.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you. I would like to ask Foreign Secretary Eden to clarify whether the US is already engaged in activities to include the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asia Defense Pact. This is, in principle, the same as the question of military bases.

When we discussed the questions of Laos and Cambodia on 13 July, I said that Laos and Cambodia must not have any foreign military bases and that the two countries must not enter into military alliances with foreign countries.

Mr. Eden agreed with me at the time.

Eden: As I said just now, the Americans have told me that they have no intention of establishing military bases in Laos and Cambodia. Of course, if the Viet Minh wants to take over Laos and Cambodia before or after an agreement can be reached, then we and the US will express our concern.

I have said just now that I will [confer] with General Smith to get further clarification.

Zhou Enlai: This brings us to the second question. Regarding the so-called Southeast Asian Defense Pact, Mr. Eden presented an argument just now that because there is an alliance between China and the Soviet Union, the UK, the US, and France needed a defense pact. But the Sino-Soviet alliance is concerned with the revival of Japanese militarism and not with Southeast Asia. The problem in Southeast Asia is of a different character. Precisely for this reason Prime Minister Nehru and I are trying to create a peaceful region and expand it. When I was in India, both Prime Minister Nehru and I thought highly of a Southeast Asian Locarno Pact¹ [as] proposed by Mr. Eden. I do not know if our interpretation is correct, but we thought that your proposal meant putting all the Southeast Asian states together to form a collective peace pact. Such a pact would not exclude anyone: if the US wanted to join in, it would not be rejected. Thus regional peace could be guaranteed, and it would include not only the two hostile sides, but also third-party states. This way we can experiment with peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia. If Mr. Eden thinks along similar lines with Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu, Chairman Ho Chi Minh, and me, then an opposing alliance should not be established in Southeast Asia, for it would undermine the idea of collective peace as well as the idea of a Locarno Pact proposed by Mr. Eden. We would like to know how far Mr. Eden has gone with that effort. Of course, the US opposes it, as we have read in the newspapers. But for peace in Indochina, we should try to persuade the US.

Eden: I have run into some trouble. I used the word "Locarno," not knowing that the US did not like it. I still do not know why they don't like it. They say that it belongs with things like [the 1938] Munich [Agreement], but in fact it is not so. Mr. Churchill and I have always been in favor of such an idea.

This could be connected to the first part of our discussion just now. If an agreement could be reached here, and if every one issues a statement announcing their support for the agreement

and opposing any sabotage of the agreement, then it would be a Locarno-style arrangement. Perhaps we should not use the term "Locarno."

I agree with you that not only the participating countries in the Geneva Conference, but also the Colombo Conference countries should be involved in this arrangement.

I do not see how such an arrangement would be incompatible with a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact. The Southeast Asian pact is concerned with a potential situation.

An important issue at the Paris talks was to ask the Americans to come here. We hope that as a result of coming here, they will feel delighted and issue a statement to honor the agreement reached here, agree not to undermine the agreement, and to oppose anyone else sabotaging the agreement. Every one of us should do the same.

Zhou Enlai: If an agreement could be reached on restoring peace in Indochina, and it could have the support of not only all the participating states at the conference but also of the Colombo Conference countries or even more countries, then it would be the result of an effort for collective peace. It would also affirm the idea of a Locarno Pact as proposed by Mr. Eden. Although the US opposes this term, in essence it is so.

Given this, if an opposing alliance is formed, it would create an unstable situation. We could promote solidarity in Southeast Asia and bring about regional peace, but if an opposing alliance is established, it would only divide the scene. In this regard, due to more interactions with the Associated States, Mr. Eden must know that some of these states support it but others oppose it, or at least it is so among the Colombo Conference countries. In consequence, as soon as some positive results are achieved, they would be undermined in some negative ways. This would generate fear, suspicion, opposition, disunity, and disquiet. When I was in Delhi, I discussed this issue with Prime Minister Nehru from various perspectives, and we both believed that it would not be beneficial. At that time we thought that Mr. Eden was trying to counter a Southeast Asian defense pact with [the] Locarno [idea]. If the two were to exist at the same time, it would be unthinkable.

Eden: It is not as bad as that. The idea of a Southeast Asian pact is an old one; it was proposed a few years ago. It is purely defensive in nature, just like NATO. As I have explained in Parliament, two things are involved here: first, everyone has to join in to support the agreement reached; second, our own defense arrangements. It should

not cause concern, for, just like NATO, it is defensive in nature. I do not know how many states will join in, and nothing has been drafted yet, but it does not threaten anyone, just like NATO is defensive.

I want to add that it is not just about Southeast Asia; it includes the western Pacific, for Australia and New Zealand are included. Australia and New Zealand had had prior arrangements in the [1952 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty] ANZUS pact. If it is to be expanded, it will not be a bad thing, but a good thing. You will agree that Australia and New Zealand will not attack others. We are confident that the US will not attack others either.

Zhou Enlai: The ANZUS pact is directed against the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism, just as the Sino-Soviet alliance, and therefore it is somewhat justified. This is because all these countries face the menace of Japanese militarism. But the problem in Southeast Asia is of a different nature.

NATO has created confrontation in Europe, and people are looking for ways to repair the damage. NATO has made it difficult to achieve peaceful co-existence. Now the possibility exists in Southeast Asia, but some people want to create disunity. We not only disdain it but also oppose it. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh all have similar feelings. We are all very pleased by the British effort here, for it brings close together the Southeast Asian countries, and therefore we welcome it. We also welcome the improvement of Sino-British relations. But the creation of disunity separates us. It brings trouble, and it is not beneficial to future development. Undoubtedly the people in Southeast Asia oppose it just like we do, for it will generate fear and suspicion.

Eden: The idea of this pact has no new content. Six years ago I myself pressed for NATO. When [US Secretary of State] Mr. [John Foster] Dulles visited London this April, we openly expressed our support for this idea. Therefore there have been no sudden or bad changes. The better our relations here, the less reason there is for making defensive arrangements elsewhere. I am above all opposed to the creation of disunity.

Zhou Enlai: I agree with your last sentence. Hardly have we promoted peace here when someone is trying again to create disunity. Our attitude towards the Paris talks is this: if they create disunity, then we oppose them; if they invite Smith to come back, then we welcome them. If they bring about dis-

unity in Southeast Asia, then we oppose them. We are in favor of peace and against disunity. This is our attitude.

Eden: The Southeast Asian pact is not a new idea, and it was not invented at the Paris talks but has been around for some time. I have just said that the better we do things here, the less we need to consider defensive arrangements.

Zhou Enlai: You can say that sentence in reverse: if someone tries to create disunity, it would bring trouble to achieving peace.

Eden: In any event, relations between our countries are good. Please do not worry about this.

1. *Editor's Note:* Eden had proposed a "Locarno type" system for guaranteeing the security of neutral states through collective defense. "Locarno" references the 1925 Locarno Treaties.



DOCUMENT No. 70

Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 13 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-05; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 7:00 p.m., 13 July 1954

Location: Premier Zhou's hotel suite

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, [PRC Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director-General] Chen Jiakang, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Chauvel: I am now presenting a document to The Honorable Premier. This document is drafted for the cease-fire agreement and some principles after the cease-fire. It also points out that the current solution is not for separate governments.

The fourth part of this document is about limiting the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia. The discussion of this issue is beyond the responsibilities of the military representatives of Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnamese government. It should belong to the nine-nation conference. Therefore, after this document is read at the conference, the representatives of Laos and Cambodia will be invited to make a statement. Their statement will be included in the document. It seems the best way to handle the situation.

Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France also talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong about this issue. Mr. Pham Van Dong believes that this document should include the French Union [as well as] French cultural and economic relations with Vietnam. We think that these issues are about the French-Vietnamese relations, not

about the conference nations. However, to restrain the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia are different issues. Thus, we would ask Mr. Pham Van Dong to re-consider this.

This is an unofficial document. Nevertheless, we have already handed it out to each delegation at the conference. We asked all the delegations to provide their additional suggestion or further corrections. So far we haven't yet got everything back from the delegations. But we have collected some of them. Mr. [Anthony] Eden is very happy with this document. The Soviet delegation shows its interest in the document. Mr. Pham Van Dong, however, responded that he agrees in principle, but he needs more time to read it carefully. Other member nations of the Union haven't sent their feedback. The American delegation hasn't yet responded to it.

Zhou Enlai: I really appreciate Mr. Chauvel's effort. As we return here, we saw this document. Even though it is a preliminary draft, it is a document for us to consider. We will study it in detail and provide our response to the French delegation as soon as possible.



DOCUMENT No. 71

Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre] Mendes-France, 17 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0007. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: Beginning at 4:45 p.m., 17 July 1954

Location: Mendes-France's Mansion

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: Our opinions are gradually getting closer now. We don't have much time, and we should reach some solutions quickly. At the present, the two issues that have been most debated are how to draw the [demarcation] line and when to hold elections. I talked to Mr. Prime Minister during the last two meetings [and said that] that we wanted to push the conference forward for a settlement. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] Now two problems remain. The three-person talks tonight and the meeting between Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Pham Van Dong should find some solutions. However, I'd like now to discuss another problem, that is, the so-called Southeast Asia Defense Pact.

After the Paris meeting, there is some recent propaganda that the United States intends to organize a Southeast Asian group, and that it also push the three countries in Indochina to participate in the organization. That is much different from what Mr. Mendes-France, Mr. Eden, and I have been talking

about. This problem causes us concern. Our wish is that a restoration of peace will be realized in Indochina, and that Laos and Cambodia will become peaceful, independent, friendly, and neutral countries. If they join America's alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. It will increase America's influence, and decrease the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is not beneficial for the Indochinese people or the French people. According to our conversations in the past meetings, I think it shouldn't happen like this. But there are so many rumors out there, as if Paris has some kind of promise. Thus, I'd like to talk to Mr. Prime Minister directly and frankly.

Mendes-France: I appreciate that Mr. Premier recalls our conversations in the past meetings and intends to maintain a consistent stance. I also want to maintain my previous position.

After our two meetings, as Mr. Premier knows, there has been some development in the situation. Our deadline—I should say my deadline—is now coming soon. But we still face many difficulties.

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

Zhou Enlai: I can't talk about this issue in detail. It should be dealt with directly by Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. Prime Minister. Mr. Prime Minister had said that the current problems are not only to draw the line, but also including the political problems. I have told this to Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. [Vyacheslav] Molotov. I guess that it may be easier to solve the two problems if we can connect them together. Tonight's meeting may bring us some results.

Mendes-France: I can now respond to Mr. Premier's concerns about the Southeast Asia alliance. I think it unnecessary for Mr. Premier to worry about this. The Paris meeting did not consider any kind of Southeast Asia alliance to include the three countries of Indochina. As far as I know, the United States does not intend to establish any military bases in Indochina. Therefore we don't need to worry about any change to our previous position in the past meetings. Certainly, if the war can't be stopped, it will be a different story. If the cease-fire becomes a reality, some country may come up with its own separate statement to strengthen its original position. Nevertheless, I want to assure Mr. Premier that we do not consider any Southeast Asia alliance to include the three countries of Indochina. Please trust me, this is my word without any reservation.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for your explanation. What we hope to see is the expansion of a peaceful region. If the United States fixes a Southeast Asia pact, including the three countries of Indochina, then, all of our efforts to push these compromises will become fruitless. That is why I want to mention my concerns.

Mendes-France: The best way to consolidate future peace is to solve the current problems reasonably. If Laos can be an example, we hope that Laos can join the French Union, and that it won't sign any military pact with other countries. Following

the regulations under the France-Laos agreements, no foreign military base can be established there. But Laos' problems remain unresolved. The Vietnamese government put forward some unrealistic requests. They suggested their regrouping area stretch from north to south nearly 1,000 kilometers. It is difficult to accept. I hope Mr. Premier can give Mr. Pham Van Dong some advice as you did on many occasions and ask him to make more realistic considerations.

Zhou Enlai: It is proper to discuss the Laos problems with Vietnam's problems such as drawing the [demarcation] line and [when to hold] elections. We have read the draft of the second political statement of the French delegation. We think it should include these issues, such as non-establishment of foreign military bases and no military alliances with foreign countries. I have mentioned this in my speeches on 16 and 19 June. Otherwise, there won't be any guarantee.

It is said that French military representatives have drafted a cease-fire proposal for Laos. [The proposal] requests that, after foreign troops withdraw, local resistance forces should regroup at certain points. Vietnam, however, asks for some pre-determined areas for the regrouping of the resistance forces, instead of regrouping at [certain] points. I think that the military staff through their negotiations can solve this problem. Moreover, this also relates to the problem of drawing the [demarcation] line in Vietnam. My hope is that Mr. Mendes-France can talk directly to Mr. Pham Van Dong again. The three-person meeting tonight may also discuss this problem.

Mendes-France: I have asked the staff of the French delegation to contact the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Hopefully, there will be some progress. Of course, the meeting with the two presidents tonight is also very important for me.

Mr. Chauvel said a little while ago that the French delegation staff had suggested to the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation [that France and the DRV should] work together and draft a political statement based on common ground. However, this task is somehow suspended right now. Hopefully, Mr. Pham Van Dong can give a push to this task.

Zhou Enlai: Besides political issues, the discussions over the cease-fire should also identify some of the main common points that may produce an agreement. Otherwise, the whole package of the truce agreement can't be put together overnight as a booklet.

Mendes-France: I fully agree with such an idea.

Zhou Enlai: Today is the 17th. It will be a success only if some agreements can be achieved on the major issues within the next two days.

Mendes-France: I am very glad to hear this word. I fully agree.



DOCUMENT No. 72

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and [Laotian Foreign Minister Phoui] Sananikone (Summary), 18 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0008. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Time: 18 July, 11:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's residence

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Dong Ningchuan (interpreter)

Attendees on the Laotian side: Sananikone, Ku Keolavong (Secretary of Defense), [Director of the General Office of the Foreign Ministry] Thao Lenam.

Sananikone: At our last meeting, the Prime Minister said that you were willing to help us solve problems, therefore I came to ask for your help today. We met with Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday and the day before yesterday. We believe that there is no problem concerning military issues which we cannot overcome. There are differences on political issues. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that first we must seriously recognize the existence of the resistance movement. Then we can delimit concentration areas and establish an independent administrative organization. This is not different from dividing our territory, and it is in fact the division of the country. It is difficult for us to accept it. Our secretary of defense also attended the meeting. Now I would like to ask him to convey our opinions to the Prime Minister.

Keolavong: Mr. Sananikone said earlier that Laos is a small country and wants to have a peaceful and friendly existence. Regarding the issue of restoring peace, we are willing to try our best to make the biggest compromise. We admit that there is a resistance movement. However, we have to point out that the resistance movement does not have a lot of influence and only has two to three thousand people. In addition, the existence of the resistance movement is based on support from the Viet Minh. Mr. Pham Van Dong suggested that the king¹ should appoint some administrative officials based on suggestions from the resistance movement. This is not suitable to our constitution. We agreed to delimit some concentration areas and to establish several joint committees and a central committee in these areas. During the time when we wait for elections, joint committees can function as a united government. We are willing to consider all suggestions. However, we cannot accept the plan to divide the country. We will be truly appreciative if the Prime Minister could consider our situation.

Sananikone: Right now what we need to achieve is the reconciliation of all the Laotian people. It is not a [true] reconciliation if we cannot live together, and we have to be separated in two different regions after the armistice. Therefore, the disadvantage of the concentration areas is bigger than the advantage.

I used to ask Mr. Pham Van Dong why they argued that we should divide [the country] like this. We all need to conduct propaganda activities freely throughout the country during the elections. If we delimit concentration areas, it will be impossible to conduct such activities. Also, they can keep cadres and weapons. They should be able to accept our plan.

[Prince] Souphanouvong has many strengths, and we all know that well. He graduated from Paris Industrial University. There are very few talented people like him in Laos. We believe that after the elections, he will surely get the most honorable position in the government. He can even be our prime minister.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you both for informing me of these situations. I would also like to give some of my opinions.

The Laotian issue can be divided into two parts to discuss: the internal one and the external one. We worked hard in June to suggest that the Vietnamese Volunteers forces and French Union forces should be withdrawn from Laos. We can then begin preparation after the above principles are decided. It is a good thing to confirm these principles in the armistice agreement on Laos. I said in my statements on 16 and 19 June, and also in my conversation with the foreign minister on the 21st, that we hope that Laos will not allow foreign countries to establish military bases within its territory or to form military alliances with foreign countries. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, unified, and friendly country with all others. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] We are neighbors. We are happy to see such a situation. It will also make us feel relieved. We believe that these points should be written into the draft agreement presented by the French delegation. However, France did not agree. This is not right. The Foreign Minister also said before that Laos would not allow foreign countries to establish military bases and would not join any foreign military group. Our common desire like this should still be achieved. Then the armistice agreement can [eventually] be reached.

Regarding internal issues, the resistance forces of Laos should recognize the Royal united government; and the Royal government should recognize the resistance forces. The number [of troops] is not an important issue. You said that there are two or three thousand of them. We think that there are more than that. It is important to contact them and then decide on concentration areas. We have already read the eleven points presented in the draft of the Laotian armistice agreement. The concentration areas are scattered in upper, central, and lower Laos, and they are too spread out. It might be because you think that the concentration areas proposed by Vietnam are too large. [However,] such a distribution of [concentration areas] will make all parties anxious and may even cause localized conflict. Therefore, we believe that large areas are better than small ones. I have already discussed this with the foreign ministers, [French Prime Minister] Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France, and Mr. [Anthony] Eden. [You] should delimit a concentration area in northeast Laos and establish a joint committee to deal with mutual and local relations. After the elections, the resistance movement [should] be able to join the Royal gov-

ernment. This is a good way to handle it.

As far as I know, no one has ever considered Laos [in the same way] as Vietnam. The delimitation of concentration areas is simply a temporary idea. Laos only has one Royal government. This is not a division of the country. After the withdrawal of all foreign forces, Laos can therefore become a peaceful, independent, and unified country. Ports around [Laos] will still be supervised in the future. Therefore, Laos's security can be guaranteed. During the armistice period, defensive weapons that Laos needs to import can be decided on through negotiations. The foreign minister said on 16 June that [members of] the resistance will be able to enjoy all civil rights and will be accepted to work [for the government?]. This is very good. Resistance forces mostly have fought the French troops. Now we need to help them and unite them. It will be great if the Royal government and Mr. Souphanouvong can meet in Laos and deal with these issues. You should start uniting them not only after the elections but also before the elections. Since Laos is a small country, it should try even harder to unite all forces within the country. I think that Mr. Pham Van Dong also shares the same thoughts.

Sananikone: I appreciate the Prime Minister's invaluable advice. It is a good basis for us to consider [those issues] carefully. We have discussed with Mr. Pham Van Dong a meeting between our prime minister [Prince Souvanna Phouma] and his brother [Prince Souphanouvong]. [We believe that] if the military conference here does not make any progress it will not be effective, even if they meet in Laos. However, if the Prime Minister believes that it is the right time for the brothers to meet, we are willing to help. In sum, our prime minister is very willing to talk directly with his brother.

Zhou Enlai: It is best [if they can] discuss internal issues directly. Mr. Pham Van Dong is simply the representative of the Laotian resistance movement and cannot discuss details. Therefore, the sooner that they meet locally the better. You are family, there will not be any problems you cannot solve. Isn't it great to have all forces of the country unified under the Royal government and have all the people of the country support the government in the future?

Sananikone: Regarding the issue of military bases, as we discussed last time, the Laotian-French agreement allowed France to keep two bases in Laos. Mr. Bidault stated at the conference that if Laos requests that France withdraw its troops from Laos, France is willing to do so after the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops. Therefore, if we ask French troops to withdraw, they will not refuse. However, we want to ask France to withdraw the majority of its troops and keep a few personnel to fulfill security needs. If the prime minister thinks that [we] should not allow the French Union troops to stay in Laos, and France is also willing to withdraw troops, then France should express its opinions at the conference. We are willing to accept that. We will follow the agreement. However, if France wants to abandon it, we will not oppose it, either.

Zhou Enlai: What kind of agreement is the Laotian-French agreement?

Sananikone: It is the agreement we signed in October

1953. Laos joined the French Union based on this agreement. If Laos is invaded, France is to provide protection. However, if the armistice agreement can be guaranteed by all participants of the conference, even by the participants of the Colombo Conference, then we will not necessarily need a guarantee from France. We think that France does not have much interest in keeping a great number of troops in Laos after the armistice since France is having economic difficulties.

I would like to ask another question. If we accept the principle of delimiting concentration areas, what areas does the Prime Minister think they should be? I hope that the Prime Minister can briefly talk to us about that so that we can consider [this issue better].

Zhou Enlai: The details should be negotiated by the Laotian military commission. I said on 21 June that concentration areas could be delimited in two provinces in northeast Laos and should not be scattered in eleven places in upper, central and lower Laos. If so, central and lower Laos can be stabilized. [You] should not [keep] too many troops there. They can be merged into the Royal army or police forces. Some of them can also be demobilized. This is only a tentative idea. What I said in June is still valid now. Some of the problems can be solved here, the others should be discussed in Laos. Regarding the issues of military bases and military alliance, we are most opposed to American bases and military alliance with the United States. I think you all know this.

Sananikone: The Laotian government has never been formally informed about these issues. We simply learned from newspapers that the United States is planning to establish a Southeast Asian Defense Pact, which will include the three countries of Indochina. However, we do not have such an idea. I have said so to many journalists.

Zhou Enlai: If the conference can reach an agreement, then we all should join together to guarantee that there will be no instances of conflict inside Laos and Cambodia. We hope that Laos and Cambodia become peaceful, neutral areas and do not join any international military groups. Otherwise, the restoration of peace will become meaningless. [*Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*]

Sananikone: If all countries join together to sign [the agreement], Laos will therefore have a guarantee and should not join any military groups.

Zhou Enlai: Perhaps you will think that China is a big country and will be anxious [about us]. However, after the peace agreement has been reached, the Kingdom of Laos will be a unified country through elections. We are willing to establish a friendly relationship with Laos. The Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence] we referred to before can also apply to the relationship between us. We are also willing to make the same statement and will keep our promise. We do not want to threaten anyone; we do not want to be threatened by anyone either.

Sananikone: Thank you very much for this very interesting conversation. We will go back and carefully consider the

points to which the Prime Minister referred. We will be back after we have reached some conclusions. We know that the Prime Minister is very busy, and we have already taken up too much of his time, please excuse us.

1. *Editor's Note:* 'King' here refers to Sisavang Vong, King of Laos.



DOCUMENT No. 73

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted Session, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Eden sent [Harold] Caccia to come and meet with Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zheng [Wentian] on the morning of the 18th. Caccia first said that he wanted to clarify one thing: if the Geneva Conference can reach an armistice agreement acceptable to all the participants, the establishment of foreign military bases in the three countries of Indochina [Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam] and the participation of the three countries in a Southeast Asia defense pact will never happen. These two issues and the issue of the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons across the border will be confirmed in either the armistice agreement or the statement by Laos and Cambodia. Caccia also said that he hoped that the atmosphere of the meeting in the afternoon would not be too tense, and [we] should not attack a certain delegate [meaning US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith] to create tension since it is harmful to the progress of the meeting. Caccia also guaranteed that the British delegation will not create tension.

(2) At the same time, Eden also met with Comrade Molotov and gave the same opinions. Comrade Molotov therefore went to consult [Pierre] Mendes-France before the meeting in the afternoon, and told him that we are willing to support his [plan to] establish a ceasefire on the 20th. The tone of the statement of our side at the meeting will be mild, too. Since our counterparts have changed and relatively softened their attitude under our pressure, we accordingly changed the tone of the text of our statement to make it milder.

(3) Comrade Molotov chaired the meeting in the afternoon. His tone was mild when he made the opening speech. He summarized the results that had been achieved [through previous meetings] and expressed his belief [that such success will continue]. He hoped that the parties concerned will display sincerity to agree on unresolved points in the agree-

ment. At last, Molotov said that he "believes that today's session will help to move forward the solution of problems." Bao Dai's Foreign Minister Tran Van Do first spoke to oppose the division [of Vietnam]. He protested it and refused [to accept] the draft declarations of both the Soviet Union and France since they all referred to the division of Vietnam into two zones. Smith spoke after that and made clear the position of the US in these critical days [of the conference]. Smith said: "The attitude of the United States toward the Geneva Conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist in arriving at an honorable settlement. Such a settlement will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and is also not willing to impose its will upon others. However, we have been very interested in this conference. If the agreement concluded here can be accepted by the American government, the American government will declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter Article II and IV, it will refrain from the threat or the use of violence to disturb this agreement."

(4) An intermission followed after Smith's speech. All the delegations became lively in the bar and energetically carried out diplomatic activities. Smith came to talk to me, and said to me: "I hope that our two countries can move toward a better mutual understanding." Smith said: [US State Department Far Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Walter S.] Robertson is sick and is staying in the United States. He asked Smith to send his regards to me. Robertson also hopes that this conference can reach a positive solution, and the relations between our two countries will be gradually improved. Eden asked me if my speech was long, and I said no. Eden said that currently there are not many unsolved problems left except the issues of division, election dates and Laos. I said that there is also the issue of the composition of the NNSC. I asked him if he had already known about the French proposal. He said that he agreed to have India as chair plus Poland and Canada [as members of the NNSC]. I agreed with that, too. Eden told Mendes-France that I agreed. Mendes-France said that was good, but he still wanted to keep it secret because he needed to deal with others. The issue of composition was thus resolved. Mendes-France told me that what he worried about was the issue of Laos. I told him that I had already given my detailed opinion to the foreign minister of Laos. He said that was good. Moreover, Bao Dai's foreign minister, Tran Van Do, talked with me through the introduction of the French delegation. The foreign minister of Cambodia asked my opinions on Cambodia's draft unilateral declaration that he presented.

(5) The atmosphere of the meeting and the intermission was very relaxed, and everyone was polite. Eden then made the suggestion to Molotov that Britain and France all believe that the meeting does not need to be continued. Comrade Molotov agreed that the meeting should be adjourned after he discussed it with us. The two chairmen also decided to announce the same communique as usual, and then the meet-



Zhou Enlai and Vyacheslav Molotov at the 1954 Geneva Conference (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives)

ing was adjourned. Neither Comrade Pham Van Dong nor I used the texts of the statements we prepared. The meeting began tensely but ended in a relaxed mood. We do not necessarily need to put any pressure on the conference since the United States made their position clear, Britain and France began showing a true spirit of conciliation, and the issue of composition has been solved. We will try to fend off [our counterparts on] other issues in these two days. If our counterparts are willing to keep making compromises, we believe that we can reach the agreement on the 20th.

Zhou Enlai
19 July 1954



DOCUMENT No. 74

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and [Harold] Caccia, 18 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-02; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 18 July 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m.

Location: Villa of the Chinese delegation

Chinese Participants: [Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (interpreter)

British Participants: [Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Administration Harold] Caccia, Ford (interpreter)

Caccia said that Eden had dispatched him because the day before Premier Zhou had mentioned certain issues regarding the Southeast Asian pact. Eden had contacted his friends and allies, and it could be said now that if the two sides could reach an agreement here, then the inclusion of the three Indochinese states in the Southeast Asian pact [Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia] absolutely would not be mentioned. The British side believed that in the resolution to be reached, these states would be neutralized so that they would not form any alliance with any side.

Ambassador Zhang then asked the question of foreign military bases. Caccia said that it was a different issue. But it was understood that such questions as bases, armed forces and military equipment would all be mentioned in the draft. So far as he knew, the agreement would include the following four issues: military alliances, military bases, entrance of foreign personnel from outside the country, and foreign arms and munitions. These decisions should apply to both sides. Ambassador Zhang said that Premier Zhou had stated repeatedly that the binding force is equal on both sides: China would not form an alliance with Vietnam, and the three Indochinese states should not enter into any alliance with other countries.

Caccia then said that he had two issues which Eden had instructed him to raise:

First was the question of Laos. Eden had heard the day before that during the French-Laotian and Vietnamese military talks, Vietnam had demanded that half of Laos be marked as the regrouping area. Eden asked China to look into the matter. Laos would soon come up with a counter-proposal detailing a series of regrouping areas, and everyone would recognize it as a sincere and good proposal. The United Kingdom hoped that everyone would deem this as a satisfactory solution. Caccia added that both Premier Zhou and Ambassador Zhang were aware that countries like India and Burma regarded the Laos question as a touchstone for testing whether we were serious about our work.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have not seen the proposal by Laos. As to our attitude towards the question of Laos, Premier Zhou has said that a regrouping area in northeastern Laos should be marked out, that it should be provisional, and that it would be reunified with Laos once the question of the resistance forces is solved in the future. As to the demand by the Vietnamese military representative, it was based on the status quo. They have not formally proposed a final regrouping area. Premier Zhou's opinion has not changed. The French delegation has proposed a series of smaller areas, which are quite scattered. We are not very supportive of this proposal. We are in favor of a single assembly area in the northeast.

Caccia said that a meeting is going to be held this afternoon, and many questions have yet to be solved. Time is short, too. Take two examples: acting on Premier Zhou's advice, [Pierre] Mendes-France went to visit Pham Van Dong and discussed the questions of demarcation and the membership of the supervisory commission. Regrettably no agreement was reached. Eden hopes that at the meeting this afternoon, the participants' attitudes will not be too stiff and polarized, which will make it even harder to solve many of the questions. Hopefully after this afternoon's meeting, everyone will come closer rather than walk farther away from each other. Mr. Ambassador certainly knows that if a delegation is attacked, its friends will come out to protect it, and such is the case with the other side. As a result, opposition

groups will be formed. The Chinese delegation can rest reassured that the British delegation will never do anything to heat up the temperature, and it hopes that the Chinese delegation will adopt the same attitude.

Ambassador Zhang said that the Chinese delegation also hopes to see everyone come closer rather than standing divided, but both sides must be willing to come closer. For example, the reason why the demarcation question has dragged on is that although the Vietnamese side has conceded to the 16th parallel, the French side still insists on the 18th parallel. If France could adjust its attitude, things would be much easier.

Caccia said, France feels that its concessions in the north could not be compensated by the Vietnamese concession from the 13th parallel to the 16th parallel.

Ambassador Zhang said, this is the opinion from the French perspective. In Vietnam's view, they have made much greater concessions, giving away their traditionally controlled zones. Both sides say that they have made enough concessions, and the question now is how to solve the problem.

Caccia said, France's basic attitude is that under no circumstances should Route 9¹ leading to Laos be controlled by Vietnam completely and unrestrictedly. Fortunately this route does not fall on the 18th parallel, otherwise we would all have to buy our return tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said, there is also the question of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This question has been under discussion for a long time, and the other side has not explicitly stated its attitude.

Caccia said, at the talk between the British, French, and Soviet foreign ministers yesterday, Eden has said that he was personally prepared to agree to have seven member states: one communist state, one non-communist state, and the five Colombo states [India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma]. Despite the rather large number of states, some of them could not supply many people. He emphasized that their side had made concessions concerning two principal issues: 1) agreeing to have a communist state as a member, and 2) agreeing to require a unanimous vote on certain issues in the voting procedures. He heard that the other side might accept this new proposal, and Molotov said he would discuss it with Pham Van Dong. Due to late time, it has not been discussed yet. Eden also mentioned a point that would have impact on both sides, which was that choosing yet another state from the Colombo states would be difficult and unfavorable to both sides, or at least the UK thought so.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have chosen two states. Moreover, the fewer the states, the easier it is for our work.

Caccia said that these states, particularly Ceylon, supplied many people.

Ambassador Zhang asked what to do with the specific date for elections. If a deadline is not set, it would be hard to explain to the Vietnamese people. With a specific date, the Vietnamese people could feel hopeful.

Caccia said that we all have to be realistic, and it is better not to promise something that one cannot reasonably accom-

plish. In fact, even without wars, countries such as India took two to three years to hold elections. He admitted that a specific date would be encouraging. He said that another solution would be not to set a definite date but stipulate that "after the armed forces are assembled, a meeting shall be held by the elections commission, a neutral nations commission, or a certain institution to determine the date for elections." Every country has its own experience regarding elections. For example, China has its own experience, France has post-World War II experience, and the UK has experience in the elections in India and Burma.

Ambassador Zhang said that our proposal for a definite date is not merely based on China's experience, but we have also sampled experience from various sides. Once a date is set, there is a goal, and the Vietnamese could see that the reunification of Vietnam is being brought about. Without a definite date, the Vietnamese would have no idea when the elections are postponed to, and when they cannot see good prospects, the people will begin to doubt.

Caccia asked Ambassador Zhang whether he felt that between the two proposed solutions, the former was better, even if the date for elections was far away, for a realistic time had to be found.

Ambassador Zhang said that a definite date has to be set. If we refer to everyone's experience, we can always find a realistic time. Time, after all, cannot be unrealistic.

In the end, Ambassador Zhang said that he would debrief Premier Zhou on the talk. Caccia also asked the Ambassador to convey the opinions on elections to Premier Zhou, and hoped that the meeting in the afternoon would not be too heated up.

1. *Editor's Note:* Route 9 is an east-west roadway located in Quang Tri province. It stretches from Dong Ha in the east to the Laotian border, via Ca Lu, Khe Sanh, and Lang Vei.



DOCUMENT No. 75

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-C0057. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 1:30 p.m. to 2:10 p.m.

Location: Premier Zhou's residence

Chinese Attendees: Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)

British Attendee: Ford (interpreter)

1. The Question of the Demarcation Line in Vietnam
Caccia said that he had reported to Eden what Ambassador Zhang said the day before. Eden had

conveyed the message to [Pierre] Mendes-France. The French side thinks that France has made considerable concessions in northern Vietnam, but the French side feels that “fortunately Route 9 does not fall on the 18th parallel.”

Ambassador Zhang asked where Eden thinks a demarcation line is south of the 18th parallel that is acceptable to the French side?

Caccia answered that there were two major considerations on this issue:

The first is Route 9, and second [is the fact that] there should be sufficient space north of Route 9 to make those who use and maintain Route 9 feel safe.

Caccia said that there are two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel, one of which enters the ocean at Dong Ha and the other at an unspecified location. These two rivers could both provide some protection for Route 9. Perhaps one of the two rivers can be chosen.

Ambassador Zhang asked whether Eden means that as long as Route 9 is safe, it would be acceptable to the French side?

Caccia said yes, but that the demarcation line should not be a preposterous line. Some topographical details must be taken into consideration, and thus a river is recommended.

Ambassador Zhang asked whether the French side insisted on Route 9?

Caccia answered that [this is] absolutely so. If this cannot be negotiated, we can only buy our tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said that he would report Eden’s opinions to the premier.

2. The Question of Date of Elections

Caccia said that he had reported to Eden the two solutions proposed by Ambassador Zhang the day before. He had also told Eden that the Chinese side was in favor of determining a date right now. He then said that based on the experience of Burma and India, it would take two to three years, and so it seems that the Soviets had promised an impossible task in their draft by proposing that the elections be held by the end of 1955. He finally said that the elections perhaps could be held in 1956, or by the end of 1956, or as early as possible in 1956.

3. The Question of Military Alliances

Caccia said that some British newspapers had run inaccurate reports of the Caccia-Zhang talk the day before, and so he would like to repeat what he had said. If an agreement could be reached here that was acceptable to all, and if the agreement stipulates the non-entry of the three Indochinese states into any military alliances, then the British side believes

that the three states will not be invited to join in any military alliances, and the United Kingdom will by no means do that. At the same time the UK believes that the Chinese side had the same attitude. Caccia went on to say that in saying so he represented not only the UK, but also the countries in the [British] Commonwealth. As to the United States, American representatives had clearly stated their attitude the previous afternoon, and this further proved what Caccia had said the previous morning.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have the same understanding of what we discussed yesterday morning.

Caccia said that, as he understood, Laos and Cambodia would issue their separate declarations saying that they would not enter into any military alliances.

Ambassador Zhang asked in what way the two sides in Vietnam would express this point?

Caccia answered that this point could be included in the armistice agreement. He promised to check the armistice agreement to see whether this point is already included.



DOCUMENT No. 76

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Pierre Mendes-France, and Eden, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-08; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 12:45 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Location: Premier Zhou’s residence

Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, [Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Foreign Minister] Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, [Director of the Foreign Ministry Staff Office] Wang Bingnan, [Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director] Chen Jiakang, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter), Dong Ningchuan (interpreter)

French Participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Jean Chauvel

British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, Ford

Mendes-France: The conference has now entered into [its] concluding stage, but the question of Laos has not seen much development. I wish to discuss this question with Your Excellency the Premier.

The question of Laos has two sides: on one hand, the restoration of peace and the problems afterwards, and on the other, the question of French troops in Laos. French troops are stationed there at the request of the Laotian government, and the number of troops is not large at around

3,000. This is a security measure to help Laos, and cannot be regarded as a danger. I have also discussed this with Mr. Pham Van Dong, and it is not necessary to worry about it. Laos has a border of about three to four thousand kilometers, and it needs an army that can maintain order and safeguard security. Therefore help from French troops is necessary. Would Your Excellency, the Premier, agree? I need to repeat that the French troops are by no means aggressive and will not threaten anyone.

Zhou Enlai: The question of the French troops stationed in Laos within a given time, at certain location, and in a certain number could be considered in connection with other questions. I wonder if the question of regrouping the Laotian resistance force in concentration areas has been solved. French troops should mostly be stationed along the Mekong River, and Xiangkhoang would be too close to the Vietnamese border.

Mendes-France: We have two bases along the Mekong River, and this should be no problem. As to the base in the Plain of Jars,¹ we can try to find another way out. We agree to a limit on the number of French troops in Laos, but in terms of duration, I hope we could reconsider the issue, for Laos needs to take some time to establish its armed forces for self-defense.

The regrouping of the resistance force in Laos is a subtle question of principle. But it should not be a big problem, since the number of the resistance troops is not large: in the beginning there were only 2,000, later the number grew to 2,500, and now it is said to be 4,000 which may not even be true. But at any rate the number is small and this question could be solved. We also agree to guarantee that these troops will be allowed to participate in state affairs and will not be retaliated upon. Their civil servants can get jobs in administrative institutions, and soldiers can be incorporated into the national army. They can be entitled to the right to vote, to be elected, and all the other civic rights. However, we do not understand why such military troops should be entitled special political rights and control a special administrative region, even part of a region. It is inappropriate when the majority does not have such political privileges while the minority does. We are willing to consider all specific suggestions in a conciliatory spirit, but it is not a good idea to partition Laos and delimit discriminatory political regions.

Zhou Enlai: The opinions that Your Excellency the Prime Minister has just stated are quite similar to mine. I discussed solutions with the Laotian foreign minister and defense minister yesterday. We believe that a distinction should be made between two questions: one is the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the other is the regrouping of local forces. These forces should be regrouped in one area, rather than at eleven points. The regrouping of the resistance force should be protected, and after the elections, they can either join the national armed forces, the

police force, or be demobilized at their own volition. Thus reunification can be realized. After the withdrawal of foreign troops, the international supervision at the ports around the country will serve as a guarantee. A further distinction should be made between two questions. The resistance force is a military organization, and it can be protected after regrouping and political work. When reunification is achieved through elections, they can be placed well. As to the question of local administration, it is a matter of internal affairs and thus the [Laotian] Royal government and the representatives of the resistance forces should meet on the spot to look for a solution. The resistance force stood in opposition to the government during the war, but now that they recognize the Royal government, the Royal government should unite with them. Mr. Mendes-France has also said that they should be granted various rights, given jobs, and placed well.

The central question now is to make the regrouping areas the areas where the resistance forces have been for a long time. This would be conducive to resolving the problem. I say candidly that we are willing to consider the French plan to retain some troops in Laos within a given time and at certain locations so as to train and strengthen Laos' self-defense forces. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, free, and friendly country, and be capable of defending itself. We believe that Mr. Mendes-France should also consider delimiting a fairly large regrouping area. Later reunification could be realized through supervised elections, and the resistance force should be taken good care of. This would be promoting reunification from another side. After the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Volunteer Forces, the resistance force should have protection.

We can promote reunification from two sides. We are willing to have Laos become a buffer zone as described by Mr. Eden. I am delighted that Mr. Eden is also here, so that we can discuss ways to reach our common goals. We should all urge upon the Royal government to assume responsibilities. When everything is done through the Royal government, it could be normalized.

Mendes-France: As Your Excellency the Premier has said, our opinions are no longer far apart. The question of French troops in Laos should be easy to solve. The retention of French troops in Laos should not cause anyone to worry; the Vietnamese People's Army should be withdrawn; the resistance forces should be well taken care of. Specific solutions to these questions should not be too difficult to find. The reason why I proposed eleven regrouping points is that we believe it to be a fairly appropriate solution. If you think there should be fewer points, it can be done easily, but it would complicate the problem to move all the people in the south to the north. Since the resistance force is all over the country, shouldn't we also consider regrouping points in the south? Most of the

people there are accustomed to local life, and the question should be solved there. The other part of the people can be transferred north. As to regrouping in the north, the question is relatively easy. We suggest that we protect the resistance force as best we can, and grant them all civic rights, but no special political rights.

Laos is a weak country; we all agree that it could be totally independent. What needs to be avoided now is that we should not give Laos and other countries the impression that just as a country is acquiring independence, people begin to consider dividing it up and marking out administrative regions with special positions. The real independence of Laos should be guaranteed, and it should not be threatened either from within or from without, otherwise it would have a negative influence on Asia and on other areas. I hope Your Excellency the Premier would pay attention to this.

Zhou Enlai: I said in a talk with Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden in June that there should be a regrouping area for the resistance force in Laos. But this is different from the situation in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two regrouping areas and two governments. Within a specific period they control their respective areas. But the regrouping areas in Vietnam are only a provisional solution, and this does not harm reunification. The proposed eleven regrouping points in Laos will not bring about stability; rather, they might cause local conflicts. The retention of French troops in Laos is to help Laos establish a force for self-defense, reunification, and independence. We will not call this French aggression, but French troops are foreign forces. The resistance forces are local forces and should be concentrated rather than scattered at eleven points. They should have protection, and after regrouping gradually participate in state affairs under international supervision. Laos is not like Vietnam, and the Royal government should be responsible for solving their problems and reassuring them.

It is possible that some people in the south do not want to move to the north. This is a political issue, and can be solved through negotiations by the representatives of the resistance force and the Royal government. Administrative questions should be separated from military questions. What I said in June was based on realistic concerns, and what I say now is the same, without any additions or reductions. On the contrary, we are willing to consider the retention of French troops in Laos. This is a new point.

Mendes-France: Now that our opinions are no longer far apart, I suggest that the discussion be continued by experts.

Eden: I hope so, too. From what we have heard, agreements have been reached on some points here. As we understand, Mr. Zhou Enlai is not opposed to the idea of a regrouping area in the south, but to the idea of eleven scattered points. I think this question can be handed to experts to be discussed along with the question of French troops in Laos.

Zhou Enlai: What I proposed in June and what I have always stated is the establishment of a regrouping area in the northeast, and not eleven scattered points. Otherwise unrest would result, and the cease-fire would not be stable. This regrouping area is only provisional, and after reunification through elections, the resistance force could become part of the Royal armed forces of part of local police forces, or simply be demobilized. This would be promoting reunification and not disunity.

Mendes-France: Regarding the question of the number and location of the regrouping areas, I think the main regrouping area can be established in the northeast. Perhaps regrouping points could still be established in the south, but as to the question of specific borders, it can be solved on the spot. After regrouping, representatives of the resistance forces can get in touch with the local authorities to solve all the problems after regrouping.

Zhou Enlai: I agree with Your Excellency the Prime Minister. The questions shall be studied by experts.

Mendes-France: The experts can meet this afternoon.

Eden: If we are through with the Laos question, I would like to propose another thing. [Mr.] Caccia and Ambassador Zhang had a very productive talk. I suggest that they talk again.

Zhou Enlai: Good. Mr. Caccia, why don't you stay for lunch so you can have a talk.

1. *Editor's Note:* A collection of fortified bunkers surrounding an airfield, this installation was built in Xiangkhoang province, near the Plain of Jars, in May 1953 as a landing point for French troops and equipment.



DOCUMENT No. 77

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, Second Meeting of 19 July, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-03; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 5:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Location: Headquarters of the British delegation

Chinese Attendees: Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

British Attendees: Ford

Ambassador Zhang said that the information that Mr. Caccia requested this afternoon would be provided now, and that he please convey it to Foreign Secretary [Anthony] Eden.

Ambassador Zhang said that the first point concerned the demarcation line. Now the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has made a further concession, i.e., accommodating the topographical details, the demarcation line is to be set ten kilome-

ters north of Route 9. If the other side still refuses to accept this, we should just buy our tickets home. According to this proposal, the security of Route 9 is no longer a problem.

Caccia said he was afraid that a ten-kilometer area might be too narrow.

Ambassador Zhang said that a five-kilometer demilitarized zone on each side of the demarcation line would be established.

Caccia said that he could not accept this proposal on behalf of the French side. He said that this matter needed to be discussed further by [Pierre] Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong, and that he believed that the French side might want a few more kilometers.

Ambassador Zhang said that the second point concerned the date for elections. The DRV has also made a further concession to hold general elections two years after the signing of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The precise date and the actual method of the elections would be negotiated by qualified and representative authorities from the northern and southern regions of Vietnam, and a decision was to be made no later than June 1955.

Caccia made no comment on this point and only said that it would be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said that the third point concerned the membership of the International Supervisory Commission. The International Supervisory Commission is to be composed of representatives from the following three countries: India, Poland and Canada, chaired by the Indian representative. This has been accepted by Mr. Eden and Mr. Mendes-France, and we can confirm it now.

Caccia said that the UK accepted this, and that France had said that it would accept it. The United States had not stated its attitude, but hopefully would accept it, too. For the sake of certainty, Caccia said that he would try to learn the American attitude and telephone the Chinese side about it.

Ambassador Zhang said that the fourth point concerned the timing of the withdrawal and transfer of troops by both sides. The regrouping of the armed forces within Vietnam is to be completed with 245 days.

Caccia said that when this question was first raised, it was divided into two parts. The first part was based upon the material conditions for the withdrawal of troops, such as the railway and ports. Based on calculations of the transportation capacity per day, France proposed 305 days, and later, after some reconsideration, proposed 260 days. The second part took into account estimates of inclement weather, and France proposed two and a half months in addition. Putting forward the present proposal of 245 days is to ask Mendes-France to entrust all his hopes to good fortune, and Mendes-France might feel dismayed by this.

Ambassador Zhang said that, according to our calculations, six months would be enough. The present proposal of 245 days has taken into consideration bad luck. Generally speaking, Mr. Mendes-France has had good luck, and only a few days of bad luck.

Caccia said that this question needed to be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said that the fifth point concerned the guarantee by all the participating countries at the Geneva Conference to negotiate the adoption of collective measures when the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission presents the problem of a breach of the agreement. This was the last article of the political declaration. The French draft used the expression "individual and collective measures," but we think it would be better if we adopt collective measures.

Caccia said that he had not seen the final draft yet, and that he could only say that he had noted our opinion. He said that US representatives said yesterday that if an agreement was reached here, they were willing to honor it. They would issue an individual statement to promise that they would not sabotage this agreement. If someone else had the intention to sabotage it, they would consider it a grave matter. These remarks by the US representatives indicated that they did not want to be bound on the issue of collective measures. Caccia then added that US representatives said yesterday that they would act in accordance with the second and fourth articles of the United Nations Charter, and that any actions taken in accordance with the UN Charter could be said to be collective in some degree. Caccia said that the question of collective measures therefore might encounter some difficulty.



DOCUMENT No. 78

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou's Meetings with Pierre Mendes-France and Eden, as well as Discussions Outside the Conference, 20 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

- (1) Mendes-France and Eden visited me in the afternoon of the 19th and focused their talks on the problems of Laos. Mendes-France said that the French troops, about 3,000 men, stationed in Laos for security reasons, [were] not threatening anyone. He agreed to numerical limit of French troops there, but didn't agree to a time limit. I said that the question of how long, which area, and how many French troops should remain stationed in Laos could be discussed with other related issues. Regarding the regrouping of the Laos resistance forces, he said that the resistance forces had only 2,000 men, not enough to control a special administrative region. I told him that the resistance troops should regroup in one area, not spread to eleven points (the French proposal suggest-

ed eleven points). With respect to their local administration, it is their own domestic affairs that should be discussed through the local contacts between Royal government and resistance force representatives. Mendes-France said that the regrouping points could be reduced, but it would become complicated if all the troops had to move from the south to the north for regrouping since the resistance forces were all over the country. Determining certain regrouping points in the south may be considered, since most people over there have become used to the way of their local life, so that it should be solved locally. I said that the eleven points for regrouping in Laos would not bring peace and stability, and could cause some local conflicts. The resistance forces are local troops that should group together, not disperse to eleven points. They should be protected. After their assembly, they will gradually participate in the life of the state under international supervision. Laos is different from Vietnam. Its Royal government will be responsible for the armed forces so that they will not worry. If someone doesn't want to go to the north, the resistance movement and Royal government could send representatives to meet and discuss this matter. Then Eden asked me whether I oppose one regrouping area in the south. I didn't answer him. Lastly, Mendes-France said that our opinions are not too far apart and that [we should] let the experts continue their discussions. He also agreed that the main regrouping areas be in the northwest, and said that there still may be a regrouping area in the south. The specific limits of the areas can be determined on the spot. After the regrouping, the commanding officers of the resistance troops can establish contact with the local governments in order to cope with all the issues after regrouping.

- (2) After my meeting with Mendes-France and Eden, Eden's assistant, Caccia, who came with Eden, stayed and talked to Ambassador [to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhang [Wentian] about the problem of drawing the line. Caccia said that France definitely wanted to have Route 9. "If this cannot be not negotiable, we all have to buy our train tickets and go home." He also demanded to have enough areas north of Route 9 in order to secure the [French troops'] safety. He suggested that one of the two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel could be chosen as the line. Regarding the election date, he proposed it [be held] during 1956. Talking about the military alliance, Caccia described the position of [the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth] as the following. If an agreement accepted by all the delegations were reached here and the agreement stipulates that the three countries of Indochina [Vietnam,

Cambodia, Laos] cannot participate in any military pact, Britain thereby believes that the three countries are not supposed to be invited [to the Southeast Asian military pact]. And Britain itself won't [invite them]. He said that Laos and Cambodia would make their [own] announcements respectively, saying that they will not join any military alliance.

- (3) The delegations of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam have discussed the final proposal this afternoon, and have presented it to Britain. The main points of the proposal have been telegraphed [to Beijing] yesterday.
- (4) I met [V.K. Krishna] Menon this evening. I told him about the proposal that had been presented to Britain. He said that France hopes to draw the line in the area near a river. Regarding the election date, Menon suggested not having a scheduled election date, but scheduling the date for forming an election committee. I firmly opposed his suggestion and said that there is an agreement that the election will be under international supervision. If an election committee is formed, it needs to have both sides plus another country. This may cause foreign intervention in domestic affairs. Both sides in Vietnam won't accept this kind of suggestion. And China does not agree [with it] either.
- (5) Comrade Pham Van Dong met Mendes-France again during the night. Mendes-France proposed to draw the line along the provincial border between Quang Binh and Quang Tri, that is, the 17th Parallel. Pham did not respond. Mendes-France agreed to set up the troop withdrawal deadline within 245 days. But he asked for two more months as a psychological preparation period. He agreed with our proposing the election date, that is, two years. The first year is for discussions and negotiations. Mendes-France disagreed with the gradual withdrawal. Regarding the protection of French economy and business in Vietnam, he presented a new proposal asking for much more than that [contained in] the previous proposal. In short, the only solution so far is the election date.

Zhou Enlai

20 July 1954, 12:00 p.m.



DOCUMENT No. 79

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan (Summary), 20 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0008. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Time: 20 July 1954, 11:00 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's residence

[Attendees on] the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Chen Dingmin (interpreter and recorder)

[Attendees on] the Cambodian side: Tep Phan, [Head of Cambodian military delegation at the Geneva Conference, Nhiek] Tioulong, [personal delegate to the King of Cambodia] Sam Sary, Thao Lenam.

Zhou Enlai: We have almost finished our working documents except for some problems concerning the Cambodian issue. We will work harder on them and hopefully we can reach an agreement at the same time [with the other agreements] at today's meeting. I have already read two documents concerning Cambodia: one was [issued on] 16 July, the other was [issued on] 19 July. We have already discussed the longer document, but have not yet discussed the shorter one in detail.

Tep Phan: We have not yet read the document of 19 July. We received a new proposal from the Vietnamese side on Sunday evening [18 July]. Our opinions still have differences regarding political issues and some on military issues as well.

Zhou Enlai: We also have something in common. We can discuss the differences.

Tioulong: It is difficult for us to accept some of the suggestions from the Vietnamese side. We have currently prepared a joint statement for the conference. We also have a unilateral statement to be presented to the conference by the Cambodian delegation. Some points we referred to in the unilateral statement can also be included in the joint statement. There are also some differences regarding military issues. We have not yet exchanged our opinions with the Vietnamese delegation. I wanted to meet with the Vietnamese delegation yesterday but was not able to do so since they were very busy. I hope I can meet with them today. As the Cambodian delegation claimed in the unilateral statement presented to the conference, we will not discriminate against Vietnamese elements in Cambodia. They will enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other Cambodian citizens. We definitely will not discriminate against them. We will make no reprisals against either themselves or their families. After they have returned to civilian life, they can be employed by administrative organizations on the same terms as other citizens.

We would also like to talk with you about [military] personnel. After peace is restored, they can enter military institutes, military academies, and military training schools.

Regarding the issue of foreign military personnel, [we

believe that this issue] should be distinguished from [other military issues]. There are French combatant personnel in Cambodia; there are also technicians and experts here, and they are not soldiers.

We accept the provisions of the joint statement claiming that there should be no combatant personnel in Cambodia; however, we should be allowed to keep foreign technicians and experts there. The number [of such people] will not be too many.

In addition, there is [a difference regarding] the issue of the introduction of weapons and armaments. We have already talked about that last time. Under the condition that we do not threaten our neighbors, we wish to be allowed to introduce a certain number of weapons and armaments for our own security reasons. Our troops are in the process of being consolidated. This is for the protection of our own country's security.

Now I would like to talk about other differences [between the Vietnamese and us]:

First of all, the Viet Minh suggested a six-month period for withdrawal. This is too long. According to our side's estimate, it will only take one month to withdraw the Viet Minh troops and elements from Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai: The areas are too spread out. There are some difficulties for them to withdraw.

Tioulong: But six months is still too long. There is another suggestion that we cannot accept: the Viet Minh suggested that people who were originally non-Cambodian nationals should remain armed until the general elections or even until the realization of the unification of Cambodia.

Tep Phan: It is unreasonable for us to keep these armed elements gathered in local areas. We hope that all people in Cambodia can join the national community life. It does not matter whether they originally grew up in Cambodia or came here later. In addition, according to our constitution, [military] personnel cannot participate in general elections.

Zhou Enlai: Why is that?

Tep Phan: According to our constitution, people on active service do not have the right to participate in elections or to be elected either.

Zhou Enlai: Don't you have a system of military service?

Tep Phan: Yes, we do have one. France and many European countries all have this system.

Zhou Enlai: American servicemen can participate in elections.

Tioulong: French police officers can participate in elections. In our country, servicepersons cannot participate in elections; monks do not participate in elections either.

Tep Phan: There are about 60,000 monks in our country. None of them participate in elections.

Zhou Enlai: Why?

Tep Phan: Because they renounce the world, and stand aloof from worldly affairs. They are not interested in politics. The monks I am talking about are people who wear the yellow *kasaya* robe. In our country everyone is Buddhist.

Tioulong: There is another issue. Some people also ask us to declare that we will not establish military bases within

our own territory.

Tep Phan: Our country is an independent country. We need to have our own military bases and airports for defensive purposes.

Zhou Enlai: This is ridiculous. Of course [you] should not make strict rules like these.

Tep Phan: It is completely for self-defense. Every Cambodian believes in the independence of our country. We should have the right to build our own bases and airports within our own territory.

Zhou Enlai: You surely can build your own airports.

Tioulong: In addition, the Vietnamese proposal suggested that we should withdraw our troops two kilometers from each side of the road along which they are to withdraw their troops. We cannot accept that either, since the width of two kilometers extends to places we live. However, our side agreed to guarantee their security when the Viet Minh withdraw their troops. We are also getting ready to provide them all with conveniences and we will provide the means of transportation such as trains, trucks and ships on the railway, on the road and on the sea. We are willing to do so. The above are the differences concerning military issues I would like to point out.

Sam Sary: There is another difference regarding the type and amount of the military personnel and weapons imported to Cambodia. [Although they said to] discuss it separately, it is not clear enough to us. With whom on earth should we discuss this? When should we discuss it? And where should we discuss it? I was wondering if we can present the issue in the unilateral statement of the Cambodian delegation on whether we are allowed to introduce a certain number of weapons and military personnel for the requirements of territorial defense.

[*Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*]

Tioulong: [Mr. Prime Minister,] our opinions on general and even practical issues can be quite close to [yours] when we discuss them with you. However, they are different [when we talk with] the [Vietnamese] side.

It is also worth studying the way we express ourselves. [For example,] what issues we need to raise in the joint statement for the conference, and what issues we can raise in the unilateral statement of our delegation.

It is stipulated in Chapter 3 Article 5 of the draft armistice agreement of Cambodia: after the restoration of peace in Cambodia, the original non-Cambodian elements can be accepted in the Cambodian Royal Army or local police forces or can be demobilized based on their own free will. After they are demobilized and become civilians they can be employed by all administrative or other organizations of the Royal government of Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai: I appreciate that you raised all these differences in detail.

Tioulong: We fully intend to make more efforts to help reach the agreement. We hope that we can revise the documents. Moreover, we believe that it is necessary to let our



Tracking the Dragon: US National Intelligence Estimates on China 1948-1976
Woodrow Wilson Center, November 2004

(L to R) Samuel F. Wells (Wilson Center), Chen Jian (Cornell), Kathryn Weathersby (Wilson Center), CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann

counterparts understand that the agreement should be reached on an equal footing.

I would also like to discuss the suggestion that we should gather these elements together and not disarm them temporarily. However, if they do not enter the military academy, they cannot obtain military ranking. They will be trained at the military academy and should pass their exams. Other service persons will oppose them if these people obtain military positions without military training and passing exams.

Tep Phan: We would like to have the Premier's opinions on the issues we presented.

Zhou Enlai: I appreciate the differences you presented. We all hope that we can reach an agreement at today's meeting. We do not have much time left, so let's make some efforts together. I deeply regret that agreements on all other issues have already been reached except the issue of Cambodia.

What we have to do now is to work to resolve our differences. We believe that we can settle the differences. I have already said many times that the basic principles concerning restoration of peace in Cambodia are independence, foreign non-intervention, unification and the integrity of sovereignty. We said on 16 June that we had been insisting on and giving support to such an argument. [We hope that we can] reach a reasonable solution that will not interfere with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia and will take care of both internal and external [issues].

The Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces [*Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*] will definitely withdraw. Regarding the issues of the period of withdrawal and of passing through the withdrawal route, if [you think] the period is too long, [we can ask them to] cut it short. [However,] one month is too short. Sooner or later they will withdraw.

Regarding the security issue of the withdrawal, the issues of the joint commission and international supervision and the

issue of the means of transportation, [we believe that] all these issues can be solved since you have already said that you are willing to cooperate.

Regarding internal issues, you should categorize all the soldiers in Cambodia taking their wishes into consideration. Some of them originally lived there and do not want to leave. Some of them are from Cochinchina. However, [you] should not discriminate against them. If some of them hope to stay in Cambodia, you surely cannot expel them. However, they should obey the Kingdom's laws.

Tioulong: Do you mean those elements who joined the resistance movement? People who enter Cambodia from Cochinchina need passes. We inspect all persons who enter Cambodia from foreign countries. [Only after we check] whether they are honest and act dutifully, will we allow them to enter. We have already informed the Vietnamese side about this.

Tep Phan: They surely can choose to leave or stay in Cambodia of their own free will. However, we have to check whether or not they are honest. Only people who act dutifully can stay in our country. We cannot let those dishonest people, even bandits, stay in our country. We must take the necessary measures since we are worried about our national security. Mr. Premier, can we make decisions for our internal affairs?

Zhou Enlai: You surely have the right to deal with [your] internal affairs. However, you should not expel them and create tension. The Royal government should not persecute those who want to stay in Cambodia and are willing to obey the laws. [The Royal government] should not discriminate against those who used to cooperate with the other side, either.

Tep Phan: We have our own constitution and laws. Our constitution is democratic.

Zhou Enlai: Regarding the armed forces of Cambodia, [you] can first gather them on the spot, and then settle problems with peaceful and political solutions. Try your best to accept them into military and administrative services. As you just said they can enter the military academy or have other choices based on their own will. Regarding political issues, [you] should pay attention to three points:

1. Do not persecute people who used to cooperate with the other side.
2. Arrange suitable jobs for them.
3. Since they still have some political organizations, parties and other groups, you should recognize their legal positions based on the constitution. You can meet and negotiate with the leaders of local political organizations.

Tep Phan: We have always gotten in touch with them until now.

Zhou Enlai: It is possible. As long as you keep the door open, you can reach an agreement. Regarding general problems of military issues, [you should] not introduce new troops and weapons from abroad, establish foreign military bases, or join military alliances. The necessary type and amount of weapons that are defined as [being] for the self-defense of Cambodia is not included in this limitation.

Tep Phan: The word "self-defense" can be described by

two words in French. One is *autodefense*, the other is *defense a l'interieur du pays* (domestic defense). We prefer the second one since the first, "self-defense," which can also be translated as local defense.

Zhou Enlai: I can agree with this.

Tioulong: Mr. Pham Van Dong also used the word self-defense. Regarding the prohibition of the introduction of weapons, we also cannot agree with their interpretation. They even included shotguns. Meanwhile, we need to add "when Cambodia is not invaded by foreign countries or threatened by foreign invasion" to the provision [that Cambodia] "should not establish foreign military bases and join military alliances."

Zhou Enlai: We can consider that.

Tep Phan: Our country is an independent country. Don't we have the right to sign agreements with foreign countries?

Zhou Enlai: Of course you do if you sign a trade agreement.

Tep Phan: What if we sign a military agreement with China?

Zhou Enlai: China has never signed any agreement of military alliance with any country. Regarding French military personnel who are training the troops [of Cambodia]...

Tioulong: (Interrupt) France or foreign countries?

Tep Phan: It's not limited to France. Regarding France, we...

Tioulong: (Interrupt) We have the experience of being ruled by France for several decades. We will not be interested in French "aid" anymore.

Zhou Enlai: You should not be pro-America, either.

Tep Phan: We won't. Even Mr. [General Walter Bedell] Smith said that the United States has no intention of providing aid.

Zhou Enlai: Smith can speak like that. However, there are still people like [US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur W.] Radford and Vice President [Richard] Nixon in the American government.

Sam Sary: We can still establish technical collaboration with countries like India and China.

Tep Phan: However, we are cautious about France.

Tioulong: We are cautious about the cooperation of French experts and technicians, too.

Zhou Enlai: France has somehow changed its attitude recently.

Tep Phan: We still have to reconsider joining the French Union. Last time when we discussed drafting documents with the French delegation, we asked them not to add the point regarding joining the French Union to the documents.

Tioulong: Personally, I have already met with the Premier three times. However, I have never met Mendes-France.

Tep Phan: We are not interested in joining the French Union [since] we do not want to be ruled by them anymore. France is no better than the Viet Minh.

Zhou Enlai: However, being pro-America is even worse. China has its experience [of dealing with the US]. Sino-British relations have a long history. The United States was a newcomer. America's attitude was relatively moderate at first.

However, it changed after the United States excluded British influence [from China] after World War II.

Tep Phan: I understand that.

Zhou Enlai: It is good that you understand it. The time for the meeting is approaching. I hope that you can reach an agreement with the Vietnamese delegation regarding these issues at the meeting in the afternoon. We will also push the Vietnamese side forward so that the meeting can be successful.

Tep Phan: Thank you very much for your help. [*Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*]

Zhou Enlai: I am sure that Vietnam does not have any such intention. Chairman Ho Chi Minh firmly clarified the position of Vietnam when I met with him on the Guangxi border this time. He promised that Vietnam would not invade any countries because an invasion is destined to fail. I am telling you the truth since we are all relatives.

Tep Phan: Yes. We need to protect our independence because we want to survive. Our situation is very difficult since our neighbors, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are all big countries. Since our country is a small country, we have no intention of attacking others and only hope that we can survive. In addition, the religion in which we believe does not allow us to attack others.

Zhou Enlai: Your situation is relatively good. The conference will publish a joint statement to guarantee [the armistice], and you have the support of the participants of the Colombo Conference [India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma]. It is much better than [the situation in] Korea.

Tioulong: I understand this. Cambodia will be a new country after peace is restored. As in China, all the people [of Cambodia] need to make efforts to build up [our country]. The Chinese and Cambodian people also have a blood relationship. For example, I myself have Chinese blood. My grandfather is Chinese. You can tell that from my name. My [last] name is Tioulong.

Zhou Enlai: Very good.

Tioulong: Our peasants cultivate [crops] and merchants do business. We all hope to live in peace. It will make our economy develop. We are currently opening up wasteland for development.

Zhou Enlai: We all want peace. The Chinese people are also conducting peaceful development.

Tep Phan: The help we get from you can speed up the achievement of the agreement, and will therefore help us obtain peace and independence. We will need China's help at all different levels in the future.

Zhou Enlai: Yes. We also welcome you to come to visit China in the future if you have the chance.

Tep Phan: We would love to. Thank you.

Zhou Enlai: We will even have diplomatic relations in the future.

Tep Phan: Yes. (Standing at the door and leaving.)

Tep Phan: We appreciate the Prime Minister's help. We hope that Cambodia will become an independent and free

country and will peacefully coexist with all its neighbors after peace is restored.

Zhou Enlai: I also hope that the friendship between the people of our two countries will be improved.



DOCUMENT No. 80

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against the United States and Jiang Jieshi after the Geneva Conference, 27 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-11; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Ambassador Zhang [Wentian], convey to Premier Zhou (top secret)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the agreements in Korea and Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policy of creating international tension for the purpose of further taking over more spheres of influence from Britain and France, of expanding military bases for preparing for war, and remaining hostile to our Organization of Defense, and of rearming Japan. The United States will surely continue to use Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of ships from various countries coming to our country, and it is likely to expand the sphere of blockade of our country to the areas off the Guangdong coast and to the Gulf of Tonkin area. Recently the United States and Jiang Jieshi have been discussing signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and the United States has repeatedly increased military aid to the Jiang bandits in Taiwan. All of this is worthy of our main attention. According to public information, it seems as if the United States still has some concerns about signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and it seems as if they have not made a final decision. But if the United States and Jiang sign such a treaty, the relationship between us and the United States will be tense for a long period, and it becomes more difficult [for the relationship] to turn around. Therefore, the central task of our struggle against the United States at present is to break up the US-Jiang treaty of defense and the Southeast Asian treaty of defense.

We believe that after the victorious conclusion of the war of liberation on our mainland and the victorious armistice of the Korean War, now we are still facing another war, that is, the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandit bloc in Taiwan. Now we are still facing a task, that is, the task of liberating Taiwan. After the end of the Korean War, we failed to highlight the task [the liberation of Taiwan] to the people throughout the entire coun-

try in a timely manner (we were late by about six months). We failed to take necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we are committing a serious political mistake. The introduction of the task is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-Jiang plot to sign a military treaty; rather, and more importantly, by highlighting the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the people of the whole country; we mean to stir up our people's revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation's socialist reconstruction. In addition, we can use this struggle to enhance our fulfilling of the task of national defense, and learn how to carry out maritime struggle.

Toward this issue the Central Committee has adopted the following measures:

- (1) In the political field, a propaganda campaign emphasizing that we must liberate Taiwan and exposing the Americans and Jiang has already begun at home. We are also prepared to issue an open statement about the Taiwan issue in the name of the foreign minister after your return to Beijing, which will be followed by a joint statement by the representatives of various parties. Then, in accordance with the two statements, broad, profound, and prolonged propaganda and education will be carried out among the people of the whole country. In addition, we are organizing broadcast specifically aimed at Taiwan.
- (2) In the military field, the Military Commission has already issued a special instruction for enhancing naval and air operations against the Jiang bandits in coastal areas. In the meantime, it is strictly regulated that the operation targets of our navy and air force should be restricted to Jiang Jieshi's military planes and vessels, and, toward American planes and warships, unless under the circumstance that they attack our troops, they are not permitted to take the initiative for attacks. The shooting down of a British transporter close to Yulin on 23 July was a mistake that is completely possible to be avoided. Apart from taking diplomatic measures to manage this, we also should use this accident to carry out serious education among our troops.
- (3) Considering that our struggles against the Americans and Jiang in the coastal area will be a matter of a very long period, and that our troops lack the capacity and experience for maritime struggles, it should become a long-range task to enhance the construction of our navy and air force. Our navy should follow a policy of first constructing boats and then constructing ships, and our air force should learn to carry out

operations over the sea. In order to meet the needs of the struggle at the present time with urgency, we plan to increase orders for naval and air force equipment from the Soviet Union in the next three years. The Military Commission has put forward an order of 500 million rubles. There is no financial or budgetary difficulty for putting forward such an order. However, we should find more ways to get foreign aid. About this we will discuss and make decisions after you have come back home.

Please report the above policies and measures to the comrades of the Soviet Party central leadership, and ask for their opinions.

Apart from the above, the various aspects of domestic situation are good, except that the flooding disaster of this year is quite serious.

The Central Committee,
27 July 1954



Russian Documents on the 1954 Geneva Conference

Introduction by Paul Wingrove

The documents printed below, while only fragments of a more substantial record of the 1954 Geneva Conference, offer partial illumination of the degree of co-ordination between the communist participants, of their negotiating tactics, and of the posture adopted by Soviet foreign minister and delegation chief Vyacheslav M. Molotov in his discussions with his French and British counterparts Pierre Mendes-France and Anthony Eden.¹

The two key issues at the conference concerning Indochina were the temporary line of demarcation to be drawn in Vietnam, and the timing of the elections which were to unify Vietnam. Molotov was aware that the Chinese, participants at the conference with security interests of their own, had held internal discussions on these matters some time before the opening of the conference, informing him as early as March 1954 that the 16th parallel would be an appropriate dividing line and “to Ho Chi Minh’s advantage”² [Document #1]. Yet in conversation with Mendes-France at Geneva, the Soviet foreign minister, perhaps only somewhat formally, pressed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s case for the 13th/14th parallel, which would later become the “concession” of a division somewhere between the 14th and 16th parallels, before finally the 17th parallel was agreed.

Similarly, the DRV position on the timing of elections (to be held within six months) was to be settled on the basis of a compromise. PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, in particular, showed his flexibility and influence on this issue [Document #5].

While throughout the conference China exerted considerable influence on the DRV delegation, the impression from these documents is that of a similarly influential Soviet delegation which was primarily interested in a political solution, rather than pressing hard for maximum advantage. The Chinese view

of what would constitute an acceptable solution to the Vietnam conflict was, no doubt, strongly argued when Zhou Enlai met with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap at Liuzhou, China, in early July 1954 [Document #3].

Aside from specific issues, the mood and dynamics of the conference were determined by the knowledge that the US was a reluctant participant, unwilling to sign an agreement that other parties—for very different reasons—were keen to conclude, but which, from the American point of view, might amount to enshrining French military defeat in a dishonorable document. Molotov’s conversations with Mendes-France and Eden demonstrate the degree of his willingness to settle at Geneva and an acknowledgement that the US position was outside the penumbra of accommodation. In the end, the settlement was, one might say, agreed over the heads of the US and the DRV, who were to leave Geneva somewhat dissatisfied with the results of the many weeks of negotiation.

1. For a fuller explanation of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003).

2. This was only one of the factors which, many years later, led the Vietnamese to accuse China of ‘betrayal’ of the DRV at Geneva—see the ‘White Book’—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam: *The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over The Last Thirty Years* (1979), 16-23. It might be noted that the White Book states that China proposed the 16th parallel ‘as early as May 1954’ (21).



DOCUMENT No. 1

From the Journal of [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation between Molotov and PRC Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zhang Wentian, 6 March 1954¹

[Source: AVPRF f. 6, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 7. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

PRC Embassy Counsellor He Bao-Xian and [Soviet Foreign Ministry Collegium Member Nikolai T.] Fedorenko were present.

Zhang Wentian says that Cdes. [CCP CC Vice Chairman] Liu Shaoqi, [PRC Premier and Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai, [PRC Vice-Chairman] Zhu De, and other CCP CC members have requested that their greetings be passed to Cde. Molotov.

Molotov thanks them.

Zhang Wentian reports that the PRC government and the Chinese people, noting the considerable success of the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference, support the decision adopted about convening the Geneva Conference.

He says that, although the Americans will try to wreck the Geneva Conference, the representatives of the democratic camp will try to make full use of the conference in order to lessen international tensions.

He stresses that the PRC is intent on taking an active part in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC.

Molotov expresses approval of the PRC's intention to take an active part in the Geneva Conference.

Zhang Wentian says that in connection with the Geneva Conference, Nam Il, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Beijing on 5 March at the invitation of the PRC government.

He reports that the PRC government intends to prepare maximum and minimum positions [*programmy*] on the Korea question. The maximum position envisions the following proposals:

1. The creation of an all-Korean committee of representatives of North and South Korea on an equal basis to govern the country until the formation of an all-Korean government.
2. The holding of general elections.
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops.

4. The unification of Korea.

In the event that this position is not adopted, propose a reduced position, namely: the preservation of the existing situation, the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops, and the regulation of economic, trade, and other relations between North and South Korea.

He noted that both these positions are based on the example of the position of the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference.

He says that the Indochina issue is more complex. Here we are talking about a cease-fire. However, the conditions for ending the war in Indochina are important. Accordingly there ought to be negotiations. This is a lengthy process.

Molotov says that, according to press reports, this process might last two or three months, but in the opinion of several foreign observers mentioned in the foreign press, it could drag out until November. The issue is complex, of course.

Zhang Wentian says that [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru's proposal about "a cease-fire in place" is hardly acceptable since the conditions for ending the war are important.

He points out that it is necessary to halt American aid to Indochina, otherwise the war will drag out.

Molotov says that if the French want to reach agreement then it is of course necessary to know on what conditions.

Zhang Wentian reports that a proposal about a demarcation line at the 16th parallel exists. This proposal is to Democratic Republic of Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh's advantage and it ought to be accepted if it is officially submitted.

He says that it is advisable to invite Ho Chi Minh to Beijing at the end of March. At this point the ambassador asks about the possibility of inviting Ho Chi Minh to Moscow for a discussion of the position at the Geneva Conference and also for a discussion of intra-party [*sic*] issues in the CPSU CC.

Molotov favors the possibility of inviting Ho Chi Minh to Moscow, but adds that the CPSU CC ought to discuss this issue.

With regard to the issue of an invitation to the Geneva Conference, Zhang Wentian speaks of the desirability of inviting representatives not only of democratic Vietnam during discussion of the issue of Indochina but also democratic Pathet Lao and Cambodia since the representatives of these three democratic countries are a counterbalance to an invitation to the three Associated States.² Otherwise the Pathet Lao and Cambodian representatives will have to be included in the

Vietnamese delegation.

Molotov says that this issue ought to be carefully considered.

Zhang Wentian explores the possibility of a discussion of other issues at the Geneva Conference such as, for example, the issues of Taiwan, the [re]armament of Japan, the US military agreement with Pakistan, and others.

Molotov says that the possibility of a discussion of these issues ought to be studied but it seems to him that such a possibility is by no means precluded.

Zhang Wentian reports that, bearing in mind the agreement of the four [foreign] ministers in Berlin,³ Zhou Enlai is preparing for a trip to Geneva to take part in the conference, considering that the representative of the Soviet Union will be Cde. Molotov.

Molotov acknowledges the agreement in Berlin on this issue and adds that possibly the ministers will not participate in the conference to the end since it will be protracted.

Zhang Wentian explains the advisability of the PRC, DPRK, and Vietnamese delegations coming to Moscow for several days in the middle of April (between the 10th and the 20th) to coordinate their positions at the Geneva Conference.

Molotov says that such a meeting would be necessary and useful for the matter.

He expresses confidence that the Chinese and Korean comrades are prepared to discuss the Korean issue in a suitable fashion inasmuch as they are better informed in this regard. He also expresses confidence that the issue of Indochina will be properly prepared by the Chinese and Vietnamese comrades, who have the appropriate opportunities to do this.

Zhang Wentian says that work in Beijing has already begun: personnel are already being selected, draft proposals [are being] developed, etc. He notes that the Chinese comrades are counting on aid from the Soviet side.

Molotov promises aid and talks of the need for joint efforts.

Referring to his lack of experience, Zhang Wentian asks that a competent USSR foreign ministry specialist be selected to help the Chinese diplomatic officials in Moscow by sharing experience in the organizational work at international conferences, the methods and techniques of bourgeois representatives, etc.

Molotov promises to grant this request and points out that

the ambassador can deal with these issues with [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister] Cde. [Andrei A.] Gromyko, who has a great deal of experience in taking part in international conferences. He says that the work in the USSR foreign ministry to prepare for the Geneva Conference will be primarily done by Cdes. Gromyko, [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov, Novikov, and Fedorenko.

Zhang Wentian reports that the PRC government has empowered him, Zhang Wentian, with maintaining constant contact with the USSR foreign ministry about questions of preparations for the Geneva Conference and has also included him in the PRC delegation to this Conference.

Molotov expresses approval.

Zhang Wentian touches on procedural issues at the Geneva Conference and is interested in particular in the possibility of Zhou Enlai chairing the conference and other things.

Molotov says that many procedural issues will arise at the Geneva Conference, the chairmanship, the staff, the premises [*pomeshchenie*], etc. Disputes and discussions are unavoidable. Consequently, it is necessary to make suitable preparations and develop our plan of action here.

Zhang Wentian is interested in the possibility of inviting representatives of neutral countries to the Geneva Conference, India in particular.

Molotov says that the composition of the participants on the Korean issue has been precisely determined but that this remains insufficiently clear regarding the Indochina issue, and serious disputes are possible here.

Regarding the question of inviting India, he says in that regard that its participation in the Geneva Conference is inadvisable since this could lead to a reduction of the role of the PRC which ought to be on par with the four other great powers, which India cannot claim to be. He notes, however, that some in foreign circles favor inviting India and Thailand about the Indochina issue and this question ought to be considered further.

The conversation lasted one hour.

Recorded by N. Fedorenko

Authenticated by Oleg Troyanovsky /signature/

Distributed [to]:

Cdes. Malenkov

Molotov

Khrushchev

Voroshilov

Bulganin
Kaganovich
Mikoyan
Saburov
Pervukhin

N° 151/M

21 copies sent nf/tb

1. *Editor's Note:* The document bears the stamp RF Foreign Policy Archive, 06/13a/25/7, /signature/ V. Molotov, Distributed to CPSU CC Presidium members.

2. *Editor's Note:* The Associated States of Indochina were Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

3. *Editor's Note:* The 1954 Berlin Conference, among the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France, and the USSR, was convened on 25 January 1954. The agreement (referenced here) to hold the Geneva Conference was made in a quadripartite communique of 18 February.



DOCUMENT No. 2

From the Journal of [Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Beijing] V. V. Vaskov, 27 August 1954: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong on 5 July 1954¹

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, papka 379, d. 7, ll. 69-70. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Paul Wingrove.]

Today at 7 p.m. I visited Comrade Mao Zedong and, on instructions from Moscow [*Tsentr*], informed him that the CPSU CC considers it necessary to take advantage of the favorable circumstances developing in France to find a resolution of the Indochina question. In this connection Comrade Molotov will arrive in Geneva on 7 July, intending to meet with Mendes-France before the start of the official sessions. I further informed him that in the opinion of the CPSU CC it would be good if Comrade Zhou Enlai could arrive in Geneva before 10 July. I further informed him that the foreign ministers of England and France would be informed, through the Soviet embassies in London and Paris, that V. M. Molotov would arrive in Geneva before 10 July, in order to rest for a few days before the start of the sessions.

Mao Zedong said that he considered us to be absolutely correct in seeking to take advantage of the improving situation in France to resolve the Indochina question. At the same time he told me that Zhou Enlai was at present in Liuzhou [Guangxi province] where he was holding discussions with [Vietnamese leaders] Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. These discussions should be concluded on 5 July. Under favorable conditions Zhou Enlai would be able to arrive in Beijing no earlier than 6/7 July. He would be able to fly from Beijing to Moscow on

9/10 July and, thus, would in practice only be able to arrive in Geneva by 12/13 July.

Later, in the course of the conversation, Mao referred to the recently concluded [informal] discussions between [British Prime Minister Winston] Churchill and [US President Dwight D.] Eisenhower [in Washington]. Mao said that he had read with great interest an article devoted to these talks, translated from "Pravda" of 3 July. Mao noted that while the US government was slamming the door on talks with the USSR and other countries of the democratic camp, the British government was expressing itself in favor of these talks. Churchill, boasting of his services as an old fighter against communism, nonetheless declared to the Americans that he was in favor of talks with the communists and of peaceful co-existence with the communist countries. Obviously, remarked Mao ironically, the international situation is such that even reactionary figures like Churchill are beginning to acknowledge Marxist-Leninist principles in foreign policy.

As for the US, Mao continued, they have spread their forces across the globe, but in the event of significant international complications that does not bode well for them. That is why the US tries by all means of its aggressive policy to revive the armed strength of West Germany and Japan. However, relying on West Germany and Japan, in the light of opposition to American policy in those countries, as well as in other countries, especially France, is an uncertain position for the US.

During the conversation Mao gave me, for my information, Zhou Enlai's telegram sent from Liuzhou on 4 July (we have sent the translated telegram by telegraph to Moscow). The conversation took place in Mao Zedong's apartment and lasted 30 minutes. The CCP CC director of foreign affairs, Yang Shangkun, and the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, I. I. Safronov, were also present during the conversation.

1. *Editor's Note:* The document bears the stamp of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far-East Department, Incoming No. 02768 31.8.1954, as well as a few illegible signatures, one of which is dated 2.IX.



DOCUMENT No. 3

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of Mendes-France, French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 10 July 1954, 9:30 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks the opinion of Prime Minister Mendes-France about the organization of the renewal of the work of the Conference of Ministers. Molotov notes that, being one of the

chairmen of the Geneva Conference, it would be desirable for him to know the opinion of the other representatives about a day acceptable to everyone to convene the Conference of Ministers and also to find out the wishes of the ministers with respect to the method for the further work of the Conference. Molotov adds that it is possible that private conversations might turn out to be useful at this stage of the conference. Molotov asks what day would be convenient for the Prime Minister.

Mendes-France replies that the chairmen set the nearest date for the Conference of Ministers, and that he is ready for the opening of the conference on any following day. Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, at the present stage of the talks unofficial conversations and personal contact between the representatives might be of greater use than the official plenary meetings. In this connection he, Mendes-France, completely shares Molotov's point of view about the effectiveness of unofficial conversations.

Molotov says that the Geneva Conference has already gone through a period of speech-making. Several decisions have been prepared by now, both during closed meetings as well as in unofficial conversations. Now the stage of the Conference has come when it would be more advisable to move from a general discussion of the issues to a specific discussion of them and, accordingly, to prepare the necessary specific decisions. Molotov asks what wishes the Prime Minister has in order to impart the proper direction to the conference to achieve peace in Indochina.

Mendes-France says that tomorrow he is to meet with DRV representative [and foreign minister] Pham Van Dong and begin a discussion with him of more specific issues. Mendes-France thinks that an opportunity will be presented during this conversation to identify common ground and differences. Mendes-France adds that all the participants of the Geneva Conference are undoubtedly interested in establishing peace in Indochina. However, France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are the directly-interested countries. Mendes-France says that it is necessary to find a basis for agreement on many issues during the conversation with Pham Van Dong. That is why, concludes Mendes-France, he considers it his first business to meet with Pham Van Dong.

Molotov says that the idea of direct talks between the Prime Minister and Pham Van Dong is completely warranted and that, as it seems, all the participants of the Geneva Conference are interested in both directly-interested parties finding a common language and coming to an agreement acceptable to both sides. Molotov adds that the other delegations, including the Soviet delegation, ought to be interested in offering the necessary assistance to the directly interested parties. To be true, at the same time it cannot be excluded that there are also such delegations which possibly desire to prevent the achievement of an agreement.

Molotov then says that he has formed the impression that the conference has made certain progress in recent weeks, which is a definite plus. Consequently, at the present time all the conditions have been created to move on to a discussion of more specific issues and obtain specific decisions. Molotov notes that, according to information he has, the conference has recently dealt more with issues affecting only the north and south of Vietnam. However, they paid no attention at all to the central part of Vietnam. With regard to the issues of Laos and Cambodia, says Molotov, apparently no special difficulty in solving them is foreseen. Then Molotov asks Mendes-France whether his information about the difficulties which have arisen about the central part of Vietnam is correct.

Mendes-France says that certain difficulties actually have been identified regarding the issues of the central part of Vietnam. At first the French delegation assumed that there would be no special difficulty about this issue since initially, as the French delegation thought, the DRV was interested only in the north of Indochina, that is, the Tonkin region.

The French delegation has assumed and [still] assumes that the line of demarcation, which corresponds to natural and historical requirements, ought to pass along the Annamese Gates [sic, *Annamskie vorota*]. This line is narrow and it is easy to monitor. However, the French delegation was deeply disappointed when the French delegation found out that this line cannot satisfy the Vietnamese delegation and when the latter presented new demands. The French delegation, as before, holds to the opinion that the most reasonable border ought to pass somewhere along the 18th parallel. Mendes-France adds that, in his opinion, it was not be advisable to create such enclaves inside each zone. The creation of such enclaves would cause political and military complications. Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, it is most important to create homogeneous zones.

Molotov says that obviously these issues still have not been discussed in all the details by the military representatives. Molotov adds that he knows that the DRV delegation initially proposed to locate the line of demarcation between the 13th and 14th parallels since this corresponds to natural requirements and, moreover, this refers to a number of regions located along these parallels which have been under the influence of a particular side for more than 10 years. According to available information, says Molotov, an attempt was made by the DRV delegation to be accommodating and a proposal was made yesterday or the day before, according to which the line was to pass to the north. As regards the other side he, Molotov, did not know whether a similar attempt had been made.

Mendes-France says that it seems difficult for the French delegation to change [its] position with regard to the line of demarcation. The DRV military representatives are actu-

ally submitting new proposals according to which the line of demarcation is to move back about 40 kilometers to the north. However this proposal does not significantly change the situation. Mendes-France notes that this cannot be about trade but about the need to find objective solutions.

Mendes-France says that he agrees with the accurate comment by Molotov about there being regions in the south of Vietnam which have been under DRV influence for a long time. However, says the prime minister, there are also regions in the north which are controlled by French authorities at the present time. Mendes-France adds that at the beginning of the discussion of these issues at the meeting of the representatives of nine countries Pham Van Dong advanced certain principles according to which regrouping zones were to be determined. The French delegation listened with interest and subscribed to specific principles, and if the determination of the line is to be based on these principles then the 18th parallel is the most reasonable line of demarcation. Mendes-France adds that it would be desirable at the same time to create homogeneous zones.

Molotov notes that the prime minister's idea about the creation of homogenous zones is undoubtedly the correct idea and it is shared by many conference participants. Molotov adds that up to now the military representatives had dealt more with general issues and less with specific issues, in particular issues relating to the central part of Vietnam. Molotov says that he has found out that French military representatives are attaching special importance to Route 9, which connects Laos with Vietnam. Molotov says that it is not completely clear to him why such great importance is attached to this road. But if it plays an important role then it is possible to talk about its use separately. Molotov adds that the arrival of the prime minister in Geneva will provide an opportunity to discuss these issues more specifically.

Mendes-France says that at the beginning of the talks the discussion was not about Route 9 since according to French proposals this road ought to be in the southern zone, that is, in the zone of the French authorities. This road passes somewhere along the 16th parallel. But if the DRV delegation expresses a desire to use this road in the future then the French delegation does not object to talking about this in particular and coming to an agreement about granting the DRV the opportunity to use this road. Mendes-France repeats that the French delegation holds to its position about the 18th parallel.

Molotov says that the prime minister obviously knows well that Pham Van Dong, the head of the DRV delegation, has already expressed his ideas about a line of demarcation between the 14th and 16th parallels and that the DRV delegation is steadfastly maintaining this position. Thus the question right now is one of discussing the specific issues connected with the determination of the line of demarcation. These are issues of both a technical and political nature. As everyone

knows, Molotov continues, much attention has been devoted to military issues recently. But political issues have almost not been discussed [at all] although these issues also have great importance. They ought to be discussed, and solutions for them ought to be found.

Mendes-France says that the political problems undoubtedly exist in connection with the fact that the French delegation is trying to prepare a general statement about political issues which ought to be acceptable to all the participants of the Geneva Conference.

Molotov says that obviously the time has now come when it is necessary to prepare specific decisions which will be acceptable both to the two directly-interested parties as well as to all the participants of the Geneva Conference.

Molotov further adds that, taking advantage of Mendes-France's presence in Geneva, he would like to exchange opinions with him not only about the problems affecting Asia, but Europe, too.

Mendes-France says that this would please him very much. However, as Mendes-France says, at the same time it needs to be borne in mind that he is, so to speak, a novice in French foreign affairs and that he is not familiar with all the problems. However, he, Mendes-France, will be extremely happy to hear out Mr. Molotov and he will report this to his government. Mendes-France says that such a conversation would be useful.

Molotov says that with respect to the Geneva Conference the Soviet delegation understands its task to be the promotion of the adoption of equitable solutions which are in accord with the vital interests of the peoples of Indochina and the achievement of honorable and fair conditions from the French point of view. The participation of the Soviet delegation will be in accord with the achievement of such solutions. Molotov adds that the Soviet delegation will act in the direction of establishing cooperation with the French delegation in the matter of achieving favorable results.

Molotov stresses that the position of Mendes-France, the prime minister of France, impresses the Soviet delegation. This position, which is directed at establishing peace in Indochina, will facilitate the strengthening of peace in the entire world.

Mendes-France thanks Molotov and says that the French delegation will act in this same spirit.

Molotov asks at what time Mendes-France will meet with Pham Van Dong.

Mendes-France replies that the meeting will be held tomorrow, but [that] the time has not yet been set. Mendes-France adds that a short time remains to reach an agreement.

Molotov notes that time ought to be valued.

In conclusion Mendes-France thanks Molotov for the cordial reception and asks Molotov's permission to display initiative in organizing another meeting with him.

Molotov says that he is ready to meet with Mendes-France at any time.

Present from the Soviet delegation were V. V. Kuznetsov and S. A. Vinogradov; from the French delegation, [Jean] Chauvel and [de la Tournelle].

Recorded by /signature/
K. Starikov



DOCUMENT No. 4

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mendes-France, 15 July 1954, 8:30 p.m.¹

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks whether Mendes-France received the changes and additions that the Soviet delegation made to the draft declaration drawn up by the French delegation.

Mendes-France says that right now the French delegation is familiarizing itself with the changes made by the Soviet delegation and that apparently it will accordingly send its amended draft tomorrow. The draft of the Soviet delegation can serve as a basis, although a number of issues still [handwritten: need discussion]. It can already be said now that the changes by the Soviet delegation are essentially based on the principle of an equal approach to the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whereas the situation in these countries is different and requires a different approach.

Molotov notes that basic principles are described in the beginning and then the particulars of the situation in each country are examined in the draft sent to Mendes-France by the Soviet delegation.

Mendes-France suggest discussing the issue of elections and their timing. If a very close date is chosen to hold elections then it can turn out that the elections will be held in a situation when all the necessary conditions have not yet been established and they will not lead to a genuine solution of the issue of the unification of Vietnam. If, however, a date is established

which is too distant this could cause legitimate discontent on the part of the population of Vietnam. Therefore it would be better to define the main principles at the Geneva Conference on which an exact date for the elections would be set.

~~Molotov notes that the Soviet delegation draft does not envision the setting of an exact date for the elections but identifies a time limit during which these elections are to be held.~~

~~Mendes-France says that is one and the same thing, for a time limit is for practical purposes usually a [one illegible word handwritten above] date. The decision of the Geneva Conference could indicate that the elections ought not be delayed without special reason and determine which bodies ought to be established, under what kind of monitoring the elections are to be held, and what conditions are needed for there to be a possibility of establishing this date.~~

Molotov says that time for the elections ought to be clearly established in the Geneva Conference declaration. With Vietnam divided into two parts, [its] people will expect a definite answer to the question of the country's unification from the Geneva Conference.

Mendes-France thinks that it is sufficient to indicate the desire to unify the country in the declaration and not to delay this unification. This is a complex and difficult issue which will be hard to solve in several days.

Molotov agrees that little time is actually left and notes that in the French draft declaration there is a reference to a document about a cease-fire in Indochina. However, the Soviet delegation has not received a draft of this document.

Mendes-France replies that right now the French delegation is working hard on a number of draft documents which it will present to the participants of the Geneva Conference in the very near future.

After dinner Mendes-France asked that the conversation continue one-on-one without any witnesses. Molotov agreed.

Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, the most difficult issues right now are those about determining the line of demarcation and organizing elections in Vietnam. In agreement with Eden [*Translator's note*: this phrase was inserted at the beginning of the sentence] he is proposing that work in Geneva be stepped up to establish the practice of tripartite meetings consisting of Molotov, Eden, and himself, Mendes-France, so that Eden can take charge of the coordination of the issues under discussion with the American delegation, Molotov—with the PRC and DRV delegations, and Mendes-France with the delegations of the Associated States of Indochina.

~~Molotov asks exactly what issues Mendes-France proposes~~

to discuss in such tripartite meetings:

Mendes-France says that [*Translator's note*: An arrow indicates that Mendes-France's paragraph above is to be inserted at this point]. All issues concerning the establishment of peace in Vietnam ought to be discussed at such tripartite meetings. This would provide an opportunity to more easily find compromise solutions, make concessions on individual issues by compensating on others, etc.

Molotov asks whether it would be impossible [handwritten: proposes] also including Zhou Enlai among the participants of such unofficial meetings. Such a necessity might definitely arise during the discussion of some issues.

Mendes-France objects, for, in his opinion, [handwritten: there would be a risk that] the number of participants of the meetings [handwritten: would grow] to five [handwritten: one would have to invite the Americans, but] this would offend the DRV delegation and the delegations of the associated states.

Molotov agrees to hold unofficial meetings among the three.

Mendes-France offers to hold the first meeting tomorrow, 16 July, after lunch.

After this Mendes-France switches to the question of the organization of the elections. As regards Laos and Cambodia this question, in his opinion, is easily decided, for the domestic laws of these countries provide for holding general elections in the near future. [Faint hand-written sentence crossed out.]

Molotov says that in Laos and Cambodia a special situation [handwritten: has been created as a result of] the war, armed struggle, which ~~has still not ended~~ [handwritten: still going on], and therefore in the question of establishing a normal situation in these countries it would be more correct not to rely on the domestic laws of Laos and Cambodia, but on formulating [handwritten: a certain formulated] desire of the Geneva Conference which might facilitate the quickest possible establishment of a normal situation.

Mendes-France says that [one/we] ~~ought not to confuse~~ the situation in Laos and Cambodia [handwritten: differs from] the situation in Vietnam. There are uniform constitutional laws and government institutions in Laos and Cambodia which ought to be strengthened. The unrest which has taken place in these countries in recent years is mainly connected with events in Vietnam. Therefore after the solution of the Vietnamese problem they [handwritten: Laos and Cambodia] can independently conduct elections in accordance with their constitution[s]. Outside interference would infringe their sovereignty of these states and would hinder the creation of democratic procedures of these still young [handwritten: states] countries. The Geneva

Conference could remark in its decision that it was noting that the elections in Laos and Cambodia should be held within certain periods in conformance with the local constitutional laws. A careful formulation ~~ought~~ [handwritten: needs] to be found ~~with full respect~~ [which does] [handwritten: not infringe] the sovereignty of these states.

Molotov agrees that no interference in the internal affairs of these states ought to take place. However, he says, the issue of holding elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has been discussed for a number of weeks at the Geneva Conference and the participants of the Conference, in particular France, are probably interested in expressing their certain wishes to the governments of Laos and Cambodia.

Mendes-France repeats that [we] ought not confuse the situation in Laos and Cambodia. [It] [handwritten: differs from] the situation in Vietnam, where there are no uniform institutions or uniform legislation is lacking; rather there exist two state institutions and two [bodies of] legislation at the same time whereas Laos and Cambodia have their own constitutions and laws, which need to be strengthened.

Molotov says that actually it is not necessary to lump the situation in these two countries together; each has its own characteristics, ~~its own specifics~~. [*Translator's note*: at this point in the transcript a single diagonal line is drawn from the word "specifics" back through the last two paragraphs to the word "that" at the beginning of Mendes-France's last statement. It is not clear whether this is intended as a deletion].

Mendes-France says that in Laos and Cambodia it is possible to hold elections before long, for the situation is not so convulsed; the opposition has the opportunity to exercise its rights, and life can soon return to normal limits. This is a comparatively simple issue. ~~to set longer periods~~ [handwritten: Longer periods] are necessary to hold prepare for elections in Vietnam. Before starting to hold elections it is necessary to conduct a number of complex operations. ~~First of all~~ In particular, the evacuation of the troops of both sides from zones which cross to the other side. We have talked about evacuating the delta, he said. It is possible that the proposed periods for evacuation [handwritten: in 3[[80]] days] are too large. ~~This question ought to be discussed more~~. However, months will be required for an evacuation. There are other steps: the relocation of the population which wants to resettle to another zone and the creation of a new civilian administration in regions which cross to the other side. It is also necessary to grant an opportunity to organize parties, to strengthen them, and to develop their propaganda. All this requires time and it is difficult to determine it right now. ~~In addition~~, The international situation will [handwritten: also] have great psychological importance. If it improves, developments in Vietnam will proceed more quickly. If it worsens, then this will ~~have an effect~~ also complicate the situation in Vietnam. Therefore it is impossible right

now to set an exact date time. If a very short time is set there is a risk that the elections will not bring a satisfactory resolution and the impression will be created among the population of Vietnam that we do not want to give them an opportunity to exercise their rights. In addition, nine countries are participating in the Geneva Conference and it is practically impossible to solve this complex issue about the periods for holding elections in Vietnam in the several days remaining. It would be realistic and reasonable not to try to set a mandatory time but to set conditions for setting a time for those who will be entrusted with setting such a time. The setting of the time can be entrusted, for example, to the two interested parties monitored by [*pod kontrolom*] the nine countries. Mendes-France amended and clarified: not “monitored by the nine” but under “specific international monitoring.”

Molotov says that if it is difficult to set a time for the elections right now then [we] might think about setting a time to solve this issue, that is, not set a time for the two sides to hold elections but a time by which they should set a date for elections.

Mendes-France says the he will think about this alternative, but at first glance it seems interesting to him. [*Translator's note*: The above sentence is circled in the transcript and an arrow indicates that it is to be moved to just before Mendes-France's next statement].

Molotov says that the best and most obvious solution to the issue would be to set a time limit for holding elections at the Geneva Conference and that [the conference] reserve for itself the right to return to this issue in order to find more flexible and acceptable forms. However [we] might also think about setting a time for the competent bodies of both sides to solve the issue of the date of the elections with instructions not to drag them out, although this would also be a more difficult way.

Mendes-France points on the map of Vietnam to the location of the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel proposed by the French delegation. The French delegation, he says, proceeded from a wish expressed by Pham Van Dong that the demarcation line be possibly shorter, follow traditional administrative boundaries, and take into consideration the distribution of the zones presently occupied by both sides. In the opinion of the French delegation, the border between the former states of Tonkin and Annam following the 18th parallel is such a natural boundary from the point of view of topography and the historical, racial, political, and religious boundary. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed placing the line of demarcation at the 13th or 14th parallel, intending to keep for itself a zone which was under its control for the entire war, a narrow coastal strip between the 13th and 14th parallels and the 16th parallel, about 150 km long. When meeting with him, Mendes-France, Pham Van Dong agreed to move the line of demarcation to the 16th parallel, that is, he abandoned this region which the DRV

had apparently been most interested in keeping. This concession, in the opinion of Mendes-France, corresponds to the concession of the Tonkin Delta by the French side. The French are to evacuate about 300,000 troops from the delta at the same time as the DRV is to evacuate about 30,000 men. Such concessions accord with the idea of an extensive regrouping of forces in Vietnam. The question before us is thus about locating the line of demarcation at the 18th or the 16th parallel. This region has always been a zone controlled by French authorities. France is interested in keeping the city of Hue, the political and spiritual capital of Annam, the bay and port of Tourane [*Translator's note*: present-day Da Nang] (Mendes-France stipulated that Tourane does not have value for France from the military point of view and the French government is ready to give a commitment not to use it as a naval base), and Route 9, the only route linking Laos and the sea. When he, Mendes-France, described these ideas to Pham Van Dong, Pham Van Dong replied that a special status [*rezhim*] might be provided for Route 9 and Hue. This readiness to immediately make an exception is, in Mendes-France's opinion, evidence that the 16th parallel line proposed by Pham Van Dong is somewhat unrealistic and inadvisable. [*Translator's note*: a single diagonal line was drawn through the previous two sentences and a forward slash was typed at both ends]. He, Mendes-France, will not be able to convince the French government of the need to reject the location of the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel and abandon Hue and Route 9. In addition, the location of the line of demarcation is a temporary measure and ought to be based on the actual state of affairs. French troops have always occupied the region located between the 16th and 17th parallels, and the DRV has no grounds to demand this region for itself.

Molotov says that, when regions being left by the DRV are compared with the northern part of Vietnam being left by the French, it evidently means that the DRV is also leaving [handwritten: to the French side] all of southern Vietnam, including Cochin. Pham Van Dong's concession is evidence of a desire to simplify the solution of the issue, for the line proposed by the DRV meets the interests of both sides. It needs to be taken into consideration that as few complications as possible arise in Vietnam after the cease-fire agreement is carried out. As everyone knows, in the zone between the 16th and 18th parallels the French authorities control only a small strip of land along the coast, behind which the entire area is in the hands of the DRV. It is also impossible to speak as though the French [handwritten: authorities] exercise full control over Route 9. It would be worth examining the question of the possibility of ensuring such conditions so that the French side can use Route 9 more freely than it has the opportunity to do right now. It would also be worth trying to find an agreement about the issue of Hue. The proposal of Pham Van Dong about locating the line of demarcation at the 16th parallel might serve as a basis for an agreement between the sides. In rejecting a demand to locate the line of demarcation at the 13th parallel, Pham Van Dong

made a great step forward in trying to reach an agreement. One cannot fail to take into account that it was hard for the DRV to give up its own longtime region and to do this required great force of conviction.

~~Mendes-France~~ replied says that if it is hard for the DRV to give up its own region in central Vietnam then it might have kept this region for itself on condition of appropriate compensation for France in the north. Another solution is, of course, possible: both sides remain in their places, but such solution might undermine the principle of an exchange of territory. He again repeated that the French government would never approve a concession on Hue and Route 9.

~~Molotov~~ said that, in making a concession from the 13th to the 16th parallels, the DRV naturally ought to stop at such a line where there would be appropriate territorial compensation from the French side. As regards the use of Route 9, then an agreement might be found which is more in keeping with the interests of both sides.

~~Mendes-France~~ repeated that he considers the concession of the delta as such compensation.

~~Molotov~~ says that the concession of the delta, including Hanoi and Haiphong, is tied not only to the issue of the concession from the 13th to 16th parallels but is in keeping with the DRV concession of south Vietnam and also the concessions on a number of other issues. If it were possible to come to an agreement about the French giving up the delta, including Hanoi and Haiphong, then in the spirit of accommodation it would also be worth finding a solution for central Vietnam.

~~Mendes-France~~ again repeated that he views giving up the delta as a very important concession which is not compensated by all the concessions made by the DRV in the southern part of Vietnam, and right now he does not see any concessions which the DRV might make in exchange for the French giving up Hue and Route 9.

~~Molotov~~ says that he is ready to explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again.

~~Mendes-France~~ repeats that he cannot envision such a solution to the issue which would mean the French would give up Hue and Route 9. It would be easier for him to give up the region between the 16th and the 13th or 14th parallels to the DRV for suitable compensation in the north, for this would at least agree with the status quo in this region. If Pham Van Dong agrees to locate the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel, then Mendes-France could find compensation on other issues regarding a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

~~Molotov~~ says that he is ready meet with Mendes-France and Eden tomorrow, but if Mendes-France has questions right

~~now, he can discuss them right now,~~ [handwritten: that he can explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again].

~~Mendes-France~~ says that he would like [one handwritten word illegible] to discuss the issue of monitoring, but the French delegation has still not prepared its draft proposals. The work on this draft is proceeding well, and it is hoped that [handwritten: the draft] might be sent to the Soviet delegation tomorrow.

~~Molotov~~ says that in the French draft declaration there is a reference to a cease-fire agreement; however the Soviet delegation has not yet received the draft of such an agreement.

~~Mendes-France~~ says that the French delegation is working on a number of documents right now which it would submit to the other delegations for discussion in the near future. It is possible that not all the documents will be agreed upon and adopted by 20 July. It is important that a cease-fire agreement based on an agreement in principle about the most important remaining issues be concluded by 19 or 20 July. The other documents might be finished after 19 or 20 July. ~~At this point he repeated that such a deadline had been set by Parliament; he would not be able to receive an extension and would not request one.~~

~~Molotov~~ notes that much depends on the French delegation and, in particular, on how soon it submits its drafts for discussion.

At the conclusion of the conversation Molotov confirms that he is ready to meet with Eden and Mendes-France and stipulates that he is not authorized to speak on behalf of the DRV and PRC and can express only his own personal opinion, but when an agreement is reached at the tripartite meeting on any issues he will try to describe these ideas to the PRC and DRV delegations objectively and with maximum force of conviction.

The dinner and conversation lasted until 1:00 a.m.

Recorded:

(Kazansky)

[signature]

1. *Editor's Note:* Text crossed out in the document was crossed out in the original; words entered by hand or underlined in the original are so indicated. The document bears the stamp RF Foreign Policy Archive 06/13a/25/7.



DOCUMENT No. 5

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 16 July 1954

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov says that he would like to inform Cdes. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about the substance of his conversations with Eden and Mendes-France which occurred on 15 July.

1. The Conversation with Eden

Molotov: In the conversation with me, Eden said that he had still not managed to carefully study the changes we (the Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese delegations) had made to the French draft declaration about Indochina, but would like to make the following preliminary comments: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are placed together in the text of the declaration. In Eden's opinion, they ought to be separated and spoken of separately inasmuch as the conditions in each of these countries are different. Eden was told in reply that real differences exist but there is also much in common.

Eden stressed that, in his opinion, it is very difficult to set a time to hold elections.

He expressed a desire to exclude military issues from the declaration drafts and move them to the cease-fire agreement.

Eden then said that the representatives of Laos complained to him that an intensified movement of men and weapons into Laotian territory had recently been observed and this is causing them concern. I replied to Eden that I was hearing about this for the first time.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong say that the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense of Laos said nothing about this in the conversation with them.

Molotov: I told Eden that we have not yet received the text of the draft agreement about the cease-fire from the French delegation and that the French are giving us the draft of this document in parts. Eden said that some delay had occurred with this matter and that now the preparation of the documents ought to be sped up.

2. The conversation with Mendes-France.

Molotov briefly describes the substance of the conversation with Mendes-France about the main issues, elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation, and

the timeframes for the evacuation of foreign troops.

Molotov says that as a result of the conversation with Mendes-France he has formed the impression that the French can agree to the establishment of a line of demarcation only somewhere north of the 16th parallel.

Molotov further reports about Mendes-France's proposal about holding a meeting of the three representatives (Eden, Mendes-France, and Molotov) and about how he reacted to the proposal by Mendes-France.

Molotov asks the opinions of Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about this question.

Zhou Enlai says that he shares the position taken by Molotov; moreover, thinks it advisable to agree with Mendes-France's proposal about holding meetings with the representatives of the USSR, France, and Britain. Zhou Enlai adds that the participation of US representatives in meetings would be undesirable to us and therefore it seems inadvisable to insist upon the participation of PRC representatives.

Pham Van Dong expresses agreement with the opinion expressed by Zhou Enlai.

Molotov talks about Eden's and Mendes-France's objections to holding elections before June 1955 and asks Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong whether we ought to press for our previous position about this issue or [whether it is] advisable to offer new proposals during the discussion. For example, propose that the elections be conducted in 1955 or recommend the adoption of this formula: propose that both sides solve the issue of the dates to hold the elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia no later than June 1955.

Zhou Enlai states that it would be advisable to take to the following position about the issue of the times of the elections: insist that the conference establish a time to hold the elections, no later than June 1955. If this proposal is declined then offer a new proposal—direct that the elections are to be held in 1955. If this proposal, too, is not adopted, then, as the last position, insist that a decision be made which provides that both sides are to decide among themselves no later than June 1955 to solve the issue of setting the dates for holding elections.

Pham Van Dong says that he agrees with the above ideas of Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai stresses that the issue about the dates to hold the elections was discussed in detail during a meeting with Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh gave agreement in principle to the third alternative for solving the issue of the dates for the elections mentioned by Zhou Enlai being offered as a last resort.

Molotov then asks what questions Pham Van Dong intends to discuss during today's meeting with Mendes-France.

Pham Van Dong says he prefers to touch on the main issues about Indochina, primarily the questions about the elections and the line of demarcation. Pham Van Dong added that he will insist on setting definite times for holding elections in accordance with the exchange of opinions between us and also on locating the line of demarcation at the 16th parallel.

Zhou Enlai says that we will probably be able to reach agreement on the issues mentioned above in the next few days but one more very important issue remains which ought not be overlooked. This is the issue of the creation of an American military bloc in Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai stresses that there is reason to suspect that the US, Britain, and France have in principle achieved some sort of agreement among themselves about this question. If the Americans manage to draw Bao Dai's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into a military bloc then the agreement we have drafted about prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of the states mentioned would lose the importance which we attach to it. Zhou Enlai added that in a conversation with Nehru in India and in a conversation with Eden in Geneva he stressed that foreign military bases should not be created on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ought not to be drawn into any military alliances [*gruppировки*] or blocs. Zhou Enlai asks whether Cde. Pham Van Dong ought not touch on this issue in the conversation with Mendes-France and express our position.

Molotov expresses his agreement with the opinion of Zhou Enlai and says that in conversations with Mendes-France and Eden we ought to point to the reports available in the press about attempts being undertaken to create military blocs in Southeast Asia and declare that we are against such blocs. Molotov asks whether any documents need to be tied to this.

Zhou Enlai says that the representatives of the Western powers will hardly agree to write about this in any particular document.

Molotov says that the issue of military blocs in Southeast Asia ought to be touched upon during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of the text of the declaration being prepared on the issue of Indochina.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong express agreement.

Zhou Enlai says that according to information available to him Britain is taking vigorous action to create an alliance of countries in Southeast Asia which would be tied to one another by a system of treaties of the Locarno type. The US is trying to counter the British plan with their own plan. They are relying on the basis of an alliance of the five powers taking part in a

meeting in Singapore and creating a military bloc under their aegis including Thailand, Pakistan, Bao Dai's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, in addition to these five countries. Zhou Enlai said that we ought to oppose the creation of military blocs in Asia, taking advantage the existing differences between the US and Britain in doing this.

Molotov and Pham Van Dong express their agreement with the opinion of Zhou Enlai.

Molotov asks whether, during negotiations about the issue of the time to carry out the regrouping of forces, [they] ought not say that the transport of French troops from North Vietnam might be accomplished not only by sea but also by rail and highway. He stressed that it would be possible to use this as an argument in order to insist on a reduction of the period of regrouping proposed by the French delegation (380 days).

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong say that the movement of enemy troops from North Vietnam to the south does not seem possible in view of a whole range of circumstances (the lack of suitable roads, the difficulties associated with the supply of the troops with food, etc.)

Zhou Enlai then says that in a conversation with Cde. Molotov Mendes-France might touch on the issue of the schedule for the withdrawal of French troops from the southern regions of Vietnam. In this connection Zhou Enlai would like to direct Cde. Molotov's attention to the fact that France is counting on keeping its troops in the south of Vietnam a little longer. Zhou Enlai said that such a delay is to our advantage inasmuch as the presence of the French in Vietnam can serve as an obstacle to the establishment of military and political collusion between the Americans and the Bao Dai authorities. Zhou Enlai added that, of course, the French troops ought to be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the time that general elections are held there.

The conversation lasted three hours and 30 minutes.

Recorded by: /signature/
A.Ledovsky



DOCUMENT No. 6

From the Journal of Molotov: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 17 July 1954, 3:30 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, l. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks Pham Van Dong about his conversations with [British Foreign Minister Anthony] Eden and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia [Tep Phan].

Pham Van Dong says that in conversations with Eden and the representative of Cambodia he had mainly touched on foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the issues of a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Both Eden and the minister of foreign affairs of Cambodia declared that the US supposedly did not intend to create military bases on the territory of these states; for their part, the governments of these countries also did not want foreign military bases to be created on their territory. In reply to a question about the possibility of the Americans involving Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the military bloc they are planning in Southeast Asia, Eden and the representative of Cambodia replied that they did not give the Americans their agreement to this and did not intend to do this in the future. They added that it was another matter if the three "Associated States" were subjected to aggression. Regarding the creation of a military bloc in Southeast Asia Eden said that the US has been acting in this direction for a long time and that nothing new was added to this in Paris. Eden added that the aforementioned bloc being created by the Americans was supposedly of a defensive nature.

Pham Van Dong said that he had taken a sharply critical position with respect to the creation of foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and also with respect to the creation of military blocs in Southeast Asia in this conversation with Eden and the representative of Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai says that in the new version of the draft declaration just received from the French, just like in the first version, there is no provision prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia and that this provision is also not in the draft documents about Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov says that it is necessary to get the appropriate changes entered in these drafts.

Molotov asks what questions we ought to discuss today.

Pham Van Dong says that, in his opinion, it is necessary to exchange opinions about how we need to act to get an agreement acceptable to us about the line of demarcation, about the elections, and about a number of other important issues, the

regrouping zones, the composition of the supervisory commission, etc.

Zhou Enlai suggests first exchanging opinions about the main fundamental issues of our positions and then discussing the texts of the documents that have been prepared.

Molotov agrees and names the main documents and the primary issues which need to be discussed—the line of demarcation, the dates of the elections, the composition and functions of the observation commission, the withdrawal and importation of weapons and military personnel into Indochina, and the prohibition against the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Molotov then says that in the private meeting on 16 July Mendes-France hinted that political representatives ought to discuss the primary issues on which both sides might make mutual concessions.

Molotov raises for discussion the first of the above seven issues (about the line of demarcation) and asks Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong to express their ideas.

Zhou Enlai says that in a conversation with Wang Bingnan, secretary general of the PRC delegation, Colonel [Jacques] Guillermaz, a representative of the French delegation, told the former that the French delegation cannot agree to Route 9 being jointly used and let it be understood that the French would insist on the line of demarcation being located north of this road. Guillermaz also said that the French delegation would insist on the setting of a more distant date for holding elections in Indochina and named a time: two years.

Molotov asks to what final position can we fall back to in the question of the line of demarcation.

Pham Van Dong says that the DRV can concede Route 9 to France and agree to locate the line of demarcation somewhat to the north of this road. He adds that it is necessary to demand concessions from the French in the regions of Tourane [Da Nang] and Hue. Mendes-France hinted earlier to the possibility of such concessions, says Pham Van Dong.

Molotov asks what concessions the DRV intends to demand from France in Tourane and Hue.

Pham Van Dong replies that he intends to demand that France not create a naval base in Tourane. Pham Van Dong says that he does not yet have any specific ideas with respect to Hue and has to think a little [about it]. Pham Van Dong then says that it is necessary to demand agreement from the French to set an exact date for holding elections in Indochina [in exchange] for the indicated concession about the issue of the line of demarcation. He adds that this date can be somewhat extended but it should be named in order that the DRV govern-

ment have an opportunity to get certain organizational work started among the population.

Zhou Enlai states that Pham Van Dong's proposal about a final position on the demarcation line issue accords with the instructions which our delegations have and [they] can agree to it. Concerning the question of Tourane, Zhou Enlai says that, in a conversation with him, Mendes-France hinted at the possibility of concessions on the part of France.

Zhou Enlai asks Molotov if, based on his conversations with Mendes-France and Eden, it is possible to count on our being able to achieve something on the issue of the elections.

Molotov says that Mendes-France and Eden talked about the issue of the elections and stresses that it is necessary to get a definite period set within which the elections ought to be held. With regard to an exact date for holding the elections then [we] might propose that it be set locally [*na meste*] by agreement of the competent authorities of both sides.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree with Molotov's suggestion.

Molotov says that if we ought be prepared to agree to set the line of demarcation north of Route 9 then it is necessary to determine this line.

Pham Van Dong says that he will give instructions to his military experts to study this question and prepare an appropriate map indicating the aforementioned line on it.

Molotov raises for discussion the issue of a military bloc in Southeast Asia and asks the opinions of Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about what our side ought to attempt.

Zhou Enlai suggests getting the representatives of Laos and Cambodia to declare definitely in their statements that they will not allow the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Laos and Cambodia and that Laos and Cambodia will not participate in any military alliances or blocs.

Molotov says that he considers it advisable to include in the text of the declaration an obligation by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia not to create foreign military bases on their territory and not to participate in military alliances.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises for discussion the issue of the international supervisory commission.

Zhou Enlai says that, in a conversation with [Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, V. K. Krishna] Menon on 16 July, the latter informed him that the French are

inclined to form a supervisory commission consisting of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland. Menon spoke approvingly of this alternative and expressed satisfaction that it did not provide for the participation of Pakistan. Zhou Enlai then said that he touched on this French alternative in a conversation with Eden. The latter expressed his agreement with this composition of the supervisory commission but declared at the same time that Britain cannot submit this proposal on its own initiative since this would produce displeasure on the part of Pakistan.

Molotov says that regarding the issue of the composition of the international supervisory commission it is advisable to adhere to the position which our three delegations agreed on earlier.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Zhou Enlai proposes coming to agreement about the scope of activity of the commission. He says that the French delegation submitted a proposal that the international commission conduct observation along the borders (including land and sea) and not at individual points, as was proposed by the Chinese-Vietnamese side. Zhou Enlai thinks that it would be more to the advantage of the DRV and PRC to establish monitoring along all the borders, which would allow for the achievement of more careful observation that the Americans or French do not move troops or weapons to the territory of Indochina.

Molotov proposes keeping to this tactic on this question: if the French insist on their proposals then agree with them so as to make a seeming concession.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises for discussion the issue of establishing the regrouping zones in Laos and Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong suggest as a final position agreeing to the establishment of regrouping zones in the north-east part of Laos.

Molotov asks who will sign the agreements about Laos and Cambodia from our side.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong think it possible to authorize two representatives, the representative of the People's Army of Vietnam and the representative of the resistance forces. They add that this issue needs to be studied more.

Zhou Enlai raises the issue of the timing of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina. He says that [they] can agree to the establishment of a period of 240 days (instead of 380, as the French propose).

Pham Van Dong agrees.

Molotov recommends proposing the establishment of a separate period for the withdrawal of troops and the period for the withdrawal of weapons, and adds that the period for the withdrawal of weapons can be made longer than the period for the withdrawal of troops.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises the draft declaration for discussion.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree with Molotov's suggestion to take the French draft as a basis and make the necessary changes to it.

Then Molotov, Zhou Enlai, and Pham Van Dong exchange opinions about all the points of the text of the declaration and make changes.

The conversation lasted one hour.

Recorded: /signature/
(A. Ledovsky)



DOCUMENT No. 7

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Eden at his Villa in Geneva, 19 July 1954, 10:00 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Present were [Andrei A.] Gromyko, Harold Caccia, British deputy undersecretary for foreign affairs, and Anthony [Rambold], Eden's principal private secretary

Eden welcomes V. M. Molotov and says that in his, Eden's, opinion the words about the withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Laos and Cambodia for inclusion in the decision about the negotiations between the representatives of the commands for Laos and Cambodia on which V. M. Molotov insisted at today's meeting do not have great importance since they are covered by the previous part of this phrase in which it talks about the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov points out that the combination of these two formulations gives this part a nuance which would be less distinct if the words about the withdrawal of foreign military personnel had been omitted.

Eden expresses his satisfaction that the conference has managed to adopt a decision about negotiations between the representatives of the commands for Laos and Cambodia. We have done what we could, he says, and now we can leave with a clear conscience.

Molotov asks whether Eden means that the ministers have already done all their work and that further negotiations ought to be entrusted to the belligerent parties.

Eden replies that he meant that the ministers have done everything that they could at this stage of the conference but, in his opinion, they will have to meet again to approve the reports of the representatives of the commands as well as to settle such issues as supervision, safeguards, etc.

Molotov replies that such a procedure for further work is evidently correct.

Molotov says that he does not understand the position of the French. On one hand, they are seemingly not in a hurry with the negotiations but, on the other, Mendes-France promised in the National Assembly to achieve a settlement of the Indochina issue by 20 July.

Eden notes that he does not understand this either.

Molotov notes that possibly [the French parliament] subsequently intends to extend the deadline indicated by Mendes-France.

Eden says that yesterday he talked with Mendes-France on the telephone and asked him if he planned to come to Geneva. Mendes-France replied no, declaring that he cannot come to Geneva. Thus, Eden continues, he has already lost three days of the time he himself had set.

Eden says that he was glad to hear that tomorrow Zhou Enlai will receive the ministers of foreign affairs of Laos and Cambodia. In his, Eden's opinion, a great deal depends on the talks about Laos and Cambodia. He, Eden, already said to Zhou Enlai that he was concerned that if Vietnamese troops continue to attack as they have done recently then this would provide fodder for new accusations from those who have a skeptical attitude toward the Geneva Conference and [would] say that Ho Chi Minh and his supporters are using the talks in Geneva as a front to conduct further combat operations. Eden seems to say jokingly that he hopes that Pham Van Dong will not display too much belligerency in the upcoming weeks when talks will be held with the representatives of the commands.

Molotov notes that Pham Van Dong is a civil person and belligerency is unlike him.

It seems to me, continues Molotov, that, in stressing the importance of the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia, [we] also ought not forget about [those] of first importance, which are the Vietnamese issues.

Eden agrees with this, but says that from the point of view of the Western delegations there is a difference between Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and the issue of Vietnam on the other, since, in the opinion of the Western delegations, there is a civil war going on in Vietnam while events in Laos and Cambodia have a different character.

Eden again expresses the hope that now, when steps have been taken to start talks between the representatives of both commands, no large offensive will be attempted as long as these talks are being conducted.

Molotov states that, in his opinion, the danger is not whether a new offensive will or will not be attempted but that the patience of the people in Indochina, who have already been fighting for eight years, is starting to be exhausted.

Molotov asks whether, in Eden's opinion, Mendes-France's elevation to prime minister meant that the French want to find a solution to the issue of the war in Indochina.

Eden replies affirmatively but says that it cannot be forgotten that Mendes-France cannot capitulate and will agree to a peace in Indochina only on terms acceptable to France. The French will exhibit a genuine desire to negotiate, Eden continues, but he, Eden, doubts that Mendes-France's peace conditions were significantly different from the conditions of his predecessors.

Molotov notes that no one is demanding capitulation by the French.

Molotov says that in yesterday's conversation with him, Molotov, [US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell] Smith explained the position of the American government on the issues being discussed at the Geneva Conference. The Americans are evidently afraid that the French will make concessions that are too great, although there is nothing to indicate that, and the position of the US government is evidently to deter the French from finding a way out of the situation which has developed. At the same time as the French and American positions are quite clear, says Molotov, the position of the British is not clear.

Eden, as if joking, replies that the British have no position at all. Essentially, Eden continues, we think that the French ought to decide themselves what conditions they consider acceptable to conclude an agreement. We think that it is not right to tell the French how they are to act. It is possible, Eden added, that the position of the Americans is partly explained

by the fact that, as allies of the French, they want the French to gain the most favorable conditions.

Molotov says that, all the same, the impression is being created that the Americans are interested in deterring the French from an agreement. We observed such a picture at yesterday's meeting, Molotov continues. The French declared that, in their opinion, the Chinese proposals deserved serious attention. The representative of Laos declared that these proposals were acceptable as a basis for negotiations. [US Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Walter S.] Robertson essentially spoke against both France and Laos. It is necessary to understand whether he wanted to be more French than the French and more Laotian than the Laotians.

Eden says that yesterday he received a telegram from London in which it mentioned a conversation which a Briton who had attended a lunch at the Soviet embassy had had with [Soviet Ambassador to the UK Jacob A.] Malik. Malik told this Briton that Eden was just as bad as [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles and that he and Dulles had simply assigned roles between themselves at the Geneva Conference in such a way that Dulles was to reflect intransigence and Eden was to play an appeasing role.

Molotov replies that he does not think that Malik could have said this or anything like this. But if Malik actually said that he, Molotov, would try to convince him that he is wrong.

Eden says that he told Molotov about this in passing and that he would not want Malik to have any trouble on account of this.

Molotov says that he received this report in confidence and can only make an appropriate hint to Malik, also in confidence. Dulles spent only several days in Geneva, adds Molotov, at the same time as Eden has been here for eight weeks. This alone speaks about the difference in their positions.

Eden agrees with this.

Molotov notes that Dulles evidently did not favor the Geneva Conference from the very start.

Eden points out that Dulles agreed in Berlin to convene the conference all the same.

Molotov notes that this still does not mean anything.

Eden says that he tried to convince Dulles not to leave Geneva, but that his appeals remained unsuccessful.

Eden notes that Dulles might still return to Geneva if the talks develop favorably.

Molotov says that in yesterday's conversation with him, Molotov, Smith mentioned his, Smith's, or Dulles' possible return to Geneva, but this was said very indefinitely.

Molotov asks Eden what, in his opinion, are the primary difficulties with which the Geneva Conference is still faced.

Eden replies that it is hard for him to answer this question and that all the existing difficulties will come to light in the next three weeks when the talks of the representatives of the commands both sides are held. However, he, Eden, thinks that the primary difficulties concern Vietnam since the issues of Laos and Cambodia are much simpler in their nature.

Molotov notes that all the questions regarding Indochina are interconnected. If the talks about Vietnam go well then it will be easier to solve the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia. On the other hand, success in examining the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia will promote a solution to the issue of Vietnam.

Eden asks whether Molotov is satisfied with the progress of the talks of the military representatives about Vietnam.

Molotov replies that he cannot say that he is satisfied with the progress of these talks. The French have manifested some desire to hold the talks. However, their actions were evidently connected with the government crisis in France.

Eden says that the French informed him that the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have taken a more intransigent position since [French Prime Minister Joseph] Laniel's government fell [in June 1954]. For his part, he, Eden, thinks that it would be a mistake to think that Mendes-France will turn out to be more pliable than his predecessors.

Molotov says that he has not formed such an opinion that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has taken a more intransigent position recently, since there have been no changes since the fall of the Laniel government in the talks between the representatives of the two commands about Vietnam. The latest proposals of the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were offered even before the fall of this government.

Eden asks what Molotov thinks about the possibility of the ministers returning to Geneva. For my part, says Eden, I think that when the reports about the talks of the military representatives are presented after 21 days we will be able to consult one another diplomatically about the question of our return to Geneva.

Molotov notes that these ideas seem reasonable to him inasmuch as otherwise the ministers might return to Geneva when the ground for their talks still has not been sufficiently prepared.

Eden states that he had formed the impression from recent talks with Zhou Enlai that Zhou Enlai favors a settlement of the Indochina problem.

Molotov replies that he also thinks so. China wants calm south of its borders. This would unquestionably agree with its interests.

Molotov expresses satisfaction that more friendly relations between the Chinese and British have been established in Geneva.

Eden notes that this occurred with Molotov's assistance.

Molotov says that it depended on Eden and Zhou Enlai in the first place. Relations between the French and the Chinese, on the other hand, have changed little during the time of the Geneva Conference, although some improvement has been noted here.

Eden says that, on the basis of his conversations with Zhou Enlai, he has come to the conclusion that the PRC has no ambitions with respect to Laos and Cambodia and that there is reason to hope that these two countries will be able to lead a happy life as neutral countries without having any foreign military bases on their territory. It is based on this very assumption, Eden continues, that I stayed to work here in Geneva and hope that my assumptions will not turn out to be mistaken.

Molotov says that, in his opinion, Eden is not mistaken. The PRC does not, of course, have any ambitions with respect to Laos and Cambodia. However, in his, Molotov's, opinion some steps should to be taken in Laos and Cambodia which would be in keeping with the sentiments which exist in several regions of these countries. This, of course, is the internal affair of these countries, but nonetheless it requires a decision. On the basis of my conversations with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Molotov continues, I have formed the opinion that the situation in Cambodia is such that a settlement of the issues relating to this country should not cause significant difficulty. The situation in Laos is more complex. Still more complex is the issue of Vietnam. But solutions to all these issues are unquestionably equally necessary.

Eden notes that Zhou Enlai might help in this matter.

Molotov says that it is the business of the French to obtain such aid.

Eden states that, in his opinion, if the talks of the representatives of the commands turn out successfully, then a solution to the question of monitoring might turn out not to be nearly so difficult a matter as it seems at the present time.

Molotov says that Eden previously attached inordinate

importance to this question. Now, however, he seems to be holding to the opposite point of view. As regards the Soviet delegation, it is agreeable not to exaggerate the importance of this question.

Eden says that the question of monitoring still has great importance but its resolution might be made easier thanks to the improvement of relations between the sides.

Eden notes that much work has to be invested in the matter of coordinating the decisions of the Geneva Conference both regarding Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov says that the French have not displayed special initiative in solving these issues. It was possibly explained by the domestic political situation in France. He, Molotov, hopes that the matter will now proceed more quickly.

Eden notes that French governments are different [than other governments] in that they exhibit great energy only in the first weeks of their existence.

Molotov says that during these first weeks they will possibly be able to overcome the current difficulties in the Indochina question.

Eden says that before the Geneva Conference the international situation concerned him very much. However, in his opinion, the conference has done much to relax the tension in international relations. The danger still exists; however the situation has started to become less acute.

Molotov says that, in his opinion, in spite of its shortcomings, the Geneva Conference has played a positive role in this respect.

Molotov, seemingly joking, says that during the upcoming trip to Washington Churchill and Eden will be able to coordinate all the issues and help [bring] a favorable outcome to the Geneva Conference.

Eden replies that what has already been achieved in Geneva will help him and Churchill to hold talks in Washington.

The conversation lasted 45 minutes.

Recorded by:/signature/
O. Troyanovsky



DOCUMENT No. 8

Memorandum of Conversation, between Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Zhou Enlai, 29 July 1954

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, o. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Top Secret

RECEPTION OF G. M. MALENKOV BY CDE.
ZHOU ENLAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 29 July 1954

Deputies to the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang

Cde. Zhou Enlai expresses ideas about several issues of the international situation.

Having suffered defeat in Indochina, the US government is trying to provoke conflict in other regions of the Far East. The chief target of these conflicts is China. With the support of the US the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] pirates are infringing upon the freedom of navigation in the open ocean and plundering ships headed for China. Guomintang aircraft make raids on the Chinese coast.

Recently the Americans moved aircraft carriers to the maritime boundaries of China. Several days ago aircraft operating from these aircraft carriers shot down two Chinese aircraft in the area of the island of Hainan.

Preparations are being made to conclude a defense pact between Jiang Jieshi and the US government. The Americans still have not decided to sign the pact. They cannot fail to understand that this act will provoke still stronger anti-American feelings in China and might hinder the settling of differences with China in the future.

The US government will continue efforts directed at forging a bloc in Southeast Asia. Evidently, this bloc will initially include a limited number of countries: the US, Britain, France, New Zealand, and Australia. It might also include the Philippines and Thailand. The US will exert pressure on Indonesia, which is wavering, trying to force it to join this bloc.

In light of these facts the CCP CC intends:

To again raise the question of the liberation of Taiwan and take steps to disrupt the conclusion of the pact between the US government and the Jiang Jieshi regime. After he, Zhou Enlai, returns to Beijing, a declaration of the PRC government is supposed to be published in which it will be pointed out that at

the present time a source of military conflict exists in only one place, Taiwan; with US government aid, the Jiang Jieshi clique is committing outrages at sea, raiding Chinese territory, and essentially committing hostile acts against China;

To strengthen the defense of the Chinese coastline. The navy and air force will need to be strengthened to do this. The Chinese Armed Forces must be ready at any moment to halt a violation of the maritime or air boundaries of China;

To achieve the failure of the organization of an aggressive bloc in Southeast Asia. To do this means tearing their allies away from the US and exacerbating of the differences between the US and other capitalist countries.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that he heard the ideas of Zhou Enlai with pleasure and says that questions about measures connected with the international situation are examined and decided in the CPSU CC. Cde. Zhou Enlai's statements deserve great attention. The goal of disrupting the conclusion of a pact between the US and Jiang Jieshi is correct. The question of Taiwan is undoubtedly a critically important problem for China. He agrees with Zhou Enlai's comment that the goal of achieving an exacerbation of the differences between the US and other bourgeois countries is important.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of the conversations with the Indonesian ambassadors in Delhi, Rangoon, and Beijing: they invited him to visit Indonesia. Zhou Enlai could not avail himself of this invitation since he was soon to return to the Geneva Conference. During Zhou Enlai's stay in Geneva, the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, who was in the Netherlands, sent the Indonesian ambassador in Paris to Zhou and repeated the invitation to visit Indonesia. It has become clear from conversations with Indonesian ambassadors that the time has come for a decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with China. Zhou Enlai proposed that a draft of this pact be developed in Beijing by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Indonesian ambassador in order for it to be possible to sign it during Zhou Enlai's visit to Jakarta. Zhou Enlai is supposed to visit Indonesia in August.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov wishes him success. He agrees with Zhou Enlai's comment about Indonesia and says that the inclusion of Indonesia in the American bloc being forged in Southeast Asia cannot be permitted. He talks briefly about conversations with [Chairman of the All-India Peace Council Dr. Saifuddin] Kitchlu and Subandrio, the Indonesian ambassador to the USSR, noting in this context that India, and, to a certain degree, Indonesia are gravitating toward a rapprochement with the PRC and USSR. He stresses that the conclusion of a Sino-Indian agreement is a quite successful step by the PRC government. The principles on which this agreement is based are being propagandized in the Soviet press in every possible way.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of a conversation with V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian [permanent] representative to the UN, about the issue of Korea. Menon suggested that elections be held separately in North and South Korea, after which a national Korean body would be formed. Menon tried to also find out what the Chinese reaction would be if the United Nations expressed a desire to convene a Geneva conference again to discuss the Korean issue. He, Zhou Enlai, replied to Menon that China would support the idea of convening a Geneva Conference in order to continue the discussion of the Korean issue. He thinks that, if a Geneva conference were convened again, its membership would have to be expanded, inviting India to participate in it.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov says that Menon also raised this question with Cde. Molotov.

Zhou Enlai says that in connection with the intention of the PRC government to accelerate the strengthening of coastal defense it will evidently have to reexamine existing plans to develop the navy and air force. Zhou Enlai plans to immediately deal with this question on return to Beijing.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov notes that strengthening the defense of the Chinese coast, the navy, and the air force is an important goal.

Referring to the fact that the Soviet military comrades recommend that a long-range heavy bomber division (of TU-4s) be created in China, Cde. Zhou Enlai says that, in the opinion of the Chinese military, these aircraft are obsolete and it is desirable for a division of long-range aircraft to be equipped with jet technology.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that the Soviet military comrades will look into this issue.

Cde. Zhou Enlai asks whether the PRC government might expect the arrival of a government delegation of senior Soviet comrades in Beijing to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. If such a delegation can be sent then the PRC government will send an official invitation.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that, of course, a delegation will be sent; the CPSU CC will determine the composition of such a delegation.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov asks that greetings be sent to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and the other comrades in the CCP CC.

Recorded by M. Kapitsa
Authenticated by: [illegible signature]

Distributed to members
of the CPSU CC Presidium
12 August 1954
to Cde. V. M. Molotov

The Vasili Mitrokhin Archive

In 2001, Vasili Mitrokhin, a former KGB archivist who had defected to the United Kingdom after the fall of the Soviet Union, approached the Cold War International History Project about making available to the general historical community the materials he had collected.

Most of these materials consist of notes which Mitrokhin had copiously assembled while he worked in the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo, outside Moscow. Mitrokhin had moved from the operational side of the FCD to its archives in late 1956, where it was his job to respond to requests by other departments. Influenced by the bloody suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the dissident movement—all of which he could follow through the files he administered as well as Western records—Mitrokhin became increasingly disaffected with the KGB. By the early seventies he had decided to compile his own account of the KGB's foreign operations, a project that became feasible when he was put in charge in 1972 of the movement of the FCD archives from the KGB's headquarters at Lubyanka in central Moscow to Yasenevo southwest of the capital Moscow.

The materials are being made available by the Cold War International History Project for publication in its "Vasili Mitrokhin Archive," integrated in CWIHP's Virtual Archive at <http://www.cwihp.org>.

Vasili Mitrokhin would be the first to point out that his notes captured only a small part of the totality of documents; his decade-long work in the archive was a "massive filtering exercise," with a flood of documents coming through his hands on a daily basis. The documents he saw were mostly informational cables from the First Directorate to the Politburo and Foreign Ministry, a copy of which went to the archives after a month. By no means are the materials therefore a complete record. Moreover, while striving to stick to the facts, Mitrokhin has stated that "I wrote it in a hurry, and as a result certain notes which I wrote to accompany my account took on an emotional tone, creating a rather unbalanced narrative." This, the author explains, was "a way of expressing my personal perception of events and my rejection of the criminal intentions, calumnies and deeds of the Soviet nomenklatura."

All the Archive material is ultimately derived from contemporaneous manuscript notes made by Mitrokhin as KGB documents passed through his hands in the Archive Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence or FCD).

The materials fall into three broad categories:

- Top Secret FCD and Directorate S ("Illegals") files;
- Secret background papers and manuals held in the restricted-access FCD Operational Library;
- Articles taken from the *Sbomik* KGB, the secret KGB in-house quarterly journal containing (sanitized) case histories and success stories for the edification of the staff.

After his retirement in 1984, Mitrokhin organized his manuscript fragments (initially roughly sorted in dozens of brown envelopes) to compile a series of volumes dealing with KGB activities in various key areas of the world: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and subsequently the USA and the UK. All these volumes were typed out by Mitrokhin himself in the Soviet Union and eventually smuggled out by him to London in 1992.

As each volume was completed, the underlying manuscript notes were systematically destroyed by Mitrokhin, primarily for security reasons, but also to avoid inadvertent duplication.

He also brought over 27 large envelopes crammed with manuscript fragments covering aspects of the KGB's work which could not be included in the Moscow-typed volumes.

Much (but not all) of this manuscript material was typed out by Mitrokhin in London, and subsequently translated and analyzed. It has extensively been used as source material for the Penguin *Mitrokhin Archive* Volumes I and II¹ and may also appear in the *Chekisms* Anthology, which will be included in the Mitrokhin collection after its publication in Britain.

To view available materials, visit CWIHP's webpage at <http://www.cwihp.org> and click on the Virtual Archive link.

1. See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); and Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao's Long March to Moscow, 1949

By Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff[◇]

Between December 1949 and February 1950 Mao visited Stalin in Moscow and the world waited in anxious anticipation. What would the communist giants decide? What great good (or evil, depending on your side) would result? In the mid 1990s, the declassification of these talks was one of the exciting highlights at the dawn of archive-based Cold War international history. Now a whole new tranche has emerged adding both length and depth to the telling of this dramatic story both from the Russian and Chinese sides.

It is common diplomatic practice to prepare a summit either through confidential talks conducted by the leaders' trusted advisors or foreign ministers. Also common is a variant where one leader dispatches an envoy to flesh out the agenda and then his counterpart sends a reply visitor to choreograph the meeting in greater detail. The latter route was chosen by Mao Zedong on 17 January 1949, when, after multiple postponements of his own trip to Moscow, Stalin again put him off. The eleven-month long preparation process that ensued has left us a rich record, much, but not all, of which has now leaked into the public sphere. Below, following several earlier CWIHP publications on this topic, is the latest installment for those who want to know what went wrong in the Mao-Stalin relationship and how it affected the whole course of Sino-Soviet relations thereafter.

Realizing that the visit would be a turning point for both, in the late 1940s Mao and Stalin each tried to control the timing of their eventual meeting, with one or the other putting the visit off time and again, with greater or lesser warning, with more or less convincing reasons. All these exchanges are well-preserved since they were precisely encoded by the Soviet doctor and GRU agent in China, Andrei Orlov (code name: Terebin). In Moscow, they were decoded and brought directly to Stalin. The exchanges appear more like a cat-and-mouse game than alliance formation.

Most of the documents reproduced below are ostensibly traceable to the *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*—the

Russian Presidential Archive, an institution notoriously unwelcoming of scholars. In fact, original documents in the archive are entirely inaccessible except to those on a short list of hand-picked Russian researchers who, over the last 15 years or so, have leaked certain “declassified” documents, showcasing them in memoirs, articles, and documentary collections. One such collection, Volume 5 of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnoshniia* (Soviet-Chinese Relations) edited by Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov—all heavyweights of Russian Sinology—appeared in print in Moscow in 2005. Volume 5 is the latest installment in a series on Sino-Soviet relations published under the auspices of the Russian Institute of the Far East (Institut Dalnego Vostoka). The present volume, made up of two books, includes documents from 1946 until February 1950 (Mao's visit to Moscow), with an unexpected addendum of 1952 talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai.

Some of the documents included in Volume 5 (for example, Mao's visit to the Soviet Union and the aforementioned talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai) have long been known in the West, and their translations have appeared in previous issues of this *Bulletin*. But some very interesting documents in Volume 5 have been put into circulation for the first time. Documents translated below came from three *fondi* and seven distinct *dela* of the Presidential Archive. These are cables between Mao Zedong and Stalin through Orlov, reports from Soviet representative to the CCP Ivan Kovalev (who replaced Orlov as liaison to Stalin in 1949), and Anastas Mikoyan's reports on his meetings with the Chinese leadership in Xibaipo in January-February 1949. A simple comparison of archival citations reveals that the editors of Volume 5 omitted a large number of documents (likely, further correspondence between Mao Zedong and Stalin, and possibly transcripts of Stalin-Liu Shaoqi meetings in Moscow), while several reprinted documents show obvious signs of tampering. In other words, Volume 5, and the translations below, still cannot be the final word on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance; yet these new

Sergey Radchenko is a visiting professor at Pittsburg State University and the author of The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Towards the People's Republic of China, 1962-67, to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press later this year. David Wolff is professor of Eurasian History at the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan, and a former director of the Cold War International History Project. He is also the author of CWIHP Working Paper #30 and To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914 (Stanford University Press, 1999).

documents vastly enrich our understanding of this intricate process.

Two additional documents come from a Chinese documentary collection, *Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao*. The first four volumes of this series appeared in 2005. Liu is, after Mao and Zhou, the number three man in Chinese Communist history, so it is no surprise that documents from his files held by the Central Archives and accessed with the authority of the Central Committee's Document Research Unit, would be of interest. For over thirty years, Liu served as the top expert on organization and administration inside the CCP Politburo, so it was logical that he should visit Moscow to take the measure of the Soviet model. And it was not Liu's first time. When Mao was visiting Beijing in 1920, learning about the exciting events taking place in Moscow and buying his first copy of *The Communist Manifesto*, knowledge that would make him a Marxist, Liu was already in Moscow. As we will see below, the most contentious moments of Liu's conversations with Stalin have been removed, so that neither Stalin's unwillingness to aid the CCP's planned campaign against Taiwan nor Stalin's fatal attentions toward Gao Gang, the Manchurian party boss and a member of Liu's delegation, would be revealed. Nonetheless, the parts of the conversations that have been printed are quite revealing, nicely complementing Russian materials on Liu's visit. There are still gaps, but they are getting smaller.

Mao postponed

Mao allegedly requested a meeting with Stalin in early 1947, though documentary evidence is still very scant on this point.¹ We can only speculate about Mao's reasons for insisting on such a meeting; Dieter Heinzig cites his pressing need for Soviet aid, especially weapons, while Odd Arne Westad adds to these practical concerns Mao's intention to re-order his long-term relationship with the Soviet ally.² But in the spring of 1947 the Chairman was in no position to travel to distant places; in March he had to abandon the long-time revolutionary base of Yan'an to the advancing Guomindang forces (a move later portrayed in Chinese historiography as work of a tactical genius, but at the time something of a setback for the CCP). Although the Guomindang offensive in Shaanxi stalled by the summer of 1947, Mao had little to take to Moscow except promises of future CCP victories.

Nevertheless, Stalin volunteered to receive the CCP Chairman in Moscow, secretly, in his message dated 15 June 1947, only to cancel this invitation two weeks later because, he claimed, Mao's absence might have a negative effect on the military situation in northern China. Stalin's about-face was almost certainly a reaction to Terebin's report (or reports) on the military situation, to which Stalin alludes in his second message (1 July). Interpreting Stalin's decision is complicated by the fact that apparently only a portion of that message has been released to the public, and over 20 pages of source text preceding Stalin's two messages remain classified, including a likely report by Terebin. The only declassified snippet from this batch is a 12 June report to Stalin by State Security official

P. Fedorov who related Gao Gang's urgent request for ammunition, desperately needed by the CCP forces for the planned offensive on the railroad town of Siping.³ There are good reasons to think that Stalin ignored this request. In the meantime, worn down by Du Yuming's forces, the PLA lifted the siege of Siping.⁴

It is not clear whether Stalin's decision to postpone Mao's visit had something to do with the Siping operation, or developments in Shaanxi, and whether it reflected Stalin's genuine concern about military prospects of the CCP in Mao's absence, or merely his unwillingness to make any promises to Mao while the outcome of the Civil War remained uncertain. In any case, the subject of Mao's visit to Moscow was shelved for several months until Mao asked again, possibly on 30 November, and Moscow confirmed his invitation in December 1947. Then Stalin did not write for four months.

A long report from Mao finally provoked Stalin's reply. Stalin casually apologized for his prolonged silence on the absurd pretext of having taken the time to "check the data" necessary for his reply. It is possible that Stalin wanted to see where the wind was blowing on the Civil War fronts, and his skeptical attitude is understandable—even Mao, in his 15 March 1948 report to Stalin predicted that the Guomindang would only be defeated in three or more years.⁵

In his letter Stalin took issue with Mao's plan to abolish other political parties once the CCP gained power and insisted that bourgeois parties would have to be included in the Chinese political process for the foreseeable future. Such advice was in line with Stalin's understanding of the character of the Chinese Revolution as essentially an anti-imperialist, not a communist revolution. Mao, on the contrary, peddled more radical policies in his communications with Stalin, whether out of sheer conviction or for tactical reasons, as a proof of his pro-Soviet orientation. Whether or not Mao was disappointed by Stalin's rebuke, in one important way the letter was very welcome news, for it mentioned the inevitable "victory of the people's liberation armies"—was this not sure indication that Stalin was coming down on the CCP side of the fence?

Mao must have thought so, for on 22 April, only two days after Stalin's letter, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi invited the Soviet radioman (Terebin/Orlov) to convey that Mao had announced his imminent departure for Moscow, by car and horse. At first Stalin agreed, but two weeks later, he was again suggesting a postponement presumably because safe transit through a war-ravaged country could not be guaranteed. These thin excuses can safely be dismissed. There are various deducible strategic explanations for Stalin's hesitance, or one may narrow Stalin's undecipherable tactics to a banality—by agreeing time and again, and then postponing Stalin may have wanted to show Mao who was the "boss."⁶

Whatever Stalin's reasons, he was at no loss for excuses because when Mao again applied for permission to visit in July 1948, Stalin asked him to postpone the trip until November, ostensibly because the leading comrades had gone to bring in the grain harvest. Stalin's motivations are once again unclear,

though we may be reasonably certain that Stalin was not in the fields in the summer of 1948. But even if he had gone to enjoy his annual vacation on the Black Sea, he could have received Mao there, as he had received many other foreign visitors.⁷ In fact, this would have been better from the point of view of secrecy. But Stalin demurred, possibly still uncertain about his strategic priorities in China. Indeed, there is some evidence to the effect that in the summer of 1948 the Soviet ambassador to China, Nikolai Roshchin, probed Guomindang officials about possibly mediating in the CCP-GMD conflict.⁸ It is possible that Stalin needed more time to define his position with respect to the CCP, the Guomindang, and their bitter confrontation.

Orlov, the radioman, transmitted Mao's agreement to yet another delay, but then wrote a separate dispatch expressing his view that Mao was deeply disappointed.

"As far as I know Mao Zedong, [which has been] for more than 6 years, his smile and words '*hao, hao*—good, good,' at the time when he was listening to the translation, do not at all suggest that he was happy with the telegram. This could be seen quite clearly...."

He was sure that he was going to go precisely now. Probably, the trip became necessary for him. He waited for a reply with great eagerness... He was ready for departure... Mao Zedong's suitcases were being packed, and even leather shoes were bought (like everybody here, he is wearing fabric slippers), and a thick wool coat was tailored... So now he is outwardly calm, polite and attentive, courteous in a purely Chinese manner. But it is hard to see his true soul."

But Mao, it appears, swallowed his soul. On 28 July Orlov reported on another conversation with Mao Zedong; this time Mao outlined an agenda for his talks with "comrade main master," as Mao now called Stalin. Sandwiched as points 4 and 5 of this agenda were Mao's concrete, urgent needs, e.g. rebuilding of Chinese industry and transport infrastructure. He also wanted a loan of thirty million dollars. Mao told Orlov that whereas he had previously "not [been] in a hurry" to visit Moscow, now he wanted to go as soon as possible. As Stalin's deadline approached, Mao reminded the Soviet leader that he was once again packing his suitcases. Unfortunately, only a small part of Mao's 28 September letter to Stalin has been declassified, leaving us some hope that future declassifications or leaks may yet make this story a little more coherent.

In the days that followed messages were exchanged between Mao's base and Moscow, discussing the logistics of the trip. But on 21 November it was Mao who cancelled the trip due to illness, possibly a fig leaf with which to avoid another suspected cancellation by Stalin, since no concrete transport plans had been made so close to the proposed date of visit.⁹ Six weeks later, though, Mao summoned his enthusiasm and proclaimed imminent departure for Moscow, naming Gao Gang and Ren Bishi as the leading figures in his retinue.

But this time, Stalin stepped forward to present the Guomindang request for USSR mediation between the GMD and CCP.¹⁰ Stalin argued the case for mediation, but Mao was adamantly against "any kind of participation of the CCP in the

negotiations," since such mediation would be accompanied by a ceasefire, preventing the PLA from continuing its successful military drive to unify China under CCP rule. Mao's messages to Stalin retained comradely civility, but let Orlov know that Mao was not happy with Stalin's meddling: "the Guomindang will agree to any conditions now, but this must not be allowed." Stalin argued, but then acquiesced, calling in the Guomindang ambassador to reject the request on the grounds that "the Soviet government is always loyal to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries..."

Mikoyan at Xibaipo

But Stalin now found Mao's presence in China "essential," effectively cancelling the Chinese leader's trip. Instead a Politburo representative, Anastas Mikoyan, would visit the temporary CCP headquarters at Xibaipo and discuss key matters. Stenographic copies were kept, so Stalin would be able to review the answers to all questions he put on Mikoyan's list of topics. All present knew it would be so and spoke for Stalin's ears as well.

Until now we have only known of the Mikoyan visit from a short report penned by Mikoyan in 1960 and sent to the CC with a copy of the stenograms.¹¹ But the stenograms were not available until now. Here the Mao-Mikoyan conversations are presented in full.¹² Mao's list of six topics from July 1948 multiplied and the transcripts list 65 topic headings, some of which were discussed at great length.

In the first meeting, on 30 January 1949 Mao went out of his way to portray himself as a humble student of Stalin. He went on to say that China "has fallen far behind Russia," that the Chinese were "weak Marxists" who had committed many mistakes, and that "if one looks at our work with Russia's measure then it will turn out that we have nothing." Stalin was thanked effusively for all he had done for the Chinese Revolution. This must have been a fairly painful process for Mao, usually a law unto himself. Mao returned to CCP "mistakes" in another conversation, on 3 February, and then again on 5 February, when he recounted the history of Chinese communism since 1921. Mao predictably dwelled on the CCP struggle against the "leftist" and "rightist" deviations, and mistakes of Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Wang Ming and Mao's other real or imaginary past opponents. Wang Ming received the brunt of criticism, for though he spoke well of Li Lisan, Mao said that Wang Ming "still has not recognized his former mistakes."

The irony of the situation was that Wang Ming had been the recognized head of the Moscow faction and the Comintern man in the CCP. Mao, though, accused Wang Ming of nationalism and in effect acting contrary to Comintern instructions, which he, Mao, always held close to his heart. The consistency with which Mao brought up the question of Wang Ming, who no longer exercised any political power (he talked about Wang Ming's mistakes before Mikoyan's arrival in a conversation with Orlov, and returned to this problem after Mikoyan's departure in a conversation with Ivan Kovalev) suggests that Mao was at pains to make sure that Stalin recognized him as

the only legitimate authority in the Chinese Communist Party. To this end, he bent over backwards to explain his policies in the light of complete adherence to Stalin's instructions. Mao's account is especially interesting if compared to his later complaints of Stalin's obstruction of the Chinese Revolution.¹³

Mao and Mikoyan also discussed the problem of China's nationalities. Here Mikoyan walked a tight rope since he had to explain away Stalin's meddling in the Chinese border areas. In 1944 Stalin sponsored Uyghur and Kazakh nationalists in a general uprising against Chinese authority. The insurgents, with the help of Soviet advisers and weapons, consolidated control of northern Xinjiang and proclaimed a short-lived republic. In 1945 Stalin pressured the insurgents to compromise with the Guomintang government, as a part of his broader scheme of improving the Soviet relationship with Nanjing. Now Mikoyan related to Mao that one should not give independence to the national minorities.

Mao was "glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever." The Chairman then questioned Mikoyan about Soviet involvement in Xinjiang and even cited GMD General Bai Chongxi's authority to claim that the insurgents had used Soviet-made artillery, tanks and planes (this was true). Mikoyan disclaimed any Soviet involvement, probably to Mao's relief.

Hopeful that Stalin's desistance from promoting Xinjiang's independence could be stretched a little further, Mao on his initiative raised the question of Outer Mongolia's independence. Though under *de facto* Soviet control since the 1920s, Outer Mongolia became *de jure* independent after the conclusion of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. At the time Jiang Jieshi bitterly resisted Stalin's demands for Outer Mongolia's independence, but the Soviet leader finally squeezed out this concession from Nanjing. Now Mao proposed that Outer Mongolia rejoin China on the premise that the Mongols had nothing to fear from the Chinese communists. Mikoyan reported that Outer Mongolia would never agree to abandon its independence and issued an implicit warning for Mao to measure his appetites: "If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be an independent Mongolia." Mao laughed off the issue and gave up the Mongolian issue for the time-being, though Liu Shaoqi again briefly resurrected it in Moscow in the summer of 1949 (with the same results).¹⁴

CCP foreign relations came up for discussion several times with Mao generally stressing that he was not in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries but hinting time and again that the Western countries (especially the US and Britain) *were* willing to recognize China under CCP rule. Mao's casual reference to this prospect was meant to elicit Stalin's promise to recognize China, for this promise had been slow in coming. Instead, the Soviet ambassador in China, Nikolai Roshchin, followed the crumbling Guomintang government to Guangzhou after it fled from Nanjing—even as many ambassadors of Western countries remained in Nanjing! In a conversation with Zhou Enlai on 1 February, Mikoyan

offered an awkward explanation to the effect that Roshchin's move was a standard diplomatic practice. One has to wonder whether Zhou was convinced, for in retrospect Roshchin's departure for Guangzhou, while even the capitalist ambassadors remained in Nanjing, still appears inexplicable and might only mean that Stalin was exceptionally keen to avoid giving the Guomintang any pretext for concluding that he was interfering in the internal affairs of China (and the prospect of US intervention, which such interference might incur). It is hard to estimate whether Mao's use of the "US card" in winning concessions from Moscow succeeded at all, but he certainly was aware of this card, and played it to his presumed advantage not only in the meeting with Mikoyan, but a year later in Moscow, to alter Stalin's position on the treaty of alliance with China.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 was also discussed at the meetings. At least initially Mao appeared content with the existing treaty (readers of the *CWIHP Bulletin* will remember that concluding a new treaty was Mao's chief concern in Moscow in 1950). Now, Mao said that though he had called for renunciation of Jiang's "treacherous treaties," these did not include the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty because it has a "patriotic character." Mikoyan was evidently surprised by this admission, asking Mao how he explained the patriotic character of the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement on Port Arthur by which the Soviet Union obtained a military base on Chinese soil. In particular, Mikoyan wondered how the CCP's support for the Soviet base in Port Arthur squared with their opposition to the US base at Qingdao. Mao replied that whereas the Americans were in China for oppression, the Soviet forces were at Port Arthur for protection against Japanese fascism.

In subsequent negotiations with the Soviets, Mao continued to insist that the Soviet presence in Port Arthur was "beneficial," as a deterrent against imperialist aggression and a point of training for the nonexistent CCP Navy. Was Mao's enthusiasm for the Soviet military base in China genuine or was he opposed to Soviet withdrawal for tactical reasons? (To show his "pro-Soviet sentiments," as he put it.) One may judge from his reaction to Mikoyan's inquiry about the agreement that Mao was well aware of its unequal character: "Mao Zedong said, laughing, that it was not he, but Jiang Jieshi who signed this treaty." But now, that the agreement was in place, he may have wanted to keep it there, both as a token of recognition of Soviet interests and as a deterrent against US intervention in the Civil War. In other words, Mao stood to benefit from some aspects of the agreement while letting Jiang Jieshi take the blame for signing yet another unequal treaty with a foreign power.

Stalin may have sensed Mao's duplicity, for on 6 February (this would have given enough time for Mikoyan to send back his report to Stalin on the exchange on Port Arthur and receive instructions) the Soviet envoy brought up Port Arthur at the beginning of the conversation, saying right away that Moscow considered the agreement "an unequal treaty, concluded in order to prevent the Guomintang's collusion with Japan and the USA against the USSR and the liberation movement in

China.” Mikoyan records the Chinese reaction: “The appraisal of this treaty as unequal was so unexpected for Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo that it caused their frank astonishment.” Mao asked to keep the base in Port Arthur, though this time he said, very importantly, that the Soviet Union could withdraw its troops after the defeat of “reactionaries” in China. He finished by saying: “When we become strong, then ‘you will leave China’ and we will conclude a Sino-Soviet mutual assistance treaty along the lines of the [April 1945] Soviet-Polish treaty.”

Mao did not set a specific timeframe for renegotiating the 1945 treaty, and his reference to a new treaty appears almost accidental, since in an earlier conversation with Mikoyan Mao explicitly spoke against the renunciation of the 1945 “patriotic” treaty. By his later remark he probed Stalin’s attitude to see how far Moscow would be willing to go in reordering its relationship with Communist China. Mikoyan did not challenge Mao’s long-term vision and therefore left doors open for Mao with respect to having a new treaty. In just under a year Mao’s long-term plan for signing a new treaty when China “becomes strong” took the shape of an immediate imperative and problem No. 1 on his agenda in Moscow in December 1949.

Finally, on 6 February 1949 Mao brought up the request of a loan of three hundred million dollars, insisting that China would pay every penny back with interest. Compared to his own figure of 30 million dollars suggested in July 1948, Mao’s appetite had increased by a factor of ten in six months.

Mikoyan’s memoranda of conversations with the Chinese leaders are exceptionally interesting for what they tell us about Moscow’s relations with the CCP in early 1949; they are even more interesting for what they do not tell us. For example, there is no mention anywhere of Mikoyan’s alleged proposal to divide China along the Yangzi River along the lines of the northern and southern dynasties of 420-581 AD. This allegation surfaced in the Chinese historiography of the Xibaipo talks and was explored at some length by Brian Murray in CWIHP Working Paper No. 12.¹⁵ Absence of any statement on Mikoyan’s part to this effect in the declassified stenograms does not yet amount to conclusive evidence to disprove the claims (there is no doubt that some documents in Volume 5 of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia* were arbitrarily cut and tampered with) but the spirit of discussions points away from this provocative proposition. Indeed, although some of the conversations were quite tense, Mikoyan succeeded in smoothing previous disagreements with the CCP over the mediation issue. Mao for his part agreed to let other parties and economic interests live on in China after the communist capture of state power.

At some point between 16 February and 13 March 1949 Orlov was replaced as liaison between Mao and Stalin by the Soviet economic adviser in China, Ivan Kovalev, the former People’s Transport Commissar.¹⁶ Kovalev’s first available report to Stalin, on 13 April recounts his lengthy conversation with Mao four days earlier. Mao emphasized PLA victories and voiced his confidence about the success of the impending

crossing of the Yangzi River by the CCP forces. Kovalev took exception to Mao’s predictions and, citing Guomindang reinforcements south of the River, warned Stalin that the Chinese comrades were “too optimistically inclined.” One has to wonder whether previous reports on the military situation by Soviet agents in China were even more skeptical and pessimistic than Kovalev’s report which was written in the wake of remarkable PLA successes. If so, there is little wonder that Stalin was uncertain about the CCP victory in China until the very last moment.

Stalin continued to worry about the military situation in China even after the PLA had already obliterated Jiang Jieshi’s main armies and turned to mopping up the remnants of the Guomindang forces in poorly accessible southern provinces. In a cable to Kovalev on 26 May Stalin asked to convey to Mao to watch out for a potential Anglo-Franco-American intervention in the conflict. He urged Mao to take his time and prepare well for the final offensive in the south while leaving two armies in the rear to guard against a possible US invasion in Tianjin or Qingdao. If Stalin was in fact more concerned than Mao about the danger of US intervention in the Chinese Civil War, we may need to take a fresh look at the well-known argument in the historiography that one of Mao’s chief reasons for an alliance with the USSR was to seek cover under Stalin’s security umbrella.¹⁷

Relations with the United States made for another important topic in Mao-Stalin exchanges in the spring of 1949. Mao informed Stalin through Kovalev of the impending changes in CCP policy toward foreign diplomats in China; in place of non-recognition (policy of “free hands”), the CCP would establish *de facto* relations with foreign representatives (policy of “semi-free hands”). Mao likely intended to probe Stalin’s attitude toward establishment of CCP’s diplomatic relations with the West; if so, Stalin’s reply was encouraging, for on 19 April Stalin cabled Kovalev that he was not against the idea of CCP relations with Western countries, including the US, provided Washington renounced its support for the Guomindang. It was evidently with Stalin’s indirect blessing that in Nanjing, Huang Hua, the CCP Aliens Affairs Office chief, approached US ambassador John Leighton Stuart in early May, and then again in June to sound out Washington’s intentions with regard to the recognition of the communist government.

The first meeting between Huang Hua and Stuart (on 14 May) was discussed at a Politburo session on 22 May, with Kovalev present. The session was likely choreographed by Mao to make an impression (duly conveyed by Kovalev to Stalin) that Mao was taking a hard line on the Americans. Mao accused Washington of relentless support for the Guomindang, and of American military occupation of Qingdao and said that it was not in China’s interest to have Stuart in Nanjing in any case. The show paid off, for on 26 May Stalin replied with the approval of the CCP’s position with regard to the US. Mao apparently did not mention in the Politburo session that Huang Hua was the one to have initiated contacts with Stuart and that, as far as the US declassi-

fied documents suggest, his chief purpose was to make a case for US recognition of communist China.¹⁸ We do not know whether Kovalev was ever informed of Huang Hua's second meeting with Stuart (on 6 June), in which he called for ending US aid to the Guomindang, or of Huang Hua's invitation to Stuart on 28 June to visit Beijing. Mao dodged the subject of US relations in his report to Stalin on 11 June. Instead, he stressed CCP loyalty in the Soviet-led struggle against imperialism. To this end, he told Kovalev on 12 May:

If one were to depict imperialism as a lion, then in the current situation the body and the head of the lion are bound by the strong vises of the revolutionary forces, by the Soviet Union. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe and the European Communist Parties help bind the head of this lion. We, the Chinese communists, pinched "the lion's tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion."¹⁹

Available documents do not paint the full picture of CCP policy toward the US and Stalin's role in the triangular diplomacy. They indicate that Stalin was at least aware of some contacts between CCP representatives and Stuart, and that he was in agreement with Mao's "semi-free hands" policy. But Mao clearly played a double game, bringing Stalin's attention to the apparent US willingness to recognize his regime, all the while claiming lack of interest in such an outcome to prove his revolutionary credentials to the Soviet leader. In the meantime, Mao may have been actually interested in immediate US recognition of Communist China as a trading chip in his dealings with Stalin. There is still not enough evidence to conclude that Huang Hua's approaches to Stuart, or, for that matter, Zhou Enlai's alleged communication to American representatives on 31 May (concerning "liberal" attitudes with regard to the US within his CCP faction) were anything more than a part of Mao's careful strategizing to have a head-start in the negotiations with the Soviets.²⁰

Liu Shaoqi in Moscow

On 19 April, Stalin scheduled the return visit by writing to Mao, stating that the quick issuance of a loan to the CCP would require a signed agreement of representatives of the USSR and China. "Without such a document," argued Stalin, interpreting USSR constitutional law for Mao, "the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet does not have the right to give agreement to a loan." Stalin apparently already approved the loan to China (Mao thanked him for that on 9 April). Therefore, the real purpose of Stalin's bureaucratic move must have been to secure a return visit to Moscow by a Chinese delegation. Accordingly, Mao sent Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang. The delegation spent most of the summer in Moscow, learning how a ruling party runs a country after capturing power. Although many things did not fit China's experience, the basic model for the political economy of the new China was adopted wholesale

from post-war Stalinism.

At several meetings with Stalin, from the informal banquet at Stalin's dacha to the Politburo session at which Liu, Gao, and Wang presented their report, topics initially discussed with Mikoyan resurfaced. At the very beginning of the first meeting on 27 June, Stalin made clear that the Chinese would get what they came for. The terms of the 300 million dollar credit were immediately clarified, all of it to be used for the purchase of Soviet goods and equipment at one percent interest to be repaid in ten years. Some Chinese commentators have considered these terms parsimonious on Stalin's part, but it was all in conformity with Mao's specific requests to Mikoyan. Maybe most striking in the 27 June transcript is Stalin's flirtation with Gao Gang, the Communist boss of Manchuria, who spoke Russian and seems to have had the best relationship with Kovalev.²¹ Manchuria could officially be the recipient of the loan, since it was already a real government. Military aid could then be passed to the CCP through Manchuria. Liu's study of the Soviet system would be easier if he was legalized as a member of the Manchurian trade delegation headed by Gao Gang. Stalin had certainly read Zhou's remark to Mikoyan about taking Manchuria "behind the Iron Curtain," but Liu probably sensed potential trouble.

Nonetheless, Zhou's report to Mao must have been basically positive, since on 30 June Mao published his "leaning to one side" article, essentially entering the Soviet camp. On 4 July, Liu followed up with a report to Stalin elaborating on one-sidedness, and on 6 July sent another letter with questions he wished to ask Stalin. This same letter requested the chance to meet with responsible cadres from a long list of institutions. Central and local organizations of the party, state, economy, and culture all fell in Liu's domain of interest, ranging from the State Bank to the MGB (Ministry of State Security, later renamed the KGB). He was clearly planning a long visit. The CCP knew how to fight, but now they needed to learn how to rule, especially in the cities where they had never held power in peacetime.

The second meeting on 11 July, according to Kovalev's unpublished memoirs, ran into trouble when Stalin refused to make commitments to aid the liberation of Taiwan.²² The version presented here from Liu's files (as well as the Chinese translator Shi Zhe's memoirs) makes no mention of this topic. Again according to Kovalev, Liu and Stalin agreed to continue discussion at their next meeting on 27 July. According to Liu's record of the 11 July meeting, Stalin continued with uncomfortable references to Manchuria's semi-autonomous status, asking with the Chinese Northeast as an example, whether the regions obeyed the center. Liu replied "Yes," but Stalin continued by suggesting that the Dairen issues be handled directly between the Soviet authorities there and Gao Gang's Northeast Bureau. Worse than irritating Liu, these encouragements seem to have gone to Gao Gang's head.

At the meeting on 27 July, seemingly in parallel with Liu's request for aid against Taiwan, Gao suggested Soviet southward military expansion in China toward that end, a goal that

had already been requested as part of air defense for Shanghai. Finally, he got carried away and although the exact context remains unclear, the phrase “17th Soviet Republic” was heard, although probably in some very hyperbolic or hypothetical sense.²³ The Soviet comrades applauded, Liu grew silent and furious, and Stalin tried to laugh off the *faux pas* by labeling Gao Gang as a second Zhang Zuolin, the warlord of a semi-autonomous Manchuria in the 1910s and 1920s. Liu telegraphed Beijing. Gao was recalled to China. Unfortunately, this is all that the new documents can tell us about the still sensitive “Gao Gang affair.”²⁴

Finally, although Stalin did not grant Liu’s request to visit a nuclear installation, he did conduct “atomic diplomacy” by implying that the Soviet Union had or soon would have nuclear weapons. Liu, claims Kovalev, was shown a filmed explosion, purported to be a Soviet atom test, although this was a full month before the “Joe One,” Stalin’s first bomb. At the 11 July meeting, Stalin also noted that the USSR was preparing “faster than them [the Americans]” to avoid nuclear blackmail. “If they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons.”

Several times Stalin tried to stop the obsequious groveling, as Mikoyan had also criticized the “shyness” of the CCP. Parties do not obey other parties, Stalin insisted to Liu, but Liu was under orders and probably Stalin was not convincing enough in his insistence. Stalin was used to flattery and could take it in stride. Stalin may also have been a little concerned by the patently false and pro-Stalin picture of inter-party relations in the 1920s that Mao had drawn for Mikoyan. On 27 July, he came out directly and asked Liu, if he [Stalin] had wronged the CCP. “No” was the answer. Having given the Chinese their chance to air grievances, Stalin may have considered this chapter behind him, but Liu’s forbearance was not necessarily enough to assuage Mao’s historical conscience. The question of what to do with the 1945 treaty was explicitly left undecided until Mao’s visit to be arranged immediately after the founding of the PRC. Stalin pushed for an early date and a 1 January 1950 plan became a 1 October 1949 reality.

Mao at Last

And yet, even then, after Mao had stood up on Tiananmen to declare that China had stood up, Stalin did not immediately issue an invitation. On 10 November 1949, Zhou visited Soviet Ambassador Roshchin and began the conversation by noting that “Mao Zedong has long cherished the hope of visiting the Soviet Union.” Kovalev had been approached on 5 November, a telegram had been sent to Moscow on 8 November, and on 10 November Zhou had been given “plenipotentiary rights” to pursue this goal, so that Mao could “personally congratulate Cde. Stalin on his [70th] birthday.”²⁵

A month later, on 9 December, Mao’s train (with Roshchin on board) crossed the Sino-Soviet border. Mao was on his way at last. In recent years an ever-larger body of material has illuminated the summit of communist titans, men whose absolute control of hundreds of millions gave them a historical stature, larger and harsher than anything we have seen before or since. Stalin

and Hitler meet only in the furnace of creative minds. Stalin and Mao really did meet, though only once. Russian memoranda of the two principal conversations as well as coded telegrams Mao sent back to Beijing have been published by CWIHP.²⁶ At the birthday celebration in the Bolshoi Theater, Mao stood beside Stalin and gave the first speech, both his special place and shared subordination reaffirmed by the same action. Again, Mao’s privileged position allowed for the re-negotiation of the 1945 Treaty, but only following the basic premises imposed by Stalin on Jiang—an anti-Japanese orientation, the independence of Mongolia, and exclusive, extensive Soviet influence in the northern borderlands, Xinjiang and Manchuria.

The airing of authoritative views on both sides by senior go-betweens made it easier to formulate common policies on a wide range of issues, but already some future problem areas can be discerned. The contentious July meetings made clear that Stalin hesitated to support a Taiwan invasion, the last necessary step to unify China. The 1945 Treaty would only be discussed by the bosses directly. It is no surprise that when Stalin and Mao meet on the very day of his arrival in Moscow, Mao raised the treaty issue almost immediately and shortly later the possibility of receiving Soviet aid to retake Taiwan. Stalin seemed unwilling to satisfy either agenda and did not schedule a next conversation until 22 January, leaving Mao, in his own words, nothing to do but “eat, shit (*lashi*), and sleep.”²⁷

The borderlands of Manchuria and Xinjiang would also remain a difficult subject of policy-planning and joint activity. The Russians had built a railway and port in China and still felt somewhat entitled to them. Although these did involve economic and strategic advantages as well, what the Chinese resented most was the Russian sense of entitlement. Stalin had excellent sensitivities for the psychological moments in international, interethnic and intercultural relations, but his solution was not to give up the Tsarist legacies, but to make the treaties look more equal. So, for example, just as the “secret” supplementary agreement to the friendship treaty gave Russians and Chinese the exclusive rights to invest in and manage ventures in Manchuria and Xinjiang, in identical language foreign influence is excluded from the Russian Far East and Soviet Central Asia.

For Mao, this was all window-dressing on another round of unequal treaties, but he would have to wait until Stalin was in his grave to voice his indignation.²⁸ The trip, long wished for, produced mixed results. The huge credit and the pledge of thousands of experts to rebuild China was a big success, with Stalin adding a symbolic regal touch to the aid plan by giving Mao a jet squadron, pilots and all, to be transported together with Mao’s personal train back to Beijing. The actual experience of Russia and Russians does not really seem to have been to Mao’s taste. He and Stalin were never able to find the right foot from which to start their partnership, nor did they succeed in having a single moment of informal connection, the only hope for confidence building. Mao would later argue that Stalin only began to trust the “Chinese Tito” when PRC troops began dying in Korea, but he himself, of course, would never

trust Stalin again.²⁹ Perhaps, the excessive time and contrived efforts necessary to arrange a first meeting soured both Stalin and Mao on each other, even before they met. The documents translated below fill in a few more blanks in this fateful and complicated puzzle.

◊. The authors thank Jim Hershberg for insightful comments.

1. Andrei Ledovskii, *SSSR i Stalin v Sudbakh Kitaiia* (Moskva: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1999), 50.
2. See Dieter Heinzig, *Die Sowjetunion und das kommunistische China 1945-1950: Der beschwerliche Weg zum Buendnis* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1998), 202-205; Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 166-7.
3. See Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaya, and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), 509-510 for full text of the report or Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery," *CWIHP Working Paper No. 12* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1995), 12, for discussion of the report.
4. Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 157.
5. *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2, 402.
6. Westad makes this argument in *Decisive Encounters*, 233.
7. Among foreign visitors whom Stalin received while vacationing in the vicinity of the Black Sea were, for example, Averell Harriman (in August 1945), Khorloogiin Choibalsan (August 1947), and Zhou Enlai (October 1950).
8. Murray, *CWIHP Working Paper No. 12*, 9.
9. The illness may well have been real, but Mao's doctor also provides cases of Mao feigning sickness for political reasons. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (Arrow: London, 1994), 105-6.
10. The full exchange of notes between Mao and Stalin can be found in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 27-29.
11. Andrei Ledovskii, *SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh Kitaiia*, 54-65.
12. There were twelve talks in all, primarily with Mao and Zhou Enlai, but also with Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, mainly dealing with economic issues (some of these are not included here). Shi Zhe, the Chinese leaders' Russian interpreter, has left us memoirs of the meetings that match in large part, although some parts, such as Mao's warning to Mikoyan about "false friends" do not appear in the Russian documents. In general, Mikoyan seems to have always had the last word in the Russian, while Mao is more verbally impressive in Chinese. Shi Zhe, *Zai Lishi Juren Shenbian: Shi Zhe Huiyilu (xiudingben)* (Revised Version) (Zhongyang Wenxian: Beijing, 1996), 372-388.
13. For samples of Mao's grievances see Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 148.
14. See Sergey Radchenko, "New Documents on Mongolia in the Cold War," in this issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.
15. See, for example, argument to this effect in Liu Xiao, *Chu Shi Sulian Ba Nian* (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986).
16. Orlov was reportedly recalled to the USSR on a false accusa-

tion, and his subsequent fate is unknown. See *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2, 510.

17. For example, see Odd Arne Westad, "Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/ 97), 224.
18. On Huang Hua's contacts with US diplomats see *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949*, Vol. VIII (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978), 741-767. For the US perspective, see Nancy B. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950* (New York: Columbia UP, 1983), p. 47. For a recent discussion of these contacts with the benefit of Chinese sources see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 41-43."
19. The indented citation is from Kovalev with the quotation inside it a verbatim from Mao.
20. For Zhou Enlai's "demarche" to the Americans see *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VIII, 357-360.
21. On 9 March 1954, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai spoke to Soviet Ambassador Pavel F. Yudin about Gao Gang's past errors, including antagonistic relations with Liu and overly intimate relations with Kovalev. On this, see Yudin's May undated May diary entry located in the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (AVPRF). The document can also be found in both Russian and English in the CWIHP Virtual Archive at <http://www.cwihip.org>.
22. On the Taiwan discussion and the Gao Gang affair as presented in Kovalev's unpublished memoirs, see Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1993), 67-75.
23. Although most of us remember the Soviet Union with fifteen republics, in 1949 the Finno-Karelian republic brought the count to sixteen.
24. On the silence of Chinese memoir materials and other documents regarding these two incidents during the Liu visit to Moscow, see Heinzig, 348-358, especially 354.
25. David Wolff, "One Finger's Worth of Historical Events": New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959," *CWIHP Working Paper No. 30* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, August 2000), 38-9.
26. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9; Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, eds. *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996, 128-142.
27. Shi Zhe, 437.
28. Mao expressed himself in this manner to Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, his first reaction to Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/ 96), 164-167.
29. Ibid.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 15 June 1947

[Source: *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Fond (F.) 39, Opis (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 31, List (L.) 23. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 327. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey S. Radchenko.]*

To Terebin¹

Convey to Mao Zedong that the VKP(b) CC² considers it desirable to have him come to Moscow without any kind of disclosure about it. If Mao Zedong also considers this necessary, then, it appears to us, it is better to do this through Harbin. If needed, [we] will send a plane.

Telegraph the results of the talk with Mao Zedong and his wishes.

F[yodor Fedotovich] Kuznetsov³

15.VI.1947

1. Terebin (real name Andrei Iakovlevich Orlov) was a Soviet doctor and Soviet operative in Mao's base in Yan'an.

2. Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia (bolshevikov), the All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)—the Soviet Communist Party.

3. Chief of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence). Though Kuznetsov's signature appeared on several cables to and from Orlov, Stalin was the real sender and recipient of this correspondence.

**DOCUMENT No. 2**

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 1 July 1947

[Source: *APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 24. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 333. Partly reprinted in Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), p. 167. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin:

All your pieces of information with regard to Mao Zedong, as well as on the situation on the fronts have been received.

1)¹ In view of the forthcoming operations and in view that Mao Zedong's absence might have an adverse affect on the transactions, we consider it appropriate to postpone Mao Zedong's trip temporarily.

[...]

F. Kuznetsov

1.VII.1947

1. "1)" indicates that probably this cable lists several (or at least two) points, either still classified or deliberately excluded by the editors of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*.

**DOCUMENT No. 3**

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 16 December 1947

[Source: *APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 25. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin:

In reply to the message about Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow in 1948, convey to Mao Zedong that

"The Soviet government will welcome the visit of Mao Zedong to the USSR and, naturally, will provide him connection with China and a personal radio."

Send by flash cable [*molniruite*] Mao Zedong's receipt and reaction to this telegram.

Kuznetsov

16.XII.1947





Mao Zedong in Moscow, December 1949 (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

DOCUMENT No. 4

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 17 December 1947

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 26. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Reporting:

1. Received the telegram at 00:35 on [17 December] local time (19:35 [16 December] Moscow).
2. On 17 December at 07:30 personally, without an interpreter, passed the received [information] to Mao Zedong.
3. Mao Zedong was exceedingly glad about the [information] conveyed. [He] immediately said: "Very good, now I will be able to live there for three months, half a year." Said that he is 54 years old, he has long wanted to go, almost all the leading persons had been there, naming many: [CCP CC Member] Zhou Enlai, [CCP CC Member] Ren Bishi, [CCP Deputy Commander in Chief] Peng Dehuai, [CCP General] Ye Jianying, [CCP CC Secretariat Member] Wang Ming and others. Asked me whether there are instructions that I go with him.

To my question what else should be inquired [from Moscow], [and] regarding his suggested dates for the trip, he said that there was no need to inquire about anything else.

Touching on the dates—after taking Pingsuilu, when one can get through. Now one cannot give a break to CKS [Jiang Jieshi], one should strike him. Then turned to the local questions. The conversation ended at this. During the conversation [he] was

fairly lively and very content. Offered me to stay here somewhat longer.

Terebin.

17.XII.1947



DOCUMENT No. 5

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 20 April 1948

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 28-29. Archival citation in accordance with Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 411-412. Published in translation in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 298-299; translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Terebin to be passed to Mao Zedong.

We have received both letters from Comrade Mao Zedong from 30 November 1947, and 15 March 1948. We could not react to them immediately because we were checking some information necessary for our answer. Now that the facts are verified, we can answer both letters.

First. The answer to the letter of 30 November 1947. We are very grateful for the information from Comrade Mao Zedong. We agree with the assessment of the situation given by Comrade Mao Zedong. We have doubts only about one point in the letter, where it is said that "In the period of the final victory of the Chinese Revolution, following the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CCP should leave the political scene, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese Revolution."

We do not agree with this. We think that the various opposition parties in China which are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers, while keeping hegemony, i.e., the leading position, in its hands. It is possible that some representatives of these parties will have to be included into the Chinese people's democratic government and the government itself has to be proclaimed a coalition government in order to widen the basis of this government among the population and to isolate imperialists and their Guomindang agents. It is necessary to keep in mind that the Chinese government in its policy will be a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one, after the victory of the People's

Liberation Armies of China, at any rate in the period immediately after the victory, the length of which is difficult to define now.

This means that nationalization of all land and abolition of private ownership of land, confiscation of the property of all industrial and trade bourgeoisie from petty to big, confiscation of property belonging not only to big landowners but to middle and small holders exploiting hired labor, will not be fulfilled for the present. These reforms have to wait for some time.

It has to be said for your information that there are other parties in Yugoslavia besides the communists which form part of the People's Front.

Second. The answer to the letter from Comrade Mao Zedong from 15 March 1948. We are very grateful to Comrade Mao Zedong for the detailed information on military and political questions. We agree with all the conclusions given by Comrade Mao Zedong in this letter. We consider as absolutely correct Comrade Mao Zedong's thoughts concerning the creation of a central government of China and including in it representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie.

With Communist greetings

Stalin

20 April 1948



DOCUMENT No. 6

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 22 April 1948

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 27. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 412-413. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

From Cde. Terebin

Reporting: on the evening of 22 April Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi invited me to [visit with] them and informed that in the beginning of May Mao Zedong will go to Moscow. Due to secrecy considerations Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi will not go.¹ On the pretext of illness and rest he [?] will, allegedly, rest here [?].

Mao Zedong will be accompanied by [his] wife [Jiang Qing] and daughter, as well as [interpreter] Shi Zhe. First [they] will go by car, [then] across the adversary's territory by horses for

10-15 days, and [then] again by car.

Probably [he] will not go to the capital of Manchuria [Harbin], but will stop nearby at one of the points, to which responsible people will be called for a meeting.

I was asked whether I had any instructions about the trip and whether I will be coming. Requested to inquire from you on my behalf.

To my question about Mao Zedong's opinion [as to whether I should come], [they] replied that he did not talk about this. Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi consider that [I] should not go, [but] provide for connection with you [Stalin]; for Melnikov² to work here as a doctor; we need a doctor, and this is more convenient from the point of secrecy, they added.

The radio, which had already arrived, is urgently being moved here. Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi are leaving to go to Liu Shaoqi in the nearest future.

Requesting your urgent instructions, for the departure is planned for 4-5 May.

Terebin.

22.IV.1948

1. *Editor's Note:* The meaning of this statement is unclear in the original, literally, it states "because of secrecy considerations [he] will not go to Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi."

2. Apparently, another Soviet doctor and operative in Yan'an; real name unknown.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 26 April 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 30-31. Archival citation in accordance with Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 415-416. Also published in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms, pp. 299-300. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Filippov,¹

1. I have received the letter of 20 April. Completely agree with it.

2. Our CC [Central Committee] has already moved to an area

near Shijiazhuang in Hebei province. It has merged and united with the working committee of the CC which used to consist of Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, [and] Dong Biwu.

3. We passed through the northern part of Shanxi province and the northwestern part of Hebei province, where we met and had conversations with the comrades from the Jinsui subbureau of the CCP CC and the comrades from the Jinchaji bureau of the CCP CC as well as with the masses. On our way we saw that the work with rectifying party ranks, carrying out land reform, reconstruction, and development of agriculture and industry, work on supplying the fronts, on helping victims of various disasters, work with non-party progressive gentry, and so on had moved in the right direction.

Leftist tendencies, which came into being in the provinces during the two years following the Japanese capitulation, have already been thoroughly corrected. A new work spirit can be felt everywhere.

4. I decided to move forward my visit [to] the USSR. I am planning to leave the Fobin district (100 km to the north of Shijiazhuang) in Hebei province in the beginning of the month and under cover of troops to cross the railway Beiping-Kalgan [Beijing-Zhangjiakou] (the Guomindang has concentrated around 100,000 troops on this railway). Possibly I will be able to arrive in Harbin in the beginning or in the middle of July. Then, from Harbin — to you.

I will be accompanied by Comrade Ren Bishi, member of the CCP CC Politburo. He has been to the USSR more than once, [and he] knows Russian. On my arrival at Harbin I am planning to invite to go with me another member of the Politburo, Comrade Chen Yun. He is now in charge of the industry and labor movement in Manchuria; he was in the USSR in 1936.

Besides them, I'll have with me two secretaries and several cipher officers and radio operators. I have organized such a big group for my trip to the USSR because I will ask for advice and guidance from the comrades in the VKP(b) CC on political, military, economic, and other important questions; besides, if you agree, we are planning to conduct studies in the USSR on military, economic, governmental, and party questions.

Besides, if possible, I would like to travel to the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe in order to study the work of the people's front and other kinds of work.

We are planning to travel for one to three months. If you agree with this plan, we will act according to it. If not, then, of course, there is only one way out — to come by myself.

5. My health is not good. I hope that the two Russian doctors who live here (one of them can speak Chinese) will accompany me to the USSR and then return here with me. Terebin's

radio station will go with us ("to be in touch on the way" [he] said but did not write. Terebin). On arrival in Harbin, we will leave the radio station there.

Please indicate to me whether we can do this.

Mao Zedong

26 April 1948

1. *Editor's Note:* 'Comrade Filippov' was Stalin's *nom de guerre*.



DOCUMENT No. 8

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong, 29 April 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 32. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 417. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Com[rade] Mao Zedong

Your letter dated 26 April has been received. [I] agree with your plan for the trip to the USSR. You may take along whom-ever and however many people you need. Both Russian doctors must depart with you. [I] agree with leaving one radio station in Harbin. Will talk about the rest at the meeting.

Stalin

29.IV.1948



DOCUMENT No. 9

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 10 May 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 33. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 419. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Com[rade] Mao Zedong

In connection with the possible development of events in the areas of your presence and, in particular, with the commenced

offensive of [prominent GMD General] Fu Zuoyi's forces on Yuxian, i.e. in the direction of those areas through which you plan to go to us, we are concerned whether your absence might influence the course of events, and also to what extent your passage is safe.

On this basis, should you not postpone your trip to visit us somewhat [?]

In case you decide not to postpone your departure, [we] ask to let us know what help we could offer you in your passage. Do you not consider it expedient that we send our plane to you [?]
In this case [we] ask [you] to let us know where to send the plane and when.

Waiting for your reply.

Filippov

10.V.1948



DOCUMENT No. 10

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 10 May 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 34. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 421. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Filippov

Today received your letter. Very grateful to you.

Under the current circumstances it is expedient to postpone my trip to you for a short time.

Requesting that you send a plane or a boat to the Shandong peninsula for my trip to you. But in the nearest future in view of the fact that I feel unwell (dizziness, the brain is very weak), cannot tolerate the vibration of the motor in the plane. Need a rest for a short time, after which can fly by plane. [I] will tell about the place of the aerodrome and port after finding out.

Mao Zedong.

10.V.1948



DOCUMENT No. 11

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 4 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 35-36. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 445-446. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Stalin!

The condition of my health, in comparison with two months ago, is considerably better. I decided to go to you [Moscow] at the nearest time.

There are three ways of coming to you: by air, by sea, and by land. But in all cases we must pass through Harbin, as I need to speak to a number of responsible comrades from Manchuria.

I hope that it will be possible to fly by plane for this is the quickest and also suits me the best on account of my health. For flying by plane one may use aerodromes in Shijiazhuang and Weixian.

The aerodrome in Weixian is the closest to Dairen and the safest. This aerodrome is to the south of Weixian at the point of Ershilibu, between Weixian and Fangzi.

Aerodrome data: the length from north to south 2,224 meters, width from east to west 368 meters. The runway: length 2,000 meters, width 96 meters. But here, everyday, from the morning until the evening, 6-7 times a day, enemy transport planes fly from Qingdao, Jinan and back through Weixian and the zones closest to it.

Will you have any kind of difficulties in sending planes from Dairen to the aerodrome in Weixian to get us [?]
(The plane upon arrival and landing at the aerodrome will remain there for 15-20 minutes, for the time necessary to board it).

If you consider that the aerodrome in Weixian is not suitable for transporting us from there, then the aerodrome in Shijiazhuang is even more complicated, for the distance from you is even greater, and the transport planes of the GMD also fly through here.

In this case [I] ask you to think about the possibility of sending a ship into one of the ports of the Shandong peninsula or to Rongcheng, Lidao, or Shidai for transporting us to Dairen.

If it is difficult to transport us by sea as well, then one is left with thinking of a land trip.

Using the moment when the main forces of Fu Zuoyi are drawn

into military operations in border areas of the eastern parts of Hebei and Rehe provinces, and [when] one senses relative desertedness at Pingsuilu, one could, under the cover of and in the company of military units, sneak through Pingsuilu, though the liberated areas of Rehe province to Harbin. But one will require about one month's time for this route. During the hot time obstacles may arise easily on the way due to my illness.

If it were possible to transport us by plane from the aerodrome in Weixian through Dairen (or other points) to Harbin, then we intend to leave a point near Shijiazhuang by car on about 15th of this month. After about a week [we] will reach Weixian, where [we] will stop for 2-3 days.

Hope the plane will fly into Weixian on about 25th of this month for transporting us.

The concrete time of the plane's arrival (day and hour) could be determined with you by radio after our arrival in Weixian.

If [you] decide to transport us by sea then we hope the ship will arrive at the end of this month at the appointed port. On about 15th of this month, we will leave from a point near Shijiazhuang.

If both the air and the sea routes are impossible for transporting us, we will in any case leave on the 15th of this month towards the north. But in this case one can only arrive in Harbin by the middle of August. We have a total of 20 (twenty) people (including Terebin, Melnikov, encoders, radio operators, secretaries). The total weight is over 3 (three) thousand kg (inclusive here of all the people).

Therefore, if [we] fly by air, it is necessary to send two transport (passenger) planes.

Request that you allow whichever of the aforementioned routes is suitable, and inform me.

Mao Zedong

4 July 1948.



DOCUMENT No. 12

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 14 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 37. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 447. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

“In view of the commenced grain harvest work the leading comrades will leave for provinces in August, where they will remain until November. Therefore the VKP(b) CC is asking Cde. Mao Zedong to time his visit to Moscow by the end of November so as to have an opportunity to see all the leading comrades.”

Stalin.

14.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 13

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 14 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 38. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 447-448. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

Reporting:

14 [July] at 14:30 local time conveyed Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong. Ren Bishi was translating. Mao Zedong listened with a subtle smile, said: “good, good” and then asked to convey to you the following text, dictated by him and translated by Ren Bishi:

“Com[rade] Stalin.

Agree with your opinion, related in the telegram dated 14 July. Will postpone trip to you to late October-early November.

Mao Zedong.

14 July.”

The small conversation, which took place afterwards, will be passed on as a separate issue.

Terebin

14.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 14

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 17 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 39-40. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 448-449. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade F. Kuznetsov

Reporting to you on my personal impressions and observations when conveying Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong.

Having heard Ren Bishi's translation of Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong asked: "is such attention really attributed to grain harvest work in the USSR that the leading persons of the party CC go out to do it?" I replied in the affirmative. Ren Bishi—as well. Mao Zedong asked again: "and what percent does the USSR gain from the agriculture, why, is it bigger than from industry, or smaller."

My reply: "Exactly what percent I do not know now, but in any case it is fairly big." And added that great significance is attributed to grain harvest work in the USSR."

Then Mao Zedong and Ren Bishi were saying that soon, probably, the main master [*glavnyi khoziain*] will go for rest. The conversation was in their language but I understood. After that Mao Zedong dictated a reply telegram to Stalin.

As far as I know Mao Zedong, [which has been] for more than 6 years, his smile and words "hao, hao—good, good," at the time when he was listening to the translation, do not at all suggest that he was happy with the telegram. This could be seen quite clearly.

My personal conviction is that Mao Zedong believed that in the worst case he will be denied having planes or a ship sent to him. But even this was improbable for him, especially since the plane was offered from Moscow.

He was sure that he was going to go right now. Probably the trip became necessary for him. He waited for a reply with great

eagerness.

On 13 July after he dictated his letter, in purely Chinese spirit, I asked when to send [it], perhaps to wait one more day, Mao Zedong replied that he had asked to send it on 13 July.

He was ready for departure.

As I learned in the last few days, they have been currently preparing a series of materials for Moscow, that is: maps of GMD positions at the fronts, data on the composition of the GMD forces, I think of their own as well, data on GMD intelligence, on its structure, some data on the CCP and other [materials]. Mao Zedong's suitcases were being packed, and even leather shoes were bought (like everybody here, he is wearing fabric slippers), and a thick wool coat was tailored. Not only the issue of the trip as such, but its timing, too, had already been decided by him. The only remaining issue was by which way to go.¹ So now he is outwardly calm, polite and attentive, courteous in a purely Chinese manner. But it is hard to see his true soul. One can judge from Ren Bishi's entire appearance that he did not expect the postponement of the visit.

Melnikov told me that on 15 July Mao Zedong put the same question to him about the grain harvest work.

Terebin

17.VII.1948

1. Translation of this sentence, with minor amendments, was taken from Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, p. 232.



DOCUMENT No. 15

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 28 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 41. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimiro Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 451-452. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Transmitting just a small part of the conversation, raised by Mao Zedong himself.

Mao Zedong was saying that whereas in 1947 he was not in a hurry to visit Moscow, now, in 1948, the situation had changed and he wanted to go to Moscow as soon as possible. [He]

wants to talk about many things there, to ask advice on some questions, on some—aid, within the bounds of the possible.

Questions about which Mao Zedong intends to talk in Moscow, are essentially:

1. On relations with small democratic parties and groups (and democratic figures).
On the calling of a political consultative council.
2. On the unification of the revolutionary forces of the East and on the contacts between the com[munist] parties of the East (and others).
3. On the strategic plan of struggle against the USA and Jiang Jieshi.
4. On the restoration and creation of industry in China, including (and in particular) military, mining, transport—railroad and highways. To say there [in Moscow] what we (the CCP) need.
5. On a silver loan in the amount of 30 million American dollars.
6. On the policy (line) with regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations with England and France.
7. On a series of other important questions.

Summing up the aforesaid Mao Zedong stressed: “one needs to come to an agreement so that our political course fully coincides with the USSR.”

Other parts of the conversations will be briefly transmitted separately.

Terebin.

28.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 16

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 28 September 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 42. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 463. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

[...]

9. On a series of questions it is necessary to report personally to the VKP(b) CC and to the main master (*glavnyi khoziain*). To receive instructions I agree to come to Moscow in accordance with the time pointed out in the previous telegram. Now, in general strokes, reporting the aforementioned, [I] ask you to convey this to the VKP(b) CC and to comrade main master. Sincerely hope that they will give us instructions.

Mao Zedong

28.IX.1948



DOCUMENT No. 17

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 17 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 43. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 468. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

“[I] received your letter dated 28 September 1948.

The VKP(b) CC is informed about this letter. The leading comrades will be happy to meet with you in Moscow at the end of November, as it was agreed upon. Then it will be possible to exchange opinions on all questions.

Stalin

17.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 18

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 17 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 44-45. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950* (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 468-469. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] Kuznetsov

Having read the translation by Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong immediately asked me: “Can one consider that the plane will be sent[?]”

After my reply that I do not know about this, that the telegram does not say so, Mao Zedong said that if there is no plane, he will not be able to come on time.

Further he said that in July he wrote about three routes, now two [of them]—by land and by sea—have fallen through. Only one remains—by air. Asked me to request from you [information as to] whether a plane will be sent.

[In reaction to] my attempt to avoid such a request on my behalf, with which he was not happy, he said so: “You write that Mao Zedong is asking to inform him whether a plane will be sent.” Right away he explained in detail why the two routes fell through.

Then he literally dictated, and Shi Zhe translated the following: “Write that in the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong asked me (Terebin) on my (Terebin’s) behalf to transmit the conversation with Mao Zedong about his trip to Moscow.

1. The land route, as before, is difficult, [it is] cut by the enemy and is very lengthy. The sea route in view of the fact that the GMD fleet strengthened control and intelligence, is also unsafe. Therefore [we] decided to ask for a plane to be sent.
2. The danger in the vicinity of the Jiaodong railroad is less, especially given that there is a good aerodrome there (Mao Zedong has Weixian in mind. Terebin). The time—the middle of November—most expedient.

When the planes are prepared [we] ask you to inform us and we will then leave from the area near Shijiazhuang toward the aerodrome. One does not have to stop in Harbin at all, but to fly to Moscow directly, since the situation there is more or less known to us now. [CCP CC member] Chen Yun can go to Moscow straight from there.”

In the conversation Mao Zedong said that military actions are taking place in the area of Pingsuilu, that the road is fairly lengthy and inconvenient, that the weather is unfavorable for the trip. [He] stressed that not only does he not have anything to do in Harbin, but it is not profitable to show up there, keeping in mind the non-party democratic politicians who are there.

[He] stressed that the day of the departure is set by You, on the basis of the preparedness of the planes, that he will be at the aerodrome at the appointed time.

[He] counted that in all 18 people had to fly. If there is one plane, then [they] will be compelled to take fewer people, which is less convenient, but [they] will fly anyhow.

[He] suggested to get the details of the quantity of people and cargo from Ren Bishi, Ren Bishi said that the quantity of people and cargo will remain the same, as pointed out in July. If there are any changes, and there will hardly be any, he will immediately inform [me]. It was decided not to take Chen Boda, but, perhaps, Ye Jianying will fly.

In general, in the last half-a-month Mao Zedong, during meetings, on every suitable occasion, stresses that he needs to go, that he is ready to go, that he will arrive on time.

Ren Bishi on the other hand asks directly: what do I think, will the plane arrive, and when[?] [He] says that Mao Zedong wrote that he will arrive by the set time, that [they] know there that without the plane they will not be able to arrive by that time, and so on.

The telegram dated 17 October strengthened their confidence even further, they consider the words “as it was agreed upon” that there will be a plane. Their questions and proposals that I request from you on my own behalf whether there will be a plane and when, place me right into an inconvenient position.

At the same time they are prepared to live the whole winter here, already heating had been installed at Mao Zedong’s and Ren Bishi’s. This, probably, can be understood in such a way that if there is no plane then they will not go by land in winter.

I am asking you again, if possible, to give me instructions about the line of my behavior in this question.

Terebin

17.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 19

Cable, Stalin [via Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 21 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 46. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 472. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong that you have received an instruction from Moscow to tell him that two passenger planes will be sent to him in the latter half of November, by which he and his group will be transported to Moscow. Details of the timing of the planes' arrival, as well as the route, will be carried out in time.

Kuznetsov

21.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 20

Cable, Mao to Stalin, 21 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 47. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 482. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Com[rade] Stalin

Over the recent days I am suffering from a small disease.

With the help of the Soviet doctor I got somewhat better, but another several days will be needed for rest. Besides, military operations near Suizhou are at the most serious stage, and an operation is being organized in the area of Tangshan-Tianjin-Beiping [Beijing]. Therefore the date of my trip will have to be postponed.

Before it was planned to leave [this] place in mid-November and by the end of November to arrive in Moscow, and now it is being planned to leave [this] place in the first part of December, and in mid- or in the end of December to arrive in Moscow.

May one act this way [?]

Requesting your advice.

Mao Zedong

21.XI.1948



DOCUMENT No. 21

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong, 22 November 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 48. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 482-483. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Com[rade] Mao Zedong!

Received your telegram dated 21 November.

Your decision to postpone for some time your trip to us in connection with the circumstances which have materialized at the fronts of military actions appears, evidently, to be correct.

When the circumstances allow you to implement your intentions with regard to the trip to Moscow, [I] request that you, ahead of time, some days before that, inform us as to the date and the place where we should direct our planes for you.

Wishing you a rapid and full recovery.

Stalin

22 November 1948



DOCUMENT No. 22

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 30 December 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 49-52. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 495-497. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Comrade Stalin!

1. Received your telegram dated 28 [sic] November.

Will act in accordance with this telegram. When the currently ongoing two large military operations are finished, then I will go to Moscow.

2. The successes of the military operations near Suizhou are considerably greater than we expected them to be in the first place. At the present time we finished off 35 full divisions of the Guomintang army, including 4 divisions [which] started a rebellion and took our side. 19 divisions of the Guomintang remain, under the command of [GMD General] Du Yuming, which are encircled by us in the area to the southwest of Suizhou and do not have an opportunity to escape. About 2 weeks will be needed to finish them off entirely.

Army groups of the GMD forces, heading for the rescue in the direction of northwest from Bangbu, have already been thrown back by our forces and retreated in the region to the south of the Yangzi River. The remnants of the enemy in the area of Bangbu are preparing to flee.

Suizhou, Huaiying, as well as all cities and villages to the north of the Huaihe River are fully in the hands of our army.

The forces of Du Yuming, which number more than 100,000 people, are occupying a territory not greater than 10 square kilometers. They are encircled on all sides by our forces.

In this military operation we concentrated two groups of field forces of [CCP military commanders] Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng numbering 600,000 people, and forces from the servicing population at the forward fronts numbering 600,000 people, in all about 1,200,000 people. This is the biggest operation of all operations conducted previously on the southern front.

The units of the enemy, which are already defeated, and [those] in the process of being defeated, are strong and elite forces of the Guomintang. After [our] victory in this operation, Jiang Jieshi will no longer have first rate forces.

3. In order that the 48 divisions of Fu Zuoyi's group do not escape from the line of Beipinglu-Pingsui, we, without waiting for [troops to] finish resting and [before] bringing in order the Manchurian units, ordered them [the troops] to undertake an offensive against the south beforehand and cooperate with our forces in northern China in encircling and destroying the forces of Fu Zuoyi.

By the present time 15 divisions of Fu Zuoyi have been destroyed by us. [We] have returned: Shanhaiguan, Tangshan, Kalgan and other wide areas, encircled the main forces of Fu Zuoyi (33 divisions) in Beiping [Beijing], Tianjin and Tanggu (a sea port). Another month will be needed, then one can finish them off.

In this military operation we are using about 900,000 troops, and about 400,000 people of the forces of the servicing population at the forward fronts. This operation is one of the largest operations, ever conducted on the northern front.

In the last military operation, conducted in Manchuria in September-October, we used the forces of the servicing population numbering a total of 900,000 people.

4. At the present time the situation is developing considerably faster than it was predicted by us at a meeting of the CC at the beginning of the month of September. Now it is already no longer what was assumed before—mainly to overthrow the power of the Guomintang within 5 years (beginning from July 1946), but now one can for the most part overthrow the power of the Guomintang in the course of three and a half years. However, we still follow the measure of confident actions [sic].

After the end of the military operations near Suizhou, Beiping [Beijing] and Tianjin the main body of our forces must take a rest and be brought into order in the course of three months, and [must] capture an isolated city of Taiyuan, and then [they] will move into the basin of the Yangzi River and into the wide southern regions.

5. We recruited and are preparing 53,000 cadres for using them to work in new regions which will be captured next year. This preparation is being carried out in a planned manner, there is confidence in carrying out work of preparing the cadres.
6. Intensified [ideological] education work is being carried out among the party cadres to grasp the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin and a series of concrete political measures of the Chinese Revolution. The faster the Chinese Revolution is developing, the more we feel the extreme importance of this education work [among] the cadres.
7. The rule of the Guomintang is difficult to sustain. Degradation and division are occurring internally. The wide masses of the country more and more strive towards us. The liberal bourgeoisie are wob-

bling more and more, searching with us for a solution for themselves. The number of people following the Guomintang is shrinking from day to day.

8. In recent months we took a number of big cities. At the same time there was a very good order there. Our various political undertakings received approval on the part of the wide masses. This had a very good influence in the areas of the Guomintang rule.
9. The discipline of the People's Liberation Army has increased considerably, the military spirit has gone up, the commanders have greater confidence in the matter of taking power in the country. The discipline of the Guomintang is unruly. The number of defectors from the Guomintang forces is growing larger and larger.

After [we] finish the two military operations near Suizhou and Beiping [Beijing] the Guomintang will no longer possess cadre-strength forces. The number of forces will be decreased to 170 divisions. The majority of these—newly formed or with low battle capability.

10. Leading figures of the democratic parties and groups and people's organizations of Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beiping [Beijing], Tianjian and other large cities have come or will soon come to our areas under the banner of the political consultative meeting and the democratic coalition government. The majority of these people were invited by us to participate in the political consultative meeting.
11. The blatantly aggressive policy of the US government has already bankrupted itself. Now the Americans intend to move from active support of the Guomintang to the support of the local Guomintang and southern Chinese militarists, so as to resist the People's Liberation Army with their military forces. This is [the case] on the one hand, and on the other—to organize and send their lackeys so that they infiltrate the political consultative meeting and the democratic coalition government and could create an opposition bloc there and undermine from within the people's revolutionary front in order that the revolution could not be consistently implemented.

This latter intrigue has already manifested itself several times. For example, they sent their diplomatic workers and journalists to the leaders of the right wing of the democratic league—Luo Longji, Zhan Lan, Hua Nanshe, and to the leader of the revolutionary committee of the Guomintang Li Jishen (he is en route to the liberated areas), so as to conduct among

them provocative work and efforts to lure [them in]. We already paid attention to this and must do our best to make sure that the Americans will not achieve the aim of their intrigue.

12. We have already called a number of comrades to a meeting in the CC, that is—Gao Gang (secretary of the party committee of Manchuria), Yao Soushi (secretary of the party committee of eastern China), Bo Yibo (secretary of the party committee of northern China), Liu Bocheng (commander of the forces of central China), Chen Yi (commander of the forces of eastern China), Luo Yunhuan (political commissar of the Manchurian forces), Lin Bocui (chairman of the government of ShenGanYingXia [sic, possibly Shaanganning?]) so to discuss the questions of the whole strategy for 1949 (which units should be responsible for which line of advance, other preparatory works), [and] of the calling of the second plenum of the CCP CC in the spring of 1949, and others.

Soon after the end of the meeting I will be able to go to Moscow and discuss with you all the questions, and then after returning from Moscow conduct the second plenum of the CCP CC.

Around the summer of next year [we] will call the political consultative meeting of the representatives of various democratic parties, groups and people's organizations and create a democratic coalition government. Now it is extremely important to create such a government, all the conditions have become ripe for this.

[I] request that you report this telegram to comrade main master and to the VKP(b) CC.

Mao Zedong

30.XII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 23

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 6 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 53. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 7-8. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Terebin

Reply to No. 1. Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

The VKP(b) CC and Cde. Stalin thank for the information about the situation in China and greet you in connection with the military successes of the People's Liberation Army of China. We agree that the question of the creation of the democratic coalition government is becoming a large and timely question. Creation of such a government in the present conditions would quicken the falling apart of the Guomindang government and would encourage a new, even more powerful surge of the democratic forces of China.

However, one circumstance causes us some doubt, namely that in your telegram the timing of creation of the democratic coalition government is set for the summer. Could it not turn out that, with the American cooperation, the Guomindang-ists will take the initiative of creating a coalition government into their hands, create their own coalition government before the summer, and, dragging into this affair some democratically disposed political figures of China, will thereby obstruct their rallying around the northern people's liberation forces of China. Such a step on the part of the Guomindang-ists is possible, especially, when they feel that their attempts to infiltrate their agents into the political consultative meeting, and then into the democratic coalition government, are failing.

Therefore would it not be better not to postpone the calling of the political consultative meeting and the formation of a democratic coalition government until the summer, but to carry out these activities immediately after the liberation of Beiping [Beijing] [?] This could confuse the cards of the Guomindang-ists and the Americans, who are preparing their plans of creation of a coalition government of China.

Telegraph the implementation.

Stalin
6.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 24

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 10 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 54-58. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 11-14. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Transmitting in a brief form the main content of a conversation with Mao Zedong on 7 January 1949.

After conveying to him the content of [telegram] No. 0100, after reading the written translation, Mao Zedong said that our plan is as follows:

After taking Beiping [Beijing], to call the consultative meeting and then to create a coalition government. This can also be done after the taking of Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and a number of other cities, in the fall or next winter.

Now my intentions are as follows: the meeting of the CC will last for another 3-4 days, after which on 20 January [I] want to go to Moscow so as to be there by the end of January.

[I] want to stay one month in Moscow, talk about many questions, including a common line in foreign policy, trade and others.

At the end of February [I] want to come back so as to conduct the second plenum of the CCP CC in March, and then in April conduct the consultative meeting, but it is better to rest for one month, to prepare well and to conduct it in May, thereafter creating a coalition government in the summer.

Perhaps it is better to do this also after taking Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and other cities. We have confidence that in the fall or next winter we will be able to do this.

In this case the government of the GMD will be no more, it will be compelled to run away, [and] the capital will be ours. Then everyone will see that only our government exists in China, [and] it will be considerably more convenient in diplomatic terms for the USSR to be the first to recognize our government. But [we] will finalize all of this in Moscow.

If the GMD creates its own coalition government, we are not afraid. Probably this would be even better. None of the democratic politicians will go over to them. The GMD will lay down all of its cards and open them, as it did also in 1946-1947, when it twice created the national assembly.

We will keep our cards hidden, no one knows anything about them. [They] will speculate, make guesses about our undertakings, but will not know anything for certain. We will keep our weapons behind our backs.

Currently the democratic organizations and their leaders do not support the peaceful howl of Jiang Jieshi, they are standing on the sidelines and [are] keeping silent.

At the present time the majority of the democratic politicians are in our areas, they themselves want to be there, and [come] to us. Whereas before we invited many but they did not go, now after the victories of our armies, it is enough to give them the smallest hint, and they immediately come.

Now in Shanghai only three politicians of the democratic wing remain—Zhan Lan, Luo Longji and Huan Yanpei, the latter two also want to come, but we are not yet calling them.

Now many noted Guomintang politicians, including, and in particular, the intelligence operatives, are looking for contact with us.

[GMD General] Bai Chongxi was asking our people—what will be the orders of the CCP, I will carry them out now and with precision. He was given an oral hint to keep his forces in the area of Hankou and not to obstruct our future offensive.

The commander of the 8th A[rmy] G[roup?] [GMD General] Liu Ruming was also told, orally, to stay in the place where the Guomintang ordered you [to be], and to allow our forces to pass during the offensive.

[GMD General] Tan [Tang] Enbo is looking for contact with us.

[GMD General] Zhong [Zheng?] Jiemin wants to establish contact with us.

Our radio station in the Xikang province did not transmit for a long time, but now the commander of the 24th army, Liu Wenkui [Wenhui], daily comes to our man and asks him if there are any instructions from the CCP.

[We] have contacts with many ships of the river fleet on the Yangzi R[iver]. During the offensive they will take our side (on Fu Zuoyi, see further and in more detail):

Many noted intelligence operatives, especially after the publication of the list of war criminals, are trying to save their lives, [and] pass to us valuable information.

The situation is such that if we now wanted to, and gave instructions, then there would be a massive uprising against the forces of Jiang Jieshi and their defection to our side. This is not profit-

able to us now. For in this case we would have too many forces of the GMD, and this is very worrisome. Especially that their commanders will want to occupy high positions, but they are not reliable.

Even the Americans are trying to establish contact with us, not even speaking of the fact that many American correspondents (and the English ones) in Hong Kong and [those who] came to us from Beijing [Beijing] asked us to allow them to come to the liberated areas just to take a look—we refuse everyone. But recently [US Ambassador John Leighton] Stuart, before bringing into Shanghai amphibious boats with US forces, sent his man to Hong Kong to our people.

This person, in words which could be understood as more than a hint, was in essence asking—will the CCP allow [them] to bring forces into Shanghai.

Our man refused to transmit an inquiry like this, replying that generally the CCP is on principle against the presence of foreign forces in China.

Mao Zedong was saying that now our forces are stronger than the forces of the GMD, especially the artillery.

Here I inserted, artillery is the god of war, as Comrade Stalin said. Mao Zedong immediately replied: we are learning from Comrade Stalin.

Once again returned to No. 0100. This is good that they are writing. It means, [they] care about us, want for us to form a government sooner. I will discuss this with the leaders—Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz [nicknames, evidently referring to Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De] and Ren Bishi.

Talked about the aid to them from the USSR. Gave an example. [In] Manchuria the representative of the USSR fairly clearly hinted why don't you ask us to send you engineers and other workers for the railroads. As soon as [we] sent a telegram, people came. Probably they were already prepared. [They] think and care about us. (Here, I saw two new automobiles ZIS-150).

True, we rely on our own forces, but [we] need help and are grateful for it.

At the meeting I told everyone that [we should] trade with the USSR and the democratic countries. To sell to America, England and other countries only that which is not needed by the USSR.

About Fu Zuoyi (collected from the entire conversation in one place).

With Fu Zuoyi [we] had regular radio contacts. [We] are conducting negotiations with him and point out who should be sent to us to conduct them.

After [we] defeated 10 divisions of Fu Zuoyi, after [we] declared him to be a war criminal, Fu Zuoyi was in a fairly depressed mood. He believed that he fell into a trap, hit himself on the face, cursed himself as a fool (*hundan*). However, after we orally, without passing any scraps of paper, conveyed to him our 6 points (what these 6 points are Mao Zedong did not say), he calmed down.

We explained to him that we could not help [it] but [had to] include him in the list of war criminals.

Fu Zuoyi committed many evil deeds in northern China, the people hate him. If he were not included in the list, Jiang Jieshi would suspect that he has contacts with us.

However, if Fu Zuoyi implements our instructions, we will tell the people about his merits and the people can forgive him and then [we] will cross him off the list.

The main demands of the CCP.

Fu Zuoyi allows the CCP forces to enter Beiping [Beijing] through his forces, [they] will not destroy the city. After that his four remaining divisions are [to be] reorganized into one army and are [to be] taken from the city to a pre-determined place. His forces are not [to be] touched.

But Fu Zuoyi grabbed us by the weak point—we do not want to destroy the cities, he is bargaining with us. Therefore we are conducting negotiations with him for a long time. Tianjin is another matter—[we] will have to take it by force.

Mao Zedong supposes that the capture of Tianjin and the destruction of the encircled group of forces of Du Yuming will take place in January, and the taking of Beiping [Beijing]—in February. Then Mao Zedong turned to other questions. He said that he is called a dictator everywhere (this and the following he told me before as well)—yes, I am a dictator.

All the affairs are managed by me, Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz, Ren Bishi. Mao said that after abandoning Yan'an, three people managed everything—he, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi.

After the supper talked a lot about the difficulties which the CCP went through in 1927 and 1931.

[He] said that as a result of the incorrect decisions of the 4th Plenum of the CCP CC, which was led by Wang Ming, 9/10th of the territory occupied by the CCP [and] a large part of the army were lost, that the membership of the party fell sharply after that.

Talked about attacks on him, about an attempt to arrest and kill him, about how [PLA Beijing Military Control Commission Chairman] Ye Jianying warned him about this.

Speaking of the intra-party struggle and disagreements within the party, said that not until the 7th Congress was unity reached, which has now become even firmer. When parting [he] thanked [me] for the message [and] said that [he] will discuss it with the leadership.

Koroleva [literally, “the Queen”—Jiang Qing—Mao’s wife] asked [me] to visit her. When I was listening to her various complaints about various diseases, I heard that Zhou Enlai came to Mao Zedong, and then Ren Bishi, and a meeting began there.

Terebin.

10.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 25

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 8 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 37, L. 1. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 10. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Comrade Stalin!

We are very grateful to you that you sent to us Comrade [Ivan] Kovalev for helping us in restoring railroads and other economic work!

With the help of Comrade Kovalev and other Soviet comrades the transport lines of the railroads in Manchuria have mainly been restored. Now Cde. Kovalev, together with the Chinese comrades, developed a plan of restoring the railroads of all of northern China, i.e. in the region north of the Yangzi River with the length of more than three thousand kilometers, in 1949. If this plan is implemented by the winter of this year, then we will have 18,000 kilometers of railroads (inclusive here of the Manchurian railroads), which will be put into use. For the implementation of this plan a series of most necessary materials will be needed; also needed will be locomotives, machines, instruments, oil and other materials for restoring the railroads in northern China. But besides what we can provide for ourselves, we need urgent help on your part, i.e. to receive from you a large part of these materials—only then will we be able to begin the work to restore the railroads.

Attaching herewith two lists of requests for materials, to procure which we need your help, as pointed out above, [I] request that you look through these lists and if [we] are able to receive approval on your part, and also if you make orders to supply

[these materials] to us as soon as possible on credit with the fastest possible loading and dispatch, we will be very grateful to you.

With Bolshevik greetings and the best wishes for your health.

Mao Zedong
8 January 1949.



DOCUMENT No. 26

Cable, Mao to Stalin, 9 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 36, L. 59. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 10-11. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Stalin!

The meeting of the CCP CC Politburo, conducted recently, is over.

I am ready to come to you.

To cut back the time I hope that you will send planes to Shijiazhuang—two planes, best if four-engine ones.

Planes may arrive on any of the three days—18, 19, 20 of this month to Shijiazhuang.

If you believe that there is not enough time for technical preparation one can postpone by several days. You decide yourself the concrete day of the planes' arrival and let me know.

For security reasons it is desirable that the planes arrive in the aforementioned place early in the morning.

21 people are coming with me.

Mao Zedong



DOCUMENT No. 27

Cable, Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 10 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 60-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 14-15. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] Filippov

1. I received your telegram dated 6 January. American imperialism and the GMD have fully lost the trust of the people of China, therefore they have lost all real initiative. In case they create a coalition government, it will not have much influence. Our coalition government can be created in the summer, and can also be created somewhat earlier, that is in the spring—one [will] not meet with great obstacles in this.
2. Our units have already fully finished off the elite forces of the GMD numbering 19 divisions under the command of Du Yuming, which were encircled by our forces in the vicinity of Suizhou.
3. Preparatory work to capture the city of Tianjin is already done. It was decided: to begin advance on this city on 13 November. After the capture of Tianjin, advance on Beiping [Beijing] begins immediately, then on Taiyuan and Datong.
4. In the spring of this year the main forces of our army will be at rest and in [the process of] re-ordering, and in the summer it will be possible to begin movement toward the South. At the latest time [sic], i.e. at the end of July or in the beginning of August, 1,500,000 people of the regular forces of the People's Liberation Army will be shipped across the Yangzi River. They will exceed the GMD forces both in terms of their fighting spirit and in technical equipment.

In the fall and winter of this year we are 90 percent confident of the successful capture of the greater part of the ten provinces, that is—Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi and Gansu, of capturing cities—Nanjing, Wuhan, Yichang, Changsha, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Fujian, Anqing, Wuhu, Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Wuxi, Fuzhou, Xi'an.

As far as Shanghai is concerned, this is no longer a question in the military sense, we are confident that one can capture it in the winter of this year, but [the

question] exists as to supplying it with fuel and food. One will still have to think about whether we will capture it.

5. The delegation is composed of Mao Zedong, Ren Bishi, and Gao Gang and the rest are with them, going together, in all 21 people. Waiting for you to send planes for transporting us to Moscow. Now it is necessary for us to come to you without delay for a report to comrade main master (*glavnyi khoziain*)—VKP(b) CC, as well as to receive instructions on a number of questions of the Chinese Revolution.

Mao Zedong
10.1.49

[As the three waited, a new complication developed: a request by the Guomindang for Stalin's mediation in the civil war. Stalin asked Mao's opinion, implying his willingness to take on this new role, but Mao absolutely refused. The full exchange can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 27-29. No mediation was undertaken, but Mao's trip was cancelled, leading to Mikoyan's appearance three weeks later in Xibaipo as a high-level substitute —S.R. & D.W.]



DOCUMENT No. 28

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 13 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L.68. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 20. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

This is the most important part of the reply.

Mao Zedong spoke more sharply. He is against any participation in the mediation, against any kind of participation by the CCP in the negotiations.

The Guomindang will agree to any conditions now, but this must not be allowed.

About Moscow.

Judging from everything, if Mao Zedong in the nearest future, no later than the end of January, is not able to go, then, probably he will not be able to go at all.

Shi Zhe spoke directly about this.

Terebin
13.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 29

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 17 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 75. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 29-30. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade Filippov

1. I received your two telegrams dated 14 and 15 January.
2. I decided to postpone [my] trip to Moscow temporarily.
3. We very much welcome you sending one comrade member of the Politburo to China.

The most suitable place for his arrival is Shijiazhuang. This is a relatively inconspicuous place and one can go from there straight to the location of our CC. Here one can speak with five comrades from the CC Secretariat on a number of questions (the main ones are presently the questions: of the political consultative meeting, of the coalition government, of the diplomatic policy and of the economic policy).

Railroad traffic from Shijiazhuang to Shanhaiguan has not been restored yet. It will take me at least 20 days to go from here to Harbin and back, and in Mukden live many representatives of the democratic parties. If I were to pass through this point, it would be difficult to maintain secrecy. Therefore it will be less secret than if your comrade were to fly in by a plane to Shijiazhuang.

If you agree with this option, then it is best if his arrival happened at the end of this or in the beginning of the next month.

Mao Zedong
17 January 1949

DOCUMENT No. 30

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 30 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 1-6. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 33-37. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

The first conversation with Mao Zedong took place on 30 January 1949. Members of the CCP CC Politburo Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Ren Bishi, as well as Mao Zedong's interpreter Shi Zhe participated in the conversation. From our side comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present.

After short questioning and answers as to how [we] flew, Mao Zedong, at his initiative recounted in detail about the military situation in China.

ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA

Mao Zedong stated that, in essence, the military stage of the Chinese Revolution must be considered complete. There is a 260 million population under the rule of the Guomindang, and a 210 million population—in the liberated regions. The CCP has 2 million 200 thousand people in the army, of them 1 million 200 thousand are in the area of Nanjing and 900 thousand (Lin Biao's forces) are in the Beiping [Beijing]-Tianjin area. The Guomindang altogether has 1 million 100 thousand people, scattered from Urumqi to Shanghai, and therefore poorly mobile. All of the Guomindang's divisions, with the exception of four, were defeated by us several times over, therefore their battle quality is low. The best Guomindang divisions, equipped by the Americans, have either been destroyed or captured. Bai Chongxi, who has his forces in the area of Wuhan, sent to the representatives of the CCP in three places his own representatives for talks, and an agreement has already been reached with him. Bai Chongxi is sending two of his divisions to Shanghai and Nanjing regions. He demanded that [Republic of China Acting President] Li Zongren remove [Legislative Yuan head] Sun Fo from the premiership. We know that Jiang Jieshi left Sun Fo as the premier so that, while in retirement, he could run the government in fact. The communists have documentary data to the effect that Jiang Jieshi, even after resigning, continues to control the Guomindang forces, for example in Xi'an. The Guomindang will organize resistance in the south in the coastal regions of Zhejiang. The Guomindang will not fight hard for Nanjing and Shanghai.

In Mao Zedong's opinion, judging by the mood of the capitalists and the public of Nanjing and Shanghai, these cities could take Beiping's [Beijing's] road, that is—surrender without a

fight under given conditions so as not to subject these cities to destruction. However, the communists make their plans expecting the worst. They are preparing after a short breather and preparation to take these cities by force. Peaceful resolution of events at Beiping [Beijing] cut the time for rest and preparation of these forces for the offensive. The time is needed not only for rest but:

- a) For digesting and educating three hundred thousand captured Guomindang-ists, who in the recent time joined the People's Liberation Army.
- b) For tightening up the rear and restoring the destroyed railroads, which feed the frontline;
- c) For accumulation of cartridges and shells from current production, since there is little in reserve. The matter is complicated by the fact that ammunition is needed for weapons of American, Japanese, Czechoslovak and Soviet types;
- d) Time is also needed to prepare cadres to manage the regions of Shanghai and Nanjing, for one cannot fully rely on the local cadres. 20 thousand people are being prepared. Efforts will also be needed to liquidate the Guomindang apparatus of managing forces of northern China, subordinate to Fu Zuoyi;
- e) Time is needed to prepare economic directorates of Shanghai and Nanjing regions—there is little food-stuff, one should stock up. We do not have enough time to print money for these regions.

The capture of Nanjing by the People's Liberation forces should be put off until April. Of course, at the present time one may also turn to the offensive, but in this case the chance of success will equal 80%. In the month of April, however, there will be all 100% chance of success. In order to win for sure in the Nanjing and Shanghai regions one will have to move Lin Biao's forces, which are the best, from the Beiping [Beijing] area to the South and the West so as to rid the Guomindang of an opportunity to throw in from there large reinforcements into the Nanjing-Shanghai area. The situation in the Beiping [Beijing] area is complicated and one will need some time to establish oneself firmly here.

Fu Zuoyi's forces have not left Beiping [Beijing] yet. [We] think that tomorrow-the day after tomorrow [they] will leave. The protection of warehouses and the order in the city is still managed by the Guomindang forces. In the next few days we will move four of our divisions into Beiping [Beijing] and gradually will replace the Guomindang guards. A unified city management has been appointed, composed of 7 people, of whom 4 are communists, including the chairman Ye Jianying (PLA Chief of Staff).

Fu Zuoyi's forces numbering more than 200 thousand people will be broken up into two groups—one will be moved out to the northeast of Nanjing, and the other—to the southwest, where they must reorganize. Inasmuch as these forces were not defeated in battle but surrendered to us peacefully on certain conditions, this process of reorganization is complex and is broken down into stages. The first stage will take a month, in the course of which no reorganization will take place, all efforts will be directed toward agitation and internal degradation. The second stage will come after that, when the most reactionary officer corps will be extracted from the divisions; the most diehard will be immediately expelled from the army, others will be directed to political education courses, then the majority will be sent home, and a part will be used for training the reserves. At the third stage a real organization will be conducted so as to mix up and dilute Guomintang-ists in the reorganized units of the People's Liberation Army. For every three former Guomintang-ists there would be 8 from the People's Liberation Army. Until this reorganization is for the most part complete it is dangerous to move out the main mass of our forces from the Beiping [Beijing] area.

To my question whether a pause in the attack for 2-3 months might give the Guomintang breathing space for overcoming panic, assembling and organization of resistance, since the agreement of the Nanjingers to peace talks shows how strongly they need breathing space, Mao Zedong replied the following: peaceful maneuver of the Guomintang-ists, instead of weakening the communists, strengthened their ranks and caused degradation in the ranks of the Guomintang to such an extent that the Guomintang cannot manage any longer. Resistance will be organized, but they will not succeed in anything serious. When the communists manage to finish preparation and strike with certainty, the remnants of the Guomintang forces will be obliterated.

ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE CCP TOWARD ITS MISTAKES

Furthermore, Mao Zedong stated that he would like to discuss with me questions of foreign policy, military questions, economic questions and questions of attitude toward the Guomintang. At the same time he was saying: "Please take into consideration that China has fallen far behind Russia, we are weak Marxists, make many mistakes and if one looks at our work with Russia's measure then it will turn out that we have nothing." I replied that these words, possibly, manifest the shyness of the leaders of the Chinese Com[munist] Party, but it is difficult to agree with them. One cannot manage a civil war in China for 20 years and lead it to such a victory while being a weak Marxist. As for mistakes, all active parties have them. Our party also makes mistakes but it firmly holds to the rule of ruthlessly uncovering its own mistakes so as not to repeat them and learn from them.

Mao Zedong added that they make mistakes frequently, and correct them frequently, and gave an example. In 1946 the CCP committed a mistake in the conduct of the land reform. When [they] began looking into it then it turned out that as far back as 1933 they wrote absolutely correctly about the land reform, which they forgot in 1946. If this were read again in 1946 these mistakes would not be committed. They once again reprinted in 1946 what had been written on the land reform in 1933 and openly declared this mistake of theirs to the peasants, taking full responsibility for mistakes, for the leadership is responsible for the mistakes of the low-level cadres, though the leadership itself did not commit these mistakes. I noted that one cannot agree with Mao Zedong's statement to the effect that if one looked at the Chinese Revolution with a Russian measure, then it would turn out that there is nothing. First of all, the Chinese Revolution represents a great historical event; secondly, it would be incorrect to apply the Russian measure to that concrete historical reality, in which the revolution in China is taking course. As if to confirm this Mao Zedong said that the CCP in 1936 in the Soviet regions manifested dogmatism, copying the Soviet methods, which led then to a serious defeat. Mao Zedong, half-jokingly, said the following phrase: "Despite China's backwardness in comparison with Russia I consider that the Chinese peasants are more conscious than all American workers and many English workers."

MARXIST EDUCATION OF THE CCP CADRES

He stated further that one of the big tasks of the CCP is the Marxist education of the cadres. They used to consider that the cadres must read all the Marxist literature. Now they convinced themselves that this is impossible, for their cadres are studying while simultaneously conducting a lot of practical work. Therefore they required from their cadres to read 12 Marxist works. Counting these works (*Manifesto, From Utopia to Science, The State and the Revolution, Questions of Leninism* etc.) he did not mention a single Chinese Marxist work. I then asked Mao Zedong whether he considers it correct that in the list of 12 books for party enlightenment of the CCP cadres there is not a single work of the CCP leaders, shedding light, theoretically, on the experience of the Chinese Revolution. Mao Zedong replied that he, as the leader of the party, brought nothing new to Marxism-Leninism, and cannot put himself on the same shelf with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Raising a toast to the health of Comrade Stalin he stressed that at the basis of the current victories of the Chinese Revolution lies the teaching of Lenin-Stalin and that Stalin is not only the teacher of the peoples of the Sov[iet] Union but also the teacher of the Chinese people and the people of the whole world. Mao Zedong said about himself that he is a pupil of Stalin and does not attribute significance to his own theoretical works, that they merely implement the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, without enriching it with anything. Moreover, he personally sent a strict telegram to the localities, forbidding to list his surname together with the surnames of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin,

though he has to argue about this with his closest comrades.

I replied that this speaks to Mao Zedong's modesty, but one cannot agree with him. Marxism-Leninism is not applied in China mechanically, but on the basis of taking into account peculiarities of the specific conditions of China. The Chinese Revolution has its own road, which gives to it the look of an anti-imperialist revolution. Therefore shedding light on the experience of the CCP cannot help but be historically valuable, cannot help but enrich Marxist science. Can one deny also that the summing up of the Chinese experience has a theoretical value for the revolutionary movement of the countries of Asia? Of course, not. Mao Zedong remarked that with them it was the supporters of [CCP Deputy Commander in Chief] Wang Ming who laid the main stress on the peculiarity of China for struggle against the party line. I replied to this that usually nationalistic elements use concrete historical specifics of their country for diverting the party to the road of bourgeois transformation; Marxists, however, take these specifics into consideration so as to lead the revolution in a Marxist-Leninist way, with which [assertion] Mao Zedong chose not to argue.

At this the conversation ended.



DOCUMENT No. 31

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 31 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 7-16. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 37-43. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

The second conversation with Mao Zedong took place on 31 January 1949 in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, [Vice Chairman] Liu Shaoqi, [PLA Deputy Commander in Chief] Ren Bishi and [PLA Commander-in-Chief] Zhu De and interpreter Shi Zhe. Comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present from our side.

Mao Zedong recounted the following:

ON THE PREPARATION FOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

Mao Zedong said that preparation for the formation of the government is connected with the cleansing of Beiping [Beijing] of the hostile elements, which requires about 3 weeks, after which in Beiping, as restored capital, one could organize a coalition government.

To my question would it not be better to organize the coalition government in Nanjing after its liberation, Mao Zedong replied in the negative, motivating this by the fact that, firstly, what would be the benefit of this, and, secondly, 9/10th of the figures who cling to their camp consider Beiping [Beijing] to be a better capital, and not Nanjing; thirdly, in the exchange with Comrade Stalin he received advice to which he will hold fast: not to put off this business and to form the government in Beiping [Beijing] after its liberation. I stated that I am aware of this exchange and that Comrade Stalin holds the opinion that if Comrade Mao Zedong agrees that it is better to organize the coalition government after the liberation of Nanjing than he will also agree to that. Therefore I asked Mao Zedong to express his opinion to the point. On my part I stated that though the successes achieved and the liberation of Beiping [Beijing] give sufficient basis for not waiting with the formation of the coalition government before the liberation of Nanjing, the moral authority of the coalition government may still be higher, when it is formed after the liberation of two capitals. This does not rule out that Beiping, and not Nanjing, can be the permanent capital.

Mao Zedong replied that personally [he] sides with the opinion that it is better to put off the formation of the coalition government until the liberation of Nanjing, and to form it in the month of June-July. I replied to him that if the formation of the government after the liberation of Nanjing increases its moral-political strength, then unnecessary delay of its formation weakens the force of the revolution and whatever great authority the Chinese Com[munist] Party has among the people. Its appeals cannot have the same force for (*ne imeiut takoi zhe sily*) non-party masses as the decision of state power, which can make laws, required for all. Mao Zedong agreed with these considerations and stated that Nanjing can be taken in April, and in the month of May or June the coalition government can be organized. Even if the Guomindang-ists tried to organize their own coalition government before that, this will not do harm to the communists and cannot obstruct the formation of a coalition government headed by the communists.

ON THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF THE VKP(b) CC WITH THE CCP CC

After a certain pause Mao Zedong raised the question about the creation of the representative office of the VKP(b) CC with the CCP CC. He asked to send a politically prepared comrade as a representative, with whom one could discuss questions, which interest them. He also spoke out in favor of this representative having a staff of 10 people, including persons who know the Chinese language, so that they study the materials, which the CCP CC will give to them.

I replied that our CC already gave its agreement in principle to the creation of such a representative office and now the selection of the personnel is under way.

Then Mao Zedong said that the length of my stay here of 4-5 days is short and that they would ask me to stay with them for up to 10 days. To this I replied that I hope to finish the discussion of all questions with them in the course of 5 days. At the same time I told Mao Zedong that two Soviet specialists in dealing with time-delay bombs and bugging equipment arrived with me to help the CCP. Mao Zedong was very content with this statement of mine and thanked Comrade Stalin for the care which he shows toward the CCP.

ON THE SITUATION ON THE CIVIL WAR FRONTS AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CCP

Speaking of the forces of Bai Chongxi, located in the Hankou theater, he said that Bai Chongxi is the most crafty general and it is more difficult to fight with him than with Fu Zuoyi. However, we are preparing to overpower him as well, especially since Bai Chongxi is carrying out a policy of duplicity with respect to Jiang Jieshi. In order to save face he wants to leave Hankou in such a way that we would not think of him that he retreated or surrendered. Therefore before we encircle him he will vacate the Hankou area and retreat to Guangxi province. His representative is in touch with us and we know something about Bai Chongxi's thinking.

Further, showing the map, Mao Zedong told about the situation with the military operations at separate fronts, repeating the facts which he recounted in yesterday's conversation. He said that at the present time their military forces count more than 3 million men, and if one adds to this politically indoctrinated units from Fu Zuoyi's captured forces, then the total number of their military forces will reach 3 million 100 thousand people. From this number 2 million 200 thousand are regular units. [Beijing-Tianjin Front Commander] Lin Biao's forces, located in the Beijing-Tianjin area, count 900 thousand people and about 1 million 300 thousand are located at the Nanjing theater. To my question of when they plan to take Taiyuan, Mao Zedong replied that they will attack [GMD General] Yan Xishan's forces at the end of February this year.

To my question of when they plan to force [the attack] on Xi'an, Mao Zedong replied that they intend to begin an attack on this point after taking Taiyuan. He added that they could force attacks on separate sections of the front and take cities faster but this is complicated by the fact that they have a sharp shortfall of politically prepared cadres, with the help of which they could take over the new territories.

Mao Zedong said that they are preparing to cross the Yangzi River. They intend to move 900 thousand people to the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance, the same to the Hankou line of advance and about 350 thousand people to Xi'an.

To my question of how they think to organize the military administration, Mao Zedong replied that they are carrying out

preparation for the creation of a war ministry.

Continuing, Mao Zedong stated that prior to now, they have had three fronts: north China, where Lin Biao's forces are active, Nanjing-Shanghai, headed by Chen Yi, and Xi'an, headed by Chen Geng.

To my question of which organization coordinates the fronts, Mao Zedong replied that they are coordinated by the military committee. The chairman of the military committee is Mao Zedong, and his deputies are Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De.

Returning to the question of the fronts Mao Zedong said that [each of] the three fronts have four army units, which are comprised of 14 army groups or 56 armies. Each army group on average consists of 3 armies, each army has 3 divisions, with the exception of the Manchurian armies, which contain 4 divisions. There are a total of 181 divisions. Political work in the army is headed by the military committee. Each army has a party committee, the same in divisions and in companies. Approximately about 30% of our forces are members of the CCP. The political morale of the People's Liberation Army is healthy. Desertions to the Guomindang-ists' side have not been noted. Of course, there are shortcomings in the units as well, manifested in a lack of discipline and elements of anarchy. This is a reflection of the Guomindang influence. We energetically struggle against this. [We] call party meetings and subject to sharp criticism uncovered shortcomings, without respect for authority.

RUNNING THE MILITARY DISTRICTS

Mao Zedong said that they have 5 bureaus of the CCP CC:

1. Manchurian Bureau of the CCP CC
2. North China Bureau of the CCP CC
3. East China Bureau of the CCP CC
4. Central China Bureau of the CCP CC
5. Northwestern China Bureau of the CCP CC

In accordance with this separation of the party organization, 5 military districts have been created so that it is easier for the party to manage military affairs. Management of military affairs is included as a rule in the relevant bureau of the CCP CC.

GUOMINDANG NAVAL FORCES

To my question on the situation in Formosa [Taiwan] Mao Zedong replied that Jiang Jieshi, with the help of the USA, is creating a naval base there. However, this intention of Jiang Jieshi's is meeting with resistance on the part of the 6 million population of the island. In order to strengthen his influence Jiang Jieshi sent trusted people to the island, headed by the governor Chen Cheng. Mao Zedong expressed confidence that sooner or later the Guomindang fleet and air forces will

take the side of the People's Liberation Army. He said that the Guomindang's Navy is already sending their delegates to them, in particular from the fleet on the Yangzi River. 8 Guomindang planes flew over to us, of them one heavy B-34 bomber which landed in the area of Shijiazhuang. There were three communists among the bomber's crew.

To my question of whether there are Guomindang naval forces in Huludao, Mao Zedong replied in the negative and said that now the Guomindang naval forces are based out of Qingdao, Shanghai, Canton [Guangzhou], Formosa and Fuzhou.

CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND THEIR ROLE

To my question whether they have covert cadres, Mao Zedong said that there are such cadres in Shanghai and Canton, but they are few.

To my question as to the conditions of the Shanghai workers and what their role was, Mao Zedong replied that the com[munist] party has boundless influence in the countryside; it has no competitors there. But cities are another thing: here, whereas among the students the com[munist] party has a strong influence, in the working class the Guomindang is stronger than the com[munist] party. For example, after the capitulation of Japan in Shanghai, when the com[munist] party started to work legally, its influence on the Shanghai workers was spread out as follows: from 500 thousand Shanghai workers 200 thousand people were under the influence of the com[munist] party and the remaining 300 thousand—under the Guomindang.

CADRES

Now the main question is the cadres. We are selecting about 53 thousand people, whom [we] plan to throw into the recently liberated areas. Because of the lack of cadres we cannot run the city economy, therefore one should not hurry to take Shanghai.

To my remark that he sees the difficulties in running Shanghai but does not see the huge profits from taking Shanghai when the communists will have working for them a half a million army of workers of a powerful industrial center of China, that he does not see that the working class of such a center will put forward from their midst many valuable workers committed to the party, strengthen the social base of the party and the revolution, [and] exert strong influence on the rest of China, Mao Zedong found nothing to reply.

PROFESSIONAL UNIONS

To my question as to who is running the professional unions, Mao Zedong replied that the chairman of the All-China Federation of the Professional Unions is Chen Yun, and his deputy—Li Lisan. Mao Zedong said that in the past Li Lisan was a Trotskyist and had his own fraction, but now he is behav-

ing well. Trotskyists, said Mao Zedong, now have no influence among us.

I remarked that one must keep in the leadership of the professional unions personnel absolutely loyal to the party and firmly connected with the workers, that one must not allow a single Trotskyist to run professional unions. The fact that some of them are presently behaving themselves well, I said, proves nothing, for the revolution in China is now on the rise and with the first difficulties from which no one is insured, Trotskyists can use the wavering of the backward elements among the workers and direct them against the com[munist] party. If the com[munist] party was able to win almost a monopoly position in the countryside, all the more must it achieve undivided influence on the workers, expelling from their midst Trotskyists and Guomindang thugs. My statement made a strong impression on Mao Zedong and members of the Politburo of the CCP CC.

WORK AMONG YOUTH AND WOMEN

I asked how the situation stands with the work among youth and women. Mao Zedong replied that these are the most backward sections of their work. Using this and referring to the experience of the Sov[iet] Union, I stressed what a great significance for the revolution carries the work among the youth and women. To this Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo declared that they will take all measures to strengthen work among youth and women.

TALKS WITH THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT

Then Mao Zedong touched upon the question of the forthcoming peace talks with the Nanjingers. As Mao Zedong said, they are not in a hurry with this business. The delegation has not been appointed yet and its composition has not been made known the Guomindang. Inasmuch as the place of talks was set at Beiping, therefore as the latter has not yet been cleaned of the capitulated forces of Fu Zuoyi, 2 weeks more will be needed to put the city in order. In fact talks with the Guomindang government may begin at the end of the month of February. The delegation will consist only of the communists but they intend to consult with parties, which will participate in the coalition government, regarding which there is a previous agreement. By approximately 20 February the CCP CC will move to Beiping.

Mao Zedong said that in November of last year they informed the VKP(b) CC that in the course of 2 ½ years the People's Liberation Army will finish off the Guomindang. But already in the course of the last six months, stated Mao Zedong, if we have not fully destroyed the Guomindang, then in any case it is on the brink of destruction. The Guomindang has completely broken off from the masses and its authority has been undermined. Its peace proposal is a forced breather, a maneuver to gather its forces against us. We, however, speak out

with eight sincere conditions for peace. They will not accept these conditions, the proof of which is the fact that Jiang Jieshi left for Fenghua, and Li Zongren remained in his stead. The Guomindang government exists nominally. All the leading members of the government have left, for example, Sun Fo, who is in Shanghai. The Guomindang public opinion is forcefully indoctrinated by the CC clique. As far as the Americans are concerned, one feels that they are not inclined to support Jiang Jieshi, and place their bets on Li Zongren, [GMD politician] Shao Lizi and [GMD military and political figure] Zhang Zhizhong. The fact that the Guomindang government has run off in different directions made England, USA and France declare their non-intervention and, moreover, the English and the Americans say that they are waiting for the People's Liberation Army. The leaders of the democratic parties are on our side.

Guomindang-ists are going for talks with us, but they are scared by the first condition of these talks, i.e. the question of war criminals, the list of which contains more than 100 people, and the list is not limited to these people. If they accept our 8 conditions, and Li Zongren said that he accepts them, then we will ask them to carry out these conditions. If they do not accept the point about the war criminals we will not talk to them.

In order to create an appearance of democracy and ingratiate himself with us, Li Zongren declared the freedom of press, but we cannot be fooled by this. It is clear to us that the struggle continues, and Jiang Jieshi, behind Li Zongren's back, continues to lead the war against us through Chief of Staff Gu Zhutong. Jiang Jieshi's forces headed by Tang Enbo are still located at the Shanghai-Nanjing theater, and Cheng Chen is equipping a base on the island of Formosa, the forces of [GMD General] Hu Zhongnan are located in the Xi'an area, and the forces of Bai Chongxi—at the Hankou theater. We understand that the Guomindang-ists will not be able to organize a strong front, but we cannot but take the situation into account and be prepared for any contingencies.

ON FOREIGN TRADE

Mao Zedong said that the question of trade stands before the future coalition government. We intend, he said, to conclude treaties with the Sov[iet] Union and the countries of new democracy [i.e. socialist countries].

I said that this intention is correct and added that it is necessary for us to provide mutual economic aid to each other. This question had not been raised before because we did not want for it to be interpreted as our intervention in the affairs of democratic countries. As a result democratic countries obstructed each other on the market until we approached them with a request to normalize trade relations by means of concluding mutual treaties. I briefly told about the results of the meeting of 6 powers in Moscow.¹

Returning to the question of trade Mao Zedong stressed that though the Chinese bourgeoisie does not desire a monopoly on foreign trade, it will be introduced. Trade will first and foremost be conducted with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy and only those things, which these countries do not need, will be exported to capitalist countries.



Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Stalin signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 14 February 1950 (Courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CCP

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting some questions of foreign policy of the CCP. He said that its basic principle is the building of relations with other states on the basis of mutual equality and mutual help.

Talking about foreign connections of the party in the period of Japanese-Chinese war Mao Zedong said that at that time they were limited to forced communication with foreign, mainly American, journalists in Yan'an. But now the situation had changed, since the People's Liberation Army took such cities as Mukden, Tianjin and Beijing, where in practice the question was raised as to how to build one's relations with the foreign consulates located there [and] recognized by the Guomindang government. Up to now we have not considered them as representative organizations of states, which have certain diplomatic relations with us. Therefore we merely guarantee the safety of lives of the consulate workers, considering that they have the status of emigrants.

Then Mao Zedong turned to the intended limitations of the rights of foreign telegraph agencies and publications in China. Independent work by the agencies will be forbidden, the same with regard to free publication of foreign newspapers and journals. Currently existing foreign publications are subjected to mandatory government registration.

Mao Zedong remarked that these limitations touch upon the interests of Soviet publications in China and in this connection he would like to agree with us that our publications would

be nominally headed by the Chinese, while the factual work would be carried out by Soviet citizens.

Talking of foreign enterprises, Mao Zedong stressed that one must apply a careful position toward them since their capital is closely intertwined with the capital of the Chinese. He reminded that the 6th Congress of the CCP took the decision about the confiscation of foreign capital and property. In principle this decision remains in force now as well, but its implementation must be carried out in more flexible forms.

Mao Zedong said that foreigners, unquestionably, will be forbidden from using radios, but there may be exceptions in certain cases. As an example he pointed to the radio of the American consulate in Tianjin, the codes of which are known to them and the banning of which would be unprofitable to them.

Mao Zedong said that with the taking of Nanjing the question of the recognition of the new government by foreign powers will emerge. The question stands as follows: whether one should accept the recognition immediately, or to put it off for a term of no less than a year. Both paths have their pluses and minuses. Time delay is profitable to us in that it unties our hands in relations with states, gives us an opportunity to take a firmer grasp, and recognition eases subversive activities against us by the USA and England. It is acceptable for us to put off recognition of us on the part of the USA and England, so as to win time.

Continuing the thought about the possible recognition of the new government by foreign powers, Mao Zedong said that this question will also stand before the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. There is information, he added, that the USA is about to recognize us, and England will necessarily follow them. For these countries recognizing us is necessary to work against us and to trade with us. What is the benefit of this recognition? It will open for us the road to other countries and to the UN. In spite of this we are leaning toward the first way, that is—not to hurry to establish diplomatic relations, but, delaying them, to strengthen ourselves.

In conclusion Mao Zedong asked me, on the premise of the interests of the common cause, to shed light on the position of the USSR regarding the substance of the aforementioned questions of the foreign policy of the CCP.

The conversation ended at this.

1. *Editor's Note:* This is a reference to the founding of COMECON in Moscow at the beginning of January 1949.



DOCUMENT No. 32

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 1 February 1949 (Day)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 17-24. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 43-48. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

On 1 February 1949, during the day, Mao Zedong's deputy Zhou Enlai, member of the Politburo Zhu De and interpreter Shi Zhe visited me and informed me that yesterday's tense conversation very much exhausted Mao Zedong and he feels unwell and asks to have another conversation a day later, and today to continue discussion of foreign policy questions with Zhou Enlai, and of military questions in the evening.

In the course of 4 hours Zhou Enlai recounted the history of the CCP's relations with foreign powers, mainly with Americans, principles and practical questions of foreign policy with the exception of [relations with] the USSR and people's democracies, with which one must carry out a policy of friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutuality.

From our sides comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present at the conversation.

CONTACTS OF THE CCP WITH THE USA

In his detailed information about foreign relations of the CCP Zhou Enlai stated that during the war they had no foreign contacts until 1944. In 1944 American general [Joseph] Stilwell sent a group of American observers to Yan'an, which was there from April 1944 to March 1946, until the fall of Yan'an, and from that moment our contacts with the external world began. Already then, in accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions, we followed a policy of not allowing the Americans' intervention in our internal affairs. We followed the same policy with regard to [Truman's envoy to China George] Marshall. For example, we declined to participate in the Sino-American mediating commission, in which the decisive vote belonged to the USA. In this case we demanded to follow the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers' Moscow meeting in October 1945.

In the course of negotiations with Marshall we made out that the Americans wanted to establish control over our forces. We signed an agreement with the Americans on the reorganization of the army (February 1946), inasmuch as this was profitable to us. Subsequently the agreement was breached, the civil war flared up and our representative office left Nanjing. From that time we started to expose the USA vigorously. Although we broke relations with the Americans, they time and again

attempted to establish contacts with us through those persons who had something to do with us. But we limited ourselves to hearing about the Americans' decisions to establish contacts with us.

As for our relations with the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration], despite the fact that we suffered more losses than the Guomintang-ists we received from it merely 2% (50 thousand tons) of all its supplies to China. In spite of this we received many valuable goods. The ammonia fertilizers supplied by the UNRRA were used by us to produce ammunition. There were many intelligence agents among the workers of the UNRRA, but there were also those who helped us.

Further Zhou Enlai said that the military clashes with the Americans had taught us a lot. It is known that even before Japan's capitulation Americans tried to create their own bases in China. With the arrival of the Sov[iet] forces in Manchuria Japan capitulated. The USA gradually began to recall their observers, and then forces from China, continuing however to help the Guomintang in the military respect. In the clashes with the Guomintang-ists we killed several Americans who participated in the Guomintang operations. The first case of such a nature dates back to the talks between Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi in Chongqing in 1945. [American forces in China Commander Albert Coady] Wedemeyer, having learned about the killing of an American soldier, presented us with an ultimatum, but we declared in reply that we knew nothing about the killing. The second case happened in the vicinity of Tianjin, when a group of Americans, under the pretext of looking for their lost people, conducted intelligence gathering. Our forces opened fire on the group. We immediately broadcasted this case on the radio but the Americans denied it. The third case happened on the road between Tianjin and Beijing [Beijing] when the Americans intentionally drove into our zone. In the firefight one American was killed. Marshall protested to us. The fourth case happened in the area of Qingdao, when, in a firefight with a group of intelligence agents, one American was killed and three were captured. Americans again protested to us, then came to negotiate and signed a document, recognizing their responsibility in this affair. The fifth case relates to last year, when an American intelligence plane wanted to land an American major general on the territory of the liberated area. We captured this general and he has been in Shandong since the month of May 1947, without admitting being a general. The Americans pretend that they don't know about this case. The sixth case of a clash with the Americans relates to the area of the Tianjin airfield, where the Americans worked as the Guomintang's instructors. Our guerrillas blew up military objects on the airfield. After this the Americans recalled their representatives.

Summarizing the aforesaid, Zhou Enlai said that we must not provoke the Americans, but if they come out against us we will deliver them decisive rebuffs. In our press we curse the USA

because this educates the masses (workers, peasants, students) in the spirit we need.

Further Zhou Enlai said that in the course of the 3 postwar years the USA undermined its authority in China. As a whole, the people hate the Americans, though there are some people, even among the progressive elements, who fear the powers of the USA.

Continuing, Zhou Enlai stated that, in relations with the Americans, a new problem emerged when our troops took Mukden [Shenyang] last year. The foreign consulates located there (American, English and French) hinted to us that they have no intention of evacuating and would like to establish *de facto* relations with us. We understand that these consulates remained for intelligence gathering against us and the USSR. We have no desire to see them in Mukden [Shenyang], therefore we are taking measures to isolate them, creating for them unbearable conditions, so as to force them to leave Mukden. In the future we will raise the question of a consular network on equal footing. Generally, Zhou Enlai said, we will grasp the Americans firmer because "we are fighting them, and not other powers." The Americans are undermining our regime and we should isolate the USA in our own country.

ON RECOGNIZING THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

Further Zhou Enlai turned to the question of the diplomatic recognition of the future coalition government headed by the communists, but before that he asked to explain why the Soviet Ambassador [Nikolai] Roshchin departed for Canton.

With regard to the question of Roshchin's move with the Guomintang government to Canton I explained that this is fairly reasonable since China so far only has one government, to which our ambassador is accredited and it is natural that he moved together with the Chinese government to Canton, having left a part of the Embassy personnel in Nanjing. In essence this will not only not hamper our common cause but, on the contrary, aid it.

Then Zhou Enlai continued on the question of recognition of the future coalition government by foreign powers. In accordance with the CCP data, received through the democratic leaders, the Americans and the English intend to recognize the new government headed by the communists. One of the cited proofs is the fact that, in their opinion, the ambassadors of the countries did not leave Nanjing and did not follow the Guomintang government, which moved to Canton.

The first option

The CCP strives toward immediate recognition of the new government by the main foreign powers. In this case it is necessary for the USSR to recognize the new government

first; according to their information, the Americans and the English want to get ahead of the Sov[iet] Union in this matter so as to put it into an unfavorable situation in the eyes of the Chinese public.

The second option

Not to strive toward immediate recognition of the new government. If a foreign government declares its desire to recognize, not to refute it and not to give agreement, continuing this tactic for approximately one year. After this, to strive toward recognition. The advantages of such an option are such that, having free hands, the new government could with more ease put pressure on all things foreign in China, ignoring the protests of foreign governments against the actions of the new government, aimed at limiting the rights and drawing [sic] foreign citizens and foreign governments. At the same time they would like to know the opinion of our CC whether one must establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and the new Chinese government after a year together with other countries or they could be established immediately after the formation of the coalition government.

I promised to report all of this to our CC, which will discuss it and reply.

ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN PROPERTY

In yesterday's conversation, Zhou Enlai said, Mao Zedong, speaking about foreign enterprises, stressed that it is necessary to apply a cautious position with respect to them, inasmuch as their capital is closely intertwined with China's interests. He reminded that the 6th Congress of the CCP made the decision on the confiscation of foreign capital and property, which was then approved by the Comintern. In principle this decision also remains in force now, but its implementation must be conducted in more flexible forms. Zhou Enlai asked that I recount my attitude toward the position, put forward by Mao Zedong on this question.

I replied that on the question of foreign property we have an opinion that one should nationalize Japanese, French and, where possible, English property. With regard to the American property one must carry out a cautious policy, so as to create an impression among the Americans that their interests will be taken into account by the new government. When the government headed by the communists takes control over the situation in China, one could discuss this question again and resolve it depending on the situation and on the behavior of the Americans. After this statement of mine, Zhou Enlai recounted the preliminary draft of the CCP position, recounted above, in accordance with which, [they] do not intend to nationalize foreign property for the time being.

PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Then Zhou Enlai, in accordance with the points expounded earlier by Mao Zedong, recounted the following principles of their foreign policy:

1. To conduct a policy of independence, without provoking foreign powers at the same time.
2. To protect the life and property of foreigners (keeping quiet for the time being about their privileges) with the exception of Japanese property, which has all been already confiscated by the Guomindang, this [provision] remaining in force.
3. With regard to the existing consulate and diplomatic representative offices before the establishment of diplomatic relations, to carry out a line of not liquidating them, protecting their life and property, taking away their right to conduct their activities, at the same time creating unbearable conditions for the consulates of the Western powers in Mukden so that they leave it and in the future not to allow them to be restored in Mukden and Harbin. As Zhou Enlai expressed himself, to strive for shutting off Manchuria with an Iron Curtain from the foreign powers except for the USSR and people's democracies. In order to create the appearance of equal attitude, Soviet consulate organizations also must formally end their activities, continuing their functions unofficially.
4. To close down all newspapers and journals published by foreigners. This means that the Soviet consulates in Tianjin and Shanghai, in order to continue the publication of their newspapers, must formally appoint as the heads of these publications some kind of democratic Chinese [persons].
5. To prohibit further entry of foreigners, missionaries and journalists into China (with the exception of [those] friendly-disposed), to introduce mandatory registration of missionary organizations, hospitals, schools, cultural and scientific institutions, foreign aid organizations, putting them under control and limiting their activities within a certain framework, protecting their life and property. To limit land property of foreign churches with their villas [sic, probably "to their villas"], confiscating the remaining land. In foreign missionary schools the directors must be Chinese, and the textbooks—from among the number approved by the government, religion must be taught on a voluntary basis. To deport foreigners accused of espionage and of breaking the law, and in some cases to send [them] to jail through the court.
6. To keep foreigners employed at Chinese state institutions, with the exception of reactionaries and

hostile persons.

7. To prohibit activity of foreign telegraph and information agencies inside of China. At the same time they ask us to hint to them what modus could be created for the [ITAR-]TASS, which, let's say, could exchange information with Chinese state agency on the basis of a treaty or otherwise taking into account our experience with the countries of people's democracies.
8. To forbid all foreigners to carry weapons, except for diplomatic workers.
9. To *de facto* isolate the American military attaches remaining in Beijing [Beijing] and Tianjin by supplying [our] own officers to them, take away their opportunity to move anywhere and take up any activities.
10. To encircle the Qingdao base, occupied by the Americans, breaking all of its contacts with the surrounding territory; without resorting to military actions to strive toward Americans' departure; to do the same with other coastal points where the Americans will leave behind or land their forces. In all cases when the Americans disturb the order or come out against [our] forces or authorities, to suppress them using weapons when necessary.
11. To put all of the customs under [our] own control, taking them completely from under the direction of foreign powers. To keep customs tariffs unchanged for the time being. To cancel the privileges, given to the Americans by the Guomindang, decreeing that entry of internal ports is allowed only with the government's permission.
12. To forbid foreigners to use radio stations on China's territory.
13. To establish control over foreign enterprises, banks and their accounting and in case of their breaching established laws, to make them bear responsibility, even as far as closing [them] down.

Talking about foreign trade Zhou Enlai said that first and foremost they will establish trade relations with the USSR and with the countries of people's democracies. They will give their goods to these countries in the first place, and the remnants—to the capitalist countries.

To my question whether they are considering trade with Japan, Zhou Enlai said that they had not discussed this question yet, but it should be thought through and we should be consulted.

To my question whether the party will take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for itself Zhou Enlai answered in the affirmative, [saying] that the minister in any case will be a communist, and his deputies—one a communist and one non-party person. In this connection Zhou Enlai said that they have created a special commission in Tianjin, which studies various foreign political documents for the eventuality of [us] being prepared for [creating a] future Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 33

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 1 February 1949 (Evening)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 25-30. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 48-51. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

On 1 February 1949 in the evening Zhou Enlai with Zhu De informed me for three hours regarding the military questions. Form their side interpreter Shi Zhe was also present, from our side—Comrades I[van] V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev

THE MUSLIM QUESTION

At the beginning of the conversation the question was raised about the Muslims of northwestern China and some Guomindang Muslim generals, in particular, Mao Bufan and Ma Hongkui.

To my question as to who supports them, Zhou Enlai replied that the Muslim generals are supported by Jiang Jieshi and the USA. The Americans want to penetrate the Muslim areas of Qinghai and Gansu. In connection with our victories the situation of the Muslim generals and their forces is becoming unstable.

To my question whether there are any demands on the part of the Chinese Muslims Zhou Enlai replied that the Muslims would want to acquire autonomy. They will cooperate with us, he said, if we give them autonomy and display caution with regard to their religion.

Zhou Enlai stressed that the Muslim question in China is a very complex one and this is reflected on the relationships within the forces of the Muslim generals. In these forces the command-

ing corps are Muslims, and the enlisted men are Chinese. Our policy with regard to the Muslim forces so far entails, firstly, saving them, and then gradually dismissing [them]. In any case at the present time we have no intention to form national forces from their units, it will be possible to talk about this only when deep political work had been carried out among them.

To my remark that the possibility is not ruled out that in case national Muslim forces were organized, the English could take them into their hands, Zhou Enlai expressed his solidarity with me and said that such Muslim units are unreliable.

Continuing to be interested in the Chinese Muslims I asked about their situation in southwestern China. Zhou Enlai replied that in this part of the country there are many small nationalities, which stand at a low level of development and only a few of them rise to high social levels. As an example he referred to the former governor of the Yunnan province Lun Yun, who originated from the Yi tribe. Now Lun Yun is in Hong Kong. At first he flirted with us but now we know that he works against us. We have a firm party organization in Hong Kong, a part of which has a semi-legal status.

POLICY IN INNER MONGOLIA

Talking about Fu Zuoyi, Zhou Enlai said that though he belongs to the group of northwestern militarists, his forces have more Chinese than nationals. Now he is negotiating with us in order to sell the surrender of Beiping [Beijing] more expensively.

Our policy in Inner Mongolia, continued Zhou Enlai, has been accepted well by the local Mongolian population. Gao Gang went there on special duty, [he] conducted great explanatory work in the party organization in connection with the mistakes, which the latter had committed. These mistakes amount to taking the "left" line with respect to the local Mongolian princes and *lamas*.¹ Land was confiscated from the top princes and at the present time they do not have great power and military forces. However, we consider it possible that under the current circumstances these princes take part in the local Mongolian governments, especially the representatives of young royalty. We even know that some young princes joined the CCP. Now Inner Mongolia exists with the rights of an autonomous region.

GUOMINDANG NAVY

Jiang Jieshi's fleet is located at the bases: Formosa (Governor Chen Cheng has about 20 thousand forces), Fuzhou, Canton. The fleet is composed of 271 ships presented to China by the USA.

From further questions about the Navy it became clear that they have no idea about the Navy's vessels in the ports and on the bases, have no plans in this regard, except for the Navy of

the Yangzi River, with which they have established contact. They are especially interested in this fleet because they believe that it must play a big role when the People's Liberation Army crosses the Yangzi River in the forthcoming attack. They do not have a single Navy vessel, there are no cases of desertions of Navy vessels to their side.

GUOMINDANG FORCES

Further Zhou Enlai gave a characterization of the Guomindang forces at different fronts. He said that the main forces of Jiang Jieshi are located in the Shanghai-Wuhu-Nanjing theater. About 58 divisions are concentrated here, about 380 thousand people. Jiang Jieshi has not retreated yet but intends to go south from here in the direction of Hankou and Nanchang. The commander of the forces of this theater, General Tang Enbo, is a trusted person of Jiang Jieshi.

The second theater of the Guomindang forces is in the Hankou area. It is headed by general Bai Chongxi. 32 divisions or about 210 thousand people are under his command. Bai Chongxi also intends to retreat to the south across the Yangzi River.

The third theater of the Guomindang forces, in Xi'an area, is headed by Hu Zhongnan. At his disposal are 36 divisions or 190 thousand people.

Jiang Jieshi relies on these army groups. In all he has 120 divisions or 800 thousand people. Therefore if we throw against Jiang Jieshi our 181 divisions, i.e. about 2 million 200 thousand people, the Guomindang forces will not withstand our pressure.

CHARACTERISTICS OF GUOMINDANG LEADERS (SUN ZIWEN, ZHANG ZHIZHONG, SHAO LIZI)

Talking about [prominent GMD politician] Sun Ziwun [T.V. Soong], Zhou Enlai said that he is sitting it out in Canton and, not being a military man, does not pose a great danger to us. We know that he intends to go the USA. He uses his official position well for personal enrichment. Jiang Jieshi is unhappy with him as he did not carry out his assignment regarding the formation of 6 divisions in southern China just as we created guerrilla areas on the island of Hainan and hold 5-7 counties there in our hands. There are also guerrilla bases in the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang.

Characterizing General Zhang Zhizhong, Zhou Enlai said that he, of course, is Jiang Jieshi's man, but justice requires that one note that though he is his trusted person, he has a clear head and he cannot help but see the inevitable victory of the new forces. During Jiang Jieshi's counterrevolutionary coup d'état in 1927 he parted with him and openly declared that he would not struggle against the communists. After Japan's capitulation he once again confirmed this declaration, continuing his sup-

port for Jiang Jieshi. He takes into account the strength of the Sov[iet] Union and understands that it must not be irritated, and therefore flirts with you. His “pro-Soviet” sentiment is used by Jiang Jieshi in the talks with the CCP. We know that Zhang Zhizhong is in a hurry to go to Lanzhou so as to put his forces together there, make contact with us and bargain out a place for his participation in the formation of the forthcoming government. His participation in the government will depend on whether he transfers his forces to us or not. If he does, then, perhaps, we will involve him as the only one who had taken our side. We do not have illusions in his regard, we know that he is an orthodox Guomindang-ist and in case of his defection to our side one can expect that he will become the center of gravitation for all the discontented elements. One should take into consideration that he is trying to create a good impression of himself in the eyes of the Sov[iet] Union.

The former Ambassador in the USSR Shao Lizi is better than Zhang Zhizhong but he is also Jiang Jieshi’s running dog. He is familiar with the Sov[iet] Union but on the whole he is an unstable figure.

We do not have contacts with the Xinjiang democratic groups. Our former people there were arrested by [one time governor of Xinjiang] Sheng Shicai. Now we are sending there a small group of party comrades.

PLA ARMS

Talking about the PLA arms, Zhou Enlai said that they do not have a unified rear and unified logistics (*intendantstvo*) but they plan to put things in order here. First and foremost they will begin with the unification of the war industry, which has only grown since 1948 and even so primarily in Manchuria. Of the military arsenals Mukden’s takes the first place, followed by that in Taiyuan. We manufacture bombs, shells, explosive substances, mountain cannons, machine guns, shrapnel. The Mukden arsenal produces the most ammunition. In comparison with the previous years, production of ammunition increased by 50%. We receive some things from North Korea.

Now we have about 900 thousand rifles, more than 50 thousand light machine guns, about 80 thousand medium [*stankovykh*] machine guns and about 60 thousand automatic [heavy?] machine guns, more than 10 thousand mountain cannons, about 6 thousand rocket launchers. We feel a shortage of mountain weapons and anti-aircraft weapons; we only have 108 of the latter. In this connection we would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to supply us with a certain amount of anti-aircraft weapons of Japanese, German, or Czechoslovak type with ammunition for the protection of Beiping [Beijing], Tianjin, Mukden and other cities.

PLA MILITARY REQUESTS

We, Zhou Enlai said, feel a great shortage of anti-tank weapons, of which we have only 150 pieces, in which connection we would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to give us a certain amount of anti-tank weapons. We have an unfavorable situation with regard to the tanks as well. The available tanks are mainly light, the heaviest is 15 tons. Near Suizhou we captured up to 70 tanks, but in the main already considerably worn out ones. We are running short on materials and we would like to get from the Sov[iet] Union TNT for manufacturing ammunition. We would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to give us also specialists and equipment for manufacture of arms, and also advisers on army reorganization, on military-educational institutions and organization of the rear, including the arms industry.

I replied that we in principle agree to help with the organization of arms manufacture and to give advisers; as to the question of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, I cannot say anything and will pass [this] on to Moscow for consideration.

Further Zhou Enlai said that that they would like to obtain from us steel rails, gasoline, about 5,000 cars and a series of others machines and materials, to which I replied that with all these requests one needs to direct an application to our government.

PLA INTELLIGENCE

During the conversation Zhou Enlai stressed that intelligence plays a great role in the running of their military operations, in particular, radio interceptions. In this sphere we have substantial achievements in comparison with the Guomindang-ists. We, Zhou Enlai said, decipher the Guomindang and even American codes.

ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR MINISTRY

Regarding the war ministry Zhou Enlai said that they intend to place communists in it, but it is possible that the military committee will have, for appearance, some Guomindang generals. All military questions, Zhou Enlai said, must be discussed at the forthcoming 2nd Plenum of CCP CC in Beiping [Beijing].

The conversation ended at this.

1. *Editor’s Note:* Lamas are Buddhist monks.



DOCUMENT No. 34

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3 February 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 47-53. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 62-66. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

On the evening of 3 February 1949 another conversation took place with Mao Zedong, in which CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, as well as the interpreter Shi Zhe, took part. I[van] V. Kovalev. and [Soviet China specialist] E.F. Kovalev were present from our side.

ON THE FOREIGN MEDIATION IN THE TALKS BETWEEN THE GUOMINDANG AND THE CCP

After mutual greetings the conversation began with me stating that we know that England, America and France stood for taking up for themselves the functions of mediation between the Guomindang and the CCP. Later, having learned somehow that the USSR and the CCP are against foreign mediation, these powers, not wishing to shame themselves, changed their position and declined mediation. In this connection it is necessary to take up seriously the questions of conspiracy and take an interest in whether there are any babbling people around the CCP, through whom this information could reach the Americans. Mao Zedong absolutely ruled out this possibility for, as he stated, such serious questions and, in particular, communications with Moscow, are known only to the 5 present members of the CC, to one interpreter Shi Zhe and to Cde. Terebin. The aforementioned persons are completely reliable and he does not have any doubt in them. As for this case, he stated that the Anglo-Americans, even before our position had become known, openly wrote that the USSR and the CCP would be against mediation. I replied that then it could only be their speculation, however, the Western powers hurried to refuse mediation after they had received reliable information about our position. Mao Zedong reiterated that one cannot [sic, probably "can"] rule out the possibility of the leaking of information from the CCP circle.

THE YUGOSLAVIA QUESTION

Then, on Mao Zedong's request, I shed light on the question of Yugoslavia. Mao Zedong asked whether the Yugoslavs are obstructing the conduct of communist work in Europe. I replied that they cannot, for they are in complete isolation, and all communist parties without exception spoke out against the Yugoslav nationalist anti-Sovietists. To this Mao Zedong said that Tito is [like] Zhang Guotao, a former CCP CC member,

traitor, defector, and renegade.

ON THE COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES AMONG THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE ASIAN COUNTRIES

Further, to my question about the coordination of activities among the communist parties of the Asian countries, Mao Zedong said that on this account they still do not have a definite opinion. They maintain contacts with the parties of Indochina, Siam, Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India, Malaya and Korea. The closest ties are with the com[munist] parties of Indochina and Korea, with the rest considerably weaker. There are no relations whatsoever with the Japanese Com[munist] Party. All work of liaison with com[munist] parties is carried out through a special comrade, located in Hong Kong, but it is conducted poorly. Therefore, as Mao Zedong stated, under these circumstances it is too early to create a bureau of com[munist] parties of Asian countries, like the bureau of com[munist] parties in Europe. One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.

Continuing, Mao Zedong pointed out that the strongest com[munist] parties are the North Korean, Indian and Chinese ones, after which one could also count among the strong the Japanese Com[munist] Party. Speaking of the Japanese Com[munist] Party Mao Zedong said that they know that in 1946 a member of the Japanese Com[munist] Party Okano (Nozako Sanzo) [sic, should be Nosaka Sanzo] held the erroneous point of view that power may be captured through parliamentary struggle. The majority of the Politburo of the Japanese Com[munist] Party was against this point of view. Recently the situation of the Japanese Com[munist] Party is improving. In Japan, anti-American sentiments are growing among the people, though the Japanese bourgeoisie are supporting the USA.

Returning to the question of creation of a bureau of com[munist] parties of Asian countries, Mao Zedong informed that they know that the com[munist] parties of Siam and Indochina spoke out in favor of creation of such a bureau. It would be expedient to create at first a bureau from the representatives of com[munist] parties of not all but several Asian countries, for example, from the representatives of the Chinese, Korean, Indochinese and Philippine com[munist] parties. As far as the Japanese Com[munist] Party is concerned, its weight ratio in the communist movement is still not high and besides, we still do not have contacts with the Japanese communists. Regarding the participation of the Japanese com[munist] party in the bureau, Mao Zedong said that one should exchange opinions with it beforehand and receive its agreement.

I said that in the opinion of our party, the CCP CC should not join the Cominform, but should create a bureau of com[munist] parties of East Asia headed by the Chinese Com[munist] Party, In the beginning, composed of 3 parties—Chinese, Japanese,

and Korean. Subsequently one may gradually involve other com[munist] parties. Mao Zedong asked then whether contacts between the CCP and the com[munist] party of the USSR should be direct, to which I replied in the affirmative. Then I warned him that in the membership of the politburo of such com[munist] parties as those of the Philippines, Indonesia, Siam and Burma there are many American and English spies, therefore the CCP must be careful in relations with them. Mao Zedong agreed with this opinion and asked whether they could contact the com[munist] parties of Japan and Korea regarding the question of forming a bureau, to which I replied in the affirmative.

THE MAIN QUESTIONS OF HISTORY OF THE CCP

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting the main questions of history of the com[munist] party of China. He separated the party history into 4 periods:

- 1) The Northern Expedition
- 2) The Soviet Movement
- 3) The Sino-Japanese War
- 4) Post-war Civil War

Speaking of the first period of party history Mao Zedong said that the CCP appeared in 1921 under the direct influence of the October revolution in the USSR and with the help of the VKP(b). Whereas the Russian Bolsheviks organized themselves at the London Congress in 1903, we were formed as Bolsheviks considerably later, i.e. only in 1921. We immediately took up the program of the Bolsheviks and of the democratic centralism. From 1921 to 1927 we cooperated with the Guomindang and conducted the Northern Expedition together with it. At this time the Sov[iet] Union helped us, until 1924 with Lenin's participation, and after his death—with the participation of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin wrote a lot about China during this period. I knew very little then but I studied Marxism carefully. The CCP did not yet have a firm foundation though it struggled heroically enjoying the support of the Chinese workers and peasants. At that time there were opportunist elements in the leadership of the CCP, headed by [co-founder of the CCP] Chen Duxiu. This led to the defeat of the Chinese Revolution of that period. Only with the help of the Comintern was the opportunist leadership of the CCP removed in August 1927.

The second period of our history falls on years 1927-1936. During this period we took into account the lessons stemming from the defeat of the revolution of 1925-1927. Whereas during the first period (1921-1927) the ranks of the com[munist] party counted up to 50,000 people, then in 1928 the number of members of the party decreased to 10,000 people. An unstable part of the party membership jumped into the opponent's camp, others died in battles or simply abandoned party work. Nevertheless the party became stronger politically though during that time some mistakes were made. First and foremost

one should note the left opportunist mistakes in the questions of economic, political and cultural construction. Then the mistakes of the leftists were that they considered that everything was incorrect both inside and outside the party. Li Lisan followed this in 1930. It is known that the left opportunist line of Li Lisan was censured by the Comintern. The members of the CCP believed the Comintern and joined its decision on Li Lisan. Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai spoke out against Li Lisan. After 1928 Zhou Enlai and Strakhov [Li Lisan] visited Moscow, learned a little there, and began to organize work in the CCP. Having come to China they called the 3rd plenum of CCP CC, which censured Li Lisan's line. The leftists did not agree with this and demanded to call the 4th plenum of the CCP CC. With this step they undermined their authority in the party, all the more so since they had no practical experience of revolutionary struggle and construction. To reach their aims they did not shun from the services of the right opportunist Chen Duxiu. They struggled against each and everyone, considering only themselves to be orthodox Bolsheviks. They called Liu Shaoqi an opportunist because he, as the leader of the professional unions movement, in the conditions of the then brutal Guomindang terror, with the aim of preserving the strength of the working class, demanded an organized retreat. In 1931-34 the leadership of the party was in the hands of these leftists. They even took into their hands the underground party organizations, blaming me, Mao Zedong said, for opportunism, considering me a representative of the rightist line of the party.

From the time of the 6th Congress of the CCP (1928) until the 7th Congress (1945) 17 years passed. Among the members of the CCP CC, elected at the 6th Congress at the present time only 3 persons remain, the rest were co-opted into the membership of the CCP CC at the 3rd and 4th plenums of the CCP CC. Among those co-opted were [former CCP CC Politburo member] Bo Gu and [former General Secretary of CCP CC] Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] who sided with the Wang Ming group and sneaked into the CC illegally. In 1930-31 this group published a brochure, in which it claimed that Bolshevism in China begins with them. Subsequently, under the pressure of our criticism, this group corrected its mistakes, but not entirely. This did not prevent us, however, from electing them into the membership of the CCP CC at the 7th Party Congress.

In 1946 Bo Gu participated in the talks with the Guomindang in Chongqing, and in April of the same year he died in an air crash together with [former Communist military leader] Ye Ting and [former CCP representative in Chongqing] Wang Ruofei. Luo Fu is in Manchuria at the present time. His main shortcoming is the absence of practical experience and besides he is fairly loquacious.

As far as Wang Ming is concerned, Mao Zedong said, he still has not recognized his former mistakes. In his regard we conducted a soft policy, trying to influence him by methods of persuasion. He, Mao Zedong said, has bourgeois habits. During the

Sino-Japanese war Wang Ming proposed to reduce the CCP to the position of the Guomindang. He insisted on the joint management by the CCP and the Guomindang of the most imperative political tasks and therefore trusted the Guomindang and *de facto* liquidated the CCP's independent political line. Having arrived in China from Moscow in December 1937 he called a meeting in Wuhan without the permission of the CCP CC and wrote a brochure, published in March 1938, calling on the party to abandon the CC leadership. It is characteristic that, when in 1937 [now CCP CC member, future Ambassador to the USSR] Wang Jiaxiang returned to China from Moscow, he brought us the program guidelines of the Comintern, and when Wang Ming came from Moscow, he did not bring us anything, whereas what Wang Jiaxiang brought, turned out to be very valuable and useful. These program guidelines helped us in developing our own concrete tasks.

Continuing to characterize the second period of the party history, Mao Zedong said that during that time they had to struggle against renegade Zhang Guotao, as well as with other opportunistic tendencies. In this struggle, as well as subsequently, the Soviet party thinking helped us. For example, in 1946 Comrade Stalin wrote a letter to Colonel Razin on the questions of military history, which pointed out that retreat is a rational form of struggle.¹ But during the second period of our party's history, in the opinion of the leftists, retreat was considered an opportunistic undertaking. Now, one can see that they were deeply mistaken.

In January 1935 in Zunyi (Guizhou province) the CCP CC called a meeting to struggle against the leftist mistakes. The conditions of the meeting were most unfavorable since Zhang Guotao was attacking us with an army of 60,000 people. But we were not at a loss and destroyed more than 30,000 of his forces. At the same time it transpired that Zhang Guotao was a good friend of Wang Ming and when the latter was requested in Moscow to provide an explanation on this question, he delayed his answer.

By the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war we had suffered great losses in the military forces. We remained with only about 30,000 fighters and in this connection Wang Ming claimed that these forces are not sufficient for the struggle against Japan, insisting on having them diluted in the Guomindang forces. Now it is clear that this was a mistaken line, because 30,000 people made for the skeleton, upon which grew the current 3 million strong People's Liberation Army.

All of these mistakes by Wang Ming were known to the delegates of the 7th CCP Congress and they caused their sincere discontent. The delegates also knew about the mistakes of Li Lisan, Bo Gu and Luo Fu and they demanded not to elect them to the CC. However, by the time of the Congress the situation in China had changed. Many from those who had been mistaken understood their mistakes and went backstage.

Marxist-Leninist study, criticism and self-criticism unfolded in the party. And though there were many arguments at the Congress—whether or not to elect Wang Ming, Li Lisan, and Bo Gu, and Luo Fu into the CC, they were elected anyhow with the aim of consolidation of party forces.

Now Li Lisan works in the professional unions, he has great experience in this area and he is more deserving before the revolution than Wang Ming is. He, together with Liu Shaoqi, led the workers' movement in Shanghai. Having arrived from the Soviet Union in China he did not speak a single bad word about the Sov[iet] Union and now is trying to pay back the trust shown in him, while there is still a wedge hammered between the CCP CC and Wang Ming.

Further, Mao Zedong said that in 1936 the CCP counted up to 40,000 members, who mainly joined the party in the period of the Soviet movement. At the present time the party has more than 3 million members. There are 44 members of the CC, 33 candidate members.

To my question whether there is any wavering in the ranks of the party at the present time Mao Zedong replied that there were manifestations of this, but to a lesser extent, in the leadership of the party [sic].

The conversation ended at this.

1. Here, Mao refers to an exchange of letters between "Colonel Razin" and Stalin printed in 1947 in the Soviet journal *Bolshevik*. For English translation of Stalin's letter see "Stalin's Reply" in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1949), pp. 77-78.



DOCUMENT No. 35

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 4 February 1949

[Source: Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko. APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 54-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 66-72.*]

On 4 February 1949 another meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De and the interpreter Shi Zhe. From our side Kovalev I[van]. V. and Kovalev E.F. were present.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

I conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists' take-over of power. One should give autonomy and not independence to the national minorities.

Mao Zedong was glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever. Mao Zedong on his initiative asked how we feel about the unification of Outer and Inner Mongolia. I said that we do not support this proposition. Then he asked for our motives in not supporting this unification.

I replied that we do not support it because this unification would lead to the loss of substantial territory for China. Mao Zedong said that he considers that Outer and Inner Mongolia could unite and join the Chinese republic. Of course, this would be possible if the leaders of Outer and Inner Mongolia stood for this. He admits, such a possibility in, say, two years' time, when the power of communists in China strengthens sufficiently and everything achieves the desired normality. Then Outer Mongolia will declare that she seceded from the Chinese state because the Guomindang ruled the state. Now, however, when the communists have the power, Outer Mongolia desires to accede the Chinese state, by joining Inner Mongolia.

I replied that this is impossible because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be [within an] independent Mongolia.

Then Ren Bishi made a remark that the population of Inner Mongolia is 3 million, and Outer Mongolia—1 million.

The end result was that Mao Zedong laughed and stopped defending his opinion.

THE XINJIANG QUESTION

Since Mao Zedong earlier told me that he wanted to discuss with me the Xinjiang question I asked him what he had in mind. Mao Zedong stated that in the Yili district of Xinjiang, which is subordinate to the Urumqi government, there is a independence movement and that there is a communist party there. I replied that I do not know about the existence of a com[munist] party in the Yili district but I know about the national movement of the local nationalities. This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese government, which does

not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not present rights of self-rule, does not permit the development of the national culture.

If the nationalities of Xinjiang were given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely remain [sic]. We do not stand for the movement of independence of the Xinjiang nationalities and do not have any claims on Xinjiang territory, considering that Xinjiang is and must be a part of China. We stand for economic cooperation and trade with Xinjiang, like that which is taking place, and which the Guomindang government itself, in the person of its representative in Xinjiang, Zhang Zhizhong, proposes to formalize by a treaty.

Then Mao Zedong said that when in 1945 he met with Bai Chongxi in Chongqing the latter told him that the local insurgents in the Yili district have Soviet-made artillery, tanks and airplanes.

I replied to Mao Zedong that I do not know about this and cannot say anything, I only know that we did not give help to this movement, though it is a national movement against oppression.

Then Mao Zedong said that they have in mind giving Xinjiang autonomy in general, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region.

Mao Zedong took a special interest in whether there is a lot of oil in Xinjiang or a little.

I said that in the times of [Xinjiang warlord] Sheng Shicai we pumped and processed oil in substantial quantity, which was used for the internal needs of Xinjiang for there is no transport for taking it out.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RAILROAD IN XINJIANG

Mao Zedong raised the question, and he was strongly supported by Ren Bishi, as to whether one couldn't build a railroad connecting the Chinese railroads with the Soviet railroads through Xinjiang. This would have great significance for joint defense in case of a new war.

In such a war China, of course, will be together with the Sov[iet] Union. In case if Manchuria were under a strike, such a railroad would be an important channel of supplying the fighting Chinese armies. This road would feed the provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, Hebei and Sichuan, rich provinces with a mountainous landscape, which are greatly convenient for the organization of firm defense.

I said that, in my opinion, this idea is interesting, it has a future, but it will be very expensive to build and before it is decided to

build, one should carefully make calculations.

Then Ren Bishi raised the question of why not build a road connecting Ulaanbaatar with Kalgan. The distance is not great here, but it would have a great significance for connecting to northern China.

I said that this question deserves attention, but we have not thought about it.

ON CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CCP AND THE VKP(b)

Further, Mao Zedong turned to the question about the contacts between the CCP and the VKP(b).

He stressed that the CCP needs all-sided help from the VKP(b). We need two advisers, one on economic, the other on the financial questions.

Replying to this, I said that Comrade I[van] Kovalev is empowered by the Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding economic questions, and the sphere of his activity includes Manchuria and northern China. He, I added, is at the complete disposal of Cde. Mao Zedong. Although he is nominally listed under the Changchun Railroad, but his activity in fact embraces all of China.

Mao Zedong expressed thanks for placing Cde. I[van] Kovalev at his disposal and, continuing the conversation, said that when the CCP CC moves to Beijing, relations between us will develop in two directions—[on the] diplomatic and party [levels]. He spoke out in favor of having an adviser on party questions with the USSR Embassy.

Politburo member Zhou Enlai, who took part in the conversation, speaking of the party adviser for the CCP, expressed a wish for him to stand as close as possible to the Chinese Com[munist] Party so as to allow one to exchange opinions with him more often, though on the main questions the CCP would like to contact VKP(b) CC directly. As Zhou Enlai said, “the main questions will be solved in Moscow.”

ON THE CANDIDATE FOR THE AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR

Touching upon the question, raised by Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong stated that periodically, for short period of time, the CCP will be sending its people to Moscow to receive relevant consultations, and the permanent job there, in the capacity of the future ambassador, will go to the CCP CC candidate member Wang Jiaxiang.

Characterizing Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong said that in the past he committed mistakes together with the Wang Ming group. In 1937 he was treated in Moscow and carried out the

duties of the CCP representative in the Comintern. In July 1947 he returned to us with Comintern directives, which were in accordance with our political line. These directives helped us to overcome our own mistakes.

ON THE AID FROM THE USSR

Further, Mao Zedong stressed that the Sov[iet] Union provided and [continues to] provide great aid to the CCP and the latter is very grateful to the VKP(b) for this. The Chinese Revolution, Mao Zedong continued, is a part of the world revolution. In this connection, particular interests should be subordinate to the general [interest]. We always take this into account, when we turn to the Sov[iet] Union for aid. And if, suppose, the Sov[iet] Union did not give something, we will not harbor complaints in its regard. When, before his departure to Moscow, Luo Yunhuan asked me how to raise the question of aid to us on the part of the Sov[iet] Union, I told him that one should not depict the situation in such a way that we are dying, that that we have no capabilities of our own, but stressed that it would be desirable for us to receive from you relevant aid with regard to Manchuria. Since 1947 Lin Biao has also often requested Moscow to provide aid in this or that question. I, Mao Zedong said, gave instructions to Gao Gang, that everything we take from the USSR must be paid back and that, moreover, the shortage of these or those materials at the expense of the Guomintang areas [must] be solved. The Chinese comrades must rationally use the aid of the Sov[iet] Union. If there we no aid on the part of the Sov[iet] Union, Mao Zedong stressed, we would hardly be able to achieve the current victories. This does not mean, however, that we must not rely on our own forces. But one cannot help but take into account the fact, Mao Zedong said, that the military aid of the Sov[iet] Union in Manchuria, which makes up one fourth of all your aid to us, plays a fairly substantial role.

ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT

Then Mao Zedong turned to the questions of negotiations with the Guomintang government. He declared that the CCP is conducting negotiations not with the Guomintang, but with the Guomintang government. This is a new development in the political life of modern China. One should, Mao Zedong stressed, agree with the government, and not with the Guomintang, since negotiations with the latter would raise its authority in the eyes of the public opinion. In the future the Guomintang will be dissolved, and if at the present time we recognize it as a party to negotiations, it will inevitably claim to have a place in the future coalition government. Now we are strengthening the propaganda so as to expose the Guomintang, and then we will dissolve it, as in his time Lenin called the constituent assembly and then dissolved it.

We, Mao Zedong stated, raised before the Guomintang eight

conditions, which were accepted by the latter as the basis. If the Guomintang-ists agree with the first point of our conditions, then we will instruct them to arrest the war criminals. Our conditions entail reorganization of the Guomintang army, formation of a government without reactionaries, cancellation of the Guomintang laws and, in particular, the law on the party status of Guomintang. Of course, during the talks with us the Guomintang-ists will insist on joining the government, but the democratic parties are against this just as the entire Chinese people are. Now nobody will defend the Guomintang any longer. It also does not have the abilities for independent organization of the coalition government. In fact the Guomintang is isolated. Even America, France and England openly come out against it. Such a situation is objectively beneficial to us. As far as separate Guomintang leaders are concerned, then, for example, we can use in our interests Bai Chongxi, but his forces should be completely destroyed.

Many people, Mao Zedong said, think that our publication of the war criminal list isolates us from other political parties but we believe that this list delivers strong blows to the Guomintang. They will not unite in the face of this list, they are afraid for their skins. Bai Chongxi, for example, declared that he is for talks with us. Li Zongren also follows this position, intending to send his representatives to us. As is known, Fu Zuoyi surrendered his forces to us. We consider him to be a war criminal. If he helps us to reorganize these forces, we will have a basis for exonerating him in the eyes of the people.

Regarding Zhang Zhizhong, Mao Zedong said that we do not have a reason to include him on the list of war criminals despite the fact that he is a trusted person of Jiang Jieshi.

Talking of the tactics of negotiations with the Guomintang government Mao Zedong spoke out in favor of ruining the general negotiations with the central government, but supporting the local negotiations. Guomintang must be destroyed a part at a time. We know that the former ambassador in the Sov[iet] Union, Yan Huiqing, intends to come to Beiping [Beijing] for negotiations over peaceful resolution of the Shanghai question. All of this suggests, Mao Zedong said, that the Guomintang is suffering one defeat after another. Moreover, many local Guomintang authorities already are voluntarily beginning to establish contact with us. For example, when Fu Zuoyi conducted negotiations with us, a delegation composed of 10 people arrived from Beiping, among who was the city mayor, CC-ist¹, Huo Sheyuan and a member of the Legislative Yuan. We received them well and they were very satisfied with our reception.

Returning to the position of Zhang Zhizhong, Mao Zedong pointed out that the issue concerning him, and the issue concerning those like him, presents itself like this: should we draw them [to us]? If they accept our conditions then they will therefore betray the Guomintang and they can be drawn to us. For example, if Zhang Zhizhong passes his forces to us, one can

think of drawing him into our power [arrangements]. In case of the taking of our side by Shao Lizi, we think, he could be drawn to the work of the future coalition government. But, Mao Zedong stressed, all these persons are unpopular with the people, and the people do not like them.

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR CONVENING THE PCM [POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING]

Further, Mao Zedong turned to the question of creation of a preparatory commission for convening the PCM. A list of 23 organizations, included in the commission, has not been published yet, but has been agreed upon with the interested parties. The following organizations are included on the list:

1. CCP
2. PLA
3. The Revolutionary Committee of the Guomintang
4. The Union to Advance Democracy in China
5. The Democratic League of China
6. The Association for Saving the Motherland
7. The Third Party (Democratic Party of Workers and Peasants)
8. The Union to Advance Democracy in Shanghai
9. The Society for the Democratic Transformation of China
10. The Congress of Professional Unions of China
11. The Peasants' Union of China
12. The Youth Organization of China
13. The Student Union of China
14. The All-China Women's Union
15. The Association of Cultural Workers of China
16. The Association of the Industrial Enterprises of Shanghai
17. The Union of Workers in Education
18. Representatives of non-party figures (Guo Moruo)
19. Representatives of the national minorities
20. Representatives of the Chinese emigrants, living in South-East Asia (Chen Jiageng, etc.)
21. Representatives of the Chinese emigrants living in the USA
22. The Association for the Study of Sun Yatsen.

The membership of the preparatory commission will be composed of 3-4 people, delegated from each of the aforementioned groups, but irrespective of the number of delegates each organization will have only one vote. The communists will have 9 people on the commission, and 5 sympathizers. The rest of the seats are assigned to 4 centrists and 5 democrats. In the PCM 2/3 of the places will belong to the CCP. The commission will convene in the beginning of the month of March, prepare the composition of the political consultative meeting and the agenda of its sessions. The PCM will discuss two questions:

1. Approval of the general political program.

2. Formation of the coalition government.

Further, Mao Zedong said that before convening of the preparatory commission they conducted large explanatory work among the democrats. We openly explain our policy (foreign, land, internal and other). They like our frankness. This guarantees their support for us.

THE CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE RULE

Speaking of the character of the future rule, Mao Zedong said that this will be a people's democracy on the basis of a union between workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat.

The proletariat, Mao Zedong said, conducts its leadership through the communist party. We say that the people's democracy is based on the union between workers and peasants because 90% of the population of China is comprised of workers and peasants. This dictatorship is directed against imperialism and the bureaucratic capital, against the enemies of the Chinese people, and we explain this to our democrats, who are still afraid of the word dictatorship.

ON THE TREATIES WITH FOREIGN POWERS

Mao Zedong informed that in the conversations with the democratic leaders they explain what they mean by the renunciation of the treacherous treaties of Jiang Jieshi. They do not demand the cancellation of all of Jiang Jieshi's treaties, because among them there are such, which have patriotic character. The following, for example, belong to them:

1. Treaty on the cancellation of the extraterritorial rights of foreigners in China.
2. Cancellation of rights of the so called 8-power treaty.
3. The Sino-Soviet treaty on the Changchun Railroad and Port Arthur.

ON THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY

I asked Mao Zedong how he explains in the conversation the patriotic character of the Sino-Soviet treaties, to which Mao Zedong said, laughing, that it was not he, but Jiang Jieshi who signed this treaty. I explain to them, Mao Zedong said, that the Sov[iet] Union arrived in Port Arthur in order protect itself and China from Japanese fascism, for China is so weak that it cannot protect itself without help from the USSR. The USSR came to the Changchun Railroad and to Port Arthur not as an imperialist force, but as a socialist force for protection of common interests.

To my question as to why the communists speak out against the American naval base in Qingdao and defend the Soviet base in

Port Arthur, Mao Zedong replied that American imperialism sits in China for oppression, but the Sov[iet] Union, which has its forces in Port Arthur—for protection from Japanese fascism. When China becomes strong and will be in a position to defend itself independently from the Japanese danger, the Sov[iet] Union will not need its base in Port Arthur. With that, Mao Zedong said that one of the Chinese women, a member of the Legislative Yuan of the Guomindang, declared that if the communists are able to get Port Arthur back for China from the Russians, it will be a great deed. Mao Zedong said that this woman does not understand politics.

In conclusion Mao Zedong stressed that they openly speak about their pro-Soviet sentiments. He referred to the fact that on the day of celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution they stressed that China must stand in the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. We do not have a middle way, concluded Mao Zedong.

The conversation ended at this.

1. CC clique, a political faction within the Guomindang.



DOCUMENT No. 36

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 5 February 1949 (day)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 64-73. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 72-78. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

On 5 February 1949 another conversation with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De and the interpreter Shi Zhe. Comrades I[van] V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev were present from our side.

ON THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN CHINA

Mao Zedong said that China is the center of oppression on the part of foreign powers. Beginning from 1840 in the course of 100 years China was exploited by a series of foreign states in contrast to India, where England acts as the main oppressive country, and in contrast to Indochina, there France acts in the oppressor's role. During this period, Mao Zedong said, the Chinese people looked for a way out of the existing situation. The Taiping Rebellion [1851-1864], and later Sun Yat-sen aimed at freeing China from foreign oppression. However, the parties of that time did not stand the test before the face

of the people and only the communist party, in possession of Marxism-Leninism, is winning in our country.

ON THE CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA

Speaking of the Chinese intelligentsia, Mao Zedong stated that they translated into Russian and will pass to us through Comrade Orlov the decision of the CCP CC Politburo dated 8 January 1949. Mao Zedong said that this decision in essence amounts to the political program of the CCP for the near future. Local party organizations demand an answer for a whole series of pertinent questions and in this connection we are calling another plenum of the CCP CC.

I said that, evidently, this plenum will have a turning-point character in the sense that it must prepare the party for new tasks, stemming from the current political situation of China.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and said that the last plenum of the CCP CC took place in June 1945. More than 3 years had passed since that time. Now preparatory work is being conducted for calling the plenum. Gao Gang, Lin Biao, Chen Yi, Liu Bocheng and Bo Yibo were present at a special meeting of the Politburo devoted to the question of the plenum. The meeting took 4 days. Now the participants in the meeting left and only Liu Bachong [Liu Bocheng] remained here. He is 63 years old, at one time he worked with Sun Yatsen. He was in Moscow, studied in the C[ommunist] U[niversity of the] T[oilers of the] E[ast]. His role, Mao Zedong said, is somewhat similar to the role of the late Comrade Kalinin. Liu Bocheng is a member of the CCP CC Politburo. Member of the Politburo Dong Biwu, the current chairman of the government of Nor[thern] China, also took part in the meeting. Gao Gang is also a member of the CCP CC Politburo. In all they have 13 members of the CCP CC PB.

THE ROLE OF CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM IN THE PARTY

Touching upon questions of history of the communist party of China, Mao Zedong separated it into 4 periods:

1. The Northern Expedition.
2. The Agrarian revolution
3. The Sino-Japanese War
4. The Civil War

During these periods our party grew and developed. We, Mao Zedong said, in the course of all these periods paid particular attention to unveiling criticism and self-criticism in the ranks of the party, since we consider them to be the sharpest weapon of Marxism-Leninism. However, elements of nepotism and familiarity still exist in the party ranks, which is a legacy of the Guomindang ideology. In our army, officers sometimes beat the soldiers and in these cases we explain to these people, that

their behavior is not different from that of the Guomindang in any way. Our local cadres sometimes part from the masses, as the conduct of the agrarian reform confirmed. That is why we stand for all-sided unveiling of criticism and self-criticism in our ranks and for periodic scrutiny of party members along the lines of their ideological preparedness and their work style. At our party meetings we raise such questions, which would give an opportunity for the bottom to scrutinize the top.

I said that what Mao Zedong is talking about testifies to the presence of democratic centralism in the party, and this is its strength. Lively democratic centralism is the basis of Bolshevik scrutiny, and Comrade Stalin pointed this out time and again.

Mao Zedong said that the party obtained unity by the means of unveiling criticism and self-criticism inside the party.

I remarked that the party is under pressure from various petite bourgeois elements from without, and if criticism and self-criticism have been unveiled in the party at the appropriate level, the purity of its ranks is thereby guaranteed. If the party parts from the masses the danger arises of degradation of some of its ranks.

Mao Zedong said that he fully agrees with me and stated that in connection with the fact that in the recent time a series of large cities had been already captured by the People's Liberation Army, the reaction[aries] are becoming more active and try to pressure the party. He stressed that now the tasks of the party become more complicated since not only the countryside but also the city is coming within the sphere of its activity.

PARTY TASKS IN THE ARMY

Speaking of the tasks of the party in the army Mao Zedong said that in the course of the civil war we gradually democratize our military forces. Our lower commanding ranks are elected, but this is approved by the high command. Every company has a soldiers' committee, in which officers also take part. War requires prepared cadres. The Army is a good political school for the people and after the war we intend to use the army cadres in various branches of the people's economic and political work. In the main our army is a peasant one. Soldiers who received land during the agrarian reform provide a reliable foundation for our army. We also do not ignore the Guomindang soldiers, whom we try to influence politically as prisoners of war. At the meetings of the former Guomindang soldiers the fighters of the People's Liberation Army make presentations, telling about how they lived under the Guomindang regime, and how they live in our conditions. They make a special emphasis on the fact that the new democratic regime gave them land. This has a great impact on the former Guomindang soldiers. Along with that we publish various brochures, which provide comparative data on the situation in our and the Guomindang areas. We use every opportunity for stressing the

tyranny of the Guomindang. By these means we change the Guomindang soldiers to our tune.

Our democratic policy in the army, Mao Zedong further said, gives soldiers an opportunity to criticize the officers. For example, it happens that before beginning a battle operation a meeting of this or that low-level military unit is called, at which the plan of the forthcoming operation is discussed. At this meeting the commander sometimes offers a plan of retreat, and the soldiers, on the contrary, a plan of attack. Under the influence of critical remarks of the soldiers, the commander accepts the plan of attack.

Our army, Mao Zedong continued, enjoys great authority among the people. On 3 February 1949, when our forces entered Beijing [Beijing] almost all the city dwellers greeted our military units. Only one army, fully armed with American weapons, entered the city. On this occasion we took from this army all the Soviet arms and fully equipped it with the American arms so as to stress how Jiang Jieshi supplies us with American technology. The people also greeted the units of the People's Liberation Army advancing on Tianjin. This speaks to the fact that the population supports us and our army displays itself among the people from the better side.

THE LEVEL OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Then Mao Zedong turned to the question of the economic situation of China and stressed that the standard of living of the Chinese people is very low. He said that imperialism uses China as a raw resource base, and this reflects on the standard of living of the population.

I remarked that in China one observes economic contrasts, for example, [between] the big industrial center Shanghai and the backward village. At the beginning of the building of the Soviet state such contrasts could also be observed in the Soviet Union but after years of existence of Soviet power we substantially liquidated them.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and continued to characterize the economic situation of China. He said that the industry takes up 10% in the entire economy of China, with the exception of Manchuria, where it takes 53%.

Using a question raised by Mao Zedong I stressed that the basis for a modern state is the industry. With the developed industry it is easier to raise the standard of living of the population in the country. The agrarian reform liquidates the obstacles to the development of an agricultural economy, but does not yet resolve the question of technical and industrial development.

Mao Zedong agreed with this and said that in China the advance on the capital will take place more slowly than in the Sov[iet] Union.

I said that the process of the industrial development of China in the conditions of the existence of the Sov[iet] Union and the countries of people's democracy will take place considerably more easily in comparison with the industrial development of the Sov[iet] Union, which from the very beginning of its formation had to spend a huge portion of its means on defense from foreign interventionists.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and said that to a certain extent favorable conditions for the industrial development of China were created by the Guomindang itself. Mao Zedong said that the Japanese and the Guomindang-ists encouraged the concentration of capital in the state's hands. For example, in Manchuria industry takes up 53% of which 47% is in the hands of the state and 6% [belongs to] private capital. In general, Mao Zedong said, all main branches of the Chinese industry are in the state's hands.

ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN PROPERTY

I asked if there are any plans for the nationalization of industry, to which Mao Zedong replied that they do not have such plans.

Using a question raised I shed light on our attitude toward the problem of foreign property in China. I said that with regard to the questions of foreign property we are of the opinion that one should nationalize Japanese and French property, and as far as possible, English [property] as well. With regard to American property one must carry out a cautious policy, so as to create an impression among the Americans that their interests will be taken into account by the new government.

ON THE ROAD AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

I stressed that the Chinese Revolution is anti-imperialist by character, which must undermine the positions of the imperialists in the country. The destruction of the landlords and the Guomindang does not yet solve the question of the destruction of imperialists, since the former (i.e. the landlords and the Guomindang) are agents of foreign imperialism. Undermining foreign positions in the country, you thereby, I said, ease the situation of the national bourgeoisie, which of course will be glad about this.

Then I explained the point of view of our CC about the road and the character of the Chinese Revolution and about its differences from the Russian Revolution and the revolutions in the countries of people's democracy.

I said that the road of the Russian Revolution and of those of the countries of the people's democracy do not suit China, since the conditions of China are different from the conditions of Russia and Europe. I pointed out that two factors facilitated the victory of people's democracy in the European countries:

1. The national bourgeoisie of these countries compromised themselves by their contacts with the German occupiers and, when the Red Army came to these countries, the bourgeoisie ran away.
2. The very coming of the Red Army and its liberation of these countries from the German yoke eased the establishment of a democratic regime for the communists.

I said that these factors are lacking in China. The Russian and the Chinese Revolutions moved forward by their internal force. One should also take in account another difference between China and Russia: Russia was not oppressed by the imperialists and therefore its revolution did not have an anti-imperialist character. In China imperialist oppression took on the character of a long-term factor and therefore the revolution in this country has an anti-imperialist character.

Speaking of the future regime in China I said that it will not represent the dictatorship of the proletariat. The future regime of China is a people's democracy, but without the Soviets. Lenin in February 1917 raised the question of the proletarian and peasant dictatorship but this regime did not work out in the pure form. Events developed in such a way that in October 1917 the question was raised about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Perhaps, China will succeed in the pure idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants but without the Soviets. The future coalition government of China must represent the dictatorship of the working class and peasants under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the countries of the new democracies, I said, the regime carries out the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, though not in the pure form. These functions are directed toward the suppression of the bourgeoisie. You do not have this. Dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in a pure form suits you better. As I understood you, this is how you think about this.

Mao Zedong expressed full agreement with the opinion of our CC and said that it will be a great help in the final formulation of [their] own views on the character of the revolution and in determining the tasks of the Chinese Com[munist] Party and asked me to convey gratitude to our CC and Comrade Stalin for this help and any other help, provided to the Chi[nese] Com[munist] Party.

Further, Mao Zedong said that during the period of the Soviet movement in China the Chinese communists adopted the program of the workers' and peasants' dictatorship but at the same time mechanically transferred the attitude toward the national bourgeoisie in the European countries to the Chinese bourgeoisie. As a result of this, though the decisions of the 6th Congress of the CCP only talked about the confiscation of foreign capital, we carried out the policy of confiscation of all national capital.

At the present time, Mao Zedong said, we stand for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry under the leadership of the com[munist] party, and for the people's dictatorship because workers and peasants comprise 90% of the population of China. Such a regime guarantees democracy for the people and dictatorship with regard to the landlords, bureaucratic capital and the imperialists. We call our regime a new democracy, based on the union of workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat represented by its vanguard—the com[munist] party.

In the course of the last 10 years, continued Mao Zedong, we explained the character of the Chinese Revolution. In this explanation we pointed to the difference of the Chinese Revolution from the old bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution is declining and we still cannot obtain the most perfect progressive democracy, i.e. of the Soviet type, therefore we call our regime a new democracy, i.e. a people's democracy. Our revolution by character is a people's [revolution], it is directed against imperialism, feudalism and the bureaucratic capital. And all of this takes place under the leadership of the proletariat. "This is all there is", as Mao Zedong expressed himself, "to our political program."

We have many people, Mao Zedong said, who advised us not to say and stress that the Chinese Revolution is going forward under the leadership of the proletariat, so as not to scare away the intelligentsia. As of late we do not take this into account and stress the point about the leadership of the proletariat represented by the com[munist] party, which is the vanguard of the proletariat. This gives good results. And even the liberal democratic representatives, who had arrived in Mukden from the South, announced in their statement that they are prepared to work under the leadership of the com[munist] party.

Then Mao Zedong said that he wrote about the aforementioned character of the modern stage of the Chinese Revolution as early as 1940, but at that time this formulation was not developed and he wants to return to it in the near future. With this he stressed that when developing the question about the character of the Chinese Revolution he based himself on the pronouncements of Comrade Stalin, relating to 1917 and on his latest work, relating to the character of the Chinese Revolution.

Mao Zedong said that for him the most valuable were Comrade Stalin's instructions that the Chinese Revolution is a part of the world revolution, as well as criticism of nationalism of Simic in Yugoslavia. Mao Zedong several times stressed that he is a pupil of Comrade Stalin and holds a "pro-Soviet orientation."

ON INCREASING THE THEORETICAL LEVEL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CCP

Mao Zedong referred also to brochures written by him at different times, in particular—about military strategy, published

in [December] 1936, on the tasks of the party (1939), On New Democracy (1940), on the main direction of the Chinese Revolution (1945). Speaking of the last brochure, Mao Zedong said that he was very content to find in a letter from Comrade Stalin to Colonel Razin instructions to the effect that “retreat is a rational attack.” We immediately, said Mao Zedong, broadcasted this letter on the radio and went through it in the units. Further, Mao Zedong said that there was great significance for them in becoming familiar with the Soviet criticism of the mistaken philosophical views of [Abram] Deborin and [Nikolai] Bukharin for strengthening the ranks of the party.¹ This Soviet criticism raised Lenin and Stalin in the eyes of our party onto the level of the greatest theorists of Marxism-Leninism. Criticism of the philosophical views of Deborin helped us in the struggle with our idealists. In general, Mao Zedong said, we fall behind the requirements of party enlightenment because, when we took power into our hands, first and foremost we took up political and economic questions. However during the period of this war we conducted great work to raise the theoretical level of our ranks and thereby prepared for the 7th Congress of the CCP. I myself had a situation when, sitting in the apparatus of the CCP CC, I could not bring it under control. Each department of the CC had its own opinion. I warned our party and the CC about this situation, in particular in 1940, but did not achieve positive results. I understood that in order to unite the CC one should work in depth on this, which is what we did and thereby provided for the calling of the 7th Congress of the CCP. On the eve of the Congress we called a plenum of the CCP CC, at which a resolution on historical questions was adopted. In this resolution the political mistakes of the former in-party groups and currents (Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, etc.) were recounted in the most detailed manner. Because of these groups and currents we lost 9/10 of the former Soviet territory under our control, and the same number of the members of our party. Why did this happen? This happened because some leaders of our party had ideological wavering. Subsequently, with regard to these leaders we began to follow the policy of principled ideological struggle with them, but we manifested caution about organizational conclusions with regard to them. We did not expel from the party for erroneous statements and this facilitated the fact that we met the post-war time united. Now there are no arguments in the party, though during the period of the recent agrarian reforms and in the cities some mistakes were made. The CC immediately corrects these mistakes. That it why we believe that the point of departure for our unity is criticism and self-criticism.

The conversation ended at this.

1. Marxist philosopher Abram Deborin fell into disgrace in the 1930s on account of his philosophical “idealism.” Nikolai Bukharin lost power in 1929 and died in the Great Purge.



DOCUMENT No. 37

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 5 February 1949 (Evening)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 74-77. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 78-80. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

On the evening of 5 February 1949 another meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, and the interpreter Shi Zhe, c[omrade]s I[van]. V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev

ON THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PARTY

Mao Zedong continued the conversation begun earlier that day about the situation within the party. He stressed once again that during the period of in-party struggle with the leftists and rightist opportunists in the Soviet areas up to 9/10 of the territory and members of the com[munist] party were lost.

In the course of 1941-1945, the consciousness of the members of the party rose substantially and this prepared the ground for calling the united 7th Congress of the CCP in 1945. The political program, adopted by the Congress, is currently being implemented and on its basis the organizational, political and ideological unity of the CCP was reached. It is true, Mao Zedong said, one can still observe in the ranks of the party a lack of discipline and elements of anarchy, but these are merely rare instances, on the whole there are no competing opinions and groupings in the party. Thereby we prepared ourselves to come out onto the modern political arena as a unified party. Otherwise it would be difficult for us to work. The intelligentsia does not compete with us. The Guomindang is still competing with us but its weight ratio in politics is becoming smaller and smaller.

THE WORKERS' QUESTION

Using a pause I conveyed the content of the telegram from comrade Filippov on the workers' question. I said that one should not prohibit strikes, otherwise the CCP may lose the trust of workers. The significance of the working class in the revolution is determined not by its quantity, I said, but by the fact that it is a new class, the carrier of the most progressive ideas. The future belongs to the working class. Its significance in the society will grow unstopably.

The question that one should not prohibit strikes caused a noticeable bewilderment on the part of Mao Zedong and the present members of the CCP CC Politburo.

On the whole telegrams with recommendations on the work among workers, youth, women and on the preparation of the Chinese cadres, the content of which was conveyed by me to Mao Zedong and the Politburo members, made a good impression. When they were related, Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo uniformly nodded in agreement, and Mao Zedong said that the suggestions will be carried out.

THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE CCP'S TASKS

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting the military situation and the tasks of the CCP. He separated the military situation into two stages.

1. The Civil War at the present time
2. Defense measures after the Civil War.

Speaking of the civil war at the present time, Mao Zedong said that the most terrible time has been left behind, the period of large operations may be considered finished. Now purely military operations are gradually being replaced by the peace offensive on large Guomindang centers. As an example he cited the peaceful resolution of the advance on Beiping, where Fu Zuoyi's forces were under offer to surrender. He said that we will not conduct large operations near Nanjing, Hankou, Shanghai and Canton. However, Mao Zedong said, this does not mean that we are not conducting any preparations at all for further offensive operations. We are facing great difficulties on this road, mainly of the financial character. Military expenses unfavorably reflect on the prices and lead to inflation. One should take into account that we never had such a huge army and never conducted such large operations as now. Of course this leads to great expenses, which reflect on the economy of the liberated areas. Nevertheless, all efforts must be directed at destroying the enemy, and then taking up the economy. As a result of this policy our People's Liberation Army since October 1948 to January 1949 destroyed 1 million 300 thousand of the elite Guomindang forces. Formally we have not yet won because we only have a half of China, but in fact the war is winding down.

After the end of the Civil War the main task of the party will amount to economic construction. In order to finally destroy the enemy, one should grow strong economically. Therefore, already now one should make relevant amendments to our plans, cut back expenses, strengthen the financial situation. We must finish the war with the least possible sacrifices, but it does not mean that we must not act. Our army must continue its offensive, take cities and be prepared for various contingencies. But one should also not forget that simultaneously with the military activities one should now prepare the cadres of political and economic workers, explain our political undertakings, be prepared for the resolution of the workers' question, market relations, prepare ourselves for work in the countryside in the new conditions. We say that our army must not

only fight but prepare itself for peaceful work.

Continuing to recount the military undertakings, Mao Zedong said that in the nearest 2-3 months one should prepare oneself in such a way so as to confidently move to southern China and take its wide and economically valuable regions. 1-2 years will be required for us to be capable to fully possess China politically and economically. Military operations must go on from Beiping [Beijing] to Canton.

In the future the focus of our work will move into the cities. In the course of the last 20 years we had little experience of work among the city population. In the recent times, when our army began to take large cities, the city question rose before us to its full height. The Red Army played a large role in the fact that now we have big industrial cities. Thank the Red Army for it regaining for us Harbin and other cities of Manchuria. The Soviet Army not only helped us to regain cities but helped us in their reconstruction. Now we must develop Changchun, Benxihu, Anshan, Kalgan, Chifu, Beiping, Tianjin and other cities. In the nearest future the same task will emerge with regard to Xi'an, Shanghai and Hankou. Possibly, our forces this winter will capture Canton and Guilin.

ON RITTERBERG AND MA HAIDE

Making use of a pause I recounted the content of the telegram regarding [US interpreter Sidney] Rittenberg. The telegram made a great impression on Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo. [CCP CC Politburo Member] Ren Bishi who took part in the conversation stated that Rittenberg was recommended and left here by the journalist [Anna Louise] Strong. Mao Zedong informed [me] that since 1936 another American has been living with them by the name of Ma Haide [George Hatem], who had joined the Chinese Com[munist] Party. Ren Bishi added that Ma Haide was recommended and left here by the journalist [Edgar] Snow.

I remarked to Mao Zedong, wasn't it clear that this American as well is a resident of the American intelligence and he should be arrested[?]. The information on Rittenberg caused surprised exclamations—"Yes! Yes!"

In conclusion of the conversation Mao Zedong asked me to give information about the situation in the Sov[iet] Union and on the international situation. I satisfied his request. Information was heard with great attention on the part of Mao Zedong and the CCP CC Politburo members.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 38

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 6 February 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 78-88. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 81-87. Translated for CUIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

On 6 February 1949 another meeting took place with Mao Zedong and CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De in the presence of the interpreter Shi Zhe and our comrades—I[van], V. Kovalev and E.F Kovalev

ON OUTER MONGOLIA

I conveyed to Mao Zedong the content of the telegram on Outer Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet treaty.

I said that the leaders of Outer Mongolia stand for the unification of all Mongolian regions of China with Outer Mongolia, though the Soviet government speaks out against this plan, as it means cutting away from China a number of regions, though this plan does not threaten the interests of the USSR. Continuing, I said that we do not think that Outer Mongolia would go for renunciation of its independence in favor of autonomy as a part of the Chinese state.

Mao Zedong said that they respect the wish of Outer Mongolia to remain a sovereign state, and if it does not want to unite with Inner Mongolia, then one must take this into account, and we are not against this. We, of course, do not defend the Chinese great power policy, added Mao Zedong.

ON THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY

On the question of the Sino-Soviet treaty I said that we consider the Sino-Soviet treaty on Port Arthur an unequal treaty, concluded in order to prevent the Guomindang's collusion with Japan and the USA against the USSR and the liberation movement in China. This treaty, I said, gave a certain benefit for the liberation movement in China, but now, with the coming to power of the Chinese communists, the situation in the country cardinally changes. In connection with this, I continued, the Soviet government has made a decision to cancel this unequal treaty and withdraw its forces from Port Arthur as soon as the peace with Japan had been signed. But if the Chinese Com[munist] Party, I said, considers it expedient to have the forces withdrawn immediately, the USSR is prepared to do this. As far as the treaty on the Changchun Railroad, we do not consider it as unequal treaty, because this road was built, mainly, with Russia's funds. Perhaps, I said, the principle

of equal rights has not been fully observed in that treaty but we are prepared to discuss this question and solve it with the Chinese comrades in a fraternal way.

The appraisal of this treaty as unequal was so unexpected for Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo that it caused their frank astonishment. After this Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo almost in unison spoke to the effect that now one should not withdraw Soviet forces from Liaodong and liquidate the base at Port Arthur because we would only help the USA this way. Mao Zedong stated that we will keep the question about withdrawal of forces from Liaodong in secret and that the treaty can be reviewed only when the political reaction[aries] had been destroyed in China, the people will be mobilized to attack the foreign capital with the aid of confiscating it, then with the help of the Soviet Union "we will put ourselves in order." The Chinese people, Mao Zedong said, are grateful to the Sov[iet] Union for this Treaty. When we become strong, then "you will leave China" and we will conclude a Sino-Soviet mutual help treaty along the lines of the Soviet-Polish treaty.

Further, Mao Zedong said that in determining the ownership over the property of the Changchun Railroad one can observe small glitches, which can be resolved locally. For example, the Guomindang took a part of the enterprises of the Changchun Railroad into their hands, and with the arrival of the PLA they were once again passed to the Changchun Railroad. The people say that the Guomindang-ists took these enterprises in accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty, and the PLA, as if infringing the treaty, is returning them to Changchun Railroad. Mao Zedong expressed himself in favor of Gao Gang and Kovalev I[van], figuring out this question and reporting to the CCP and the VKP(b).

ON THE SITUATION OF THE NATIONAL MINORITIES IN CHINA

We recognize the Muslims, Mao Zedong said, as a nation. We never approved the Guomindang policy of oppressing the Chinese Muslims and therefore believe that we must provide them with autonomy in the framework of China. There are up to 30 million Muslims in China in total. They live mainly in the provinces of Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. Their language is Chinese but their writing is different. Their religious books are written in the Arabic language.

Some national minorities live in the province of Xikang where they suffer from slave-like exploitation on the part of the local feudal lords.

We intend to give the autonomy rights to the Thais living in Southwestern China.

In the provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan live the Miao national

minority, with which the Chinese authorities have tense relations. In 1934-1935, when our army passed through these provinces, the Miao supported us. We believe that the Miao have a right to be represented in the provincial governments.

The Yao tribes are spread across the Guangxi and Hunan provinces. They constantly pose resistance to the Chinese.

Among the more than 50 million of the population in the Sichuan province there are small national groups, from which one can create separate national counties. The Li tribes counting from 3 to 4 million people populate the Hainan Island. A part of them are in the stage of barbarism.

On Formosa Island, from the 6 million population several hundred thousand are from the local nations.

About 2 million Koreans live in Manchuria.

The Tibet question is very complicated. In essence, it is a British colony, and only formally counts as China's. Recently the Americans have been flirting with the Tibetans by various means.

Xinjiang has about 14 nationalities, counting about 3 million. Xinjiang has a great strategic significance and economically connects us to the USSR. In accordance with our plan we will be there in 1951.

Returning to the question of Tibet, Mao Zedong said that once we finish the Civil War and resolve internal political questions inside the country and when the Tibetans feel that we do not threaten them with aggression and treat them equally, then we will solve the subsequent fate of this region. With regard to Tibet we must be careful and patient, taking into account the complex regional mix there and the power of Lamaism.

In resolving the national question in China, Mao Zedong said, we learn from the Russian Bolsheviks.

THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CCP

Further, Mao Zedong turned to relating the question of economic policy of the CCP. He said that the industry takes up 10% in the economy of China. Industry means that there is national proletariat and national bourgeoisie. If we do not take this into account we may commit mistakes. The remaining 90% of the economy of China comes under individual peasant households, which are under imperialist and feudal oppression. That is why this peasantry is a reliable ally of the proletariat. In all of China it amounts to 360 million population, or 90 million households, of which 67% is taken by poor households. In the liberated regions the peasants obtained land, they are led by the working class. But if we do not develop our industry, do not give industrial goods to the peasants, then we will not provide

for the leadership of the working class over the peasantry. The experience of Russia teaches us that one must give the countryside not only the land, but also city goods. In this respect we have had changes in the last three months: we began to work in the cities and develop their industry. We have no doubts that the USSR will help us in developing the industry, and then we will be able to give help to our countryside.

Returning to the question of the weight ratio of industry in the economy of China, Mao Zedong said that the 10% includes state monopolies and private capital. The bureaucratic capital takes up the largest part of this 10%. Roads, mines, shipping companies, etc.—all are in the hands of the bureaucratic capital.

Private capital takes a small portion of the 10%. Our policy with regard to private industrial enterprises must not repeat former mistakes, so as not to scare away the national bourgeoisie, therefore now we will not carry out the confiscation of private industrial capital and its enterprises. We explain that in Russia there was a socialist revolution, and our revolution is new democratic. But even in Russia after the October revolution NEP [New Economic Policy] was introduced and only after 12 years liquidation of the kulaks was begun. We have a different situation, and we must treat our bourgeoisie with more caution. We are not afraid of the capitalists and do not adjust to them, and in this case only Sun Yatsen's mottos about the limitation of capital and equalized land use are employed.

What should be limited?

Loan shark banks, jewelry and silk-producing enterprises, as not manufacturing goods of wide consumption.

Ore mining enterprises should be given the opportunity to export their products, but under the condition that export will be in the hands of the state. Free competition is allowed on the market, but the state control over it is also not allowed to slip. For example, if the state has a lot of grain it will always be able to regulate the market in the interests of workers and peasants. This control may also limit the growth of capitalism.

In the cities and in the countryside one should encourage the development of cooperative production and not allow excessive exploitation of workers and laborers on the part of the private capital and land lords. At private enterprises capitalists may obtain legal profits, but at the same time one should protect the rights of workers. In contrast with the former times to allow the capitalists and workers to have their own organizations. For example, we organize prof[essional] unions on the scale of all of China.

Permitting that the capitalists have profits from their enterprises we at the same time must regulate the development of these enterprises in such a way that it benefits the state. One should

develop those branches of the industry, which strengthen the country.

Therefore, Mao Zedong said, with our economic policy our economy is different from the Soviet economy, but we are also against taking the capitalist economies of England and the USA as the example. We stand for the strengthening of the elements of state and cooperative economy. The state economy will be socialist in character but we are not shouting about this so as not to scare someone away. The state economy will be strengthened because the communists have the power and the army is in their hands. This is why the state economy will be leading in the economy of new China.

Cooperative economy by character is semi-socialist. It is created on the basis of unification of private interests. Now we cannot take the road of *kolkhozes*, though many would like them. Conditions have not been created for them yet.

THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER

Turning to the question of the structure of state power Mao Zedong said that we do not intend to use the parliamentary form. The CCP is leading in the entire country, it has its own military forces. The Guomindang has been destroyed, and the small parties have no influence in the country. Therefore the question of the structure of power comes up differently. It will be different from the Soviets. We are calling a congress of people's representatives on the basis of a union between workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. The government is elected at this congress. Governments of villages, regions, counties [and] provinces are elected at congresses, and the people's government of the Chinese Democratic Republic is elected at the All-China Congress of People's Representatives.

Departments will be created in the provincial governments. Ministries will be created in Manchuria, inasmuch as it unites 9 provinces. China will have 9 administrative regions or lines, that is:

1. The Northeastern, with the center in Mukden
2. North China—Beiping
3. Central China—Hankou
4. South—Canton
5. Southwestern—Kunming
6. Sichuan-Xikang—Chengdu
7. Northwestern—Xi'an
8. Xinjiang—Urumqi

The lines will not have ministries (with the exception of Manchuria).

We need such a structure, Mao Zedong said, in order to give the initiative to the localities and not concentrate everything in

the Central government. This system is also beneficial in that it raises the role of the communists at the localities in comparison with the democrats.

The North Chinese government has already been created and on its base will be prepared the central government with the capital—the city of Beiping [Beijing].

In the future government communists and leftist democrats will take probably 2/3 of all seats. Formally communists will not have that many seats, but in fact the majority of seats in the government will belong to them because a number of seats will be taken by covert communists. The rightist parties will also take part in the government, but in the minority.

ON THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT

The structure of the central government is similar to the government of the USSR. It is headed by a presidium with a Chairman, the premier has not been confirmed yet but probably, Mao Zedong said, it will be Zhou Enlai.

As to himself Mao Zedong said that he will leave to himself the chairmanship of the CCP CC and will join the government with the rights of a member of the presidium.

Sun Yatsen's widow Sun Qinglin is intended as the chairman of the presidium. She, Mao Zedong said, is fully subordinate to us, and has a huge authority among the people.

Ren Bishi who participated in the conversation said that, in his opinion, it is better for Mao Zedong to be the chairman of the presidium; he was supported by Zhou Enlai who stated that Sun Yatsen's widow still makes them uncomfortable, though she is close to the communists and never revealed secret information, which came to her from them, in particular that at one time she passed to the CCP money from the Comintern. Zhou Enlai said that if Mao Zedong does not take up the post of the chairman of the presidium, this will not be understood by the people. Then, he continued, strict surveillance has been established over Sun Yatsen's widow and there are concerns that the Guomindang-ists will take her away by force. In any case, Zhou Enlai said, if Sun Yatsen's widow becomes the chairman of the presidium, Mao Zedong should take the premier's post.

Continuing, Mao Zedong said that there are three more candidates for the post of the chairman of the presidium: Zhu De, Dong Biwu and Liu Bocheng. The question of the chairman should be solved taking into account the internal and the international situation.

THE NEW SITUATION AND THE QUESTION OF CADRES

Speaking of the fact that in the nearest future the CCP will con-

vene the political consultative council Mao Zedong stressed it will take place in conditions under which the Civil War has not ended yet, the offensive must not be slackened, and Jiang Jieshi still has 1 million forces. Now, the situation is different and though it has not become entirely clear, it already requires an appraisal. The novelty is that whereas up to the present time we have had the territory north of the Yangzi, the countryside was at the first place for us, and then the cities, and usually we resorted to the tactic of encirclement, now with the move beyond the Yangzi we will have to take large cities, the scale of the military operations widens considerably, and before us rise to full height the questions of the industry, i.e. the city economies of Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhu, Hankou, and other cities. In this connection the problem of the cadres is becoming more acute than ever. We are now preparing 53 thousand people. Our army is the source for the cadres. The demobilized will be directed to leadership work in the cities and villages. Kang Sheng has been entrusted with the work to prepare the cadres. If one took account of the fact that on the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance we have employed 900 thousand people and on the Xi'an line of advance 300 thousand people, this mass of battle-trying and politically prepared people will give us the supply of the necessary cadres.

ON THE SOVIET LOAN TO CHINA

Then Mao Zedong turned to the financial questions and asked whether they could receive a loan and paper for printing banknotes. He said that they have no more than 5 million American dollars worth of silver. In the course of 3 years they would like to obtain a loan in silver (for possible emission of hard currency), oil, raw materials, equipment etc. to the amount of 300 million American dollars. They would like to receive this amount by equal parts beginning in 1949.

Talking about the loan Mao Zedong said that the 300 million is our need, we do not know whether you can give us such an amount, less or more of it, but even if you do not give, we will not hold it against you. We are not asking for gratis aid, because this would be exploitation of the Soviet Union on the part of China. We are asking for a returnable loan with the payment of relevant interest, which China will be able to pay in the future. The latter is important for the Chinese workers who will know that the loan should be repaid to the Soviet Union.

Until now, continued Mao Zedong, we received arms free of charge. But we know that the labor of the Soviet workers goes into the production of the Soviet arms, which should be paid for.

We will not widen for now the list of the arms needed by us. We have enough arms for the current operations. At the same time one should say that we need 3000 vehicles and gasoline. We have put together requests for these and other needed machines and materials, but we do not know how much it

all will cost and whether their full cost fits into the loan. We are not also clear about the question as to how we should pay for this loan. If the question of the loan is resolved positively, we will send our delegation to Moscow for signing a relevant agreement. In connection with the loan we would like to send a group of our cadres to the USSR for getting to know the work of the Soviet banks.

As for the paper for printing banknotes, our need of it amounts to 10 thousand tons.

CCP CC PLAN FOR THE MONTHS OF FEBRUARY – MARCH 1949

Further, Mao Zedong turned to recounting the CCP plans for February-March 1949. During this period control will be taken administratively over Tianjin and Beiping, Fu Zuoyi's army will be reorganized, movement of the leading organs to Beiping [Beijing] will be carried out, a plenum of the CCP CC will be called (first half of March), the preparatory commission for the calling of the political consultative council will begin work and possible negotiations with the Guomindang will begin, though [they] know ahead of time that our conditions are absolutely unacceptable to it, especially the question of war criminals. The latter list also includes Japanese war criminals.

The plan also stipulates that in April the 900 thousand strong army on the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance will launch an offensive and take a number of cities near Nanjing. The capture of Nanjing is planned for April. It is possible that Lin Biao's forces will at the same time reach Hankou and capture it. At the same time Chen Yi's forces must capture Xi'an.

In March the women's congress will open, and in April—the congress of the new democratic union of the youth.

ON THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

As Mao Zedong said, the organization of the youth movement stipulates two stages: first, a congress of the union of the new democratic youth is called, then the All-China youth federation is created, which will be joined by youth organizations (student union, peasant union of the young people, etc.).

I raised a question that in the previous conversation they agreed with Cde. Filippov on the question of work among the youth, in particular, about the organization of a wide youth union like the union of the young patriots of China, and now from the plan recounted by them it transpires that such a union will not materialize, but there will be a federation of several youth unions—new democratic (like the Komsomol), Marxist, Christian, student and other youth unions.

With such organization it may turn out that the progressive

youth in the new democratic youth union will be isolated, and other unions will remain in the hands of the bourgeois parties and may become its reserves.

I asked whether they think about the membership of the youth in many unions. In reply to this, Mao Zedong, supported by Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, said that in the future they intend to liquidate the Christian federation of young people, and on the basis of the new democratic union of the youth to create a federation of a unified youth organization. The Student Union will be kept independent.

I told them that they, of course, know better how to go about the organization of the youth, but still [I] asked them to think it through well and discuss this question from all sides so as to correctly implement the advice of Comrade Stalin. Mao Zedong and his comrades agreed with that.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 39

Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13 April 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 15-21. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 116-120. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade Filippov

Reporting:

On 9 April a three hour conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong took place at which were present members of the CCP Politburo comrades Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi.

During the conversation Cde. Mao Zedong briefly shed light on the following questions:

1. Gave an appraisal of the work and the decisions of the second plenum of the CCP CC.
2. On the loan, given by the USSR
3. About the military situation in China and the prospects of war against the Guomindang forces
4. About the city of Shanghai and its specifics.
5. About the course of the peace talks with the

Guomindang representatives

6. About the second Plenum of CCP CC.

The Plenum, Cde. Mao Zedong said, took place at a high level of political ideology. The statements of the members of the CC were active and rich in content with the exception of Wang Ming, who spoke more than once, but at the insistence of the members of the CC who demanded from him recognition of all of his former mistakes; until the end, however, his statements were unclear and unsatisfactory.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong expressed his particular satisfaction that the VKP(b) CC approved the decisions of the Plenum. He stressed his desire to acquaint the leading Russian communists in the liberated areas of China with the decisions of the plenum.

On the loan.

We are grateful, Cde. Mao Zedong said, to the VKP(b) CC and first and foremost to comrade Filippov for this big support for the CCP. This loan is the collateral of the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the realization of friendship of the two great peoples.

Comrade Mao Zedong asked to help them to make a plan of rational usage of the loan, first and foremost for the restoration of crucial branches of the industry and of the railroad transport. At the same time he added that we very badly need the soonest arrival in China of the Soviet specialists.

Comrade Mao Zedong informed that the American government through third persons (Citibank) is offering a loan to the amount from 100 to 300 million dollars. We look at this offer, Comrade Mao Zedong said, as an attempt to drag us into a deal not for providing aid to the Chinese people, but for saving American capitalism from a crisis (in accordance with the Marshall Plan) and for putting the Chinese people under the yoke, in the same way as they were able to do this under the Jiang Jieshi regime.

On the military situation in China and the prospects of war against the Guomindang forces.

We, Comrade Mao Zedong said, consider the victory over the Guomindang forces to be decided [and] the war—finished.

We do not expect large military operations with the Guomindang forces. The Yangzi River will probably be crossed without big battles.

We make this conclusion on the basis that, first of all, the Guomindang forces defending the Yangzi and cities of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hankou are two and a half times smaller than

our forces located on the Northern bank of the Yangzi.

Secondly, there is no unity among the Guomintang. Some generals, like Bai Chongxi who has at his disposal 32 divisions, have already established contacts with us so as to agree about settling the question by peaceful means like it was in Beiping [Beijing] with general Fu Zuoyi.

Thirdly, the leaders of the Guomintang government and first and foremost Li Zongren and [GMD General] He Yingqin do not have confidence in the strength of the Guomintang forces for beating back our attack when crossing the Yangzi and therefore they established contacts with us expressing an intention to fly into Beiping [Beijing] so as to agree on the transfer of the Central government into our hands and the transfer to us of the cities of Nanjing and Shanghai.

Further, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that the delegates of the Guomintang government who had arrived for the peace negotiations, after sharp criticism of them on the part of the CCP CC both at the meetings, and in the press, changed their arrogant behavior, to which they held in the beginning.

At official consultations they behave themselves seemingly in the same way as before, but at closed meetings with us in separate groups they in essence agree to all conditions put forward by us, limiting themselves merely to reservations, in particular, that one does not name concrete persons for now in the war criminal list.

They agree that the People's Liberation Army must cross the Yangzi and take Nanjing and Shanghai but request that it does so after the end of the peace negotiations.

On the city of Shanghai and its specifics

Comrade Mao Zedong dwelled particularly on this question. He said that if the Guomintang forces pose resistance when [the PLA] crosses the Yangzi, we will cross it anyhow and take Nanjing and Shanghai.

However, to take these cities will be easier than to run them. Shanghai is a special city, stressed Comrade Mao Zedong—this is the center of economic and political interests of foreign capitalists, the center of the Guomintang and foreign counter-revolution, espionage and intelligence.

More than 8 million people live in Shanghai and its suburban areas. Big industry, electricity stations (200 thousand kilowatts), water supply, tramways, buses—all of this almost fully belongs to the American capitalists. And we, he said, are apprehensive that in case of complications the Americans will paralyze the life of the city.

This apprehension of ours is connected with our lack of expe-

rience with running such a big city, we do not have specialists, capable of handling the management and usage of the electrical station, water supply, large textile and other enterprises.

We are apprehensive of this, said Comrade Mao Zedong, and therefore until now we have not firmly decided whether to take Shanghai into our hands.

We request the VKP(b) CC, if this is possible, to help us with specialists specifically meant for the city of Shanghai, sending them by the time of our capture of the city.

We request also to help us with specialists for struggle against espionage and intelligence. If for some reasons specialists are not sent we will not be offended, knowing that such a decision may only be taken in the interests of the revolution.

In case of capture of Nanjing and Shanghai, secretary of the bureau of the CC of Central China comrade Yao Raoshi will be appointed as the secretary of the city committee of Shanghai (strong party worker, studied in Moscow for two years). I met with him and will report on the conversation separately.

The [post of the] mayor of Shanghai is intended for general Chen Yi, the mayor of Nanjing—general Liu Bocheng.

Comrade Mao Zedong is concerned as to how to supply Shanghai with food and raw materials, for they will not be able to provide for delivery by railroad transport alone, and they do not have a Navy, and asked to report this to you.

On the course of peace negotiations with the Guomintang government.

Summing up the course of the peace negotiations, from which stems the possibility of the transfer by the Guomintang-ists to the CCP of the central power and all that, which is stipulated by the treaty relations between China and other countries (including communists' acceptance of diplomatic representative offices, embassies, consulates), as well as in connection with the special situation in Shanghai, Comrade Mao Zedong drew the conclusion that the CCP CC considers it possible to change the previously accepted point of view on the relations with the capitalist countries.

Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into *de facto* relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.

These relations of ours with the capitalist countries must be such that at any time we could change our point of view in the interests of the revolution.

This is still not the final decision but we are leaning toward a similar course of policy of our party in the sphere of diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries.

[I] consider it necessary to report to you some of my remarks on the related questions:

I. The Chinese comrades, both in the sphere of military operations, and in the sphere of peace negotiations, are too optimistically inclined. This concerns not only the Politburo but also other leading comrades, in particular the secretary of the bureau of the CC for Central China Cde. Yao Raoshi holds this position. He also stated that the Yangzi will be crossed without particular difficulties. Generals Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi have the same point of view.

In connection with the set conviction among the leading communists with regard to the success of the peace negotiations, the crossing of the Yangzi and the capture of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hankou without a battle, by the Beiping [Beijing] scenario, [I am] drawing your attention to some facts of the behavior of the Guomindang government and the command:

1. The Guomindang-ists are conducting intensive work to create defenses along the entire southern bank of the Yangzi, and to a great depth. Big and small steel-concrete defenses with appropriate garrisons are being constructed. Mobilization into the army and mandatory requisition of goods are being carried out.
2. All the mouths of the rivers that flow into the Yangzi from the North are blocked so as not to allow entry into the Yangzi of even the smallest boats, which could be used when crossing for getting over [to the other side.]
3. To the depth of 150 kilometers along the front intelligence, fighting and bombardment aviation of the Guomindang-ists is conducting vigorous activities, shoots and bomb the PLA forces and military objects, particularly going after means of crossing [the river], boats, and so on.
4. On the order of general Bai Chongxi (striving to establish contacts with the CCP allegedly for deciding the question by peaceful means) railroad bridges and tunnels are being destroyed.

In particular, a big bridge near Wushenchuan across the Huanghe River at the Beiping-Hankou stretch was destroyed. From the 14 sections of the bridge

with a total length of about 500 meters, 12 sections were destroyed. Also the bridge over a river near Xinan station was demolished, where all 9 sections were destroyed.

On 2 April during the period of the peace negotiations, which had already commenced in Beiping, a tunnel near Shengguang station was destroyed, inside of which two trains loaded with stones were sent toward each other. Colliding, they obstructed the tunnel, and the entry and exit to it were exploded.

In connection with the destruction of the bridges and the tunnel, carried out on the order of general Bai Chongxi, I asked comrade Zhu De how he appraises the behavior of Bai Chongxi.

Comrade Zhu De replied to this that this is one of the most reactionary and cunning Guomindang generals, there are two like these in China, said Cde. Zhu De, these are Fu Zuoyi and Bai Chongxi.

- II. Representatives of the Guomindang (according to Cde. Zhou Enlai's claim) at the official consultations on peace negotiations are afraid to express their real views, relating merely the directives assigned to them. In the press [they] make claims to the effect that [they] will not yield to the communists. However some groupings from the peace delegations at the meetings with the communists, which they secretly from each other insistently attempt [to arrange], behave themselves differently, in essence fully agreeing with the conditions put forward by the CCP.

The behavior of Li Zongren, He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi also testify that they, on the one hand, are afraid of Jiang Jieshi and the Americans and therefore officially carry out a policy of strong hand, but on the other hand secretly from each other flirt with the communists, trying to reserve with them special privileges for themselves in case of the Guomindang-ists' defeat.

- III. The American imperialists' attempts to establish contacts with the CCP are manifested not only in the proposal on the loan made by them through Citibank.

Thus, for example, on 9 April a telegram was received from Hong Kong, from 10 American trade cartels (allegedly on [former Vice President Henry?] Wallace's recommendation) with the request to receive representatives of the South Mills for trade talks. The CCP CC did not give a reply to this telegram.

Today and in the subsequent days [acting] on Mao Zedong's proposal for more in-depth investigation of the questions related by him in the conversation, I will have meetings with comrades Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, the secretary of underground city committee of the party of Shanghai Cde. Liu Xiao.

I will report separately on the content of each conversation.



DOCUMENT No. 40

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao [via Kovalev], 19 April 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 24-25. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 120-121. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Kovalev

When meeting Mao Zedong, tell him the following:

First. We consider that the democratic government of China should not refuse establishing official relations with some capitalist states, including the USA, if these states officially renounce military, economic and political support of Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang government.

This condition is absolutely necessary for the following motives. At the present time, the policy of the USA is directed toward breaking China up into southern, central, and northern China with three governments. At the same time, the USA is supporting the south-Chinese and central-Chinese governments of the Guomindang and, as one can see, do not mind supporting also the northern Chinese democratic government so that these governments fight among themselves and weaken China [as a whole], and the USA could extract benefit from that. Therefore, if you want a united China headed by the communists, one needs to restore diplomatic relations only with those capitalist governments which officially renounce support of the Canton and Nanjing groups of the Guomindang.

Second. We consider that one should not refuse a foreign loan and trade with capitalist countries under certain conditions. The issue is for the conditions of this loan and trade not to place such economic or financial responsibilities on China, which could be used to limit the national sovereignty of the democratic Chinese state and strangle Chinese national industry.

Third. As far as the loan on the part of the USSR to China is concerned, we must inform you of the following. We are conducting and will conduct trade with China on the principle of goods for goods. For this one does not need the permission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As for the loan, the government is not able to solve this question by itself, as the question of the loan is subject to the permission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. And the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not objecting to a loan to China, must nevertheless have a relevant document on an agreement about the loan, signed by the representative of China and the USSR. Without such a document the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet does not have a right to give agreement to a loan. If you are not able to send a delegation to Moscow to conclude the agreement on a loan, we could empower c[omrade] Kovalev to begin talks with the representatives of the CC CP China and develop a draft agreement, which in case of approval will be signed by the representatives of both sides. After this we will consider that the loan has been granted to you and you will receive both the equipment and the Russian specialists.

Filippov



DOCUMENT No. 41

Cable, Stalin to Kovalev, 26 April 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 3331 [sic, probably 331], L. 3. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 126. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Mukden

To Kovalev

To No. 43

Tell Chen Yun that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let's say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists. The Chinese communists must decide for themselves which goods to buy and which to sell.



DOCUMENT No. 42

Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, 17 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 50-55. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 128-132. Translated for CWHIP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

On 12 May a meeting with Mao Zedong took place and later that day with members of the Politburo in Mao Zedong's presence. Present at the meeting were comrades Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and member of the CC Wang Jiaxiang.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong briefly recounted the course of the military operations. He said that General Chen Yi's army group alone took more than 100 thousand Guomintang forces as prisoners, having lost merely 6 thousand soldiers of the PLA, adding that: "the main body of our forces is moving unstopably to south [China] for annihilation of the active forces of the adversary, and then a part of them will turn in the direction of Shanghai for liquidating a Guomintang grouping, which has already been encircled by us. Forces of the PLA will come out to the mouth of the Yangzi River with the aim of cutting access to Shanghai from the sea side. After encirclement, the forces will adopt a waiting position." They do not intend to take Shanghai now for a month while the adversary is posing even slight resistance, though [they] already now could destroy the weak garrison protecting Shanghai without much effort.

[We] are not taking Shanghai, he said, consciously, so as to stir among the inhabitants of Shanghai the hatred toward the Guomintang forces and the Guomintang government, and at the same time prepare ourselves better for running the city.

Relative ease of our victories, he remarked, suggests that our estimates, expressed in the month of February to the effect that the main big battles against the Guomintang forces are already over, and that in the prospect one has only particular, small scale operations, have been justified.

The military situation materialized in such a way that the army of Cde. Lin Biao is crossing the Yangzi River 15-20 days earlier than planned. Before it was considered necessary to carry out the crossing of the Yangzi River by Lin Biao's forces only after their full concentration at the points of crossing. Now, when the adversary is retreating, and at the crossing points his forces are not substantial, the crossing of the river will be carried out by parts as Lin Biao's forces arrive to the crossing points. Before it was not planned to take the Southern provinces this year, now with the current situation they will be taken in the nearest three months.

The only province which is causing difficulties in terms of taking it is Xinjiang, but this is not because any resistance is expected there on the part of the forces of the adversary, but only because this province is far from the deployment of the PLA forces, and covering large distances across the sands poses big difficulties.

He said that we are close to completing the victory in the open military struggle with a very strong and cunning Guomintang reactionary Jiang Jieshi regime, which was actively supported and is still supported by the American imperialists. We owe these victories of ours to the international revolutionary movement, and first and foremost to the Soviet Union. If there were no Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, created by the great leaders Lenin and Stalin, if there were no Soviet Union, if there were no victory over the reaction in 1917-1921, if there were no defeat of the most terrible reaction represented by the German fascists and the Japanese militarists during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, there would be no Chinese Communist Party and victory of the Chinese Revolution.

We, and all fraternal communist parties owe to our elder brother—the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, owe to its creators: great leaders—Lenin and Stalin; the high authority of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks—is a sign of the power of the revolution, without this authority it would be impossible to lead, unite the revolutionary movement of all countries against the imperialists of all countries. Without this authority the forces of the revolution would lose, and the imperialists would win in the strengthening of the forces of reaction.

If one were to depict imperialism as a lion, then in the current situation the body and the head of the lion are bound by the strong vises of the revolutionary forces, by the Soviet Union. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe and the European Communist Parties help bind the head of this lion.

We, the Chinese communists, pinched "the lion's tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion."

Further, Cde. Mao Zedong turned to economic questions. He said that recently [he] spoke with the democrats who declared that "you, communists, have a political and military center—this is your strength, but you do not have an economic center—this is your weakness."

"We understand this weakness of ours, said Cde. Mao Zedong—we feel it. Not only we, the leaders, do not have the experience of running the economy, but our whole party.

We are like a girl who, when marrying, knowing that she will have to bear children, but not knowing how it will be, she still knows that it will be inevitable and so [she] marries.

We are like that, we know the general direction, how the economy of our country should develop, and we are going for it, but how it takes place, we cannot say this, because we do not know. We must create an economic center as soon as possible.

This leading economic center should have, from the CCP CC—secretary of the CC Liu Shaoqi, from the future democratic government—member of the managing board of the CCP, Cde. Chen Yun and you, as a representative of the Soviet government.”

“Through you, he says, I will interfere in the management of the economy and push [it].”

It is suggested to complete the work to develop the structure of the economic center in the course of a month, in order that no later than 2 June the delegation could depart for Moscow.

Comrade Mao Zedong further gave a characteristic to the comrades: Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Bai Po, who will be the deputy of Cde. Chen Yun.

He said that “the secretary of the CCP CC Comrade Liu Shaoqi came out from the bottom, from the workers; in the course of 15 years he worked with the working class, [he is] theoretically prepared person. In the course of his entire work in the party [he] did not commit serious mistakes. Very thoughtful, careful, likes to look into details, into small things. Has a great authority. Was one of the first to visit the Soviet Union.

Com[rade] Chen Yun was formerly a manager for a big bookseller. Therefore he has an opportunity to study, received an education, cultured, thoughtful, capable, including economic questions, very careful in his actions, has authority.

Com[rade] Bai Po—secretary of the CC bureau of Northern China, honest, capable person but with little experience. [“]

Further Cde. Mao Zedong turned to characterization of comrades Wang Ming, Li Lisan and other comrades.

Turning to me he said:

“You will necessarily encounter professional union figures, including Li Lisan. With regard to Li Lisan, we received an explanation from Moscow, that if he maintains honesty at work and does not commit political mistakes, he could be left at leadership work. We know that Li Lisan in the past committed big political mistakes. He committed the first mistake in 1930, when [he] came to the leadership of the CC without elections, [and] took a Trotskyist position on the questions of the Chinese Revolution. After this big mistake of his, he was removed from [his] post and sent to the Soviet Union. He stayed in the Soviet Union until 1946, i.e. 16 years. There he was arrested for Trotskyism, but was freed from confinement

with a resolution that he does not have counterrevolutionary activities [on his hands]. After the arrival of Li Lisan to China, we studied him carefully. Li Lisan behaves himself honestly. [He] takes active part in work. His attitude toward the Soviet Union and toward the Soviet comrades is a good one. We suppose that he is an honest communist and may remain in the role of a deputy head of the professional unions. Com[rade] Chen Yun was elected by us to be the chairman of the professional unions, and the political leader of the professional unions is the secretary of the CC Cde. Liu Shaoqi. If we uncover the slightest mistakes on the part of Li Lisan, then comrades Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun will immediately interfere and correct him.”

Com[rade] Mao Zedong requested that, as questions arise on the part of Li Lisan, or on my part to Li Lisan, to meet with him. [I] consider it necessary to report to you that Li Lisan is from the same place as Mao Zedong [*zemliak Mao Tzeduna*], they know each other from childhood, and therefore according to the traditions of common-place-origin [*zemliachestva*] and friendship, which are particularly strong in China, Cde. Mao Zedong consistently and insistently supports Li Lisan. Com[rade] Mao Zedong particularly touched on the role and behavior of Wang Ming. He said that “there were three deviations in the Chinese Revolution: the first, committed by Chen Duxiu, the second—is Strakhov (Li Lisan), the third—Wang Ming. During the first period, the period of the rightist deviation, as a result of Chen Duxiu’s actions, the party decreased from 50,000 to 10,000, the revolutionary forces suffered a great loss. The defeat of the Chen Duxiu group raised the authority of the party and it grew to 400,000 people, and the army—from 10,000 people to 300,000 people. The leftist activity of Wang Ming resulted in the ranks of the party shrinking from 400,000 people to 40,000 people, and the army—from 300,000 to 30,000, and from the 10 Soviet regions only one remained. The underground communist organization was completely ruined in the Guomindang regions, [and] since Wang Ming covered his actions by the Comintern’s name, claiming that “whoever is against me, [he] is against the Comintern,” therefore many communists, including Bo Gu, Luo Fu, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, supported him. His most active supporters were Bo Gu and Luo Fu.

Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang and Luo Fu honestly committed and honestly recognized their mistakes and now correct them in practice. Behavior of Wang Ming, however, in the course of the last 3-4 years, testifies to the fact that he has not learned much, has not understood much in the events, which are taking place. As a doctrine-man he probably continued to believe in his rightness, and his semi-recognition of his mistakes is a forced maneuver. Therefore at the second plenum of the CC, which took place in March 1949, members of the plenum demanded more than once from Wang Ming that he talk about his mistakes in a more consistent and frank fashion.

In his many statements, Wang Ming did not reveal his mis-

takes. Already after the plenum Wang Ming was offered [the opportunity] to express an appraisal of his incorrect activity in writing. He gave a promise to do this, and probably, after recovery, will write it.

Comrade Mao Zedong turned to me with a request, after Wang Ming sends his written statement, to study it and then to talk with Wang Ming.

1. In case Li Lisan or Wang Ming turned to me, may I meet with them.
2. In the course of 5 days from 12 until 17 May comrades Chen Yun, Wang Jiaxiang and I consulted with regard to the future administrative economic center. Not one of the Chinese comrades expressed concrete propositions, having turned [to me] with a request to give the structure of the future administrative center on the basis of the exchange of opinion.

[I] developed an approximate structure. Today, on 17 May it was discussed for 6 hours at the Politburo in the presence of comrades Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Chen Yun, Wang Jiaxiang, and Bai Po.

No substantial amendments were introduced. Decision was made to work on it for several more days. Comrades Mao Zedong expressed a wish to consult with Moscow with regard to the creation of the economic center.

The structure of the economic center is transmitted next. Request your instructions for advising the Chinese comrades.

Kovalev.



DOCUMENT No. 43

Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May CCP CC Politburo Discussion, 23 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 66-69. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 132-134. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

Reporting: on 22 May the Politburo in the presence of Cde. Mao Zedong continued the discussion of the future economic center. My proposals were accepted:

1. For now to limit oneself to looking at the structure of

the central apparatus of the economic center, and to look separately at the structures of departments-ministries, proposing to the persons heading the departments, to develop the structure of departments and introduce it to the CC for discussion and approval.

2. The structure of the economic center and the departments may be considered a draft so as to have an opportunity to consult leading workers of the departments and democratic figures and only after this finally to approve it. After looking at the structure Cde. Mao Zedong briefly informed me about two questions:

1. On the course of military actions and
2. On the meeting and conversation of a representative of the CCP with American Ambassador [John Leighton] Stuart, which took place in Nanjing in the beginning of May.

1. About military actions Cde. Mao Zedong said that they are developing successfully, that no serious resistance is posed to the PLA forces. In connection with the successful military actions vice-president Li Zongren and General Bai Chongxi renewed attempts to begin negotiations with us about ending military actions and solving the questions of the spheres of influence by peaceful means. We, Cde. Mao Zedong said, will maintain radio contact with these persons in order to create an illusion on Bai Chongxi's party that it is possible to solve the question by peaceful means and so that he does not move his forces to the South and further, as he intended, to Indochina. In the case if we succeed at this, we will encircle and destroy his forces.

We do not intend to conduct any negotiations about the peaceful solution of the question with them (Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi). If he goes to Indochina we will have an excuse to invade Indochina and to destroy there both him and other reactionary forces. With this Mao Zedong said that two armies of Lin Biao, acting against the forces of Bai Chongxi, successfully crossed the Yangzi River and are quickly moving to the South, that by 15 June another six armies will have crossed the Yangzi. These main forces of Lin Biao will pursue the forces of Bai Chongxi until their complete annihilation.

Further he informed that Shanghai is encircled by the PLA forces, and, on 27 May, a storm of the city will be undertaken. As one can see, Shanghai will not be surrendered without a fight, as it was supposed earlier, 22 divisions of forces are concentrated here,

with the total number of 150 thousand soldiers and besides the entire Navy and aviation. Big defenses have been created, a lot of artillery and mine throwers are concentrated [there]. Jiang Jieshi personally commands the defense of Shanghai, [he] is on a ship, consulting with American advisers.

The English upgraded their military fleet by Shanghai with warships from Singapore. Two English warships have already taken part together with the Guomintang fleet in the military actions against the PLA forces. The artillery fire of three Guomintang and two English ships broke through the positions of two companies of the PLA forces, which suffered great losses. In this connection, Cde. Mao Zedong said, we issued an order to shoot without warning in the zone of military actions and along the entire Yangzi River, at any foreign ships, including non-military, which sailed along the Yangzi without our permission.

2. About a meeting and conversation, which took place in Nanjing at the beginning of May between CCP representative Huang Hua with the American Ambassador Stuart.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong said that an exchange of opinions took place on three questions:

On the support by the American government of the Jiang Jieshi regime—the Guomintang-ists;

On the withdrawal of American forces from China;

On the creation of a coalition government.

Stuart, Mao Zedong said, expressed his opinion that they—the Americans—have now stopped supporting the Guomintang regime, and testifying to this is the fact that the American embassy he headed remained in Nanjing; their example was followed by the English, French and other embassies.

About the American forces in China he said that as soon as the regiments of the People's Liberation Army enter the cities (Qingdao, Shanghai), the Americans will evacuate their forces and the Navy.

Stuart asked to take into account the circumstance that there was 200 million dollars worth of American property in Shanghai, and that to protect it the American government maintains warships and some force units of the forces in Shanghai.

Stuart expressed the desire for the future coalition government to represent all the democratic elements of the country as widely as possible.

After the formation of the coalition government, which must be supported by the entire people, said Stuart, this government will be recognized and diplomatic relations will be established with it.

Stuart informed that he intended to go to America in July and that his departure is related to the situation in China.

With regard to the conversation with Stuart, Mao Zedong said that the statements of Stuart contradict the actions of [American General Douglas] MacArthur, who recently landed two companies of American soldiers in Qingdao, and is also strengthening the Navy in Shanghai. Either Stuart is lying or the military (MacArthur) does not care about what the State Department says about anything.

Stuart also lied, said Cde. Mao Zedong, [by saying] that the Americans have allegedly stopped supporting the Guomintang regime. We know of the opposite, that this support continues actively.

As for Stuart's reference to the fact that the American and other embassies remained in Nanjing, this is once again not in our interests. We would be happy if all the embassies of the capitalist countries get out of China.

Kovalev.



DOCUMENT No. 44

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Kovalev], 26 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 73-75. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 136-138. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Convey to Cde. Mao Zedong the following:

First. [We] consider correct the idea of creating the administrative economic center. We have some observations on the draft of the structure of the administrative economic center, chosen by the CCP CC Commission:

- a) The draft copies the Soviet construction of the administrative-planning center, and, besides, it is too bulky. This is not suitable for China now. It should be simplified and downsized.
- b) The customs business and the protection of boundaries by the border forces has a great significance

for China. Customs can give China large currency income. Therefore this business should be singled out into a separate department;

- c) Private Chinese enterprises should not be placed on one plank with foreign industrial and financial enterprises; they should be assigned to two separate departments. We suppose, however, that the CCP CC knows better which organizational forms for the administrative economic center of China are more suitable to the Chinese conditions.

Second. The administrative economic center of China must be composed, understandably, of only Chinese figures. Therefore Cde. Kovalev must not have the membership of this center. It would be better if Cde. Kovalev were in a position of an adviser with the CCP CC, and if needed, at the same time adviser with the economic center.

Third. We have still not received the list of those Soviet specialists, which the CCP CC needs for helping in the organization of the economic center and economic life of Shanghai. We request the CCP CC together with Cde. Kovalev to make such a list and transmit it to us, so that we could take practical measures with regard to sending Soviet specialists to China. We consider that these Soviet specialists must have the positions of experts with those Chinese figures, which will be appointed to the relevant posts.

Fourth. We do not consider the current moment suitable for broad demonstration of friendship between the USSR and Democratic China. This demonstration could be timed to the formation of the Chinese democratic government and establishment of diplomatic relations between it and the USSR.

Fifth. We do not have objections against sending to the USSR, as well as to the countries of people's democracy, of a delegation of Chinese democratic figures. One could include into this delegation also Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi and Fu Zuoyi, if the CCP CC considers this expedient.

Sixth. We advise not to delay any longer the formation of the Chinese democratic government. Now there is no government in China. The CCP CC cannot be called a government. The Guomindang government has *de facto* ceased to be a government. China is left without a government. This is dangerous from the perspective of internal politics. [It is] also dangerous from the point of view of the international position of China. One cannot delay any longer the formation of a government.

Seventh. The successes of the PLA are brilliant, and we are very glad about these successes. We think, however, that one cannot consider the military campaign finished. Anglo-Franco-Americans cannot help but understand that the approach of the PLA to the borders of Indochina, Burma [and] India will cre-

ate a revolutionary situation in these countries, as well as in Indonesia and on the Philippine Islands. This is fraught with the danger of the loss of these countries for the imperialists. Therefore the imperialists will take all measures from blockade to military clashes with the PLA in order to keep South China under their influence. There is danger that the Anglo-Americans might land in Qingdao their forces in the rear of the main forces of the PLA, which had left for the South. This is a very serious danger. It is possible that the Anglo-Americans will use other ports, for example, the port of Tanggu near Tianjin for landing in the PLA's rear. We therefore advise:

- a) Not to hurry and seriously prepare the PLA's approach to the south for coming out to the borders of Indochina, Burma [and] India;
- b) To assign two good armies from the main forces of the PLA heading south, move them into the Tianjin and Qingdao region, replenish them and keep ready for preempting the landing of enemy forces;
- c) Not to cut back yet the number of PLA forces.

Eighth. We agree with the observations by Cde. Mao Zedong, which he made with regard to the questions of Korea, and also to the effect that one should not create an Eastern Cominform for now.

Ninth. We agree also with the observations of Cde. Mao Zedong, which he made with regard to American ambassador Stuart.

Tenth. The VKP(b) CC thanks Comrade Mao Zedong for the information.



DOCUMENT No. 45

Cable, Mao Zedong [via Kovalev] to Stalin, 14 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 101-111. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 141-146. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Reporting: on 12 June Cde. Mao Zedong gave me his report for transmitting to you. The text of the report follows:

- 1. I received your telegram dated 26 May through Cde. Kovalev.

Besides those points, which I conveyed to you through comrade Kovalev, I will write to you the

present report. From the time of the previous report, which I wrote to you on 19 and 21 March of this year, already two and a half months have passed. Now there are a number of questions, about which I must report to you and request your instructions.

2. Question on the creation of a government.

Now we decided to form a government in the months of August-September of this year. All the preparatory work must be completed before the middle of the month of August. In the middle or in the second half of the month of August one can call the political consultative meeting and form the government.

The preparatory work amounts to the following:

- a) At the all-China level there are 44 various parties, public organizations, groups and non-party figures. 500 delegates and personal invitees will be selected from these organizations [to take part] in the political consultative meeting.
- b) Development of the organizational position and rights of the consultative committee.
- c) Development of a draft of the general political program of the consultative meeting and its discussion.
- d) Development of the structure, of the organizational basis and the composition of the government with a preliminary exchange of opinions.

In view of the fact that a number of provinces in the area to the south of the Yangzi River will be quickly integrated into our territories, the number of the delegates, and of the organizations that send them to the political consultative meeting, will be greater than we previously supposed. Therefore, the consultative meeting will represent more than a half of the territory and the population of China.

In connection with the fact that the war is nearing its end, the general political program, developed earlier with the gravitation center of gaining victory in the war, must be reviewed and composed on the basis of restoring and developing the economy of China.

The organizational structure and the composition of the government must also be developed for solving this task. All of this preparatory work with a great exertion of effort can be implemented by the middle of August. Therefore the consultative meeting may be called in the middle or in the second half of September. Both from the point of view of internal and of external policy, this is a suitable time.

All circles hope that this meeting will go well and give positive results. Representatives of all circles place great hopes on this meeting. The opinion of some democratic figures, who believed that the meeting must be called after the taking of Canton and Chongqing, is no longer supported by them.

3. Judging by the internal and external situation, there is a possibility and the necessity for our army to take the [following] cities in winter of this year: Canton, Nanning, Kunming, Guiyang, Chongqing, Chengdu, Qinghai, Ningxia[.] [W]ith the aim of preventing a possible economic blockade and military intervention on the part of the imperialist powers, one should take the following measures:

- a) As quickly as possible to wipe out from the face of the earth the lackeys of imperialism—the remnants of the Guomindang. This is the main thing. If the Chinese mainland does not have lackeys of imperialism, then it will be difficult or almost impossible for the imperialists to carry out economic blockade and intervention.
- b) To create the defense of the coastal line.
- c) To prepare for economic self-sufficiency, so as not to be dependent on a possible economic blockade.

4. The development of events is occurring faster than we previously supposed. Difficulties, arising in the connection with the fact that units of our forces do not rely on the supply from the rear but are supplied from the local resources (human replenishment, ammunition, foodstuff, clothing and so on), which the PLA encountered in the Guomindang areas are also less than we previously estimated.

The resistance force of the Guomindang has lessened considerably; with the exception of a part of the Guomindang forces numbering more than 200 thousand people, who still have some battle capacity, the rest of the forces no longer have this battle capacity. The breaking up and the falling apart of the Guomindang forces is the characteristic trait.

In the course of military operations over 50 days, from 21 April until the present time, our army, at the price of 60 thousand killed and wounded destroyed 580 thousand Guomindang forces.

As a result of three years of the liberation war, our army killed in all 5 million 590 thousand people. The Guomindang army in general, including regular and

irregular units, apparatus of the rear service, military schools and others, now count no more than one and a half million people. These are insignificant remnants of the Guomindang forces. It will not take too much time to destroy them.

The discipline of the PLA, with the exception of some units, is on the whole very high. Our forces displayed people's heroism in a revolutionary upsurge, received the support of all levels of the population and were solemnly greeted by the people in the liberated areas, the battle capacity of our army has reached an unheard of level, the three months political and military preparation, which the PLA forces underwent in the spring of this year, gave positive results. The entire army with all seriousness and decisiveness, in complete order, moved forward and accomplished a great military march unheard of in Chinese history.

Workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national bourgeoisie (with the exception of some rightist elements, which are wavering) unanimously support our party, our army in the struggle against the Guomindang.

In places reached by our army, the majority of the Guomindang-ists move away from the reactionaries, remain at the places, protect the apparatus of the government, institutions, enterprises and cultural-enlightenment institutions, waiting for our arrival so as to pass them into our hands, so that we decide the question of their life and work.

Our underground party organizations and guerrilla regiments in the villages very effectively combined their activities with the military operations of the PLA and with work to take over the city economy. All of this allowed the PLA to solve comparatively successfully the difficult problem of supply at the localities, and not from the rear.

The present situation gives us an opportunity to exceed the scale of the military operations stipulated in the previous plan. In accordance with that plan, about which I personally told Cde. Andreev,¹ we intended to take 10 provinces this year: Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu. However, in the 50 days from 21 April we already took five provinces: Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Hubei and Shaanxi, and also a part of provinces Jiangxi and Fujian.

Considering the estimate of the time and military forces, another 8 provinces can be taken already in winter of this year: Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai. The

ones that remain are only Xinjiang, Xikang (i.e. the Western part of the Sichuan province), Formosa and the Hainan Island, the taking of which will be put off until next year.

In case the Guangxi forces of Bai Chongxi retreat without a battle to Yunnan province, then the taking of this province possibly will also be put off until the spring of next year.

The situation in Tibet is special (*spetsyfucheskaja*); perhaps its question will still not be solved next year.

If we stick to this plan, this will shorten the length of war considerably and will allow to cleanse [ourselves] quickly from the lackeys of imperialism on the continent. Then the third part of the PLA in the fall and winter of this year will not be inactive and the question of the foodstuff for the regular army of 2 million 150 thousand people will be solved in better conditions as it will be supplied from 16 provinces, and not from 10 provinces as it was supposed by the previous plan.

[... Here follow details on military planning.]

9. At the present time not only can we not cut back the number of our forces—on the contrary, in all taken provinces one will have to create local forces in the process of implementing the land reform, the number of which will reach, perhaps, one and a half million forces.

Therefore, if one counts the regular army numbering 2 million 150 thousand people, forces directly responsible to the center and the local forces of the old northern areas, counting in total one and a half million people (including the military apparatus of the rear), then the full strength of our army at a certain stretch of time will reach 5 million people. When we reach this number, then one will be able to cut back gradually the number of our forces. Then it will be enough to have about 3 million forces (including regular and local forces—the protection regiments) in China. Now we are turning not to cutting the forces, but to cutting the military industry.

In old liberated areas to the north of Yangzi River we have 160 military industry enterprises, which employ 100 thousand workers and employees.

Considering the necessities of the Civil War we will not need now to manufacture arms and ammunition. Our field armies can fight using the trophies captured

in the battles and the military industry received from the Guomindang in order to satisfy the needs of war. If there is no intervention on the part of the imperialists, we will be able to gradually begin the preparation for cutback and transfer of the military industry to peaceful products. Otherwise, one will have to produce unnecessary products, which is very unprofitable for us.

With the aim of creating long-term defense of the country it will be necessary for us to stipulate and include into our general economic plan a suitable plan for creating new military industry, which would be suitable to the aims of protecting the state. In this we need help on the part of your specialists.

11. At the present time we still do not have a plan of wide propaganda and demonstration of friendly relations of China with the Soviet Union. Our opinion is to use the occasions of trips of various democratic parties on excursions to the USSR and the countries of new democracy of Eastern Europe in order that they see for themselves and sense the friendly relations of the USSR to China so as to dissipate some erroneous views, which some of them have on this account.

This will thereby ease the official formalization of treaties with the USSR on the loan and the Soviet specialists after the formation of a democratic government. At the same time this will help the Soviet specialists to work in China officially.

In view of the fact that the government will be formed in the month of August and, jointly with us, the democratic figures should complete in June-July the preparatory work to call the consultative meeting and the creation of the government (the work is very tense), their trip to the USSR therefore will have to be postponed and carried out only after the formation of the government. Now, as of yet, we have not exchanged opinions with them with regard to their trip to the USSR.

12. I fully agree with your observations that the structure of the economic center of the future Chinese government must not be bulky but flexible, suitable to the conditions in China.
13. The list of the number and the profile of the Soviet specialists, whom we need, was sent to you by a telegram dated 9 June.

With Bolshevik greetings,

Mao Zedong
11 June 1949

1. *Editor's Note:* Andreev is Mikoyan's *nom de guerre*.



DOCUMENT No. 46

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong [via Kovalev], 18 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 119. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 148. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Convey to c[omrade] Mao Zedong the following telegram:

“We consider your plan of the organization of the government and the further campaign to take over the west and the south to be sensible and fairly expedient. If we still say that intervention and blockade cannot be ruled out, then it is because when making a plan one should take into consideration not only the good, but the worst as well, so as to hedge against accidents and not to be caught unawares.

2. [We] advise to pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is oil in the subsoil and where you will be able to obtain cotton. It will be difficult for you without your own oil. If one were to begin work soon in Xinjiang, then after 2-3 years one could have one's own oil.

One could lay an oil pipeline from the area of extraction and processing of oil to the Qinzhou station, and from Qinzhou you could ship oil around China both by water and by the railroad. Therefore you should not delay for a long time the taking of Xinjiang. One army will be needed for this business. You exaggerate the forces of Ma Bufan. In accordance with our information, he is not that strong.

Filippov.”

Telegraph implementation.



DOCUMENT No. 47

Memorandum of Conversation between Stalin and CCP Delegation, 27 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 329, Ll. 1-7. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 148-151. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Cde. V. M. Molotov personally.

Record of conversation of I.V. Stalin with a delegation of CCP CC about a credit from the USSR to China, possibility of sending Soviet specialists to China, and about other questions of Soviet aid to China.

The meeting [*priem*] took place on 27 June and continued from 23 hours until 24 hours.

Present at the meeting were: cdes. [Vyacheslav] Molotov, [Georgii] Malenkov, [Anastas] Mikoyan, Liu Shaoqi—secretary of the CCP CC, Gao Gang—member of the Politburo of the CCP CC, the same being the secretary of the Bureau of the CC and the chairman of the government of Manchuria, Wang Jiaxiang, member of the CCP CC, Karskii (Shi Zhe)—interpreter, and I[van] V. Kovalev.

After mutual greetings and handshakes with the delegation Cde. Stalin asked about the health of Cde. Mao Zedong.

Cde. Liu Shaoqi thanked Cde. Stalin for his attention to Cde. Mao Zedong and handed to him a letter from Cde. Mao Zedong, which expressed gratitude to Cde. Stalin for enormous aid, given to China by the Soviet Union and requested Cde. Stalin to receive the delegation.

Whereupon Cde. Stalin turned to the discussion of the questions raised by the delegation.

1. About the credit. Cde. Stalin said that the VKP(b) CC decided to provide to the CCP CC a credit of 300 million dollars. With this, he remarked that this is the first time in history that such an agreement is being concluded between [the] two parties.

A credit of 300 million dollars with one percent annual interest will be provided to China in the form of equipment, machines, and various kinds of materials and goods by equal parts of 60 million in the course of 5 years.

Repayment of the credit by China will take place in

the course of 10 years after the full appropriation of the credit. With regard to this Cde. Stalin said that Cde. Mao Zedong, in a telegram addressed to [Stalin], expressed the opinion that 1% annual interest is small for such a credit, that one should increase it.

Cde. Stalin explained to the delegation that the Soviet Union provided credits with 2% interest rate to the countries of Western democracy [Eastern Europe], while one percent is taken from China because there [in China], in comparison to the countries of Western democracy, where there is no war and their economy had already strengthened, the war continues, devastation continues, and by the force of this [circumstance] China needs greater help, on more privileged terms.

Then Cde. Stalin, laughing, said: “Well, if you insist on a bigger annual interest rate, this is your business, we can accept an increased interest rate.”

With regard to the signing of an agreement on credit, Cde. Stalin said that there are two options: the first—for the representatives of the VKP(b) CC and the CCP CC to sign the agreement, and the second—for the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet government and the government of Manchuria, which already exists [to sign it] so that later, when the all-Chinese democratic coalition government is created, to formalize the agreement by treaties between the governments of the Soviet Union and China.

2. About the specialists. As for the specialists, Cde. Stalin said, [we] will give them. We are prepared to send at the nearest time the first group, requested by you. But we should come to an agreement about the conditions of the specialists' livelihood. We consider that the pay, perhaps foodstuffs, if you give it to your specialists, must stand at the level of the highest pay for your best specialists, not lower, but also not higher. In connection to the fact that our specialists have high [pay] rates, we, if this is needed, will pay them extra at the expense of the Soviet state.

We ask you, Cde. Stalin said, that you report to us about bad behavior of our specific specialists, for, as they say, there is a black sheep in every family [*v sem'ie ne bez uroda*], there may be a bad one among the good ones.

Bad behavior will shame the honor of the Soviet state, therefore we will take measures of preemption, education, and, if needed, also punishment.

We will not allow the Soviet specialists to look down on the Chinese specialists and the Chinese people

and to slight them.

In response to these words of Cde. Stalin Cde. Liu Shaoqi said: in China there are foreign specialists, not connected with the activity of the imperialists, and that they receive rates much higher than the Chinese specialists. To this Cde. Stalin replied: we, the Soviet state, have [our] own judgments and practices different from the capitalist countries, and we want to stick to them.

3. About the sending of specialists to Shanghai. Cde. Stalin said that we have selected 15 specialists and can, on your demand, send them at any time. Discuss this and tell us. In general You should keep in mind that in large cities, and especially in Shanghai, there are many of your specialists and qualified workers, who are able to give you not less but more aid than the Soviet specialists, therefore You need to draw them to active work.

4. We, Cde. Stalin said, are also prepared to provide you with aid to demine waters near Shanghai, both in terms of specialists, of whom we have many, and in terms of minesweepers.

We could, for instance, sell several minesweepers to the government of Manchuria, train Chinese sailors in Dairen, Port Arthur or Vladivostok in the business of demining, and the Manchurian government, Cde. Stalin said laughing, can “sell” them to the Chinese government.

5. About Xinjiang. Cde. Stalin said that one should not put off occupation of Xinjiang, because a delay may lead to the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly.

The Chinese population in Xinjiang does not exceed 5%, after taking Xinjiang one should bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30% by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection.

In general, in the interests of strengthening the defense of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese.

You, Cde. Stalin said, exaggerate the forces of Ma Bufang. He has cavalry, which can be easily defeated

with artillery. If you want, we will give you 40 fighter planes, which will help destroy and scatter this cavalry very quickly.

6. About the fleet. China does not have its own fleet, Cde. Stalin said and immediately added: don’t you already have some number of ships captured from the Guomindang?

China must have a fleet and we are prepared to help you in the creation of a fleet. Now, for example, we can raise sunk military and merchant ships and help repair them.

As far as your request about the strengthening of defense of Qingdao is concerned, we can send our squadron to the port of Qingdao with a visit after the creation of all-China government.

- [7.] Cde. Liu Shaoqi thanked Cde. Stalin for the enormous aid, which is now being provided in all spheres of life and activity of China on exceptionally privileged conditions, which history has never seen.

He stressed right away that the CCP CC developed an instruction, which will be sent to the party organizations, to create such conditions of work for the Soviet specialists that nobody offends them.

8. Cde. Stalin said that we will also develop a detailed instruction for the Soviet specialists, that they also do not offend the Chinese specialists.
9. In reply to a request of the Chinese comrades to establish air links between Moscow and Beijing, Cde. Stalin said that we are already prepared now to undertake the organization of this air route.

We can help you build an assembly-repairs plane factory, we can give you fighter planes of the latest makes, Czechoslovak if you want, Russian if you want, so that you prepare your aviation cadres with them.

10. Cde. Stalin agreed to the delegation’s request to be heard at the Politburo with their reports about the military-political and economic situation of China and exchange opinions on a series of most important questions at the time when they are ready, after 3 or 4 days.
11. Cde. Stalin said that we are prepared to help you all-sidedly in studying the state apparatus, industry and all that you wish, but for this aim one should legalize you, naming [you] a trade delegation from Manchuria.

12. If it suits you, we will publish a report in the press that a trade delegation arrived in Moscow headed by Cde. Gao Gang, and then you will be provided with a wide opportunity to look at everything, including any spectator [zrelischchnye] activities. The Chinese comrades asked to give them an opportunity to reply after they consult with Cde. Mao Zedong.

I. Kovalev
[signature]
Printed 1 copy.



DOCUMENT No. 48

Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 6 July 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 3, Op. 65, D. 363, Ll. 20-23. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 163-164. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade I.V. Stalin.

Reporting:

In conversations with me on 5 and 6 July Cdes. Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang requested to report to you the following:

1. They want to receive from you instructions and advice on the questions, recounted in the report of c. Liu Shaoqi, provided to you.
 2. They would like to familiarize themselves, while in Moscow:
 - a. With the structure of the VKP(b) and the work of the party organs;
 - b. With the structure of the Soviet state;
 - c. With the planning organs, the planning of people's economy and managing the economy of the country;
 - d. With the situation with enlightenment and cultural work in the country;
 - e. With the structure and work of mass organizations (professional unions, volunteer societies etc.)
 - f. To conduct excursions to plants, factories, kol-
3. They ask to send to China Soviet professors of different branches of knowledge (including a professor of Marxism-Leninism) for teaching work in the Chinese higher educational institutions and, for their part, would like:
 - a. To send to the USSR a group of senior managers (heads of the directories, directors of plants) for 1.5—2 months for studying specific branches of the industry;
 - b. To organize in the Soviet Union a special educational institution for the Chinese, in which three categories of people could simultaneously study, to the total amount of 1,000 people. 1st category—leading cadres, engineers and technicians with a one year course of study, 2nd category—middle management ranks with a two year course of study, and the 3rd category is the youth with a 5 year course of study. This educational institution could prepare specialists—managers of industry, trade, finance, jurists etc.
 4. The delegation expressed a wish to resolve some questions concerning Manchuria:
 - a. About the provision of heavy machine for machine building plants, not on credit, but as reciprocal exchange, goods for goods;
 - b. They would like to clarify the prospects of trade between the USSR and Manchuria, the names of goods, prices, means of goods exchange and the timing;
 - c. They would like to receive for Manchuria no less than 300 specialists for various branches of industry, especially for replacing the Japanese, who work in the metallurgical, military, aviation industries, as well as at the power plants and as doctors in the hospitals.
- They also raised the question of Port Arthur, declaring that they wish that the Soviet forces stay there not for 30 years, as the treaty stipulates, but even 60 years, but they would like to change somewhat the existing situation in the mutual relations of Manchuria and Dairen:
1. To obtain free access to the port for taking out coal and salt and for receiving freight destined for Manchuria;

2. To establish one currency note for all of the Manchurian territory, without which they cannot support the activity of enterprises, which formerly worked solely for the war [effort], located in Dairen. [They] have to close them down, which causes unemployment and discontent of the workers. They would like to conduct this undertaking with regard to the currency note in September 1949.
5. They also turned [to us] with a request as to whether they can use 50% of the power of the power plant on the Yalujiang (its total power, in their words, is 400 thousand kilowatts). They reminded that at the time of the construction of this power plant China invested 75 million yen, and Korea 50 million yen. Their efforts to reach an agreement with Korea independently were not crowned with success. The Koreans set aside for them only 20 thousand kilowatts.
6. They are asking whether they can receive a Czechoslovak trade delegation, which the Czechoslovak government is asking them to receive. The delegation is composed of 5 people: 2 representatives of the Skoda plant, 2 from the Batia concern and one textile-man.
7. The delegation requested to convey Cde. Mao Zedong's request to you to inform the delegation regarding questions touching upon the international situation and, in particular, is war possible, and when is it possible?
8. The delegation received a telegram from Cde. Mao Zedong, in which he agrees to the creation of a commission to work out an agreement on supply of goods on credit. But in view of the fact that the financial-economic apparatus has not been created yet, and also the specialists, data and estimates of needed equipment are lacking, [he] requested to make the list of orders for equipment on the spot after the arrival in China of Soviet specialists and their study of the situation in industry. In his telegram he pointed out that the credit (50%) will be mainly utilized in Manchuria, then in northern China, and then in the northwest for the restoration of the metallurgical, coal industry, power plants, railroads, and for the organization of extraction and processing of oil. The delegation also expressed the opinion that it is empowered to sign the credit agreement without further consultation with the CCP CC.

Kovalev.

**DOCUMENT No. 49****Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, 19 July 1949**

[Source: Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao, co-edited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document Research Unit and the Central Archives, Vol. 1, (Beijing, 2005) (pp. 30-37). Translated for CWIHP from Chinese by David Wolff, who thanks Chen Jian for his continuing guidance through this kind of material.]

A Telegram about the Meeting of Stalin with the Chinese Communist Party's Delegation (18 July 1949)

To the Center, to Chairman Mao:

I. After we had sent the Soviet Party Center's Stalin a written report and some other materials, on 11 July at 10 p.m. the Soviet Party's Politburo met in the Kremlin. We [Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang] and Kovalev took part with Shi Zhe translating. [Others present were] Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, [Lavrentii] Beria, Mikoyan, [Lazar] Kaganovich, [Nikolai] Bulganin, [Nikolai] Shvernik, [Vasilii] Sokolovskii, intelligence heads, and admirals. First Stalin explained that several of the Politburo members had already left for vacations and that several military men would participate, since the Chinese delegation's report had touched on military issues. Then Stalin asked us: Do you have your own naval officers? Does the airforce have its own pilots? Does each province have a provincial government? Is each provincial government and regional government like the northeast obeying the future central government? Does the future central government have the right to approve and dismiss the main personnel of provincial and regional governments? With Mao Zedong as the central government's chairman, is "chairman" the same as "president" [?]. What is the nature of the relations between the chairman and the cabinet? He also asked about bureaucratic capital? Would comprador¹ capital be included in bureaucratic capital? After we had answered every question, Stalin started to explain about the Chinese national bourgeoisie and answered all the questions we had raised in our report. At the end, at our request, he explained the present international situation. The other comrades spoke very little and the mood was completely serious. After the meeting Stalin asked if we were comfortable and everyone watched four movies that had been picked by Stalin. He gave a running commentary as we watched the movies.

II. During the meeting a committee to draft a loan agreement was constituted with Mikoyan and Kovalev participating on the Soviet side and we three on the Chinese side. We decided to have Gao Gang sign the loan agreement in the name of the Northeast Government, since the Soviet side considered this an appropriate procedure. They will now send it to the Supreme Soviet for approval and we can collect the loan at an early

date. Below is a summary report of Stalin's oral answers to the questions we asked in our report [to him].

- a. Regarding the CCP's policy towards the Chinese national bourgeoisie

Stalin said: The point of view that considers cooperation between you and the Chinese national bourgeoisie as the way of drawing them into the government is correct. The Chinese national bourgeoisie is not the same as the East European and German bourgeoisie, which cooperated with Hitler during the war, tarnishing itself, and were forced to leave with Hitler. They settled down in their enterprises, so in the period after the defeat of Hitler, all these countries focused on was their enterprises, and not on themselves. But the Chinese national bourgeoisie is different. They did not surrender to Japan during the war. So they didn't have to retreat with the Japanese. After the defeat of Japan, a part of this group supported Jiang Jieshi to get American recognition and support. But the Chinese-American Trade and Shipping Convention was extremely unfair, a big attack on the Chinese national bourgeoisie, which found itself dependent both in trade and in shipping. Therefore, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is against the US and Jiang Jieshi, against the relations between the US and Jiang Jieshi. That the Chinese Communist Party is using this anti-American feeling in order to establish a comparatively long-term cooperative tie with the Chinese national bourgeoisie is a correct policy. It is necessary to get the Chinese national bourgeoisie to stand in the anti-imperialist camp. You should undertake some kind of policy that is good for the national bourgeoisie, such as protective tariffs, preventing any imperialist goods from entering China, profitable for the national capitalists, while also giving infant national industry a chance to develop. This is a second advantage. After the October Revolution in Russia almost all the private capitalist enterprises were confiscated, while a [state] monopoly on foreign trade was introduced. In China, at the present time, it is very difficult to resist a trade monopoly, but we should institute a protective tariff policy.

The contradictions between the soviets and the capitalists is an objective (*keguan*) one, strikes can take place. For now we do not want to broaden the conflict between the soviets and the capitalists, but labor conflict is what might cause us trouble in our cooperation with the bourgeoisie. In order to prevent labor conflict from ruining our cooperation with the bourgeoisie, we should push for an agreement between the bourgeoisie and the workers. This agreement should protect workers' rights and we must persuade the capitalists to become civilized capitalists who take care of their workers. Such an agreement would allow cooperation between the capitalists and us to go on for a while.

- b. Regarding the matter of people's democratic dictatorship

Stalin said: Your implementation of a people's democratic dictatorship system of government is correct. Your citing Stalin's 1926 statement to the effect that "China's future revolutionary sovereignty will emphasize anti-imperialism" is also correct. After we had answered the questions about the central government's Chairman group and the relationship between the Chairman group and the cabinet (to the effect that, the Chairman's group is a collective presidency and the cabinet serves the Chairman's group as the central government's executive organ), Stalin said: It is possible that this system is very suitable to present-day China. When we answered the questions about whether each regional (for example, the northeast) and provincial government obeyed the central government and whether the central government had the right to approve or dismiss each regional or provincial government's choices of leaders, Stalin said: Your present point of view of avoiding excesses in carrying out central collectivism is correct. That is to say, on the condition that the local governments are obeying the central government, it is not necessary to implement excessive central collectivism. But Stalin pays much attention to the possibility of splits between the local and central governments. Furthermore, in the report we had not mentioned the comprador bourgeoisie, so Stalin asked if comprador capital was or was not included in bureaucratic capital. It seems that he is paying great attention not to mix up the comprador bourgeoisie and the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

- c. Regarding foreign policy issues

Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China's trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Regarding the investments and enterprises in China of various imperialist countries, Stalin said: You can use the labor laws. Require each foreign enterprise to implement the labor laws strictly as a method for struggling with them. At the present, you don't want to expropriate the Chinese affairs of each imperialism, don't rush (*bumang*) into taking any other measures, wait a bit and see what happens. As to the question of whether we should strive for all of the imperialist countries to recognize China's new government, Stalin said: You should not rush into demanding recognition from all the imperialist countries, while you increase your observations, grasp the situation, see how they express themselves. You have a really good magic weapon (*fabao*), which is that imperialism wants to do business (*maimai*) with you. The imperialist countries' economic crisis has already begun. I think the powers could quickly decide to try and recognize you. You can first do good business with them and then discuss the recognition issue.

- d. Regarding Chinese-Soviet relations

Stalin said: As soon as the Chinese government is established, the Soviet Union will immediately recognize you. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Treaty, he said: There was already a statement about this in the exchange of cables with Mao Zedong, saying that this treaty is unequal, that it can't be otherwise, since the treaty was made with the Guomindang at that time. There are a lot of American soldiers in Japan; Jiang Jieshi is also collaborating with the Americans. The Soviet troops in Port Arthur [Lushun] prevent them having the freedom of action to make use of armed force; they protect the Soviet Union and at the same time, they also protect the interests of the Chinese Revolution. At the present time, the Soviet Communist Party has already decided to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. After the Americans remove their troops from Japan, the Soviet Union can consider withdrawing troops from Lushun. If the Chinese Communist Party considers it necessary that the Soviet troops leave Lushun immediately in order to give the Chinese Communist Party more room to maneuver in the political sphere, the Soviet troops can withdraw from Lushun and Dalian [Luda] right now. Stalin does not consider necessary [*yongbuzhao*] any of the three preliminary options (inherit the treaty without changes, sign a new treaty or announce that in a while a new treaty will be signed) for handling the Chinese-Soviet treaty that we presented in the report. He said to wait until Mao Zedong comes to Moscow to solve this matter. Regarding China's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Stalin said: You can negotiate with all the countries of Eastern Europe. We can help you, but it is best if you negotiate directly. Furthermore, he said, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania all can supply you with goods and help you. You can negotiate with them boldly. Regarding the question of relations between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, Stalin said: when you said in the report that the Chinese Communist Party obeys the Soviet Communist Party, we felt strange. There has never been a case of one country's party obeying another country's party, because it is impermissible [*buxukede*]. The two parties are responsible to their own peoples. If there is a problem, we talk about it. If there is a difficulty, we help each other. It's not a matter of one party obeying another. Close party relations is correct. Today's Politburo meeting is such a kind of tie. Regarding Mao Zedong's coming to Moscow, Stalin said: When China's [new] government is established and relations are established between our countries, then Mao can come. If Mao still finds it inconvenient to come, the Soviet Union can send a delegation to China.

e. Other matters

1. Regarding Xinjiang, Stalin said: because in Xinjiang there are no runways, there is still no way to bring troops in to Xinjiang by air. As for sending fighter aircraft to beat Ma's cavalry², this is very simply done. We can send a detachment of 40-50 aircraft and we'll begin with Soviet pilots and then pass them over to Chinese pilots [as they are trained.] While we were watching films,

Stalin said: in the Second World War, cavalry was not of much use, because they feared the airplane, because they were such a big target, very easy to disperse.

2. Regarding Dalian, Stalin said: we could let the Northeast [Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party] and the Soviet comrades in Dalian discuss and reach agreement. Dalian's governing regime should be united with the Northeast [Bureau's]. While countries are not recognizing China, before the Japanese Peace Treaty is concluded, Dalian's harbor should only be used by Chinese and Soviets.
3. We had asked in the past about opening a Chinese university in Moscow for fewer than 1,000 students to train and build up China's construction and management personnel. Stalin said: this is a good thing. There are difficulties, but we can do it.
4. Stalin himself raised the question of building a railway from Outer Mongolia's Hulun [Buir] area to Zhangjiakou (because someone raised this idea during Andreev's visit to Xibaipo). He said, this is a good thing, we can do it. We asked: Can we build a railway from Shaanxi through Xinjiang to the Soviet Union? S[talin] said: It's too long. It's not as good as first building an oil pipeline that would cost less than a third of the railroad. Stalin also said: If you have tea, tung oil, husked rice, tungsten ore, pig bristles and other plant oils, we need them all. Furthermore, he said, you should expand the land area under cotton cultivation and raise cotton production. In order to do this, you should gradually make use of agricultural machinery. It would be very good to increase cotton production.
5. Stalin said: [They can] help us to set up a naval school at Lushun and help us to build maritime defense. Stalin asked us if a Soviet film crew could visit our frontlines and help us to make a film. They [the Soviets] could help us with film technology. We answered that this was possible and said that a film crew had visited Lin Biao's headquarters in the past. Stalin said: because they did a bad job of it there, we withdrew them. We say we want to shoot a film again. It could be good for our relations. Stalin said: We can make the film's contents completely according to your suggestions.

III. Regarding the international situation, after we raised the issue, Stalin replied as follows:

There is a main point for estimating the contemporary international situation and this is whether or not a war can break out. By looking at all manner of international and economic conditions and [deducing] from America's preparations for war (imperialism is always preparing well for war), we can see that at present it is disadvantageous [*buli*] for imperialism to make war on the Soviet Union. According to regular patterns of historical development, there should not be a war at the moment, but there are adventurers and lunatics (*jingshen shichang*) in history, so there is still a possibility of war break-

ing out. We are ready for this. They are even using the nuclear bomb to intimidate [*konghe*] us, but we are also preparing. We are preparing a bit more quickly than they are.

Some adventurers and lunatics propagandize and say: The Soviet Union wants to attack the US. Others believe this kind of talk, which gives ground for the emergence of adventurers. For example, if the US Secretary of Defense [James] Forrestal, although he is dead, can still produce these kinds of people, then the possibility of war [*neng chuwai*] is always with us.³

We asked: can a compromise agreement be reached on the various problems that separate you and the British and Americans? Stalin answered: It is very difficult. It is possible to resolve individual issues, but the most important matter is very hard to resolve. Let's wait a bit and see.

[Stalin continued regarding] our present policy of isolating the reactionary party, making use of mass methods and meetings, while in many countries, including America, continuing a propaganda battle, is very effective and should be continued.

Today the American government is forcing non-resolution of the problems with its policies. There are some people in the US who want to have good relations with the Soviet Union, but they are not in power. In the future, if the Americans have a new government and a new policy, it is possible that US-Soviet relations will get better.

The Marshall Plan is already bankrupt. American influence in Germany is already very small.

If imperialism wants to attack, let them attack; if they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons.

The Americans, of course, are not planning to attack themselves, since they always think of how to use other people's hands to attack for them. They even said so publicly, but there are not so many people willing to spill blood for America.

In general, neither do we fear peace, nor do we fear war.
Liu [Shaoqi] Gao [Gang] Wang [Jiexiang]

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

1. Intermediary between the Chinese government and western powers who became part of the Chinese middle class.
2. Probably referring to Warlord Ma Bufang. The ethnically Hui "Ma clique," in particular, controlled Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and parts of Xinjiang in the 1940s. Their warlord leader was Ma Bufang, although over 200 relatives, all with the surname Ma, served in his armies, including his son Ma Chi-yuan.
3. Forrestal's apparent suicide on 22 May seems to have attracted Stalin's attention.



DOCUMENT No. 50

Memorandum of Conversation between Liu Shaoqi and Stalin, 27 July 1949

[Source: Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao (*This selection was co-edited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document Research Unit and the Central Archives*) Vol. 1, (Beijing, 2005), pp. 40-41. Translated from Chinese by David Wolff.]

Discussing the overthrow of the Guomintang with Stalin¹

27 July 1949

We said: During the first cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party, after the Guomintang betrayed us by doing an about-face, we were not at all prepared, we suffered a terrible defeat and were terribly taken in [*shangle hendade dang*]. But on account of this our heads were clear during the second cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party. Even as the cooperation began, we were preparing to overthrow Jiang Jieshi. At the time of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, we prepared steadily for eight years, since this time Jiang Jieshi was also planning to destroy the Communist Party. So when the anti-Japanese war of resistance ended, Jiang Jieshi turned to face us, but we were ready. Having listened this far, Stalin said: This is what the enemy has taught you. He also said: Have we harassed or done you harm? We said: No. And we continued: Comrade Mao Zedong did not have to go to Chongqing. It would have been enough to send Comrade Zhou Enlai. But Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing with good result. It gave us an immediate initiative on the political side of things. Stalin said: Mao's trip to Chongqing was dangerous. The CC² or other secret services could have hurt him. At that time the Americans asked us: The Guomintang wants peace. Why do the communists not want peace? I [Stalin] answered them: We do not interfere [*guanbuzhao*] in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Stalin also asked us: Did your participation with the Americans in the peace movement cause you losses or harm? We answered: The Chinese Communist Party was quite clear-headed going into the peace movement, but there was another responsible comrade who entertained illusions about peace and experienced a minor loss. But this kind of peace movement is very necessary with the result this time that we isolated the Americans and Jiang. When we overthrow the Guomintang later and depose Jiang Jieshi, there will not be a single person to say we have not done right. Comrade Stalin said: The victors are not brought to judgment. Victors are always correct.

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

1. This conversation took place during a banquet at Stalin's dacha.

2. This has a double meaning as the initials of a group within the Guomindang devoted to keeping Jiang Jieshi in power through party and strong-arm activities, many of them violently anti-Communist.



DOCUMENT No. 51

Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 24 December 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 3, Op. 65, D. 584, Ll. 123-144. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 234-243. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Comrade I. V. Stalin

Reporting to you on some questions of policy and practice of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. Some data on the economic situation in the country.

You advised the Chinese comrades to “pay special attention to the restoration and development of the national industry, including the industry which is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie.”

One should note that in this respect substantial results have not been achieved, with the exception of Manchuria, and the country is undergoing great economic difficulties.

The volume of production in the main branches of industry is still sharply behind the level, reached in the years of maximum production output. So, for instance, coal production in 1949 will amount only to 33.5 million tons as against 58.7 million tons in the year of maximum production (1942) or 57%.

At the metallurgical plants of Manchuria, which comprise the main metallurgical base of China, production of pig iron will not surpass 150-170 thousand tons or no more than 7% of the plant capacity at the maximum production level (1942), and of steel production 120-150 thousand tons accordingly, or no more than 11% of the steel -making machine capacity.

Production of electrical power at Manchuria’s electricity stations, the ratio of which to China’s determined capacity is over 50%, in 1949 will not exceed 1400 million kilowatt/hours, or 31% of the maximum electrical energy production in 1944.

The situation in other branches of the industry is no better.

Newly created industrial ministries still have not taken into their hands the management of state enterprises, do not know

the plants’ capacities, the character and the volume of products which they manufacture, have not ascertained [the whereabouts of the] unused equipment, located in the ports and warehouses and numbering several thousand machines (cities of Shanghai, Canton, Hankou etc.), and have not taken any measures to establish state control over the work of private capitalist enterprises.

In agriculture in 1949 40% of the harvest was destroyed as a result of drought and floods, which creates great food difficulties with regard to the provision of foodstuff to the population, especially in the cities, and which sharply reduced export possibilities.

A better situation materialized with the railroad transport, where in 1949 some 2,650 km of the tracks and 1,355 bridges amounting to 13,550 meters were restored, which allowed to provide for the movement of trains on the roads of northern, central and southern China, along the length of 9,700 km, to restore movement on the most important lines of advance of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as to connect northern regions of China with central and southern China.

Wholesale and retail trade, with the exception of Manchuria, is almost fully in the hands of the private trader, which takes away the state’s ability to exert any kind of influence on the condition of the market and on the market prices, leads to serious difficulties with the supply of the population with some goods, especially grain, and creates favorable conditions for speculation.

The ratio of state and cooperative trade in the general turnover is appraised at merely 5-8%.

No serious measures to widen and take over by the state of the wholesale trade, as well as to widen state and cooperative trade in the retail turnover, are yet being taken.

In the sphere of external trade the state merely established control over the import and export of goods.

State finances and monetary circulation are in a completely unsatisfactory state.

At the present time there is still no all-state financial, credit and monetary system. There is no unified state budget of China, and there were no unified budgets for separate economic regions. There were merely separate budgets of each local organ of the state power. The aforementioned budgets had large deficits, which were covered by the emission of paper money.

For example, in the 9 months of 1949 the budgetary deficit amounted to: 11% in Manchuria, 35.1% in northern China as a ratio of the total income.

Budgetary deficit for 1949 was determined as being, for cen-

tral China—29.2%, and for northwestern China—43.2%.

At the present time China does not have unified money. 10 various types of money are in the circulation on the liberated territory (yuan of the People's Bank of China, yuan of the Northeastern Bank, money emitted by the former banks of some liberated regions, yuan of the Inner Mongolia and Kwantung area banks, Xinjiang dollars, Guomindang money, the exchange of which is not over yet).

No measures are being taken to regulate money circulation. Large-scale emission of money continues. As of 1 November 1949 there were 1401 billion yuan of the People's Bank of China and 9972 billion yuan of the Bank of the Northeast in circulation, while only in October 1949 664 billion yuan of the People's bank and 1120 yuan of the Bank of the Northeast were put in the circulation. There was also emission of money on substantial scale in November 1949.

Increase in the circulation of money, emitted to cover budgetary deficit, resulted in the systemic increase of goods prices, in the drop of the purchasing power of money, and in the depreciation of its rates in relation to foreign currencies.

The price of one *jin* of foxtail millet increased by 1 November 1949 in comparison with 1 April 1949 15.3 times in Beijing, 14 times in Tianjin, and the price of rice, accordingly, 13.8 times and 11.5 times. Large increase of prices took place for all other foodstuff and industrial goods in the aforementioned and other cities of China.

In November, in comparison with the end of October 1949 prices again increased 3-4 times for foodstuff and 2-3 times for industrial goods.

The official rate of the People's Bank of China yuan in relation to the American dollar on 25 November 1949 fell 16 times in Beijing and Tianjin in comparison with 18 April 1949, the day the rate was first established.

The Central People's government adopted a budget with a large deficit for 1950, equal to 5623.8 tons of foxtail millet, or 18.9% to the total volume of expenditure. A part of this deficit in the amount of 2150 thousand tons of grain is supposed to be covered by the emission of internal debt, and the rest of the sum by additional emission of money.

One's attention is drawn to the excessively large ratio of allocations for military expenditures—38.8%, and for administrative-management expenditures—21.4% from the total sum of budget expenditure. It is characteristic that the Central People's government does not intend to reduce the military forces in 1950, and the state apparatus, which is already very overblown at the present time, is supposed to be increased by 1.5 million people, this being motivated by the aim of not allowing the

increase in the number of the unemployed.

Therefore, the data provided testify to the fact that in 1950 the Central government will still not create necessary economic prerequisites for serious normalization of monetary circulation.

With regard to the work of the banks, no serious measures are being taken to limit the activities of private banks, including foreign ones.

2. On the working class

You advised in January 1949 to "win over to the side of the Chinese Com[munist] Party the majority of the working class," and drew special attention to the necessity of "strengthening political work among the Chinese working class and creation of material and other conditions, under which the working class would feel that it is the ruling class and possesses the power."

Since then the CCP CC has not taken any kind of radical measures in this direction.

The situation for the workers has improved somewhat merely at some state enterprises, the railroad transport, mines and metallurgical plants, located on Manchuria's territory.

In other regions the working class, having obtained political freedom as a result of the defeat of the Jiang Jieshi regime, does not feel the improvement of its material circumstances and as before remains in the conditions of semi-hungry existence. Suffice it to say that in the law provisions on labor published in the beginning of December 1949 the length of the working day is set at 12 hours. The same law provisions indicate that "...In the newly liberated regions businessmen must maintain former rates of pay, which existed three months before the liberation of a city, workers cannot demand a pay raise at the low-profit enterprises." Therefore, the salary of the workers also remained without change and as before maintains a semicolonial character. So, for example, the lowest, literally beggar's salary, exists in the mining and metallurgical industry, and the highest—for postal officials and textile workers.

No laws have been passed yet about the protection of labor of workers and on social security. As for the "Rules, regulating relations between labor and capital" approved by the All-China Federation of Labor in January 1949, they not only fail to develop the main principles, established by the general program of the Political Consultative Meeting but in essence reduce them to naught.

Necessary measures are not being taken to attract workers to study at secondary and higher educational institutions and to prepare engineer and technical cadres from among workers.

Leading circles of the Chinese Communist Party as before underestimate the role of the working class in the revolutionary transformation of the country.

3. On the peasantry and the land reform

In 1926 you said that "...Among the Guomindang and even among the Chinese communists there are people, who do not consider it possible to unveil revolution in the countryside, fearing that involving the peasantry into the revolution will undermine the united anti-imperialist front. This is the deepest delusion, comrades. The sooner and more fundamentally the peasantry is involved in the revolution the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front will be."

Relying for many years on the peasantry as the main force, by which the People's Liberation Army was created, and as a source of material supply of the army, the communist party of China at the same time manifests indecisiveness and apprehension in the conduct of revolutionary activities in the countryside.

By the present time land reform had been conducted merely on Manchuria's territory and some long liberated regions of Northern China with a population of slightly higher than 100 million.

On other territory not only has agrarian reform not been implemented but even the high land rental rates, still charged by the landholders from the peasants, have not been cut back.

The leading organs intend to begin organizational conduct of the land reform in 2-3 years.

In connection with this, peasants in the localities frequently begin re-division of land in spite of the central authorities, without waiting for permission. This lowers the authority of the Chinese Com[munist] Party and the government among the peasantry.

A fallacious "theory" became widespread among a certain part of the communists and in the leading circles of the com[munist] party that new kulaks, who appear after the conduct of the land reform in the previously liberated regions, are a revolutionary force, supporting the com[munist] party and the new government.

4. On the party

You advised "...by means of strengthening mass political work in the cities to widen the ranks of the communist party by drawing on the working class, to create strong party organizations at factories and railroads."

However, the growth of the party in the working class has been

inconsequential up to now. No active work is being conducted to attract workers into the ranks of the party. Party organizations to a considerable extent are polluted by landlord-kulak and bourgeois elements; party recruitment in a number of regions is conducted in an indiscriminate manner.

According to the data of the CCP CC 80% of the entire party membership is made up of peasants. In eastern China only 414 of 34835 party cells are factory-plant party cells. In northern China only 4.1% of party members are workers, and 85% are peasants. In the party organization of Shandong province alone there are more than 10,000 landlords, kulaks and merchants.

As for party tenure, more than a half of CCP members are young communists, who joined its ranks after the defeat and capitulation of Japan. In northern China 54% of all members of the party joined its ranks after 1946.

General educational level of the majority of the CCP members is exceedingly low. In Northern China 60.9% of all communists are completely illiterate, 13.6% are poorly literate, and only 19.7% graduated from the elementary school.

In the ranks of the party, including the members of the CC, there are people who were formerly disposed in a pro-American and anti-Soviet way, whom the leadership of the CC now supports. Thus, for example, Peng Zhen, member of the CCP CC, secretary of the Beijing party committee and deputy chairman of the political-legal government committee, Lin Feng, member of the CCP CC, deputy chairman of the Manchurian government and a member of the Central People's government, Li Fuchun, deputy chairman of the Manchurian government, Li Lisan, minister of labor and member of the Central People's government, Bo Yibo, minister of finance, member of the CCP CC and deputy chairman of the financial-economic committee under the government and others. At the same time, the chairman of the Manchurian government, member of the CCP CC Gao Gang, under whose leadership undeniable successes were achieved in the economic and cultural development of Manchuria, suffers from unjustified criticism, and an unhealthy environment had been created around him. This criticism is spearheaded and organized by CCP CC secretary Liu Shaoqi.

It deserves attention, for example, that Bo Yibo, as the minister of finance, voluntarily (Zhou Enlai told me about this with indignation), without the knowledge and permission of the CC, allowed in October 1949 the emission of 664 billion paper money (in yuan), which led to a sharp drop in the rate of the yuan, a 3-4 times increase of prices for all kinds of goods, lowering of real wages and caused sharp discontent of workers, peasants and cadres.

Besides, Bo Yibo twice sanctioned the increase of the railroad tariff for cargo shipments (each time by 200%), which led to a

situation when 12 types of cargos, from the 20 transported by the railroad, including basic foodstuffs and consumer goods, became unprofitable to transport; transport became underused, food problems emerged in the cities, prices rose again.

Minister of Labor Li Lisan, known in the past for his Trotskyist activities, proposed in June 1949 to create the league of entrepreneurs for organized protection of their interests in connection with the massive demands by the workers about improving conditions of labor.

In November 1949 during the work of the conference of professional unions of Asian countries, in the presence of Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the VTsSPS (All-Union Central Union of Professional Unions of the USSR) Solov'ev, and my own [presence], Li Lisan spoke out against the creation of a liaison bureau of Asia's professional organizations.

Serving as the deputy chairman of the All-Chinese Federation of Labor Li Lisan was one of the initiators of adoption and publication in the newspapers of the "rules, regulating relations between labor and capital," which go against the general program of the political consultative meeting and worsen the conditions of workers at private enterprises.

5. On the press

From September 1949 there has been a sharp decrease in the publication in the press of materials, shedding light on the party life, work of party organizations to involve workers in the party, struggle of the party for the strengthening of the people's democratic dictatorship and the implementation of revolutionary reforms.

This is done to appease the bourgeois capitalist elements inside the country and abroad.

6. On the state apparatus

You advised in June 1949 "not to delay any longer the formation of the Central government... China is left without a government. And this is dangerous from the point of view of internal politics, and also dangerous from the point of view of the international situation."

In September 1949 the Central people's government was formed at the political consultative meeting, which amounts to a coalition of various democratic parties and groups.

In October 1949 central government organs were formed composed of 37 ministries and other central government institutions. Of these 22 are headed by communists, and 15—by representatives of other parties and non-party bourgeois democrats, including such reactionary elements as former Guomintang generals Fu Zuoyi and Chen Jian.

Communists head main leading ministries and central institutions: the State Administrative Council, People's Military-Revolutionary committee, Financial-Economic Committee, Political-Legal Committee; ministries—of Foreign Affairs, State Security, Internal Affairs, Finances, Trade, Heavy Industry, Fuel Industry, Textile Industry, Foodstuff Industry, Railroads, Labor; Supreme People's Prosecutor's Office, Main Directorate of Information, Main Directorate of Press Affairs, People's Bank, Main Customs Directorate, Nationalities Committee and Legal Drafting Committee.

Representatives of the Guomintang Revolutionary Committee head: Ministries of Post and Telegraph, Ministry of Health, Committee for Chinese Emigrants Abroad.

Representatives of the Democratic League head: Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Justice, Supreme People's Court, Main Directorate for Publishing Houses' Affairs. Committee for People's Control is headed by a representative of the Association of Three Principles of the People, Ministry of Enlightenment—by a representative of the Society for Democratic Movement, Ministry of Light Industry—by a representative of the Society for Democratic State Building. The five remaining ministries—of Agriculture, Forestry, Culture, Irrigation and the Committee for Enlightenment and Culture are headed by formally non-party progressive politicians.

Among the deputy ministers and heads of central government institutions there are 57 communists and 35 representatives of other parties and non-party persons.

Filling vacancies in the government apparatus is taking place exceedingly slowly. In the majority of ministries and central institutions apparatus is less than half full, and in some ministries, for example those of light industry, textile industry, forestry, [and] labor, there are no officials at all except for the ministers and their deputies.

Creation of organs of state power in the localities almost has not been embarked upon yet. There activities are continued by either frontline military-administrative organs, or administration is carried out by the apparatus of the former power, consisting in the overwhelming majority of cases of the Guomintang-ists.

Therefore the apparatus of executive power has not been created yet, as a result of which the central government does not carry out centralized management of the whole country, and many of its decisions still remain merely declarations.

7. On the army

You advised not to cut back the size of the military for the time being. This advice of yours was implemented by the CCP CC. The People's Liberation Army at the present time has

grown considerably and counts about 6 million of soldiers and officers.

However, one should note that a substantial part of soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation Army are former Guomintang-ists, who were either captured or voluntarily, in entire detachments, took the side of the People's Liberation Army.

The number of the Guomintang-ists, for example, in some military units of generals Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng reaches 70-80%, at the same time former Guomintang-ists are not dispersed among the tried cadre units of the People's Liberation Army, but are kept in their ranks almost in the same shape, in which they were captured. A small number of command-political workers from the cadres of the People's Liberation Army were appointed to these former Guomintang units. A situation like this conceals a serious danger from the point of view of stability and commitment of the military forces to the cause of the revolution.

8. On the intelligentsia

You advised the Chinese communists to "create their own intelligentsia, so as to fully take control of the country. To teach in the schools, educate in the communist spirit the workers, peasants and democratically-inclined intelligentsia."

The Chinese intelligentsia by and large positively views the policy of the com[munist] party. However, after the declaration of the People's Republic many intellectuals took a wait-and-see position, watching the first steps of the new government. Such a position is partly explained by the fact that a part of the intelligentsia cannot yet find use for their knowledge, and elementary material conditions have not been created for those who work. The wages of specialists of high qualification are equal to the wages of low-qualified workers, or even less. There are instances when, because of material insecurity university professors and docents work as lifters and rickshaws at night, take up petty trade and commercial activities. Some intellectuals have a false impression that they will not find use for themselves and end up excluded from creative activities under the new regime. Slow attraction of the national intelligentsia to active creative work gives certain basis for such suppositions and creates a fertile ground for increasing the activities of reactionary elements and agents of Anglo-American imperialism hostile to the new regime.

The CCP CC has not yet taken a serious policy to prepare its own intelligentsia from among the workers. Workers are not drawn to the communist university, now being organized in Beijing since the leadership considers them insufficiently mature, illiterate, politically backward and allegedly not active participants in the revolution.

9. On the attitude toward the national bourgeoisie.

You advised the Chinese communists "not to push away the national bourgeoisie but draw them to cooperation as a force, capable of aiding the struggle with the imperialists. Advised to encourage trade activity of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside."

The CCP CC widely implements this advice of yours in its activity. However a considerable part of the national bourgeoisie eyes cautiously the activities of the new government and expresses doubts that its rights, declared by the political consultative meeting, will not be infringed, manifests caution in the use of their capital in the industry and trade, fearing nationalization. This finds its expression in a partial cut-back of production, the wrapping-up of trade and commercial activity, hiding of goods-material valuables. On the other hand, the lack of any kind of limiting measures with regard even to the big national bourgeoisie creates conditions for the intensification of its reactionary activity. Even the not so high a tax on the trade turnover, established for 1949, has not been collected for 10 months in all the newly-liberated regions, including Beijing. The state monopoly on salt, tobacco and alcoholic products across the entire territory of the country has not been introduced. No determined struggle with the reactionary and speculative elements is being conducted.

10. On the attitude toward foreign capital

You gave advice that "one must not refuse trade with the capitalist countries on the condition, which would not place such economic and financial responsibilities upon, which could be used for limiting the national sovereignty and for strangling the Chinese national industry."

It is necessary to report that the Chinese trade and industrial circles are prepared to conduct trade with any foreign merchants, for as long as it gives them profit. At the present time the Chinese government has not introduced any limitations on the international trade, as well as on trade by foreigners inside the country. Moreover, there is a policy of flirting with regard to foreign capitalist enterprises and trade companies. No kind of a tax regime or any other limiting measures are being implemented. Foreign enterprises in all respects are put in the same conditions as national trade and industrial enterprises. Foreigners conduct themselves differently in China.

In Shanghai American firms, in whose hands are the energy enterprises, immediately after the transfer of power to the people's government doubled the prices for electrical energy, provided to the national Chinese enterprises, having left without a change prices for industrial and trade enterprises of foreign capital.

11. On the class struggle

A serious danger for the cause of the revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is concealed in the views, which have gained currency recently among party members, to the effect that with the full victory at the fronts class struggle will not die out inasmuch as the new government will draw to economic cooperation all segments of the country's population, including the national bourgeoisie.

Liu Shaoqi, in particular, shares such a point of view. In reality many facts speak to the sudden sharpening of the class struggle in all areas.

Class struggle is currently unveiling with particular force on the economic front. Using the fact that the government lacks in its hands effective means of influence on market relations, class-hostile elements inflate the prices for goods, create an artificial goods deficit, buy up and hide grain thereby causing discontent in the population and undermining the authority of the new government.

Nothing else but economic sabotage was the emission in October 1949 of 664 billion yuan of paper money, which resulted in upsetting money circulation, sharp increase in prices for goods and worsening of the material conditions of workers first and foremost; one must count among similar enemy attacks the increase of the railroad tariff fourfold in a short period of time, which was aimed at the disorganization of railroad transport and normal cargo turnover.

In the month of September, just at the time of the work of the political consultative meeting, a powerful turbine at the state power plant in Beijing was put out of service. On the day of the Soviet Union's recognition of the People's Republic of China a turbine of 70,000 kilowatt capacity was put out of service at the country's largest Jilin power plant. On 1 May 1949 the tramway park of Beijing city was set on fire. In the meantime in Tianjin there was an explosion of ammunition warehouses. The desire of some Chinese comrades to look upon these facts as purely coincidental can only be explained by political blindness.

There is information about the reactionary elements' resort to terrorist acts. In the month of October specially prepared terrorist groups with weapons and poisons for killing of party and government workers were dispatched from Formosa to Central China; two public security workers were killed in Beijing; there is information about a series of murders of military-political workers of the People's Liberation Army, the poisoning of a platoon of soldiers through food.

Finally, already at the very recent time, when Mao Zedong was travelling to Moscow, several people were arrested at the Tianjin station, in whose bags were discovered bombs and other explosive substances.

12. On foreign policy

You advised that the new government should not refuse establishing diplomatic relations with capitalist states, including America, if these states officially renounce military, economic and political support for Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime as a whole.

Despite the fact that England and America have actively supported and [continue to] support Jiang Jieshi, the leadership of the CCP CC until November 1949 was infected with illusions of quick recognition of the People's Republic of China by these countries.

As a reflection of these sentiments, Liu Shaoqi and Li Lisan spoke out against participation in the conference of professional unions of Asian countries by Japan, India and other [countries] subordinate or connected to the Anglo-American bloc so as not to cause irritation on the part of America and England.

This also explains the silencing of the fact of Yugoslavia's approach to China with a proposal on the establishment of diplomatic relations and exchanging of ambassadors.

It is characteristic to note that in one of the conversations in Mao Zedong's presence Zhou Enlai stated that "...if we refuse Yugoslavia's proposal and openly censure its policy, then, one may ask, how are we supposed to act in case America, which is the master of Yugoslavia, approached us."

Among similar sentiments counts also Zhou Enlai's negative attitude toward the dispatch of groups of Soviet specialists to Shanghai and Tianjin because big economic interests of America and England are concentrated at these points.

Such sentiments are the result of pressure on the CC on the part of the bourgeois democrats and other capitalist elements inside the country, who wished and wish the soonest recognition by America and England of new China so as to, relying on these imperialist states, the Chinese bourgeoisie could prevent further democratization of China and disallow strengthening and widening of friendship between China and the Soviet Union.



“Albania is not Cuba.” Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split

Edited, annotated and introduced by Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Ostermann, and Ryan Gage

“Albania is not Cuba.” To most observers during the Cold War this statement would connote the sense that, in the scheme of Cold War geopolitics, Cuba’s peculiar role that brought the world to the edge of a nuclear conflagration differed vastly in significance and consequence from the historic understudy played by the secluded country on the edge of the Balkans. But in fact this statement by a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politburo member to the Albanian ambassador in Beijing in 1961 meant precisely the opposite—comforting reassurance: “If imperialism dares to attack Albania, we will assist her with all our forces.”¹ Unlike Moscow’s allegedly weak response to the Bay of Pigs crisis, Beijing would not abandon its far-away ally, no matter how dire the circumstances. One may wonder whether Beijing would have lived up to such expectations if push came to shove. Yet the statement, at the end of a briefing by the Chinese official on the developments that had unfolded in Cuba, captured succinctly the remarkable importance that tiny Albania had taken on for the communist giant by the early 1960s.

Viewed from Beijing, the small and traditionally xenophobic Balkan country had actually much in common with Cuba. And not just in size and population: as the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s dissolved amidst mutual recriminations at communist gatherings and the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and economic aid, Albania emerged as China’s only but increasingly fervent ally in Europe. Much as Fidel Castro’s revolution had given the Soviet leaders a highly valuable strategic outpost in the US-dominated Western hemisphere, Enver Hoxha’s break with Moscow provided the People’s Republic a political beachhead at a neuralgic spot on the southern edge of the Warsaw Pact. Much as Moscow supported the infant regime in Havana with generous military and economic aid, Chinese leaders stepped up aid in grain, industrial material and know-how to the Albanians after the fall-out with Khrushchev. That this happened at a time of acute shortages and nationwide famine in the wake of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward,” reflected not just strategic calculations but deeper ideological considerations: Much as the Cuban communists’ zeal and actions seemed to appeal to Khrushchev’s revolutionary

romanticism, the Albanian communists’ open defection from the “revisionists” in Moscow likely validated and reinforced Mao’s ideological extremism and his eagerness to challenge the USSR for leadership in the communist world.

Albanian-Soviet relations had been on a path of decline from the post-1948 heyday of anti-Tito collaboration between Moscow and Tirana for some years. Khrushchev’s rapprochement with Belgrade in 1953-1955 and the de-Stalinization campaign launched at the February 1956 Twentieth CPSU Congress threatened a return to the postwar subjugation to the hated and feared Yugoslavs. At the April 1956 Tirana party conference ALP members demanded greater democracy in the inner life of their party organizations and asked their leaders to give up excessive privileges given the severe poverty in the country. Delegates also called for the rehabilitation of certain political figures and a change in relations with Yugoslavia. Though Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha was not named personally, the discussion constituted a severe criticism of his policies. On the second day of the conference, Hoxha launched a counterattack, forcing an end to the mounting criticism. Though he later made marginal concessions on Yugoslav policy and even exercised a certain degree of self-criticism at the Third ALP Congress in May 1956, he saw to it that within a short time many of his critics within the party were purged.²

Having survived the threat posed by the pro-Yugoslav Soviet policies, Hoxha was among the very first and the most violent in renewing the attack on Tito after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Here he soon found himself in company of the Chinese, who were undergoing a radical shift to the left in 1958. Not even a visit to Tirana by Khrushchev in May 1959 could stop the downturn in Albanian-Soviet relations.

During the June 1960 Romanian Workers Party Congress, the Albanian delegation, headed by the party’s no. 3 man, Hysni Kapo, refused to fall in line behind Khrushchev’s orchestrated attack on the Chinese. In turn Moscow refused the Albania’s request for emergency grain supplies, reinforcing doubts on Hoxha’s part that any further support from Moscow would be forthcoming.³ After Bucharest Hoxha sent two letters to the Soviet leadership, complaining that Soviet Ambassador

Dr. Ana Lalaj is the director of the Albanian Cold War Studies Center. Christian F. Ostermann is the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program and has headed CWIHP since 1997/98. Ryan Gage is a CWIHP Assistant and a MA candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).



CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann, Tirana University Professor Ana Lalaj, Vice-Prime Minister Namik Dokle, and GWU Professor James G. Hershberg during November 2004 meetings hosted by the Albanian Cold War Studies Center.

Ivanov had allegedly questioned Albanian generals and officers on the allegiance of the Albanian Army and had apparently tried to gather information from party functionaries and cadres in Tirana, Durres, Elbasan and other localities on the issues raised in the ALP's plenums. In return, Moscow withdrew its ambassador. Perhaps feeling that he that had gone too far, Khrushchev urged the Albanians in August to attend the November meeting of 81 communist parties in Moscow to overcome the Bucharest dispute and "to exterminate the sparks of the misunderstanding born between us."⁴

Meanwhile, an Albanian government delegation participated in the PRC's national day celebrations in October 1960. The head of Albanian delegation, Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi, publicly praised the ideological rigor of the Chinese communists and Mao Zedong personally. Following the fallout with Khrushchev in Bucharest, Hoxha began to purge pro-Soviet personalities from the Albanian leadership, such as Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko. After those purges the Albanian leadership under Hoxha turned increasingly vitriolic in its attacks on Khrushchev. At the Hanoi congress of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, the Albanian delegate, Defense Minister Beqir Ballaku, strongly supported the Chinese position. The recriminations climaxed at the meeting of 81 communist parties. On 12 November, in a conversation with Khrushchev, Hoxha repeatedly revealed his ability to press the Soviet leader's buttons: "Why do you talk this way?" Khrushchev finally retorted with exasperation.⁵ But Hoxha only stepped up his violent charges: in what was widely seen as a philippic, he decried Khrushchev's alleged wrongdoings in front of the assembled delegates: "while the rats could eat in the Soviet Union, the Albanian people were starving to death, because the leadership of the Albanian Labor Party had not bent to the will of the Soviet leadership."⁶

After the Moscow Conference, the Soviet leadership imposed a number of punitive measures on the Albanians for refusal to back the Soviet position: In December 1960, the Soviets cancelled grants and credits and cut off all trade. In April

1961 the USSR withdrew its advisers. In mid-1961 Moscow revoked scholarships for Albanian students in the USSR, later deporting all those remaining. Moscow's East European allies soon followed suit, curtailing much of the support they had provided to Albania since 1949 through COMECON. Soviet actions dealt the Albanian economy a severe blow: Tirana's third five-year plan (1961-1965) was contingent on Soviet aid, and its potential for success fell under serious doubt.⁷

The breakdown of Soviet-Albanian economic relations after Moscow quickly spilled over to the military relationship. Conflict over control of the Albanian-manned but Soviet-owned submarines stationed at the Warsaw Pact base in Vlorë led to the withdrawal of the Soviet submarines in June 1961, leaving Tirana to accuse Moscow of undermining its defense capabilities.⁸ During the 3-5 August 1961 Warsaw Pact summit, called at East German leader Walter Ulbricht's request to discuss the closing of the Berlin border, the Albanian delegate was forced to leave on the first day: his Pact colleagues refused to recognize the junior Ramiz Alia whom Hoxha had sent in his stead in a show of contempt. On 19 August Khrushchev recalled Josef Shikin, his ambassador to Tirana, then, at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in October 1961, engaged in long diatribes against the Albanian leaders (in two speeches on 17 and 27 October). The Albanians followed suit with a month-long media campaign against Khrushchev, headlined with a speech by Hoxha on 7 November widely broadcast by Radio Tirana. In the speech, Hoxha exhorted the Albanian people in now-famous words: "The Albanian people and its Labor Party will even eat grass if it is necessary in order not to be sold for 30 pieces of silver to imperialists."⁹ Four days later, the Albanians addressed a letter to the newly elected Soviet Central Committee appealing to intervene against the "brutal and anti-Marxist actions of Khrushchev and his group."¹⁰ The next month, the countries' embassies were shut down, and at the beginning of 1962, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON *de facto* expelled Hoxha's Albania.

As he sought to propel China towards a more radical path internationally, Mao Zedong sensed an opportunity in the growing Soviet-Albanian estrangement. Sino-Albanian solidarity was plainly emergent at the first open confrontation between Moscow and Beijing, at the communist-front General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in early June 1960. After the Bucharest meeting Mao swiftly stepped in to provide increased economic aid to Tirana as the faucets in Moscow all but dried up.¹¹ Despite dramatic shortages, widespread famine, and mass starvation at home, the PRC granted Albania what was considered to be the largest loan extended by the Chinese government up to that time. Aside from consumer goods (including wheat bought from France and shipped directly to Albania) and agricultural machinery, China agreed to provide the Albanians with a number of major industrial projects. In further evidence of the new commitment, the Chinese bought about 60,000 tons of Canadian wheat in April 1961, shipping it to Albania in May.¹² Within months, Albania would jump to the near top of the list of countries receiving development aid

from the PRC. Only North Vietnam, North Korea and Outer Mongolia owed more to Chinese largesse. As a result, between 1962 and 1965, Albania put into operation a number of industrial plants: major objects included hydro-electrical power plants on the Mati and Bistrica rivers, copper metallurgical plants in Kukës and Robik, a tractor spare parts plant in Tirana, a textile mill in Berat, and an oil refinery in Stalin City.¹³

Chinese and Albanian official statements and reciprocal visits of high officials emphasized the close alliance as an “everlasting friendship.” Despite the projected ideological congruity and fraternity in fighting “modern revisionism,” however, notable differences between the two governments existed, at least until the mid-1960s. Until the failure of the Sino-Soviet party talks in July 1963 and the final collapse of party relations in 1966, Beijing remained—at least intermittently—open to reestablishing unity within the communist camp (though only on Mao’s terms). Obsessed by a resurgence of Yugoslav influence in Moscow, Hoxha, by contrast, opposed any concessions to Moscow, resisted muting Tirana’s anti-Soviet polemics, and internally seemed to bemoan Beijing’s “unprincipled” position. Unlike important segments of the Chinese leadership, Hoxha was ready to burn all bridges to Moscow after the Twenty-second CPSU Congress. Hoxha also came to promote a more formal alliance of the (largely Asian) anti-Soviet left-wing movements and communist parties under Chinese leadership. His hard-line stance vis-à-vis Moscow notwithstanding, Hoxha, however, seems to have opposed Chinese calls for “rectification” of the border issue with the USSR, an issue that Mao raised publicly July 1964 and that would take the two countries to the brink of major war in 1969.¹⁴ Nor did Beijing and Tirana see eye to eye on development strategies or aid levels. The Albanians demanded aid and credits far beyond what Beijing was prepared to give. The Chinese leadership also doubted the wisdom of Hoxha’s large-scale industrialization and modernization policies, and, by 1965, Chinese assistance to Albania was scaled back.

Yet for both China and Albania the other’s allegiance was crucial ideologically, psychologically, strategically, and economically. As time went on, Albanian and Chinese positions on domestic and foreign policy issues converged to a remarkable degree. Hoxha came to emulate the PRC’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” through Albania’s “Ideological and Cultural Revolution,” and in 1967 endorsed the Red Guard Movement publicly. Mimicking Mao’s revolution, Hoxha launched a movement against religion and religious institutions, with Albania being declared the first and only atheist country in the world. As in China, military ranks were abolished, intellectuals were sent to labor in the countryside, and political repression and violence became pervasive throughout the country. Internationally, both countries saw themselves in a two-front struggle against “imperialism” and “modern revisionism.” The Sino-Albanian “friendship” survived so long as the common struggle on the two fronts continued. Only in the wake of the Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s did this close alliance unravel with the same fervor that had fostered its creation.¹⁵

The following documents from the Albanian Central State Archive in Tirana provide “fly-on-the-wall” glimpses of this remarkable relationship. Obtained by Ana Lalaj, director of the CWIHP-affiliated Albanian Cold War Studies Center in Tirana, after their release was requested by CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann and Professor James G. Hershberg during a visit to Tirana in November 2004, the memoranda of these confidential conversations chronicle the Soviet-Albanian split and the emergence of the Sino-Albanian alliance. Not only do these documents allow Hoxha’s Albania for the first time to make its own entry—archivally speaking—in the (*Bulletin*) pages of Cold War international history, the documents provide some of the most revealing evidence that has yet come to light on Beijing’s view of the world and its diplomacy during the early to mid-1960s and the Cultural Revolution. Dated between 1960 and 1967, the conversations cover a wide range of subjects—among them the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Straits Crises, the Sino-Indian conflict, the Chinese nuclear program and non-proliferation, Ho Chi Minh’s 1961 mediation attempt, Warsaw Pact meetings, Berlin, North Korea, the Indochina Wars, China’s relations with the non-aligned countries and Asian communist movements, as well as domestic crises in both countries. Future issues of the *Bulletin* and CWIHP website publications will feature additional documents as they become available.

Notes

1. Information Memorandum on Meeting between the Albanian Ambassador to China, Reis Malile, and Comrade Dong Biwu, 21 July 1961. [Document No. 7]
2. William Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963), 22-26.
3. Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 28; Griffith, p. 41-42.
4. CALPA, Administrative Directory, F. 14, V. 1960, D. 2.
5. See “Hoxha vs. Khrushchev,” p. 190 of this *Bulletin*.
6. See Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 189.
7. Biberaj, 28.
8. Lüthi, 202-203.
9. *Zeri i Popullit*, 8 November 1961.
10. Document 26 in Griffith, 335-346.
11. China had extended limited amounts of aid and credit since late 1954, when Beijing agreed to a long-term loan and provided Albania with wheat, silk, rice and sugar. See Griffith, 23.
12. Griffith, 79.
13. Biberaj, 60. China also took Albania’s side in the Vlorë controversy, seeing in Khrushchev’s actions another manifestation of great-power chauvinism. Luthi, 205
14. Though reasoned in ideological terms, Hoxha seems to have feared that Tirana’s endorsement of PRC territorial claims could prompt the Soviets to inspire Yugoslav or Greek pressure on Albania. Biberaj, 59.
15. See Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 2006).

DOCUMENT No. 1

Memorandum of Conversation between Albanian Ambassador to the PRC Mihal Prifti and Soviet Ambassador to the PRC Stepan V. Chervonenko, 27 June 1960

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSh-MPKBS-V. 1960, L14/1, D.20. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

Today, on 27 June 1960, I had a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, Comrade Chervonenko, at his house. Below I am writing briefly the contents of the conversation.

For your information, before my return to Beijing, he had personally inquired about me with our secretary and had tried to find out whether, in our meeting with [Chinese Communist Party Chairman] Comrade Mao Zedong in the city of Hangzhou, we had any political conversations with him, and of what nature these conversations were. He had asked our comrade to notify him upon my return because he wanted to discuss something with me. Our comrade had replied that so far as he knew, our conversation with Comrade Mao was simply a protocol meeting by our comrades and that no political conversations took place during the meeting. Our embassy comrades do not know about our Beijing meetings with the Chinese leadership comrades. While our comrades were still in Beijing, the foreigners here were interested in knowing about the eventual talks we were going to have with the Chinese comrades and their interest grew even more after the events of the General Council of the World Unions' Federation (WUF) [in Bucharest in June 1960]. After consulting with Comrade Liri, I instructed our comrades that if they would be asked by foreigners, they should answer that [Albanian Party of Labor (ALP) First Secretary] Comrade [Enver] Hoxha's visit to China and to the other fraternal countries was simply a friendship visit by our president to these countries and that there were no political talks, nor would there be any. The Soviet ambassador was sick at the time of our comrades' visit and continues to be. He only leaves the house on rare and special occasions, such as the meeting organized on the 10th anniversary of the Attack on Korea [on 24-25 June 1960]. I met him then, and he tried to find out from me whether there had been any political talks with Comrade Mao. After I assured him that there had not been any political talks, he expressed the desire to meet with me because he also had something to tell me. I met him under these circumstances.

The contents of the meeting are below. After we left Beijing (7 June 1960) he had had three meetings with [CCP Central Committee (CC) Member and Secretariat] Comrade Peng Zhen. He told me that after we left Beijing, all the other Chinese leadership comrades also left, except for Comrade Peng Zhen. They all left for Shanghai, where on 8 June 1960 the Plenum

of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CCP CC) would start, and Peng Zhen had remained behind to oversee all matters in Beijing. On 8 June 1960, Chervonenko, at his own initiative and without authorization from Moscow, asked for a meeting with Peng Zhen and talked with him about the session-in-progress of the General Council of the WUF, which due to the insistence of the Chinese comrades was lasting on without purpose while the WUF itself was in danger of disunity. He said he had spoken to Peng Zhen as a communist and not as an ambassador of the Soviet Union. He had not been authorized to meet on the situation of the session and the dangers they posed, but had, nonetheless, asked Peng Zhen that the proceedings end as soon as possible, even if that meant approving a very simple communique containing only general statements.

"Peng Zhen," he said, "received me with a temper and told me that if the situation has thus deteriorated, we are responsible for this because we are the ones to have raised issues unilaterally. When I asked him what he had in mind, he referred to the communique by TASS on the Sino-Indian border dispute. I knew this issue well, because I started my tenure as ambassador in Beijing last October with talks on this issue. (Chervonenko had been a member of the Soviet delegation [in Sep.-Oct. 1959] attending the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China and took part in the talks on Sino-Indian relations.) I told Peng Zhen that as a member of the Politburo of his party he should know about the talks held during the month of October on this issue and the letter that Comrade Mao wrote after the discussions. I told him that his posing the problem in such a way was a distortion of the truth and hypocritical behavior and asked that this be recorded exactly by the interpreter and that Comrade Mao be notified accordingly. He said that in last October's letter, Comrade Mao had accepted that our side had been right in the position on the Sino-Indian conflict it held during the talks." His talks with Peng Zhen lasted three hours. On the same day, [Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo Member Viktor] Grishin (the president of the Soviet Professional Union) had also held talks on this issue with the Chinese comrades during the session. "In the evening," he said "I spoke to Grishin over any possible back-tracking on the language of the session documents. The next day, however, the Chinese comrades had withdrawn their opposition and had accepted all the documents as they were prepared by the session bureau."

On 15 June 1960 Chervonenko told me that he had had another meeting with Peng Zhen. This time Peng Zhen had requested the meeting and had invited him to his house. He said that Peng Zhen's demeanor this time had been completely different from the first meeting. "Peng Zhen told me," continued Chervonenko, "that he had just returned from Shanghai where he had had conversations with all the comrades and with Comrade Mao. He notified me that the Central Committee of their party had decided to send a delegation to the Romanian

Workers' Party [Third] Congress in Bucharest [20-28 June 1960], gave me the delegation member list and added that he would be leading the delegation. He also told me the opinion of the leadership of his party that representatives of 14 parties of capitalist countries, including representatives of the Communist Party of France, that of Italy and the parties of a few Latin American countries also be invited to the next meeting of the socialist sister parties. Since he intended to discuss this issue with our comrades in Moscow, he asked to go there 2-3 days before the meeting and for this he asked to fly with a special plane. I notified Moscow immediately of this and they agreed with everything. On our third meeting I notified him of this and told him that during their stay in Moscow, he and his comrades would be guests of the Central Committee of my party. Peng Zhen left for Moscow on 16 June. Aside from the comrades of the delegation, with him there were also eight functionaries of the Central Committee apparatus carrying many documents. The Moscow talks took place on 17 and 18 June, and [CPSU First Secretary] Comrade [Nikita] Khrushchev took part in them. He spoke to them about the unfair [sic] talks they had here with you and also on their positions during the session meeting of the General Council of the WUF. The talks continued for five hours and I expect details on them in the coming days. Judging by Peng Zhen's speech in Bucharest, they [the Chinese] have made a sharp turn."

Then he told me that the meeting of the representatives of our parties, slated to be held this time in Bucharest, would not be held since the Central Committee of the Polish comrades and the Central Committee of the Chinese comrades had their own meetings. With that meeting rescheduled for later we would only schedule a preliminary/consultative meeting to decide the place and time for the representatives' meeting, which could be held in Moscow on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. We would also have a meeting of the representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Then he told me very confidentially that after we left Beijing, the Chinese comrades invited [Korean Workers' Party (KWP) General Secretary] Kim Il Sung; and Comrade Mao and other Chinese comrades held talks with him in the same spirit as our own Beijing talks. Kim Il Sung went from Pyongyang directly to Shanghai by special plane. He told me this was information coming directly from their own people, because they had people in every airport both in Korea and here in China. "I notified Moscow immediately," he added, "and was instructed to show no interest whatsoever in their talks. In reality, the Chinese comrades have not told me anything about it and think that we do not know. On the other hand, Kim Il Sung, on his return from Pyongyang, went immediately to Moscow and notified our comrades there of everything he had discussed with the Chinese comrades in Shanghai, and this is another thing the Chinese comrades do not know. Until now the Chinese comrades have not told us anything about their talks with Kim Il Sung. We'll see if they tell us anything tomorrow."

Then, speaking uninterrupted, he said, "What they have told you, that you are the first to learn about their opinions, is a lie. [PRC Premier] Zhou Enlai spoke about this same matter when he was in Mongolia. It should be noted that they have not spoken so openly about [these matters] with them but have, nevertheless, spoken to [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) General Secretary Yumjaagiin] Tsendenbal about these matters." He told me that the Chinese have asked them for 130 or 300 tons of uranium (I do not remember the exact amount). I rushed a bit on this point. Thinking that they knew about it, I said "they have also unveiled their secret to us and told us that they will do all they can to get the atomic bomb." He did not know about this, so he asked very inquisitively, "They have told you this?" I answered positively. "This is a very bad thing," he said. "But this fact," he continued, "I know very well because I follow with much attention and care their activities in this matter. I am telling you that they have nothing in their basket in this matter and could not produce it [the bomb] before 1962. They could not test an atomic explosion because, aside from the uranium, they need many other components which they do not yet have. [PRC Vice Premier and Foreign Minister] Chen Yi had complained to the Czechoslovak ambassador when they met as he was leaving China that we are not giving them the bomb. (The Czechoslovak ambassador was transferred about a month ago. Here he told me that the counselor at the Czechoslovak embassy was an agent of the Intelligence Service and had contacts with the English representative here, and that was the reason he was transferred.) I repeat that they do not have the capacity to make it themselves. Even [French President Charles] De Gaulle had a hard time testing an atomic bomb, and France is still far away from what is called a genuine atomic explosion."

After this I asked him if he knew how to explain this change in position by the Chinese and if he knew whether the opinion presented to us was that of the entire Chinese leadership. I asked for his opinion on the fact that today, more and more, Maoism is being touted as the Marxism of the 20th Century.

He started by answering the last question saying, "I think the Chinese comrades accept that the October Revolution was truly an event of historical proportions on a worldwide scale. But they think that its influence has been larger over the European countries, while the Chinese Revolution, according to their opinion, also of worldwide importance, is more important for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, where the general conditions of those nations, such as poverty, illiteracy, etc., are more or less like those of the Chinese people. As a result, the peoples of these countries and the entire world's workers' and communist movement should take lessons from the Chinese Revolution. They should walk in its path and not in that of the October Revolution. Furthermore, after Stalin's death, someone should be at the helm of the entire world's workers' and communist movement. This person is Comrade Mao and the CCP. This is a case of the personality cult. They

are also pushing the theory that the more suffering, misery and poverty [exists], the more appropriate conditions there are for a revolution.”

The first question he answered as follows: “You might have noticed that Comrade Mao did not present an opinion on the matters brought before you. The same was true with (President of the People’s Republic of China) Liu Shaoqi who was mostly there to chair the talks, while the opinions were presented by Deng Xiaoping. It should be noted that Comrade Mao has mostly retired from managing the everyday state and party matters; all this under the pretense of health conditions. He is not in Beijing. He is traveling from one city to another, and this causes him to be out of touch with the issues and not to take part in solving the various problems. I may say that he has been informed in a very one-sided manner on the Soviet Union and only through the press. When I have met and talked with him about the situation in our country, he has been very interested and has asked numerous questions on other issues as well. This is not a good thing. The one who decides here is Liu Shaoqi. What he says is what gets done. Zhou Enlai has been marginalized from the decision-making. In this situation, Comrade Mao does not present opinions. He stands above everyone. They do not want to implicate him. He stands infallible and only reserves his opinion for decisive moments. Liu Shaoqi did not speak much this time because he is preparing to visit our and other countries this year. This is why only Deng Xiaoping spoke, but his opinions are those of Liu Shaoqi.

Responding to my question as to who was on Liu Shaoqi’s side he answered: “On his side are Peng Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, and (he mentioned someone else’s name, but I do not remember it). Liu Shaoqi is a very slippery (hypocritical) person. He is against us, against the Soviet Union.”

“And who is on the Soviet Union’s side?” I asked. He answered: “Gao Gang used to be on the Soviet Union’s side. I believe you have heard his name. (For your information, Gao Gang is mentioned in the 8th Congress of the CCP CC report by Liu Shaoqi, in the last chapter, on page 90 of the book *The 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, Tirana 1957.) Another friend of the Soviet Union is also someone else (he mentioned the name, but I cannot recall it) who for a long time has been elected to the Central Committee of their party, but who has never been allowed to visit the Soviet Union. Of all the actual and active Chinese leaders, the one who is on our side and stays closer to us is Zhou Enlai.” Since I immediately showed a puzzled face at this fact and asked him about it, noting that he had often described Zhou Enlai to me as the most obstinate [Chinese leader], he answered, “Yes, yes, Zhou Enlai. Despite his position on some matters, he is the person that stands closer to us, but he has been marginalized in current affairs.”

When I asked him why he [Zhou Enlai] had been marginalized, he answered: “When the current Chinese leadership came

to power, it thought that Stalin sought to change and replace it. It asked the most senior cadres to initiate a very anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet investigation. (I did not understand as to whether this was asked by the cadres when this leadership came to power or when the party rose to power.) Zhou Enlai has not signed the ensuing declaration due to its contents and stands as our best friend.” He led me to believe that the marginalization of Zhou Enlai from managing and decision-making was due to his being pro-Soviet Union and due to this last issue (the opinion on the last issue is mine).

Then I asked him who was on Comrade Mao’s side. He said, “Chen Yi and others are on Mao’s side, but they do not exhibit this and do not make decisions. The ones that make decisions are in Liu Shaoqi’s group.”

Then I asked him who Liu Shaoqi was. I mentioned that when Mao Zedong, [People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Commander-in-Chief and CCP Vice Chairman] Zhu De and others were talked about and written about during the Chinese People’s Army fighting against the Japanese and [Republic of China President] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], Liu Shaoqi was never mentioned. He answered that Liu Shaoqi was the most influential person within the party now (I understand this to mean after Comrade Mao). He is the one who decides in all matters. By his hand and signature thousands and thousands of cadres and people had been killed in China.

To tell you the truth, I could not contain my surprise and asked, “How can this be explained?” He answered, “There is one wild card here, and it puts everything in motion. In my opinion, this card is Liu Shaoqi.”

I told him that these are very delicate and important matters and they should be straightened out. He agreed with me saying that this matter required prudence and self-control. He added, “For the reasons I mentioned earlier and because they do not fully understand our policy of peaceful co-existence, they are now raising these issues for the first time.”

Since he never mentioned Yugoslav revisionism, I purposefully stated that, “the Chinese are very tough and resolute toward the Yugoslav revisionists.” He answered, “In this case we should not only consider [Yugoslavian Communist Leader Josip Broz] Tito and his group, who in reality are agents of imperialism, but also the Yugoslav people. The Yugoslav people should not be left to fall more deeply under the influence of the imperialists. We should not allow this.”

Later the conversation moved on to the Yugoslav chargé d’affaires here in Beijing. He said, “Even though he has come to improve relations here, he still continues to look at issues through Western eyes.” I said: “What do you expect from him? He started his career in London and America and you yourself said that Tito is an agent of imperialism.” I spoke at length

about many issues of our relations with the Yugoslavs and he listened with interest.

After about an hour of conversing with him, I asked permission to depart, but he asked me to stay and started to talk to me about the internal Chinese situation. He said, "I have information that in northeastern China (Manchuria) there have been many deaths due to starvation." He stated his opinion that the Chinese comrades are having economic difficulties at this time and that if they would [only] ask for aid or loans, they would not have to face these hard times. "If they would ask, we would give them aid or loans," he said. "But they do not ask. Nonetheless, we are looking for ways to help our Chinese comrades. We are thinking about giving China new aid in light of the new situation, and this is important." He stated his opinion that the actual difficulties China faced were due mainly to the increase in consumption and this was true.

Then he said that until 1967 they would be giving China [aid amounting to] 14 billion rubles in the form of various equipment. 120 large economic enterprises would be built this year from this aid. The 14 billion [rubles] in equipment, if measured by internal Soviet prices, were actually worth 140 billion, or equal to Ukraine's current holdings.

When I asked why China, facing such difficulties, was [still] helping Mongolia and Vietnam with such large sums, he answered that this was due to the fact that China wanted to control these countries.

This, briefly, was today's conversation with the Soviet ambassador. At the end of our meeting he proposed that we meet and exchange opinions more often. I expressed agreement with this.

I forgot to say at the pertinent section of this report that he was interested to know whether we held any talks with the Chinese comrades when we visited Shanghai and whether we showed any particular interest in any issues while there. Actually, the conversation that [ALP CC Politburo Member] Comrade Liri [Belishova] had while departing from the Shanghai airport with Ke Qingshi, the Shanghai Secretary and member of the CCP CC Bureau, was noted by foreigners, including the Soviet consul.

I mentioned that the conversation between Comrade Liri and Ke Qingshi may have been noted, but the conversation actually consisted of nothing more than the issues we talked about here in Beijing of which he already knew. This is how I answered his question.

Typed by [Albanian Ambassador to the PRC] M[ihal] P[rifti].



DOCUMENT No. 2

Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai, 18 January 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, L. 13, D. 1. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

WHAT COMRADE ZHOU ENLAI SAID TO US AT THE 17 JANUARY 1961 MEETING

I thank you for your kind words. I read the notes from your meeting with [CCP CC Member] Comrade Li Xiannian. The relations between our countries have continued to strengthen since the liberation and especially these past few years. Though you are a few thousand kilometers away, our work and interests coincide: Help each other and continue onward. Though our countries are different—one has a large population and the other a small one—the very spirit of our struggles is the same. We admire you because we have three things in common: *First*, you are very dedicated to the fight against imperialism and revisionism; *second*, we are undertaking the same efforts towards building socialism and communism in our countries; *third*, in our relations we both stay faithful to proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism and show perfect unity. We will never lose as long as we keep high these three flags. Hence, we have a responsibility to help you, just as you help us by remaining steadfast on the shores of the Mediterranean. We must remain resolute on these three issues. If others also fight for them, we must support them too.

In the socialist camp there have been countries which lie close to imperialism: Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany. Germany does not behave well towards you and us, but were they to go to war with Western Germany, we would help them. Tomorrow the [East] German delegation is coming here.

Within these next 10 days it is a good idea to arrive at some agreement in principle and choose the issues we will decide on.

I wanted to give you some clarification on issues you discussed with Comrade Li Xiannian.

In relation to economic cooperation we must keep in mind three main issues: *First*, you have a right to ask from us and we will give you all we can, but do not thank us; *second*, ask from us depending on your immediate need. Ask today for what is imperative. Ask tomorrow for what can wait. If we have it, we will give it to you. Meanwhile what we do not have, we will not say we will give to you because it would not be realistic. *Third*, we must manage our activities based on: a) proletarian internationalism, b) the current situation, [continued on p. 195]

HOXHA VS. KHRUSHCHEV

Report of the Meeting of the Albanian Labor Party Delegation with Leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 12 November 1960

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSh-MPKBS-V.1960, L.14/1, D.24. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

Albanian delegation represented by: Enver Hoxha, [ALP CC Member and Ministerial Council Chairman] Mehmet Shehu, [ALP CC Secretariat and Politburo Member] Hysni Kapo, [ALP CC Secretariat and Politburo Member] Ramiz Alia.

Soviet delegation represented by: N. S. Khrushchev, [Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I.] Mikoyan, [CPSU CC Politburo Member Frol] Kozlov, [CPSU Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries Head Yuri V.] Andropov.

N. S. Khrushchev: You may start. We are listening

Comrade Enver: You have invited us. The host must speak first. There is a proverb in our country: "The host must take forty more bites after the guest is finished, and he must also speak first."

N. S. Khrushchev: We accept the Albanians' conditions.

In the name of the Presidium of the Central Committee I express my desire to find and understand the reasons that have brought about the deterioration of the relations between us. I do not understand what has happened since my visit to Albania in 1959. If you have been unhappy with us since then, I must be very dense and naïve not to have understood this. After I returned to the USSR I spoke to all the comrades about the great impression the warm reception by the Albanian people left on me. Besides nice words, we have said nothing (aside from a few jokes, such as the one about the poplars I made with Comrade Mehmet Shehu).

Comrade Mehmet: Certainly, jokes cannot influence our relations.

N. S. Khrushchev: I mentioned that joke because it was the only one I could remember. What are, then, the reasons for the deterioration of our relations?

Comrade Enver: If this is a preamble to our talks, it is another matter. The poplar joke has no place here. You saw how we all laughed when you spoke about the poplars.

N. S. Khrushchev: Then what other reason could there be? Why have you changed your attitude toward us?

Comrade Enver: It is not us but you who have changed attitude. We have had disagreements before, such as about the Yugoslavs, but the change in attitude happened after Bucharest [the Third Romanian Workers' Party Congress in June 1960, at which Khrushchev criticized the Albanian delegation] and it is all coming from your end.

N. S. Khrushchev: I want to make something clear. I thought that we had no disagreement about Yugoslavia. I am hearing for the first time that we have different positions on the Yugoslav issue. You have spoken much more than us on this matter, and we have written and expressed our opinion but always without passion. We have always held that the more they are talked about, the more their luster increases. And this has proven true.

Comrade Enver: We do not see it that way.

N. S. Khrushchev: I am talking about us. But that we have had different views on this issue is news to me. I hear it for the first time. We have held talks in Albania and you never raised this issue. I would like to ask you: What tone of voice should we use? You ask me questions and I answer you, but you are still brooding. If you do not want our friendship, please tell us so. We want a friendship with you, but a proverb of ours says that friendship cannot be forced.

Comrade Enver: We want to be friends forever. We would like to talk amicably. But this does not mean we have to agree on all issues.

N. S. Khrushchev: Who says we should agree on all issues? You are brooding while I try to plead with you. Three times we have invited you for talks. Do you want to doom our relations? I do not understand in what direction you are trying to lead the conversation. I want relations to go back to what they used to be. The Yugoslav matter, which you consider as contentious between us, we may set aside for the moment. That is not a principal issue.

Comrade Enver: The deterioration of relations between us after Bucharest was your fault. We have shown numerous documents to your comrades that attest to this fact. They should have relayed them to you.

Mikoyan: Yes, you have sent them to us. But the point is that you accuse us while we accuse you. Hence we must look to find the issues that can be resolved.

N. S. Khrushchev: I do not understand this very well.

[Hysni] Kapo and I did not have such disagreements in Bucharest. He said he was not authorized by the Central Committee to express his opinion on the issues then being discussed.

Comrade Hysni: In Bucharest I expressed our party's position. As to the need to wait for authorization from our Central Committee, I was only referring to the authority to sign the communique.

N. S. Khrushchev: That is exactly what I am talking about. Then Comrade Kapo said that the authorization from the Central Committee had been granted and that he would sign the communique.

Comrade Hysni: In Bucharest you pointed out that you found the position of the Albanian Labor Party (ALP) strange. You did this at the meeting of the twelve parties of socialist countries, as well as at the larger meeting of the more than fifty parties. The truth is that we expressed to you our party's position even before the meeting of the 12 parties. I spoke to Andropov about this. After he relayed this to you, you instructed him to relay back to the Albanians that they should think it over and try to change their position. When Andropov and I met, we did not talk about the Moscow Declaration, but about the issue of us supporting the Soviet material.

Andropov: I think this issue needs to be analyzed well as it is the second time it has been raised. Initially I met Comrade Kapo along with Comrade [Alexandru] Moghioros, member of the Romanian Workers' Party Politburo, in whose house we were holding the meeting. When I handed him our [information] report, I also talked to him about its contents. Comrade Kapo said that I should relay to Comrade Khrushchev that the Albanians agree with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on this issue. I relayed it to Khrushchev. He said he did not expect a different position from the Albanians. Then Comrade Kapo asked to meet me again and talked to me about a letter he had in front of him saying he was only telling this to me. That night I informed Khrushchev about this. He instructed me to relay back to Comrade Kapo that we do not understand the Albanian position and to relay back to Comrade Enver Hoxha to think over this issue once more.

Comrade Enver: This is nonsense. Our Central Committee has never agreed to the Bucharest Declaration. I have been in the loop with everything going on in Bucharest from the very start.

N. S. Khrushchev: This is not important. The issue seems to be that even before Bucharest you have not been in agree-

ment with us. Yet, you have failed to notify us of this, though we have considered you to be our friends. The fault with all this rests with me for having trusted you too much.

Comrade Mehmet: We ask Comrade Khrushchev to remember the conversations with us in 1957. You gave us your word as we wholeheartedly spoke to you about all the issues, including Yugoslavia. I spoke first, and then Comrade Enver spoke in more detail on the Yugoslav question. You listened and then after a rebuttal from Comrade Enver, you rose and said to us. "Is it your intention to take us back to the Stalin line?" This means that you knew all along that we see the Yugoslav issue differently. But if you remember, when you went to Yugoslavia in 1955, we answered your letter [saying] that we had reservations and asked the opinion of the Bureau of Information on the matter.

Mikoyan: This is exactly how it happened, but this never impeded our friendship. We ask why this happened after Bucharest.

N. S. Khrushchev: Tell us your opinion on why this happened?

Comrade Mehmet: Maybe you could tell us yours.

N. S. Khrushchev: You say that in the USSR the people who recently have come to power are young and inexperienced. Are you trying to lecture us? [ALP CC Politburo Member and Ministerial Council First Vice Chairman] Beqir Balluku has said to our officers, "Khrushchev expelled all the Bureau [Politburo] comrades, [CPSU CC CC Secretary] Malenkov, [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov, [CPSU CC Politburo and Presidium Member Lazar] Kaganovich, [Soviet Premier Nikolai] Bulganin, etc." I have been so many years in this party; I do not know who is older than me here. Here is the letter that Bulganin sent me three days ago, if you would like to read it.

Comrade Enver and Comrade Mehmet: That would not be necessary. This is an internal affair of yours.

Andropov reading the Bulganin letter: (a short review of the letter) Greetings on the occasion of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The 43rd year of the Soviet order is characterized by great successes achieved by our country under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with you at its helm. We wish you and your family success and health. Friendly regards. Bulganin. Moscow, November 1960.

Comrade Enver: We are not interested in why you removed Molotov, Bulganin and the others from the

Presidium.

N. S. Khrushchey: We have informed you on this matter.

Comrade Enver: These are your own internal affairs. You know how you have relayed the information to us. Now to the matter of what you said about Beqir Balluku. While we were in Albania nothing of the kind had happened. If this has happened after we came here, then we will go to Albania and look this matter over. To throw around accusations simply because the old [officials] have been removed and replaced by the young is not right. This is your own internal organizational matter. If Beqir Balluku has said such a thing, we will take the appropriate measures.

N. S. Khrushchey: Unfortunately he has said it a few times.

Comrade Enver: Yes, but do you know what your own ambassador has said? Instead of mentioning many cases, I will mention one that is a military matter. He has put into the question to which side the Albanian army would swear allegiance.

N. S. Khrushchey: Who has he said this to?

Comrade Enver: To our generals, at the airport, in the presence of your general. Our officers replied that the Albanian army would remain faithful to the party and the socialist camp.

N. S. Khrushchey: If our ambassador has said such a thing, then that is sheer stupidity.

Comrade Enver: But this stupidity is political.

N. S. Khrushchey: This is every kind of stupidity.

Mikoyan: Maybe you are inferring that the ambassador's behavior is our official position?

Comrade Enver: One case of stupidity from one idiot may be forgiven, even if it is political, but when it is repeated many times it is official position.

N. S. Khrushchey: Yes, this is true.

Comrade Enver: Your ambassador has been the best friend to our party and to us on a personal level. He is not an idiot.

N. S. Khrushchey: If he has spoken so, he is an idiot.

Comrade Enver: His stupidity only came out after Bucharest. Why did he not do this for three years in a row? This is strange.

Mikoyan: It is not strange. He used to get information from you regularly and had not seen such a behavior from your part.

Comrade Enver: I think you said that he did not know about the disagreements between us.

Mikoyan: No, he did not, because this case was after Bucharest.

Comrade Mehmet: After Bucharest you thought we had betrayed you, so you said *dolloi* [Russian in original, meaning 'down with'] the Albanians.

Mikoyan: Comrade Enver told us that he used to tell everything to [Soviet Ambassador to Albania V. I.] Ivanov, but then stopped doing so. The behavior of the ambassador is a result of this. We spoke about this issue already.

Comrade Mehmet: How would you feel if our ambassador went to Stalingrad and started collecting information? Obviously you would not like it. And what is worse is that not only your ambassador, but even his people have behaved in such a manner.

Comrade Enver: If, as Mikoyan says, we have already spoken about these issues, then why are we still here? If, after we discuss these issues, we proclaim that we are not in agreement with you, then you may say that we already discussed them.

Mikoyan: But we already recalled our ambassador, why are you making an issue out of this?

Comrade Enver: OK, let's leave the issue of the ambassador aside. Now, look what you have written in the letter to the Chinese. This for us is a monstrosity.

Mikoyan: We have simply expressed our opinion.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: (Reading from page 46 of the letter). You publicly accuse us of anti-Sovietism.

N. S. Khrushchey: This is our opinion. Do not get angry.

Comrade Mehmet: You attack us, and we should not get angry?

N. S. Khrushchey: You accused me over our conversation

in [April] 1957. [Back] then, Comrade Enver spoke for two hours, while I kept my mouth shut. I spoke for five minutes and you interrupted me immediately, and then again and again. I said that you do not wish to listen and I could stop talking. Then you came to our Central Committee, said that what happened was not a good thing and [we] reconciled. Now you should let me speak. All four of you are interrupting me again.

We are sorry about what happened to these people. You do not believe us. I do not know Koco Tashko. I may have seen him before, but even if you showed me a picture of him, I would not recognize him.

Comrade Enver: If you would like a picture, we can bring you one.

N. S. Khrushchev: Why do you talk this way?

Comrade Enver: I apologize.

N. S. Khrushchev: You sent me the picture in which we are hugging. Maybe you burned that one. I keep mine at the Central Committee. I will keep it no matter what happens.

Comrade Enver: I keep mine in my children's room.

N. S. Khrushchev: When I was in Albania, I spoke a lot. You made me an Honorary Citizen of your capital and, I think, a representative of Albania in Moscow. I have served this task well. I have ordered that everything should be done in order that Albania becomes a garden. I know [recently ousted ALP CC Politburo Member Liri] Belishova much less than you do. I know that she is a member of the Bureau [Politburo], faithful to the revolution, a good communist. We heard that you expelled her from the Central Committee Politburo. We consider ourselves the guilty party in this. She told us about the conversation she had in China. [Soviet Premier Alexei N.] Kosygin told Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] about this when he was in the hospital. When Comrade Mehmet heard this, his face became white. Was this the reason for her expulsion? You want us to believe that this was done to strengthen our friendship[?] She was a strong woman. She told us openly what she felt. This is a tragedy. You expelled her because she was in favor of our friendship. This is why we wrote about this in the document.

Comrade Enver: Then you consider what is written here as just.

N. S. Khrushchev: Yes.

Comrade Enver: There are two issues here. First, it says

that we expelled a member of the Bureau undemocratically. Who told you that this was not done following democratic rules and Leninist norms, but, as you call it, through Stalinist methods? Secondly, you say that we expelled her for pro-Sovietism and deduce that we are anti-Sovietists. Could you explain this?

N. S. Khrushchev: We are people who know and stand by what we write. This is an act that we do not think will lead to the strengthening of our friendship. If you have come here with the predetermined objective of degrading relations instead of finding agreement, then tell us so as not to waste more time.

Comrade Enver: You did not answer our question. This material has been distributed to all the parties.

N. S. Khrushchev: Only to those parties the Chinese themselves gave it to.

Comrade Enver: We also have our point of view and it does not coincide with yours. You have asked us two or three times whether we want to strengthen or degrade our relations. We have come here to strengthen our friendship. But you do not accept any of your mistakes. You have criticisms of us and we have [criticisms] of you. You have criticized us openly and publicly as well as behind closed doors. You may even have more criticism. Tell us about it so that our Central Committees can know about it. Our Central Committee sent us to strengthen our friendship.

N. S. Khrushchev: Beqir Balluku has said to our military officers that Khrushchev is not a Marxist.

Comrade Enver: We have spoken to your comrades on the issue of the military officers. How could it be in our interest that our military officers at the [Vlora] base quarrel? You keep bringing documents that Comrade Beqir said so and so. You should look at your own officers. I told Comrade Mikoyan that your Rear Admiral in our headquarters is not a Rear Admiral.

N. S. Khrushchev: If you want, we could remove the base.

Comrade Mehmet: How did you arrive at that conclusion?

Comrade Enver: Then what Malenkov and [Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact Marshal Andrei A.] Grechko told us is true! Are you threatening us? If the Soviet people hear that you seek to remove the base from Vlora at a time when the Albanian people wholeheartedly asked for

it to defend Albania and the whole [socialist] camp, because Vlora will be burned before Sevastopol...

N. S. Khrushchev: Comrade Enver, do not raise your voice. Let's speak in turn.

Comrade Enver: If you remove the base, you would be making a big mistake. We have fought without bread, without shoes and...

N. S. Khrushchev: We also fought.

Comrade Enver: Yes, and you have fought *zdorovo* ['well'; Russian in original]. We are here thanks to how the Soviet army fought.

N. S. Khrushchev: You do not know that when the Warsaw Pact was being created [in 1955], Molotov insisted that Albania and the German Democratic Republic not be allowed to enter. "Why," he would say, "should we fight if Albania is attacked?" There are documents attesting to this. I said then that if Albania was not admitted, it would be swallowed whole, so we must admit it. If necessary, we would fight for Albania and for the Democratic Republic of Germany. Now we say that if you want, we can remove the base. The submarines are ours.

Comrade Enver: Yours and ours. We fight for you.

N. S. Khrushchev: But you spit on me.

Mikoyan: Who proposed that the base be created?

Comrade Enver: I did and I have asked for it since Stalin's time.

N. S. Khrushchev: You have no respect for me.

Comrade Enver: I defend the interests of my country. The base territory belongs to us, the submarines to you, and both of us belong to the [socialist] camp.

Mikoyan: It was Khrushchev who proposed that the base be created.

Comrade Mehmet: No, it was Comrade Enver.

Kozlov: We are saying that in our Central Committee this matter was brought up by Comrade Khrushchev.

Mikoyan: You proposed the base to Stalin, but he did not agree to it. And now you say that Stalin is a Marxist, while Khrushchev is not, and that he has not given anything to

you.

Comrade Mehmet: This is not true.

Mikoyan: Your tone says so. It says Khrushchev has given you nothing. We have discussed the base among ourselves. Khrushchev was not for removing the base. I said to him, "if our officers will quarrel with the Albanians at the base, then why do we need it?"

Comrade Mehmet: You have considered us enemies. Even here in Moscow you have undertaken intelligence operations against us. You know this well.

Mikoyan: In that conversation I asked Khrushchev, "Maybe the Albanians are angry because they want the base to be removed." Khrushchev said that the base was in a very suitable place, so we would be sorry to see it removed. "But, even though it is a good base," I said, "if it will cause problems, it is better to remove it." Our Central Committee is for keeping the base. Now we ask you. You also want it to remain [in place]. Very well then.

Comrade Enver: The way the matter was presented here, we should discuss it at [a meeting of] the Warsaw Pact. I want to point out that you have thought about this, while we never have. You say that if we want, you would remove it. Good relations between the Albanians and the Soviets have always existed at the base. Only after Bucharest have there been problems and they were caused by bad-tempered officers of yours. If you insist, we could request a Warsaw Pact meeting. We would lose the most. You would lose eight submarines, and Albania would turn to ashes. We are for keeping the base.

N. S. Khrushchev: You lose your temper. It is impossible to have a conversation with you.

Comrade Enver: You always say that we are hot-tempered.

N. S. Khrushchev: You always twist my words. Does your translator know Russian well?

Comrade Enver: I respect you and you should also respect me.

Mikoyan (talking to Comrade Mehmet about Comrade Enver): He always speaks with passion, while Khrushchev speaks calmly.

N. S. Khrushchev: [British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan also wanted to talk to me this way.

<p><u>Comrades Mehmet and Hysni</u>: Comrade Enver is not MacMillan, so you should take back that statement.</p> <p><u>N. S. Khrushchev</u>: And where should I put it?</p> <p><u>Comrade Mehmet</u>: Put it in your pocket.</p> <p><u>Comrade Hysni</u>: How could you say that he speaks to you like MacMillan?</p> <p><u>Mikoyan</u>: He speaks worse than MacMillan.</p> <p><u>Comrade Hysni (to the comrades of our delegation)</u>: I do not agree to continue talks under these conditions.</p>	<p>(Comrade Enver and the other comrades stand up to exit the room.)</p> <p><u>Comrade Mehmet (to Khrushchev)</u>: You should know, Comrade Khrushchev, that Albania will always remain faithful to the Soviet Union and be a member of the socialist camp.</p> <p>These notes were kept by the translator F. Gjerazi. This copy has not been edited, corrected or checked.</p> <p>[signed]</p>
--	---

and c) the course of action.

I read the notes from the meeting you had with Comrade Li Xiannian and the list of issues. These could be grouped into:

- 1) Commerce for 1961.
- 2) Long-term commerce and cooperation for the years 1961-1965, including specialists, farming mechanization, grain, research, etc.
- 3) Military matters

My thoughts on the first issue:

For goods we must give you 20 million rubles, while you give us 9 million rubles. There is a deficit of 11 million. Last year's deficit was 10 million for a total of 21 million. We think that for this year this is easy to solve.

On the other hand, from last year to June of this year we have given and will give you 190,000 tons of grains. During 1961 we will also give you 2,000 tons of rice, 3,000 tons of fats and 6,000 tons of sugar. All these come up to 60 million rubles and are included in the loan without interest that we have given you. We think that you should pay off the loan around 1971, just as we have done with the other socialist countries. If by then you will have difficulty paying, we could exchange letters and postpone the due date. If in 1981 you will still have trouble paying, the date could, with your request, be moved again to a later date. And if even after that you will be unable to pay, it is possible that we could write it all off. In fact, in order to postpone the 1971 deadline, you could [at any point] from now write a letter from the Central Committee, but this fact should be kept between us.

We also have a request by you for 85 different articles at a

value of 70 million rubles for 1961. We analyzed this request and can give you up to 60% of them. The other 40% we do not have. These last ones we will include in the new loan and not in the one for 55 million rubles. But these matters should be discussed with our vice minister for foreign trade.

Hence, you should for 1961 use 21 million rubles of the previous loan and around 100 million rubles as a new loan. This can also be published in the press.

Thoughts on long-term trade and cooperation (second point):

In relation to this point we have the following issues: *First*, 100 million rubles for farming mechanization; *second*, grains for 1962-1963 at about 350,000 tons (including rice, edible fats, and sugar) or around 100 million rubles; *third*, for the next four years you have requested 125 industrial plants (17 non-interconnected factories, 25 smaller factories advised by [ALP CC Member and Ministerial Council Vice Chairman] Comrade Abdyl Kellezi, and 85 plants [previously to be given] by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, etc.); *fourth*, you have requested from us [the substitution of] the Soviet specialists whose tenure is about to end; *fifth*, similarly, along the activity by Soviet specialists on geological research, you request our specialists to also work in those areas.

The above five issues are complex and not easy like the ones discussed in the first point (trade for 1961).

Our thoughts are that from these five issues the grain issue is the easiest to deal with. If you cannot provide them [grains] on your own, we will give them to you. For the other issues, which are complex, we must understand (explain) these points:

- 1) Will the above mentioned factories by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia be given or not? Is that [decision] final?
- 2) If they will not give them to you, is your work going to continue as previously planned or not?
- 3) We must analyze to see whether we are able to solve all your issues.

We think that, as you also mentioned, the Soviets, the Czechs and others might not keep their promises or drag out the deliveries. We think it is fair to think so. But, at the same time, we think that announcing this immediately could be very damaging. Is this a suitable course of action after the Moscow meeting?

If the Soviet Union and the other countries will not deliver the factories, how can we undertake delivering them to you? At the moment we cannot express our opinion on that matter. We think that you could instead review your plans for these factories. For example: *first*, at the moment farming, irrigation, fertilizers, mechanization, etc. are the most important areas for you; *second*, the farming products processing industry for increasing living standards; *third*, minerals industry, including petroleum, to ensure cheaper foreign currency; *fourth*, heavy industry, smelting, communications, etc.; *fifth*, the construction of an industry for repairing factories. Could you take a closer look at the above issues? Our thoughts could be immature since we do not know your situation extremely well. You know it much better.

Is China able to give Albania all the 125 factories it is asking for and provide the mechanization of farming as well? Is its technological capacity able to give all you ask? On these matters we need a longer period of information exchange and better knowledge of the issues on our part. We cannot give you our complete thoughts within a period of ten days.

On long-term trade and economic cooperation we must decide on the course we should follow. At this moment we could decide the total sum of the loans we will give you. We could say that it will be used for the construction of the economy, construction of industrial works, mechanization of farming, grains, specialists, geological research, etc. But we cannot, at the moment, provide concrete details on how the loans will be used. This we will decide at a later date.

If you agree to all we said, I will notify our Central Committee so that the question of how many hundreds of millions of rubles [we will loan you] can be decided upon. Tell us how much you want. At this time we will sign just a non-specific agreement. We think that the presidents of the Planning Commissions should exchange thoughts and information so we can get a better idea on the above mentioned matters. Among the delegation that we will send to your [ALP] Congress will be a comrade who is knowledgeable in matters of economical planning to continue talks with you. On the other hand, you

requested that we send advisors to our embassy in Tirana. We will send them. At your Congress you could mention that China will help you, but without mentioning specific activities. Later, when the issues with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have been clarified, a delegation can be sent that can finalize specific details on all the matters.

The military aid matter is also very complicated. You are a member of the Warsaw Pact. It is the Soviet Union's duty to help you. We think that it is inappropriate for us to interfere in this matter. Yet, this does not mean that if the Soviet Union does not give you aid, we will not either. We must make a list of the needs for half of the army, 17,500 personnel. But we do not have some of the things you need. We do not, for example, have MiG fighters and Type 19 planes and we still do not have enough tanks. We think that we could provide over half of your needs. We will also notify you later of what we do not have. We need to find out the shape and model of the military uniforms and who will sew them. But this is not the main thing. What is important is that you are a member of the Warsaw Pact.

We think that you should discuss this matter again with the Soviet Union. We will also talk to them so that the relations with Albania improve and that they help you on military matters, because they still utilize Albania as their own port. Your talks with the Soviet Union and ours with them are in the interest of both countries. If these talks are not successful, then we will help you with what we have. If the Soviet Union will get back to helping you, we will stop furnishing you [military aid] because you are a member of the Warsaw Pact. And this does not mean that we do not protect you.

If [ALP CC Politburo Member and Ministerial Council Vice Chairman] Comrade [Spiro] Koleka will give his opinion on these matters, I will notify our Central Committee.

In short, our opinion on the three issues is this:

- 1) For 1961 we can decide on the loan amount and the equipment and can sign the pertinent agreements;
- 2) For long-term trade and economic cooperation we think that at the moment we should decide the amount of funds so that your Congress is not impeded [in its work]. It would be helpful if you talked to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia again to find out if they will deliver the promised plants. You should seek to resolve these issues with them and between us the work will continue unhindered;
- 3) As to the matter of [providing] 50% of the needs of the army (food and dress), we should calculate the necessary amounts and also start preparatory work on the other matters.

Aside from those matters, we should discuss the matter of the [loan] figures that you want altered. The Central Committee

will notify you on this matter and I will also speak to the relevant organs.

(During the talks with Comrade Koleka, Zhou Enlai also said this :)

- It is not possible for us to secure goods, plants, etc. for you from Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, etc.
- We will defer to the Soviet Union on the military aid matters because we cannot deliver military goods without Soviet and other socialist countries' ships. We do not have ships of our own for this.

Note. The Chinese side in the talks was represented by: The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party member and Vice Chairman of the State Li Xiannian, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Zeng Yongquan, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang, Vice President of the Planning Commission Liu Min Fou, Vice-President of the State Economic Committee Chan Kuo Zhian, Vice Chief of Staff Chan Chun Siu and the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Tirana, Luo Shigao.

The Albanian side was represented by comrades: Mihal Prifti, Pupo Shyti and Shenasi Dragoti.

This report was compiled after the notes taken by the comrades attending the meeting were consulted and compared. Three copies of this report were printed. One copy was sent to Comrade Enver Hoxha, one copy is held by Comrade Spiro Koleka, and the third copy is kept at the embassy by Comrade Mihal Prifti.

The notes kept by our comrades during the meeting were destroyed.

The report was typed by comrades Mihal Prifti and Pupo Shyti.

Beijing, 18 January 1961



DOCUMENT No. 3

Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai, 2 February 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V, 1961, L. 13, D. 1. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

30 January 1961

ON WHAT COMRADE ZHOU ENLAI SAID TO US
(At the second meeting on 30 January 1961)

People present at the meeting: from the Chinese side it was the same group as in the first meeting. From our side there were Spiro Koleka and Mihal Prifti.

After we delivered the answers to the questions that the Chinese side had raised during the meeting of 17 January 1961 and requested the loan for 100 + 600 million rubles = 700 million rubles, Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out that he had a question.

Zhou Enlai: Aside from the loan delivered on January 1959 for the years 1961-1965, you are seeking a new loan, is that correct?

Spiro Koleka: Yes.

Zhou Enlai: In other words, aside from the old loan of 55 million rubles you are also requesting a new loan of 600 million rubles.

Spiro Koleka: Yes, without including here the loan for 1961.

Zhou Enlai: Then you are requesting a total of 700 million rubles. We have an opinion on this matter. We are thinking of giving you 100 million rubles this year and for the years 1962-1965 a total of 400 million rubles. These figures were discussed in the Central Committee of our party. On this issue we have a few propositions (the translator used the word 'assumptions') to make to you. And these propositions are well-founded. And here it is where these propositions are based. They are based, as I also mentioned the last time we spoke, on your needs and our capacity.

I wanted to also add a few thoughts based on our experience and wanted to make a few constructive propositions for your country. I knew that in order to complete the third five-year plan you were in need of 800 million rubles. This fact we received from [Vice Chairman of the Ministerial Council and Member of the ALP CC] Comrade A. Këllëzi. We think that if this course is followed, it will not be easy for your country (economically) to accomplish such a task. We think that it is not easy for your country to burden the economy with such weight, because your resources, both above and below ground, and your working force cannot carry the load of (cannot cope with) such investments.

We think that all the socialist countries follow certain mutual rules. And what is this rule? This rule says that if farming cannot be achieved (its development), then the development of the industry is also hindered. Now let us look at how farming is doing and whether it is achieved. Are the grains, workforce, raw materials and market achieved? At the moment, neither you, nor we, or the Soviet Union have secured farming in

certain areas. For example, in the Soviet Union, the percentage of peasants is much higher than that of the United States of America. There are fewer farmers in the USA, hence, she is more advanced and the industry is more developed. In the Soviet Union the level of farming mechanization is much lower than that of the USA. Irrigation levels are also lower. The electrical energy is still not enough and the chemical fertilizer levels are much lower than those of the USA.

If Albania, a country with a population of only 1.6 million souls, will try to develop its industry at such [high] rates, will its agricultural capacity support such a heavy industrial burden? I also mentioned last time we spoke that agriculture has a particular priority. You must increase the efficiency of farming and secure grains without import. When you develop your agriculture, even if there are natural disasters, people will have bread to eat, which is why we advise that during the third five-year plan you ensure bread [grains] without import. In other words, to ensure that you produce all the grain you need, you must achieve an annual production not of 250 thousand tons, not of 400 thousand tons, but production of a total of 600 thousand tons. This way, for your population of 1.6 million souls you will have ensured 400 kilos of grains [per capita] per year. This will be used partly for basic nutritional needs, partly for seed, and partly for animals.

We know very well that ensuring 400 kilos of grains per person is not easy. For example, last year—a year of natural disasters—we only produced 250 kilos grains per person, in fact, even less. In your case, where the workforce is smaller, naturally a higher level of mechanization is needed, especially as you also need manpower for irrigation. To ensure success you need higher investments, more machinery and a faster pace of progress than us. This is the only way to solve the farming problem so that you can produce the necessary 400 kilos per person.

From agriculture you then could draw raw materials needed by the industry. When we speak of agriculture we also include husbandry and dairy production, fishing, the timber industry and other auxiliary resources. Thus, once these areas are well developed, industry will also develop, you will recover your initial investment and the people's living standard will increase. Once agriculture, along with husbandry and dairy production, fishing, timber industry, etc. develops, light industry will also develop and then you will have a real increase in production and prosperity.

You should seek to develop those areas of industry which have greater potential for growth and importance. You cannot assure the development of all areas of heavy industry. You should develop those areas of heavy industry where you can afford to use your workforce, which is not big enough to do everything. If you try to develop heavy industry, you should keep in mind the raw materials, workforce and equipment

needed, and the capacity on our part to give you the necessary technical aid and equipment. We know, for example, that you have petroleum. Petroleum needs equipment, technology and machinery to be exploited. For the next two, three years we are not able to help you with those, we simply do not have them. You need pipes and other equipment. We do not possess refining and processing equipment for petroleum. We import all such technology. If your ambassador would visit Harbin, he would see that our petroleum sits in large puddles. I am telling you now an economic secret of ours: we cannot move it from there because we do not have the necessary pipes.

I'll give you a second example. You need chemical fertilizers. We know that they are important for your agriculture and are sorely needed, but you should keep in mind that you do not have enough coal and we cannot furnish you the equipment. Even the smaller equipment we have, we have had to import, and as for the large factories we have, those are still in the experimental stage. So we cannot furnish you with what you need. You want to build a thermal power station with a capacity of 50 thousand kW, but for the time being you cannot get all the coal it needs. The same goes with petrol. Even if you could get the petrol needed for this, we do not have the necessary equipment and cannot help you with the technological needs either.

We think that the previous help you have received from the Soviet Union and other friendly countries in Europe has not been completely suitable to your conditions. We believe that if we follow the same course, you will move beyond your capacity.

You require a series of industrial factories; today you asked for a few new ones (he is talking about a few new factories, sixteen of them, that we saw in different countries. Some of these are non-interconnected plants and the others are from those advised by A. Kellezi). I have just seen the list. Naturally, it is a good thing that you have a desire for a lot of things. We also went through the same desires in the beginning just like you. But, I wonder, is it prudent to follow such a course? There must be ranking for such things. There must be a decision which should be constructed first and which later; which is more important and which is less [so]. You want to build many plants, but based on your workforce and your technicians, you are not able to achieve all of your goals and we are not able to help you with everything. We cannot make many propositions to you on the course you should follow, but let us see the situation in your country first-hand, let us familiarize [ourselves] with your economy, and then we can discuss these issues from better positions. Obviously, Albania is in a difficult situation. She cannot secure all it needs for herself, due to shortages in workforce and her geographical position which has her surrounded by enemies, so she is forced to ask for help from abroad. But we think that you should secure your common usage goods yourselves. You must secure yourselves on your own, because if you are blockaded from abroad, you

should have the capacity to produce all you need, as we might not be able to help you with such goods, which cannot be transported by plane.

We know very well that should you be provoked by others, you will fight to the end. We are certain of this. But in the next few years you need to develop your agriculture and light industry. These are our thoughts and propositions arrived at based on our 11-year experience. In the morning I spoke with our comrades, and we were saying that a large country has its difficulties, but a smaller one has its own as well. We understand you fully.

Now, what are the concrete steps we should take?

First. For this year, we should decide on the new loan for the goods discussed in the correspondence between Comrade Mehmet Shehu and me for the 190 thousand tons of grains and other food stuffs; these come up to about 66 million old rubles.

Second. For list number one we have analyzed the 85 articles you are requesting; those come to about 70 million rubles. For the moment, we can furnish you with goods of around 14 million rubles in value. We can produce about 30 million rubles more in goods this year, but we must first talk to the pertinent departments, because the planning for this year has been designed, and we need to find the appropriate raw materials for them, etc. Nonetheless, we should eventually be able to furnish you with about 60% of the goods on the list, though, for the moment, we are unable to do so. Hence, we cannot give you a concrete answer at this point. So, the grains and these other articles value about 100 million rubles. For the other years we will have a total of 400 million old rubles.

(Answering our remark that these goods have a value of 110 million rubles and not 100 million, the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade said that the list's value is less, so in total the value of 100 million is not surpassed.)

From your request for 100 million rubles for agricultural equipment and tools, for this year and the next we can only furnish you a small amount, because we do not have all of it. We also have a large deficit. If the next few years we are more successful, we will give you more and can fulfill a part of your requests. The 300 million rubles shall be used for the plants of the next few years, or about 70 million per year. They cannot be used for 1961; we cannot furnish you with the equipment.

As the comrades of the Planning Commission told me, and as the experience with Vietnam, [North] Korea and Mongolia has shown, we can tell you that it is not an easy thing to build all those factories. Many things need to be taken into account: securing the necessary workforce, equipment, etc. You could secure those things with this loan. Our equipment does not cost

much compared with the other countries, but this is a large volume of goods. We are concerned that you will not be able to use them and will have to push their usage into the next five-year plan. Vietnam went through the same thing. Though a country of 16 million, it is not able to provide 40 thousand workers for construction, because more are needed for other projects as well. The Vietnamese comrades asked that the deadlines for sixteen projects be moved forward, because they are not able to meet them.

In closing, I would like to say that we should sign a simple agreement, which says that we are giving you a loan of 500 million rubles for the period of 1961-1965. The agreement must say that through this loan our side is giving yours materials, equipment for complete plants, scientific materials, technical help, etc. As to the loan's actual use, we must make specific protocols. For the moment we will give you the 14 million rubles for the items on the first list. Let us not rush ahead for the others yet. Let us study the issues carefully. The money is yours. The agreement should be simple and clear. If you can spend this loan until 1964, we will take a look at it again. You can ask us again for 1965 and we will look at your request together as brothers. We should be in a better position to help you by then. It is not necessary that we include lists and details, such as the 16 factories we mentioned earlier, in this agreement. We could do that later. You can announce to your [ALP] Congress that China desires to help you. If we add to the agreement details of actual factories, we might fall into disagreement with the Soviet Union and the other countries that have pledged to help you. We should only mention the amount of the loan we are giving you in the agreement, so that we are fine politically as well.

Military matters. As I also said last time, we cannot help you here because until now you have not answered us whether we can mediate with the Soviet Union.

(Comrade Koleka expressed his regret to Comrade Zhou Enlai for the misunderstanding on this point. In order to straighten out this point, we note that all four members of our side did not understand that Comrade Zhou Enlai was seeking the opinion of the Albanian comrades "whether China should mediate or not with the Soviet Union on the matter of military deliveries to our army." It seems the translator did not interpret faithfully Comrade Zhou Enlai's thoughts, because all our notes were the same and that was what was sent to Comrade Enver.)

Now that Comrade Li Xiannian will go to Tirana he will speak to Comrade Enver Hoxha about this matter. As I mentioned last time, we cannot help you with weapons. The same goes for food and uniforms. We cannot help you with them, because if the Soviet Union finds out, they may misunderstand us. We cannot help you with other goods either, such as fuel. You know well that we do not have fuel and that we import it

from the Soviet Union. That is why we cannot give you fuel from the Soviet Union. The same with lubricant oils and spare parts, because a large number of them are from the Soviets and ours are not the same. Your army is equipped, fed, dressed—its overall level is—better than our army. In the future, if the Soviet Union will stop helping you altogether, it will be another matter. At the moment, we think that you can import the fabric, canned food and other items you need through your regular foreign trade... temporarily. You could use the old loan of 55 million rubles, buy the goods and process them in-country.

You can review these four points once again and let us know what you think. There is one thing we want: We desire to help you. We should carefully assess how to proceed so that we help the development of your economy and do not overload you.

Two of the comrades from the delegation coming to you are from the Planning Commission. They will assess there the matter of the two petrol engineers that you have requested. (This request was made in this meeting as the telegraph by Comrade Mehmet Shehu ordered.)

The two cipher comrades will also be part of the delegation. They will be staying at our embassy in Tirana. This should be completely secret so that no misunderstandings will arise.

I can tell you that this year, due to the natural disasters of the past two years, we will be importing 3 million tons of grains. We have authorized Comrade Li Xiannian to sign the necessary agreements with Canada and Australia. We will import 2.3 million tons of grains from there.

(Compiled out of the notes taken by Spiro Koleka and Mihal Prifti. Typed by Mihal Prifti in three copies, one of which was left under the care of Mihal Prifti.)

Beijing, 2 February 1961



DOCUMENT No. 4

Report on the Second Meeting with the CCP Delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Labor Party, 25 February 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, L. 13, D. 4. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

REPORT

ON THE SECOND MEETING WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (CCP) DELEGATION THAT CAME

TO OUR COUNTRY TO ATTEND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4th CONGRESS OF THE ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP) ON 25 FEBRUARY 1961

The meeting was held at the office of the ALP CC First Secretary Comrade Enver Hoxha at 10 a.m. and continued until 2 p.m.. From our side the member of the ALP CC Politburo and the head of the Council of the Ministers, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, was also present.

Attending from the Chinese side there were the head of the delegation, Comrade Li Xiannian, comrade [blank; name not in original], and the interpreter.

After the greetings and everyone was seated, [Hoxha] took the floor:

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We finished our party's congress with success. What did you think about our congress? How did your visit to our country go?

Comrade Li Xiannian: Well, we saw that your leadership and the masses of your party hold the same positions.

After the congress we visited a few cities like Kavaja, Lushnja, Berati, Fieri and Vlora and we noticed the great changes that had taken place in comparison to 1954, the last time I visited Albania. Your industry and agriculture have progressed far ahead, and the Albanian people's living standards have improved considerably. Your people's enthusiasm is complete and visible everywhere. Your working masses' love for your party and for Comrade Enver Hoxha is extraordinary. You have progressed faster than us in these areas.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: No, you are further ahead than us. China is a very great country.

Comrade Li Xiannian: The ALP leadership and the Central Committee with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its helm are fully on the right course. All I have seen in your country is an indication of your just party line.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We think that the 4th Congress of our party went well and was successful. There the determined unity of our party and its just, consistent and Marxist-Leninist line was fully confirmed. This fact has us convinced that in the future our party will successfully fulfill the promise it made to the people to execute fully the 3rd five-year plan and to resolutely defend Marxism-Leninism against all the internal and external deviators.

Some of the principal moments of the congress, where our whole party was represented, showed that our party is following the just course in these hard times that not only we, but

the whole internationalist communist movement are going through. I want to say that the just reactions of the congress prove that our party is resolute in executing faithfully the [1957] Moscow Declaration. The party now understands who is on a just Marxist-Leninist course and who pursues an unjust, opportunist and revisionist one. The reaction of our congress showed that in these very delicate moments the party knows how to keep the balance between its love, friendship and fidelity to the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Communist Party of Lenin and the group of persons who follow the Khrushchev line, who can be rightly called opportunist revisionists, along with the other groups and elements who are now in the leadership of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. We would like to say that our congress knew how to maneuver smartly and handle justly the challenge it faced.

On the other hand, our congress knew how to manifest very well our faithfulness and friendship to the glorious communist parties of the Soviet Union, of China and all the other parties—but mainly to the communist and workers' parties of Asia who are consistent and firm in the defense of Marxism-Leninism—to their just line and to the defense of the Moscow Declaration. This was clearly shown by our congress.

Our congress also showed our full faith in the fact that we are a great power and will successfully resist and emerge victorious over the dangerous, revisionist tide that has initiated a savage attack against the international communist movement. This is very important to us. Obviously, as the leadership, we understand its importance, but when the whole party understands it too, then the just position of our party and of our people's republic is strengthened immensely.

We have kept our party in touch with issues and have done so in all situations. We notified our party immediately of the course of events [at the Third Congress] in Bucharest [in June 1960]. We told our party the good side and the bad, how they accused us in Bucharest and in Moscow [in November 1960] and how the CCP defended us from those attacks. Hence, the delegates were prepared before they came to the congress and had a well developed political sense. The party is also very much in touch with the contents of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's speech. Thus, not only the leadership, but the masses of the party as well, know these issues and the situation very well.

The congress delegates did know what dirt the Czechoslovak delegation was cooking up backstage at the congress, but their reaction was quite just. The congress delegates smelled their intentions and reacted very justly and politically.

You probably noticed this yourself, but we are of the opinion that both the Soviet and the Czechoslovak delegations had taken it upon themselves, in cooperation with many of the other delegations, to sabotage our congress. It was very clear

that they had not come here with friendly intentions and to improve a bit the relations between our parties. The same could be said about the Polish, French, German, Italian, Bulgarian and Romanian delegations. Their intention was to attack our party and through it the glorious CCP, to attack our just views and to try and find some reason to accuse us of deviating from the Moscow Declaration. These were our thoughts on the first issue, the international situation.

Secondly, their immediate intention was to create a schism at our congress, in order to separate the leadership from the congress (meaning, the party) and if unable to achieve this, to create such confusion at the congress as to be able to use this later in their subversive activities.

Third, they tried to stage provocations at the congress so as to cause some scandal that would allow them to leave.

We knew very well they would attempt this. It is of great importance that the congress understood the situation very well. It is of great satisfaction to our leadership that the situation did not influence the congress delegates. Their reaction was spontaneous, no internal directives were necessary.

The leader of this unfriendly activity was the Soviet delegation. But the main intriguer was Andropov.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: He is a snake. He is not human.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But the role of the greatest and most open provocateur was played by [CPCz CC Member Rudolf] Barak, the leader of the Czechoslovak delegation. He showed himself to be a dastardly provocateur. But they failed in their intentions. The congress gave them a punch and taught them a good lesson. It showed the steely unity of our party. There has never been seen such a unity within our party. This is supported by the fact that while in the previous elections there have been a few votes "against," this time, as you saw first-hand, not one vote was "opposed," there was perfect unity.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Our congress did this to spite Khrushchev and Barak. The congress delegates were furious with their subversive and provocative behavior, so all of them decided to vote without any objections.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This was a terrible lesson for the revisionists. They saw that not only is it impossible to use intrigues and instill division, but that our party is tight and united when there are dangers threatening the party, the people and international communism. They themselves attest to the cohesion of our party with the CCP, which carries high the unsoiled flag of Marxism-Leninism. They saw this tightness on an international scale.

We think that our party's congress gave the revisionists a

good lesson in both the national and the international arena. During the first few days of the congress they would not even say 'good morning' to us. But towards the end of the congress, when they saw the determined unity of our party, [CPSU CC Secretary Petr] Pospelov and his people asked for a meeting with us. So we met with them.

Pospelov took out his notebook and—afraid of making a mistake—read out word for word what he had written, looking at Andropov from time to time. We think their coming here was an attempt to sabotage our congress. They did not mention our congress, nor the reports read there, nor the congress delegates' discussions or anything of the kind, as if nothing out of ordinary had been happening in Albania lately. (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs). But listen to this, according to them other more important events had taken place in the relationship between our countries. They claimed that one of our people while drinking *raki* in a restaurant had cursed Khrushchev next to a Soviet specialist. They also claimed that at the scene there were a few Soviets and one Czech as witnesses. Aside from that, they also brought up an issue claiming that we had searched the offices where Soviet geologists work. They also brought up some other issues that were so unimportant we don't even remember what they were. And after mentioning all these stories [Pospelov] concluded by saying that the friendship between our two sides and parties cannot be meaningful if Khrushchev is never mentioned and is completely set aside.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: He had a problem with the fact that we did not applaud in Khrushchev's honor at the congress.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: He did not say this.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: He did not say it, but he meant it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We, clearly and in an amicable way, told them our views on how our party sees the sacred friendship with the Soviet Union and Lenin's communist party and that our congress attested to this. We told them exactly where our party stands on this issue. We said how our people and party love and will sincerely love the Soviet Union, that we would never wish evil on the Soviet Union, because whoever does that, is wishing evil upon their own people. We also told them that should something happen to the Soviet Union, the Albanians would be the first to jump to its defense. We reiterated that those are just not words, but that we have shown in practice and will always prove this in any situation that requires it.

We told them how there were people in the world that because we consistently defend Marxism-Leninism, call us anti-Soviet, while the true anti-Soviets now pose as defenders of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev himself told me how [Polish leader Wladyslaw] Gomulka acts like a fascist, and

now Gomulka has become pro-Soviet and we have become anti-Soviet? But this does not split us. We know how much the people and the CPSU love us.

We reiterated that Albanians never break their promise and that we would continually strengthen and temper our friendship with the Soviet Union. As to Comrade Khrushchev, we did not interfere with the internal affairs of the CPSU. He is the leader of the Central Committee of CPSU, elected by their congress. We see him as such and we do not meddle in the internal affairs of a friendly party and nation. But he cannot knock out our leadership either. We told them that this fact must be clear to them.

Our friendship with the Soviet Union is not simply symbolic. This friendship we must temper in close cooperation with each other, but always the Marxist-Leninist way. But with whom shall we do this? Certainly we must do this with the Soviet leadership, we said, with Comrade Khrushchev, [Anastas I.] Mikoyan and the other Soviet leadership comrades, but on the basis of equality too. The Soviet Union is certainly much more powerful economically and militarily than we are, but both sides are Marxists, so the Soviet leadership should not think of us a small and poor people and seek to impose unjust views on us. This, we said to them, is how we understand cooperation, sincere, fraternal, in the Marxist-Leninist way.

They told us, and we agreed with them, that we have disagreements with the CPSU leadership, disagreements that are political, ideological, and actual. To say that these disagreements could disappear with a stroke of the pen would be lying to ourselves. They can and should only be smoothed over gradually, with goodwill and in the Marxist-Leninist way from both sides. They also say that we are in agreement on this course (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs).

As to the accusation that we have spoken ill of Khrushchev, we told them that those are slanderous accusations, and, in fact, their claims were discredited. We undertake office inspections two-three times a year everywhere because it serves to strengthen the care that our people put in the protection of state and party secrets. We do the same thing, two-three times every year, in the Central Committee apparatus. We do it in the petrol administration where Soviet comrades work with ours. We even did it in their presence after we obtained permission from their manager before we started. We told them that they also did the same in the Soviet Union. In fact, we learned this practice from them.

It happens in our offices that people forget important documents lying about in desks. We performed inspections in the petrol administration because it was ascertained that some Soviet specialists had hung secret maps on the walls. Other Soviets, instead of fulfilling their appropriate state duties, made special maps that have nothing to do with their jobs, claiming

that they have been asked to do so by Moscow. (Comrade Li Xiannian shows his surprise at this.)

Comrade [blank in original]: The Soviets have published special articles on the care that employees should take for the protection of state and party secrets.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But they used our measures as a reason to fulfill their intention, e.g. the recall of the Soviet petrol specialists from Albania. We told them to stop this activity, because should we start with such blame, we could provide long lists of activities against our party and leadership by the Soviet people in Albania and in the Soviet Union.

Then we reiterated that in order to strengthen our friendship, both sides must show good intentions, but the Soviets have only done the opposite. We also brought up the matter of loans. We asked why they sought to stop the loans and why they tried to tie their issuance in the future to a trip by me to Moscow. These loans were decided bilaterally at the highest levels and the appropriate documents have been signed. Mehmet and I traveled to Moscow in 1959 for this matter.

Then why are you revisiting this matter, we asked. Is it for ideological and political reasons, or for other objectives? They said that there were no ideological or political reasons, that for these matters we had the Moscow Declaration, and any political or ideological disagreements could be solved on the basis of the Declaration. Then we asked why we should visit Moscow for a matter for which we already had an agreement. "We know why you want us to visit Moscow," we said. "You want us to kowtow."

Comrade Li Xiannian: Their mentioning of the Moscow Declaration as a basis for solving political and ideological disagreements is a good thing.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Andropov said that a government was entitled to reconsider its prior agreements. We answered that the Soviet government could reconsider its agreements with the Yugoslav revisionists or the capitalist countries, but it should not do so for agreements it has with a socialist country like Albania and a Marxist-Leninist party like the ALP. Since you are eliminating the ideological and political disagreements, there is no reason why economic agreements signed from both sides should not be executed and the respective loans should not be granted.

We reiterated that though they might say that these were not the reasons for stopping the issuance of loans to us, we knew that in reality they were. We made it known that we would never trample on Marxism-Leninism. We would not go to Moscow to reconsider the agreements we have signed together. We consider them positively indisputable.

We also told them that we had never been and were not

against meetings and dialogue at all levels, including high-level talks, and we were still ready to meet with whatever official, including Comrade Khrushchev and other Soviet leadership comrades, but we would not meet about the matter of the loans for which we had already reached an agreement. We have openly said to Comrade Khrushchev that, though we may end up without bread or shoes, we would never trample on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the honor of our party and people as you [Khrushchev] were asking us to do. We told them that it would be a great crime against Albania and a very serious disservice to the international communist movement if the agreements were disregarded and Albania did not get the loans, because not only were they important economically for our country, but they also had great importance from an ideological and political standpoint for the whole international communist movement. We said that if the loans specified by the bilateral agreements were to be issued accordingly, we would consider this a first sign of their goodwill for improving relations with our party and state. This is how we laid down the issue.

Comrade Li Xiannian: You have acted the right way.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We told them how our Central Committee and government has written four, five letters to them on these issues and they have never answered. Is this normal, we asked? We told them that this was a sign of disdain by their government and the Central Committee of their party. Andropov interrupted saying that they had answered our letters. I told him that these answers he spoke of had to have been held back in some drawer somewhere, because our Central Committee never received any.

Then we mentioned how we had written to them on the issue of the problems with armaments deliveries described in our military agreements.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We are talking about the credit that the Soviet Union has not delivered for a while now on this area. After [the] Bucharest [conference] all the military deliveries have been stopped and all the bilateral agreements have also been suspended.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We told them that this was a serious matter, because we were a member state of the Warsaw Pact, because we were a small country surrounded by enemy states, because many conspiracies were at work against our country, and that at precisely these hard conditions they were suspending deliveries. This was a serious matter for us and for them.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We also pointed out to them the fact that when the Indonesian marshal, [General Abdul Haris] Nasution, visited Moscow recently, within a week the Soviet Union conferred a loan of one million rubles for military equipment, etc. Meanwhile the Albanians, who had signed

agreements with the Soviet Union and were members of the Warsaw Pact, had stopped receiving deliveries.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is precisely so. Hence, we told them that these issues should be taken into account as soon as possible by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The unfair treatment should cease and action should be taken so that we would receive what should be fairly given to us.

We told them that they ought not think that since China was also helping us, we did not need them anymore and they should not give to us. We reiterated that China has done her eminent internationalist duty toward us in these hard times, but that does not mean that you should not give to us. At this point we told them that China had given us a loan of 500 million rubles.

They had no answer to our arguments, so the conversation later steered to laughter and jokes. At the end I told them to give my regards to Comrade Khrushchev when they returned to Moscow. When I said this, Pospelov rose and said, "How could I possibly send him your regards?" He could not believe his ears. "Yes," I said. "Give him my regards." Then Mehmet asked that he give him regards too, and Comrade Hysni [Kapo] asked for same as well. "I will make a note of it," said Pospelov.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: They saw this act as something extraordinary and unbelievable, as a success that they succeeded in wresting greetings for Khrushchev from Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs.) In other words, the end of the discussion was a bit more light-hearted.

After they left Albania and as soon as they arrived in Budapest, based on the information we have received from our people, Pospelov told the Hungarian comrades that they had achieved more than they thought they would in Albania, while the Czech comrade said, "We're finally away from all that noise." Andropov added that the Budapest fog was better than the Tirana sun. He truly is a man of fog.

You, Comrade Li Xiannian, already had a good idea of our party's stance, but now, after the congress, have a much better picture of the strong and healthy situation of our party and people, their determined unity and their resolution in defending Marxism-Leninism and the freedom and independence of Albania.

Comrade Li Xiannian: (Nodding in affirmation). They are bound like flesh and bone.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Before the congress they were already bound like flesh and bone, but the hostile behavior of these provocateurs made them one, in other words the party and the people have merged into one.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Our determination to defend Marxism-Leninism, to progress on the road laid by the Moscow Declaration, to strengthen and temper our friendship with the Soviet Union, the PRC, their glorious parties and all the countries of the socialist camp is unshaken. The matter of our unity is of great importance, and it is crucial to all of us. We will fight for the strengthening of our unity with all our might.

Our party's Central Committee and the party itself will never give the revisionists a leg to stand on so that they may fight against us. We will never take an unmeasured step which they could use against us. They are so uncouth that they could make a male donkey pregnant, meaning that they make things up.

We have been and will always be united for the defense of this important cause with the glorious CCP, with our dear friend Mao Zedong, for whom our party has very great love and respect, and we say this with all our hearts. We are proud of this relationship and have unshaken faith that in these very hard moments for international communism, together with the great CCP, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its helm, we are holding high the unsoiled flag of Marxism-Leninism, something that is of life-saving importance to the international communist movement and humanity as a whole.

We briefly presented our point of view in this matter. It is the opinion of the Central Committee of our party that international communism is going through an enormously grave crisis. A very strong revisionist current is pervading the international communist movement, creating grave and serious dangers. Tito's renegade, revisionist group is one of the main enemies of communism, and while he has been unmasked, he has not yet been destroyed. (Comrade Li Xiannian nods affirmatively.) But the N. S. Khrushchev revisionist group is much more dangerous. He poses a greater threat to the international communist movement because he has not been unmasked yet. His course not only breeds disunity, but is also a great danger to the peace and the international communist movement.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: To the peace, of course, because the more disunited the socialist countries appear, the more courage and hopes are instilled in the imperialists, especially the Americans, to attack the Soviet Union, or at the very least, China.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: That is why we think that, first of all, the Soviet Union itself is in great danger, because the revisionist Khrushchev group is at the helm there. His plans are to weaken and ultimately liquidate the socialist camp, starting with the great Marxist-Leninist China, which is the foremost obstacle to revisionists and the unbending and resolute defender of Marxism-Leninism.

This is the reason why, besides considering this as our party's national duty, we consider it a great international task

to save our socialist camp and international communism from the subversive and rabid activities of Nikita Khrushchev, and, at the same time, to save the Soviet Union by gathering around the strong party that carries high the flag of Marxism-Leninism, the glorious CCP. This should be the internationalist duty of all parties that are consistent in their defense of Marxism-Leninism. (Comrade Li Xiannian nods in approval.) We should all be clear on this point. To us Albanians, to the Central Committee of our party, this point is perfectly clear and not even cannons could budge us from it, as we say in our language. But how could we achieve our objectives? By interfering in the internal affairs of Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, whose leadership has slipped away from the Marxist-Leninist course? Absolutely not! Only through our unrelenting stand for the defense of Marxism-Leninism, our political position against imperialism and modern and Yugoslav revisionism, and gathered as a perfect group around the CCP would we shed light on the eyes of those who have fell in darkness. As for those like N. S. Khrushchev, who are enemies to Marxism-Leninism, we harbor no hope of recovery.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have lost all hope in N. S. Khrushchev and W. Gomulka, just like we had lost [hope] long ago in Tito.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We, as I said before, will keep our poise and work strategically with them. Our party is in full agreement with all the positions of the CCP in ideological matters and in all the wider international matters. But your party's Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong should be certain that we Albanians will always fight to the end for this great cause. But we are a drop in the ocean. It is our opinion that the great and glorious task of the great Chinese people, of your party and its Central Committee, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its helm, in this very difficult situation that international communism is passing through, is to gather around itself all the other Marxist-Leninist parties in the struggle against the dividers [and] in defense of Marxism-Leninism. This is how we view this issue.

Our party's Central Committee is aware that this issue cannot be solved quickly. This will be long and complex, hard and knotty, and can be solved neither in a day, nor a year, nor 5 years.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Comrade Mao Zedong has foreseen that it will take 10 years.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The renegade Tito has been in power for 13 years, and he continues there even though he has no missiles or hydrogen bombs, nor great economic potential, nor the great international authority that the CPSU has and in whose shadow Nikita Khrushchev operates. That is why we are fully in agreement with Comrade Mao Zedong's view that this will take a long time.

But you understand how difficult our country's situation is under these conditions. We are now surrounded not only by capitalist countries, but also by a second encirclement of friendly socialist countries, led temporarily by revisionist leaderships. The imperialists have struggled now for 17 years to destroy our party and fatherland. They will not give up their weapons and will continue their economic efforts with intensity, but to their ranks is now added the enemy activity of N. Khrushchev and his followers.

We know we are not alone. We have a faithful and resolute friend in the PRC, in all the Marxist-Leninist parties, and in the fraternal people of Asia. We have the support of the fraternal people of the Soviet Union and all the other socialist countries. All these are important factors in the defense of our country. But, practically, we are as Comrade Mehmet said; we dance before the mouth of the wolf. Hence, the policy of our Central Committee will be such that the wolf will not be able to close his mouth. We will achieve this by always being vigilant and ready militarily, politically, ideologically and economically, to destroy the plans of the capitalist countries and the hidden plans of the revisionist groups. Our party's Central Committee will be always vigilant in defense of our country and in the policies and strategies that we will follow in the current situation.

We will leave no tactical opportunity unexploited, but our strategy will not be exactly the same as Great China's strategy. Great China is a big country, very powerful. The enemies will certainly try to hurt it too, but they better think it over well, because she is a continent in itself. So before they start something, the imperialists and the revisionists better think it over. China cannot be hurt easily. Our party's Central Committee understands and finds it logical that the strategy and policy of the CCP CC in many issues is to lay a wide net. It does this because the great economical and political power of China allows it to do so, while our country does not have the same capacity.

I am trying to say that the CCP should understand us when our party's strategy is stricter, curter, and tougher.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: This happens when the situation warrants it, and our strategy would be in line with your party's general policies and not in contradiction to it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Thinking that Albania is a small and lonely country, the imperialists will openly try to liquidate us, while the revisionist groups in the leaderships of the European socialist states, like those in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and the GDR, will do it secretly.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Their immediate objective is to liquidate Albania, not China.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Hence, influenced by these condi-

tions, our strategies will be rougher, more resolute. In the current situation, the enemies that are trying to eliminate Albania also take into account the great potential of China's aid to Albania, especially its political and ideological help, despite its geographical distance from Albania. Our enemies cannot but take this powerful help into account in this important situation for the international communist movement and peace. It is of the greatest importance to us.

Now let us not talk of the imperialists that have surrounded us, especially the American imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists, but let us turn our attention to Nikita Khrushchev's revisionist group and the other revisionist groups that stand at the helm of the European people's democratic nations. They have initiated and are waging an intense ideological and political war against our party and leadership. The Soviet press, led by the newspaper "Pravda," has stopped talking about Albania and its economic problems since the Bucharest meeting. In other words, they are politically isolating us in this field. On the other hand, ideologically, after the [November 1960] Moscow conference, people within their parties are slandering us and inventing all kinds of things about our leadership. We know what Gomulka has said and have information that the Polish press has also received orders to be silent on Albania.

Comrade Li Xiannian: At the Moscow conference, Gomulka invented a lot of slanderous things about the ALP.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: And now he has ordered his press to stop talking about Albania. The same is happening in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia, and in Romania. In Bulgaria, also led by a revisionist group which is in fact N. S. Khrushchev's faithful lackey, the Bulgarian press mentions Albania here and there due to the friendly relations that exist between the Albanian and Bulgarian peoples and the strong pressure from the base.

Comrade Li Xiannian: It seems to me that among the greetings by the communist and workers' parties of the European socialist countries, the ones by the Bulgarians and the Hungarians differed somewhat from the others.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We think that in Hungary the situation is different. The Hungarian party and state leadership behaves well toward us. In Moscow, [Hungarian Prime Minister Janos] Kadar did not attack China and us like the others. We noticed this. When we returned home from Moscow, Comrade Mehmet and I passed through Hungary. The Hungarian leadership comrades displayed closeness and friendship toward us and we thanked them for it. Later, the situation became more favorable. In a reception of our ambassador to Budapest by the Hungarian prime minister, the prime minister said [that], "[the] Albanian leadership's tone in Moscow was necessary and indispensable."

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: When talking about the Moscow conference, the Hungarian prime minister, Ferenc Münnich, said that the Albanians' tone was indispensable in some cases.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Then we had our 28 and 29 November holidays. The entire Hungarian press spoke of our country's successes. Meetings were held in every Hungarian city with the communists and the people. Many other indications of sympathy have been displayed by important Hungarian cadres toward our comrades. They have said to our people, "your line is just and we have great respect for your leadership. The Soviets also pressure us like they do Albania, but we have now learned from you how to stand fast." There is something happening in Hungary now. We are not sure what it is yet, but we are exploiting it.

The situation between the communist and workers' parties is an issue of great and grave ideological and political implications. [East German Socialist Unity Party General Secretary] Walter Ulbricht has openly said that the Albanians are dogmatic and sectarian. Hence, we know that from now on the ideological war against our party will get even tougher. This is what we forecast, even though in their press their propaganda talks about the "friendship" with China, etc. We think that the intention is to distance us from China, to isolate us, and to give the impression that while they do not want any disagreements, the Albanians are unreasonable people. This tactic is meant to deceive their parties by showing that the disagreements with China have been repaired, while with the Albanians this is impossible.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Before I came to Albania, the German Socialist Unity Party Politburo member [Hermann] Matern visited China [in January 1961]. In a conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai they had a dispute over the Germans' slandering of Albania. Obviously, they also spoke of economic matters between the two countries, but the Germans' behavior is not pleasant in this area either. They had such a dispute that day that Comrade Zhou Enlai had become happy [possibly meaning "got drunk"] out of exasperation, something he does not usually do. (Laughter)

Comrade Enver Hoxha: They do use such pressure.

We have information from our people in the Soviet Union who meet with various Soviet employees. It seems that the majority of them shake hands with our people telling them that we are following a just course, that in party organizations the Soviet leadership is telling them that they have mended relations with China, that the Chinese comrades have understood their mistaken ways, but that the same is not happening with the Albanians. It seems that N. Khrushchev is looking to profit from the situation and gain time so that he may strengthen his revisionist position.

We think that Khrushchev, his revisionist group, and all the other revisionist groups at the helm of some of the parties are now in the first stage, the stage of strengthening of their position. They are waging a war to purge their ranks of undesirable elements. The second stage will be that of attack to liquidate all signs of Marxism-Leninism from their parties, the stage of liquidating all healthy Marxist elements. In this stage they will even resort to terror. In the third stage they will use provocations just like Tito does now. This is our Central Committee's forecast of the roadmap these revisionist groups will follow.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We have experienced the Soviet military provocations at our border. On our border with the Soviet Union more or less the same things happen that you describe, Comrade Enver, but we never made them an issue.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The Soviet leaders will start an ideological campaign against us. But they will find a wall of steel in us. They saw the ideological and political unity of our party at our congress. Despite that, they will not back off, but will progress with their plans and will try to create diversions. But our party will not pull back one millimeter.

Now we will talk about the economic blockade that we foresee they will put in place against us. Seeing that they will never be able to break our party ideologically and politically, they will try to wage economic war against us, diversionary acts aside. They will try to damage our party and our people's republic through this course, hiding sometimes behind the mask of reciprocal help between socialist countries.

The fulfillment of our third five-year plan takes in these conditions a crucial importance for our party. The fulfillment of this plan represents to us not only an economic imperative, but a political and ideological one as well. But as you well know, our plan is supported through the loans that are given to us by the PRC and the other socialist countries of Europe.

Our third five-year plan is a concrete, dense plan, but one which is well thought-out and based on our current capabilities. If conditions would develop normally, this plan would not only be faced and fulfilled successfully, but we could even exceed its requirements. In other words, this could happen if the loans accorded by the socialist countries were given to us without impediments. We have signed agreements for this matter with all the countries and we have even specified the objects to be built in detail from the start of the project to the end of construction. Every detail has been included in these agreements, the necessary materials, the precise usage of the loan monies, etc. As I said before we have signed such agreements with all the European socialist countries, but the situation with the Soviet Union stands as we have already described to you.

Now a question arises: will these agreements be carried out or not? This depends on the relations we have with these coun-

tries and, obviously, the international situation. But we are certain that the leadership at the helm of the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries, especially N. S. Khrushchev, will either freeze the loans or sabotage the process. We can only hope that they will not freeze the loans, because, as to sabotage, we are sure that is going to happen. Our hope stems from the political situation, which could force political opportunists to avoid freezing the loans. One such case that could aid us is the enormous help accorded us by the PRC.

As far as we are concerned we will never give them a reason to act against us. Hence, if the loans are frozen, they could only do this arbitrarily. China has helped us in the past and continues to do so. This will put them in a difficult situation and will uncover them if they cut the aid to us. This factor could force them not to cut aid to us. In any case they will sabotage us. We know that the Soviets will sabotage us further. The Czechs will do this after the Soviets because they have an interest in trading with us and need our chrome, copper and other minerals, and they are also better. Then the others will follow suit, though their loans are smaller and matter less.

The Central Committee of our party is prepared for what could arise. Hence, not only are we doing a lot of work in maintaining enthusiasm for the accomplishment of tasks, we are also preparing to overcome the difficulties. Our Central Committee is of the opinion that our just behavior will force them to give us the loans agreed upon.

As Comrade Spiro Koleka has told you, the loans we have been accorded are imperative for our five-year plan. We will fight with all our might to fulfill this plan and will successfully face all tricks that these groups will throw at us.

The most important objectives in this plan, which we think should receive attention and be achieved at any cost during this five-year plan are:

First is agriculture. In this area, as you know, we have progressed much and we will place more importance on it, especially in [land] reclamation, irrigation, new land reclamation, etc.

Comrade Li Xiannian: As we traveled we saw a lot of new land you had reclaimed.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The main task of our agriculture is the production of bread in-country. That is why we agree completely on this issue with Comrade Zhou Enlai and the other Chinese leader comrades. We must produce our bread in-country completely at any cost, because the national and international situations are such that they make fulfilling this task imperative as soon as possible. Our party's Central Committee has been continually preoccupied with this problem in other five-year plans as well, and we returned to studying it more closely on the current one. Nonetheless, despite our effort and

desire, it is impossible to achieve producing bread completely in-country during this period. The Chinese comrades have given us considerable help, first, by delivering great amounts of grains in the first months, and, second, by doing it at great promptness. This action has been life-saving for our people. Our party and people will always be grateful to you for this fraternal and internationalist action.

Comrade Li Xiannian: This support is mutual. You also help us politically.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Our people say: "A friend in need is a friend indeed."

Comrade Li Xiannian: The situation should first be looked at from the point of Albania's being surrounded by capitalism.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Your [promised] help with grain deliveries in 1961 is immensely great. We fully understand the sacrifices that the Chinese leadership is making, especially taking into account the difficult agricultural year you have also had. We have secured our bread for 1961 because of you.

For the next four years, 1962-1965 we will still be forced to import our bread. We have made the necessary plans to have in stock goods which will allow us to import about 315 thousand tons of grain using the clearing option.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have sought to secure this amount of grains through the Soviet Union using clearing, but until now we have received no answer from them.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We have also sought to do this from the other socialist countries, but if they will not come through with it, we also have barter [credits] at our disposal for importing it.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Comrade Spiro Koleka spoke to me about this problem the last time he visited China.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Because we foresee different dangers ahead, we will need 400 [thousand?] tons of grains for the period of 1962-65. For example, if you had not helped us this year, there would be a great famine in our country. But we managed to overcome it.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We only had bread for 15 days.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is how our bread situation stands. In this area the increase of efficiency of agricultural crop production is imperative for the development of agriculture in our country. Since we do not have much new land at our disposal, this is the only way for us to produce our bread in-country. This forces us to build new chemical fertilizer factories. We have signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to help us

build a factory of nitrogen fertilizer along with a thermal power station slated for construction in the city of Fier. The Soviets know well that this is a key and vital problem for the development of agriculture for our country, so we foresee that they will either sabotage the project or not give it to us altogether.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: For example, they could postpone the delivery of machinery to 1968.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: I will give you an example. When we did a refitting of the cement factory in Vlora last year, they dragged their feet in the delivery of a suitcase of electrical equipment (50 kg), causing us not to utilize the factory for 8 consecutive months.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: According to the contract, this factory should have been operational by 1 June, but they held back those few materials on purpose after the meetings of Bucharest and Moscow. They finally delivered them at the end of December. Thus, our economy lost the considerable amount of 30 thousand tons of cement.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Think what they could do with the chemical fertilizer factory. We plan to construct these factories. We will have them operational by 1965, but they might try to postpone them until 1968 or 1970. So that we would not be able to secure our bread even in the fourth five-year plan. This is one objective.

Another objective is that we plan to build a cement factory. If we do not build this factory, all the construction required by our third five-year plan will not be achieved. They sabotaged us for 8 months with one suitcase of equipment, and by causing this very important project not to be carried out, they will sabotage all the construction plans.

We have made an agreement with the Czechs to build a metallurgical plant for ferro-chrome production containing one super-phosphate factory with a capacity of 180 thousand tons of phosphate fertilizer per year. In the current situation they could also sabotage us, though the Czechs look to their own interest and could [sabotage] us at the same time. It is possible that they will also sabotage us. Nonetheless, we can very well hope that the construction of this project by the Czechs will happen.

Another matter we had is the construction of a smelting factory for iron-nickel, which would produce 30 thousand tons of processed metal a year. This object is not included in our five-year plan, but we see its construction as very necessary, because the European socialist countries will hold back metal article deliveries for which we have great need on this five-year plan. The usual parties from where we get these articles told us that they do not have them for us. So we have nowhere else to get them. This is why we think that this project's construction, though not in the plan, is necessary. It is imposed by the current situation.

Our party's CC asks you that, whether or not the European countries with which we have signed agreements give us these key objects for our third five-year plan, you deliver to the CCP CC and the Chinese people our request that within the loan you have accorded us, the PRC help us in constructing these objects. This means, first of all, the construction of a factory for the production of nitrogen fertilizers with the attached thermal power station and a capacity of 110 tons of fertilizer a year, as well as the other objects I mentioned earlier. In fact, if the Soviets do not evade responsibilities, we could build two nitrogen fertilizer plants, one with your help and one from the Soviets'. But the one thing that is very important is that we can assure the building of one factory of chemical fertilizers even if the Soviets sabotage us. You use coal for these factories, but we plan to use petrol or natural gas. That is why we ask from the Chinese comrades that they help us procure this factory under these conditions whether or not the Soviets build it as they have promised.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We ask this of you independently of the answer the Soviets may give us and without waiting for their answer.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We value your help. This would be an enormous sacrifice for the Chinese comrades and we would be very grateful to you for it. If you cannot build this for us, since you do not build such factories that use petrol or natural gas in China, then we request that you mediate with the Soviets or the Czechs for a purchase or even with the European capitalist countries, such as Italy, which is close to us.

It is possible that the Soviets will come through and build this factory without any obstacles. In that case we would have surplus chemical fertilizers and we would have to export part of the production. Then through the profit from the export we would return to the Chinese comrades the funds used for the factory's construction.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: If the Soviets will keep their side of the deal, economically for us it would be much more advantageous to process our petrol into chemical fertilizers and then export it, rather than just exporting it as petrol. So it is of great interest to us to build two nitrogen fertilizer factories even if [this occurred] at the same time.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: As to the necessary workforce and internal financing for these plants, we have the capability to cover it even though they would be outside the plan. The question is how to cover these large plants if our workforce is already slated to go elsewhere. We could do this because we have the workforce needed, but if we are hard pressed, we could even slow down the building of one of these objects. For example, we could slow down the one that the Soviet Union would give us and finish it in 1966 or 1967. But one of them must absolutely be finished by 1965.

As to the phosphor factory for the production of superphosphates, we ask that—within the loans you have granted us—you help us build two, three units with a capacity of 20-30 thousand tons each a year, for a total [production] of 30-70 thousand tons of superphosphates per year. This way we would be prepared for any dangers posed by a potential Czech sabotage, even though this amount would be only one-third of the phosphor fertilizers that we plan to produce in 1965 with the factory that the Czechs will build for us.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: These factories can produce sulfuric acid in addition to the superphosphates, while the apatite we need to import from you using [the] clearing [arrangement].

Comrade Enver Hoxha: For the factory that the Czechs will help us build we have agreed that the Soviet Union will provide us with apatite.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Always provided that they do not sabotage us.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The third factory that we need your help to build is one for cement [production]. We hereby also request that the Chinese comrades help us build a cement factory with an initial capacity of 100 thousand tons per year and a future production of 200 thousand [tons].

The fourth object is the construction of a factory for iron-nickel smelting with a capacity of 30 thousand tons of processed metal per year. While this will cause us to lose a [certain] amount of nickel for some time, we will accept this loss because no one is delivering any processed metal articles to us now. Even during the second five-year plan we have suffered numerous difficulties with the European socialist countries in the area of deliveries of processed metal articles.

Another great problem of ours is that of mechanization of agriculture. Within the 100 million rubles loan that you have granted us, we request that you look at the possibility of tractor deliveries for our agricultural needs.

We ask that all these projects we are requesting be included in the loan of 500 million rubles you have granted to us. Along this [line of] requests, we would also like to receive a few smaller factories, such as a paper mill, a few repair shops, etc. The specifics of those requests can be decided upon by the planning commissions of our countries. The five specific problems that we laid out above are vital for our country's economy and for overcoming the difficult situation in which the Soviets and the other European socialist countries have put us.

Finally, I also wanted to familiarize you with our military needs. The difficulties of equipping the military stand as I already notified you on our first meeting. The Soviets have suspended deliveries to our military. We have taken some measures

to revise drilling and exercise plans, have scaled back the planning for fuel and spare parts usage, have reduced the quotas for using munitions, etc. Now our party is mobilizing the military so that it may fulfill all duties given as efficiently as possible.

Even in this very vital area the Soviets are trying to exert pressure on us creating a very difficult situation for our army and military cadres. They seek to create discontent among our officers and to weaken our military's strength as a result.

We have agreements with the Soviets for an appropriate furnishing of our military with armaments and equipment, but they have suspended all deliveries. On this matter our government has sent a letter to the Soviet government. Yesterday we also sent a letter to Marshal Grechko, supreme commander of the armed forces of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact, in which Comrade Beqir Balluku makes the required annual report that we have sent every year as a member nation of this military organization, showing the moral-political and military readiness of our army. The letter also shows the armament situation in our country and the needs of our military. We point out in that report how the Soviet government has suspended military deliveries to our country's army. The report calls on Marshal Grechko, as supreme commander of the armed forces of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact, to mediate with the Soviet government to find a solution to this problem.

Now, Chinese comrades, you understand the great importance of this matter to us. Our party's Central Committee puts forward before the CCP CC and Comrade Mao Zedong our military's urgent needs for its infantry and artillery and the great importance that this matter has for our country's defense. We can take on the matter of planes, tanks, etc. later, but the matter of procurements of necessary equipment for the light armament of infantry and artillery units is, we think, of an urgent nature for any eventuality, for any danger posed from outside our borders, so that we may put in place a long resistance both as a regular army or as partisan units.

You mentioned that you think the Chinese comrades might mediate with the Soviets in this matter. Our party's Central Committee thinks that this might not be a bad idea, in fact, it might be a good one, but we think that this should be done after we get an answer, be it positive or negative, from the Soviets. In the case that they do not give us one, then we will officially approach you through a letter in which we will state that we have sent the Soviet comrades a letter and that they have answered [to the effect] that they will not supply us with armaments, and that hence we are asking the Chinese government to furnish us these materials. In this case the Chinese comrades would say to the Soviet comrades that the Albanians are requesting to be furnished with armaments and ask why they were not doing it. If you are not going to do it, then we will furnish them [with the requested materials]. The Chinese comrades will have a good reason to tell [the Soviets] that we

should help defend Albania and that if they were not going to give them the weapons, we would.

Comrade Li Xiannian: When Comrade Liu Shaoqi went to Moscow, he said to the Soviets that in the event that they did not help Albania, we would denounce them. When the Soviets told Comrade Liu Shaoqi that they would not help Albania, Khrushchev also added that they would give the Albanians everything for which there is a signed contract.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Khrushchev has lied to Comrade Liu Shaoqi. He should not be trusted because he lies a lot. As soon as he said goodbye to Comrade Liu Shaoqi, he immediately suspended all military aid. That is why we can have no trust in such military aid.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We thought that they would step back if they took China into account. Were it not for the help that the PRC gives us, we should have been preparing for the mountains [partisan warfare].

Comrade Li Xiannian: We see your cause as our cause.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We thank you very much. That is what we wanted to say to you, Comrade Li Xiannian. We have been asked by our Central Committee to speak openly to you about these matters and we ask you to personally transmit our requests to Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrade Li Xiannian: All that you have told me, Comrade Enver, I will personally transmit to comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the other comrades of our Central Committee.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Also transmit to comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the other comrades of the CCP CC that they have a faithful friend for life in the mold of the Marxist-Leninist way in the ALP and the Albanian people. Tell your leadership comrades of your party that the comrades of the Chinese delegation, with Comrade Li Xiannian at their head, gave our party and congress immense help. The presence of the CCP delegation has contributed enormously to the great strength manifested by our congress and all our people. This has instilled in our party and people great faith that we are not alone and that Marxism-Leninism is unconquerable.

We always believe, particularly now, that the unity within our camp and especially the determined unity between our two parties, the ALP and CCP, is one of the most important necessities for little Albania's freedom and independence and in the interest of the socialist camp.

Comrade Li Xiannian: It is one of the most important requirements for the defense of the international communist movement.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We also see this matter in this way.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Communism in Asia is a huge block around the CCP that walks in the Marxist-Leninist path, while in the ocean of European revisionism Albania is just a small rock facing huge waves.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But we will never give in.

Comrade Li Xiannian: On your island the red flag flies pristinely.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: This is why the relations between this Marxist continent and our little, lonely island are so important for our country, as Comrade Enver pointed out. We know, as Comrade Enver said, that we are not the ones to decide the fate of Marxism-Leninism. This is your prerogative, that of the CCP and the great PRC. That is why your help to our country is crucial. On this subject we have another request and we have been asked by our party's Central Committee to deliver it to you: Protect your leadership. Protect Comrade Mao Zedong and the other comrades.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Do not worry. Our party [leadership], just like yours, is closely linked with the party rank-and-file, as is the whole party with the people. But even if some renegade appears as has happened before, he will not be able to damage the party leadership at all.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is precisely so.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: The revisionists' hopes rest with people like Tuk Jakova, Liri Belishova and Peng Dehuai and company.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The parties now led by revisionist groups will not tolerate them for much longer. We know, for example, what goes on in Bulgaria. When the Moscow Declaration was publicized for analysis by the masses, the party Central Committee ordered that no communist should discuss its contents and, furthermore, no questions should be asked. But an entire party can never be silent and forget such activities, never! (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs.)

After returning from the Moscow conference, the party leaders in Bulgaria did not dare say one bad word about your party. And in party meetings, despite orders that no discussion or questions take place, turmoil ensued. And, according to information we have, in the party activity in February in the city of Ren, or some other area, a general rose and asked for clarifications about the situation with China, "because," he said, "after Bucharest you told us that much is going wrong." The party delegate to the meeting said that all is well now with China. "But you told us that in China they were building a cult of Mao," said the general. "It is true," said the delegate, "They do

have a cult of Mao Zedong in China." (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs.) The general pointed out that while Mao had previously been both the party chairman and president of the Republic, he was now only the first secretary of the Central Committee. He asked, "And where is this cult of personality of Mao when Khrushchev, who was previously only a First Secretary of the Central Committee, later also became prime minister?"

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: He has even tried to become president. (Comrade Li Xiannian laughs.)

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Then another attendee rose and asked whether the party stood by the opinion that Stalin had had no leadership skills and that he had in fact not been the one to lead the Soviet Union during WWII. The delegate not knowing what to say had answered that while they could not say that Stalin was completely devoid of leadership skills, he had had an array of marshals and Central Committee members to lead the war and had managed the war issues together with all of them. Then the person who asked the question said, "And then where is Stalin's cult of personality if he had led so democratically and managed the most pressing issues for the people consulting with a group of cadres?"

I want to point out by this that our cause is just and that we have faith that the other parties will not tolerate these revisionist groups at their helm for too long. And we ask that you communicate the points of view we have laid out before you to Comrade Mao Zedong. We have spoken openly to you. There may be issues which we do not see clearly and correctly, but we ask that you help us to see them appropriately. Comrade Mao Zedong is one of the greatest comrades of the international communist movement, one of the comrades with the widest of revolutionary and party leadership experience, so we are eternally ready to take his criticism and advice and look them over and study them with the greatest care. He should never hesitate to confront us with these criticisms.

Comrade Li Xiannian: In a friendly way, of course.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Yes, in a friendly way. We will keep in regular contact with the comrades of the Chinese embassy here in our country so that they can be fully in touch with our problems and situation. We will keep close contact with them. Furthermore, when possible, please keep in mind the establishment of an aerial direct route Tirana-Cairo-New Delhi-Rangoon-Manton-Beijing.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Obviously, we mean: whenever you see it possible. We understand that this is not so easy to do.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We would like to have such a direct route.

Comrade Li Xiannian: At the moment this is not possible.

(They laugh). Do you have anything else to add?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: No, that was it.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Neither does Comrade Mehmet Shehu?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Nothing further from what Comrade Enver Hoxha brought forth.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Then I would like to say a few words.

This time I came here with the task of greeting your steadfast, Marxist-Leninist party's 4th Congress. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the warm reception extended to us everywhere we went. I deeply thank all the comrades, especially Comrade Enver Hoxha, for the high praise of our party and Comrade Mao Zedong.

It is surely my duty to transmit faithfully your words and the results of your congress to comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and the other comrades of our party's Central Committee. Our people and the entire party understand and know well your party and Central Committee, with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its helm, as a strongly Marxist-Leninist party. Our party and the entire Chinese people fully support your people and party in these extremely difficult conditions, surrounded from all four sides by enemies, this country of small people and size who continue to fight a dedicated and resolute struggle against the imperialism and revisionism represented by the Titoist clique.

We were extremely happy when we saw with our own eyes how the proceedings of your 4th Congress were held in high spirit. The relationship between the leadership and the party rank-and-file and that between the party and the people were manifested to be close and unbreakable at the congress. So we have to come to the conclusion that Marxism can be defended not only in a big country, but in a small one as well. We saw this very clearly during this visit to your country.

Your people, led by the party, hold high the flag of Marxism-Leninism—a flag that is perfectly red—on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. Not only the Chinese people, but the peoples of the entire world should defend this same flag you defend.

As to the relations between the countries of the socialist camp, Sino-Soviet relations and the Albanian-Soviet relations, the question that arises is, "Have these relations improved after the discussions of the Moscow Conference?" Our desire is that they improve, but the objective state of the facts does not allow us to see this issue as we desire. Comrade Enver was right when he said that this struggle was long, complex and difficult. This is also the conclusion that our party has drawn.

For these relations to improve considerably three or five years might not be enough. Maybe more are needed. Obviously, our desire is that there be no quarrels in our large family, but the principles of Marxism-Leninism must be defended stubbornly. Our strategies might be different, but the principles we defend are the same.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: I agree. It is precisely so.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Just as you pointed out, Comrade Enver, just as your party says, Marxism-Leninism cannot be traded for goods. It is the ultimate truth. It is the ultimate science. Hence, we must fight with all our might to defend it despite the sacrifices we might be required to make. On the other hand, we must raise high our flag of unity in the struggle against imperialism, the flag of unity of all the parties of the socialist camp. In particular, we must raise high the flag of unity with the Soviet Union, the people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The defense of Marxist-Leninist principles is our highest priority. The strengthening of the unity between our countries is also a high priority, because this unity is a defining factor for the socialist camp, for the entire international communist movement, and for the vital interests of humanity. Nonetheless, this unity must be based in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For this, all the nations of the socialist camp need to be treated as equals. The principle of mutual, fraternal help needs to be applied among them, be it between the large countries or between the large and the small ones, be it between the parties that have already gained the seat of power and between those that have yet to achieve this.

Comrade Mao Zedong has said that there is no help without benefit; that everyone's pitching in is mutually beneficial. The ALP has raised the flag of Marxism-Leninism high in the resolute struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism. This is why this struggle is very important for the peoples of the socialist camp and the entire world. This is also very important for your party, for your Central Committee, with Comrade Enver at the helm, and for your people. Your fighting spirit was clearly apparent during your congress.

When we spoke about you during the dinner held by the Soviet leaders Kozlov and Suslov for our delegation [passing] through Moscow, I was thinking about this issue and understood that the dinner they held was an unusual one. This is why when the CPSU delegation spoke at your congress we listened attentively and with interest, but saw that not a word was spoken about the just leadership of the ALP CC with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its helm. We are very sorry for this fact. We do not understand which party's congress they came to attend.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: They, Chinese comrades, came to our congress with one intention in mind, to bring down



Inside the Albanian Central State Archive, Tirana, during a visit by a CWIHP delegation in November 2004

our leadership. They came to buy hair and left clean-shaven [*Editor's Note: Albanian proverb meaning to fail at something and lose more in the process*] (laughter).

Comrade Li Xiannian: Now, I would like to say a few words about Sino-Soviet relations. Our greatest desire is to improve these relations. As I said before the improvement of these relations does not depend solely on us, but we want to show our friendship to the Soviet people and communists.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: You are right.

Comrade Li Xiannian: In our hearts we know well who those leading the CPSU today are. They are people of the kind that never fulfill their obligations to agreements they have made with us. Our approach is to ask them to fulfill their obligations. At the same time, we are prepared to go forward even without their help should it not be forthcoming. On the other hand, not to ask for their help would not be prudent on our part. Now, should they not give us their help, what should we do? We must always follow the just course. For example, when the Soviet leaders ordered the departure of Soviet specialists from China, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that we should accept this, but this Soviet action caused a lot of damage to our economy. Nonetheless, we fought resolutely for the defense

of our principles and for the preservation of our unity. After the Moscow Conference we called the plenum of our party's Central Committee and decided on this course of action.

I also wanted to say a few words on the economic relations between our two countries. Comrade Spiro Koleka spoke at length on this matter to me when I was still in Beijing. Comrade Zhou Enlai has expressed his opinion on your requests. We have a lot of interest in the matter of your agriculture's production of bread in-country. On this matter we also weigh your country's situation. If the situation changes for the worse, we will not be able to send you grains even if we have them. What, then, should be done about this issue? We must seriously think about solving this problem.

Before we left Beijing, comrades Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai told me to communicate to you the opinion that the industry in your country be built on the basis of small and medium objects, since for your country's conditions and capabilities this course would be the easiest and with the fastest effect for your economy. Such an industrial policy would give a great advantage to your economy. Obviously, this is just a suggestion. You know your situation better than us. Our country's experience in the past eight years has shown that small and medium objects can be built and produce profitably faster than large ones. Nonetheless, this is an internal matter of yours.

Comrade Mao Zedong directed and requested me to tell our Albanian comrades openly that we will fulfill your requests and help you with everything we can. In case our technical means do not allow [us to do so], we will openly tell you that we cannot help you. Should our technical means allow [us to assist you], we will make every effort to fulfill your needs. This is what the chairman of our party's Central Committee told me. We know that the Soviet Union is much more technologically advanced. We still have a lot of deficiencies in comparison, but if, for example, next year we will have the technical means of assisting you in building an object, we will not hesitate to extend our help.

Now, let us come to the specific objects that Comrade Enver spoke about. I have brought an economist with me with the specific intention of consulting him. You want to build a nitrogen fertilizer factory that uses petrol or natural gas. Very well, but we do not have such plants and cannot help you with the construction of such an object. But we could help you with the construction of the thermal power station. The comrade economist that has come along says that Albania has coal, though not of high quality. Can this factory use coal instead?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: The use of coal is not advantageous for us. It costs too much. The advantage of using petrol is, however, bigger.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Your point of view on this matter is very reasonable and we understand it, so we will analyze this

matter and give you an answer.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: If we would build this fertilizer factory to work with petrol or natural gas rather than coal, we would be independent from others. From Gomulka, for example, from whom we would have to get coal. This way we could solve the bread problem. If we don't build these two fertilizer factories, we would not be able to produce our bread in-country in the fourth five-year plan or even in the fifth.

Comrade Li Xiannian: A comrade from your State Planning Commission told us that you have lignite, and our economist took a look at it and said that it may be utilized, but this is a matter we should study. We are still not very clear on the quality of your coal.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We think that the PRC could get such a factory for us by buying it in the Western capitalist countries like Italy, France or England, and it may cost around \$25-30 million. I think that Czechoslovakia or East Germany are also willing to build it for us with dollars. The countries of people's democracies and even the Soviet Union buy chemical factories from Italy. Getting this object would be life-saving for us. Chemical fertilizers are vital to us for the production of bread in-country.

The conclusion of your party's Central Committee that we should build economically viable small and medium objects in our country is right, but this particular object is vital to the production of bread. Our agriculture cannot progress without it. We have all the necessary conditions for the production of bread, except for two conditions on which we are dependent from abroad: chemical fertilizers and agriculture mechanization. The fulfillment of these two conditions, meaning on the fourth five-year plan, will truly allow us to think of producing bread in-country. This is why we placed such importance on this matter and, as Comrade Enver said earlier, why we ask you to review this matter carefully.

Comrade Li Xiannian: At the moment, our technological capability does not allow us to help you with the construction of a factory that uses petrol or natural gas. We have plans to build a small experimental factory that uses petrol or natural gas. We can look more closely at your proposal of buying such a factory from Italy.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Buying from Italy is very advantageous to us, because it is very close.

Comrade Li Xiannian: I cannot say a word about this matter, but I will inform our Central Committee and we will give you an answer.

We are able to build the second factory for the production of superphosphates for you. We are also capable of building

the sulfuric acid section of this factory. The problem for you will be in securing the raw material for this factory, apatite. This matter should be considered carefully. But we could look at Comrade Enver's idea of securing apatite from Morocco more closely. We have very good relations with Morocco. They have offered us apatite, but we do not need it, because we have enough of our own. If we import some amount of apatite from Morocco, we are only doing it because we are doing it in the interest of the national liberation movement in Africa.

We will also not have any problems with our support for the construction of a cement factory. You said that you are looking to build one with a capacity of 200 thousand tons and want to build it in two phases. My opinion is that you should instead build a series of smaller factories with a total capacity of 200 thousand tons.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: OK. We will study the economic advantages of this [suggestion] and give you our opinion.

Comrade Li Xiannian: You can study it, but know that this is my personal opinion.

We are also capable of building for you a factory for iron smelting with a maximum capacity of 30 thousand tons per year. During our travels in the south, Comrade Spiro Koleka and I exchanged an array of ideas, because he and I are specialists in the same field. Comrade Koleka emphasized that the main problem with such an undertaking will be finding the necessary supplies of coke. When I asked him where you would find coke, he said that you would have to import it from Poland or secure it from other countries. I told him that we can look at the possibility of building such an object with our help.

At the same time, I proposed Comrade Spiro Koleka the matter of building an electric oven for residual iron smelting.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We now export these iron residuals, but if we would build the iron-smelting factory, it would be advantageous to build in this factory an additional section for iron residual smelting as well. Then this job could also be done in-country.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We have the necessary technical means to help you with mineral extraction, mineral enrichment, iron smelting and metal foliation. The only big problem for you is finding the coke.

Regarding the military matters you brought up, we will notify our Central Committee immediately. Comrade Spiro Koleka has handed us the appropriate lists of military deliveries. A part of those needs we will fulfill for you through clearing [arrangements]. Though using clearing [arrangements] does not mean we will be able to fulfill all military delivery needs. We have

told Comrade Spiro Koleka that we do not have some of the military materials contained in your list, so we will not be able to deliver them to you. We are able to deliver to you ammunition and clothes, but as to fighter planes and other such equipment, we do not yet have them.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Supplying our infantry with ammunition is a more urgent need for us.

Comrade Li Xiannian: As to what you said, that we should approach the Soviet Union for these matters, we will do as you ask.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have asked for grain from the Soviet Union and have yet to get an answer. We have asked for a total of 300 thousand tons of grain from the socialist camp nations through clearing [arrangements], while for an additional 100 thousand tons of grains we do not satisfy the clearing requirements. In that case, if we do not get all the grain supplies we need, could we rely on you to secure all the bread necessary for the four years from 1961 to 1965?

Comrade Li Xiannian: It is possible, but Comrade Spiro Koleka made a request for only 300 thousand tons of grains. And now you are asking for 100 thousand more. Personally, I think that there should not be any hurdles to delivering this additional amount, but before we can give you a definitive answer, I must inform our Central Committee about this request. As you well know, we are also having difficulties with grain, but we also keep in mind that the Albanian comrades are heroically fighting the struggle for the defense of Marxism-Leninism against imperialism and revisionism without thinking of the hardships this may cause, so our duty is to help you.

You mentioned that you would use our foreign currency to buy chemical fertilizers in the West?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We did not exactly say that. It would not be prudent to buy chemical fertilizers in the West with your foreign currency. This currency would only be used to buy the machinery needed for the construction of a factory for nitrogen fertilizers that utilizes petrol or natural gas from the West in case you could not build it for us. We would not buy chemical fertilizers from the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia using foreign currency, let alone buying it from the West. We would like to build a nitrogen fertilizer factory using the foreign currency you have given us through the accorded loan. We could buy this factory from Italy or from some other capitalist country in the West.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We will study this issue, and if we are able to do it, we will send you an answer.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: If at all possible, look at this issue favorably because this concerns our bread.

Comrade Li Xiannian: I also wanted to talk about issues relating to technical-scientific cooperation. Two of our economists who came with me here visited the knitwear factory in Korca, and seeing that this factory's products were of low quality, suggested to me that we should help you. So, if you so desire we could send some specialists that could immensely help your people to increase immediately the quality of your product there.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We agree that specialists can come here for our tricot needs, and would also like to ask if you could take a look at the possibility of doing the same for our petrol and geology needs. You, a large country, certainly have very large needs for geological activities and petrol. We, on the other hand, have no such specialists to help in these areas so necessary for us. We should at least have some Chinese specialist comrades help us with the inspection of the machinery and the accompanying documentation we will receive from European countries.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We do not have much experience in the field of petrol, but as for tricot our experience is broad.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Then, please, send the tricot specialists immediately.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Before I set off for Albania, Comrade Zhou Enlai told me that the signing of economic agreements with Albania is the first step. Now the most important matter is how these agreements will be carried out because the geographical distance between our countries is very large. This will require that we communicate through numerous telegrams. This is not bad in itself, but for the sake of carrying out these agreements faster, would it be possible to have a few Chinese economists working in our embassy in Albania?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Please send them whenever you wish. In fact we have even asked for such a thing.

Comrade Li Xiannian: You could also send a group of economists to Beijing or a delegation of your State Planning Commission employees to meet and have talks with comrades at our State Planning Commission and the appropriate departments to decide how to proceed with the delivery of the loan.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is a very prudent proposal and we are in full agreement with you on this issue also.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We do not think that it is necessary that this delegation contain a supervisor comrade. It will be sufficient that the comrades that come with the delegation be State Planning Commission employees.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: As to the matter of the economic specialists you will send to your embassy, I think you could

also send an additional good person or two specializing in petrol or geological research. In our country a number of large Soviet teams of about 120 people have been working for the past two, three years. But we have noticed that at all the points they have told us to drill for petrol, we have found none, while the ones to which our specialists have directed us have yielded petrol. We have spent hundreds of millions [of rubles] in this field and have had no results. We have also raised this concern with the Soviet government. Please read again the report of our party's Central Committee that I presented at the congress, at the section concerning our petrol efforts. There we allude to this matter and blame these teams. This is why we consider your sending one or two such able people from you as indispensable to us.

We have indirectly learned that our country also possesses radioactive minerals. We will now see the report we will receive from the Soviet teams. This is why we also sent the samples to Beijing so that you may analyze them for us. You understand the importance of finding such minerals would have for our country. Bringing such people to your embassy here is not objectionable to the Soviets either, so appearances are kept.

Comrade Li Xiannian: I thank you for the information you have given me.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We also thank you in the name of our Central Committee.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: When can we send these people to Beijing?

Comrade Li Xiannian: Whenever you decide to [do so]. We speak as between brothers.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: I had another matter. We are having a dinner for the Chinese comrades tonight. What do you think, should we publicize this meeting in the press or only the dinner?

Comrade Li Xiannian: We are of the opinion of only making the dinner public. I wanted to say to you that this time it was my duty to return the visit to Comrade Hysni Kapo who came to China last year. We were busy and I was late in doing it, but now that duty is fulfilled. Now, by the order of the Central Committee I must depart from here on 28 February.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We are sorry you are leaving so early.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Now it is possible to come here more often.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: You should come for vacation.

Comrade Li Xiannian: I told Comrade Spiro Koleka that this time I came with three tasks: first, to attend your congress, second, to return Comrade Hysni Kapo's visit, and third, for a vacation.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: The vacation task was not fulfilled.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We do not record the vacation part and keep this case open. (Happy and sincere laughter.)

Comrade Li Xiannian: I have not reached an agreement with Comrade Spiro Koleka on this matter.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Comrade Spiro is right. You should come again to Albania and should even send other comrades here to rest and to get to know our country.

Comrade Li Xiannian: This is also what Comrade Spiro Koleka said to me, that I should rest. I said to him, "You and I are both economists and we must get to know each-other's country well, so you should come to visit us too." But he only remained silent.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: He was displaying such behavior because he did not agree with you not resting a bit while here in Albania.

Comrade Li Xiannian: Now Comrade Enver Hoxha does not accept that I have fulfilled my third task either.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: You have fulfilled your first two tasks, and marvelously so, but the third is completely undone.

(After these last words there is plenty of laughter and happiness. That was the end of the meeting.)

Proceedings note-keeper

Haxhi Kroj



DOCUMENT No. 5

Information Memorandum, Zhou Enlai's Comments, 9 March 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, L. 13, D. 21. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

INFORMATION

ON THE MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, COMRADE ZHOU ENLAI ON 8 MARCH 1961

On the above date Comrade Chen Yi, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC), summoned the titulars and chargés d'affaires of the socialist countries. In this meeting Comrade Zhou Enlai informed us as follows:

Comrade Ambassadors and Chargés d'Affaires, we often meet but have never had the opportunity to speak in detail. This meeting was organized by Comrade Chen Yi for the purpose of discussing our situation. You are aware of this matter through our 9th Plenum press communique. Other topics of the communique concern the friendship within our socialist countries, the strengthening of unity between the CCP, the CP of the USSR and all the other countries of the socialist and international communist movement, the Moscow Conference of the 81 communist and workers' sister parties and the call extended to all the peoples of the world from this conference. I will not speak of these matters to you. I will only speak in detail about our internal situation and the state of affairs created after the 9th Plenum. You all know well that our country has gone through very difficult and unparalleled times due to the natural disasters of the past two years—especially last year's. These disasters befell us gradually and not all at once. The plentiful harvest of 1958, the most favorable year for agriculture, helped immensely to overcome the difficulties of 1959. But last year, our agriculture underwent unheard of damages in many areas of the country. I am now 63 and do not remember such natural disasters. While a century ago such disasters also befell our country producing millions of victims, this time, thanks to the measures taken by our party and government in the past two years, a normal life for our people has been ensured despite the great disasters. The natural disasters of the past two years have been varied [in nature]. Some areas have been hit by droughts, some by flooding, others by hurricanes, and yet others by waves of destructive insects. These disasters created serious difficulties and only five areas escaped with less suffering. Those areas that achieved good harvests are far and mainly in border regions, hence, we had difficulties in transporting their produce into the damaged areas. In the northern area of China where the farmed area is large and the population density is high, such as in the provinces of Shandong, Liaoning, Shanxi,

Hebei, etc., they have had great droughts and other disasters, while in southwestern China, such as in Hunan province and others, last year the disasters have been even more serious.

As a result of the facts I mentioned above, the agricultural production of the past year has been much lower than that of 1959. In a previous meeting we have had, I remember saying to you that for the year 1960 we expected to equal the harvests of 1957, but the opposite happened. Due to the reasons I mentioned before, the production of 1960 was only 60% of the amount forecasted by that year's planning. This figure concerns grain production. The second matter is cotton production. This area is of great importance too, because grains and cotton are the bread and cloth of our people. This area suffered great disaster too in the past year. In the fields of Hunan, Anhui, and others, known as cotton producing areas, production has been far lower than our forecast. While in 1958 we harvested 2 million tons of cotton, last year we only reached 1 million tons, or only half. The same situation exists in the areas known for cultivating mainly tobacco. These are limited areas as a result of feudalism and colonialism, which developed this plant only in limited areas, such as Shandong, Anhui, Guizhou, etc. The same situation has befallen meat production. As a result of the decrease in fodder production, the numbers of livestock fell considerably, especially the number of horses used as work-force in rural areas. The slim harvests of the fall, in particular, caused great difficulties and negatively influenced the development of the light industry and partly the development of the heavy industry since it is also partly dependent on agricultural production. Nonetheless, as you well know, due to the Great Leap of development jumpstarted by 1958, the planning for industrial production has been achieved and it has even been exceeded in the [area of] heavy industry.

If we would not have had the disasters mentioned above, our five-year plan would have been surpassed in all areas. As you well know, our motorized capacity in agriculture is smaller compared to the other socialist countries. We are undertaking rapid measures to increase our agricultural motorized capacity based on the Great Industrial Leap, though we still need a few years to fully achieve this. Our party and government have explained the situation caused by these disasters to the people and the people have mobilized with faith in their strength to overcome these difficulties, because they know that their economic standards during the years of liberation have been steadily increasing. We are confident that we will overcome all obstacles.

In order to have a good harvest this year, our party and government have undertaken numerous measures in order to achieve a satisfactory summer harvest during the first half of the year and fall harvests at the same levels. This year some areas have seen rains and snows and we expect better weather later. Nonetheless, we expect new difficulties and new droughts in some other areas. The question that arises is: What shall we do if we face new natural disasters this year? Thanks to the mobi-

lization of popular masses we are taking all measures needed to overcome the difficulties. This is the third year of great difficulties in agriculture and during the last two years we gained considerable experience in our struggle against natural disasters. Hence, this year, thanks to the three red banners, we are better prepared. This year we have built big and small reservoirs, are opening many wells, are cleaning canals, are increasing agricultural mechanization and are improving our transport infrastructure. Despite all this, even if we still do not achieve good harvests this year, we are well-prepared to face all difficulties.

I will now go to another political matter. You know that our 9th Plenum communique points out that the number of those opposed to our party's line is quite small. This is the active number, but there are many more that only wait and see. Only 11 years have passed since our country's liberation, but two thousand years of feudalism, colonialism, etc. have influenced the people's conscience, both in the rural and urban areas. As a result, 40 million people in rural areas and 10 million in urban areas make up the numbers of those I mentioned above. Our party has always undertaken measures for their re-education and the results have been very positive. A good number of them have a desire to be re-educated. In the future our party will continue to undertake such measures. It should be said that such elements with such views exist also within our party, but, naturally, their numbers are very limited. The class enemy elements are happy with our temporary difficulties and rise up and act. The same goes for the reactionary elements abroad and imperialists who have been energized in their work against us, sending their elements into our country. They have even sent different agents to work with the communists and the youth, but we have eliminated them. This is the reason that our party forcibly stresses the issue of strengthening our vigilance, and this has also been mentioned in our 9th Plenum's communique. As always, our party is working at full strength to enlighten our masses so that they may understand the situation and overcome the difficulties. This has helped us immensely.

We made plans with the socialist countries expecting good harvests for 1959 and especially for the second half of 1960. For example, in the first half of the past year our side fulfilled satisfactorily its obligations, while for the reasons explained above those obligations remained unfulfilled, especially for grains, oil, canned foods, fruit, etc. As a result of the situation, the size of our export deficit with the Soviet Union is up to 1.5 billion old rubles. The same is happening with other fraternal countries. As it is apparent, the export to the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries of Eastern Europe of agricultural commodities will be decreasing this year and not only are we unable to make up last year's deficits, but this year's export plan will have to be reduced. Our delegation to Moscow has discussed this fact, and I have also mentioned this to the Soviet trade delegation that visited here. So, as a result of the situation our imports from fraternal countries will not be what we have asked for. Hence, the great natural disasters that befell us have

made things more difficult for other fraternal countries as well, by decreasing our exports to these countries and our imports from them. But we are fraternal countries and know and understand each other's difficulties. Limiting our exports, especially on food items, to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany would be of immense help to us to overcome our difficulties. Despite these great difficulties we have not asked the fraternal countries for grains. Trade talks continue on these matters in Moscow between us and the Soviet Union, while with Bulgaria a trade agreement was signed, though it is about half as large as before. Once more, Comrades, I would like to reiterate that this is enormously helpful for us to remedy our internal situation. For this we thank our fraternal countries not only in our name, but also in the name of our party and our people. Last year agriculture was not favorable in other countries too, such as in the Soviet Union, but the People's Republic of Albania has had particularly great difficulties. Still, the Soviet Union has helped other countries too. In relation to the matters I discussed above, we are trying to remedy the situation and have taken measures to import grains. For example, we have signed agreements with Canada and Australia to import 2.6 million tons of grains for our internal needs. We have also signed an agreement with Burma for a half million tons of rice and others with other countries for different items, though those are not for our internal needs. We are trying to ensure even more grain sources and for this we are continuing talks with capitalist countries. But to procure the grains we need foreign currency, and we will export our products in order to support grain imports. In the past ten years we have never imported grains, on the contrary, we have exported. We will try to make sure, if we can, that we import 4-5 million tons of grain. This allows us to only fulfill our needs for two weeks or a bit more—it is only 5-6 kg per person—but we do not rely on imports to overcome our difficulties. We rely on our internal strength.

I want to reiterate that the capitalist countries try to exploit our temporary difficulties at every chance and spread all kinds of gossip as if we are not steadfast, are not strong, etc. so as to decrease our country's influence in the eyes of the world. They are also trying to impede the purchase of the grain and its delivery here. But we know this very well and all the difficulties will be overcome and we cannot accept their "help." If they get in the way of the deliveries of grain here, I declare to you that this is not dangerous for us. Spring is coming and in our southern and other areas we will replace food items with surrogates. Hence we are calm and resolute in facing every difficulty. In front of the unity of our camp the imperialists will fail. They try to exploit our temporary difficulties, while their own difficulties are insurmountable; the unity between our countries gets stronger everyday and the anti-imperialist and the anti-colonialist struggle in Latin America, Africa, etc. gets tougher.

Please notify the governments and parties of your countries about all I have said. We have difficulties, but we will over-

come them. We inform you of the situation so that the parties and governments of our fraternal countries know the difficulties with our exports during the past year and this one. The outlook for our agriculture's future is bright and our economy will also get stronger in all areas, as will the cooperation and unity between our fraternal countries. Hence, the temporary difficulties that have befallen us should not give rise to misunderstandings. Otherwise, the faith in our structure may be lost.

(This is what Comrade Zhou Enlai said and then he asked us whether there were any questions on the issues he discussed. At this moment, the Bulgarian ambassador, Panchovski, rose and said, "We thank Comrade Zhou Enlai, the Chinese party and government very much not only for informing us in detail on their internal situation, but also for the measures they have undertaken to overcome these difficulties. We are mindful and understand your difficulties and have full trust that you will successfully overcome them."

Beijing, 9 March 1961

Halil Zeneli



DOCUMENT No. 6

Memorandum of Conversation, Comrade Abdyl Kellezi with Comrade Zhou Enlai, 20 April 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, L. 13, D. 6. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

At the meeting there were also present: from our side, Comrade Mihal Prifti, from the Chinese side the comrades Deng Xiaoping, Luo Ruiqing, Vice Premier of the State Council and Chief of Staff, and Wu Xiuquan, Deputy Director of the CCP CC International Department. In the lunch that was given after the talks there was also Comrade Tan Zhenlin, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP CC and dealing with agriculture issues, as well as Comrade Li Xiannian.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We took a look at the minutes of the meeting between Comrade Mehmet Shehu and Comrade Luo Shigao that they had after the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee that was held in Moscow. In addition, we have also seen the minutes of your meeting with Comrade Li Xiannian. Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Liu Shaoqi are not here and we still do not know when they will be back, and that is why we requested this meeting. Today we have a party meeting to attend, too.

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: (Took the floor and expressed thanks for the great help that was given to us.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: There is no reason to thank us. In brief, I can tell you that since the Moscow Conference (he was referring to the conference of [November] 1960) the relations between our two parties and our two countries have been strengthened even further, because we have often exchanged thoughts, and because, as you also mentioned, what we have to say we say it to each other. These past few days we also received the report by Comrade Liu Xiao on the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact and are of the opinion that the positions, letters and the discussions of the CPSU and of the Soviet government, and especially of Khrushchev, are incorrect. They are in contradiction to the principles of last year's Moscow meeting, accepted by all the parties. Particularly incorrect was the decision over the naval base which was accepted by a forced majority. They, as Comrade Abdyl Kellezi mentioned, entered into the inter-governmental jurisdiction. It is a well known fact that all this is in contradiction to the Marxist-Leninist principles. As far as your side is concerned, in our opinion the behavior of Comrade Beqir Balluku was correct. As to the relations between Albania and the Soviet Union since the Moscow Conference and until the Warsaw Pact meeting, whenever we have had the chance, we have suggested to the Soviet comrades that these relations should be improved. We think that the larger responsibility falls to the CPSU because it is a big country, and these relations have deteriorated because of them.

During the days that the Moscow meeting was being held, comrades Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen spoke to many Soviet comrades about this. This was reiterated once more by Comrade Li Xiannian when he passed through Moscow on his way to your congress. And lately, during the latest meeting in Moscow, Comrade Liu Xiao (ambassador of the PRC to Moscow), whenever he has had the chance, has again spoken to the comrades of the CPSU CC.

During the proceedings of this latest meeting, since we are only observers, we did not read any speeches. We took the position of not reading any speeches. This was as a silent protest against the blackmail and the unreasonable attacks that Khrushchev waged against Albania. In fact there were also some other observers, such as those from Korea and Vietnam, who took the same position of silence, approving the Albanian position. We did not applaud Khrushchev. If we are given the chance again, we would continue to keep this attitude toward them. We are convinced that the leadership of the ALP CC and the PRA government have taken the correct position and the CCP and the PRC government stand on your side.

As you also say, we support and stand on the side of those that follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Since the CPSU CC proceeded incorrectly and unfairly toward you, we are against them. I believe you know well the situation of our relations with them. Starting from the year 1958, in fact since 1957, we have entered into polemics with them. And especially

during the period of 1959-1960 we have exchanged very bitter polemics. The polemics reached its climax at the beginning of the second half of last year.

If we should speak of thanks, it should be us thanking you, because you took a brave stance at the [June 1960] Bucharest meeting and it was you defending us, a task that was not easy. We have a greater capacity of helping you, than you do us because we are a larger party and you are a smaller one, are situated in Europe, and are a member of the Warsaw Pact. From today onwards we will continue to exchange our points of view because we are Marxists. It should be noted that our opinions are sometimes incorrect, and that is why we need to exchange opinions. As Comrade Mao Zedong says, we must stay with the truth and correct our mistakes. This would be the most correct position to take, to look at our mistakes and to correct them. Not only are some of the leaders of the CPSU not on the side of truth and do not correct their mistakes, but they do not even accept them. This is not according to the Marxist-Leninist principles. This must be dealt with seriously.

Now let us talk about the economic assistance.

[Discussion of economic issues omitted; full text available at www.cwihp.org.]

[Zhou Enlai:] We are of the opinion that the Moscow Conference of the 81 Parties was a great success and it has developed even further the spirit of the 1957 Conference. Of course, this has happened as a result of our work of keeping with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as a result of the efforts of the CCP and the ALP and of many other parties. But we cannot say this without including [sic] the CPSU and some other parties because they have revisionist points of view, but when faced with the truth they cannot accept this reality. During these past four years we have been able to finish two very important documents: The Declaration of 1957 and that of 1960. These are a common program for the international communist and workers' movement; they are our banner and weapon in our war; these weapons help us in the war against imperialism and against the modern revisionism in the defense of Marxism-Leninism and in the construction of socialism, and that is why we need to value deeply, and carry and raise high this banner. Whenever someone drops this banner and distances himself from the Moscow Declaration, he allows us to criticize him. When this weapon is held by our hand, then the errors will not be able to raise their heads, because we will raise this weapon high and they will lower their heads. It is precisely because we have this weapon that we are strong and on the side of rightness. The events taking place attest to this. The development of the events in our times proves our thoughts on the Declaration and not that of Khrushchev, who claims that we live in a time where we do not need weapons, wars and militaries.

And this time, at the Moscow meeting, Khrushchev did

not mention this anymore. On the contrary, he pointed out that importance must be placed on the navy, aviation, nuclear submarines. He spoke about the strengthening of the defensive force of the Warsaw Pact, etc.

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: But he also wants to close the naval base in our country.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Everyone is laughing about it and is saying that they think he will not close it. And what do the new events in Cuba tell us? They show that there is no difference between Kennedy and Eisenhower. If there can be any discussion about any differences between the two, then the difference is this: When Eisenhower came to power, he ended the war in Korea; but when Kennedy came to power, he started the war in Cuba. The war in Korea was started by Kennedy's party and was ended by that of Eisenhower. Kennedy is developing military preparedness even further. And if there is another difference, it is this: Eisenhower and Dulles openly followed the policy of "open war," while Kennedy on the surface appears as a person of peace but in reality has increased armaments. Not three months had passed before he showed his true face. Comrade Mao Zedong has said, "sometimes the criticism of the comrades and even of the masses do not have an effect on a comrade, but the acts of the enemy will have an effect if the comrade is still a revolutionary and a Marxist." According to our opinion, the leadership of the CPSU and Khrushchev may not have any differences in their ideology and their working style, but we cannot say that they will not be influenced by all of this movement of the masses and the people if they are Marxists. And that is why in this case he could not pass on sending a letter to Kennedy and making the declaration (on the events in Cuba). On this he did a good job and we support him. I believe that you also agree.

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: We do.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: It seems to us that the situation in Cuba will develop even further. In this situation Kennedy shows his true face, and the entire world is learning that America has organized and manages this war against Cuba. As far as we know, the revolutionary Cuban government is prepared, and it may even be able to cope with this situation on its own, but since this is a war cooked up by America itself, it will not back down easily. If all the countries rise up and give America a strong punch, then it may back down. As I said, the war on Korea was initiated by Kennedy's party and continued for three years until Eisenhower's party ended it. When one party cannot continue a war, then the other party comes in and ends it. We like a Khrushchev expression from his letter that says approximately, "do not think that it is possible to speak with one country about the establishment of peace and in another to ignite the world on fire."

Kennedy's circles have understood this and say that they

are willing to cooperate in Laos for the reestablishment of peace and that they are willing to carry out the UN resolutions in Congo for the normalization of the situation.

I had a meeting on this issue with the Soviet embassy's chargé d'affaires, because the ambassador is not here. I told him that we must look at the possibility of starting up another situation in another country as well. They are making the situation difficult in Cuba, so we go ahead and start another in a place more suitable for us. We speak up and condemn them in the UN. This should also be happening elsewhere, outside the UN.

He told me that the Cuban government has told the Soviet ambassador that the landing was done with American ships and planes. They must have been using an aircraft carrier, because the planes went and returned within 20 minutes. We can document this because we know how far Cuban land is from the territory of other countries, like Guatemala, etc.

But the war might continue for a long time, and that is why we need to be prepared. Of course, both you and we are far away from Cuba and cannot help her, but we could help her through the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union has ships and other equipment. It is our opinion that at the last meeting in Moscow the issue of the Soviet Union not helping the other socialist countries so that they may also develop militarily was also left unresolved. The Americans have helped the others, not to mention here France and England. They are also helping Japan, have helped Canada, and Canada is helping India to develop atomic and nuclear weapons. We think that the Soviet Union should help the other countries so that they may also have atomic weapons, nuclear submarines, etc. When Comrade Deng Xiaoping was in Moscow, he said that if all the socialist countries had nuclear weapons, peace would be even more guaranteed. And this is a very simple thing. Why does Khrushchev not accept this? He wants the monopoly of nuclear weapons. Well, it does not matter; we will work on our own.

[*Editor's Note:* The notes change into third person from this point on] He [Zhou Enlai] spoke about the situation in Laos and said that [Laotian Prime Minister Prince] Souvanna Phouma cancelled his trip to the USA because of the attack on Cuba. He presents his character as a wavering individual, but said that we must still keep contacts with him because there are progressive elements in his government that cooperate with the Pathet Lao. Then he said that the situation in Laos is developing to the favor of the partisan forces. Then he said, "We can influence the situation not only in Cuba, but also in Laos. In the world there exist and are being fought local wars, but a world war does not come from this."

He noted that he had had a meeting with the Mongolian ambassador who had just come to Beijing, and he had said that the situation in Congo has now been stabilized, despite the fact that the country is isolated. Nonetheless, the situation there

looks good.

[*Editor's Note:* The notes switch back to first person.] About the situation, I think that in diplomacy we can use strategic words but we must also prepare for war in practice.

We are Marxist–Leninists and we see that the course of events confirms our forecasts. This will also convince the others, and that is why we must keep high the Moscow Declaration.

The leader comrades of our party and government, relying on the lessons of Comrade Mao Zedong, started off in unity and through the necessary war [sic] we want to arrive at a new unity. We have come up with our own method through the war experience of our party. You know well that we have also had enemies and have fought against various currents within our party. From this long struggle within our party we have gained our own experience, according to which:

- 1) In the struggle against the enemy we do not speak first but second. We do not raise the issues but allow the adversary to do so, because through this he uncovers himself. After this we answer our adversary. This tool is more powerful. We defend the truth, and by defending it the masses and the others that do not see clearly, little by little are enlightened and come to our side.
- 2) We keep high the banner of unity. Often the opposite side does not keep this banner high, such as in Bucharest against us and now in Moscow against you. They do not keep the banner of unity high and through their stance wanted to expel us from the camp and make us kneel. But we understand their intentions and in Bucharest we fought our own war and presented our own points of view. For example, we signed the Bucharest Declaration, but we also distributed our own declaration.

At the Moscow meeting of November 1960, they conceded and we did the same and, finally, the Declaration was signed. Comrade Mao Zedong tells us to keep high the banner of unity. The intention is to bring the masses of the party and the people to our side, because when we have them on our side, it is more difficult for the enemy.

- 3) Confronted with the issues we must keep a correct stance. We say that we must speak openly and carefully. Sometimes we take this course: You speak and yell loudly, and I say nothing. This is a silent protest. For example, Comrade Beqir Balluku, when he spoke, said to Khrushchev, "Will you let me continue, or not?" This was a good protest.

- 4) We must deal with restraint both in the war against the enemy and in the internal struggle between the parties. We do not say our entire piece to the end, because the situation cannot develop in only one manner. There can be two, three, or four ways it can develop. For example, Khrushchev says his final word first, but the situation does not develop as he thinks, and so he has to pull back and change course.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Such is his position when dealing with the naval base [at Vlora]. He deals without restraint. He said that he would liquidate the base, but this must not be done. Under these conditions the decision that was taken has no value. We must deal with restraint. As far as the base goes, we must require that the existing agreement is honored. This base lies in Albania, and that is why Albania should have command of it. For example, Albania says that we must improve relations and the base must be strengthened. This is fair.

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: He says that he will remove the base, but we say no.

Both of them: They are saying that they think it will not be removed, because it should be kept.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Of course, the enemies realize that there are differences between China and the Soviet Union and between Albania and the Soviet Union, but they do not know what these differences actually are. That is why we need to analyze these issues step by step and with restraint. For example, Khrushchev always goes into battle personally, but we do not follow this course. We sent comrade Peng Zhen to Bucharest and we sent Comrade Deng Xiaoping to Moscow. We hold back the other comrades. We keep Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Deng Xiaoping in reserve for later.

Comrade Liu Shaoqi, when he went to Moscow, told Khrushchev, "Why do you continually go personally to other countries? Let the other comrades go and prepare the situation and then you can go." We saw then that many Soviet comrades liked this idea of ours, but in Moscow it was Khrushchev again who came out. That is why we say that Khrushchev's method of thinking and his style of work are difficult to change. Nonetheless, we do not say that his politics will not change, because the development of the situation and the pressure from the people and the party will have an influence on him.

We think there are a few possibilities here:

- 1) You should continue your struggle with determination. We will help you in this struggle and you, through your struggle, will influence the other parties. But, nonetheless, a bad outcome may not be avoided.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: This would not be a very big or a

difficult outcome. Should it happen, we will help you with all our strength.

His words were approved by Comrade Zhou Enlai, who then continued: We will show the enemy, his party and the other sister parties his mistakes and weaknesses and force him to answer for those mistakes.

We will try and change him and will not make concessions on these points of view. We think that whenever we have the chance, we will speak again with the Soviet comrades to see if relations with you can be improved. As far as the military assistance, we think that we should wait a little longer until he [Khrushchev] answers you with a letter. After this, we will say that we will temporarily help Albania. You will also talk about this with Comrade Mao Zedong.

If the other socialist countries really do not help you, we think that we should make some adjustments to the proportion of assistance you receive. We think that the field of agriculture should be the primary concern of these adjustments. And when we do this (meaning the socialist reconstruction of the country), we should take into account all the variables, such as the work force, the raw materials, etc., etc.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Comrade Zhou Enlai mentioned all the issues and these are the opinions of every one of us. They are the opinions of the Central Committee of our party. I would only like to mention two issues.

- 1) One is the problem of the internal relations within the socialist camp. As you well know, Bucharest was a struggle against us. You found yourselves in the flames of the fire, drew the fire of the battle upon yourselves, and that was a good move. You showed bravery. Marx was also the brave type. All of the Marxists are the same. They are not afraid of prison, or of internment, and not even afraid of death. They follow this road out of their own free will. Then, at the Moscow Conference, both our parties were in the line of fire. After the Moscow Conference, their fire was directed back against you. It seems like the fire against us is a little bit softer, maybe because we are a larger party. But, in fact, they direct their fire not only against you and not only against us both. It seems like this issue is here to stay for a long time. As I speak, I may also repeat things a few times. During the Moscow Conference I did not have the chance to meet comrade [Albanian Party of Labour (ALP) First Secretary] Enver Hoxha and had a lot of meetings and talks with Comrade Hysni Kapo. The same with Comrade Liu Shaoqi, most of whose meetings were also with Comrade Hysni Kapo. The opinion that this is an issue that will take a long time is a common opinion of both our parties. But we are on the side of justice. Justice is with us, and this is essential. But even formally we should always be just. We should owe nothing. In fact, they owe us, but this struggle will be

long, and that is why we should operate in such a way that both formally and in actuality justice should be on our side and they should owe us. Let us look at the naval base, for example. You are on the side of justice. You should request that the relevant agreement be respected. You should keep repeating this and say nothing else, until you find out what he has to say. We think that the method that Comrade Beqir Balluku used was very correct. If you get mad, then why shouldn't I? If you curse, then why shouldn't I? This makes them think.

It seems that this struggle will be a long one, which is why detailed and careful work is required here. I am convinced that we have common points of view and that there are no misunderstandings between us. We immediately understand all your materials. For example, the case of the five girls we understood immediately, because we also had our own experience with this issue. During the Moscow Conference, Comrade Hysni Kapo gave me a list and told me...[illegible]

We are convinced that your opinions are correct and we cannot fathom how small Albania could be the perpetrator against the big Soviet Union.

We recognize the truth at first sight. The issue is how to organize our work. We used to have a good coordination with Moscow. Of course, they have attacked you unfairly during the last meeting and the way you retorted was good. We did not speak. We will look to find out the right time to speak.

We have mentioned this issue many times in the coordination commission and Comrade Liu Shaoqi has spoken officially to Gomulka. We told them that they should not act in such a way toward Albania and that Albania is right in this case. In his greetings, Comrade Liu Shaoqi spoke about twelve socialist countries. He said that from Albania to Vietnam and from Germany to Korea there should be complete unity, and whoever destroys this unity shall be committing a historic crime. We will always repeat this position.

This time we only sent our ambassador to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, while to other meetings we have sent a delegation. They understand our position. We had instructed our ambassador that if the meeting's proceedings were in order, he could read a greeting, but if there would be anything spoken against Albania, he should be silent. Sometimes, when you do not hold a speech, it weighs more than if you say something. This does not mean that we did not take a position in Moscow. They owe you and the entire communist movement. We will be speaking out, but when or how we are going to do this, is an issue that we must look over carefully. For example, he [Khrushchev] has not decided to remove the base, and even if he does so, [we have] to prevent him from doing so. But we will try so that he does not. This is in your favor and that of the entire socialist camp. That is

why we will carefully study the issue of when we will speak out about this. We will also weigh its effect. It may be that the events in Cuba have some sort of benefit for you. Of course, should they not back down, there should be a retreat position. This is our opinion for the moment. Of course, when we speak out and what we will say will be discussed with you first. For the moment, we are being silent. But, of course, on such an issue, one cannot stay silent forever.

- 2) The second issue has to do with the matter of economic assistance. Should they decide not to help you, it will be our duty to do so, because you have given a great assistance to the world communist movement. This is what we say: We will help you with all the capacity we have. If there are some things which, right now or in the near future, we cannot help you with, we will tell you so. These are issues which have to do with the development and technological stage in which we find ourselves. These are issues which we should solve in stages. There are some objects which we are not able to build right away.

We think that in the field of economic cooperation you should operate in such away that for the next 100 years the responsibility falls on them. Whatever you can solve, solve it with them, keeping justice always on your side. The rest we can look at together. But in your conditions, the way to solve these issues (the construction of socialism) is a big deal. We also raised these issues with the Cuban comrades when the general secretary of the party was here and we exchanged opinions with them. Comrade Mao Zedong said, "first of all, you should keep and strengthen the people's police force. Second, you should change their one-sided economy and develop the agriculture." Now in the development of their economy they are keeping this in mind. Instead of planting only sugar cane, they will also develop the production of rice and other cultures. Now they have a 300,000 [men] strong people's police force, which serves as a guarantee for them. Can the [Soviet] missiles [stationed in Cuba] really be used? This is not an easy thing, because a world war could be ignited, while local wars have always existed and will continue to exist. Today, a people's police force is more important than a regular military. It is possible that the enemy can occupy all the main cities, but the war will be continued in the rear by the people's police force.

Of course, such advice is not for Albania's conditions, because all the people are behind you. For you important is the issue of reconstruction and this should be the basis of your work.

Your agriculture has a relatively high potential, and this is an important issue. The development of industry should have at its base the development of agriculture. First we should fill our bellies and then comes the rest. As for the other issues, you can see to them yourselves, because you

have enough experience. In general, though, developed industry with underdeveloped agriculture becomes a hindrance. For example, every year we supply the province of [Manchuria] with 1.6 billion tons of grains. There are also examples of other provinces where work in various industrial projects has been suspended. We now have to slow down the building of industry to develop our agriculture. In the next three years we will not see a visible development of our industry. We will mainly place the most importance on the development of agriculture.

When you go back to Albania, please tell Comrade Enver Hoxha that we will help you with all our strength, with all we have, but we will not be able to fulfill all of your needs.

(As Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Deng Xiaoping finished their speeches, Comrade Abdyl Kellezi asked for permission to speak and spoke as follows.)

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Deng Xiaoping presented their opinion that we have common points of view and have no disagreements. We are convinced of this because we found each other on the same page in Bucharest without any previous planning. We found ourselves holding the same positions in defense of Marxism–Leninism. The Central Committee of our party is completely convinced that we have common points of view when it comes to the defense of Marxism–Leninism, because both you and we are on a just course, because between us there have not been and there are no disagreements.

We were not caught unprepared in the meeting of the Consultative Committee because our leadership had foreseen that there might be some kind of attack against us there, which actually happened. You had also foreseen that there might be an attack against Albania. Nikita Khrushchev, backed by the rest of them, elevated the issue of ideological disagreements to the level of inter-state relations.

We did not start the fight at the meeting of the Consultative Commission. The speech by Comrade Beqir Balluku was correct and principled; it had been approved by the leadership of our party. Our speech relied on the Moscow Declaration after the Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties of 1960, in which, the need for the strengthening of the militaries of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the dangers that American imperialism presented were mentioned; the activities of the imperialists, Kennedy, and of the Belgrade revisionists were unmasked publicly; the need for the strengthening of our military was stressed, etc. In other words, that speech was correct and principled.

Nikita Khrushchev, on the other hand, and the rest of them attacked Albania and, as you well know, presented shameful declarations and arguments against our country and our party.

The fabrications and the slander on the issue of the naval base are ignoble. Nothing has happened at the base which has been done purposefully by us. (Comrade Deng Xiaoping interrupted here and said that they had heard about the case of the five Soviet women that had been stopped by the police and that the Soviets had used such methods against them too.) The reason for their attack is not this event, but what happened in Bucharest, and we said this openly at the meeting. It is a fact that since Bucharest they have started to sabotage the readiness of the base and of the military; they have not completed supply deliveries of any goods and we have raised this issue with them time after time. They requested that either only Soviet personnel be stationed at the base, or else it be removed. We explained that the base was constructed at the initiative of the ALP CC and in agreement with the CPSU CC and that there is a signed agreement on this between us and the Soviet government. We told them that we would never agree to remove the Albanian personnel from the base, and that if they wanted, they could remove the base, but I also said that it would be a violation of the signed agreements and that they would be held responsible to their [own] people, to the world communist movement, and to history. The removal of the base damages Albania, the Soviet Union and our entire socialist camp, but we defend and will continue to defend our country in every situation. We told them that if they would remove the base, we would help them and would not hinder their work, but that we think that the base should be strengthened instead. They also delivered a letter to us, but our delegation did not answer them on the spot. It was a letter by [Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Andrei A.] Grechko and we only answered it after they asked us for an answer. In other words, it was not us who started the fight. It was they who started it, and we answered as we should have. It was they who trampled on the Moscow Declaration of the 81 Parties.

Khrushchev said that the Albanians are trying to overthrow him and other things. This is absurd and anti-Marxist, but he thinks of himself as someone who has taken under his wing and defends the enemies of the ALP. How is it possible that the ALP could seek to overthrow the secretary of another party? It is not our business. Who is and who remains the secretary of a party or another is only the business of the communists who are members of that party. But we do say openly to Khrushchev that he should have nothing to do with the traitors of our own party. He should not interfere with the internal business of our party, because we do not allow anyone to do this. So, we did not initiate an attack. Khrushchev did, and we gave him the counterpunch. In this situation Khrushchev is the one who is trampling on the Moscow Declaration. Our party has fought and will continue to fight for the execution of the Moscow Declaration and we are convinced that both our parties will always be the ones to hold high consistently that banner, and they will be left to hold the other banner, the banner of opportunism and revisionism.

They came to our Fourth Congress and trampled on the Moscow Declaration. We, on the contrary, continued with the congress's proceedings in the spirit of the Moscow Declaration, on which you have been briefed by Comrade Li Xiannian. They tried to find some crack in our work, but were disillusioned, because our party showed itself to be monolithic. It was said here that this struggle will be long because this is an ideological struggle. We agree that it will be a long one, that patience is needed, and that we will prevail. We are presenting to you our opinions ... [illegible] ... it says that our position is correct. For example, Cuba, Laos, Congo, etc. show that justice is on our side. They do not want to change, and the reason is that this issue is not simple. It is an ideologically anti-Marxist point of view. He says we have the missiles, we tell him that it is not only the missiles that matter. The people must be armed, they must be vigilant, the military must be strengthened, and imperialism must be unmasked. Then he says that we must remove the base from Albania. In the meeting of the Warsaw Pact the danger was not American imperialism, it was Albania and its naval base. Thus, here we see two opposing theories, two ideologies. Patience is necessary, and our party thinks so too. As our people say, "The tree cannot be felled in one strike."

The comrades here said that you did not speak at the meeting in Moscow, just like the others that were there as observers did not speak either. But you are on our side and you support our stance. We know that your ambassador had instructions not to speak and that he spoke outside the meeting. We know that you will speak up when you think it necessary and will not stay silent forever. We believe what you say. You know it better when, what and at what level you will speak up. We are confident that when you deem it necessary, you will speak up and this you know better. We are confident that we have common points of view in our just and principled struggle.

Comrade Zhou Enlai spoke on the need for the stocking up of reserves and for the preparation of people for good days and for bad days. We are realists. We understand that we may also face difficult days ahead, but we are not afraid of them. We have, as always, prepared the people and will continue to do so, with the slogan, "In one hand the pickaxe, the other the rifle." As far as the reserves in grain, fuel and other materials are concerned, the Central Committee has kept them in mind, but the conditions have not been favorable and we have not had any surplus in those materials to build up any reserves. We are taking serious measures. Thus, for example, the members of the Central Committee and the government have gone in teams in plant after plant around the country in order to economize the material and financial funds and in a short time we will devise a plan on the strengthening of the regimen of frugality, which will help in the creation of our reserves[...]

[...] but they will fail in this and in it the great assistance that you gave us played a very important role. There are also nuances, for example, the Hungarians did not make it difficult

for us. The Czechs, merchants that they are, might not break the agreements with us, because they would rather trade the goods, especially the iron and the copper they get from us. We agree to trade with them. But there is one thing that is clear; they are trying to sabotage our five-year plan.

As to the matter of military assistance, I have also told Comrade Li Xiannian that since the Bucharest events they have not sent any more supplies and are not even thinking of sending them. They also want to destroy the base. Once again, on this issue, they showed themselves to be in opposition to the Moscow Declaration and with the signed agreements. After the Moscow meeting (of the Warsaw Pact), our representative requested from the Soviet side that they decide on the materials and equipments that should be sent to Albania for the military. The Soviet representative asked him whether the answer that Khrushchev and Grechko gave us was not enough for us. In other words, they are not going to send any supplies for the military.

This was also indicated by the work of the commission that made the decision of how the munitions would be produced and the difference between its decision and the list of the equipment that we asked to receive from the Soviet Union. They asked that the supplies be bought 50% through clearing and 50% through a loan plus annual interest. We opposed this and it was removed from the protocol. Chinese comrades, we do not ask for the fulfillment of the list. We only ask for the munitions from it.

(Then it was agreed that the competent comrades set off for Albania to deal with this issue, because the Chinese comrades are willing to help us and the defense minister will be the point person on their side. Comrade Abdyl Kellezi thanked them once more for their readiness to assist us and emphasized once again that what we were asking for is needed to create what Comrade Zhou Enlai advised about, the creation of necessary reserves for bad days. Comrade Abdyl Kellezi told them that our entire party and our entire people would fight for the defense of our fatherland, for the defense of their revolutionary victories, for the defense of Marxism–Leninism. He assured them once more that all what was said he will faithfully transmit to Comrade Enver Hoxha.

Comrade Zhou Enlai said that the next day there would be a great rally for Cuba where there would be 100,000 people attending, and hundreds of thousands more would be listening from public squares. He invited us to attend this rally and Comrade Abdyl Kellezi gleefully accepted the invitation.)

Comrade Abdyl Kellezi: Comrades, you said that there is no reason for us to thank you. You have to forgive me but we thanked you because we, first of all, have to fulfill the instructions that Comrade Enver Hoxha gave us. Furthermore, this is something that we deeply feel it in our hearts and we cannot

keep it inside. You are helping us in an unprecedented manner, as true brothers. We come here to you and we ask that you forgive us for continually bothering you and making so many requests. We are saying this like communist friends and brothers and you should do the same and tell us openly what your capabilities are and where you can help us. We will never forget this internationalist assistance. Just like you understand us when we come and openly seek your assistance, we also understand you when you say to us that this is something you have, or something you do not have but which you will try to maybe give to us a bit later. We understand that sometimes it is difficult for you to say no to us, but we also understand that you are doing what you can and more, because you are taking from your own table to give to us. This is an internationalist behavior. We are also very confident that when you tell us that a certain factory, for example, shall be delivered to us on that date, which may not be very suitable for us, your apparatus, following your orders, will work hard to deliver it before the deadline.

(Comrade Zhou Enlai intervenes here and said that there may also be technical difficulties or some materials, like steel for example, due to shipping problems may be delivered after the deadline. Comrade Abdyl Kellezi added that such things may happen in life, but that we understand each other and that what is important is that our unified forces will be put to use to execute the tasks that await us. He also added that we have no doubt about this. Comrade Zhou Enlai said that it may happen that they could give us something which may not be completely perfect and may have some problems. He said that if that happens they would plead with us to send it back. Comrade Abdyl Kellezi added that we will solve everything like communists and that... [illegible].

After the conversation lunch was served during which a warm conversation ensued, various toasts were made to the friendship, to both our parties, to both our leaders, Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mao Zedong, and to the defense of Marxism–Leninism.)

Conceived by A. K. and M. P.

Typed by T. F.

Three copies were produced, two of which were handed to Comrade A. K. and the other to M. P.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Information Memorandum, Meeting between Albanian Ambassador to China Reis Malile and Comrade Dong Biwu, 21 July 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, D. 22. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

No. 38 Secret

Contents: Information on the meeting with Comrade Dong Biwu

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TIRANA

On 18 July, I arrived in Beijing to start my new duty. The next day I paid a visit to the vice director of protocol, Ji Pengfei, and to the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Zhen Yongquan. On 20 July, I handed the credential papers to the vice president of the PRC, Comrade Dong Biwu, a member of the [CCP CC] Politburo and one of the founders of the CCP. The usual formalities were quite simple, in fact, following the local protocol, the speeches were not even read. Their texts were exchanged before the ceremony according to protocol.

Comrade Dong Biwu received me in a very friendly manner. During the conversation, I initially conveyed to him the greetings from Comrade Enver Hoxha, Comrade Mehmet Shehu and Comrade Haxhi Lleshi, as well as the thanks from our people, our party and our government for the great help that is given us by the PRC. He thanked me for the greetings and at the same time asked me to transmit our leadership comrades his most sincere greetings. As to the matter of the thanks I transmitted, he received them almost completely silently. Then he spoke at length on the development of the PRC, on the achieved economic plans, the development of industry, agriculture, and culture, and on the difficulties that are faced at the moment in the country's economy due to the natural disasters. He said that these disasters have forced them to even make changes in their economic planning and now the primary attention has turned to agriculture. "We," he said, "for many years have been able to secure our bread in-country, but this year we imported it and will be forced to import it for a few more years in the future." He added that due to the natural disasters, they have been forced to postpone the publishing of the plan for this year, but that very soon the Assembly shall convene and the plan shall be published. Later he spoke with admiration about our party and her unwavering Marxist-Leninist stance and added that "the Albanian comrades work well."

I thanked him for the kind words that he said about our party and assured him that nothing will make it waver from

the correct course. I spoke briefly to him on the achievements in our country, and, wanting to steer the conversation toward the problems that preoccupy us, I mentioned to him that at the moment the enemies of our country have increased their attacks and that some individuals who act like communists in their behavior against us, are in fact playing the enemy's game. Comrade Dong Biwu said, "You are right. The same situation is also happening with us. What is happening to you today, has been happening to our party and country for several years now in various forms and means." After this, I informed him in brief about the anti-Marxist stance of the Soviet leadership against our party and people, listing many actual facts. "The Khrushchev attempts," I said, "to isolate our country politically, economically and militarily and to force our party to kneel have not and will not produce any results."

Comrade Dong Biwu answered that the Albanian comrades have worked and continue to work very well. He continued, "Last year, when Comrade Haxhi Lleshi and Liri Belishova were visiting here, we had talks with them and told them our points of view very openly. But when we saw the negative behavior of Liri Belishova, we did not continue our talks with them." I told Comrade Dong Biwu that the behavior of Liri Belishova was not the stance that our party takes and that for her points of view, Liri Belishova received the answer she merited from our party. Comrade Dong Biwu said that in reality, "we heard the points of view of the Albanian comrades very openly during the Bucharest meeting, where their party fought with bravery in the defense of Marxism–Leninism. We did not know what the Albanian comrades would say in the Bucharest meeting, but when they defended us, this had the effect of encouraging us even more to continue our struggle with all our might. We have not had any backstage talks with the Albanian comrades at the meeting in Bucharest. Neither did we have any secret meetings with them. This was done with the only intention of not letting Khrushchev and the others say, 'Look, the Albanians and the Chinese have reached an agreement from before on what their position would be.'"

On the issue of the removal of the Soviet military naval base from Vlora, Comrade Dong Biwu said that, "When the Soviet Union notified us that they were going to close the military base, comrades Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping told the Soviet ambassador here that the Chinese government and Communist Party were not at all in agreement with such a decision and that this measure would only succeed in making the enemies of socialism happy." "This issue," said Comrade Dong Biwu, "we also brought forth in the meeting of the Central Committee of the party and the Central Committee approved the correct position of Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Deng Xiaoping on this issue. We later also answered in writing to the CPSU and to the Soviet government and also notified the ALP by letter. We told the Soviet comrades that the pressure that they are exerting on us about the removal of the Soviet specialists from China after Bucharest caused us great damage, but that

the removal of the military base from Vlora was a very great damage to all the socialist countries. The stance of the ALP on this problem and on others is generally very correct. Its position is strong. They (he is talking here about Khrushchev and the others) do not know how to distinguish who is a friend and who is an enemy."

Later, I spoke to Comrade Dong Biwu on the measures that the Soviets have taken regarding our cadets, about the Soviet press that is completely silent on Albania, as well as about the [musical] ensemble and the sports team that were not accepted there. All this is happening at a time when the relations of the Soviet Union with the US are broadening, when the visits by American artists and athletes to the Soviet Union are many, while the Albanian artists, who would not threaten the Albanian-Soviet friendship or socialism, are forbidden to enter into contact with the Soviet people. Comrade Dong Biwu answered that, "they have done the same thing against us, too. We used to publish the magazine "Druzha" here and in Moscow. After the Bucharest meeting, the Soviets stopped the publishing of this magazine in Moscow, while at the same time in Moscow there were many American magazines and other publications of the Western countries being distributed. From this it is clear that they do not know how to distinguish friend from foe."

"In the socialist camp and in the world communist movement there are many great forces and many distinguished comrades, who with determination defend the principles of Marxism–Leninism. In this movement there are more healthy internationalists than there are opportunists. What is happening today should not surprise us. The German people have given birth to the distinguished leaders, [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels, but it should also not be forgotten that Germany is also the birthplace of [Karl] Kautsky." (He was talking also about the concrete example of the Soviet Union, which is the birthplace of Lenin and Stalin, but from where Khrushchev has also come out.) Comrade Dong Biwu then continued, "Marxism–Leninism is not afraid of the difficulties it faces. History itself shows how, over the years, all the opportunist streams in the world communist movement have been destroyed. This is shown by the experience of the First International, that of the Second International, as well as the struggle against all of the opportunist streams later, including here the Titoist Yugoslavia today as well as the other opportunists. From the experience until now, it appears that the healthy forces have always prevailed over the others."

Then, Comrade Dong Biwu spoke in brief about how the true Marxists understand the concept of peaceful coexistence, and while speaking of the Khrushchev persona, he said that this year his behavior seems a little better than it did last year. As an example of this he brought up his speech at the Military Academy in Moscow, "which," he said, "was a good speech. There he speaks of the arming against imperialism. This we sup-



Tracking the Dragon: US National Intelligence Estimates on China 1948-1976, November 2004

CWIHP Conference Participants Yang Kuisong (East China Normal University) and former CWIHP scholar Li Danhui (Beijing University)

port because it is in agreement with the Moscow Declaration.” “Regarding what Khrushchev is doing to Albania,” I said to Comrade Dong Biwu, “it seems that Khrushchev is not thinking of becoming a better person. And as far as his speech at the Military Academy in Moscow goes,” I said, “we will see whether he will keep to his words, because he is used to saying one thing today and another tomorrow.” Comrade Dong Biwu laughed out loud and said, “You are right.” “In reality,” he continued, “with its stance toward Albania, the Soviet government has opened the doors for the American imperialists in Albania. But imperialism cannot attack Albania, because the international conditions do not allow it to. Despite the fact that the Soviets withdrew from the military base from Vlora, in time, the Albanian people will strengthen this base again relying on their own forces. Some time ago, Albania, in its war against fascism did not have weapons, but the Albanian people took their weapons from fascism and fought it with them. Today the conditions are much better because, among other reasons, Albania also has a good foundation in industry and agriculture. Furthermore,” added Comrade Dong Biwu, “Albania is not Cuba. If imperialism dares to attack Albania, we will assist her with all our forces.”

In the end I thanked Comrade Dong Biwu for the very warm reception and for the feelings of sincere friendship that he expressed directed at the people and the party.

THE AMBASSADOR
(Reis Malile)



DOCUMENT No. 8

Information on the Meeting with Comrade Chen Yi, 27 July 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, D. 22. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

Beijing, 27 July 1961

No. 41 Secret

Contents: Information on the meeting with Comrade Chen Yi

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TIRANA

On 25 July 1961 I was received for a meeting by Comrade Chen Yi, member of the CCP CC Politburo, [and] Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. In the meeting, comrade Zeng Yongquan, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, was also present, as well as some other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning I delivered to Comrade Chen Yi the greetings from the leadership comrades of our party. He thanked me and asked how they were. I answered, “They are very well. They are better than they have ever been before.” Comrade Chen Yi laughed out loud and said, “That is correct. Very well.” Then he told me that he was very well informed about our present relations with the Soviet Union, at which point I spoke to him in brief about this issue and told him that, “the Soviet leadership has used all the methods at its disposal. Except for the pressures, which have been continuous, they have also initiated a [policy of] military, political and economic isolation toward us, but they have not been successful. We will see what they will do in the future.” Comrade Chen Yi answered that, “the Soviet leaders will try to make Albania kneel and to lower China’s prestige, but they will not be successful. The Albanian proverb—better be dead on your feet than alive on your knees—has now become popular throughout China. They have isolated both our countries and call us dogmatic, but in reality the majority of the rest support us because the right is on our side. The war and struggle temper the person. Without war and without struggle the person becomes a revisionist.”

Then I asked Comrade Chen Yi how the Geneva Conference on Laos had proceeded. Comrade Chen Yi answered that “the issue of Laos is a serious problem and it is not simple to solve. The imperialists are dead-set on their positions. The cooperation with the Soviet comrades in Geneva was good, to a certain degree, but the Soviets are not too keen on consulting. They come up with their own approaches and insist on them. This is what actually happened with their approach to the Laos issue in Geneva. There the Soviets did not openly speak against American imperialism. As far as the Soviet negotiations with the Americans on the dis-

armament issue, etc. are concerned,” Comrade Chen Yi said that “despite the lengthy discussions, the Americans will not back down from their position on these issues.”

Later the discussion on how we understand the issue of the assistance by the Soviet Union was opened. At this point I pointed out the issue of assistance as a tool of pressure by the Soviets against our country. Comrade Chen Yi said that their approach on this issue was a mistake. He added that when he was in Moscow, on his return trip from Geneva, he had spoken to [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko regarding the assistance that the Soviets gave to the Indians. “I asked Gromyko, ‘what do you think of the position of India. Will it ever come to our side?’ Gromyko answered, ‘Under these conditions India will never come to our side.’ So I asked him again, ‘Then why are you helping India with large sums at a time when it does not support our policies?’ Gromyko just shrugged his shoulders.” Comrade Chen Yi then continued, “This policy is unusual. On the one hand they give the Indians money, and nothing comes of this because the Indians support the imperialists. On the other [hand], they ask for money from us, the Chinese. “To us,” he said, “the Soviet Union has given economic assistance to the tune of a total of about 5 billion rubles, plus three billion more rubles for armaments. They are asking for all those back. We suffered casualties in Korea. When we left, we left behind all our armaments with a total value of more than \$600 million and for this we did not ask of the Korean comrades the smallest payment. The Soviet leaders understand the issue of assistance in the most unusual way.”

Comrade Chen Yi also spoke in brief about the situation in China. He said that that the drought in China was unusually severe and that they were having great difficulties. In answering my question of what is happening with the wheat they were going to buy from Canada, since the Americans have been exerting pressure on the Canadian government not to deliver the wheat to China, he said that it is true that the Americans are exerting great pressure, but that, despite this, “we will get our wheat. The Canadians will give it to us. We trade with a lot of countries and we also buy from all the capitalist countries, even from the Americans—through third parties—even though the Americans say that they do not want to have trade relations with us.”

In the end, Comrade Chen Yi, in a very determined way and with optimism, reiterated once more that we are very strong and that we will win, because the right is on our side. Aside from our two parties, there are also a large number of other parties which are expressing a very healthy behavior. He enumerated a list of communist parties of Asian countries (which showed a consistent stance in the Moscow Conference) including here the Workers’ Party of Vietnam, too.

THE AMBASSADOR
(Reis Malile)



DOCUMENT No. 9

Information on the Meeting with Comrade Zhou Enlai, 21 August 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, D. 22. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

THE EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
ALBANIA

BEIJING

21 AUGUST 1961

No. 58 Top Secret

Contents: Information on the meeting with Comrade Zhou Enlai.

TO THE CC OF THE PRA
TIRANA

On the evening of 21 August 1961, I was called to a meeting by Comrade Zhou Enlai and he spoke to me about the visit by Comrade Ho Chi Minh to Moscow. At the beginning, he told me that today he had received a telegram by their ambassador in Tirana, through which the ambassador notified him of the particulars of the meeting he had had with Comrade Enver Hoxha. Of this conversation, Comrade Zhou Enlai notified me in brief.

Comrade Zhou Enlai told me that today he had had a meeting with the Vietnamese minister of foreign affairs, Comrade Ung Van Khiem, who on his return from Geneva passed through Beijing on his way to Hanoi. Comrade Zhou Enlai told me that he had talked with him about the issue of the visit by Comrade Ho Chi Minh. Comrade Ung Van Khiem knew about the Khrushchev position as well as our party’s position on this visit. He had told Comrade Zhou Enlai that initially Comrade Ho Chi Minh was not planning on coming to Albania. There must have been some misunderstanding about this, because he first wanted to go to Sochi and then to Tirana. The intention of Comrade Ho Chi Minh was to fulfill his mission through unofficial channels. “If,” Comrade Ung Van Khiem had continued, “he would have followed the request by the ALP that he come to Albania in November at the helm of a party delegation, then his travel would not have had an unofficial character anymore, but would have been official.” After the second telegram that he received from the ALP CC, Comrade Ho Chi Minh went to Sochi and met twice with Khrushchev. Comrade Ung Van Khiem told Comrade Zhou Enlai that he was not aware of the details of what had been talked about in these meetings and that one of these days Comrade Ho Chi Minh would be returning to Hanoi. This was the information in brief that was given to Comrade Zhou Enlai by the minister of foreign affairs of

Vietnam. Later, Comrade Zhou Enlai presented to me his opinions on this issue as follows:

“Our opinions,” he said, “do not differ from those that Comrade Liu Shaoqi expressed in the meeting you had. In the beginning we thought that the visit by Comrade Ho Chi Minh would have the effect of lowering the tensions in the relations between the ALP and the CPSU, but of course the principal problems would not be solved by it.”

“Now,” he continued, “the war against imperialism is sharpening; we must join all our forces; the problem of the peace treaty with Germany and the issue of Berlin must be resolved. The US sent their Vice President Johnson to West Berlin; England and France have increased their troop presence in West Germany. The situation in Laos is sharpening even more, as well as in the area of Taiwan, where the Americans are increasing their activities. In Congo, the imperialists are increasing their control. American imperialism until now was obstructing the French imperialism in Africa, but now it is helping it in Algeria and elsewhere. When they increase the international tensions, the imperialists operate in a united fashion, even if only temporarily. In this very serious situation all the socialist countries must get together and strengthen their unity, and that is why we thought that the visit by Comrade Ho Chi Minh could have helped in smoothing the disagreements, but not in the essential solving of the problems.”

“We have also had some concerns that maybe Comrade Ho Chi Minh could have wanted to make the visit at the urging of by the Soviets, but Comrade Ho Chi Minh says that this idea was of his own initiative. We had had some hope that he could have smoothed out the situation, but it seems that he could not do anything about it.”

“We hope that you will continue to remain cold-blooded—as you have done so far—composed, and will have the initiative in smoothing out the disagreements. Let them (Khrushchev and friends) make provocations; let them try to isolate you; let them undertake subversive actions against us. One day all these will be known and the truth shall be on our side. We must always let them be the first to say things against us, because as a Chinese proverb says, ‘Be not the first to start, then win.’ We are able to discount their attacks with very strong arguments.”

“Now, in this actual case, Khrushchev will speak badly of the ALP to Comrade Ho Chi Minh, even worse than before, but by this he will unmask himself. We have a multitude of facts to answer him with. As far as the disagreements that we have had with the CPSU, our tactic has always been to let Khrushchev say the first word, but this does not mean that we are backing down. By being the first to speak, they showed to everyone who they are and how crassly they act toward us. We had a stronger basis from which to discount their attacks and to argue better about our position and the other parties could

judge from a better position about which side the truth favors. Despite the influence that Khrushchev wields over the other parties, this tactic will cause them to see the truth better.”

“We are making all efforts to explain to the other parties the situation surrounding your party and its correct stance.”

Later, Comrade Zhou Enlai told me that he had spoken to the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam about the conversation that he and Comrade Liu Shaoqi had had with Comrade Ho Chi Minh before he had left for Moscow. He had asked the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam to inform the general secretary of the party, Comrade Le Duan and [DRV] prime minister, Pham Van Dong, as follows:

(Below I will enumerate the opinions presented by Comrade Zhou Enlai to the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam about the visit by Comrade Ho Chi Minh.)

- 1) “Comrade Ho Chi Minh’s desire was positive, but it seems that he was not well-informed about the state of relations between the ALP and the CP of the Soviet Union, and that is why his method is not very suitable. As a result, it is not very likely that it will produce any results. On the contrary, it is possible that it will lead to new provocations. In fact, Khrushchev could now say to Comrade Ho Chi Minh, ‘Look, we received you and greeted you, but the Albanians did not.’ This,” added Comrade Zhou Enlai, “could damage the prestige of Comrade Ho Chi Minh.”
- 2) “To be able to reconcile Albania with the Soviet Union,” Comrade Zhou Enlai had said to the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam, “is more difficult than reconciling China and the Soviet Union. This is so because the CCP is a large party, because China itself is a very large country, and because should the relations between these two countries should be severed, it would be of grave international consequence. As a result, when trying to reconcile China and the Soviet Union a compromise can be achieved while preserving the principles. This was apparent, for example, in the Moscow Conference where the CPSU backed down on three of its points and we accepted the formula on the 20th Congress. But the Soviets would not do the same with Albania. They think that the ALP is small, that Albania is very small, and use pressure to debase them at all costs; otherwise the Albanians would severely damage its prestige, which would have the effect of the other parties in Europe not obeying to the ‘stick that keeps the order.’ But we understand well,” continued Comrade Zhou Enlai, “that the ALP, despite its size, is tough, it defends the principles with determination and does not give in. And they (Khrushchev and friends) would not back down, because the ‘stick’ would lose its power. That is why reconciling Albania and the Soviet Union is harder than reconciling China and the Soviet Union, and, as a result, why the visit

by Comrade Ho Chi Minh may increase the disagreements, instead of lessening them.”

- 3) “Before the present situation, all the disagreements between the ALP and the CPSU had a collegial character, an internal party character. That is why if the concrete reasons could be looked at more closely, they could have been solved easily through bipartite talks, but the Soviet Union made two very grave mistakes: a) It removed the military base from Albania, along with the specialists; and, b) Khrushchev did not agree to let the Albanian delegation take part in the proceedings of the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact on the issue of Germany. These are principal and very important mistakes. What we are dealing with here is a great truth and a small truth. By removing the military base, the Soviets openly revealed our disagreements to the enemies. In the second case, that of the Warsaw Pact meeting, if the CCP had not insisted that the ALP be included in the final communique, the pertaining document that would be published after the meeting would also have openly revealed our disagreements to the enemies. These stances weaken our position toward the enemy. This means that the Soviet Union is wrong in this case. Is Albania more afraid of the Soviet Union, or is the Soviet Union more afraid of Albania? It cannot be fathomed that the ALP is trying to overturn Khrushchev’s rule, but he (Khrushchev) is undertaking diversionist activities to overturn the leadership of the ALP. The Soviet Union is mobilizing the parties of the socialist countries of Europe to attack the ALP and this is making the Yugoslavs happy. In that case, the Albanian comrades are right to doubt Khrushchev’s intentions. How could Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu have gone to Moscow in this situation? These facts show that Khrushchev carries the principal responsibility.”
- 4) “I,” continued Comrade Zhou Enlai, “told the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam, that if Comrade Ho Chi Minh will follow the Khrushchev advice and go to Albania, he should in no way exert any pressure on the Albanian comrades. If Khrushchev asks from Comrade Ho Chi Minh to invite Comrade Enver Hoxha to the Soviet Union or to a third country for talks with Khrushchev, Comrade Ho Chi Minh should refuse to do this. (Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out that he had told this to him because the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam had said that Comrade Ho Chi Minh had initially not made any plans about going to Albania.) We must understand the position that the Albanian comrades find themselves in. In the face of these great pressures, they react strongly and quickly.”
- 5) “Initially, we thought that the Comrade Ho Chi Minh visit could have brought some kind of relaxation, despite the fact that the principled problems could not be solved by it. This did not happen. ‘What are the perspectives of the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania?’ asked the minister

of foreign affairs of Vietnam. I told him,” said Comrade Zhou Enlai, “that the Albanian comrades think that Khrushchev will utilize the 22nd Congress of the CPSU [in November 1961] to attack Albania. (This is based on an opinion that I had expressed in a conversation with Comrade Liu Shaoqi.) This opinion of the Albanian comrades has some validity based on the fact that it has happened a few times before, such as at the Bucharest meeting where our party was attacked. This is a very conceivable perspective. We also do not exclude another possibility. After the 22nd Congress, there will be a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs on the issue of the peace treaty with Germany. At that time we will be in a very embittered situation and in a state of war with the enemy. If we are divided, how will we be able to fight the enemy? This situation may force Khrushchev to stop his attacks against Albania; it may even bring about a softening of the animosity.”

“The relations between the Soviet Union and Albania cannot be fixed right away. Is it possible that Khrushchev would publicly admit his mistakes? It is a very hard thing. Is it completely impossible? We will have to wait. The Albanian comrades are on the side of good relations; a softening would be a good thing. It would be such from the position of its necessity for the common struggle against imperialism, but not in the interest of the strengthening of Khrushchev’s position.”

“We must be patient and wait. We must be mature, because this is how we will achieve our objective. Nonetheless, we must also be ready for the other eventuality. If the provocations and attacks against us start, then we (the CCP) will answer to them. But our objective is the strengthening of unity.”

“What I mentioned here,” said Comrade Zhou Enlai, “I said to the minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam and asked him to convey it to the general secretary of the party, Comrade Le Duan, and the prime minister, Pham Van Dong, who are cool-blooded, far-seeing people. Comrade Ho Chi Minh is well known all over Vietnam, but his words and declarations are not always approved of by the other comrades in the Political Bureau, or in full agreement with their opinions. At the Moscow Conference, Comrade Le Duan was in full agreement with our points of view. Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu,” Comrade Zhou Enlai said to me, “must be aware of this point.”

Comrade Zhou Enlai asked me to transmit all of the above to the Central Committee. He also added, “What I have said so far are my personal opinions. I have not consulted the other comrades, because the time was not available and they are not even in Beijing, but I believe that they would agree with me since this is the party line on these issues. In the light of the new situation, I clarified further the thoughts that Comrade Liu Shaoqi expressed to you on the meeting you had with him.”

During the conversation, while replying to the thought I had expressed that Khrushchev cannot change his opinions and his demeanor, Comrade Zhou Enlai said that “it is possible that Khrushchev can change his opinions and his demeanor, if the situation and the fact that he is facing imperialism and cannot fight on two fronts are taken into account.”

In the end, on the persona of Comrade Ho Chi Minh and on the issue of the lack of results on his mission, Comrade Zhou Enlai said that, “we may be facing two possibilities: a) the multiple attacks by Khrushchev against Albania may cause a reaction and discontent on the side of Comrade Ho Chi Minh against Khrushchev, and b) Comrade Ho Chi Minh wanted to come to Albania, but since he was not successful in this at this time, this may instill in him discontent with the ALP, but this will not last long. It is not possible that Khrushchev will be able to turn the entire Workers’ Party of Vietnam against you.”

(Since the plane to Moscow is leaving in a few hours, we are writing the notes that we took from the above meeting for you in a bit hurried fashion and as we had taken them in shorthand, without being able to sort through them very well.)

THE AMBASSADOR

(Reis Malile)

[Signed]

[Seal of the Embassy of the PRA, Beijing]



DOCUMENT No. 10

Information on the Meeting with Comrade Chen Yi, 29 August 1961

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1961, D. 14. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

INFORMATION ON THE MEETING WITH COMRADE CHEN YI

Following, in brief, we are writing on the conversation that Comrade Chen Yi, Politburo member and minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, had on 29 August 1961 with [Albanian Ambassador to the PRC] Comrade Reis Malile. (Since Comrade Reis Malile left urgently and unexpectedly for Vietnam, we are writing the notes of the conversation with Comrade Chen Yi as they were kept by Comrade Gaqo Pojani, who also assisted in the above-mentioned conversation.)

“We are very happy for the correct and determined position of the ALP, Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu. The correct position of your party is in the interest of the entire socialist camp. The fact that you are not and

will not pull back from your position in the face of the pressures and the blackmailing is also the correct course and a great contribution. The position of the ALP in differentiating between Khrushchev, the CPSU and the Soviet people is correct. Your silence, avoiding of the open revelation of contradictions and of all the blackmailing and the pressures exerted by Khrushchev, is also correct. If in the future Khrushchev will speak openly against Albania and about the disagreements that exist (he is talking about the possibility of the expulsion from the Warsaw Pact and the eventual attacks that may openly be directed toward us in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU), then your opinion that you should openly answer to this situation is also correct.”

“The ALP and the Albanian people have been strengthened and become steeper by all the unfair actions and the pressures of Khrushchev. They (the leadership of the CPSU) act in an unfair way in their intentions of making the ALP kneel and become docile. Their position is in open opposition to the lessons of Marxism–Leninism. In their rapport and relations with the imperialists, they make compromises. The same goes for Yugoslavia. But toward Albania, which is a socialist country, they make no effort to reconcile.”

“The ALP, if it continues to stay on a course like the one it has followed so far, will undoubtedly be successful. You have acted very correctly against their intentions. They want to subordinate a small nation and base this on the wrong notion of being a large, powerful and rich nation.”

“I fully support your stance against the Soviet Union. On this issue (the guarding of the principles) we also stand in such a determined position.”

Answering to the thanks by our party and people for the large assistance that the CCP and the Chinese people give us delivered by Comrade Reis Malile, Comrade Chen Yi said, “As to what you said about the assistance that you receive from us, that is an international duty and it is imperative that we act this way. You said that the assistance that we are giving to you is a life-savior to you, but in this case we are acting according to the principles of Marxism–Leninism and against those that are trying to change them.”

“Do not be scared by any pressure against you, because your course is the correct one. We will criticize the CPSU not whether it is strong or not, not whether the Soviet Union is a powerful country or not. We will criticize it because of the incorrect course that it follows.”

“We have said to the Soviet comrades that they are wrong in hating the ALP simply because it has criticized them. It is a grave mistake on their part to want people who they expect to always applaud them. Either way, the more time that passes, the clearer it will become to the peoples of the world who has

the correct course. I will transmit to the Central Committee of our party all that you said and there is no doubt that they will be happy about your position.”

+ +
+

Later on, Comrade Reis Malile asked about the positions of Comrade Ho Chi Minh in China on his way back from Moscow and about what he thought about his not going to Albania.

“I will give you the information that you asked for and would ask you to, please, communicate it to the ALP. It is possible that my information will be useful to you on your trip to Vietnam. I accompanied Comrade Ho Chi Minh for three days and spoke with him on this topic.”

The words by Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

“When I heard that the Albanians postponed the date of my visit, I became unhappy. Whatever the situation, the Albanians should have accepted my visit. I tried to reconcile the Albanians and the Soviet Union. I made this effort in the interest of unity, so that it may become stronger. My intentions were not to find out who was wrong and who was right, because such a thing is hard to solve at this stage in the rift. This initiative was my own and not one of the Vietnamese Party.”

“When I was in Moscow, Khrushchev said to me that, ‘we are willing to arrive at an agreement with the Albanians, if they would return the two submarines to us and send a delegation to Moscow for discussions.’”

“I have now made all of my efforts to strengthen the unity and to reconcile the Albanians and the Soviet Union. In the future, such attempts should be taken by the Chinese comrades. Please transmit this proposal to the CCP CC.”

The words of Comrade Chen Yi spoken to Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

“The Albanian comrades had good reason to postpone the date of your visit there. Today they find themselves in a difficult situation, under continuous pressure and blackmail on the part of Khrushchev. Toward Albania, he holds an incorrect stance and follows an incorrect course. You should have understood the situation the Albanians are in.”

“If you had gone at such a situation in Albania, this would have meant that the Albanians and the ALP are kneeling before Khrushchev and that would not have been fair. You were seeking to convince the Albanians to move away from their incorrect course, despite the fact that they have done nothing wrong.”

“If you cannot see the differences that exist between the position of the Albanians and that of the CPSU; if you do not want to differentiate between the two, then the Albanians do not have to support you. The unification between the small and the big under such conditions cannot be successful.”

“How could it be possible to solve all these disagreements if we do not put our Marxist–Leninist principles first?”

“You are an old comrade of the international communist movement. You should have first talked to Khrushchev about his mistakes and criticized him, and then go to Albania. This is how your visit would have been successful.”

“Why should the Albanians send a delegation to Moscow and not the Soviets [to Albania] since they are the ones that have been unfair to the Albanians? You should have told Khrushchev that he should send a delegation to Albania first. As far as the issue of handing over the two submarines, they, as it is well known, on the basis of recognized protocol, belong to the Albanians. Nonetheless, this is not a contentious issue in the disagreements that have sprung up. When compared to the current relations between the Albanians and the Soviets, the issue of the submarines is a very minor thing. The Soviet Union has many submarines. What problems can the two submarines in Albania cause?”

“The lack of recognizing the mistakes and the refusal to send a delegation to Albania means that Khrushchev acts contrary to the lessons of Marxism–Leninism. He visited plenty of capitalist countries and Belgrade and said very nice things to them. Why then does he not do the same thing for the Albanians? This is where a friend is distinguished from an enemy. During the last meeting in Moscow, Khrushchev expelled the Albanian delegation from the proceedings saying the ALP was not at the sufficient level. You should have said to Khrushchev that what he is doing to the Albanians, even the imperialists have not done.”

“Do you know that Tito is trying to destroy the PRA and the ALP? And Khrushchev is telling the Albanians that they should not fight Tito. This is an incorrect course. Stalin did a good thing by ripping Tito’s mask off and fighting him as a traitor of Marxism–Leninism. Why were the naval base and specialists removed from Albania leaving her exposed in front of the imperialists? How would you have acted if such unfairness was done to Vietnam? He is trying to do the same to China too, but as you know we are a big country and here he has not had any success. In such a situation it is Albania that should absolutely be supported, not Khrushchev. If we would support Albania, we would be helping in the strengthening of unity; the opposite action would weaken it. You know well that the CCP has spared no efforts for reconciliation, but Khrushchev does not listen.”

“Now in the international communist movement there has

arisen a tendency much like the one that exists in the UN. There the majority of the capitalist states support the USA because it is the most powerful, the biggest and the richest state and do not take into account the devilish intentions of American imperialism. Such a thing is also happening in the international communist movement. In the Moscow Conference of the 81 Parties, the majority of them supported the CPSU because it is the strongest, the biggest and the richest without taking into account its grave mistakes.”

“The truth is on our side even though we are few. The right is not always with the strongest, the richest or those that are greater in numbers.”

“Imperialism is undertaking all efforts to divide and destroy the socialist camp. It is using the tactic of exerting pressure at the edges of the camp, such as, for example, in Hungary, Germany, etc. You can see what is happening in the German Democratic Republic. The war has yet to start and a few million people have already escaped to the West.”

“You must understand, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, that the Albanians honor you and have a high regard for you as an old comrade of the international communist movement. One should not get mad at them. The Albanians are very determined in their correct course. If the need presents itself, they are willing to fight until the last man.”

+ +
+

“All the issues that I brought up to Comrade Ho Chi Minh, I mentioned because I wanted him to realize his mistakes in relation to the visit. For this reason, I also told him that at the moment the comrades of the CCP CC are busy with other problems. If fact, I half joked and told him that he and I are not of the sufficient level to discuss such issues. During this conversation Comrade Ho Chi Minh said that he had made a subjective mistake in the manner in which he had acted.”

“During the conversation I noticed that Comrade Ho Chi Minh’s points of view had changed somewhat. At the beginning he was saying that only the Albanians are wrong in this, while later he was also saying the Soviets are also wrong. Nonetheless, as far as criticizing Khrushchev, he did not do it and was silent.”

“I would ask you to transmit to Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu that the party of Vietnam is not fully in agreement with Comrade Ho Chi Minh’s points of view and his method. I ask you that you keep these points in mind in your relations with them. On the other hand it must be said that Khrushchev has been able to influence Comrade Ho Chi Minh. Hence it is necessary that you think how to draw in Comrade Ho Chi Minh and explain all the problems about which he is

in the dark. It would be a good thing to ask Comrade Ho Chi Minh to come to a visit to Albania in the near future, with the intention of drawing him in and showing him all the unfair activities that are done to you. He is a good and old comrade, but has some incorrect points of view and wavers.”

“It would be a good thing if you went to Vietnam and explained the main issues to them and the unfairness by the leadership of the CPSU. I think that Khrushchev will not declare open war upon Albania in the 22nd Congress. If he is going to do it he will do so after the congress. It would be very favorable to keep Vietnam on our side in this situation. The struggle against Khrushchev’s incorrect points of view will be a very long one, and we must have patience to see it through.”

“You, Comrade Reis Malile, must go to Vietnam for the [DRV anniversary] celebrations. If you encounter any trouble in terms of transportation to Vietnam, for example, for lack of sufficient time, then you may ask us and we will put a special plane at your disposal.”

Beijing, 29 August 1961

(Gaqo Pojani)

[Signed]

[Seal of the Embassy of the PRA, Beijing]



DOCUMENT No. 11

Memorandum of Conversation between Deng Xiaoping, [CCP CC Liaison Department Director] Wang Jiexiang, Hysni Kapo, and Ramiz Alia, 19 June 1962

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSh-MPKK-V. 1962, L14, D. 6. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

THE FIFTH OFFICIAL MEETING BETWEEN
THE DELEGATION OF THE ALBANIAN LABOR
PARTY AND THE DELEGATION OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY (HELD AT THE HEADQUARTERS
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY, AT 9 O’CLOCK IN THE
MORNING, ON 19 JUNE 1962)

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We apologize that during the past three days we have been very busy and have not been able to meet with you. A meeting with Comrade Mao Zedong in Beijing has been planned for you in a few days from now.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: That would be a very good thing.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Until when would you be able to

extend your stay in our country?

Comrades Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia: This is an issue we can discuss together.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: You also expressed the desire to visit some of the regions in our country, so we are of the opinion that we can continue our talks when you return from those visits. Would you like to visit Tianjin or northeastern China? Either way, when you return, Comrade Mao Zedong will have also returned, we can then keep in contact and arrange to talk with you. The Central Committee of our party has not yet even invited you to break bread together. (Laughter)

Some of your comrades would like to visit Shanghai and the cities of the south. This is something you can also do as you depart from Beijing during your trip back to Albania. This is what we think, but you should also give us your opinion on this. We will manage the matter of the visits according to your desires and opinions.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Everything is dependent on the time we have and the course of our travel.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We can talk about the course you will take on your way back.

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang: My personal opinion is that when you return to Albania, an airplane of ours should take you to Rangoon. From there you could use an airplane to go through the countries of the West. Yet I personally still think that (and of course, you will make the final decision yourselves) the principal comrades of your delegation should once again use a ship for their travel. The rest can return by air via Rangoon, where we can take them with our own plane. We do not have a plane that can take them further. I am only thinking of security for the principal comrades.

In the future we are planning on creating an air route between Beijing and Cairo, and then to your country, but for the moment we have no route of the kind.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Are you also thinking of such a route?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We have not thought of such a route because we do not have the capacity.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: Even the plane that goes through Albania at this moment belongs to a Dutch airline.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We are not planning on creating such a route, because as you well know we are not able to do this. The plane that comes now to Tirana follows the route of Tirana—Beirut—Rangoon and only comes once every two weeks.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Has it [your return flight] been set already?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Yes, there will be a flight on 25 June and another on 11 July. We, the principal comrades of the delegation, have been instructed by our Central Committee that we are able to travel by plane, after we also consult with you and if we all find it suitable together. The reason is that sea travel takes too long and, furthermore, our ship, due to the nature of the cargo it is carrying, will not stop anywhere. If we return to Albania from China by air, our coming here will surely become known no matter which route we take.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: It would not matter if it becomes known. We have no opposition to whichever route you take to return. As to our steps, we will take you all the way to Rangoon, and there we will get you tickets for your trip to Albania. So if you think it prudent to return via that route, we are not opposed to it.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: You should still keep in mind, comrades, that if we take this route back, the Western countries will start to talk, because we will have to ask for visas from Burma, the United Arab Republic, and Italy.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: This does not bother us.

In the future, as Comrade Wang Jiaxiang said, we are planning on creating an air route to Cairo. Now we are making contacts with the English for the purchase of airplanes, because, due to the fact that many people come to China from southern countries, the single air route that we have with the north is not nearly enough. That is why we also need an air route in that direction. The point in time when we will decide to start it will be decided later. Either way, the plane on this route will not stop in India, because the situation may get complicated, in fact, it will not stop in Ceylon either.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Are you planning on creating the route this year or the next?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We are still in negotiations with the English over the price of the planes. We are actively working on the solution to this issue.

Since our last meeting, you have brought up a few issues. I think that we should not talk about some of them today. The comrades responsible for dealing directly with specific issues will inform you in the next round. As to the issue of the international organizations of the masses, we have the expert here, Comrade ... Yi [the name is obscured but is probably Liu Ningyi] and he will speak to you, but I think he will not give you very good news. (Laughter.) In order to talk about such issues, the activity of such organizations must be observed in the field. What do you think?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: As to what has happened in the past in these organizations—at least in those in which we have taken part, such as in the meetings of Stockholm, of Moscow, of Berlin, etc.—we are fully knowledgeable, but that has always depended on what our delegations have been able to gather information on. So if there are further specific items, you may inform us about them.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: Our people do not take part in the executive organs of these organizations, so if there are some things which you deem necessary for us to be informed about, you may tell us.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: As to our positions on issues, we do not intend to change them and nor is it necessary that we do. Also, as to the matter of the coordination of the activities of both our sides, this is also an issue that can be easily solved. Comrade Liu Ningyi will talk to you about the meeting that will be held in Moscow on the issue of disarmament and peace. We do not intend to send any high-level delegation to this meeting; the delegation will probably be headed by Gao Dun, not a member of the party. We initially intended to have Comrade Liu Ningyi go, but now we think we might not send him. Our position toward this meeting is neither warm nor cold.

Our plan on the issue of the nitrogen fertilizer plant called for Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Li Xiannian to speak to you about it when we discussed the domestic situation. This is an economic problem. I just wanted to say that our side has some difficulties with such a plant.

Comrade Wang Jiexiang: Especially on the technical side, because natural gas will be used as a raw material for this plant.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We are now keeping contacts with the Italians in working on a solution to this problem. The Italians are telling us that they have given their technology to the Americans and cannot sell it to us, but they have not been outrightly curt about this. But we are able to find many ways to solve this problem in the capitalist world. If we buy it [the technology], for you this issue becomes much easier to solve. We also have a lot of natural gas that goes to waste. Either way, we are actively working to solve this issue that preoccupies you so much.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: This [plant] is an object that in the state economic planning sector preoccupies us very much, especially as it concerns the development of our agriculture, and that is why we wanted to discuss it with you. We know that on your end there is much interest in relation to the Italians, but we wanted to know what the possibilities and perspectives are on this issue, because it is the main objective of our third five-year plan. We agree to discuss this issue when we talk to the comrades that you mentioned.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: This issue preoccupies us as well. The way that we produce the fertilizer is not economical. Our annual production is less than two million tons, and so we are forced to import fertilizer from the capitalist world. This year we are also foreseeing the importation of over one million tons. All the socialist countries have a deficit in the production of fertilizers. The USSR has only recently started to produce more fertilizers. Furthermore, the complete construction of such a plant is difficult; it takes time, at least three years. That is why it will be difficult for you to construct such a plant within this five-year plan. We are not experts, but I do know that if coal is used as raw material, the task will become easier.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: In the talks that you have had with the Italians, they said that such a facility can be constructed within three years. In the talks that [Central Committee member] Comrade Abdyl Kellezi has had with your comrades, it was foreseen that such an object can be constructed before the end of 1966 at the latest. The deadline has yet to be set, however, since that was just an exchange of thoughts.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We will discuss this issue specifically. Comrade Li Xiannian knows this issue better.

Another issue that you have presented to us is that of our participation and position in the meetings of the organizations and institutions of the 12 socialist countries. The organizations of the socialist countries have diverse characters. For example, in the meeting[s] of the Warsaw Pact we take part only as observers.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: The Economic Council [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)] and the Warsaw Pact have another character.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: In the organizations of the socialist countries that have such a character, like the Economic Council [COMECON] and the Warsaw Pact, we have not taken part, in fact we did not even send any observers to the last meeting.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Before these meetings were called, you had also asked us whether we had received an invitation or not, and we have not had any concern in relation to your position.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Both these organizations are of the same character. We will also not take part in them in the future.

The cultural organizations have a different character. These are organizations of a temporary or permanent nature. A permanent organization is, for example, that of the military, the Sports Society of Friendly Armies. We have wrangled with them on the gathering of this Society, which should have been

held in your country, and we have informed you about that. Now the struggle in this organization continues. We think that it is possible that we will not take part if this changes the existing rules of the organization. We will only take part on the condition that the existing statute of the organization is not changed and that Albania is also invited to take part in it.

But there are also organizations of a temporary character. You are not a member of the railroads organization. We also decide our position toward these organizations depending on their character. For example, we did not take part in the gymnastics challenge in which the socialist countries and some European countries took part. There are also certain temporary meetings in which the representatives of the socialist countries and of some capitalist countries take part. Such an organization is that of weight-lifting.

A permanent organization of the socialist countries does not exist, except for that of the military.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Perhaps our intentions in asking these questions have not been understood. As to COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, we did not even ask any questions about them, because no issue to be discussed has arisen from the correct position that your party and government have taken toward these organizations. After the chilling of relations with Albania, the possibility of our participation in these organizations was severed. Not only have we not taken part in these organizations, but we have not taken part in the commissions either, and we know full well that even in the future, every position taken from your party and government toward these organizations shall be the correct position.

As to the issue of the organizations of the twelve socialist countries, we agree with the classification that you make as those of a permanent or of temporary character. But we wanted to add that for both the temporary ones and the permanent ones or for the meetings that are held for the consultation of the representatives of the twelve socialist countries, we are, naturally, ready in principle to take part if we are invited. If they do not invite us, we are sorry, but there is nothing we can do about it. But when eleven socialist countries are invited and Albania is left aside, this is done intentionally to let the world know that Albania has been expelled from the socialist camp and that it is not a socialist country. I say this because there is a tendency in the meetings of the temporary or permanent organizations and in the consultative meetings of the various institutions to leave Albania aside. So, we wanted to tell you that when there are meetings of the organizations of the twelve socialist countries, whether they are temporary or permanent ones, we agree to take part if we are invited. Had they invited us to take part in the organization of the railroads, we would not take part, not because we are against such a meeting, but because we have nothing to discuss on this particular matter since no such problems exist in our country. But when they do not invite us, we

consider this as an affront towards us by the organizers of the meeting. Here we simply wanted to express our point of view on the participation in these meetings.

The position of your party on this matter is very clear to us; it has always insisted, and continues to do so, that in all the meetings of these organizations all 12 socialist countries take part and not only 11 of them. We know that your party and government have requested the participation of Albania in the meetings of the temporary and permanent organizations.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: On these issues we do not have any opposing viewpoints; we agree with your point of view. Our position, as you also mentioned, has been and will remain the same: without an invitation for Albania to participate, we will not participate in these meetings either. If there are meetings where the participants include other states, such as Yugoslavia, we will also not take part in them either.

You said that if they invite you, you would take part in these meetings. Then it is easy to tackle this issue together. If, as in the case of the Sports Society of Friendly Armies, they do not invite you, or invite Yugoslavia or India, we will not take part.

Another question you raised was that of the international issues that are being discussed between our countries and the Western countries. We have a general opinion on these issues. Among them there are three issues: disarmament, the cessation of nuclear weapons testing, and the issue of Berlin. The socialist countries have not reached an agreement with the Western countries on any of these three issues. This, of course, does not mean that there can be no agreement on partial issues, but on the main problems the positions of the Western countries, especially of the US, are very clear. They will not retreat one bit from their position.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: That is so.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: [Nikita] Khrushchev, on the other hand, makes concessions at every step. But due to the fact that the Soviet Union is a great power, he only makes concessions up to a certain point. He cannot go any further, because further concessions would not be approved by the Soviet people, by the peoples of the entire world; some of his concessions would not be approved by the countries of Eastern Europe either. Furthermore, the US is limited to a certain degree as well, because they have their own contradictions with the English, the French, and the leaders of West Germany. But there are some issues on which no agreement can be reached, such as, for example, the issue of disarmament, especially over the so-called full and general disarmament. We have never fallen for this. It is just strange to think that the imperialists will ever agree to disarm.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: In other words, to surrender their

weapons.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Only with the fist will the proletariat ever destroy imperialism.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (With sarcasm) But the imperialists are good-hearted and will disarm.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: So, disarmament is an impossibility. They may make some noise in some way or form, or on some partial agreement. For example, [if] the Soviet Union [were to] reduce their military by some hundreds of thousands of soldiers, it is possible that the US might also do the same, but such a thing would be a token move; in reality this would not mean a decrease in armaments, on the contrary, it would be an increase in armaments, because they will reduce the army by some [number of] people, but increase the quality of their armaments. It is thus impossible to achieve an agreement on disarmament.

As to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we think that no concrete achievement can come of it. This can happen only when more socialist countries are in possession of nuclear weapons and when they have absolute superiority over the imperialist countries; only then might the imperialists accept such an agreement, but as of now an agreement on the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be reached. In fact, at the moment, even a cessation of nuclear weapons testing cannot be reached. Look at what happens: when they [the West] cease their tests, the Soviet Union starts them. Now the US has started them too. How can the talks on the cessation of the testing of such weapons go forward under these circumstances?

On the issue of Berlin, we also have the problem of the old borders of the East. On the issue of Berlin, N. Khrushchev has made many concessions, but the US insists on two points: on the occupation of West Berlin by Western forces (they will not concede on this point), and we also have the issue of the passage corridor into West Berlin (the imperialists will not make a concession on this point either, while N. Khrushchev has already conceded to a certain degree on it).

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang: N. Khrushchev's concessions will go as far as an agreement to an occupation regime in West Berlin by the military forces of the Western countries. In fact, such an occupation regime already exists there at the present. Even if the government of the USA agrees to remove the occupation regime in Berlin, [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer will not agree to it.

At the same time, the issue of the old borders in the East is even more complicated. Could Poland and Czechoslovakia agree to a change of the borders [that were] decided in the Potsdam agreement? The USSR itself would not want the borders of Kaliningrad and its region to change. But Adenauer will not make concessions on this point. There is also a

party in West Germany, the party of the refugees. There are around three million refugees who have left the eastern part of Germany, and they are organized.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: The three million are only those in Germany and do not include those of Poland and Czechoslovakia, etc.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: In the rest of the world the fiercest aggression is represented by American imperialism, while in Europe, on the issues of Berlin and West Germany, Adenauer is the fiercest one.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: We would like to exchange opinions on this matter. It is possible that N. Khrushchev will come to a compromise with the Americans only on the issue of Berlin? For example, West Berlin could be allowed to become an occupied area by the UN, which in fact would mean the Americans, and control over the corridor could be entrusted to the German Democratic Republic. From a political standpoint this would be considered a success by N. Khrushchev. With such a move imperialism would make a concession to N. Khrushchev to win his support, while, as a solution to this issue, it would only be partial, as it would only cover Berlin, and the problem of a peace treaty for Germany would be postponed. Could such a possibility, for example, ever occur?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: It cannot be ruled out, though it would not be easy. Adenauer would not agree to it, and furthermore [General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Walter] Ulbricht would most likely not agree either. But again, such a possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. Should it ever come to fruition, such a possibility would not be a success for N. Khrushchev. No! He thinks that West Berlin should become a free city and the peace treaty for Germany should be signed. Without the signing of a peace treaty, N. Khrushchev will not be able to see good days. In what position would this put East Germany? Should this possibility happen, the prestige of the USSR would suffer heavily in the eyes of the world. So while this possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, the fact that the USSR is a large and powerful country means that it is not going to be easy for this to happen. N. Khrushchev and his cohorts want to make concessions, but they do not find it easy. On the other hand, even making concessions does not mean that the issues would be resolved; it does not mean that the imperialists would give them much in return.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (With sarcasm) And the peace treaty can wait, as far as N. Khrushchev is concerned; he has plenty of time to solve this issue; and the measures that were taken at the Berlin Wall, according to them, showed their great power.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: His point of view is entirely different from that of the entire world, including here even the capitalist world. By his acting this way, the capitalist countries

will create a view of the USSR as weak. If he continues to make constant concessions, N. Khrushchev will automatically and continuously be unmasked.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We have similar points of view on the disarmament matter, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and on Berlin. Though we know it is political blackmail, the proposal by N. Khrushchev for a non-aggression pact between the countries of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact has caught our attention. And though it is only a political maneuver, the proposal by the Poles at the UN for the prohibition of those countries that as of now do not have nuclear weapons from ever having them—in other words, to keep the status quo and allow only those countries that already have them—has also caught our attention. We do not consider the proposal about a status quo in the matter of military bases to be fair either because it is well known that only the US has such bases in other countries. Do these proposals, perhaps, have the goal of causing imperialism to shift its attention into striking another area, Asia? This is the reason we brought this issue up. What are the intentions of imperialism in Asia where we know that its main objective is the People's Republic of China? These thoughts have gone through our minds when considering the concessions and proposals that we see being made and which appease imperialism in the other areas, but urge it to shift its attention in the direction of Asia. We ask this question only so that we may be clear, because for us no matter where the attack against the socialist countries is made, the pain will still be the same. That is why we want to discuss this issue.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: On the proposal for the signing of a non-aggression pact between the countries of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact we were in agreement, but this does not mean that such a thing will ever be realized. We have also proposed the signing of such a pact with Japan.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: But we consider this proposal alongside the other issues that I mentioned.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: It is impossible that this non-aggression pact will ever be signed. We are in agreement with N. Khrushchev on the matter of the non-aggression pact only because of the fact that this proposal is a tool for unmasking imperialism when it answers that it does not agree. I think that neither the Soviets nor the Americans ever seriously considered that such a thing can ever be achieved. The Americans themselves say that if other issues can be solved, this can be solved too; in other words, they are putting conditions on it. It is also difficult to achieve an agreement that nuclear weapons not be given to others.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We are convinced of this.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: For example, France will not agree to such an agreement. It has started to conduct testing of

nuclear weapons and asks the US and the UK to give it the new technologies for the development of such weapons. The concessions that France makes to the UK on the issue of inclusion into the Common Market [European Economic Community], is done with the intention of obtaining the new technology for the development of nuclear weapons. West Germany also seeks the technology for the development of those weapons. But even if they do not give West Germany this technology, it is capable of developing it on its own. The English did the same exact thing; the Americans did not give them the technology, they developed it on their own. There will certainly be many states in the capitalist world which will possess atomic weapons, including West Germany; in fact, in addition to such states as Sweden and Switzerland, Japan and Italy will possess them as well. Everyone is actively working to achieve such a thing. The small countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, will of course not be able to achieve it completely, but they will have some partial success, enough to sell it to others, because they are born peddlers. In their world you cannot restrict them from doing such things.

And why should something like this not happen in our world? We are also actively working to achieve this. We have told the Soviets a long time ago that on the matter of nuclear weapons we will not be part of the obligations that they may put on themselves. In the international peace organization we have declared that we will not honor the obligations that others will place on themselves on this issue.

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang: We also declared there that if the countries that already have nuclear weapons do not retreat from producing them, why should we take on such obligations? We are in favor of the complete liquidation of such weapons, but we will cease producing them only if everyone ceases also.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Now I would like to speak about the situation in Asia. According to our opinion, the primary attention of the US is now centered on Europe. This position of theirs has not changed and will not change; their primary arrows are [pointed at] the USSR. When we spoke the last time on this issue, we said that this is an objective issue and will not change. The US guided missile bases are directed primarily at the USSR, though some of them, of course, are directed at our country. We are a country that does not have nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union has them. Should a war start, the primary danger to the capitalist countries would be the Soviet Union, as long as China does not possess many nuclear weapons. This is what defines the strategy of the US. Of course, after the Soviet Union, the greatest danger to the capitalist countries comes from China. The bases in the East are not all meant for us, but [are] also against the Soviet Union, while at the same time they are against us too [sic]. This is the general situation. This does not mean that American imperialism will not increase its aggression and will not take various concrete measures against China. It can be said that the process

of encirclement of the USSR by the US has been completely finished, while in Asia, according to our opinion, the work still goes on toward achieving the same results. Such a system has yet to be completed in Asia.

During these last two years it is clear that the American imperialists are helping two forces in Asia: Japan and India. These two forces have yet to form completely. The attempts by the American imperialists to increase the power of India are due to the fact that India is very populous, while Japan is both populous and technologically advanced. Of course, lesser countries of South Asia and Indochina are also included in this plan. Their specific measures are intended to help India become a great power, but its body is very weak. In other words, they are trying to shift India from a policy of neutrality to the side of the American imperialists. Should something like this come to fruition, it would be a blow not only to China, but to the Soviet Union as well. When they help India, they offend Pakistan. The public opinion in Pakistan is now on the side of a change in the government policy, and now Pakistan has a good position towards us. This has yet to be achieved completely. It would take a long time to achieve it.

Further away in the East, the American imperialists are building a defensive line from Thailand, to Cambodia, to South Vietnam. Thailand has always been a country where the American imperialists have sought to establish their presence. Using the situation in Laos to their advantage, they have now sent a few thousand American troops to Thailand. But the Americans' business in South Vietnam is not going well, because even [South Vietnam President] Ngo Dinh Diem, in his own way, is now working in opposition to the US. The partisan struggle, especially in South Vietnam, has now developed greatly. For a long time now the American imperialists have lost control of Cambodia.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Does this mean that, due to the difficult situation in this region of Asia and the trouble developing in Laos, the situation in Vietnam and Thailand, etc., there is no possibility that the imperialists will escalate the situation?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: It is possible that it will be escalated, but it will not be a wide-scale conflict.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: In other words, no conflict of a wide scale could be expected in this area at the moment.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: At the moment we do not see it that way. But we have said many times that a partial war in the East cannot be ruled out, though this cannot be easily achieved. We have been shown this by the events of the Taiwan Strait [in 1958] and the issue of Laos. The American imperialists today have no interest in widening the war in Laos, because they think that it is not in their favor. The Korean War is still a fresh lesson for them. The American imperialists are trying to create

an aggressive bloc in East and Southeast Asia, with Japan as its nucleus, including also South Korea and Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], but until now they have not been able to achieve this. The Japanese are suffering economic difficulties. Lately a lot of talk is coming from there about trade with China; in fact [Japanese Prime Minister] Ikeda [Hayato] himself has spoken about it. The ruling classes in Japan are not showing any interest in the creation of such a bloc, in which South Korea and Jiang Jieshi are included, because such a thing would be a heavy burden on Japan.

In order for a war to be started in the East against us, it can come mainly from three points:

From the west, India. But no war can start from India. How can a war be waged in an area that has no people? Can a struggle between a few hundred people be called a war? It is very difficult to use a division at the border with India. That is why a war from this side is very difficult to wage. Our existing military units in the border areas with India are fully sufficient at the moment. If they attack, the Indians could take some areas from our land, but they would be mainly snowy mountains, places that are completely uninhabitable.

Another war point against us could be opened from Indochina, but the terrain there is also not suitable for warfare. That is why the American imperialists are not increasing their presence in Laos, because it is not a suitable area for them from which to wage war. If the war starts further south, it will be easy for us to break through to Laos. Nonetheless, such a possibility cannot be completely discounted, it could happen.

In the east, another point for war could be in Korea. The American imperialists have been there, they know the terrain, [but] they also know that the forces of North Korea and our main forces are situated in that area, so it will not be easy for them.

Aside from these areas, another point to start a war against us would be in the Taiwan Straits. In this area the war has to come from the sea, but this place is not easy for our enemies either. Can American imperialism use Jiang Jieshi for such a war? Lately we have noticed that Jiang Jieshi is making attempts at achieving this, in other words, he is trying to start a counterattack against the continent. He has done some serious preparatory work towards this end, but he only has about half a million people for this job. His infantry counts around 400 thousand troops, and he has 300 planes at his disposal to use against us.

But why does Jiang Jieshi think he should undertake such a move? He thinks that we are in a difficult situation. But in his army, from the vice commanders of companies down to the simple soldier, he no longer has people from continental China as he used to before. If he does not undertake his attack against the continent at this time, he will never have another hope for such an attack in the future. That is why Jiang Jieshi has been

making preparations for a counterattack since the beginning of the year.

He has made preparations for an attack against the continent, but in the US there are two schools of thought on this issue. One is that of the Department of State, which holds that there is no hope in such a move. The other is that of the Pentagon, where some people agree with the idea of an attack by Jiang Jieshi. At least until now, we see no resolution by the US for such a thing.

Should an attack start against China, American imperialism may give aid to Jiang Jieshi with some ships with the intention of solving the problem of supplying his army. But we have also made our own preparations in this direction. We are thinking that it would be a good thing to make some concessions to the army of Jiang Jieshi, so that he may put around 200 thousand troops on the mainland, the best part of his army; let him occupy a piece of land and then eliminate him completely. We are thinking about such a move.

But we are faced with another problem: should we preserve or liquidate Jiang Jieshi. If we liquidate 200,000 of Jiang Jieshi's soldiers, his regime would fall and American imperialism would achieve its objective of the so-called "Two Chinas." The weakening or the liquidation of Jiang Jieshi would mean the occupation of Taiwan by the American imperialists. The American imperialists support some forces that call for the liquidation of Jiang Jieshi, for the reasons I mentioned. In this light Jiang Jieshi is our friend against the "Two Chinas." [That is why our intention is to preserve Jiang Jieshi.] We fight so that his intentions may never be achieved, and at the same time we make sure that he is not heavily damaged. You can thus see that a counterattack against the continent is not an easy thing.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Could you speak to us a bit about the present situation in Laos? We have a general idea, but would want to have a better picture of the situation in this country.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We agree with the formation of the coalition government in Laos. To this end we have exchanged some thoughts with the Vietnamese comrades, with those of Laos, and with the Soviets. Our reason is that we think that with the creation of a coalition government in Laos, the forces of the US will be forbidden to enter the country. The most important thing is to gain time for Pathet Lao to strengthen its work with the masses (it commands around 40% of Laos's land, without including here the area of [Prince] Souvanna Phouma). There are still a lot of difficulties with the formation of a coalition government, and that is why the achievement of an agreement on Laos does not mean the creation of a coalition government.

Now a question arises: Will the coalition government be approved by the traitorous parliament? In the next few days

there will be a struggle on this point there, and in the future there will be struggle every day. The direction of the talks means that in reality a "cart with three horses" will emerge there. The UN also uses such a term, "a cart with three horses," which means that each participant has the right of rejection (a veto) of the proposals of the other participants. The coalition government is an empty thing. Now each of the sides there is doing its own thing, and that is why there are and will be difficulties in finding a solution to the issues there. That is why the formation of the coalition government in Laos is the start of the new struggle, which will be even more complicated than the armed war, because all three sides will want to profit from this chance to increase their power; to strengthen as much as possible their position.

[...] There are only two solutions to the normalization of the situation in Laos. Should the conclusion of the situation be the elections, which is one of the solutions possible for the internal situation in Laos, [Prince] Souphanouvong will win, and not Souvanna Phouma or Phoumi Nosavan. But will they agree to such a conclusion? The greatest prestige in Laos is commanded by Souphanouvong, so a troika will only work there for a short time.

We must now strengthen our position there and then we can progress further; in other words, we must make the necessary preparations for the further strengthening of our position there and at the same time boycott [sic] the entrance of the armed forces of the USA in Laos.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We are now clear on the situation in Laos. Could you tell us anything about the non-aligned countries? You told us something about the attempts undertaken by American imperialism to move India away from neutrality, but there are also other non-aligned countries, who work under the guise of neutrality. I am talking about those countries that have a unified cause with American imperialism.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: I would like to say a few more words on Laos, before I speak about the issue you just asked about. Will the creation of the coalition government be achieved? This will become clearer in the next few days. Without the creation of this government, victory in Laos will not be worth very much. On this matter, our point of view is very different from that of N. Khrushchev. N. Khrushchev considered the agreement for the creation of the coalition government in Laos as an example of how to achieve agreements with the Western powers through talks. We are far apart from this point of view of N. Khrushchev. Either way, the distancing of the USSR from the attempt to solve the issue of Laos is in our interest.

As to the issue of the non-aligned countries, in some of the areas of the East, they have a good position; their relations with us are not bad. For example, Cambodia has good relations

with our country. There are instances when they speak badly of us, but in general they behave well toward us, especially Sihanouk, who treats us well. He thinks that on the matter of preserving Cambodia's independence he can rely on us and that we are friends of his. Cambodia is afraid of Ho Chi Minh, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, because during the revolution the territory of Cambodia was under the control of Ho Chi Minh. But Cambodia is most afraid of the USA, and that is why they mostly scold the Americans.

The USA wants to create a defense line that would include Cambodia, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Thailand. These last two are trying to also include Cambodia in their group.

On a Western course, a non-aligned country is Burma, which has very good relations with us. The signing of the agreement for the border dispute was done by [Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of Burma] Ne Win, and not by [Burmese Prime Minister] U Nu, who only signed the agreement at the end. Now Burma is ruled by a military government. The military coup that happened in Burma deposed U Nu, the friend of [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. It may be said that for a while the military government will maintain good relations with China, better yet than what we had with U Nu. But in the future, this government will pose a danger for us. That is why, according to our analysis, this government is good, and is also not good. Either way, at the moment our country's relations with Burma are very good. There is division at the heart of the Burmese military; one side wants to follow a pro-Japanese orientation, another, including Ne Win, wants to continue on the path of neutrality and wants Burma to have good relations with us. The government of Ne Win does not get along well with Nehru and Thailand, and this struggle has already started. Now in Burma there are attempts to create a united party.

Further west of us is Nepal. This is an anti-Indian country. The King of Nepal keeps good relations with us; he is not bad, and at his own initiative we solved the Sino-Nepalese border issue definitively. In Nepal they will build a paved road toward our Tibet. In other words, Nepal is looking to disengage itself from Indian control. Nepal is also getting along well with Pakistan. The Nepalese know well that we have nothing against them and that the threat to their country comes from the Indian direction.

We keep neutral relations with Iraq; they are neither warm, nor cold. The problems in the Arab world are very complicated. Both [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser and Iraq are trying to establish their own hegemony over the Arab world. The Soviet Union has made considerable investments in Iraq, but Iraq's relations with us are not bad either.

The United Arab Republic also has good relations with us. The new Syria's relations with us are not bad either. We have

neutral relations with all these countries. Our policy with these countries is not to interfere in their internal matters. I also want to point out that Nasser does not have very good relations with the Soviet Union.

Some African countries have very good relations with us, such as Guinea, Mali, Ghana, etc. [Ghanaian President Kwame] Nkrumah is not a leftist element; Mali and Guinea. [...]

Also, those countries in Africa that have some form of formal independence keep good relations with us. The peoples of these countries trust that China is anti-imperialist, that it actively supports their struggle for full independence, and that China does not undertake subversive actions against them.

In general, these are our relations with non-aligned countries.

Our relations with Indonesia are very good, because the Communist Party of Indonesia has done a lot of work in this direction. The problems left to us by the past, such as the issue of the Chinese immigrants in Indonesia, were solved through efforts by both sides. Our country is one of the first that came out in support of the Indonesian people's national liberation war.

As to the relations with the European countries, you already know the situation.

In Yugoslavia, some time ago, a meeting of the chairmen of the non-aligned countries was held.¹ There were also a few leftists in this meeting, such as Sukarno, the representatives of Mali, of Cuba, and of Guinea, though [Guinean President] Sékou Touré did not go there himself. Nasser and the representative of Ghana also took a good position at that meeting. The worst position taken there was by India and Burma of U Nu, who is a pro-Indian element. The relationship of U Nu and Nehru was like the relationship between the student and his teacher. U Nu would ask for Nehru's opinion for all the most important matters. Despite this, U Nu has not interfered in Sino-Indian relations. But Ne Win is different from U Nu; Ne Win is anti-Indian. [Next in line] after Ne Win in Burma is the Brigadier General An Ti, who is not of good character, he is pro-Japanese.

This is what I had to say.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We consider as very interesting this analysis of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and will make sure to transmit it to our Central Committee. I wanted to add that there is plenty of interest in our country on the part of the Arab countries; in fact some countries in Africa are also interested in our country.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: You are a Muslim country, so you could do a lot of good work with the Muslim countries of

Africa.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We are getting a few requests for experience-sharing from some of the African countries; they ask for help with specialists and want to send students in our country. We will see what kind of assistance we could give these countries within our capacity, always keeping in mind the objective of strengthening the relations with these countries following a correct course. We also keep in mind what Comrade Deng Xiaoping said to us about not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries; we do not have diversionary objectives. Having as a starting point our common objectives in the struggle against imperialism, we have used this point of view and continue to do so in our relations with the Arab countries, as well in those with the African countries. As far as the Yugoslav revisionists' position toward these countries, it is well known that they are trying to be active in them. We always keep this in mind in our work. Wherever it is possible, we fight, with our staunch position, against the activities of the Yugoslav revisionists in these countries. They are waging a struggle in general in Africa, but also against us in particular, but we are working hard with these countries so that they may understand what our true position is.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: You are standing on correct ground. It may be possible for us to increase our work in Africa, because we do have bases there, such as in Algeria. Our relations with Yemen are also very good. The King of Yemen is better than the revisionists.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: In our work in these countries we are finding difficulties with propaganda tools. We will look more carefully at our capacity for activity and if necessary, we will also come and talk to you and if this is something that is of interest to both of us, you might even help us in this area. In fact, you already help us very much with propaganda tools, not only with radio equipment, but with plenty others, such as magazines and other literature of ours, which is published for distribution to other countries.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: It has been our experience that when working with African countries, one thing is of great importance: the people in Africa are very sharp, because they have been feeling the yoke of imperialism for a long time. That is why it is not an easy thing to gain their trust. First of all, the African trusts only [people] who do not interfere in his internal affairs; then trust is added if one does not take anything from them. I am talking here especially about us as a great power. That is why we do not rush in our actions toward them; we do not make many gestures, and always take into account their difficulties. We also wage our propaganda activity at such a level as it may be acceptable to them, at a level which they themselves will accept. We feel that it is correct to work this way. If one rushes in his work, if one shows a lot of activity toward them, they may develop doubts about you.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: It is so, we agree.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: That is our opinion on these issues.

What must we talk about now, the relations between our two parties?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We want the communication between our two parties to be more frequent, because it would be that much better.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: That is correct. We have no opposing points of view on that. We have had plenty of contacts through our ambassadors. The difficulty with us is in the exchange of visits by the leaders of the two parties, but little by little we will also create the conditions for this too. It will be that much better when we solve the problem of communication [travel] and we are actively working on it. When we thought about this, we were not thinking only in terms of the need for better relations with Albania, because, aside from you, we also have the issues of Africa, Europe, and of Latin America. It is necessary for us to also have an air route in the southern direction. Either way, it will take some time for the establishment of such a route.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: What Comrade Deng Xiaoping said is correct; the best course for relations between our two countries at the moment is through our ambassadors. Nonetheless, many issues can be better solved through direct contact.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: That is why it is better to have direct meetings.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Not only should we have them, but these meetings should be as often as possible. Who would not like to meet face-to-face?! First of all, because it is good for work matters, but also because it gives us a chance to see each other.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: These are precisely our feelings, too.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: I also had another question. We do not know anything about the conclusions of the latest meeting of the Economic Council [COMECON] and of the Warsaw Pact of the socialist countries of Europe.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We do not know anything either. They have only communicated a few unimportant things to newspaper correspondents. We were expecting that they would discuss, for example, the letter that the CPSU Central Committee would send to us. They must, of course, have discussed economic cooperation amongst them. This is indicated by a short notice we received from them in Russian. We just

received it, and it has yet to be translated. We will give you a copy of it. But this material was only sent to us as a formality. Something of interest from that meeting is that Mongolia took part in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance meeting.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: How do the comrades see this; what were the objectives for it?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: The intention is to open a door for the socialist countries of Asia in the East as well and to exclude Albania. But it must be noted that the Economic Council [COMECON] is not the same thing as the Warsaw Pact. We have not said anything about this matter; we are turning one deaf ear and one blind eye toward it. They have also extended an invitation to us to take part in the meeting of the Economic Council at an observer level.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: And despite this you did not take part in it. It seems that they are inviting you to prepare the terrain and so that they are able to say later, whenever the time is most profitable, look who is not on the side of cooperation.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: We do not pay much attention to that, but you have a right to protest because you are members of COMECON.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: As you have seen, our government has made a declaration on the meeting of COMECON, as well as on the Warsaw Pact.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping: Our position toward these things is not to pay much attention to them, and we have only published a very small and unimportant note in the newspapers about these meetings. If you give them more attention, their importance increases.

I think this is sufficient conversation on these matters for today; we will have more time to converse. You will talk to our comrades about your plans in China, in other words, whether you would like to make visits outside or remain in Beijing. As you return from your visits, we will invite you for a dinner.

(Recorded by stenograph)

1. *Editor's Note*: Reference to the September 1961 Belgrade summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.



DOCUMENT No. 12

Memorandum of Conversation, Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia with Zhou Enlai, 27 June 1962

[Source: Archives of Foreign Ministry of Albania (AFMA), V. 1961, D. 165. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

MEETING

OF THE COMRADES HYSNI KAPO AND RAMIZ ALIA
WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, COMRADE
ZHOU ENLAI, AT 11 A.M. ON 27 JUNE 1962

(At the meeting our side was also represented by our ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Comrade Reis Malile, who also took the notes appearing below.)

From the Chinese side the following were present: Comrade Chen Yi, deputy chairman of the council of state and minister of foreign affairs; Comrade Zhou Enlai, deputy chairman of the council of state; Comrade Wu Xiuquan, deputy director of the Central Committee [International Department] of the Chinese Communist Party; and Comrade Luo Shigao, PRC ambassador to the People's Republic of Albania.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We have been received very warmly at every place we have visited around your country. I take this opportunity to express the gratitude of our party and people for everything that the Communist Party of China, the PRC government, and the Chinese people have done for our party and people. I would also like to transmit to you the greetings of Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu, who wanted to come themselves, but could not make it for the reasons you already know.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I thank you for the kind words you expressed for our party, government and people, as well as for the greetings of Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu. We, just like you, are preoccupied with the health of your comrade leaders, Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu, because they are at the forefront of a difficult struggle against the imperialists and the revisionists. The Chinese party and people greatly admire your resoluteness; our hearts are continuously trained on you and we understand very well the situation you are currently facing. That is why it is a good thing that Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu stay behind in Albania to lead this struggle. This is how our party and people also operate; they do not allow Comrade Mao Zedong to leave the country, while the rest of us can. In the world the imperialist enemies still rule, in fact over an area larger than that governed by socialism. In many countries the reactionaries rule and in some socialist countries the revisionists, who follow in the footsteps of the imperialists, are in

power. It is why, in these conditions, the movements of our leadership comrades must be careful.

But in the work of a party there is also a division of duties; some must stay behind to conduct their duty within the country's borders, and others must at times leave the country. Travel to the fraternal socialist countries must be conducted, but if the need should arise, we must also go to the enemies. How can you catch the tiger, if you do not go to his lair? For justice, for the truth, and for Marxism-Leninism, we must not hesitate, even to enter a bonfire. So we must also go to the enemy's home. You, the Albanians, are such people. We are also of the same kind. For example, in the year 1950 comrade Wu Xiuquan went to the UN and took part in the proceedings of the Security Council. Jiang Jieshi's representative was also there. Comrade Wu Xiuquan did not go there with the hopes of changing American imperialism, but with the goal of letting the working masses of the world understand our position; he went there to raise our banner and to win the opinion of the world, and this was done despite the fact that the situation was difficult, since the war in Korea had only started three months previously.

During the civil war we have fought against Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], but at that time we were also dealing with the issue of the war with Japan, which preoccupied us. It was easy for Jiang Jieshi to strike at the Japanese. But during the time that we were fighting against the Jiang Jieshists, we were also conducting talks with them to gain unification of all the forces of the country in the war against the Japanese imperialists. Even after the capitulation of Japan, the units that were led by Comrade Chen Yi and Comrade Li Xiannian continued the war against Jiang Jieshi, while I continued talks and conducted negotiations with him. Later, I called those comrades and all three of us talked to the enemy, the Jiang Jieshists and the Americans. This shows our experience. Though we were fighting against the Jiang Jieshists, we were also talking to them.

In the war against the Japanese we had three slogans: To fight against the Japanese and never capitulate; to preserve our unity and avoid division; and to progress forward steadfastly and avoid retreat. Jiang Jieshi could never oppose our slogans; he would not dare say that I want to capitulate or that I am against unity. By following this course, we thus won over the masses and isolated the Jiang Jieshists. We only had one adventure in this sector when Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing. This was a mistake by Stalin. In the telegram that Stalin sent us, he said that if Comrade Mao Zedong did not go there, the Chinese nation would be wiped out and [Stalin] advised us not to continue the civil war. Can this not be called interference in our internal affairs? Either way, we respected his advice. Comrade Mao Zedong went there, but we continued the war. Later the war was interrupted and we used the time to strengthen our army, but when Comrade Mao Zedong returned to Yan'an, Jiang Jieshi restarted the civil war.

Still, even after this, we continued the talks with them. The delegation stayed in Nanjing until they were expelled. We did not leave before being expelled, though the building where our comrades were staying in Nanjing was surrounded by spies, but we dared to stay there because we knew that the Chinese people and party were behind us and because we were convinced that we would win.

When our struggle for the liberation of the country was nearing a victorious end, Jiang Jieshi once again asked for talks with us. We accepted [his] proposal and [his] delegation came to Beijing. The conditions that we presented to [his] delegation were accepted by the delegation, but not by the government of Jiang Jieshi, because the Americans did not agree to them. So we continued our drive south. In the white books [sic] published by Kennedy, there are many documents on this event.

The policy of our party is that we have two ways of achieving victory. The first way is through revolution. We are for armed war against the enemy. But we also have another way of doing this. We also do not refuse peaceful struggle. The only thing is that this must be supported by armed war. We have waged legal and illegal wars. We have great animosity toward the American imperialists, but in Warsaw we talk with their representatives. Even now we do not exclude the possibility of talks with Jiang Jieshi if he would like to send a delegation here. This is our tactic; this is Leninism. In the struggle that Lenin waged against the Second International, the division came only after [Karl] Kautsky published the book "Wilhelm II." Lenin fought against him though he was in the minority. This has entered the tradition of our party since Comrade Mao Zedong came to its helm.

So we use two revolutionary methods and our experience has shown this to be effective. This is our experience in the struggle against imperialism, as well as in the struggle against modern revisionism. This is also how we have acted with India. Though our relations with India are now tense, we always leave the door open for talks. India is placed in a difficult position, because while we are for talks, they are against them. In order to have talks, India requested preliminary conditions—that we pull back—while we do not ask for any preliminary conditions, though this does not mean that during the meeting we would not set our conditions. This is how we gain the initiative. The conflict on the Sino-Indian border started in the year 1959 and in 1960 this conflict became more grave. We then invited [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru for talks, he answered negatively and asked that Comrade Zhou Enlai go to Delhi for talks. At that time, the spirit of the official Indian leadership was hostile toward us; in fact the pictures of Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai were torn publicly there. Despite this, Comrade Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of our party decided that in that situation I should go to Delhi for talks. This placed Nehru in a passive position. We then posed six conditions to him for the solution

of the Sino-Indian border problem, which they [India] did not accept, but which they could also not dispute.

The struggle against the modern revisionism should also follow this course. Though there have been two meetings of the communist and workers' parties in 1957 and in 1960, Khrushchev does not change his revisionism; he now has the majority in the international communist movement; some peoples and some sister parties are now following him. In this situation we favor meetings so that we can defend our correct positions there and put N. Khrushchev on the defensive. He (N. Khrushchev) does not dare publicly to oppose the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the need for unity in the international communist movement. This is how we can hold in our hands the banner of Marxism-Leninism and that of the Moscow Declaration.

Now we, as the minority that understands Marxism-Leninism correctly, must work hard so that the masses of the party and of the peoples know the truth well, and then united with them, we can fight for the truth. To achieve this, time is needed as well as a long struggle, but in the end the undecided elements and the rightists will eventually come to our side too. In our struggle we must not only unify the leftist elements but the centrists as well, and even the rightists. In this way we will cause the decomposition of the revisionists. That is why we must not only fight against the revisionists in the ideological sense, but also in the international meetings of the parties, waging in them a continued and resolute fight. Of course, all that I am saying is drawn only from the experience of the struggle of our party. We place this experience before you for judgment, using the principles of Marxism-Leninism as a starting point; you may then decide for yourselves. We always admire the manners of fighting your party uses, but at the same time we also present to you our party's experience of struggle and implore you to transmit this and our other thoughts to Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu.

As to the other sister parties of Asia, such as the Communist Party of Indonesia, the Korean Workers' Party, and the Vietnam Workers' Party, we think that their tactics are quite correct, as the delegation of our party that held talks with you previously also indicated. We must keep in mind that revisionism is now in power in many countries. The revisionists have severed diplomatic relations with you, and because of what they have done they are in a passive position. With these actions that he takes, N. Khrushchev does not gain any favor in the world. There are also some parties that think like N. Khrushchev, but that do not follow him, such as for example the Polish party that did not sever diplomatic relations with Albania. Keeping this in mind, you now have the initiative in hand.

The peoples require that we have unity, that we have good relations with each other in the socialist countries. In the relations between the socialist countries, diplomats must be care-

ful, because they represent their government, the people and their desires in the country where they have been assigned. You are in a positive situation not only in the area of diplomatic relations, but you are in such a position in the area of trade relations as well. We also have trade relations with the imperialists; in fact, we may do even more trade with the countries that have revisionists at their helm, but this must be done on the basis of the principle of equality and in the interest of the peoples. We desire to see that you develop trade with the socialist countries of Europe and with the Soviet Union. Such a thing will have a great influence on the peoples of these countries; it will be in the interest of all the peoples of socialist countries.

In relation to [Albania's] economic problems, you expressed here your gratitude for the help we have given you. I am really sorry that the truth is that we do not have the ability to fulfill each and every one of your needs. We understand your condition well; you are a small country that cannot solve all of its problems, but we are certain that your country has an ancient tradition of perseverance in overcoming your difficulties and, based on your own forces, you will move forward. In this spirit, we try to fulfill our duty as much as possible in assisting to the development of your economy, but you must, first of all, rely on your own forces. For as long as your economy is not walking on its own feet, we will not be comfortable.

While we are on the topic, I would like to inform you about our economic situation. China used to be a backward country, with a very weak economy, much weaker than even pre-revolutionary tsarist Russia. After our victory, our economy's period of recovery was not very long, though the war very much destroyed our country. In our first five-year plan we did some initial work. In our second five-year plan, based on the specific situation in China, we laid down the general course for the construction of socialism. Our course of the three banners is a correct one. As to our industry, it is weak. We have constructed some plants in this sector, but we have yet to develop a full system for the production of all those items we need. A proverb says: I have the piano, but I do not have the violin. For example, in a plane production plant we cannot produce all the plane parts we need because we do not possess certain kinds of steel, in particular special steels for the production of MiG-17s, MiG-19s, and MiG-21s. During all these years we have achieved some results, especially in conventional armaments, but are not yet able to produce everything.

Comrade Chen Yi: This has been dependent also on the assistance that the Soviet Union has given us during the past 10 years. The assistance that the Soviet Union has given us has not been complete. For example, we produce training aircraft, but no helicopters. For the production of planes, we are forced to buy some of the parts from the Soviet Union. We produce televisions and movie equipment, but we have to buy some of the parts from the Soviet Union. We will need time before we

are able to produce them on our own.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The level of mechanization in our country is still low; that of electrification is low as well. We are able to produce equipment [domestically] and during the last few years the number [of these products] has grown, but we are still unable to produce some key items; we are forced to import such things. Now we do not possess precision machinery; we will need time for those.

In addition, the industrialization of the country also requires advanced agriculture, otherwise, the people cannot be supplied with foodstuffs and the raw material industry cannot be supplied with all it needs, either. During the last three years we have faced several natural disasters. This year our agricultural [production] will also not fare very well. As to summer production, this year's harvest will be lower than that of last year, because some places suffered from floods, while in other parts of the country we had severe droughts. As a result of the drought, it is possible that agricultural production will not be good in general. We had planned to have higher agricultural production this year, but no longer have hope for such an achievement, so this year we will once again be forced to import grains. This presents us with the problem of the procurement of the necessary foreign currency. We will buy only 10 tins of grain per capita, but this will mean that we will buy several millions tons of grain. The recovery of some of the industrial plants [works] this year will be slow. We have done some work toward the increase of agricultural production; we have decreased the number of clerks and workers and have sent many of them to the farms.

Our market this year is better; we are seeing the initial results, but we will need a lot of time for the recovery of agriculture. Our industry was also hurt badly from the recall of the Soviet specialists.¹ The Soviets did not consult with us on the recall of the specialists. As a result, thousands of specialists immediately left their work in the field. But this was, at the same time, a trial for our country so that we may draw lessons on how to walk on our own feet. We do not complain why others do not help us; China is a large country and we must increase our capacity to produce.

The modern revisionists have created great difficulties for us, but the greatest difficulties for us come from the imperialists, because the greatest part of our border is shared with countries that are on the side of imperialism. For a long time now, the imperialists have coaxed these countries to form a crescent-shaped enclosure around China, but until now this has not happened yet. Now, American imperialism, seeing our difficulties, is inciting Jiang Jieshi against us, with the intention of having him attack the continent.

(After this Comrade Zhou Enlai explains the situation on the basis of the notice given by the Xinhua news agency, and then

continues): We unmask the intrigues of the American imperialists and have undertaken military measures. If Jiang Jieshi should dare to attack us, we will eliminate him. We unmask the American imperialists through our propaganda on these issues. We also told them during the talks in Warsaw² that if an attack should happen, [the Americans] will not escape from the responsibility.

On this issue there are two possibilities. Keeping in mind our warning to them, the American imperialists and Jiang Jieshi might not undertake anything. But they might still try their hand at an attack and in that case we will liquidate them completely.

We wanted to inform you about our situation. We have been born with difficulties and that is how we are growing. The same thing that is happening to us is also happening to you—you were born with difficulties and with difficulties are growing.

In our third five-year plan we will continue to strengthen the defense and the economy of our country, and, in the end, we will once again walk with a great leap. Keeping in mind all the above, with a feeling of sorrow we say to you that in the economic relations between our two countries it is possible that we will not be able to fulfill our obligations to you before the deadlines. You are not an economic delegation, but I still wanted to inform you of this.

As to the trade volume for 1962, it will reach 52 million new rubles. Of this amount, it is certain that 36 million new rubles, or 67% of the agreement, will be realized. In the amount that will not be realized, the following items are included:

- 1) We cannot supply you this year with the grain that has yet to be delivered for the year—a total of 55,000 tons. The same goes for 900 tons of crude oil. It is possible that we will not be able to supply these articles to you. We wanted to consult with you on this.
- 2) As to the goods which we should supply to you by purchasing them from other countries, they are not certain. The majority of them we will be unable to give to you, such as the lubricants, for example. The same goes for the goods we will procure from capitalist countries; since we do not have foreign currency, we will not be able to give them to you.
- 3) For some objects which we do not produce on our own, and which are not very necessary, we wanted to consult with you about them.

So, for this year we will not be able to fulfill the agreement we have with you. There is very little hope that the amount will reach over the 36 million new rubles.

When [Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers] Comrade Abdyl Kellezi was here,³ we discussed these objects. After we

discussed them further, and based on the production capacity of our country and the conditions of yours, we are of the opinion that until the end of the year 1964, with great travails, only 10 objects can be implemented; the other 19 objects can be categorized as such:

For the nitrogen fertilizer plant, Italy refuses to give us the necessary technical data, so that object could not be secured. The same goes for the glass factory. For the other 17 objects, we think that you should build them later than the planned deadlines, in other words, you should extend them to sometime in 1966 and 1967, and even later. We are not able to build them by the deadline, because we are short on equipment. The same thing is also going on with Vietnam and the other countries to which we have promised assistance; we are forced to extend the deadlines with all of them. Of course, this may bring some difficulties to you, but we must take responsibility for this. On the other hand, we think that, judging from your workforce, you will not be able to fulfill all the construction required. This is our opinion, but your government does not accept this. You have announced these objects in your five-year plan, but the plan can also be amended and there are plenty of examples of this. Comrade Stalin has said that a suitable plan must be amended often. And now N. Khrushchev, as well as other socialist countries, amend their plans.

In a few words, we are bringing you some difficulty in the economic relations between our countries. This is a truth that troubles us. We know that you have not come to China for this matter, but we beg you to transmit this matter to the ALP CC. We will cooperate through the Albanian embassy with the group of Albanian specialists that have come here.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: You evaluated correctly the position of our party and the care that it must pay to its leadership. The CCP is very correct to thus protect Comrade Mao Zedong who is not only yours, but also of the world communists, who see in him an eminent leader of the international communist movement. Comrade Mao Zedong is the son of your people and your party, but all that he has done for Marxism-Leninism belongs to us all.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The same goes for your struggle and your leaders, who are also ours.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We understood well all that you said to us. All those parties that are led by Marxism-Leninism in their struggle, are the same in one way or another. To a certain degree, as far as our conditions have allowed, our party, during the war, has tried to draw in all the masses.

(Further on, Comrade Hysni Kapo describes the policy of our party toward the National Liberation Front, and then continues): During the course of the national liberation war we have also entered into negotiations and talks with the heads of the reactionary organizations with the intention of drawing the masses

into the war effort. Of course, when it becomes necessary, we must also go to the enemy to talk. A proof of this is the course of your party and its correct line. To a certain degree this is very similar to our country. In 1946, the People's Republic of Albania was recognized only by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The imperialists were organizing plots even at the UN and only the Soviet Union defended Albania there. A delegation of our country also went to the UN then to unmask American imperialism and its lackeys. This is similar to what you said that we must go to the lair of our enemy and strike him there. We all know what imperialism is, though should it become necessary, we know that we must also talk to our enemy.

We also have other examples that show the policy of our party in this area. The position of Greece toward the People's Republic of Albania is well known. (Then Comrade Hysni Kapo explains the relations of our country with Greece, and continues further): Despite the enemy stance of the Greeks, the ALP and our government have continually taken steps for the amelioration of our relations with Greece. (Further on Comrade Hysni Kapo explained the stance of Yugoslavia toward our country and our efforts to achieve normal relations at the governmental level, and on this, Comrade Hysni Kapo said, we have applied the principle that one must also talk to the enemy as a starting point.)

Our relations with the countries of the communist family are completely different from the relations we have with the countries that are ruled by other social systems. Within our family the Leninist rules and principles must always be respected. These rules and principles have been thrown away by N. Khrushchev. It is a fact that our party was publicly attacked as being traitorous, as anti-Marxist, etc.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Second International also accused Lenin of being a traitor, as an agent of imperialism, etc., but he still took part in the meeting of the Second International because not all of the mass of communists saw its errors. According to our opinion, in the midst of the international communist movement, as well as between the socialist countries, the talks are necessary. N. Khrushchev made a big mistake by not inviting Albania to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. The attacks that he initiated against you at that congress unmasked him.

In the meeting of the Warsaw Pact [Political Consultative Committee] that was held in February of 1960, N. Khrushchev called Comrade Mao Zedong a "discarded shoe" (an old boot). This made us very happy, because by this N. Khrushchev showed that he is a revisionist. He has been slandering us for a long time now, but we nevertheless went to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. The speech I read at the congress, at the behest of the CC of our party, was soft but with effect on the world. Our participation in the congress did not add to the weight of N. Khrushchev, but to that of the ALP. The participation of the

other sister parties that stand on correct ground did not add to the weight of N. Khrushchev. Marxism-Leninism allows us to follow the above-mentioned tactic in the midst of the international communist movement as well, to take part in the unmasking of the enemies. We would be isolated without our participation in the meetings.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: I thank Comrade Zhou Enlai for the speech that he read at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in defense of the ALP and of Marxism-Leninism.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The thanks you express are not necessary. The speech I read was necessary and it was held in the interest of the preservation of Marxism-Leninism.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: When we speak of the Soviet-Albanian disagreements, the issue is not only the disagreements themselves, it is an issue of Marxism-Leninism. We were hit at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, but the arrows were intended for somewhere else as well. (Here Comrade Hysni Kapo explained how these blows were also directed against the CCP.)

Comrade Ramiz Alia: The handle of the hammer falls on Albania, but the head strikes China.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes, it is so. The main blow is directed against China. We have a proverb here that says: Let us strike at the oak, so that the mountain can hear.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Had N. Khrushchev invited us to the 22nd Congress, we would have taken part. The attack he initiated against us at this congress has neither frightened us, nor made us any weaker. In Albania there is a unity that has not been seen before in either the party or the people. His attacks have strengthened us even more. The correct line of our party has played a role in this regard, [but also] external factors, the struggle of the sister parties in the defense of Marxism-Leninism and, above all, the struggle of the CCP, its assistance and international solidarity.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The main help is the internal factor.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Explains the issue related to the unity within our party, then continues on to say that) ... we agree with what you (Comrade Zhou Enlai) said that Lenin, despite the division between the parties in the Second International, continued to take part in its meeting. (Further on, Comrade Hysni Kapo pointed out the situation at the [June 1960] Bucharest meeting.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Your support for our party at the Bucharest meeting was pivotal.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Both you and we knew before-

hand what N. Khrushchev would bring up at this meeting and despite our participation. In addition, we also participated in the Moscow meeting [in November 1960] despite the difficult situation that had been created there. We took part there not because we thought that N. Khrushchev might change his thoughts and his stance, but because it was necessary for us to discuss the problems of our family. We should not have given the upper hand to the enemy by taking the first step in that direction. And N. Khrushchev stepped on the norms of the relations between the parties and of the [1957] Moscow Declaration; he organized the open attack on the ALP at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

(Further on Comrade Hysni Kapo describes the unequal situation in which our party has been put after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the situation it would have faced had it gone to the meeting; later he explained the reasons for which the position of the ALP is correct and pointed out that the CCP stands on other conditions. He then said that on all the principal issues both of our parties stand on similar grounds and our points of view only differ on the issue of the meeting. But, Comrade Hysni Kapo continued, we will transmit your thoughts to the Central Committee of our party. We have been led by the spirit of the friendship and sincerity that ties us every time we have expressed an opinion here.)

You, Comrade Zhou Enlai, spoke here about your economic situation. We are two bodies with one single heart; every difficulty of yours is felt by us too. We understood by the explanations that you gave that you placed your heart in our hand and did not keep any secrets from us. We understand very well the measures that you have taken.

We are not empowered by the Central Committee of our party to talk with you about economic problems; the leadership of our party has entrusted us with discussing only the issue of the nitrogen fertilizer plant and only to see where we are regarding the deadlines for the objects. As to the issues that you brought forth, we cannot express any opinion, but we think that the changes that you propose will bring extremely grave economic and political hardships to us, such as, for example, the failure to fulfill the agreement on bread supplies. We would never want to cause you to have less bread than us, but considering the conditions in which we find ourselves, we would ask that this issue, as well as the others, be looked at one more time.

(Further on, Comrade Hysni Kapo speaks in more detail to Comrade Zhou Enlai about the imperative need for procuring grains and shows the real basis on why we asked for them. He also pointed out the need for deliveries of oils, of tubes, etc. Comrade Hysni Kapo then said to Comrade Zhou Enlai that we understand the intent of your point that we must walk on our own feet, but because of the economic conditions of our country we are not able to achieve this at the moment, but we

have mobilized all the working masses for the complete fulfillment of all the tasks of the 3rd five-year plan.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: (Spoke once again and said that we should tap into our reserves.)

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Pointed out that we have very few reserves; that they are only enough for a time of war; and that in fact even from those we have already taken out for the first three months of the year with the hope that we could replace them with the assistance from China.)

The decrease in the number of objects from 29 to 10 that you would like to do is very troublesome for us. You expressed the opinion that our plan might be overloaded. You have also expressed this opinion to [First Deputy Premier] Comrade Spiro Koleka. We analyzed all these issues one by one at the Politburo and came to the conclusion that we have the power to construct all the objects that we have included in the plan. Comrade Abdyl Kellezi was sent here exactly for the conclusion of the agreements. The signing of the agreements with you calmed us because the objects that we will receive from you are the foundation of our third five-year plan for industry and if we could be given them, we have the power to build them. The failure to receive 19 objects would be a very damaging thing for us and that is why we plead with you to reconsider this issue. We will report to the Central Committee of our party about your point of view on this, but we can tell you beforehand that we know the situation and the effect that such a measure would have on us would be very grave.

As to the nitrogen fertilizer plant, it was known for a while that it would come from other countries. If the Italians will not provide it, let us look somewhere else to see if it can be found, because agriculture is also vital in our country and nitrogen fertilizers play an important role in agriculture.

(Further on, Comrade Hysni Kapo gives general information on the agricultural situation in our country. If we do not secure nitrogen fertilizers, he says, we will always have to import our bread. The change of plan will be a very grave thing for us to bear, especially when considering our political, economic, and geographic position. Comrade Hysni Kapo then pointed out our great needs in the area of strengthening our defenses and gave some details about the armed forces of the countries that surround Albania. He also pointed out that despite the economic weight that the armed forces place on the country, they are necessary for the security of our fatherland.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I am aware of some of the things that you pointed out, but there are also some new things. First of all, on the issue of defense, I had known the information from the talks I have had with your comrades from the military delegations. Whatever potential for military materiel assistance we have had, we have given to you, and we will continue to do

some part in the future.

We are convinced that the heroic Albanian people, led by the party will withstand all the enemies that will dare to attack your country. The issue here can be compressed into two main problems for you: [illegible] ... fertilizers. We cannot fulfill the grain plan. For this year could you use some amount of grain from the military reserves? Whenever we will have freed foreign currency, we will replace all you use. The amount of grain that you would receive this year, we will give to you next year. We would like to help you with chemical fertilizers, but we are not able to solve the technical side of the production of the nitrogen fertilizers. The Italians refuse to give us the technology.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We are still trying to procure it from the Italians.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We will still try to achieve something with the Italians. We assure you that whenever we manage to get the patents, we will first of all help you and then we will look into our needs. But if they do not give it to us, there is nothing we can do. We will also ask [PRC Foreign Minister] Comrade Chen Yi to talk about this issue with the Italian firm MOTAI when he goes to Geneva [for the conference on Laos]. The faraway water cannot put out the fire that is nearby, goes a wise proverb of our people. Even if we get the technology, we will need 2, 3, or even more years before we can start producing [nitrogen fertilizers].

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Points out that in no way can the small reserve of grains intended for the military be touched and gives an explanation of our country's great need for the nitrogen fertilizer plant. Then he adds that the gasification shop construction can be postponed for later, but that the other shops must start to be built now.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We do not have the experience for this. This can only be done after we receive the documentation from the Italians.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: Let us at least start building the thermal power station that will supply energy to the nitrogen fertilizer plant since we know the capacity it must have.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This also cannot be done. (Then he insists again that the nitrogen fertilizer plant needs a few years to be built) and you have an urgent need for chemical fertilizers. So I will speak with the comrades in the government so that we may furnish you with some next year and then do that again and again until the plant is constructed. 10,000 tons of chemical fertilizers spread on the fields will add 30,000 tons of grain. These are the proportions that we will use to supply you for the fulfillment of your needs.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Asks one more time that all the

issues that Comrade Zhou Enlai brought forth be reconsidered once again.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The thoughts that I brought forth to you are realistic. I think that we must share all the blessings and the misfortunes with each other. We will supply you with chemical fertilizers in the coming year; we will also give you the grain at that time. In the coming year we can give you up to 15,000 tons of chemical fertilizers.

[...]

What I have presented here is the reality, and we implore you to transmit it to the Central Committee of your party and to your government. Most needed for you are the fertilizers and the grains; the industrial objects can be postponed. The most important thing is the agriculture. I say this once again because I know that this issue is worrisome for you.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Points out the great worry that such a thing causes us.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I was in northeast China trying to solve the bread problem. Many industrial and very important centers there we have closed, and the workers have all been sent to work in the fields.

Comrade Li Xiannian: We are responsible for all that we have said to you today, especially I who made promises to you. These last days I looked at the list of objects. We see that after they are all built, you will have a great need for a large workforce for them. By pulling all these forces from the village, your agriculture will become weaker.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (Explains that we already have these forces and that the problem has been well studied from all sides.) If the problem we face is that we cannot build the objects due to technical shortcomings, that is another thing, but as to the necessary workforce for the construction and then for the operation of these objects, we can procure it.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The main thing are the technical shortcomings; we simply are not able to [provide] it [the technology]. We are your good friends, but we are also poor; we accepted your requests only after great deliberation.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: For us it is better to have a poor friend who is good, such as we have in the CCP and the Chinese people, than to have a rich friend who seeks to stick a knife into your back.

1. *Editor's Note:* The Soviet Union abruptly withdrew its scientific and technical advisors from Albania in July 1960.

2. *Editor's Note:* The Sino-American ambassadorial talks first opened in Geneva in August 1955 and continued, after being sus-

pending in December 1957, in Warsaw, Poland.

3. *Editor's Note:* An Albanian trade delegation, led by Kellezi, arrived in Beijing on 22 December 1961.



DOCUMENT No. 13

Memorandum of Conversation, ALP Delegation with Mao Zedong, 29 June 1962

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSh-MPKK-V.1962, L. 14, D. 7. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

THE MEETING OF THE DELEGATION OF THE ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG, AT THE CITY OF WUHAN, AT 5:00 P.M., ON 29 JUNE 1962

Chairman Mao Zedong received our delegation at the city of Wuhan. He had come out to the outer door, where he received the delegation. After the participants took their seats at the sitting room, Chairman Mao Zedong asked Comrade Hysni Kapo how the delegation had enjoyed their time during the days of their stay in the People's Republic of China, Comrade Hysni Kapo, after answering the question asked by Comrade Mao Zedong, said:

"I would like to first of all express the joy of the delegation of our party for the possibility it was given of meeting with you personally, Comrade Mao Zedong. We value immensely the sacrifice you are making by expending a very valuable part of your time to receive us. We thank the CC of your party from the bottom of our hearts and especially you personally for this chance you have given us."

Comrade Mao Zedong: Welcome.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: When we left Albania, the CC of our party and Comrade Enver Hoxha personally, asked us to bring you the most heartfelt greetings of our party, our people, of the CC, and of Comrade Enver Hoxha to the fraternal and friendly people of China, your glorious party, the leadership of your party, and to you personally.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I thank you very much.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: At the same time, we would like to express the deep gratitude of our people and party to the Chinese people, their Communist Party and its leadership, with you at its helm, for the extremely great, internationalist, and universal assistance that your people and party have given and are giving to our people and party during these hard moments

we have been going through lately under the conditions of the geographic encirclement by the imperialists and their lackeys, the modern revisionists.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We must be the first to thank you because you stand at the front line, because you live under very difficult circumstances, and you fight in defense of Marxism–Leninism. This is a very valuable thing; it is more valuable than anything else. You did not fall under the strikes from the batons of others.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We did not fall because we have good and faithful friends. We are proud that we are linked by such a great friendship with the fraternal people of China, and that in our struggle we have found and have next to us the glorious Communist Party of China, with you at the helm, Comrade Mao Zedong, a dear person not only to the Chinese communists and people, but also of our party and people and of the entire world proletariat.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The entire world supports you in your struggle, all the revolutionaries support you; everyone is on your side except for the imperialists, the reactionary bourgeoisie, and the revisionists.

It is very significant that your country was recognized even by Cuba, and precisely after the [October 1961] 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Cuba established diplomatic relations with you not before, but after the 22nd Congress. Cuba did this at a time when it finds itself in a very difficult situation; a time when it cannot avoid relying on the Soviet Union for many things. That is why I say that this is a very meaningful sign. At present, despite the fact that the leaderships of many parties stand on the side of the revisionists, the situation within these parties, nonetheless, changes continually.

The fact that the imperialists even today exploit many oppressed peoples is an objective reality. Two-thirds of humanity is now under the yoke of imperialism and capitalism. Does this mean that all these peoples will perhaps not fight on the side of the revolution? We say that they will lose their desire to wage a revolution only when they are no longer under the oppression of the imperialists and the reactionaries of the various countries. This is a fact that is visible by all; it is not a lie when we say that the imperialists and the reactionaries are still oppressing all these peoples. Sooner or later all the oppressed peoples of the world will definitely wage a revolution.

It will be very hard for the revisionists to continue ruling over the people in the countries where they are in power for one thousand or one hundred years. We see from now that the revisionists are not calm and they are very afraid of Stalin; Stalin terrifies them, though he died a few years ago. But the revisionists are also very afraid of Albania. The position that they take toward you can be explained in that light, otherwise

why would they expel you by not inviting you to take part at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and attacking you publicly? They did not invite you to their congress and attacked you in your absence. Such a move is not allowed by the Moscow Declaration. Even if we suppose that Albania has erred, then a meeting of all the communist and workers' parties should have been called to discuss this issue together. But N. Khrushchev is afraid; he is very afraid of such a meeting. He has proclaimed at his own decision that you have erred, and he did this in the name of the party. The source of this behavior is the 20th CPSU Congress in which he proclaimed his war on Stalin. But we know well that the war that N. Khrushchev is waging against Stalin is a war that is waged on Marxism–Leninism. This is the essence of all the activity of the revisionists.

Revisionism, as a movement, took power in its hands in some countries after the death of Stalin. We did not understand this right away, but gradually; perhaps it was also understood by your party in this way. After the death of J. V. Stalin, the revisionists took measured steps. So, by looking at their activity, we understood well who they were. After the death of Stalin they expelled Molotov and his friends and continually waged a cleansing of the cadres that were not on their side. At the center this cleansing ran up to 50%, while at the base it went up to 70%. So, in this manner, a great change was achieved.

At the beginning we did not foresee the effects that would flow from the spirit of the 20th Congress. Later the 21st and the 22nd Congresses were held. From them we saw that N. Khrushchev was not calm; he once again showed that he is very worried about Stalin. That is why he once again attacked Stalin at the 22nd Congress until he achieved his goal of removing Stalin's body from the mausoleum and burning it. But we know well that N. Khrushchev is not so much afraid of dead people; he is afraid of the living, he is afraid of those that support Stalin. Is it possible that N. Khrushchev, after he attacked Stalin, after he removed his body from the mausoleum and burned it, created better days for himself? What do you think of this?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: When we rely on the teachings of the always victorious Marxism–Leninism, whatever move that N. Khrushchev does will never give him good days.

Comrade Mao Zedong: That is correct. He seems to have been taken over by many devils from all sides.

Albania was not in the past a center of attention of all the peoples of the world; then your country was only known as one of the 12 socialist countries, but now, after the 22nd CPSU Congress, Albania is at the center of attention of the majority of the peoples of the world. Is it not so?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: It is so.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Such a phenomenon also appeared in our country. During the 22nd Congress, we published the speeches and the articles of their press that were full of attacks against Albania, but we also published the materials of your party. But the great majority of our people centered their attention on the speech of Comrade Enver Hoxha that was held on 7 November 1961. We did not make any comments or clarifications about this speech, but in our country all those that are able to read the newspaper read the speech of Comrade Enver Hoxha with much attention and more than 90% of them valued it very correctly. Did this also happen in your province? (He directs his question at the first secretary of the party committee of the province of Wuhan, who was also present at this meeting.)

The First Secretary of Wuhan: That has also happened in our province.

Comrade Mao Zedong: (Directing his question at the ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania, who is also a member of the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania.) Comrade Malile, when did you come to our country?

Comrade Reis Malile: At the end of July of last year.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Have we met?

Comrade Reis Malile: Yes, we met when you received the Albanian economic delegation in January of this year.¹

Comrade Mao Zedong: That is why I do not know you that well, because I have only met you once. What about the other comrades of the delegation, have I seen them before?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: (After he introduces all the comrades of the delegation.) No, all the other comrades come to the People's Republic of China for the first time.

Comrade Mao Zedong: How is Comrade Enver Hoxha's health?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: He is very well, thank you.

Comrade Mao Zedong: What about Comrade Mehmet Shehu?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: He is also very well.

When we received the letter from the CCP CC signed by you, Comrade Mao Zedong, that invited a delegation of our party to China, the desire of the comrades of the leadership was for Comrade Enver Hoxha to come himself, but such a trip, in the very difficult conditions that have been created around us, is a desire that has become impossible to realize.

We greeted the invitation that you sent, Comrade Mao

Zedong, as a very important matter. Comrade Enver Hoxha himself instructed us that during the exchange of thoughts with the delegation of your country we should express everything that our party thinks. It was a great joy and satisfaction for us that during the exchange of opinions with the delegation of your party, led by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, as well as at the other meetings that we have had with other Chinese leadership comrades, the unity of our points of view in all the principal issues that preoccupy our two parties was confirmed. We left Beijing with the impression that the talks held between the two sides are very valuable and beneficial and we will report to the CC of our party the points of view of your party. At the same time, we will specifically inform the CC of our party of your advice and thoughts from this meeting.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Very well, there is plenty of time to think. We are not afraid of anything for as long as the truth is in our hand. We are convinced that the truth is in our hand. We knew it at the Meeting of the 81 Parties in Moscow, too; though we were in the minority the truth was on our side. Since ancient times the truth has always been on the side of the few. In the beginning, Marx and Engels were alone. They were just two people, but with what speed their ideas were spread out! Leninism was not in the majority in the beginning either. In 1903, when the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party was held in England, Lenin won the majority with much difficulty, but after the congress he once again was left in the minority until the time of the Revolution in 1917 when the situation changed once again as the St. Petersburg soviet secured more than 50%.

The revisionists and N. Khrushchev unmask themselves with their activities. The work that N. Khrushchev does makes the imperialists happy and not the peoples of the various countries, including here the Soviet people, too. I think that the majority of the Soviet people are not happy with the activities of the revisionist group of N. Khrushchev. They are unhappy from the war that N. Khrushchev has waged and wages on J. V. Stalin.

The peoples of the Soviet Union are also unhappy with the war that N. Khrushchev and his group are waging on the ALP and the CCP. This unhappiness grows continually. In China, our party, which was founded in 1921, at the beginning found the support of only a few people too. There were only 12 delegates in its 1st Congress, who represented only a few tens of party members, a total of 57 people. The declaration or the decision taken by this congress did not draw the attention of many people, but the facts show that our people gradually understood the line of the party; they absorbed Marxism little by little.

Our people have had two kinds of teachers: One kind of these teachers are Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The other kind is the various imperialists and Jiang Jieshi. If the teach-

ers of the second kind did not exist, the revolutionary conscience of our people would not have been born; they would have never been able to understand Marxism, if they had not been oppressed by the imperialists and Jiang Jieshi. Perhaps the same thing happened in your country too; in the beginning only a few people should have believed in Marxism, but with the oppression exerted on the people by the enemies, they start to understand the course, to be clarified, and gradually to believe in Marxism. At the present time, the teachers of the second kind are the imperialists and the reactionaries of the various countries.

In a way, the revisionists are to us the second kind of teachers. On the struggle against the revisionists the people could not be clear on many issues. The modern revisionists are today playing the same role that the old revisionists, such as Bernstein with Kautsky in Germany and Plekhanov in Russia, played in the past. The old revisionists also brought forth the idea of the peaceful transfer to socialism, without revolution. So the theory of the peaceful transfer of power to socialism is not something new, it is an old theory.

The true Marxists of the time had many things to do; they were forced to fight against revisionism. Leninism, the Party of the Bolsheviks, the communist parties in the various countries of the world, and the Third International were born in these conditions, and then the revolution developed further. From one socialist country that existed before World War II, and that country was the SU, now there are 12 socialist countries. With the exception of Mongolia, the other 10 new socialist countries were born during or right after World War II. This is the dialectics of history; in the world everything has changed and will continue to change. Here I am talking about materialist dialectics. N. Khrushchev will not change all the Marxists and turn them into revisionists.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: It is so. What you have said is very correct; those that become revisionists are the undecided, only those that are not true Marxists.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes. Now we live at a time when the others are cursing at us. We have been and are being cursed at by the imperialists and the Jiang Jieshiists; later, along with them, we had and have [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and [Yugoslav President Josip Broz] Tito cursing at us; now we have N. Khrushchev cursing at us, too. We are used to being damned by our enemies. The damning actions by the revisionists are malignant, as are for example their political pressures toward us, the severing of relations, etc., but they do not scare us. These are the kinds of activities they engage in.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: It is so. Neither their damning, nor their pressure will scare us. As you said, with these things that they have done and continue to do against us, after all the cursing at us and their attacks, they only managed to get the name

of our party to be heard and followed all around the world.

Comrade Mao Zedong: It is so.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: You know that our population is small; for many centuries our people have lived under the yoke of the foreigners, but they have never kneeled before them. The only friends they had at those times were the rifle and the mountains of Albania, in fact even the mountains were at those times the property of the feudal owners and the rich people, and the rifles had flints. Nonetheless, despite the conditions ... [a few illegible words] ... of theirs, the rifles are very good and, above all, they have their party that leads them on a correct course; they have faithful friends who assist them. When I say that our people are not alone but have good friends, I am talking about the Chinese people, the glorious CCP, the peoples of the socialist countries, the Soviet people, as well as all the peoples of the world.

Our party, Comrade Mao Zedong, despite the rabid attacks by N. Khrushchev and those in the parties of the socialist countries of Europe that follow him, has never considered N. Khrushchev to be identified with the Soviet people and the Soviet communists. Neither the Soviet Union, nor the Soviet people, or the party of Lenin, are the property of N. Khrushchev. The Soviet party and people are educated by Lenin and, as you also said, the time will come when the revisionists will end up in the same place as their predecessors. This is what history teaches us.

On what you said that we should not be afraid of meetings, I would like to say that our party, like your party, knew what the situation was when the meeting of the parties was held in Moscow back in 1960; we knew that we would be in the minority there, and yet, despite that, we went to this meeting (both of our parties), we spoke there and fought together, alongside many other parties.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The same has happened in Bucharest [at the RWP Congress in June 1960] too.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: There we were in an even smaller minority.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We were attacked openly there and we were not prepared for it.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We consider the words and the advice that you have given us here, Comrade Mao Zedong, to be extremely valuable.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I would like to invite you to have dinner tonight. Are all the Albanian comrades here?

Comrade Hysni Kapo: We thank you very much. We told

you that we have had extremely good impressions from the talks with your delegation, [see Documents #11 and #12] but allow me to bring up only one issue, because for what I would like to talk about we are kind of worried. I am talking about our economic problems that we recently discussed at the last meeting with the Chinese leadership comrades in Beijing. We expressed our points of view on this issue to the comrades in Beijing, so I do not want to go at length; I only want to ask you whether the issue that was presented to us could be revisited one more time, because if what we were offered happens, difficult conditions will be created for us. Of course, we will fight to withstand and overcome them, but given the situation that our country is facing, I think that these issues should be revisited once more.

We understand your situation, on which we were briefed by the comrades in Beijing. We saw everything here; you placed your hearts in our hands. We saw a friendly atmosphere with all the comrades with whom we conversed. But the economic issues preoccupy us very much. This is all I wanted to say to you.

You should be convinced that our party, as always, will fight for unity and for the ever deeper embedment of an ever greater love for the Chinese people and your party. These are two things that we will continually strengthen in our communists and people. Our comrades in Tirana impatiently wait to be informed on the exchange of thoughts that we have had with you and will carefully listen to all we will inform them on.

We told Comrade Deng Xiaoping, as well as Comrade Liu Shaoqi, on behalf of the CC of our party that whenever you see it suitable, we await the arrival of a delegation of the CCP to Albania and assure you that it will be received with great joy by our people and party.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Very well, it is a good thing.

On the economic issue that you mentioned, Comrade Hysni Kapo, I am not informed in detail, because I have yet to read all the material. When I return to Beijing, I will speak with the comrades about it.

Comrade Hysni Kapo: What I have told you, Comrade Mao Zedong, we have also told to the comrades in Beijing; they listened very attentively to us. But we just wanted to say it to you as well.

(After the talks Comrade Mao Zedong posed for a picture with the comrades of the delegation of the ALP and then invited them to have dinner with him. The dinner was had in a very warm atmosphere.)

(Recorded by stenograph)

+
+ +

During the dinner the friendly conversation of Comrade Mao Zedong with the comrades of our delegation continued.

Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that we must show vigilance against the revisionists, because they are able to prepare surprises. He said that, “for us N. Khrushchev’s raising of the issue of the personality cult of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress came as a surprise. He had read a report on the struggle against the ‘cult of personality,’ on the basis of which a very short resolution was adopted on the issue. This all happened after the daily agenda of the congress had finished, and after the new Central Committee of the CPSU and N. Khrushchev as a new first secretary had been elected. Only later did he inform the delegations of the sister parties. The delegation of the CCP was informed by N. Khrushchev himself. He tried to convince us of the ‘grave damages’ that Stalin had made. They call it a ‘provocation’ that in China Stalin’s portrait is hung on walls. Yes, in our country, in Tiananmen Square, twice a year, on 1 May and on 1 October, Stalin’s portrait is hung, alongside the portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Neither of those four is alive, but the people want them there. If we do not hang the portrait of Stalin, the people will admonish us.”

Comrade Hysni Kapo added that “it is the same in Albania too. You were right earlier, Comrade Mao Zedong, when you said that both our parties and our people are like a single brain; they have a single heart.”

Comrade Mao Zedong then said that “there are also many bourgeois elements that are not in agreement with the accusations that N. Khrushchev makes against Stalin, they do not believe them. They say that they are not convinced that, for example, Stalin was a coward during the World War II, as N. Khrushchev is propagandizing. Furthermore, the removal of his body from the mausoleum and its cremation was not well received by the people.”

Comrade Hysni Kapo and Comrade Ramiz Alia added that this had never been seen in history. “The monuments of the tsars of Russia, from Ivan the Terrible to Peter I and others, who have done a thousand and one evils to the people, have not been removed, while the monuments, and even the body of Stalin, were liquidated.”

Comrade Mao Zedong then said that during a meeting that he had had some time ago with Comrade Abdyl Kellezi, he had asked him, “is the grass growing in your mountains in Albania after N. Khrushchev spoke badly of you? Comrade Abdyl Kellezi answered that it was growing well. I told him that ours in China was also growing just fine, too. The thing is that some people, especially in the small countries, are very afraid of N. Khrushchev and his group. Some are afraid that division might

follow, because in their parties there are also elements that are for the line of N. Khrushchev. For example, the comrades of the CP of Indonesia are afraid that N. Khrushchev might unleash the reactionaries against them. Ho Chi Minh is afraid that, if N. Khrushchev expelled Albania today, he may tomorrow expel Vietnam too. In a meeting that Ho Chi Minh had with me, I asked him, why are you afraid? In our country, in China, the grass is growing just fine even though N. Khrushchev is attacking and fighting us. If you do not believe this, go have a stroll around our mountains and see with your own eyes. I told him that he should not be afraid, because whatever happens, the grass will grow just fine in Vietnam too.”

Amongst other things, Comrade Mao Zedong said that the former Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union did not return from Moscow; he had stayed there. “We also have a few elements in our country that support the line of N. Khrushchev; the rightist elements ... [a few unintelligible words] ... Pen De Huai in the party.”

“We also have maybe two or three people in our party too,” added Comrade Hysni Kapo.

“I know,” said Comrade Mao Zedong, “you had Liri Belishova. She has also been here in China.”¹

Comrade Hysni Kapo took the floor once again, saying, “We had noticed something and have followed her activities very closely. During her [June 1960] trip to China, she secretly went to the Central Committee of the CPSU. During her return from China she, keeping this a secret from Comrade Haxhi Lleshi, went and met with [Frol] Kozlov. It seems that she received new instructions, but they were useless because the Meeting of Bucharest had already happened.”

Comrade Hysni Kapo also pointed out that, “The Soviet leadership tried to hold in the Soviet Union our students that were there for studies until before the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.” Comrade Ramiz Alia added that, “Despite the great attempts by N. Khrushchev’s people to attract our students using girls and promises, or by threatening them with their security organs, they only succeeded in keeping three or four people out of 1,500 students that we had sent to the Soviet Union. This was the result of all their attempts.”

“This,” Comrade Mao Zedong said, “is a victory of yours.”

Comrade Hysni Kapo pointed out, “In the struggle against the revisionist group of N. Khrushchev the unity of our people around the party has been strengthened like never before. This is perfectly shown by the glorious results of the elections for the People’s Assembly; only 37 people in all of Albania voted against it. Such a unity had never been seen in our country. The mobilization of the working masses is also at a high level. In fact, even many of the nationalists, which were not on our side,

have been swept by a patriotic feeling and are now in support of our party and power.”

“In China, too,” added Comrade Mao Zedong, “a good part of the nationalist bourgeoisie supports our party.”

Comrade Mao Zedong said, amongst other things, that “The delegation of the CCP at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, had seen [former USSR Premier Nikolai] Bulganin there, who was a delegate. He did not have a car; he was walking.”

Comrade Hysni Kapo told how, “During the days of the Moscow meeting of 1960, the delegation of our party had had some meetings with the Soviet leadership, who were trying to compel our delegation not to speak at the Moscow meeting. Kozlov, Mikoyan, Suslov, Pospelov, etc. came to the headquarters of our delegation then. They said that they were ready to give anything to Albania, including wheat, machinery, credit, etc., leaving no doubt that in return they expected the delegation of our party to keep their mouths shut at the meeting. Comrade Enver Hoxha answered them that we do not sell our principles, neither for wheat nor for credit.”

“Then,” Comrade Hysni Kapo continued, “a meeting was held with N. Khrushchev [on 12 November 1960, see *Hoxha vs. Khrushchev*, p. 190]. He tried to convince us that Stalin had committed errors and great crimes. He pulled out a letter and said, ‘Please read what Bulganin writes on the matter of the errors of Stalin.’ Then he added, ‘I get thousands of such letters.’ Comrade Enver Hoxha answered that we do not need to read a letter from Bulganin to get to know Joseph Stalin. The conversation turned sour at this meeting and N. Khrushchev, talking to Comrade Enver Hoxha, said, ‘I can better get along with [British Prime Minister Harold] MacMillan than I can with you.’ Comrade Enver Hoxha then answered to him, ‘We have no doubt that you can better get along with MacMillan than you can with us.’”

Here Comrade Mao Zedong cut in and said, “Perhaps he does not get along so easily with MacMillan.”

During the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong, amongst other things, pointed out that there is a phenomenon that is often visible: “In periods of revolution, the leftist deviations are more apparent, while in peaceful period, the rightist deviations are more prevalent. For example, in China, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai came out with their rightist opportunist points of view exactly during peaceful periods. This shows that revisionism is not a phenomenon of chance.”

Comrade Ramiz Alia added that, “at the present time, the revisionist tendencies are more popular in the developed countries (for example, Italy or elsewhere). So revisionism has its own social base.”

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that, “[Italian Communist leader Palmiro] Togliatti and his friends are now predicating the theory of the ‘structural reforms.’ This is an entirely opportunistic theory, because these ‘structural reforms’ do not touch in the least the economic base of the capitalist system, while not touching the most important part of the superstructure at all. They think that they will take the reigns of power in their hands using a parliamentary course, without a revolution.”

Comrade Mao Zedong then asked how many kilometers of coastline Albania had and after receiving an answer, he said that Albania had great conditions for better links with the outside world. He said that during the Long March of the Chinese Red Army, the Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in one of the revolutionary bases. The base was surrounded on all sides by the Jiang Jieshi armies. Despite this, the delegates to the congress were able to break the encirclement and come to the congress from all the various regions of China.

Comrade Hysni Kapo and Comrade Ramiz Alia emphasized that, “the economic blockade that N. Khrushchev tried to establish around the People’s Republic of Albania failed and will fail. One of the intentions of N. Khrushchev was not to allow Albania to get closer to its friend, China. For this reason, the Soviet side also eliminated the Moscow-Tirana air route. But N. Khrushchev, who speaks so much about technology, underestimated [Albania’s] capabilities: we found our way to the People’s Republic of China, whether by ship, or by another air route. No matter how much N. Khrushchev might try, he cannot separate our two parties and people.”

+
+ +

These were the main points of the conversation that was held between Comrade Mao Zedong and the delegation of our party during the dinner. Toasts were also raised. Comrade Mao Zedong proposed a toast to the Albanian Labor Party, to Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu, to the unbreakable friendship between our two parties and people, to the victory of Marxism—Leninism. Comrade Hysni Kapo also proposed the pertinent toasts.

1. *Editor’s Note:* An Albanian economic delegation led by Council of Ministers Vice Chairman Abdyl Kellezi, arrived in Beijing on 22 December 1961.

2. *Editor’s Note:* Liri Belishova visited China in June 1960 as part of a delegation headed by Haxhi Lleshi. During the visit she made several pro-Soviet statements, and was purged soon afterwards.



DOCUMENT No. 14

Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Zhou Enlai and Party and State Leaders of the PRA, 27-29 March 1965

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1965, D. 4. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
General Branch

On 27-29 March 1965, talks were held between Comrade Zhou Enlai, chairman of the PRC State Council and vice-chairman of the CCP CC and party and state leaders of the PRA, at the Palace of the Prime Minister.

From the Albanian side there were present the comrades: Enver Hoxha, ALP CC first secretary; Mehmet Shehu, Ministerial Council chairman and ALP CC Politburo member; Adil Carcani, minister of mining and geology and ALP CC Politburo member; Beqir Balluku, Ministerial Council first vice chairman, minister of People’s Defense and ALP CC Politburo member; Gogo Nushi, ALP CC Politburo member and president of the Central Council of the Professional Unions of Albania; Haki Toska, ALP CC Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee; Hysni Kapo, ALP CC Politburo member and Central Committee secretary; Manush Myftiu, Ministerial Council first vice chairman, Minister of Learning and Culture and ALP CC Politburo member; Ramiz Alia, ALP CC Politburo member and Central Committee secretary; Rita Marko, ALP CC Politburo member and Central Committee secretary; Spiro Koleka, Ministerial Council first vice chairman and ALP CC Politburo member; Koco Theodhosi, Ministerial Council vice chairman, State Planning Commission president and candidate to the ALP CC Politburo; Abdyl Kellezi, vice chairman of the Ministerial Council and member of the ALP CC; Behar Shtylla, minister of foreign affairs and ALP CC member; and Nesti Nase, Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary to the PRC and candidate to the ALP CC.

From the Chinese side there were present the comrades: Zhou Enlai, PRC State Council chairman and CCP CC vice chairman; General Xie Fuzhi, State Council vice-chairman and CCP CC member; Zhang Hanfu, vice-minister of foreign affairs and CCP CC candidate; Zhao Yimin, CCP CC candidate and vice director to the directorate to the CCP CC; Zhou Jien Guo, PRC ambassador plenipotentiary and extraordinary to the PRA; Li Xiannian, State Council general vice chairman.

THE FIRST MEETING

The talks of the first meeting started at 4:30 p.m., 27 March 1965

After the participants took their places, the ALP CC, first secretary Comrade Enver Hoxha, asked Comrade Zhou Enlai to continue first with the proceedings following the meeting agenda as is the custom in such events.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Ok. You may start.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: (Jokingly). Very well, I will start talking and you can chair the meeting.

Dear Comrade Zhou Enlai.

Dear Comrades of the Chinese delegation.

Your visit here has brought great and indescribable joy in our hearts. May such joyous occasions become a tradition and may they return every year. Our party and people are celebrating because for the second time they find you, Comrade Zhou Enlai, amongst them, a dear and faithful friend of our party and people. Having you amongst us is like having the Great China, the Central Committee of the glorious CCP, the government of the PRC and the dearest Comrade Mao nearby. For this glorious leader and great Marxist-Leninist our party and people have boundless love and great respect.

But we do not just have these deep Marxist-Leninist feelings today that you are here with us. These feelings exist everyday. Our party and people have connected these feelings with their best feelings. They have connected them with their life, their struggle, their victories, their merriment and their sorrow. Albania and China, tightly bound together for life on an eternal friendship live, fight, win and progress together, joined as one in a unity that no force able to damage will ever exist.

We see everyday the fast-paced, successful development of your great country, the far-seeing, wise, heroic and Marxist-Leninist policies, both internal and external, of your party and state. We see your heroic, unbending, Marxist-Leninist struggle against world imperialism, especially American imperialism, and against modern revisionism, especially Khrushchevian revisionism. This just course and politics inspire, help and strengthen us enormously.

The visit of Comrade Beqir to Beijing and the fruitful talks he had with Comrade Mao, with you and with all the other leader comrades there, have been for us not only a great pleasure, but also helpful in further strengthening our friendship. We drew conclusions and lessons from your brother-like attitude, your warm welcome and Comrade Mao's exalted conversations. We were extremely happy when Comrade Beqir talked at length about the great enthusiasm and colossal power of the Chinese people, its steely unity around the party and its

resoluteness. Your continuous economic progress and achievements made us very happy. Our ambassador comrade in Beijing speaks enthusiastically and admiringly about the love that you and the Chinese people have for our people. In his reports he talks about your just economic policy's successes. He talks about how you overcome your difficulties and he does this because the Chinese comrades and especially you help him with frequent meetings and valuable talks and advice.

All our delegations that return from China come back with great passion for everything they saw there, especially and above all for the warm and sincere love that the Chinese people have for the Albanian people. All this not only makes us live by and follow closely your people and party's vigorous life and struggle, not only does it make us happier and stronger, but we also draw lessons from it and are inspired to work better, to overcome difficulties and to score even higher victories.

The colossal weight of Great China, its just strategy, the glorious, consequential, unwavering, Marxist-Leninist line of the CCP, led by Comrade Mao Zedong have become in the international arena, the international communist movement and to the National Liberation struggle of the peoples of the world the main factor of success, a beacon of light, the great catalyst of progress, of peace, of the struggle for liberation and the crusade for the chastity of Marxism-Leninism and the triumph of the world revolution, to socialism and communism.

The peoples of the world, in their struggle toward enlightenment, have the PRC as a faithful friend, defender, and great warrior. The Marxist-Leninists of the entire world can lean on the CCP and Comrade Mao Zedong with complete trust, and around them, [can] unite [with] their power in that exalted common cause for the defense and triumph of Marxism-Leninism, of socialism and communism, against modern revisionism and against whatever enemy, open or hidden. American imperialism, the modern revisionists, and the reactionaries of the entire world are right when they see in China their resolute and unbreakable enemy which, together with the other peoples of the world, sooner or later, will open their eternal graves.

This is our great fortune and certainty for our victory. Important events happen in the world, complex problems face the peoples, wars of all kinds and intensity are being fought, alliances are built and broken, leaders are brought down and others take their place, intrigues are woven and unwoven by the imperialist enemies and their allies, the revisionists and reactionaries of the whole world, but above all this we see that the just cause of the people, shone upon by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine moves forward, and, like a steam-roller, compresses underneath without mercy the old world that is rotting and breathing its last breath, and all the while, the new [world] is born and gets stronger.

In this great war Mao's China stands as a rock, as a ban-

ner. Our party and heroic people are honored to fight alongside the fraternal people of China. It is their honor and their duty to give their small and modest contribution in this colossal struggle where China carries on her shoulders an enormous, but glorious, weight. The PRA and our party will, to the death, remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and their loyal friend, China and her party. We will always stand together and will always become stronger in our shared struggle.

Your visit here and the exchange of opinions we are about to start—of which I have no doubt will be identical and in complete Marxist-Leninist unity—will help us become stronger in our multi-faceted struggle.

Allow me to express some opinions of ours:

One of the main preoccupations of our leadership, since your visit to Albania last year, has been the continuation of work and the realization of the blueprints of our 4th five-year plan. It has been one of the main preoccupations because we wanted to make sure that this plan was following as realistically as possible the party line, was supported by our previous successes, was realistically and rationally exploiting our internal capabilities. We also wanted to make sure that we were ready on schedule, as we agreed in January of last year when we laid down our needs for your help.

We tried, through the letter we sent you, to make the general course of action and orientation of our upcoming five-year plan as clear as possible, but we are not sure whether we accomplished this satisfactorily. Now, some specialist comrades of ours are in China checking on problems, clarifying and discussing matters in a spirit of exemplary understanding, in a spirit of sincere and warm friendship, and in a spirit of sincere and healthy Marxist-Leninist cooperation with their Chinese counterparts which is always dominant in our relations.

When, after our comrades and you in Beijing have discussed all matters and you find an appropriate moment, our delegation, led by Comrade Spiro Koleka, is ready to come to China to solve that very vital matter for our country, the upcoming five-year plan. But, aside from Comrade Spiro Koleka's visit, good fortune has walked into our very homes, as a proverb of our people says. I am talking about your visit here, which we consider a great victory for Albania in any way you look at it, and especially for the chance to have preliminary talks on our economic issues.

Your visit here last year [in January 1964], Comrade Zhou Enlai, was not only one of the most important historical events for our country and for our very close, very sincere, Marxist-Leninist relations between our peoples, parties and governments; did not only help enormously to strengthen the moral and political situation in our country, both internally and externally; but the talks we had on all issues, especially on the econ-

omy, helped us immeasurably.

The exchange of opinions on the short-term development of our economy that we had last year, though [only] along general lines, demonstrated the unity of our view on the economic development of our country. We were extraordinary happy to have received from you Great China's competent experience in these key sectors and especially in the development of the socialist economy. The talks we have had with you have helped us immensely in setting down our great economic tasks, in correctly and concretely developing the various economic sectors and in precisely synchronizing capital investments, things that have a direct importance for the short- and long-term development of our socialist economy. You were right in advising us to rely mainly on our internal assets. This has always been and will always remain our opinion as well. This common, just and Marxist-Leninist approach has and will always lead us in our work. You were right in advising us to place the highest importance on the development of agriculture in the blueprints of the upcoming five-year plan as the basic sector of our socialist economy. This was also our opinion of the matter and it coincided perfectly with yours, and we have been led by it in our work for the realization of this basic and colossal task for our economy as the plan requires.

We warmly thank you for the outlook and inspiration you instilled in us for the further development of our industry, as the leading and determinative sector of the socialist economy and for the fact that you would never hesitate to help and advise us in the exploitation of our internal mineral resources and in as good and rational processing of these resources as possible. You were particularly interested in the further in-country development and refinement of the iron-nickel and iron-chrome minerals, the further development of the production of electrical energy so closely linked to them, and in the better refinement of petrol.

This encouragement and correct orientation, which coincided with ours, has led us in very carefully compiling the tasks we have set in our planning. If we are able to fulfill these tasks so very vital for our economy—and we are fully confident that we will accomplish this with our own internal forces, helped and accompanied by you—it will be a second liberation for Albania.

It is clear to us that without your generous help in these matters, we would not be able to accomplish this great task so very vital to our economy. We are very mindful and at the same time very grateful to the great China, this sister and ally that sacrifices so much for us helping us so generously not only with the development of our economy, but also in the military and defensive areas of our country and in the sectors of agitation and culture, not to mention here the great political support she gives to the PRA in the international arena.

We are mindful that along the colossal tasks of internal and international character that the PRC faces and considers vital to her interests, such as steering, helping and changing the worldwide course of events in the favor of Marxism-Leninism, world peace, socialism and communism, our requests to you are a burden and a further great sacrifice for you. Nonetheless, recognizing that you understand fully our strong feelings on this matter, let us assure you that our desire for the further development of our socialist economy on a just and rational course, has no egotistical character. In other words, it is not led by narrow, nationalistic interests. On the contrary, our desire for development is in its essence strongly international. Socialist Albania's just and harmonious economic development in today's Europe seething with capitalist systems and degenerated by modern revisionism, seems to us to take a distinctive importance as a small socialist state role-model, as a drop of water in the capitalist-revisionist European ocean, that not only resists these exploiting and enslaving systems, but triumphs over them. Furthermore, this correct development of our country serves as a great example of the support, brotherhood, and internationalist cooperation of the great China, led by the glorious CCP, with our dearest Comrade Mao Zedong at its helm. You understand just as well and correctly as we do that Albania's small power has no real importance in the total material potential of the world, but she has done and will forever do, until our final and complete victory, her duty as a socialist state and all her powers and capabilities will be totally committed to that sacred struggle for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, socialism and communism, to the unbending struggle against world imperialism, especially American imperialism, and against modern revisionism, especially Soviet revisionism.

The development of our socialist economy and the direction of our upcoming five-year plan take into account the entire current political and ideological situation, the international circumstances, and the expected and unexpected problems that may arise and will certainly arise due to them. During this struggle we, while fighting, are also preparing for future battles.

Our upcoming five-year plan, in these times of armed "peace" and wars, is also a preparation for battle. We think and have full faith that you also think this way. We think, and are also very certain you will agree, that in these turbulent times, in this relative "calmness," there is an urgent need, or better put, an imperative need for the small PRA, so far geographically from her great sister and powerful ally, the PRC, to increase the pace of strengthening her defenses and the right construction of the socialist economy, especially in its most vital sectors, and to be ready to face all and any unexpected events so that she may fight even if surrounded.

We are conscious that our upcoming five-year plan, while being very concrete and realistically achievable, is at the same time very dense with tasks and will certainly require from the

people and the party a total mobilization of effort and great sacrifices. We are ready to accomplish this and will do so.

So we are asking you, the CCP CC, and Comrade Mao to understand the reasoning behind our requests to you, which we consider as of great help to us and as a great sacrifice on your part, especially considering your great tasks and undertakings, within your country and in the international arena.

As you well know, dear Comrade Zhou Enlai, our iron-nickel reserves with their known industrial potential and high quality of metal components, are one of the most important natural resources for our economy. Our country's iron and steel needs, as you well know, are high and constantly growing. All the processed iron and steel we use is imported and it uses up too much of the clearing available to us. And what is of more importance, we are at the mercy of Polish and Czech revisionists who constantly fail to fulfill our needs and their obligations, constantly fail to fulfill the required amounts or quality of material and could at any aggravated situation cut off all supplies and blockade us. The Soviet revisionists already acted like this. The Czech revisionists in particular have shown their anti-Marxist, capitalist, mercantilist and colonialist spirit before in dealings with us. You know that we have had to fight a protracted and unfair battle with the Czechs over the matter of our iron-nickel minerals since long before the decay of our relations with them. All the conditions required that the iron-nickel processing factory be built in our country, rather than in Czechoslovakia since the raw materials would come from our resources. We fought hard for this, but our legitimate interests were trampled upon. The Czechs built the factory in their own country and we were forced to comply and give them the raw materials for it. Within these capitalist-colonialist relations we, against our will, were forced to sell our iron nickel as raw material to them and only to them because we could not find any other market and because we were using the proceeds as clearing with them. And during this whole time, the Czechs have not only been able to start utilizing the factory using our raw materials, but have been able to gather iron nickel reserves from us for the next two-three years. So, every year, they exert constant pressure on many issues: either by refusing to get the determined amount of minerals, or by trying to reduce the buying price for them or by refusing to deliver the required amount of steel, or trucks, etc. Now, with your help, we have entered the right road toward the solving of this very vital problem for our economy. We have started the construction of our metallurgical operations in the area of Elbasan and it is proceeding successfully. The Chinese comrades have finished or are in the process of finishing the analysis of our mineral deposits so that a factory for the processing of 100 thousand tons of iron-nickel mineral may be built in Elbasan. We propose and ask you to accept our idea that in the blueprints for the new five-year plan, alongside the 100 thousand tons project already included, you help us to raise the smelting limits to 300 thousand tons and phase the construction time for this addition until 1972-73, in other words

until the second or third year of the 5th five-year plan. For all the reasons I mentioned earlier, we believe that such a thing is necessary for our life, for ensuring the concrete and real development of our economy and the strengthening of the PRA. We have every confidence that you will agree with us.

The matter of the iron-chrome factory is of high importance to us due to the high significance of this mineral for our economy. This factory will help raise the value of our chromium and, as a result, the value of our barter credits. We must continue to make great efforts toward this goal. Our specialists think that such a factory is profitable and that its construction is absorbable in a short time. In order to extract and enrich our chromium we must study from your experience not only the modern processes of such a factory, but also the exportation issues. We think that you will need a considerable amount of it. Then we could easily find a market for the remaining product.

As to the matter of energy production through hydro-power stations, we were encouraged by the prospects you opened for us when you visited here last year. Your perspective on this matter fits perfectly with ours. Our specialists in this area were greatly encouraged when we notified them of this fact. You sent us a group of distinguished Chinese comrade energy specialists, and they cooperated competently and like brothers with our specialists. The latter then went to China with the results of this cooperation in hand, discussed matters with your best and most competent people, took your valuable experience on these matters and, upon returning from China, reported to us on the work and the fruitful results they had achieved. We consider this a great success and the foundation of our most fruitful cooperation. Now, based on these preliminary studies on our vital needs for electrical energy and by relying on our internal strengths and your many-sided help we have added the building of a hydropower plant in Vau i Dejës to the blueprints for the five-year plan. Now, our comrades there are carefully studying and discussing the implementation of this great duty for our country. We could concentrate our specialist forces in designing, etc. but we must accept and openly say to you that in many areas we would not be able to achieve success in this project without the many-sided help of Chinese specialist comrades. We ask you to please understand our strengths. We will have total mobilization. This will be a colossal school for our cadres in the matters of designing such a grand project, but your help, we think, is indispensable.

Further on the matter of energy, the issue of the construction of the hydropower station in Fierza is also of imperative importance to us. Its construction is slated to be completed towards the end of the upcoming five-year plan and the beginning of the next. It is, however, important that the studies and designs for this project be undertaken at the same time with the design of the Vau i Dejës hydropower plant.

If we have been able through the letter we sent to make

clear more or less what the general points of the blueprints for our upcoming five-year plan are, you will have seen that we have placed high importance on the utilization of our petrol resources, the widening of operations for extraction using the newly acquired reserves information, and on the further processing of our petrol for the various and always expanding needs of our economy. Along with this, we have also asked for you to help us with the designing of an addition to the nitrogen fertilizer plant, the construction of which will be phased to finish in the 5th five-year plan. This addition will be a powerful foundation for the further strengthening of our agriculture and the exportation of part of the product to China or elsewhere.

In the designing of the blueprints for our 4th five-year plan we have been led, first of all, by the objective of developing our agriculture further and achieving this successfully without obstacles and reaching our fullest potential possible within the projected five-year plan. As you may have already determined, we have placed difficult tasks before ourselves. But we will take big leaps in this direction, big leaps that are possible and workable with a total mobilization by the people, the party and the state who will be successful with their patriotic and revolutionary spirit.

We have exercised all care possible [to ensure] that the financial and material issues and our workforce, both specialized and menial, are balanced so that they will not be an overbearing burden on the development of our economy, so that these projects do not turn into a back-breaking load which could damage our economy and slow the increase of the livelihood standards of the people. Naturally, we mean that we do not want this to happen to a large degree. We modestly understand and accept that sacrifices will need to be made for the construction of socialism, the defense of the fatherland, and the contribution we must give in our common struggle.

We think that by very carefully studying the matter of the workforce required for the construction and utilization of the industrial works we are planning, we have achieved good and concrete results in maximally avoiding the movement of workers from villages, from agriculture. At present, the party measures and state regulations we have put in place have not only given us a good experience in dealing with such issues, but have achieved pleasing results. We are now able to control satisfactorily the movement of the workforce from the rural to the urban areas. We have been able to move many city folks to rural areas, together with their families, and brought into the cities those people and the numbers the economy needs. We will continually temper and strengthen this very important and stabilizing factor for the economy ahead of the grand tasks we have for the future.

Naturally, we would very much desire and gladly wait for your remarks, critique and suggestions because they will be of great importance to our leadership, as well as yours, and

will better equip our delegation about to come to Beijing and the comrades Spiro Koleka and Koco Theodhosi who will be accompanying it there. Our leadership's thoughts and opinions, which these comrades will bring with them to present to your party and state leadership for a final discussion, will be better processed.

I would also like, Comrade Zhou Enlai, to bring you briefly up to date on our economy's achievements during the past year.

The achievements of 1964 have been reached with great patriotic zeal, a revolutionary leap and total mobilization by our party and people. These achievements can be called satisfactory, and the weather conditions were favorable to us. The objectives for the yearly industrial production were surpassed at 100.7% and industrial production grew by 7.4% over that of 1963. Objectives were met in almost all fields of the industry.

Total agricultural production for the year 1964 was greater than that of 1963. We produced more grains, industrial plants, vegetables, milk, etc. than the year before, while for tobacco, cotton, and olive production we fell below the levels reached during 1963. As to animal husbandry, we now have more of all the types of animals than in the year before.

The objectives for the circulation of rare goods were surpassed by 10% or 5.7% more than in 1963. This shows an increase in our people's buying power and an increase in living standards. Modest increases, to be sure, but on the rise nonetheless.

We held a special plenum meeting of our Central Committee about the tasks of this year's objectives. The tasks we have undertaken for this year are great. The total industrial production will be 4.7% higher than last year's, while this year's total agricultural production is forecast to be 5% greater than last year's. In these objectives the field plants are forecasted to be at 5.9% higher, fruit production at 2% higher, animal husbandry at 4.4% higher and forestry and medicinal plants at 6.6% higher than last year's. In the production of field plants we are placing the highest importance on the production of grains which will be at 8.7% higher than last year's production.

Our objectives for next year's planning are the same in other sectors of the economy as well. But our main forces will be particularly mobilized and placed in our agriculture and in finishing the construction and starting the utilization of the industrial objects we are completing with your help within the deadlines. We think we will achieve great success in our objectives, especially in these two very important sectors, because of our total mobilization. From the industrial works we are constructing with the help of the PRC, the 1965 planning foresees the completion of sixteen of them and the start of utilization for them by the beginning of the next year.

This year we had a particularly harsh winter. There has been

a lot of snow, not only in the mountains where it usually falls every year, but also in the field areas of the seashore. While we could not say that the snow is particularly bad for our agriculture, this year it did cause serious damage to animal farming. We had up to 100 thousand small animal deaths due to lack of sufficient feed and milk and miscarriages due to very cold conditions. Despite the state aid to affected areas, the cold took us by surprise, especially in the lowlands. Nonetheless, we will take the appropriate measures to overcome this problem. For agriculture, especially for spring sowing, the weather conditions are good. Everyone—people, tractors, work animals—is in the fields working the land and planting. We hope that with our total mobilization we will be successful once again this year and will go to Congress to appear before the people with satisfactory results.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Comrade Enver, When do you plan to hold your party's congress?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We are thinking of organizing it towards the end of this year or the beginning of the next.

The unity of our party, the party-people unity, the friendship and the steely unity with our sister, the great China, are stronger than ever and are getting stronger and more tempered every day in our revolutionary struggle. The situation at our borders is quiet, be it in our north, east, west or south. The enemies that surround us, seeing our resoluteness, are not provoking us at the moment. But we are teaching our people, army, border guards and, above all, our party to be vigilant and always vigilant. No "lull" should cause them to fall asleep for one moment. They should always be awake and on guard, because, as our people say, "A river may sleep, but an enemy never does."

We have placed particular attention on the elevation of military preparation of our armed forces so that they are sufficiently ready for the defense of our country. The military technical experience received from the PRC is being utilized and adopted by our military. In addition, as required by the armament plan, we have stabilized the organizational structure and the wartime mobilization plans, we are continuing the work for the operational preparedness of terrain, and we have finished organizing the arming of the country's popular police.

Your coming here, dear Comrade Zhou Enlai, will strengthen even more our political situation, both internally and externally, and our economic situation. With the generous and internationalist help that we receive from the PRC, the people's trust and zeal will increase even more than before, because they, as always, will feel very close to them the great and steely heart of China, beating nearby and united to the end, in good times and in bad, with the steely heart of the Albanian people.

HOW WE SEE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,

THE LESSONS WE SHOULD DRAW, AND THE MEASURES WE SHOULD TAKE IN RELATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION.

We think that the CCP and the Chinese government, the ALP and the Albanian government were not caught off-guard by the latest international developments. In general, they have been able to foresee them precisely, and, acting in a revolutionary way, have known how to influence these situations and leave their emphatic, revolutionary marks on them. They have succeeded in drawing multiple benefits for the strengthening of the socialist and communist cause, of wholesome world peace and of the liberation struggle of the peoples of the world. At the same time, the continuing, consistent, unrelenting Marxist-Leninist struggle of our parties has credibly unmasked in the eyes of the people and communists of the world the aggressive and warmongering nature and activities of world imperialism led by the Americans, and the great betrayal of the modern revisionists led by the Soviets.

We think that the defining characteristic of this period is the cooperation between American imperialism and the modern revisionists—led by the Soviet revisionists. They are cooperating more openly each and every day. American imperialism has found in the Khrushchevian revisionists the allies and the friends it needs to successfully put into practice its world policy and strategy—to wage war and destroy the socialist camp and communism in general, to redraw the areas of influence in the world, and to create a new system of colonialism dominated by the two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

These two world superpowers, having the same common objective of war against true socialism, are at the same time trying to protect and strengthen their supremacy over one another, to tighten the group of friends around each of them, to try and wrestle each other's friends from their respective groups, to strengthen their own groups and then in alliance to attack the true socialist countries, especially the great socialist force, China, and at the same time the other socialist countries, Albania, Korea, and North Vietnam.

The American-Soviet alliance that is developing and materializing every day—naturally not without pains and difficulties—is in the international arena a great danger for the fate of the world and a grand target against which we should direct our greatest efforts. This alliance is growing in all directions and spheres, political, ideological, economical and cultural. It has been accepted and recorded in official records in many ways, treaties, agreements and contracts. It is ideologically coordinated from both sides and is at war with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In all these spheres and directions we will see an increase in the mutual agreements, cooperation and coordination between these two world powers, until they reach sensational military treaties, mutual defense and stabilization

of their political-military alliances.

Naturally, the tendency of these two superpowers that want to dominate the world by squashing socialism, freedom and the independence of nations is to have a few differences as well. The US acts with fire and steel, using nuclear blackmail and any other form of pressure it can think of—from military to corruption. While the Soviet revisionists, kneeling before the American pressure and blackmail and not opposing their aggressive moves—except in words—are at the moment using all means and methods, save open aggressive warfare, to create their area of influence and to establish their dominance over the people of the world. Through their confrontation with socialism and our countries in particular and through [counter-]balancing the dominant power of the USA, they think they will accomplish their evil plans at the same time.

We think that the Soviet revisionists with their course of peaceful coexistence cannot think they could avoid war forever, but intend to gain time to fight socialism and our countries and to strengthen their position in the world as we mentioned before. It is understandable that the Soviet revisionists are playing with fire. Allowing the Americans to act with impunity, using fire and steel against the peoples who are fighting for liberation and defense, the Soviets seek to allow them to become weaker economically, militarily and politically. On the other side of the coin, they use all methods available to them to undermine, corrupt, degenerate, dominate and enslave them. Both these brigands constantly look for a way to use the other to do their dirty work. But naturally, the intentions and events they want do not and cannot develop as they wish. Other colossal forces are at work in the world. These forces are the forces of socialism and the peoples of the world who are destroying the plans of the imperialist-revisionists and are giving great and successive defeats to them.

The building of this new American-Soviet alliance cannot make the “law of the jungle” disappear. On the contrary, it makes it more real everyday. And this is happening not only between these two imperialist-revisionist superpowers, one, the USA having become one long ago, and the other, the Soviet Union becoming one at a fast pace everyday, but also between other capitalist states and the countries where the modern revisionists are in power, such as the socialist countries of Europe who are degenerating at a constant pace into capitalist countries. The degeneration of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of Europe brought about the establishment of the “law of the jungle” among them, and, all together or one by one, they are circling around in the international arena, like a hungry pack of wolves, alongside the other imperialist wolves.

We are currently spectators of such phenomena as the decomposition of the old imperialist alliances between them, the waning of the Soviet influence over the socialist countries

and the fissures and weakening of the alliances between them. In other words, both groups, the imperialists and the revisionists, have declined and are plagued by insuperable contradictions and disagreements within themselves and by numerous and insurmountable conflict and contradictions on the outside, each group against the other.

These insuperable contradictions are readily evident in all their activities. They can be seen in the actions of NATO, the UN, the European Common Market, the Union of Europe, in the involvement in Vietnam, Laos and Congo, in the German issue, the Treaty of Warsaw, in the 1 March meeting in Moscow [of 19 communist parties], in the Council of Mutual Economic Aid, in the relations between the European people's democracies and the still- dominant Soviet power.

This is a very complex group of issues, but it is our duty to navigate through this forest, follow the right course, to come up with the correct conclusions and build our strategy and tactics for the struggle against imperialism and revisionism based on our infallible science.

We may say that in general the international situation we are facing is favorable to the forces of socialism and the peoples of the world. Imperialism in general and the American one in particular are in the process of decomposition, of decadence, of downfall. It is losing its terrain and is being unmasked from all directions in everything it does. Modern revisionism, and Khrushchevian revisionism in particular, greatly damage our exalted cause by creating a crisis at the heart of the socialist camp and the international communism. But knowing this fact, we may say that the unmasking, the disclosure, and the stern struggle that we [are waging] and will continue to shell out to this scourge in our midst is causing it to lose terrain and power.

The deepening of the contradictions that continues to grow in the midst of the imperialist powers is greatly weakening the main adversary we face. These contradictions within the imperialist nations have existed and will exist forever. They are eating them from the inside and weakening them, though at the moment while aggravated, they have also reached great maturity.

The imperialist camp, coming out of the crisis of WWII, needed some time to land on its feet, and it was forced to accept, whether it wanted or not, American aid accompanied by the USA's dominance. Either way, American imperialism, helped by English imperialism, managed to join its partners weakened by the war in military-political alliances in which it ruled over the others. It created military bases in many capitalist countries around the world, helped by these alliances under the guise of aiding these countries whose economy had been ravaged by the war. At the same time, America for a long time dictated its will in the areas of economy, investments, trade, etc. to these countries. There is no doubt that in these situa-

tions America also dictated the way of life and the political and ideological thought of these countries. Furthermore, America financed the economic reconstruction of Bonn's Germany and made sure it was rearmed, that militarism, fascism and revanchism were reborn. American imperialism's plans have always included, and they have always acted upon, the idea of creating a strong fascist Germany as its ally to the end and as the main offensive force against the socialist camp. At the same time, a fascist Germany also acts as a threatening and blackmailing force against its wavering allies.

Thus, this capitalist bloc, under the absolute rule of the Americans, was naturally a [force] threatening with the danger of war. It still remains today a threat and a strong danger for a world war, but as a force it is not as monolithic as it has been in the past.

Now, capitalist France, though officially a NATO member, has entered the road of open contradiction to American imperialism. The high capital of a rebuilt France cannot stand the American pincers and dictates. It does not accept being strangled. France feels that she is strong enough to resist American strangulation. This has, naturally, shaken up and weakened NATO's military and political power. The Americans find French opposition everywhere. Naturally, this is a positive thing for us. This positive situation that has been created cannot be due only to French capital, it is mainly a consequence of the heroic struggle that our socialist countries are waging and the national liberation wars that the peoples of the world are waging against American imperialism. Our struggle weakened it, and the French capital used the moment to throw off the American shackles. We, the Marxists, should exploit this situation and these moments of great crisis in the midst of world capitalism. But we do not have the least bit of illusion of any chance of French capitalism changing character only because it now finds itself in great contradictions with American imperialism. No! It remains the same as it was before and with the same objectives to dominate others. The only new thing is its strategy in fighting socialism and communism, oppressing peoples and exploiting them with a renewed colonialist brutality. The new phenomena in the apparent contradictions that we see were foreseen a long time ago by Stalin, and things are now happening precisely as he anticipated.

We think that American imperialism is very preoccupied with problems at this moment. It is weakening everywhere and, in fact, its aggressive actions, accompanied by nuclear blackmail, show its weakness and not its strength. It is facing great troubles in Europe and its dominant position is not stable. At the moment the Americans are trying to build a new position, and for this [they] are mostly relying on Bonn's Germany. In other words, they are trying to do this by relying on the most powerful and most aggressive ally.

We think that Bonn's Germany is everyone's prize. The

Americans are doing all they can to steer the revanchist [West German Chancellor] Ludwig Erhard government to keep its pro-American stance. To achieve this they are bending over backwards to fulfill all its requests, especially its armament with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Americans are also doing their best to bring the Soviets to their knees on the matter of the unification of Germany on their own conditions and those of the revanchists of Bonn. If the Americans can achieve this, they will have strengthened their position in Europe, will have counterbalanced the weakening caused by France, and will have isolated the French to a point. In this game, the Americans seek to isolate the French and to stop an effective alliance of theirs with Bonn, and, once they have achieved this, to preclude France from recreating its old alliances with the Soviet revisionists, with the intention of isolating Bonn Germany and American dominance.

In summing up, we could say that the Americans are trying to undermine the French objective of resuscitating [France's] old alliances with Eastern, Central and Southeastern European countries, while at the same time being closely bound with Bonn's Germany so as to better "fight" communism and the American dominance. Actually, France is trying to establish her own dominance. This is the reason for the Gaullist advances to draw closer the countries of popular democracy, by issuing loans and developing cultural relations with them.

On the other side, the Americans are trying to protect and strengthen the Bonn-Washington axis, to strengthen relations and alliances with the Soviet Union so that the Soviets may follow the American course, to stop the Soviet Union from establishing an alliance with France, and, at the same time, to include in its own sphere the European countries of popular democracy where the revisionists are now in power.

In this situation, the will and points of view of the other NATO members are not taken into account, with the exception of Bonn and London. The English government, whichever [party] is ruling at the moment and of whatever color it may be, will continue its traditional balance of power policy, though the balance will always be tipped in the Americans' favor. Its tradition, history, interest, continuation of old alliances, and especially the help its received during the last two world wars, cause England to fall to the side of the Americans. Nonetheless, contradictions between them do exist and they will always continue to exist.

At the same time, the Bonn revanchist government's intentions are well known. Bonn Germany fights for dominance in Europe, tries to fine-tune its nuclear armaments, [and] to dominate at America's side (for a short while) in NATO. It seeks to swallow the German Democratic Republic (GDR), to reestablish the old borders of the Third Reich, to recreate new alliances in its favor, and to threaten and start a new nuclear war whenever she or her partners deem favorable. In other words,

by having two immediate intentions, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the swallowing of the GDR, Bonn's government, by supporting the American policy, is avoiding stepping on England's feet, is trying not to aggravate relations and burn their bridges with de Gaulle, and is attempting, openly and covertly, to start talks and finalize agreements with the Soviet revisionists. At the same time, Bonn trades with the European popular democracies, gives them loans and even has some trade relations with the GDR.

As far as we can judge this situation, the imperialist coalition in Europe is not ready to go to war [yet]. First, the French issue has shaken up the equilibrium and it will take some time to reestablish it, and, secondly, the capitulation of the Soviet revisionists on the one hand, and that of their European satellites on the other, has created a new realm of action for the imperialists. They now have room for hope, attempts and opportunities for new coalitions. They will not let these favorable moments slide by, and enter into new adventures and armed conflicts in Europe that the Khrushchevians have afforded them.

We could arrive at the conclusion that at the moment a new black cloud dominates Europe, that the continent has now become a playground for imperialist-revisionist intrigues, and that, despite the deep contradictions that exist among all these imperialist-revisionist countries, there do not exist any countries in Europe that could take advantage of these contradictions and create a revolutionizing atmosphere there. The only forces [to do this] are the Marxist-Leninists, the ALP, the PRA and, to a smaller degree, Romania, which is still in a centrist position. The great weight of the PRC is and should always be felt strongly in Europe. It should, as a government, utilize these contradictions.

Let us now take a look at the situation within the revisionist camp. It may be said that its political-economic unity has weakened, though it is still formally in existence. The Warsaw Pact is still in effect and we believe it will continue to be around, though, we think, mostly as a formal "shield." The Soviet revisionists will continue to use the Pact, first and foremost, to hold on to their military hegemony, to keep in check and watch the armed forces of their partners, and to dominate them with the help of a perceived threat of an "attack" on the weak, frightened and "unarmed" partners of the Pact. They can use the Pact to intervene as a group if one of their partners diverges from their policies. The Soviet revisionists are putting much hope in the Warsaw Pact with the intention of using it as an expendable buffer zone, as a market to sell their old weaponry, and, above all, to keep [the East European countries] under their rule.

In this unstable political situation, in these times of multiple diplomatic dealings with the American imperialists and others, in this difficult economic, political and ideological situation, the other revisionist partners of the Pact consider it as a shield

against any eventual internal or external threat they may face. But we think that there is no harmony, no unity within the Pact. There's only dissatisfaction and mistrust.

In these dealings with the imperialists, especially with the Americans, there is a tendency on the side of the Soviets to make sure that everything achieved, every result attained, every deal concluded has their stamp on it and that the rest of the camp accepts it without opposition. Of course, this does not exist anymore and cannot be achieved, the Soviets' attempts notwithstanding, because there are centrifugal forces at play. There exists, thus, another tendency (in almost all the other revisionist countries, forcefully fed by the Americans, the French, the English and Bonn) of not fully accepting the Soviet diktat. These countries have the tendency to see things from their national point of view and to operate at the national governmental level in such a way as to treat issues, enter talks and arrive at agreements on their own, in other words, to stem, disrupt, sabotage, amend and cause problems to Soviet hegemony.

This has aggravated the contradictions among them, and this is apparent in their internal and external weaknesses. The German issue is touted loudly by them as a very important political-military matter. They act as if they have a unified and resolute position on this issue. But this is not and cannot be reality. It is true that this is a problem that preoccupies everyone, but each of them wants to resolve the problem in his own way. They all maneuver at the expense of the GDR. [Socialist Unity Party First Secretary Walter] Ulbricht's calls and memoranda and the Warsaw Pact meetings are not taken into account. The meeting communiques are demagoguery and bluffs. They do not reflect the truth. No one is actually thinking about the real course for defending the GDR. They are all afraid of the battle, of war. Gomulka is willing to impose heavy, capitulatory conditions on the GDR to the benefit of Bonn, as long as the imperialist nations officially accept the Oder-Neisse line [separating East Germany and Poland since the end of World War II]. Czechoslovakia is also moving toward the normalization of old alliances as long as any [German] pretensions on the Sudetenland are buried. Hungary is not willing at all to go to a war for Ulbricht's beard. It is more interested in its aspirations for Romanian territory and in the strengthening of the capitalist regime it is restoring.

The Soviets, as well as the others, are very interested in resolving the German issue. With a little bit of pain and a lot of demagoguery, they are looking to the certainty, even if temporary, of a relatively quiet situation coming from Bonn. It is our opinion that the GDR is being used at this time by the Soviet Union and its allies as a bargaining chip in the dealing, blackmailing, and chaffering between the imperialists and the modern revisionists. Of course, this is another important factor that deepens the contradictions between the revisionists and weakens their internal and external positions. They are constantly being unmasked.

As to political relations between the revisionist countries and the bourgeois countries of the world, they do not follow a general, unified course. Each of them tends to proceed based on their own national interest, often at the expense of their revisionist partners. Everyone looks to ensure personal economic, political or prestige gains and for their own good, often trampling upon principles and most of the time at the loss of their own revisionist friends. In other words, the law of the jungle reigns in their relations. Naturally, this deepens the contradictions and weakens and unmasks them.

The economic relations between the revisionists continue to exist and the Soviet revisionists, as the largest economic power, continue to dominate and be in control, though not as they used to. The Soviet Union dominates the weak economies of its partners using its economic clout and placing important economic locks and shackles, from which, at the moment, its partners cannot break and be freed. This is the source of the great Soviet pressure on them, which extends beyond economic matters. These sorts of relations are in fact capitalist and enslaving. No one is happy with the other. There are quarrels, disagreements, blackmailing and threats everywhere. There exist among them numerous, deep, insurmountable and subversive contradictions which exert great influence as they degenerate.

With the exception of the Soviet Union, though it is watching its rubles more carefully before giving them away, not one of the other revisionist nations is led by the internationalist principle of helping one another economically. On the contrary, they, in a very capitalistic way, [only] consider who can profit the most from the other. Thus, every step, every economic relationship between them is considered and acted upon only through the capitalist's eye. The economic crisis that has befallen the Soviet Union does not allow it, even if it tried to do this the capitalist way, to help its revisionist allies, who also are deep in crisis, and to cope with their ever increasing needs. Under these conditions, the only way out for these new capitalists is to welcome foreign capital into their countries, from the Americans, the French, the English and the Germans. These loans from the Americans and others have started to penetrate, to multiply, and to settle down like leeches in the economies of the Soviet Union and the other European popular democracies. This brings with it economic and political influence, the degeneration of the system, and the political, economic and military take-over of these countries, which have started, little by little and one now and another later, to become dependent on the various imperialists and to turn into their zones of influence.

Naturally, this increases the contradictions within them and among them, and the Soviet revisionists who are losing their absolute economic and political dominance over them [the popular democracies]. This increases and deepens the contradictions between the people and the true Marxist-Leninists on the one side, and the revisionist leaders of each country on the

other. It impoverishes these countries, polarizes the reactionary forces and the people and creates favorable conditions for a revolution in these countries.

How can we now evaluate the ideological “unity” of the revisionists and the war they are waging against Marxism-Leninism and especially against the CCP and the ALP?

The bellicosity against Marxism-Leninism and against our two parties is resolute. There exists a unity of thought and of action. The revisionist leaders—not only those at the helm of the parties and governments of the Soviet Union and the other popular democracies in Europe, but also all those who lead the parties in the capitalist countries—have entered and are deeply and hopelessly compromised by their anti-Marxist road. They are the backbone of the modern revisionism. They have crystallized the line of reformism and degeneration of Marxism-Leninism. They receive guidance from the Soviet leadership. Their foundation and orientation comes from the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses of the CP Soviet Union. This is on what all the modern revisionists rely. This is what their ideological unity stands and what their orientation for the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism derives from. These countries implement this general line in their own way and according to the actual situation within their parties and countries. When implementing this general revisionist line, there naturally are and will always be different tendencies, which have become and will continue to become apparent as functions of the inclinations of these leaders dictated by pressures by the bourgeoisie, resistance by the party, the political-economic situation of the country, the revolutionary movement, and the level of its development, and many other factors.

Unwavering in their intentions and fighting to achieve their anti-Marxist objectives, the modern revisionists are actually exhibiting some emphatic tendencies. The Titoist revisionists are following the defined road, openly and without cover (maybe because we tore off their mask), of marching triumphantly toward capitalism, in complete and open unity with the capitalist bourgeoisie and social democracy and in alliance with and at the service of American imperialism. They have gone so far in this course that the other revisionists—though they are in fact in complete solidarity with them, use them as role models in their actions and adopt Titoist practices in the degeneration of their parties and nations—do not dare to rehabilitate them openly. Constantly cooperating closely with the Titoists, while declaring that they completely agree with their policies, and while adopting the capitalist, Titoist reforms, they will add that they have “a few disagreements with them.” This is demagoguery and just a formality. But the fact remains that the Titoist-revisionist clan cannot even be considered the most extreme right of modern revisionism. Titoism has actually removed itself completely from modern revisionism. It can be said that the title of most extreme right revisionists is now held by the Italian revisionist leaders, the Togliat[t]ists.

By not being in power in their country, they have taken upon themselves the role of practicing revisionism to the letter in capitalist countries. This role is that of total liquidation of the party, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the revolutionary struggle. They are trying to do away with the contradictions with the social democrats, to unite with them, to merge with them, and to cooperate fully ideologically and politically with the bourgeoisie. In other words, they are for the elimination of all forms of class warfare and for the reestablishment of the omnipotent reign of the bourgeoisie. The Italian revisionists, not actually being in power, want to go even further than the Titoists, who have the power and would never agree to share it with anyone. Aside from the complete trampling of principles, they are followers of the actual revisionist governments, from whom they draw lessons on how to best hasten their degeneration and how to carry out as consistently as possible the general revisionist line laid out by the 20th, 21st and 22nd congresses. The Italian revisionists think that the fastest way to achieve these results is through their theory of “poly-centrism,” which is, in fact, an erosion of the Soviet revisionists’ authority and a fissure among the revisionists so as to liquidate faster and easier, in the general framework of the ideological offensive of the monopolist capital, every shred of remaining Marxism-Leninism in the revisionist parties and governments. The Italian revisionists, naturally, are adventurers in the full meaning of the word. They are irresponsible and do not take into account their losses, defeats and their complete unmasking. They want to speed up the process of degeneration. Of course, the Soviet revisionists cannot agree with such a tactic that removes so quickly every demagogic weapon in their arsenal. This is the source of their contradictions and the differences in their strategies.

The Polish revisionists approach is a demagogic strategy which tries to convince us to soften our polemics and especially to try and show their independence from the Soviet revisionists in matters of strategy. But they are among the most brutal enemies of Marxism-Leninism, the CCP, the ALP and our socialist countries. They are some of the biggest chauvinist revisionists. The Soviets consider them very important, despite the differences with them. The Soviets need them very much, as a split from the Soviets and open approach in the direction of the imperialists by the Poles would be [the Soviets’] final catastrophe.

The other European revisionists, despite their nuances which are most visible in Ulbricht and Kadar, follow, to a certain degree, the general Soviet course and strategy in their war against Marxism-Leninism and in particular against our two parties. But in general it may be said that amongst them the blind faith they used to have in the Soviet revisionists no longer exists.

The same can also be said for the other parties of the world where the revisionists have managed to get to the top. Faith in

the revisionist Soviet leadership has weakened. The only faith or attraction that may exist is to the ruble which finances their anti-Marxist and anti-socialist activities. These activities are revisionist and treasonous, despite the independence of action or regional regrouping.

The Soviet revisionists have suffered great defeats. It may be said that our parties' struggle against them has been the main architect of these defeats. Our principled and militant positions towards them have unmasked the Soviet revisionists, have blocked their subversive activities, have crushed their suffocating and poisoning demagoguery, and have resisted and emerged victorious over their blackmailing and pressuring of all sorts. Our resolute struggle was a fork in the road against the treasonous, revisionist activities, was a beacon of light to the communist masses of the world, shone light over the truth for the peoples, and unmasked the agreements made between the Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists.

Since the 20th Congress, the Soviet revisionists took the reins in their hands and were completely convinced that they would not encounter any serious resistance to their treason. Even if they would [encounter resistance], led by the chauvinism and self-confidence of a large state, their great economic and military power, and by hiding behind the great political and ideological prestige of the Soviet Union and the CP Soviet Union, they thought they could crush it quickly, painlessly and quietly. At the same time, the Soviet revisionists were convinced that they would be granted understanding of and quick agreement to their proposals and great concessions by the American imperialists. So the Soviet revisionists were convinced that their revisionist political and ideological course would "triumph and shine brightly." They were convinced that a "miracle" would happen faster than the blink of an eye, just like at a game at a carnival. And this game (we should give credit where it is due) was performed brilliantly like a true carnival clown by Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet revisionists.

Revisionism carries within itself its own demise. It brings defeat to those that have been infected by it, because revisionism is betrayal, defeatism, capitulation and destruction. Modern revisionism, led by the Soviet revisionism, brought along an array of evils. It weakened the Soviet Union, lowered its prestige and that of the Bolshevik Party, started the ideological-political degeneration of the Soviet Union, weakened the revolutionary forces, flung the socialist economy of the Soviet Union into chaos and continuous decadence, made huge concessions to the American imperialists, and [it] continues to destroy Soviet power and puts it at the mercy of a new bourgeois capitalist class, which is becoming every day more and more dependent on the interests of international capitalism.

Whether in its ideological-organizational development, in its internal and external political strategy, or in its relations

with the socialist camp and international communism, their whole ideological line was a fiasco.

The unity within the socialist camp and the international communist movement was in fact very strong and monolithically confronted the bourgeois ideology. The reason for this was that it was led by Marxism-Leninism. Prior to the ascendancy of the revisionists to power, the Soviet Union was following a just cause and was inspired by, and inspired others, friends and allies alike, with a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist spirit.

After the ascendancy of the revisionists to power, the Marxist unity of the past could not continue. Our idea that unity can only exist where Marxism-Leninism is in power, was triumphant. The revisionists' bluffing and demagoguery, their mudslinging and defamation of Stalin, their charges that it was his cult, his terror, his killing and threatening the factors which kept this unity alive artificially, have suffered a shameful defeat. Not only have the Marxist-Leninists everywhere risen against the revisionists and are forging the true unity under the direction and inspiration of Marxism-Leninism, but we are seeing very clearly that it was the Soviet revisionists who caused not only the destruction of the socialist camp and international communist unity, but also (and it could not have happened otherwise) the schism among themselves. The revisionists are disunited and will be so even more. They bring their own death along with them.

When the Soviet revisionists found themselves confronted with great defeat and a great harm, they preferred the smaller evil and liquidated their leader and ideologue, Nikita Khrushchev. They implicitly placed all the blame on him, and, without changing a single iota from his old line, his friends, Khrushchev's collaborators and co-conspirators, emerged into the political scene to carry out Khrushchevianism without Khrushchev.

The period since the liquidation of Khrushchev has proved that the Soviet revisionists are as much to blame for treason as Khrushchev and that they follow with the utmost faithfulness his treasonous, anti-Marxist ideas. In matters of treason they have even surpassed Khrushchev; while knowing full well the terrible mistakes Khrushchev made, they did not change ways (not that they could remedy the damage) and do not even pretend to camouflage their actions.

It is true, they are trying to design and follow a new line, but one which is just as scandalous as Khrushchev's.

First of all, their strategy only includes some formalities and superficialities:

They have left behind the fuss and bombastic ways of Khrushchev. For the time being, the Soviet revisionists that

took over for Khrushchev are not holding speeches, but sit silent so as to give the impression that they are “reflecting,” that “they are reasonable and wise,” that they are not “unrestrained rowdies.” Nonetheless, in practice the first steps are being taken and their voice is beginning to be heard.

They maintain their relations with the Americans and strengthen them. They are capitulating more and more everyday, because they are getting weaker everyday. Khrushchev’s [1964] removal from the scene did not strengthen them. On the contrary, it discredited them. They are now trying to glue together what Khrushchev broke apart. They have no hope that we will turn their way but are concerned about the remaining allies who are slipping through their fingers. They want to build some kind of “unity” among them on new foundations to confront the catastrophe that awaits them. This is one of their actual primary concerns. The Moscow meeting, above everything else, sought to accomplish this. They were more concerned with establishing a common ideological-political platform, suitable in the new actual situation between the revisionists, than they were with deceiving us. Naturally, the communique that they released after the meeting on 1 March includes the demagoguery of their whole line, but we think that the issue was more their attempt to create some sort of revisionist unity. The Soviets hoped to achieve this “unity” by covertly assuring their partners that nothing would change in their line. During this time their public behavior proved that nothing had changed after Khrushchev.

But did this unity so highly desired by the Soviet leadership ever materialize? No, not at all. As revisionists the Soviets understand unity to be dominance and absolute control over others. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the others have become more independent than ever before. They did not cry for Khrushchev, they were happy that he was out because he was arrogant and threatened them. At the same time, the other revisionists were concerned that, “God forbid,” the new Soviet leadership might turn direction and become like us [Chinese and Albanians]. Such a fear had enveloped them to the bone. As soon as they were assured that this was not going to happen, their posture of independence from the “conductor” was sharpened and, according to information we have, there was no unity in their meeting, even though all of them are bearded revisionists [(sic) possibly meaning “experienced revisionists”].

In the communique they published, the modern Soviet revisionists confirmed publicly the defeats we have dealt them, showed the confusion and panic that has enveloped them and the fact that they have not been able to find anything new to offer to their minions. They demonstrated that the initiative did not belong to them. Everything is dependent on us. They are defeated. They are weak. They are on the defensive. In their communique the Soviet revisionists confirm that they cannot openly control the other revisionists anymore. They cannot impose their will on them anymore. The divisiveness, the

“independence,” and loss of control over them is insurmountable. The gap between them is deep. Using indirect methods, the Soviet revisionists will try to salvage their prestige and their authority over their allies. They will try to activate, encourage, organize and manage the war against our parties and states.

The period after Khrushchev’s fall can be characterized as one in which the Soviet revisionists have been weakened immensely. Of great importance in this regard is the defeat instilled upon them by our militant stance and the continuous polemics shelled out by our parties. This is one of the sources of the fire that is burning the scatterbrained revisionists and the Soviet revisionists aside from all the other troubles bothering them. The Americans also realized during this period that not only were the Soviet revisionists not going to change course, but by getting ever weaker, they were giving the Americans an opportunity to toughen their campaign of blackmail in order to bring them on their side and compromise them even further. The Americans can clearly see that the “center” of Soviet demagoguery is, supposedly, “the anti-imperialist war” and “the anti-imperialist front.” The American imperialists understand this very well and are directing all their effort and aggressiveness precisely at this point in order to back the Soviet revisionists into a corner and to unmask and discredit them so that they capitulate quickly.

The notions of “peaceful co-existence” and “the world without wars and weapons” have now lost their glamour. No one believes in them anymore. The wars in Congo, Laos, South Vietnam and now the American piratical bombardments in North Vietnam have enabled the Americans not only to put the Soviets closer to capitulation and unmasking, but also under the terror of war. They have forced the Soviets to support diplomatic measures that are in favor of imperialist ideas on Vietnam and that prepare the capitulation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and bring the liberation struggle to an end. Kosygin’s visit to the DRV took place for devilish, deceitful, demagogue, diversionist and capitulating reasons. But he was dealt a defeat there. The claim for the supposed weapons deliveries to DRV was nothing but demagoguery and a trap. On the other hand, the Soviets are trying to organize international conferences with the participation of bourgeois capitalist states but without Vietnam. We need to think carefully and be prepared very well militarily, because the chances look good that the Soviets, since the time of Khrushchev and continuing today, have been in agreement with the Americans to allow them free hand in “climbing up the steps” [escalating] in Vietnam and going all the way to China, in other words, enlarging the conflict. In such a case, the Soviets might conveniently limit themselves to bombastic demagoguery declarations and sensational “protests” on the one hand, but on the other hand they will collect numerous “facts and documents” supposedly attesting that the DRV and China did not allow the Soviet Union to positively help them with weapons or men. Of course the Soviet revisionists are playing with fire, but they

think that they might come out “victorious” by weakening both sides, by tossing China amid a war predicament, surrounding her with a ring of fire and a ring of “friends” of the Soviet revisionists, such as the Indians. We need to strangle such Soviet plans while they are still in the womb.

We think that the “problem of mutual disarmament” and the “issue of Germany and Berlin” are brought up and blown out of proportion by the revisionists as a diversion. These problems are in fact used by them as a propaganda smoke screen to mask and draw attention away from China and Indochina, where a war is going on against imperialism and revisionism. This is where our two main enemies’ efforts are centered in order to advance their common designs.

The Soviet revisionists, along with the American, French and Bonn imperialists, are trying to preoccupy the peoples of the so-called “third forces” with regional issues and to prevent them from dealing with more pressing concerns, or to [prevent them from striking back at] them. For example, we see that the countries of Africa are interested more exclusively with African issues, such as the issue of Congo (which is an important one). The Arabs are mostly interested in the problems relating to Israel and the relations with Bonn or Ulbricht and tend to neglect or be minutely concerned with Indochina or Malaysia. In Latin America the Soviets have put the bridle on Castro, who is preoccupying Latin America with equivocal views that do not serve well the unity of true Marxist-Leninist revolutionary forces, but instead weaken them and even help the revisionist leaders of the communist and workers’ parties of the countries of Latin America and all the modern revisionists.

To us it looks like there is a universal tendency of modern revisionism, in cooperation with imperialism, to scatter and preoccupy the revolutionary forces with unconnected issues, or to separate them so as to disorient them.

The fact is that at various international gatherings this tendency is evident in different countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. They do not operate coherently. They either are routed or isolated, or are “convinced” to bring up various obstructions so that the important international or regional gatherings scheduled to be held at a certain time are postponed, completely canceled, etc. We think that this issue requires revision. We need to build a new strategy that will revolutionize the situation.

What is our opinion on how we should proceed with our struggle in the present situation and conditions, as we have described them so far?

We are of the opinion that we should increase our polemics against modern revisionism and, above all, against the Soviet revisionists. They are very much weakened and need a break in polemics. We should not let them catch their breath. We

should hit and unmask them ceaselessly politically and ideologically. We should unmask every step they take in the international arena and in the area of their relations with the other revisionists by pointing out their divergences. We should not allow them to regroup and we should stop their single or group actions against us. Every “concession” they make, every “tactic” of theirs supposedly to make up with us, should be used at every opportunity we get, following the Marxist-Leninist course, to unmask them, disarm them, push them to capitulate, and cause them to start fighting amongst themselves.

We think that our struggle against them should be well-organized and well-coordinated. Even if our two parties do not coordinate our actions, the end result is going to be a complete, coordinated struggle, because both our parties know everything clearly and stand resolute at the first line of battle. But we cannot say and readmit that the same thing also happens with the other Marxist-Leninist parties who stand on strong footing. They do not have strong contacts with our party, and we have no common coordination. We might even say that, while in agreement on different matters, we do not stand on a common front when it comes to the consistency of our polemics. We may be wrong, but we believe that we have differences in strategy with them. They may consider the ALP as “crude” and themselves as on a straight line, or “mature.”

This “straight and mature” line, we think, has nothing to do with Marxist-Leninist maturity, with the real meaning of events as they evolve, and with who stands in front of us as an enemy. It has nothing to do with the reasonable evaluation of the dangerousness of the enemy, his cunning, his resolute enmity against our parties and countries, and against Marxism-Leninism as it is justly understood by the great CCP and the ALP.

In order to achieve some sort of unity in our approach to strategy, or to at least explain and illuminate to each other the reasons behind tactical activities by each party, we think that we should hold bilateral meetings. According to Xinhua [News Agency], in Asia you follow such practices with the parties of Asia and this is a good thing. We do this with you and it is also a good thing. But we and the parties of Asia do not do this, not because we do not want to, but because we have not been given the opportunity, especially by the Korean Workers’ Party, but also by the parties of Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, or New Zealand. We have tried to take advantage of every meeting we have had with comrades from these parties who have visited us on different holidays and have expressed our opinion to them. But discussing these matters in such conditions does not yield the same results as would specific two-party talks for bilateral discussion of problems and exchange of opinions as we do with you, Chinese comrades. We think there is a lack in this area and that we need such meetings.

We think that we also need a big, general meeting of all these parties. We have always been for such a meeting. We should

prepare for such a meeting and the preparation should be done in bilateral or trilateral meetings where we could straighten out everything so that when we have the big meeting, we can come out of it in full unity on every topic and the meeting would put a new date on the calendar as the beginning of a new historic period in the international communist movement.

We think that communists and the peoples of the world have a continuous need to be enlightened, to receive an interpretation of events, and a need for orientation of their actions, especially the communists and peoples in the Soviet Union and the other people's democratic countries. We must have an unshakable faith in the healthy forces of these countries and parties. The truth is that this group of people is oppressed and under surveillance. Many are confused by lies and demagoguery. Many others can only surmise our stance, while many others listen to our radio programs, draw conclusions and, maybe, are even organizing or coordinating their resistance illegally, etc. This should be the situation in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries, but the truth is that our relations with these forces in these countries are still very weak. We still have no contacts there and the truth is that contacts with them are not easy for us or for them. Nonetheless, we must think of something to do about this, because this matter is of the utmost importance.

In the countries where the revisionists rule, resistance and organization of the Marxist-Leninists is the decisive factor, the only factor, which we should assist from the outside. The work within the castle of the revisionists should be done by the Marxists and the people of these countries. So in this matter we should exchange opinion on a course of action, which includes more activities than we presently undertake.

As to the multi-layered help that we afford to the new parties and in the Marxist-Leninist groups in the capitalist countries, this is much easier to be done and it is being done somewhere successfully, somewhere with the natural hardships, wavering, and squirming of such an undertaking. The revolutionary Marxist-Leninists are organizing and fighting. It would be a good idea to help them even more and effectively, because these comrades are in need of our help. Of course, we should not interfere in their internal affairs. We must have and show patience, tact and vigilance, but to say that we will not make any mistakes in the course of this work would not be prudent, though we should avoid any mistakes as much as possible. The revisionists are putting forks in our road. The imperialists are doing the same. Both we and our revolutionary comrades should keep this in mind. Many foreign elements have infiltrated and will attempt to infiltrate these new parties and groups that are forming. This is unavoidable. Both our revolutionary comrades and we could be fooled by the "pseudo-Marxists," the agents of the revisionists and the capitalists that are attempting to infiltrate us, to sabotage us from within. Hence, it is imperative that we sharpen our vigilance. We must

protect ourselves from the "baseless enthusiasm," from the "exaggerated confidence" without proof from the battlefield. We must protect and shield ourselves from the "beautiful, revolution-filled words" of some. At the same time, these many dangers along the road should not turn us into sectarians and hinder our help to our comrades. It would be prudent that we carefully analyze our help because there may be shortcomings and mistakes on our side and, if possible, to better coordinate our help and decide when and where to direct our thrust.

The Marxist-Leninist unity of thought and action of our two parties has been, is and will forever be, solid in the whole of the wide and multi-layered front of the war against American imperialism and modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionists at its helm. This great truth is demonstrated every day by our struggle and our political and ideological positions. It is demonstrated by our coordinated strategy and tactics. It was demonstrated quite brilliantly once again by the just and resolute position of the CCP and the ALP toward the divisive revisionist meeting that was held in Moscow on 1-5 March of this year. It could not have happened differently since both of us are led resolutely by Marxism-Leninism.

The exalted and principled stance of the CCP toward the Moscow meeting will have colossal effects on the world, on world events, on the communist and workers' parties, and in all the Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionaries. The revolutionary spirit, the war against American imperialism, the Soviet modern revisionism and their satellites will rise higher and higher.

We follow with admiration the just, courageous Marxist-Leninist war of the Communist Party of Japan against the internal reactionaries, against American imperialism, against modern revisionism, and especially against the Soviet revisionism. This is active and heroic participation in our great, common war. We could say the same for the party and comrades of New Zealand. The only thing is that it seems to us that the New Zealander comrades could do more to create the groundwork for more contacts that would help activate the consolidation of the war against revisionism and American imperialism in all the English-speaking countries of the world, such as in England itself, in Canada and in the other countries of the British Commonwealth.

Generally, we think that at a time when the American imperialists are widening the war in Vietnam, when they are looking to hit the great China, humanity's castle [redoubt], support and great hope, at a time when the revisionists, with the Soviet leaders at the helm, are intensifying their treasonous against communism, the common struggle of all the Marxist-Leninist parties against Soviet revisionism must be strengthened and all of them should support the CCP in this great war. Our opinion is that in these moments when the enemy has approached our gates, such as is the case of the American threat in Vietnam, vague or less than active (not to call them passive) positions

of some sister parties or of the Marxist-Leninists of different countries does not help our common cause.

Our opinion is that we must utilize every opportunity in every country to make sure that the earth beneath the feet of the American imperialists and their revisionist allies is burning with the fire of the war of the peoples and of the Marxist-Leninists.

It is clear that the general and concrete objective of American imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and the world reactionaries is to start a general war in Asia to bring it to China and the other socialist countries of Asia, by escalating from local wars to a general conflagration. The Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists are using all their means to arm the Indian reactionaries with the greatest speed so that they may repeat the armed attack against China. There is no doubt that the Soviet revisionists will strengthen their border with China under the pretext of the defense of their territory to put her under continuous pressure and blackmail, and will use all means at their disposal to neutralize the surrounding countries if they fail at separating them from their traditional friendship with China. On the other side, American imperialism will try to strengthen the relations with Japan and its domination and preponderance there so as to keep it under its control and to push it into aggression, if possible. The Americans have placed a lot of hope on the possibility of closer cooperation with England, whose colonies in Asia are in danger, for reasons of aggression. In this situation we see with great admiration and faith in her success, China's attempts and its just policies to bring closer, consolidate the friendships and relations with Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan, and all the other countries of Asia and Africa, in particular with countries where American imperialism has undertaken open aggression. We think, just like you do, that we must get closer and work with them and not only to make them conscious of the great danger looming from a war that is taking a brutal shape in Southeast Asia, but also to achieve the goal of making them actively counter the American aggression and its objective of a wider war.

We think that for our part we should intensify even more our campaign of propaganda and unmasking of the war-mongering American imperialism and the modern Soviet revisionists, Titoists and their treasonous supporters. We should intensify our attack on every alliance and agreement they make, should extend a call to the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other countries to take measures and block and boot all these agreements with the American imperialists, should extend a call to them for a total blockage of the aggressive America, should extend a call to the peoples, the working class, the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia of the world to rise up strongly against the American aggression, this new Hitlerism of the world that threatens it with fire and steel.

As to the heroic struggle of South Vietnam, as to the unwavering stance of North Vietnam, as to your staunch, just, Marxist-Leninist, and heroic stance toward the brotherly people of Vietnam, the help that you extend to them and your infinite support, rest assured, we know about it and admire it—it inspires and enthralls us. We are fully on your side and give ourselves to you to the end and will help with all we have at our disposal. Your war is our war; it is the war of every anti-imperialist, anti-revisionist; it is the war of socialism against imperialism and its lackeys, the modern revisionists and the world reactionaries.

The fraternal Vietnamese people engaged in a heroic war deserve every support possible. American imperialism is even using poisonous gas against the fighters of South Vietnam, all the while systematically bombing the North. It is the sacred duty of all the peoples and revolutionaries of the world to defend the cause of the brotherly Vietnamese people and to help in any way so that it may emerge victorious.

We have expressed our opinion to you about the issue of South Vietnam through your ambassador here. It may be possible that this opinion of ours has not matured yet, but we have expressed it to our friends and partners who know well, judge fairly and can decide justly on this matter.

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate once again that which you so justly and openly in your later position on the divisive meeting in Moscow; that we must strengthen the unity of thought and action; that we must be armed and tempered more and more each day for the battles ahead. We understand, admire and support you with all our might; we fight alongside you as a single body in your great, life-saving, and politically, militarily and ideologically just war. All the Marxist-Leninists of the world should concentrate their struggle and fight to help and strengthen the wide and worldly activity of the PRC, the CCP, and the Chinese government. All of us should understand and explain it to others, that the axis of steel of our sacred war, of our victories, is Comrade Mao Zedong's China, which is always led by Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This is our last word on these subjects; we present it to you, to our people, to our brotherly Chinese people, your party, and our Comrade Mao.

+
+ +

I thank you Comrade Zhou Enlai and the other Chinese comrades for the attention you showed and beg your pardon for the long speech. I have tired you.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We thank you for your all-encompassing opinions. It is you who is tired.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We propose to close this session

and go get something to eat, outside protocol.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I have a proposition. Let us postpone tomorrow's meeting a half hour from the scheduled time. Instead of meeting from 9 a.m. until 12 p.m., let us postpone it to 9:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: If you would like, we could postpone it until 10 a.m. so that you may rest.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: It is not necessary. 9:30 a.m. is sufficient.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Then we agree. We will meet tomorrow at 9:30 a.m.

(The first meeting ended at 9:10 p.m.)

+
+ +

THE SECOND MEETING

The second meeting started at 9:30 a.m. on 28 March 1965. The floor was given to:

Comrade Zhou Enlai: First of all, I would like to say that we feel very happy to be given the chance to visit Albania for the second time. I would particularly like to thank you for the very warm welcome the ALP CC, the government, and the wide mass of the people of your country have extended to us. This welcome has made a great impression on us. This is an indication that the friendship between our two peoples, parties, and countries continues to become stronger and more unbreakable.

I take this opportunity to thank your party's Central Committee, with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its helm, the government, and the heroic Albanian people for this demonstration of friendship.

I would also like to thank Comrade Enver Hoxha for yesterday's explanation of your opinions and activities related to the various problems in your country and the international arena.

Today, we intend to present to you our opinion on these matters. But I will change the order of the issues a bit. I will first cover the international problems and then will go on to speak about the issues of the cooperation between our two countries.

Our two parties' and governments' opinions on the fundamental issues of the international arena are fully in concert. I am talking about the issues of our struggle against imperialism, with American imperialism at its forefront, and modern revisionism, with today's Soviet revisionist leadership at its helm,

as well as against the reactionaries of various countries, intent on forming as wide and unique a front as possible of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world. There is no doubt that this front must have at its core the leftist groups of the socialist camp and of the international communist movement, in other words, the leftist parties and the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists of the world. The forces that are waging today the struggle for socialism, national liberation, democracy and peace in the world stand in one front and have common opinions on today's international arena situation, a situation which is progressing in favor of socialism, the peoples of the world, and the revolution and at the expense of the imperialists, the modern revisionists, and the reactionaries of different countries.

I wanted to express to you our opinions and position in relation to the latest developments and the problems they cause. Of our three main enemies, the most important one is imperialism, with the USA at its helm, or in other words, American imperialism. Why do I say this? I say it because American imperialism is trying to rule the whole world. It is trying to force the modern revisionists to capitulate and place themselves in its service. And as to the reactionaries in the various countries, the American imperialists are all the more trying to turn them into their servants. Meanwhile, the Soviet revisionists, whether Khrushchev when he was in power or the current Soviet leaders, have tried and are still trying alongside American imperialism to divide the domination of the whole world between the two superpowers. But the USA does not agree to such a deal. It is a well-known fact, for example, that Khrushchev tried to control the mood at [the September 1959] Camp David meeting, but Eisenhower would have none of it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: He was trying to establish American imperialism as the lone ruler.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Then, during the following year, it is a known fact that another quarrel occurred in France. This shows that there are contradictions among the imperialists, just like they also exist between US imperialism and modern revisionists. At the same time, there are contradictions between the USA and the satellite nations. Hence, as Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out yesterday, the question is how to exploit these contradictions best in favor of our intentions.

Currently, American imperialism is trying many different tricks, but it is meeting with defeat, because it is facing the opposition of the peoples of the entire world to its actions, and it is putting modern revisionism in a difficult position. It is also putting in such a position all its other servants. In other words, imperialism is exposing more and more the modern revisionists and the reactionaries of the various countries.

Today the American imperialists are trying to create crises throughout the entire world. That is why their role is becoming continually clearer to the international public. The peoples of the

world already know that American imperialism is the source of all the misfortunes and the evil in the world. This is causing the ranks of the opponents of American imperialism to keep growing every day. The peoples of Africa and Asia are moving toward an escalation of their war against American imperialism.

The USA is even using poisonous gas in their war against the people of South Vietnam and has openly admitted that it has taken such an actions. But this barbarous act has drawn the criticism of all the countries, including that of the Labor government of the UK, which has expressed its disagreement. As a result, the USA has had to reverse their practice.

The continuing bombing of the DRV by the US has had the effect that the allied and servant countries of the Americans have expressed their intent to stop following them, except for England which justifies the Americans' actions while maintaining that [the bombing] has nothing to do with China and should lead to talks very soon. Meanwhile the USA is threatening and trying to scare the others by blackmailing them with the escalation of the war from South Vietnam to North Vietnam, into all of Indochina, and even into China. Their allies are disturbed by this. This shows that the USA is not getting the support they need and is being rebutted not only by the peoples of various countries, but also by their allies and satellites, whose opinions differ from those of the Americans and are disturbed by their actions.

But why are they disturbed? On the one hand, because they foresee that the USA will be dealt an even greater defeat in this area, i.e. in South Vietnam, Indochina, and China. On the other, they are worried that the USA might get weaker in other areas and that the anti-American movement there might get stronger and, as a result, the rule of the allies and their satellites in these areas might be in danger.

Let us consider now how the modern revisionists see these problems.

A characteristic of modern revisionists, starting with the time of Khrushchev and continuing with his followers today, is that they are afraid of American imperialism and a world war. They are afraid that some local war might escalate, with American interference, into a large-scale world war. They do not want the peoples of the world to wage an armed war for their national independence. They are afraid of the peoples of the world revolution. Hence, they are trying to discourage and stop such revolutions. This is the logic behind their actions.

But what does their strategy for this look like?

First of all, by seeking to rule the world alongside the American imperialists, the Soviet revisionists are trying to bring the socialist countries, the sister parties, and the national liberation struggles under their control and use them to make compromises with the USA.

To attain this control, to make their dealings with the USA easier, and to salvage their prestige, the revisionists were forced to hold the 1 March meeting. But the end result was the opposite of their expectations. They lost even more of their prestige.

As Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out yesterday, the attendees at the meeting came out even more scattered and divided. The 1 March meeting communique itself was quite weak, while the resolution of the CPSU CC, released on 26 March and concerning the 1 March meeting has nothing further in it except for the repetition of a few words from the communique. I believe you have seen this resolution.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is so. Correct.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: And naturally, this course of action ensured that the prestige of the Soviet revisionists and those that rule other countries and parties declined even more. It becomes more and more apparent that they seek to conspire with American imperialism to dominate the world together.

Another activity by the Soviet Union to find a way out, for both itself and American imperialism, was to start to take steps with the intention of leading the matter of Vietnam to the negotiations table. The tendency of the Soviet revisionists for talks was apparent especially during [Premier of the USSR, Alexei N.] Kosygin's [February 1965] visit to the Far East. First of all, he suggested that all the socialist countries make a common declaration through which they would express their support for Vietnam, against American imperialism. But right away we detected that this was simply a plot by the Soviet revisionists. Through this common declaration they sought to enter into bargains with the American imperialists in the name of all the countries of the socialist camp under the guise of the Soviet Union being a representative of the countries of the socialist camp. We expressed to the Soviets our opposition to this proposal and made our opinion known to the Korean Workers' Party and the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP).

Hence, though there was a bilateral Soviet-Vietnamese declaration and later a Soviet-Korean one, a common declaration of all the socialist countries was not issued. In these bilateral declarations the matter of the common declaration proposed by the Soviets was not mentioned. During the framing of the Soviet-Vietnamese declaration the Soviets were forced to accept as the basis for the declaration's main points the point of view of the VWP and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

Obviously, China did not publish a common declaration with the Soviets because Kosygin merely passed through China [in February 1965]. Hence, he was unable to play his role of a swindler. But the Soviet revisionists did not agree with this situation. As soon as Kosygin returned to Moscow, they presented their opinion to the DRV [Pham Van Dong] that

it would be possible for the Soviet Union to intervene for talks with the US on the issue of Vietnam. On 26 February, the prime minister of the DRV summarily rejected this proposal saying the conditions for talks on the situation in South Vietnam did not exist. He declared that the people of Vietnam would never kneel before the American imperialists' bayonets and bombing and they would fight resolutely until the final victory.¹ On the same day, the Soviets presented this same suggestion to the Chinese government, but we responded that on this issue they should only talk to the government of the DRV and the VWP. Yet, without waiting for our answer, the Soviet government had already intervened with the French government on this issue. The Soviet ambassador had met with de Gaulle. Two days later, the Soviet ambassador told his Chinese counterpart in France that the Soviet Union and France's points of view on the Vietnam issue were the same. But what was the French point of view? The French were for entering talks without prior conditions.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Just like Tito.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: (Laughs.) The French foreign minister, on the same day, handed a memo to the Soviet Union which proved the similarity of both sides' points of view on this matter. At the same time, the Soviet Union took steps in the direction of the English as well, as the visit by Andrei Gromyko to London clearly shows. Naturally, by the time of Gromyko's visit to London, China had already made her firm opposition to talks known to the Soviet Union. Hence, Gromyko, in his talks with the English, was forced to formally accept that talks should be held with prior conditions. The difference was that the Soviet Union did not even mention the conditions required by Vietnam. The Soviet Union simply wanted talks to be held. All the while, Vietnam was saying that it was the US that had broken the Geneva Convention, that it was the US that should stop the war and withdraw all its troops from Vietnam and the all of Indochina, that it should stop its North Vietnam bombing campaign, and that the people of South Vietnam should not be prevented from solving their internal problems on their own. By contrast, England presented to Gromyko the same conditions called for by the US, i.e.: The Vietcong should stop its armed struggle, the aggression from the North should stop, North Vietnam should terminate its aid to South Vietnam, and the armed forces of South Vietnam [the National Liberation Front] should end their war and relinquish their weapons.

The essence of these talks was visible in Gromyko's press conference, held before his departure from England. The correspondents asked him whether he had talked to the English about the Vietnam issue. Gromyko answered that this matter should be resolved by the interested parties, in other words, this matter was one pertaining to the US and Vietnam. It is very clear that Gromyko considers the US, who is the aggressor and has intervened with armed forces in South Vietnam, and Vietnam as the two warring parties. Hence, in essence, the

Soviet revisionists are trying to get to talks without any prior conditions. We are facing here attempts that seek to stop the fighting without any conditions. The Soviet Union and France are in agreement on this, while England is reserved on it, and the US does not agree. Vietnam does not agree either. The Soviet Union does not agree with Vietnam's point of view, because it wants to sell out Vietnam.

The Soviet Union protests against the American bombing campaign in North Vietnam and the sending of additional American troops to South Vietnam are only a rouse; they are not words coming from the heart. This is plainly clear to the Vietnamese people, to the Chinese people, and to all the peoples of the world. This is also confirmed by the fact that every time Soviet diplomacy, the Soviet press, or the Soviet revisionists—like in the 1 March meeting—raise the issue of the war against the American aggression in South Vietnam, the American press justifies the Soviet position. It says that what the Soviet press is saying is not true and that the Soviet Union is in reality in favor of talks. This clearly shows the essence of the true stance of the Soviet Union on this matter. When the Soviet foreign minister presented to the American ambassador a [note of] protest against the American bombing in South Vietnam, the American ambassador sent the Soviet [note of] protest back. This reminded us of the events of 1958, when [former US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles was very worried because we started an artillery bombardment against the Chinese coastal island of Quemoy. The Americans thought that at that time China was preparing to attack Taiwan. In fact, they even brought part of their Navy's 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. At that time, the Soviet government was also very worried by these events. They sent Gromyko to China to enquire about this matter. This fact has not been published. We answered Gromyko that since Dulles at that time was applying a policy of brinkmanship against us, we were acting as if we were responding in kind and were testing them by attacking the Jiang-Jieshi army and not the Americans. The end result was that America did not fire against China and ordered that the Chinese territorial water and airspace not be violated. So we had no exchanges with them.

But why did we fire there? We fired, and we told Gromyko this, as a measure against the American attempt to create two Chinas. They wanted to withdraw their own forces from Quemoy and Matsu to break them completely away from Taiwan and the US Navy's 7th Fleet, to make it an independent unit. But as soon as we fired at Quemoy and Matsu, Jiang Jieshi found a pretext for saying that the Communist Party fired at his side, and, as a result, he could not withdraw his armies from these two islands. So the Americans were not able to convince Jiang Jieshi to withdraw his armies after our artillery bombardments. We know that both you and your foreign minister, Behar Shtlla, are clear about the reasons why we are against the idea of two Chinas. We told Gromyko about our secret that with this action we intended to express our opposition to the two Chinas. We went even further and we told him

that should the Americans bombard the Chinese homeland, we would carry the whole burden of a war with them ourselves and we would not want them [the Soviets] to send their army, we would not want the Soviet Union to be involved in this issue. Gromyko was extremely touched when China spoke openly and told him all its secrets.

Last year, when I was in Moscow [in November], Gromyko asked me whether I remembered the events of that period. I replied that I did, adding that Khrushchev had calmed down when he learned that in our opinion the Soviet Union would not have to get involved should a world war explode, something he was very scared of. Once Khrushchev found out about our opinion, he wrote a letter to Eisenhower protesting in a very strong tone, ostensibly in support of China, but Eisenhower returned the letter to him. The Americans had by this time a good idea of the nature of the Soviet revisionists. OK, so the Americans returned the letter to the Soviets, but did they afterwards attack anywhere in the Taiwan Straits? No, on the contrary, while we were bombarding Quemoy and Matsu, they moved part of the 7th Fleet in the direction of Hong Kong and other places under the pretext that it was going for rest. Now Khrushchev and his followers are telling us that on the matter of Taiwan the Soviet Union has been supporting China. This time the Americans again returned the letter to the Soviet Union. They know well what the Soviet revisionists are.

How do the American imperialists detect these weaknesses, this nature of the Soviet revisionists? This happens because the ambassadors of each of these two countries, both the American ambassador to Moscow and the Soviet ambassador to the US, covertly and continually keep in frequent contact with the respective government of the country in which they serve, with the intention of coordinating and preparing their activities. The same is happening right now on the issue of Vietnam. But Vietnam is against these preparations and against talks, and China agrees with Vietnam's decision. That is why they are not able to execute their plan. We are fully convinced that all the Left parties are also against them. What then remains for them to do there? For this they commanded Tito and gave him a special task. Tito, it is well known, is a bilateral product of the Americans and the Soviet revisionists. He started fulfilling his task by first calling a meeting of the non-aligned nations [on 14-15 March 1965 in Belgrade]. Initially, some of them were under the influence of Tito, and they agreed to call for talks and the end of fighting in South Vietnam. But what does discontinuation of fighting mean to them? This means that the liberation army of South Vietnam [NLF] should lay down its weapons so that the Americans and their South Vietnamese mercenaries get a respite to catch their breath, and later, after they have recovered, be able to have an opportunity to suppress the liberation forces. They also want North Vietnam and all the revolutionary forces of the world to end their support and aid to South Vietnam. Initially, this undertaking was successful for Tito, and it had some effect because some took part

in it like, for example, Cuba. To show that he was on Cuba's side, Tito said that he denounced American imperialism's war in Vietnam and was certain that the others would agree with him. But in the end some countries, like India, the United Arab Republic and Ceylon, showed that they were not against it. It is true that all three of these countries have their own internal reasons to side with the Americans. India is a servant of the Americans. Ceylon was just before its elections, and, just like India, it had no intention of joining an opposition against the American imperialists, while the United Arab Republic was facing the issues of Israel and West Germany which are supported by the Americans. As a result of their opposition, the draft proposal for the proclamation did not include a denunciation of the American aggression. The phrase was changed to read "against outside interference." But this is a very vague definition, which the Americans interpret as meaning against interference by North Vietnam and China, while North Vietnam interprets it as meaning interference by the Americans. Thus, this phrase can be exploited by both sides. The main points in this document are the cease-fire and the beginning of talks, and it is well known that the non-aligned nations exert a greater amount of influence than the Soviet Union on the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

It was under these conditions that our activity started, and we reiterated that neither South Vietnam's National Liberation Front nor the DRV could accept such positions, because these would serve the interests of American imperialism and were helping it to find a way out.

After this the other countries of Asia and Africa started carrying themselves better. Vietnam started its activity. The 15 non-aligned nations were, first of all, opposed by [Cambodian Head of State Prince Norodom] Sihanouk. At the beginning, Sihanouk, under the French diktat, called a meeting of the peoples of Indochina. His intention was to create in these countries a situation much like that of Laos, in other words, to create a united front with the cooperation of three groups, namely, the elements of a rightist group who are servants of the Americans, a centrist group that would represent the interests of France, and a leftist group, i.e. the South Vietnam's National Liberation Front. In other words, he intended to create a troika. But the situation in South Vietnam quickly started to look less and less like the one in Laos. South Vietnam's National Liberation Front is in a dominant position. South Vietnam's National Liberation Front and the National Front of North Vietnam resolutely expressed their opposition to the troika proposal. In the end, Sihanouk was forced to accept the opinions of South Vietnam and North Vietnam. In other words, he served a good purpose. The main gist of his position is that the American troops should be withdrawn from South Vietnam and the whole of Indochina. That way the people of South Vietnam can solve their problems on their own. As soon as Sihanouk received the draft proclamation by Tito, he resolutely expressed his opposition to it. He understands that Tito

helps the US by trying to find a way out for them. Sihanouk seeks the Americans' withdrawal from Indochina and the reorganization of the UN.

As a result of the activity on the issue of Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Mali, and Guinea expressed their opposition to the Tito draft proclamation. We worked on this issue with the Syrian foreign minister when he visited China [ostensibly for the signing of a cultural cooperation agreement on 18 March 1965], and, as a result, he expressed his reservations to the draft. Indonesia was also against the draft. And finally, the United Arab Republic did not respond to Tito.

Around this time, on 22 March 1965, South Vietnam's National Liberation Front issued a declaration of which the Albanian comrades are aware.² In this declaration the Front resolutely expresses its opposition to peace talks. The South Vietnamese declared that they would fight to the end against the US, even if the war continued on for 10 or 20 more years, and that they would fight until the last of the Americans had been thrown out of South Vietnam.

On 25 March 1965 the *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*] newspaper published a cover story in which the war of the South Vietnamese people was resolutely supported. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) also published a state declaration in which the same resolute support was extended to the people of South Vietnam. Thus, under these conditions Tito's activity ceased for the time being, but he will never agree with the situation, and we foresee that he will try to cook up some other maneuver. Judging from the activities to date it seems that the Soviet revisionists and Tito are trying to find a way that would get the American imperialists out of a very difficult situation.

Why is this happening? This is happening because the US is today facing a huge problem, and this problem is the crisis in South Vietnam. In the current conditions, the faster the Americans can withdraw from Vietnam, the better it will be for them so that they do not lose their prestige in other areas of the world. But American imperialism has no plans to withdraw because it considers that a great loss and shame.

And if the US does not withdraw, how will it proceed, going forward? That would mean escalating the war, sending troops directly to South Vietnam, escalating the war to North Vietnam and even further, to China. The only thing is that the US is not sure about the future of such a step, because, well, the US might enter China, but what would it do after taking this step? And if it continues to be dealt such defeats, then its prestige will suffer even more, it will be shamed, its military bases in the different countries around the world will be shaken, and the anti-American movement around the world will get a big boost.

So, in reality, the US is not resolute in going forward,

but they also do not want to withdraw. Will it then keep the situation as it is right now? This is what they desire. But the Americans want the issue of talks and the ceasefire to be raised by others, not by them. It is clear that today Vietnam is resolutely opposed to such a move. Tito also sees that today he is not able to execute his plot and, at the moment, the Soviet Union will not so easily come out and openly ask for such talks to be held without conditions.

Now the problem stands like this: the Americans will work hard so that the situation in Vietnam deteriorates for a while, then wait and see how that goes, and then they will go back to escalation. In other words, escalate, wait a while, then deteriorate again. But we, and I mean the leftists and the revolutionaries, all as one stand beside Vietnam. We have a clear course. We wanted to talk to you about this issue when we were in Romania, and now that we are in Albania. We also wanted to talk to you about the issue of the countries of Asia and Africa.

But as a central problem, I will touch upon mainly this one, because today Vietnam and Indochina have become the center of the war against American imperialism, modern revisionism, and the reactionaries of the various countries. Of course, American imperialism causes trouble on all four sides of the world. That is why the anti-American movement in the world today is not confined to Indochina only. It is also active in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Palestine, Congo (Leopoldville), Latin America, etc., etc. Obviously, the anti-American movement is also alive in the Mediterranean, but Vietnam and Indochina have become today the main segment of the war against American imperialism. It is precisely here that the Americans have centered their land, sea, and air forces today.

I would like to talk a bit about the state of the revolutionary forces in Vietnam. It is quite apparent that the enemy is not about to withdraw, and the Americans are also having a hard time making headway there. The national liberation forces of South Vietnam are winning more and more. In a time span of a little more than a year the situation in South Vietnam is turning increasingly anti-American, and the war of the people of Vietnam is partly being transformed from guerrilla [*partizane*] to mobile warfare. The fact that the Vietnamese are now able to continually destroy the organized forces of the enemy is fundamental. The Americans in Vietnam are waging a special war using mainly troops from South Vietnam. Previously, the US only had military advisors there, along with their naval and air forces. But lately, the situation has warranted that they also send marine units to Vietnam to protect their sea ports and airports. The mercenary forces in Vietnam can be categorized into two groups: the regular army, and the local forces that operate in various areas in the south of the country. They have had the task of fighting against the South Vietnam liberation army. But today these forces, wherever they are destroyed, have difficulty in regrouping. It is true that they are continually adding new elements to fill their ranks, but people of the

National Liberation Front are also infiltrating these forces and they are mining the mercenary army from the inside. The regular mercenary forces are comprised of nine divisions which are given the task mainly of defending key points around the cities, airports and sea ports.

At the moment, however, due to the fact that the local forces have mostly been destroyed, the enemies have been forced to send units of the regular army into battle against the liberation army. But today, the partisan liberation army is able to destroy full battalions of the mercenary army. It is able to stay in battle for 4-5 days in a row and destroy even two battalions of the enemy at once. The enemies organize their special war basing their operations mainly in strategic villages. Their plan was to organize 7,500 such villages [hamlets] and gather the villagers at certain points. But through the work of the partisan army, from the inside as well as from the outside, these villages have been destroyed, and there remain today only about 1,000 of them and they are continually being destroyed.

South Vietnam has a population of about 14 million souls, or a little more. Three quarters of this population are today on the side of the National Liberation Front. A few of those on the side of the Front are hiding inside the cities with the task of organizing demonstrations, or fighting while coordinating their activities with the partisan forces from within the enemy zones. In the past, the American army would use helicopters to transport regular soldiers to help those who were fighting the partisans, but the helicopters did not produce the desired effect because the liberation army was destroying them en masse. The liberation forces have even been able to destroy the very airport where the enemy forces are centered. In other words, the people are able to help the liberation army.

After undertaking a study of the development of the war of the people of South Vietnam, we came to the conclusion that the scale of the war in this country is much larger, relatively speaking, than that of the resistance of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism. We could say that the Vietnamese are fighting much better than we fought at that time. This is the truth, and it is a great achievement of the people of South Vietnam.

As to the pseudo-government of South Vietnam, as you well know, after Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother was killed [on 2 November 1963], the state leadership there has been changed about ten times. This shows the instability of the government in that country. No puppet government in the countries dominated by the Americans is as unstable as the one in South Vietnam. In the past, both China and the DRV have been able to deliver weapons to the liberation army of South Vietnam by both land and sea, but today the Vietnamese liberation army is capable of arming itself by taking weapons from the enemy.

[US Secretary of State] Dean Rusk is at the present forced

to accept that the issues in South Vietnam can only be solved by the internal forces and on three conditions: First, the puppet government needs to be stable and united. Second, the mercenary army needs to be developed and strengthen its fighting units. Third, the local government needs to become effective, because, according to their opinion, the outskirts are disconnected. But these conditions can never be achieved there. We are strongly convinced that if the liberation forces continue their fight as they have so far against the puppet government, [the SVG] will be destroyed and North Vietnam will be victorious. As to when—whether after a long or a short time—this depends on the changes in the relative strength of the two parties. But one thing is certain: Victory there will be on our side.

Faced with these defeats, the USA has only one reason to insist on staying there, and it is quite justified from its point of view. An American forced withdrawal from South Vietnam, after they threw so many forces there to help, would mean that the national liberation struggle in other areas of the world where they have their bases would deal them the same defeat. Additionally, this means that even a small country can fight and win over a larger country that is pestering it. So, under these circumstances, because of its nature, American imperialism will not give up so easily on Vietnam, because this is a vital issue for it. This is the reason for which it is seeking a ceasefire, it needs talks and it is trying to hold these talks in its favor. In this area the American imperialists are being helped at any cost by the revisionists, the reactionaries of various countries, and by their allies.

But, as I said before, the various attempts to arrive at a ceasefire were not successful. That is why now the US is forced to look for another way and jump to adventures. Of course, if one looks at our objective desire, we would like that the national liberation forces emerge victorious in South Vietnam, but the US cannot agree to such an outcome and that is why it may jump to desperate and even adventurous measures. This is why we need to be prepared to face an even more difficult situation. We have thought about such a possibility, have studied the future of the US in South Vietnam and have divided it into four stages. In the past this has also been murmured around the White House and in the Pentagon. I am talking about the increase of [US] forces in South Vietnam while at the same time intensifying their bombing for the blockade of North Vietnam. This is [the United States'] first option today, i.e. moving from a special war to a local war. According to the US plan, they have already sent marine forces to South Vietnam. They have transferred these forces from the Okinawa islands of Japan in order to strengthen their allies in South Vietnam. The Americans also wanted to transfer to South Vietnam an infantry division from South Korea. But the reactionary leaders of South Korea warned against such move, warning the Americans that in the event of "danger" from North Korea they would not be in a good position to resist them. Due to this reason the Americans were forced to use an infantry divi-

sion from the US mainland or from Honolulu. Thus, at the present they will transfer two divisions to South Vietnam, of which one will be a marine division and the other an infantry one. The Americans are also trying to secure troops from their satellite nations, such as from the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc. which will probably not even reach 10 thousand troops. As to the Philippines, in the war against Korea they only sent a symbolic unit of only one battalion, and at the moment we think they will have difficulty sending even one such unit. Thailand is also having difficulty sending troops from its country, because it has its own problems. And as to Malaysia, England does not agree that it should enter the war in South Vietnam.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Also because Malaysia needs its troops for itself, too.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: But for what will the Americans use these three divisions? Mainly to protect the seashore, the cities and their air bases in South Vietnam, by taking the place of the regular soldiers of the South Vietnamese reactionaries, which they are trying to send outside the cities to fight against the forces of the liberation army at the exact time when the liberation army is looking to fight these very forces of the regular army of the reactionaries of South Vietnam in order to destroy them. If the regular army is destroyed, then why would the American army remain there? Such a move would not produce any results, because by that time the government in the South would have fallen. Hence, the American army would have nothing to do there anymore and would have no choice but to withdraw.

As to the bombings in North Vietnam, there is no doubt that they are causing a lot of damage. But if the anti-aircraft war is strengthened, more and more American aircraft will be shot down. Meanwhile, the blockade that the Americans have put in place at sea will not be able to stop the transport of weapons from the North to the South, because in the end there are also roads on land. After this first stage, if the US will continue to be dealt defeats, and if they do not withdraw, they will then try to enter the second stage.

This is how we foresee the events. It is possible that the American imperialists will start an all-out bombing in Vietnam, including here Hanoi, and also send a much higher number of forces to South Vietnam, in order to widen the war in Laos and North Vietnam at the same time. In such a situation, the separation between the north and the south will cease to exist. Even today it is hard to distinguish between north and south in Vietnam. If the USA increases its troops in the southern part of the country, the northern side might also send reinforcements to the south in order to topple as soon as possible the puppet government there and to destroy the regular army of South Vietnam. As to the all-out bombing of North Vietnam, it is predictable that they will reach the border with China, but China will not remain indifferent. As to the manner of delivery

of China's aid, this will be decided in bilateral talks at the right time between the governments of China and the DRV.

If the war will continue still, then there remains the possibility that it will enter a new state, its third stage. This will mean that the Americans will also bomb the Chinese areas at the border with Vietnam and Laos, including our air bases, military depots, and even our rear positions. At such a situation the war will escalate because China cannot but resist and respond to the American aggression by throwing in the field of battle her army on the side of Vietnam. So the possibility remains that the war might escalate, but in the East and not in the entire world.

Then the Americans might finally attack on a broad front all of China. Regarding this possibility, we have taken measures for even the worst scenario. But if the war comes to China, Korea will definitely be affected as well. If this happened, it would be a good thing, because American imperialism will be destroyed on the Chinese fields of battle. Naturally, such a war will not last a short time, but it will require a considerably long time to achieve victory.

We are looking to secure ten to fifteen years to be able to accomplish peacetime construction so as to get stronger. That way the imperialists will not dare start a war against us. But, in the end, should they decide to go headfirst into adventures, we cannot but accept their challenge and give them a quick end. But even if we have a war at that moment, this would also have its positive aspects, because most of the leadership in our country today is comprised of people who have taken part in both the civil war and in our war against American imperialism. In other words, they have experience and will be able to train our descendants during this war. This is the reason why we also need to be prepared for such an eventuality.

Before facing these potential developments, we will consult with the Vietnamese side on a course of action. Had not the death of [Romanian Communist Party General Secretary Gheorghie] Gheorghiu-Dej occurred [on 19 March 1965], I would not have visited so soon, because the Vietnamese side had proposed talks with us. We will not be able to finish consulting with them right away because we would like to have talks on military matters with the Vietnamese before we have political talks. The Vietnamese comrades are prepared for a total mobilization. As the first step of this action they published a declaration of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on the mobilization of the people of South Vietnam in which it expresses its determination.

The second step will be the total mobilization of the DRV. Since more than a month ago, Hanoi has started to move its population out of the capital drawing on the experience of Korea, which during its three-year war against American imperialism was turned into ruins but still managed to build

a socialist society after ten years. I believe that your comrades who have been to Korea have witnessed this.

China is also prepared for mobilization. At the moment, we have undertaken an internal mobilization. It is possible that we will also undertake open mobilization in order to show the Americans that we are prepared to face them. We have indicated this to them in various ways, but we could also show them in practice so that they can stop and think.

Naturally, they have not even thought, let alone prepared, about these four stages that we think will take place. At the moment they, now that the war is still in its first stage, are measuring the situation. They bomb and watch, bomb and watch. They very much desire that the revisionists and their allies help them to force Vietnam to accept a ceasefire and talks, but such a thing cannot come to be. The laws of waging warfare are not dependent on their subjective desire, or our own subjective desires for that matter. That is why we have to broaden our perspective. We should take into account all the possibilities and be prepared for even worse situations; because only when you are prepared do the enemies stop and think.

After the publishing of the [Five-Point] declaration of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on the 22nd, we also published a leading article on the 25th. We did not make a declaration, but the Americans understand that this leading article is a forefather of a declaration. We published this leading article on the morning of the 25th, while Johnson made a declaration that same afternoon.³

Comrade Enver Hoxha: He felt it right away.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: He called a meeting with his closest advisors and discussed this issue. He is the one always shouting for war, but this time he was pretending to be on the side of peace. Our leading article has also been published in your newspaper. For the sake of balance you should also publish his declaration and then comment on it. Let the people learn what Johnson thinks.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: "We are ready," Johnson said, "to talk with our friends, as well as our enemies."

Comrade Zhou Enlai: He said, "Let us be cool-blooded" and "clear-headed," because "the Americans are not against talks." But then he said that Vietcong should cease its "aggression" and that the Americans are, allegedly, against the escalation of war in Vietnam and seek peace. "If the possibility for talks exists," declared Johnson, "I am ready to talk anywhere, with whomever you want."⁴

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Khrushchev used to say the same thing.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: When we publish such a declaration, we also make our comments on it completely known afterwards, thus revealing [the declaration's] true colors. This shows that they feel a great fear in their hearts, because justice is not on their side. All the peoples of the entire world are against the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and against the use of poison gas. If we continue to hold a resolute and strict position in this matter, and show all we are prepared to go through, they will stop and think. It was not us who started the fire in Vietnam, it was them. We do not want to bring the Soviet Union into this matter. But should a war explode in Vietnam and China, would the people of the Soviet Union stand by indifferently and observantly? This would be a great test for the revisionists. But if the Soviet Union stood by indifferently, the Americans would have to do the dirty work, as you pointed out earlier, on their own. Hence, they will have to stop and think.

Only when we hold on to a strong position in front of the enemies will their conspiracy be revealed to the entire world. This is the fundamental difference between the revolutionaries and the revisionists. We are against pleading for peace. Peace cannot be begged for.

If we concentrate all of the fire of our war on Indochina and Vietnam, then the war against the American imperialists will give a big boost to all the other areas of the world. This way we will be showing the peoples of these areas that if the war in Vietnam and in all of Indochina is supported, it would also be in their favor, because the opposite would be to their demise. The Soviet Union also raises the issue of Vietnam, but only formally, without responsibility. All they are looking for is to make deals with the US.

Lately we have learned that Ulbricht, at the suggestion of the Soviet Union, went on a visit to the United Arab Republic. Previously, [CPSU CC Secretary Alexander Nikolaevich] Shelepin, and later the Soviet deputy minister of defense had visited Cairo. [UAR President Gamal Abdel] Nasser asked the Soviet deputy minister of defense: "If Israel and West Germany will take action on what they have declared, thus challenging us, what will the Soviet Union do?"⁵ The Soviet deputy minister of defense promised to help Nasser. But, and let us remember first the [1956] events of the Suez Canal, this is a dangerous step. At that time Comrade Mao Zedong asked Khrushchev what he thought of this problem. Khrushchev answered that he had information that the US was against England and France sending troops to Egypt and that for this reason he had intervened with the American government to ask jointly at the UN for the withdrawal of the English and French troops from Egypt. Simultaneously, with this move, Khrushchev published a declaration in which he said that if England and France would not withdraw their troops from Egypt, then the Soviet Union would send its own forces there. This is the kind of person Khrushchev is. When you provoke him, he will tell you the truth. The United Arab Republic trusts

the Soviet Union, but at the end of the day it may be sold out by the Soviet Union.

Why did the Soviet Union want the United Arab Republic to invite Ulbricht for a visit? The Khrushchevians, like Khrushchev, seek to cause problems. They want everyone to rise up against the Americans and then intervene to bring them back together. They only look to do some haggling and never to give anyone true support to a correct road. This time Nasser fell for it and invited Ulbricht for a visit. In many Arab countries you could see opposition to this visit, such as from [President Habib] Bourguiba of Tunisia and [King] Hassan II of Morocco.

I will also talk to [Algerian President Ahmed] Ben Bella and Nasser about these matters. Our position is this: To pin down the Americans in Indochina and, while there, to weaken them as much as possible. The armed forces of American imperialism are not such a terrible thing. The Americans do not even have a 3 million strong standing-army today, only 2,700,000 or 2,800,000, to be exact. In other words, 19 standing divisions, of which 16 divisions are infantry, 2 marine divisions, and 1 paratrooper division. Of all these forces, half of them are to be found outside the US, i.e. 8 infantry divisions and 1 marine division. Lately, the US transferred one marine division from Okinawa to South Vietnam. But to make up for the one they transferred from Okinawa, they moved one division from Honolulu. By reducing their forces in Honolulu by one division, their forces in the US are now one division smaller.

The American 7th Fleet is today to be found in Taiwan and the South China Sea, but they feel it that this force is not enough to deal with the situation. They are now thinking about pulling towards this area part of the 2nd Fleet, which is now located in the eastern area of the Pacific Ocean, and increasing the number of their aircraft carriers in the South China Sea from four to seven by bringing them from other areas where they are now deployed. Of a total of three thousand plus fighter and bomber planes, over five hundred of these are being used only in South Vietnam.

This is the situation in the first stage of the war, the time of the transformation of the war from a special war to a local one, and the partial bombardment of North Vietnam. If the war is to be escalated into Indochina and China, these forces are obviously not sufficient. If they decide to wage a larger war, then they will be forced to concentrate more land, sea and air forces in the Pacific Ocean, in China and in Indochina, bringing them to this area from other areas of the world. In such an event their position in the other areas of the world would be weakened. If the American imperialists will recruit new forces from within their country for this, their people will rise and ask why it needs to fight in China. During the past three months, in the world and American public opinion, and currently even in the press, they are openly discussing the issue of the reasons for

fighting in Vietnam and the opinions on the matter differ. The rightist elements, like [US presidential candidate and Senator Barry] Goldwater and [former Vice President Richard] Nixon, want to continue the war. They have even circulated the opinion that China should be bombed too, though they have not mentioned that troops should be sent there. This shows the great weakness of the enemy. [Former British Deputy Commander of NATO] Marshal [Bernard] Montgomery has warned the Americans that should one enter China, they would not be able to find their way out. Even [General Douglas] MacArthur, who started the war in Korea, has advised Eisenhower not to start a war against China. Johnson is also afraid of it.

In the conversation I had with the Syrian minister of culture when he visited China [in March 1965], he also informed me to this effect. "Today a great danger exists for us," he said. "Israel, with the help of the US and West Germany, could attack Syria. Is it possible," he asked, "for China to pin down America in the East?" I told him that we have been doing such a thing for a long time, while you are now having talks with Tito, something that goes against what you are saying. This answer surprised him. I then emphasized that the situation in South Vietnam was developing in such a direction that many more American forces would be pinned down there. This made it known to him that the recent attempts for talks on the issue of South Vietnam are nothing but steps to find a way out for the American imperialists, something that would be unfavorable to Syria in relation to the Israel issue. He sent a telegram to Syria on that same day, and that is why Syria is exhibiting a reserved position toward the Tito draft. I also spoke about this matter to [Chairman Ahmad] Shukairy, the Leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who is a close confidant of Nasser, and he told me that as soon as he would return to Cairo, he would talk to Nasser that they should not agree with Tito. As far as we know, Nasser has not given Tito an answer in this matter.

Now it has become very clear that the events in Vietnam and the efforts that China is making to pin down the forces of American imperialism in the East will play a great role for the entire world.

As to the contradictions between the allies of the US, we can and should always exploit them. For example, before coming here, I had a conversation with the French ambassador to China. We spoke about two topics:

The first topic was in relation to the establishment of an unconditional ceasefire in South Vietnam. I told the French ambassador that since the Americans are asking for an unconditional ceasefire, one could say that they do not ever intend to withdraw from South Vietnam and what you are saying, that the people of South Vietnam should be able to resolve their own internal problems and that an independent and free South Vietnam should be created, cannot happen under these circum-

stances. So with a position such as yours, you are in fact helping the USA. And what good are you deriving from this? This shook up the ambassador a bit and he understood the essence of the issue. I also told him that those directly concerned with this matter, in other words, the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and the DRV, have expressed their opposition to the Americans' request. Then the French ambassador replied that we would not be able to achieve any results. I told him "to make an effort. Indochina is now comprised of four units. The situation today is that the American army is not only not withdrawing from South Vietnam, but is also bombing North Vietnam at the same time. In these circumstances the South Vietnam National Liberation Front will not agree to unconditional peace talks with the Americans."

Of course, we are not absolutely against talks. The issue is at what moment and on what conditions should the talks be held. In Laos, for example, we were for talks, but the USA undermined the coalition government and the conference was scrapped. All that remains now is Cambodia. There exist no difficulties with regard to talks here. Sihanouk is asking that a conference be held in Geneva which would ensure Cambodia's neutral, independent and peaceful position. France agrees with Sihanouk's request, and so does the Soviet Union and China. The DRV also agrees with it, while England is only half for it. Let us wait and see what the US will say about it. So, until now, only England is against it. I advised the French ambassador to seek at least that a conference be held to ensure Cambodia's position, and from this they could see whether America truly was in favor of talks. But I reiterated that in my opinion there did not seem to be any serious intention for talks on the issue of Cambodia. At the same time, China is not against your making such an attempt on the issue of Cambodia. After this conversation the French government issued a declaration in which it emphasized that that moment was not the right time to have talks on Vietnam.

The second topic had to do with the conference between the five great powers for the solution of world problems. I told the French ambassador that these five great powers did not exist, because the Americans did not recognize People's China, preferring instead to recognize Jiang Jieshi whom we do not recognize. Under these circumstances, I told him, no meeting of these five great powers could be held. As to the role that these five large countries should play, I also told him that we should study this matter too, but one thing should be kept in mind: that we were against these five great powers monopolizing the world. Just as we are against the domination of the world by the Soviet Union and the US, so are we against the domination of the world by these five great powers. We are for equality between all countries, regardless of whether they are large or small. It is because of this belief that we are in favor of organizing a conference of the heads of state of all the countries of the world for the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. I told him that if the five great powers would like to play some kind of role in

the world, if they would like to do something in favor of peace, China had a proposal for them: France should advise its ally England, and China should advise its ally the Soviet Union, so that these four powers together take the appropriate measures to isolate the Americans and fight against the US. But against what precisely should they fight? They would fight against the disorder that the US was cooking up everywhere in order to install its world hegemony, against the American nuclear blackmail, and against their war threats. If these four great powers could join up in such a struggle, then the outbreak of a nuclear war could be avoided, then we would be able to say that these four great powers were truly MAKING their contribution to world peace. "But at the present the situation is not ripe for such an action," I concluded, and the French ambassador laughed. Under these conditions, what five great powers could we say exist? No such thing can even be talked about at the moment. So, right now, it is possible and imperative that we exploit the contradictions between the allies of the US.

As you said before, the greatest danger of the moment for the world communist movement is revisionism. The current Soviet leaders are even more cowardly than Khrushchev. In fact, as you mentioned, in some respects they have gone even further than Khrushchev. They, the Soviet revisionists, are truly not ready to support the Vietnamese people or their national liberation struggle in general. Their declarations are bogus. In reality, the Soviet revisionists are only looking to find a way out for the US. This is one issue. The other is that they are looking to use the national liberation movement as a bargaining chip for their deals with the US. Hence, the issue we are facing is how to fight against the Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists.

We could end the session at this juncture and in the afternoon we can talk about the modern revisionists, and after, if we have the time, we can talk about the economic relations between our two countries.

(So, at 12:30 p.m. the morning session came to an end.)

+
+ +

The third session started in the afternoon at 4:00 p.m. [Zhou Enlai] took the floor once again:

Comrade Zhou Enlai: In the morning I took a lot of your time to lay down some facts and to make some analyses.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: On the contrary, it was a pleasure for us.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I would also like to give you some information concerning the Soviets.

Now I will speak on some of the characteristics of the war under way today in the international arena and on some of our activities.

Our enemies, i.e. the imperialists with the US at their helm, the modern revisionists with the Soviet revisionists at their helm, and reactionaries of various countries, find themselves facing a number of difficulties. Their leaders, especially Johnson, the Labor government in England which follows him, and Khrushchev's successors, i.e. today's Soviet revisionist leaders, are even weaker than their predecessors and do not have as healthy a standing. And since they are so weak, they face even more difficulties. This is one of their characteristics. Meanwhile, the leader of the Indian reactionaries, [Indian Prime Minister] Lal Bahadur Shastri, is even weaker than [former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. Your ambassador to China knows our phrase that this is a fellowship of the three Ns and one T. During a short time Kennedy [*Nekedy*] was killed, Nikita [Khrushchev] fell, and Nehru died [on 27 May 1964]. Now all that is left is one Tito. As the saying goes in China, "when there are no more soldiers left, the general himself must stand on watch." During last year's conference Tito showed himself to be no more competent than the other three (the 3 N's).

We could say that the American imperialists, the Soviet revisionists and the reactionaries of various countries, along with Tito, have created much turmoil in the past three years since the proceedings of the [17-21 October 1961] 22nd [CPSU] Congress when they openly attacked Albania. But today they are on a slippery slope because the situation is not in their favor, and continually and everywhere they are met with defeat. The new leaders of these three enemy groups have been forced to also draw some lessons. Hence, another characteristic of these new leaders is that they possess a strong deceitful character; they exploit demagoguery extensively even toward American imperialism. You also spoke about this issue yesterday.

So, the situation is a little bit more complicated. But, as you rightly pointed out yesterday, this complicated situation cannot save them from the unavoidable defeat. They can only prolong their life by zig-zagging around.

We must undertake a concrete analysis of their situation. At the moment, though we are fully against these three enemies, and our future is bright, we must exploit by any means any favorable opportunity to work against them; we must combine our principled character with flexibility. In other words, we need to have a strategic plan and a tactical system. Here the problems appear in several directions.

Before anything else, I would like to also talk a bit about the war we are waging against American imperialism and how we could go about destroying its plans that seek to dominate the entire world. At the moment, it seems that the main and

central front of the war on American imperialism is Vietnam and Indochina. We do not deny in the least the seriousness of the German issue as it relates to revanchism. We also place special importance on the issues of the Caribbean [Cuba], Congo and Israel, because all these countries are important to the intentions of American imperialism. But Vietnam and Indochina constitute a weak link for the US, because they have concentrated most of their forces in those areas and, by doing so they have induced the greatest ire from the people there. In Vietnam, great contradictions have appeared among the imperialists themselves, while the Soviet revisionists, who are trying to find a way out for the American imperialists, have met their own difficulties.

In this corner of the world the leftist parties make up the majority. There we find the Vietnamese Workers' Party, the Korean Workers' Party, the communist parties of China, Japan, Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, the leftist groups of India and Australia, as well as the Communist Party of New Zealand. That is the reason that the revolutionary activity is less hindered by the revisionists. In this area the imperialists find themselves plagued by many contradictions, such as those between America and France. Meanwhile, England, though continually following the USA, would have difficulty following them if the Americans would enter in a great war with China, because in such circumstances it would not be able to keep Malaysia for itself.

Yesterday, Comrade Enver Hoxha was right when he pointed out that the imperialists are still not ready for a great war. This is why they need to continue to arm West Germany, especially with nuclear weapons, while in the East they need to arm Japanese militarism. This feat is yet to be finished in both those countries. Of course, the most important thing here is the fact that the American imperialists have concentrated all their forces on their aggression against the Vietnamese people, but the people of South Vietnam are fighting resolutely and are determined to continue their war until victory. Naturally, such a situation exerts positive influence on the surrounding peoples, such as in Laos, Cambodia, China, etc.

In this area, the imperialists, as well as the Soviet revisionists, will use deceit and machinations. Hence, it is precisely in this area that it will be easier to uncover and unmask them. The American imperialists, for example, on the one hand are seeking to start talks, and on the other, they say that in order for Vietnam to enter talks, it needs to first stop its aggression. Their deceit here is easy to spot. Because at the end, who is the real aggressor? It is not Vietnam who has gone to North America for aggression. Aside from this, it is understandable that Vietnam cannot be the aggressor against Vietnam. This is something the Americans cannot explain. The Americans want talks, but at the same time they threaten with a war. Even after the 25 [March statement by Johnson] the Americans made another declaration in which they threatened to raze Hanoi and

Beijing to the ground, but despite their threats, they not only did not bomb these cities, but reiterated that if possible they would even go to Hanoi and Beijing for talks. Comrade Mao Zedong says that the Americans are trying to gain through talks what they could not win through arms.

So, we said that the American imperialists were threatening to raze Hanoi and Beijing to the ground. But after such threats, who will accept to enter talks with them? It is the Americans and not us, Vietnam and China, who are trying to gain at the table through talks what they could not win through arms. We have already told them that they would never be able to gain through talks what they could not win through arms. The war in Korea was proof of this. These attempts also show the great pressure being exerted on the Americans by the others, because everyone is against the war and concerned that the Americans will start an even bigger war. But we, along with Vietnam, are keeping a resolute position in order to force the American imperialists to go where we want them. That is why they are forced to react, step by step, to the changes in the situation. Now the American ambassador to Vietnam, [General Maxwell] Taylor, will go back to America because the Americans are aware once again that they cannot subdue Vietnam even through the bombing of North Vietnam. That is why they need to think things over again. We, on the other hand, are following carefully the development of the situation.

It is true that in some areas people do not know what is going on in Vietnam, because the imperialists, and the modern revisionists alongside them, are making a lot of propaganda to avoid the eruption of a great war, or threatening that the whole world would become a part of it. Such a war would envelop both the East and the West. Many people in the world still do not understand what is covered up behind this propaganda. A few days ago, when I was in Romania, for example, people there told me that this was a new problem. But war is not such a terrible thing. Nonetheless, this issue merits attention, and we must carefully think about every step. There are people that are afraid of war. There are others who think that the war should not go on as it has so far in Vietnam, that the national liberation war there could fail, and that the people might lose even more. There are even socialist states or nationalist ones who think so. But if we explained the situation, we could make it clear to them that war is not such a terrible thing. For example, the Vietnamese comrades say that, in the end, in Vietnam we will have a war much like that in Korea, but China is resolute in helping us. But China and Vietnam might be destroyed. Yes, this could happen, but after the war we will start at once the reconstruction. The Cuban comrades tell us that in their opinion the weapons we have sent to Vietnam are not playing such a big role, because the Vietnamese have only downed 20 American planes, while in reality they have downed more than 70 planes. They say that if the Cubans went there, they would play a much bigger role.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Castro measures himself by his morning shadow.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We think that Vietnam is our enemies' weakest link if we measure it against other areas. But should the war in the other areas develop further, we would not deny the newly arisen objective reality and react subjectively to it.

It is true that the situation in Germany is also serious. Yesterday, Comrade Enver gave us some very important information. We place a special importance on the support for GDR, its struggle against the West German militarism and its acquiring of nuclear weapons. But there are also difficulties here. The situation in West Germany is not like the one in South Vietnam where the wide masses of the people have taken up arms against American imperialism, because in Germany the people are under the control of the revanchists who follow the Americans. And in East Germany, the desire to rely on their own capabilities and to fight against the enemies is very weak.

Last year, before his demise, Khrushchev wanted to sell out East Germany. During the German National Day we told this to [GDR Foreign Minister] Lothar Bolz, and he could not deny it. When I went to Moscow, I also met Ulbricht and told him about this. He was not able to deny it either. Furthermore, during the last meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries [on 19-20 January 1965 in Warsaw], the support given to the GDR was exceptionally weak, and there was nothing Ulbricht could do about it. Not only the Soviet revisionists, but also those in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have the tendency to sell out the GDR, and, as to the matter of West Berlin, they agree that it belongs to West Germany. Such a position is almost accepted even in the Soviet press. West Berlin, they say, is a unit which in trade relations is considered as belonging to West Germany. When I met Ulbricht in Moscow, I told him that when West Germany wanted to sign a trade agreement with China, we agreed as long as West Berlin was not considered in the agreement as belonging to West Germany. He thanked us for it. But the socialist countries of Europe do not do such a thing. Hence, while West Germany is now holding its parliamentary [Bundestag] meeting in West Berlin, the Soviet Union is content with only a weak protest. All the Germans know well that the Soviet Union will never go further than this, and that is why the West Germans act this way. It is understandable what influence such a position has on the German people.

One thing is very clear: that the contradictions between France and the US on the issue of Germany are sharp; in fact, they are sharper than their differences on Indochina. But, despite these contradictions, the revolutionary forces in Germany are obtuse and are not able to exploit them. Hence, the existence of such a situation does not have any sizable effects. Sometimes, the Soviet Union exploits the Franco-American contradictions. But the Soviet Union does not do this following a revolutionary approach but only uses them as

a bargaining chip. Its main objective is to cooperate with the Americans. It is not interested in joining the French for a common war against American imperialism. And the worst part of it all is that today the Soviet Union finds itself under the influence of revisionism. The Soviet Union should have been the force that played the main role in the German issue, but it cannot accomplish this task because it is led by revisionists. Hence, it is impossible that the Soviet Union would wage serious war against the US under these conditions.

The same thing is happening in another area, in the Caribbean, in Cuba. It is a well known fact how Khrushchev sold out Cuba. And now it seems that Cuba is no longer as resolute against American imperialism as it used to be. Lately [in November 1964] they organized there a meeting of the revisionist representatives of 22 parties from Latin American countries. By doing so, they toppled the spirit of the [4 February 1962] Second Havana Declaration, though the Cubans do not accept such a claim. In Cuba the revisionist parties are considered legitimate, while the revolutionary parties are considered illegitimate. The revolutionary flag in Cuba has thus fallen. Cuba now survives on Soviet aid, so it is possible that it will not fight as before. And since now in Cuba the revolutionary flag is not held high like it used to be, it so happens that it does not exert any positive influence in the countries of Latin America. The revolutionary elements of Latin America are now turned a cold shoulder by Cuba.

Even in the areas of Congo (Leopoldville) and Black Africa, the revolutionary situation is in its infancy. No decisive role is being played there.

The war between the Arabs and Israel is certainly being fought under the American diktat. Israel has the support of the US, England and France. This causes the active elements within the Arab world to be divided into three main groups: Leftists, Rightists and Centrists, and [this] causes them to never be united. The revisionist parties there even sell contraband goods. This is the reason why the anti-imperialist war there sometimes is fought with compromises. The Algerians' wavering comes as a result of the fact that the old Algerian Communist Party has for a long time now been turned into a branch of the French Communist Party and the CPSU. The Algerian revisionists act as if they support Ben Bella, but in reality they are simply spreading their revisionist line. What is happening in Algeria is the same that happened in Cuba. The revisionists are infiltrating the national liberation front just like the revisionist elements of the old Cuban party infiltrated the ranks of the Cuban revolutionary group.

We support the war in Vietnam and Indochina, and we are against the expansion of war everywhere by the Americans. This position is in the interest of the world revolutionary movement, and if the American imperialists do not agree to withdraw from Indochina, it will not be such a bad thing because it

gives us the chance to pin most of the American forces down, and give a chance for a greater boost to the anti-American movement elsewhere. Since the US has built many bases in so many countries around the world, the widening of local war in one place weakens over time the American position in the other places. And vice versa; when the anti-American war in other areas of the world grows, this is favorable to the anti-American war fought by Indochina, Vietnam, and China. Even Cuba is now sending people to Vietnam. This is a good thing. We are not against it. But of more importance would be for Cuba to raise high once again the spirit of the Second Havana Declaration in support of the revolutionary wars of the peoples of Latin America, an action that would help pin down the American imperialists' forces there in increasingly greater numbers. The Cubans say that that they will send surface-to-air missile units to Vietnam which they say they "know how to use," while the Vietnamese, they claim, "do not know how to use them." In reality the Vietnamese command these weapons well, even though the Soviets have not sent anything to Vietnam. If it is as the Cubans say, that Cuba now has missile technology, then why does it not shoot down one of the U-2 airplanes that violate Cuban airspace and display it [all] for us to see?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: They are not and have never been Marxists. They are only a bunch of anarchists.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: They are bourgeois revolutionaries. They simply took a step toward Marxism-Leninism and then retreated.

Comrade Beqir Balluku: They returned to their roots.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Naturally, we are not rigid. Faced with American pressure, it is possible some other situation may arise there.

The issue is, thus, in the nature of the war against imperialism.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Could you give us some information on the war in Malaya?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This is a complicated matter for the area of Southeast Asia. England has agreed that Malaysia can remain semi-independent. In fact, Malaya is even a member of the UN. England accepted this, but separated Singapore from the territory. Thus, Malaya was turned into two political units in the same way as the administrative separation of India and Pakistan. Now we also have revolutionary war under way in Indochina, Indonesia, etc. Under these conditions, England understands its unstable position in Malaya and Singapore. That is why it is squirming, along with the American colonizers, to create a Federation of Malaysia, which would include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, just like it did before

when it created the Federation of Central Africa, which included South Rhodesia, North Rhodesia (now Zambia), and Malawi. In the latter, the English put a white government in power, but the black Africans are against it, so England suffered defeat there. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, the war in Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah is weak. In Sarawak and Sabah the people are against them, but the English are stationed in the Northern Kalimantan, which poses a threat to Southern Kalimantan. That is why the movement against the creation of Malaysia is widespread in Indonesia, and the CP of Indonesia tries to urge it and strengthen it. This war is led by President Sukarno with the intention of strengthening his own position.

Not only the people, but also those of the higher classes are against Malaysia. Meanwhile, the Americans attempted to exploit this movement in order to place Malaysia and Indonesia under their control. The Americans published an ever farther reaching plan. They wanted to create a confederation which would include Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In other words, the Americans, with the English at their side, want to put this area under their control, and put the brakes on the spread of communism.

On this issue, Sukarno has a position different from the Americans. He says that Malaysia should not take part in the conference as a separate political unit. Naturally, the Americans and the English do not agree with this. So the war there becomes more complicated. In the mean time, the revolution in Indonesia progresses further. In the beginning, the state took control of the English industrial enterprises, while, at the moment, it has started doing the same to the American ones.

A weak point, in our opinion, is the fact that the revolutionary war in Malaya is not strong because the revolutionary situation necessary for it has not arisen yet. This is why [Malaysian Premier and Foreign Minister Tunku Abdul] Rahman [Putra Al-Haj] has been able to keep the situation under control there. Singapore has its own contradictions with Rahman, but it also has two weak points: First, being a separate unit, but without an agricultural basis or a powerful industry, Singapore survives on Malaya's exports, especially rubber. Secondly, the Singapore populace of about a million plus inhabitants is made up mostly of Chinese. This greatly scares Malaya because there are many Chinese bourgeois elements there. Now the situation is such that Indonesia is against Malaysia, but the movement inside Malaysia is not widespread. The UN has truly undertaken some very unlawful steps. Two years ago, at the 18th UN General Assembly [1963], with the cooperation of the Americans and the support of the Soviet Union, the English arranged to include Malay in the Malaysian Federation and become a member of the UN without even putting it up for a vote. At the last session of the UN they even asked to make Malaysia a non-permanent member of the Security Council. This is definitely not a good thing. Malaysia entered into a race with Czechoslovakia for the candidacy, but neither of

them won because neither could garner even half of the votes needed. Then a compromise was achieved between England, the US, and the Soviet Union to allow each country to hold this post for only one year. There has never been such a thing at the UN. At that time Indonesia expressed her opposition, but did not withdraw from the UN at that time.

What happened at the 19th Session of the UN General Assembly [November 1964-February 1965] cannot be digested. But the Albanian representative [Ambassador Halim Budo] there performed wonderfully this time. He was supported by the representative from Mauritania for taking the matter to a vote and went against the decision of the Assembly speaker. But the enemies took the Albanian decision to a vote. The representative from Ghana rose and spoke, but the Soviet representative was nervous because he was afraid that the Soviet Union might lose its right to vote according to Article 19. The Ghanaian chairman was scared about this also. Under these conditions, the American representative declared that he would not use the right granted by Article 19, because, he claimed, this was a procedural matter. So the Soviet Union was spared. You already know the result. In this session, Malaysia managed to get into the Security Council. Indonesia was opposed to this, so it left the UN.

Some African and Asian countries say that the Indonesian walk-out [on 21 January 1965] did not happen at an opportune time. Had it happened at a different moment, they would, they claimed, have agreed to Indonesia's leaving the UN. You know about the speech I held in honor of the Indonesian foreign minister in China. We said that Indonesia got out of the UN, but we, after 15 years, have still not been able to get it, yet we live and prosper. We said that we must think about creating a new and revolutionary UN. Today, China, Indonesia, Korea and Vietnam are not members of the UN. Through the support we gave Indonesia, we managed to get her on our side in the war against American and English imperialism. Of course, in the mean time, we also found solutions for other countries from Africa and Asia, because it is not the right moment for them to get out of the UN. We told them that getting out of the UN depended on the situation of each country. But their common request is to free the UN from the American control, to have a thorough reorganization of the UN, and to remedy the mistakes of the past. Thus, we managed to turn public opinion in Africa and Asia in the direction of criticism of the UN. Hence, [Albania's] membership in the UN is a very just and notable thing.

The issue of Malaya in Southeast Asia is truly complicated. This issue is also related to the second conference of the nations of Africa and Asia. I will say a few words about this matter when we talk about the national independence movements of these areas.

The second issue is how to continue to crush revisionism in

the future. On this matter, we think that we should concentrate our forces mainly on the fight against the Soviet revisionists. Although, Khrushchev has fallen, in the Soviet Union they continue to practice Khrushchevianism even without him. The head of modern revisionism remains in the Soviet Union. It was Khrushchev who had decided to call the meeting of 1 March. As we say in China, you must first destroy the head of the enemy. This is where we need to concentrate our forces, against the main enemy; the others are of lesser importance. In Tito's case, as you mentioned before, we are talking about a revisionist of his own kind. He is now at the helm of a special detachment with specific tasks from the American imperialists. We fight against him within this framework. Today we do not even accept him to be considered a leftist element; neither do we accept his party as part of the international communist movement. Yugoslavia is not a socialist country. We view this matter completely differently from the revisionists. The parties now comprising the international communist movement can be classified in three groups: The parties of the left, the right and the center.

As Comrade Enver Hoxha also mentioned yesterday in his correct analysis, the leaders of the rightist groups are disintegrating. There exists no unity or solidarity among them. This can be clearly seen at the [January 1965 Warsaw Pact] meeting in Warsaw, as well as at the 1 March meeting. The prestige of the Soviet revisionist leadership has fallen even further. For a long time now it has seen no increase. This is how the Romanian comrades see this issue also. One thing is certain, that the conductor's staff is no longer having any effect. The disintegration in the revisionist countries will probably continue. Under these conditions, the leftist forces there will rise to their feet, too, though this requires time and struggle. It is hard to achieve swift changes there, because the socialist countries have dictatorial apparatuses and once they detect someone who is against their course, the revisionists in power undertake persuasion and fascist measures against the leftist elements. But either way, the revisionist forces are weakening constantly.

The centrist group is appearing now in the midst of the communist movement. A typical example of this group is Romania. Since Romania already took such a step, it is possible that in the future other parties may act like the Romanians. With their audacity for keeping contacts with the other groups, the Romanians are setting a new example. The rightists cannot do anything against them.

On the other hand, the leftist forces are continuing to develop. Since the representatives of the revisionists in Latin America held a meeting in Havana, great pressure has been exerted on the revolutionary forces. It is true, the revisionist leaders there are seen as legitimate, but this cannot prevent the development of the revolutionary forces, because the people want the revolution to begin.

The question that arises is: In the midst of this situation in

which the international communist movement is decomposing into the three groups, the leftists, the rightists and the centrists, how shall we proceed?

The rightist groups within the revolutionary movement play their own negative role, they deceive. This, we have said, is a characteristic of this period. In our articles on the press we have said it plainly that they do three things mistakenly and three things correctly; four things that are alike and four that are opposites. In today's situation we must continue to perform their concrete unmasking, because some people might be fooled by their declarations, such as, for example, by their declarations in support of Vietnam.

When Kosygin was en route to Vietnam [in February 1965], he stopped briefly in Beijing. He told us that the Soviet Union was going to help Vietnam. Again, on his way back from Vietnam, he enumerated what kinds of things he had promised to the Vietnamese they [the Soviets] would help with. This time he did not ask them for money, because the Vietnamese told him that the Chinese give them weapons for free. When Kosygin met Comrade Mao Zedong, he said that the Soviet Union was going to give Vietnam a lot of aid. Comrade Mao Zedong answered that the bigger the help to a brother country, the better it is.

In the middle of February, Kosygin sent us a list. But there was a problem with this list. According to it, the Soviets were giving the DRV two units of surface-to-air missiles. For this they wanted to send to Vietnam a brigade of 4,000 soldiers.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: In other words, they want to send troops "to teach" the Vietnamese how to use the missiles.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Obviously, they want to get the Vietnamese under their control.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes. (They laugh.)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: They also said that they were also going to give the DRV MiG-21 planes. The Soviets know well that the Vietnamese are only able to pilot MiG-17 planes. They are not able to use the MiG-21 planes. In addition, Vietnam does not have sufficient airports. The Soviets have promised to send them a total of 12 planes, and since Vietnam does not have airports, they were "thinking" they should send the planes to a Chinese airport close to the border with Vietnam. For this they say that they will need to send an additional 500 people for "service" needs.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We understand very well the Soviets' intentions. We also have experience in relations with them.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: As to the matter of the delivery of

these materials, the Soviets request that China grant an air transport route starting in the Soviet Union, through China up to Kunming, and from there to Hanoi. In other words, they want to establish a route from the Soviet Union to Hanoi, through a Chinese air passage. They promise that they will send [not only] missiles, but also troops. Obviously, with this "aid" they want to put not only Vietnam, but also China under their control. How can we, then, accept such a thing? We told the Soviets that the Vietnamese comrades have not requested MiG-21 airplanes. But even if it is decided that these airplanes should be sent to them, then before the delivery, the Vietnamese should be given the chance to send their own people to the Soviet Union to learn how to pilot such planes. This matter has to do with the common declaration of all the socialist countries that the Soviets tried to publish since the beginning, through which they were trying to earn the right to enter bargaining with the Americans and to place the socialist camp under their control.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: They are trying to do in Vietnam the same thing they tried to do here, in Vlora, with the submarines.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: But we confronted the situation. We, as well as the Vietnamese comrades, did not agree with these Soviet proposals. We told them, that if they would like to send munitions to the Vietnamese, we are able to deliver them by rail. After our answer, the Soviets made up all kinds of stories and spread them around the socialist countries, saying that the Chinese refuse to transport through China Soviet military aid for Vietnam. Aside from this, the lists foresaw that the delivery of military goods would happen very slowly, a long process.

Since the fall of Khrushchev up to the present, more than half of the list that was presented to us has yet to be delivered. For the delivery of the two units of surface-to-air missiles the Soviets made a request according to which 12 trains would be needed for a period from 5 April to 25 April, in other words, for a relatively long time. Of course, for these they do not send troops, but only 260 people for training purposes. But the list clearly says that the majority of this equipment is used and old and that there are no costs associated with it. Hence, it is hard to say whether one could shoot the enemy with such equipment or not. This is where the intentions of the Soviets become clear. They want to place Vietnam under their control by using old equipment that does not "cost" them anything. Of course, this "aid" is only for North Vietnam, because they do not want to give anything to South Vietnam.

The Soviets did not say a word about the declaration of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, except what they have already said: that they would send volunteers. They spread deviousness in all directions, and that is why we continually unmask them.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Despite their [stated] reasons

for giving these materials. We, the Albanians, could serve them some good by unmasking and telling the world about the Soviets' intentions here with regard to their submarines, marines, specialists and armaments.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This shows the complicated character of the war against the Soviet revisionists and those parties whose leadership is comprised of revisionists.

After the meeting of the revisionists on 1 March, there is a great possibility that the representatives of the leftist parties will hold bilateral or multilateral talks. The leftist parties in the East have had more contacts with us, because they stand at the front line of the war against American imperialism. But we, except for bilateral or multilateral talks, have never had a meeting with the representatives of all the leftist parties.

Comrade Enver Hoxha raised an important problem. We should exchange information with each other so that in the future we can be able to coordinate our activities in the war against revisionism. Even though the war against the revisionists is complicated and they wage their war by cheating, if we proceed carefully, it will not be difficult to unmask them. At the end of the day, they will even unmask themselves, because they are not on the side of truth. They are on the side of fiction.

On this matter, it is our opinion that at the moment the time is not yet ripe to organize a meeting of all the leftist parties and groups. The truth is that between the various leftist groups, due to the [varying] conditions and situations in each country, there are differences. This is reality. But such a thing is allowable and natural. During the waging of this war, everywhere problems arise and situations develop in different circumstances. For example, you attacked the Soviet revisionists because they were the first ones to attack you directly, so you came out openly against them. Later they attacked the CCP by name, so it also came out openly and unmasked them. Then they openly attacked the Communist Party of Japan, and there they stopped. They do not dare come out against the other Marxist-Leninist parties. Today, the war between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is rough, but there are differences. The issue is to see what kinds of enemies you are facing. Some fight in this war on the front line and some, due to various circumstances, stand in the rear. But we are convinced of one thing. When American imperialism escalates its war in Vietnam further, the anti-American struggle will then develop further and rise even higher. In those circumstances all leftist groups in the international communist movement would be involved. And if the war becomes even larger and China is forced to enter into it as well, then each group's position will become clearer. In other words, the rhythm of the development of the situation in such conditions would be faster than what we foresee. This is what I wanted to say on the war against revisionism.

The third issue is that of the national liberation wars of the

countries of Asia and Africa. The truth is that in these continents the majority of the national liberation wars are neither under the leadership of the communists, nor under that of leftist revolutionary elements. Some national liberation wars are under the leadership of bourgeois elements. We spoke about this problem last year. After a period of war of over one year, since we last met, a division has also been created in the midst of the revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, comprised of the three groups: the leftists, the rightists, and the centrists. After this one year of war, we are noticing, for example, that the rightist groups have made a compromise with imperialism, while the leftists are resolute in their war against it. But some centrist groups have been created, and they are great in number.

The main issue in Asia, Africa, and the countries of Latin America is the war against imperialism, and, in particular, against American imperialism. The nationalist countries are worried about imperialism, while at the same time they are not interested in the war against revisionism that is going on in the ranks of the communist movement. Some of them are troubled for the stand-off between China and the Soviet Union. We must study and analyze [those groups] to find out who is resolute against the American imperialists and who has good relations with the US. The real actions of each one of them will show on which side they are.

A lesser issue is that we could look at the situation through the prism of economic aid. The Soviet Union “helps” the countries who are fighting for national liberation and gives them arms, but at a high price and always with interest added. [Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr.] Subandrio, for example, told me that when he was in China [on 23-28 January 1965] that the Soviet Union was planning on granting the Indonesians military aid at the tune of \$900 million. We advised the Indonesians to ask the Soviets not to include any interest.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The Soviets have become like [Sir Basil] Zaharov who used to deal in arms.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The second advice we gave them was to ask for the postponement of the deadlines for the repayment of the arms loans. The Indonesians are now using this method against the Soviets. The Foreign Minister of Syria [Dr. Hassan Mourid] also told me that they have allocated \$200 million for the weapons that the Soviet Union has given them.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: They have turned into arms dealers.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Syrian foreign minister asked us for a loan of \$20 million. When we asked why they needed this money, they told us it was [needed] for interest payments to the Soviet Union for the arms loan. I responded that we would not give them the money for this purpose. I advised the Syrian,

first of all, to ask the Soviets to eliminate the interest from the loan and tell them that China did not charge any interest in arms sales to other countries. Then I told him to also ask for the postponement of arms loan payments telling the Soviets that the Syrian side was unable to pay. Finally, I emphasized that if they were resolute in the war against imperialism, they should continue to ask for weapons from the Soviet Union, but should also tell the Soviets not to ask them for any more cash for arms because China did not ask either. He told me that he was going to visit the Soviet Union, and I advised him to tell the Soviets that this was what the Chinese were saying. This action uncovers and unmask them [the Soviets] because through it they are trying to control others.

This is also proved by their economic aid to other countries. In this area they act exactly the same way as the US. First of all, it is easier for them to give promises, but the problem is that they do not keep them, or they help build a large object, but the country receiving “the help” has to suffer a lot of expenses without any economic benefit, because the object requires further investments to become profitable. This is what they did at the Aswan Dam. Even after the construction of this dam ends, if the Egyptians do not make supplementary investments by building other dams, the lands of Egypt will remain as they are, lacking irrigation.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: In other words, the investment there is useless.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I was told this by the vice prime minister of the United Arab Republic.

When giving others economic aid, the Soviets follow the policy of making these countries economically dependent on them, as they are doing in the case of Cuba. In order to have them under their control, they urge the Cubans only to plant sugar cane. This is the policy they also follow with the countries of Asia and Africa.

In addition, the Soviets’ technology is not that new. If we compare it to the world’s technology, we will see that their equipment is very heavy, it requires many expenses and a large workforce, and it [only] yields high-cost products. Faced with this situation we have also brought up the matter of economic development in the countries of Asia and Africa, and lately we have proposed that these countries cooperate with each other on the basis of equality. But the Soviet representatives expressed their disagreement with this principle. We asked that the resolution include a phrase that stressed that each country should follow the course of an independent economy, relying on its own strengths, and the Soviet representative intervened with the Algerians to withdraw from this position, but we noticed this. In the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America we see that in the matters of the war against imperialism and their economic development, they also have [to deal with] the

recalcitrance of the Soviet revisionists. The June conference of the countries of Asia and Africa is also facing disintegration due to the segmentation of these countries in the three groups: the leftists, the rightists, and the centrists. The Soviet Union is inventing a thousand and one reasons to attend this conference, trying to pass itself off as an Asian nation. Of course, as a first measure, we will fight with all our might not to allow the Soviets to attend. Nonetheless, the situation at this conference will be complicated. Even if the Soviet Union does not attend the conference, it will have its own representatives in it, i.e. the rightists. But this will be a good thing, because it will give us the chance to unmask them and their collaboration with the Americans. In Asia, the rightist at the moment is India, which is a product of both the Americans and the Soviets, while in Africa this role is played by [Tunisian President Habib] Bourguiba, who is a product of the Americans, but who also wages propaganda in the Soviets' favor and against China. The war helps differentiate these countries in three groups.

This situation is also reflected by the working-class movement in Europe and North America. The situation in this country is not clear to us. Yesterday, Comrade Enver Hoxha spoke to us a little on this topic.

The same can also be said about the peace movement in the world. The whole revolutionary movement of the peoples of the world will continue to disintegrate. In other words, the rightists will continue to increase their cooperation with the imperialists and the revisionists, and will continue to be unmasked. They will work to hinder the revolution in Asia and Africa, while the revisionists in these continents will use various deceptive methods to serve ever better American imperialism. But if the revisionist leaderships of the socialist countries capitulate in front of imperialism, the peoples will not agree to this and will not listen to them. Hence, the tougher and more unrelenting our struggle to unmask them gets, the smaller their deceptive role will become.

In a meeting with Kosygin, Comrade Mao Zedong notified him once again that we will continue our polemics not only for 10 or 20 years, but if need be even for 1,000 or 10,000 years. When Kosygin asked if it were possible to continue it for a little less, then Mao answered, "OK, we will make an exception. We'll continue it for 9,900 years." (Laughter.) Then Kosygin asked, "Is this how we will proceed with our polemics?" Comrade Mao Zedong answered that when the imperialist enemies force you, you will come to our side. When Kosygin asked when this alignment would happen, Comrade Mao Zedong told him that this depended on our enemies, in other words, on the point at which the enemies of socialism started a big war.

Comrade Mao Zedong has said that we must work to ensure a peaceful period of 10 to 15 years for reconstruction. But a world war is not dependent on us. If American imperialism

will start one, we will not be able to avoid it. Kosygin intervened and added that, "it is not necessary for us to wait for a great war from the enemies and then align. Would it not be possible to create unity between us now?" Comrade Mao Zedong answered that at the moment he did not see such a possibility. Then he added that they (the revisionists) could hold their 1 March meeting. "But," he said to Kosygin, "it will become a burden on you. If you would like to carry it, then, go ahead. If you favor disunity, then disunite." But Kosygin did not answer him. And, in fact, they did hold their meeting. So Comrade Mao Zedong correctly foresaw this matter. Then Kosygin asked again, "Should we only unite when the enemies attack us? Can we not do it right now?"

"We can also unite now," said Comrade Mao Zedong. "All you have to do is accept the mistakes you have made vis-a-vis the Albanian comrades, our party, and the other leftist parties. Only this way can unity be achieved."

Of course, Kosygin did not have an answer to that.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Comrade Mao did a number on him.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We are certain about our future and the international situation is developing favorably for us. For example, when we spoke to each other in January of last year, we had not thought that Khrushchev would be ousted in October 1964. We had foreseen his defeat, but not this early. And in one night his friends ousted him. No person can be compared to him. He played such a hideous role that even his Soviet revisionist friends threw him out, though they too are suffering and will continue to suffer defeats.

That is why we are certain about our future. For as long as we keep high the flag of our war against American imperialism, for as long as the people of the world will fight and unite in a great and common front against American imperialism, the revisionists will have no leg to stand on, they will be unmasked and their capitulating conspiracies for cooperation with American imperialism to divide the world into areas of dominance will fail.

These were the international relations issues I wanted to discuss. I do not know what your opinion is, Comrade Enver Hoxha and other leadership comrades of the ALP, on these issues.

As to the issues of the economic cooperation between our two countries, I think we can also discuss those tomorrow.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Allow me, Chinese comrades, to express my opinion on Comrade Zhou Enlai's wonderful disposition. This has not only satisfied us immensely, but as also strengthened our resolute faith. Comrade Zhou Enlai's presentation is a Marxist-Leninist, thorough and correct analysis that

makes things clear to us and sheds light on all the issues that preoccupy us and on all the issues surrounding the international situation, the national liberation wars, and the war of our parties and of Marxism-Leninism in the world against imperialism and modern revisionism, especially against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

As we have always emphasized, as I also emphasized yesterday, and as Comrade Zhou Enlai's presentation proves once again, we have always been and are in complete-thought and action-unity on all issues. There is not the slightest thing that we are not in agreement with each other. This is a grand victory for us. This victory is being tempered every day and today's reality shows it.

We learned much from Comrade Zhou Enlai's presentation. The great CCP and the Chinese government have a great amount of experience and possess extensive knowledge of all the issues that happen and develop in the world. They have colossal capacity to have a clear and correct picture of the world's situation and, led resolutely by Marxism-Leninism, have known and know how to draw correct conclusions from it. With his presentation Comrade Zhou Enlai not only gave us a clear picture of the situation, but also gave multi-sided help to the leadership of the party, and to the Albanian government, and this will immensely strengthen our party's and people's work on the main issue of the line that our party and government follow.

Comrade Zhou Enlai, aside from other things, also clarified for us very well the situation developing in the Indochina war and its perspectives, and the various stages that this war might go through. He also presented for us a clear picture of the strength of American imperialism and the colossal forces of China, of the Vietnamese people, and the peoples of all of Asia facing this massive aggression. We never had any doubts about their power. We were and are fully convinced of the weakening of imperialism, its decomposition, the colossal Marxist-Leninist strength, courage and bravery of the Chinese people and the CCP in front of this massive aggression. Here stands the certainty of the worldwide victory of communism and of the destruction of American imperialism and its allies, the modern Khrushchevian revisionists in particular, and also the reactionaries of the countries of the whole world.

Receiving this clear picture through the presentation of Comrade Zhou Enlai, we will strengthen even further our resolve to contribute as much as we can with our participation in the war for this great, imperative and decisive cause for the unmasking and weakening of American imperialism. This was truly a splendid Marxist-Leninist analysis. Comrade Zhou Enlai's presentation, as I already mentioned, made things clear to us in many respects. It clearly showed the balance between all the Marxist-Leninist, socialist, communist and progressive forces of the world in their war against American imperialism

and revisionism and we think that what you told us is completely correct. We are in full agreement with the lessons of the CCP.

We are also in full agreement with the correct viewpoints and the resolute struggle that we must wage against modern revisionism, with the Khrushchevian revisionists at their helm, until its complete destruction. Both you and we know this full well and are in perfect agreement on the danger that these treasonous elements pose for our two countries, our parties, and for all the other Marxist-Leninist parties of the world. That is why we reiterate that the position of the CCP on this vital issue, the war against imperialism and modern revisionism, forms a pillar of steel against which we will lean and around which we, all the other Marxist-Leninist forces, will gather to wage our war until our final victory.

Marxism-Leninism and the boundless friendship between our two peoples and parties shine on our common path. We will always walk united with you because there is no force in the world that could stop our war against our enemies. Our war will only grow bigger. We will both utilize and learn from the experience of the CCP. We will properly utilize all the elements and situations, following the right path, so that we may contribute to our common victory with our modest capabilities. We are saying this to you using very few words, but rest assured, Comrade Zhou Enlai, that you will have in our party, people, and government, a friend for life, in good times and in bad, as we also have in you a friend, an ally, a faithful companion, sincere, generous and internationalist that loves our people and Party. We thank you personally, Comrade Zhou Enlai, dear friend and companion, from the bottom of our hearts for your presentation to us.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I laid down some opinions of our party and its analysis of the international situation. And the evaluation of this situation that Comrade Enver Hoxha presented to us, I think is also of a very high level. My presentation was not prepared properly. I did not speak so systematically as Comrade Enver Hoxha did.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Your presentation was so organized, and of such high quality, that we were very clear on all the issues that you touched upon.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: There is one thing that is clear; both our sides have common opinions on the war against imperialism and revisionism, on the support for the national liberation war and national liberation revolution, on world events in general, and on matters of strategy, tactics, and general course of action. We are now facing the new situation of the waging of our war against revisionism. This war has now entered a new stage. This is why this new meeting between our two sides helps us a lot because we are given a chance to understand each other better, to facilitate our work in this direction and to

coordinate our activities better. This way it will be easier for us to undertake common activities in support of each other.

In this viewpoint, the problems and international struggles of our two parties and our common Marxist-Leninist positions on principal matters will play a galvanizing role and in every concrete situation, when this fact is better understood and we coordinate our actions even better, we will achieve even more.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is precisely so.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Of course, in the future the possibility that we might have some problems in a particular area, or a distance in opinion, cannot be avoided. This is permitted because we are talking about two countries with different conditions that know the situation to variable degrees. But we will notify and clarify each other, and in this fashion will arrive at common opinions. Thus, we will get even closer to each other.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This opinion is quite correct.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Now I would like to answer the issue you have raised, whether it is the right moment to create a government of South Vietnam.

We certainly understand very well your opinion. Its intention is for the war in South Vietnam to secure a powerful leadership. The leadership comrades of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam and of the Vietnam Workers' Party have also thought about such a course. They think that at the present stage it is still not the right time to take steps for the creation of a government, but they are in the preparatory stage for such a possibility. The reason is that even though the forces of the armed struggle in South Vietnam have actually grown, they have yet to gain the stability that such a step requires. If we compare China's war and the one being waged now in South Vietnam, we could say that the latter is somewhere at the beginning of the final stage. The nationalists there still do not accept the fact that the National Liberation Front has achieved a leadership position in the war against American imperialism. At the moment this fact is accepted by only a part of them, a part which might even take part in a government; a part of the troika as we call it, such as Sihanouk, who accepts such a thing. Sihanouk has proposed a coalition government comprised of three groups: leftists, rightists and centrists. In other words, this government would also include American backers and French sympathizers. But the National Liberation Front did not accept this proposal. But if the South Vietnam National Liberation Front excludes all these other forces and only accept the participation of the forces on its side, then the front will have a narrower sphere of influence. At the same time, the centrists would not accept a government that only includes leftists, so the National Liberation Front would find itself relatively isolated. Hence, in its 22 March declaration the National Liberation Front contended that only the South

Vietnam National Liberation Front can represent the people of South Vietnam. And in fact, this is correct. The issue of South Vietnam cannot be solved outside the National Liberation Front. If an interested party would like to get in touch with North Vietnam or China, it cannot solve anything without South Vietnam. The South Vietnam National Liberation Front hopes that the brother countries and sister parties will respond positively to its declaration. Obviously, the ways to respond can be different according to the situation of each party. The issue is for the Front to be accepted in the international arena.

The Vietnamese situation is different from that of the Algerians. When the Algerian people were fighting, the Algerian Communist Party did not take part in the war, so the nationalist leaders of the war in Algeria created a front on their own, while the war in Vietnam is led by the Communist Party which is the same for the whole country. There are two front organizations, one for the north and one for the south. In the north there is the National Front and in the south the National Liberation Front.

Along the successful development of the war in South Vietnam, it is possible that the Front will draw all the patriotic elements of South Vietnam and the puppet government will fall quickly.

China has experience with such a situation. Towards the end of our national liberation war, around May 1948 when our counterattack had won a decisive victory, we made a call for a new political consultative conference. But the situation in South Vietnam is completely different from that. It is possible that the Americans will directly intervene to escalate the conflict following the four stages we discussed earlier. It is due to this reason that the comrades in South Vietnam have decided to wait at this moment a little longer regarding what you are asking.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We are clear on it.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: In the meantime, the Soviet Union only speaks in general terms as far the support for the liberation struggle of South Vietnam or the sending of volunteers is concerned. Until now the Soviets have not satisfactorily consolidated their relationship with the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, even though they have representation there at the diplomatic level. Other nationalist countries also have their representatives at the diplomatic level there. This situation in Vietnam is developing in a very complicated, though interesting, manner. For the Soviets, Vietnam is a test. Are they really in support of the national liberation war, or do they want to sell it out?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This issue is very clear to us right now. You have judged this issue correctly, too.

(This is the end of the afternoon session of 28 March 1965.)

[Discussion of economic issues follows.]

[Haxhi Kroj]
[signed]

+
+ +

The next session started at 9:00 AM on 29 March 1965.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Before we start, maybe you are thinking of coming out with a common declaration, a communique, or maybe you think that we should do neither one nor the other? What is your opinion?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I think it would be better if we came out with a common declaration since the main issues will be included in our speeches.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Very well then. Shall we ask the comrades of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to work on the preparation of the communique draft? Or maybe you have a draft already prepared?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes, we do have a copy of the draft communique and can give it to you.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Very well then. We will look at it together and then ask your vice minister of foreign affairs, Comrade Zhang Hanfu and Comrade Behar to work on it and whenever we find it suitable we look at it and decide.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Agreed.

I think that today we should work on the issues of the economic cooperation between our two countries, Albania and China. I do not know whether you, Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other Albanian comrades, agree with this proposal, or if you have any objections to it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: No, we have no objections to it.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We are well aware of the successes you have achieved during the last few years. These successes are apparent from the report that Comrade Enver Hoxha presented last November on the occasion of the 20th year anniversary of the liberation of the PRA. It becomes clear from the report that Albania has achieved great development in its popular economy and this has created favorable conditions for the further development of the country. I feel great happiness for your successes, because your successes are at the same time our successes, just as China's successes are your successes. I do not

think it is necessary that I go on for too long on this issue.

In relation to the issue of the economic cooperation between our two countries I wanted to clarify one thing: Before I set off for Albania, I read one more time the letter that Comrade Mehmet Shehu sent to us and the answer that we sent back. But until now we have only completed a general study of your requests. We have not been able to complete a detailed and thorough analysis. Of course, when Comrade Spiro Koleka comes to Beijing, we will study and take steps on those as appropriate.

More than two weeks have passed since talks between the specialist teams of the two countries started. During this time they have reached several conclusions. They have held talks twice. They have reached an agreement on the concrete solution of several problems, but there are still a few problems that have not been solved yet.

I am talking about a few issues on which we are not sufficiently sure. Some of these issues I have already discussed with comrades Mehmet Shehu and Beqir Balluku during my visit to Albania last year, and have expressed my opinion on those issues, but I ask for your forgiveness this time because I have not had the chance to look into them in detail and thoroughly having to pay more attention to the issues of the international situation.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We understand that you have great problems on your hands, and thank you for what you have done.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: That is why I ask comrades Mehmet Shehu and Spiro Koleka to understand me on this issue. But saying all this does not mean that your requests have not been studied at all, that the issues of the economic cooperation between our two countries are of secondary importance. Only during the last two days have I met with our specialists twice and have talked to them about your problems. Nonetheless, I will present here some partial opinions, which will not give the full range of our position. I say all this to make clear that my thoughts on these issues are limited. Now let us get to the point.

First of all, we understand the feelings, desires and requests that the ALP, the government, and the Albanian people presented to us to speed up the pace of building socialism in your country. Your requests have their own point of departure.

The fundamental starting point, as Comrade Enver pointed out, is the fact that Albania lies far from the East; it is the southwestern outpost of the socialist camp surrounded by enemies and from the viewpoint of aid and cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe it is restricted. Judging from this fact, you are obviously justified and we understand very well your desire to speed up the pace of building socialism in your country.

We understand the second point of departure to be the fact that Albania is now going forward with the intention of building socialism by relying on its own forces. And, naturally, during this process, China cannot sit aside and not help Albania, because at the present stage Albania is still not fully capable and does not have the required wherewithal to fulfill all its needs. Of course, Albania now has some capabilities, but they are not fully sufficient and we must, for the moment, help it, especially since the other socialist countries cannot give it the amount of help that the PRC is capable of offering.

The third point of departure is the fact that if Albania through such aid can become even more powerful than it is at the present moment, she will play a much larger role in the international arena than she can at present.

These three points of departure were also raised by Comrade Enver Hoxha in the presentation he gave, and we think and must accept once more that these three points of departure are correct.

It should also be said that we are in full agreement as to the course being followed in Albania for building socialism. This course is the same as ours, which means that the national economy has agriculture at its base, while keeping industry as an important lever. It also means that an independent economy, based on its own forces, will be built and all the tasks will be achieved based on the particular realities of the country.

On the first starting point: building a national economy, I can say that we started capital construction in our country around 1959. But I also want to point out that during this time we also encountered a lot of errors and shortcomings. These were important shortcomings. For example, one of them was that during this period we did not undertake a generalization of our experience. I want to talk to you about some of the main shortcomings that we identified in our work, including the problems in the aid we give to foreign countries. The comrades of the Committee for Economic Relations with the Outside World can tell you more on this topic, but as far as I know, until now, we have found shortcomings in four areas:

First, during these last six years, especially during the initial period and the middle period until 1963, we have not been able to fully understand or sufficiently gather political or economic information on your country, especially information about your sub-terrain and above-ground raw materials. We still have deficiencies in this area. [...] The designs have been done without sufficiently relying on the economic and political characteristics of your country, without knowing well the raw materials and above-ground information on the areas where the object would be built. So, during object designs we have not relied sufficiently on your country's characteristics. On this shortcoming we may mention, for example, the fact that your country has limited arable land area, but we have

designed objects that require large swaths of arable land. Because of this, the volume of work required for capital projects has increased, a larger workforce is needed, and the time period required for completion is longer. This is not favorable to you, to your construction time, for the economization of arable land, workforce, investments, and time. As our specialists and ambassador in Albania have informed me, comrades Mehmet Shehu and Spiro Koleka have also pointed out these problems. You know about them, and we are very happy that our Albanian comrades do not hesitate to inform us of their opinions. This serves us as a lesson and for this I extend my gratitude, because such mistakes also happen in our country and we often criticize our capital project building organs for mistakes of that nature.

Use of land for capital project building also happens in our country and we consider this as an important problem. Lately we have come up with four guidelines for this problem. We have now started undertaking construction of projects on "third line construction." This means that we do not construct objects by the sea or along railways. Instead we construct them spread out in all the areas, with the intention of balancing them instead of having them concentrated in some areas only. This is one of the reasons. The other is that if something unexpected happens, if eventually we have to fight a war, the objects that we build will be in isolated areas and safe. This way we are always prepared to face the enemy.

What are these four guidelines I am talking about?

First, the capital projects should not be built on good land;

Second, they should occupy as little arable land as possible;

Third, in case of need, the population displacement should be as small as possible. In other words, we should not have to move populations on a large scale. This means building projects at the base of the mountains. This requires, as I mentioned, that we spread out construction, instead of concentrating it.

Fourth, the capital projects should complement the population of the area where they are undertaken. The help of the people should be secured during construction and when they begin operation as the people's enterprise, they should be favorable to the population of the area. This is help that comes indirectly. Along with this, it is our intention to make sure that the factories, mines, plants, and various economic enterprises are also directly favorable to the local population. For example, during agricultural campaigns, if they have the time, these projects can help the local population with transportation needs, and when the workforce in the villages is free, they can help in the plants, etc.

Lately we have been working based on this conceptual-

ization and are concentrating on these issues. Right after the conceptualization, we started to work right away on this issue. We organized a nation-wide meeting on issues of cotton production. At this meeting I spoke to one of the brigade (the unit below popular commune) leaders. This brigade had had a full-some harvest of both cotton and bread grains, and had handed in a considerable amount of cotton to the state, while at the same time had not only fulfilled the brigade needs for grains, but had also handed in a good amount of them to the state. In addition, an airport was being built in this brigade's land. I asked the comrades about the amount of land that the airport had occupied. The brigade leader answered that it occupied one third of the land. I then asked whether the brigade had suffered any economic damage by losing the land now occupied by the airport, but he answered no, pointing out that the brigade still had two thirds of the land they previously held and that gave them a good harvest. He also told me that the airport was necessary because it served the defense of the homeland, and as such should be given to the army when needed. This airport occupies an area a bit larger than 70 hectares. In the evening of that same day I met the commander of the air forces of that area and explained to him the four guidelines I spoke about on saving as much arable land as possible. The next day I sent a group of specialists to study this airport. A few days later the specialists reported to me that the area occupied by the airport could be reduced by 20 hectares. This land could be returned to the commune and reused. The specialists' group also wrote some guidelines for the airport to come to the aid of the local population. Relying on this experience I next sent similar specialist groups to study airports of that same kind. We have many of them, probably over a hundred, which have the same capacity and occupy the same land area. If we could salvage 20 hectares of land from every 100 airports built on good land, we could get about 2,000 hectares of land. Thus, by preserving good land, we could offer immense help to the agricultural sector. But think how many objects there are in our country which sit on good land occupying more than they should. If we accounted for them all, if we increased our efforts in this direction, it would help immensely in the increase of agricultural production.

It has now been almost 15 years since we started building projects, but only during the last year did we come up with these four guidelines. We have also spoken in the past on these issues, but these directions have only been delivered partially, we have never been able to draw guidelines as this year. But whenever the work is only partially done and the problems are not looked at from all sides, the effect will not be sufficient. As far as I know, all the present comrades have visited China.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Everyone, except Comrade Koco Theodhosi, president of the State Planning Commission, but he will also visit soon, along with Comrade Spiro Koleka.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I believe such a thing has also caught

your eye there. You may have seen that our plants and factories take up a large amount of land. It must be noted that these projects were built during the first five-year plan and the designs for these objects were developed by the Soviets. But even today when we design our own objects, they still occupy too much land. I mean to point out that such mistakes were also made after 1959. Naturally, there is a reason for this, both China and the Soviet Union are nations with large territory and large land areas, hence when our people design projects for factories and plants, they do not pay much attention to using as little land as possible. Of course, such mistakes have also been as a result of several objective reasons, but that is not the only reason. There have also been subjective reasons. We have not done the generalization of our experience and have not executed well the tasks like the ones we are discussing today, and as a result we know neither your characteristics nor your experience.

On the matter of project building, you should also keep in mind another problem. In Albania, the possibility of a war should also be taken into account. The past few years we have also taken such conditions into account. Thus, we have kept in mind that Comrade Mao Zedong has forwarded the directive that during the course of constructing objects, we should follow the criteria that they be spread out and not concentrated; the various objects and works be built in secret locations, not visible and at the foot of the mountains. This also means that we should not build very large objects, and that they occupy as little land as possible. All this is in the interest of the people and favorable from the military point of view. This kind of thinking serves Albania, which has very limited land area, where arable land is even more limited, and which must constantly and always be ready to defend itself from its enemies.

One of our shortcomings is the fact that the designs for the projects that would be built here were undertaken before the revolution of project design took place in our country. Of the 37 project designs we have done for you, 29 were done during this period. In old China no design of large objects was ever undertaken. Hence, when the great construction started on a wide scale in our country, we did not have any experience in this field. Thus, we were forced to draw from the Soviets' experience. Naturally, the Soviet Union would and did give us its experience in this field and we should not complain about it. During the first stage, such a practice was natural and permissible; otherwise we would not have been able to start constructing our objects. But during the first and second five-year plan, when the "Great Leap Forward" was undertaken in our country, we thought of starting a revolution in the field of construction and project design; in other words, of not copying from others in this field.

But, in reality, even after 1959 we have not been able to grasp the matter of construction with the required seriousness. This is why, in some aspects, one can still see the old practices at work in our country. In some other aspects, a general-

ization of the Soviets' experience in project construction and design can be seen and this does not conform to the conditions in China. We could say that we had drafted all the dispositions and regulations on project design to include the smallest detail, but the problem is that they did not fully cover the reality of our country and the accuracy of the data (such as hydro-geological data, geographical, etc. etc.) in such a way as to make them useful for building the project. The designs continued to be drafted from inside the offices, without taking into account the terrain where the object would be built, without taking into account the necessary conditions required for such undertaking, such as the climate, etc. From this angle, most of the designs we have drafted have not been favorable to the economic exploitation of the objects. For example, our plants and factories were always built big, because we wanted them to be complete and universal. Today many mechanical plants in China are able to coordinate their activities and cooperate amongst each other, allowing each one to specialize in a particular field. Thus, a factory or plant could specialize in a particular product. This is a good thing, because this way large savings could be achieved in work hours, workforce, investment, material, etc. The better the progress in this direction, the more the production is increased and the workers will specialize better and faster. The specialization of an enterprise is a tendency of modern industrialization. Once such an enterprise is put to use, it can cooperate and coordinate its activity with other enterprises. This is possible for those enterprises that produce a particular type of product, such as, for example, the tractor or auto vehicle plants that produce particular types of tractors or vehicles and also have to produce all the parts themselves. Each unit or annex within these plants is designed to produce only that particular product. If we would want to produce a new kind of tractor or vehicle, then we would have to make the necessary changes to the entire production line. Such a course would not be prudent under our requirements for savings, would not be prudent under a modern industry's requirements, would especially not allow cooperation of the kind required by today's industry, and would not be favorable to make changes easily to the types of products to make new, different and plentiful kinds and assortments of products.

Of course, such a design practice cannot be useful in your case, because you have a more specialized industry, and other conditions and data. But your country is on a lower industrialization level than our country. The mechanical industry of your country has less of a capacity for cooperation or coordination of activity between enterprises than our country. But I would not dare say that there is no chance for at least some cooperation and activity coordination between various enterprises in your country, because, and this must be emphasized, there is always a possibility for a better exploitation of available resources.

As to the 29 objects that have been designed for you, we could say at full confidence that the design drafting was done inside the offices without using the necessary data, such as the

above-ground specifics and the characteristics of the subterrain; in other words, the climate, geological, hydraulic, and other data. Our design employees have not studied the terrain before starting work on the design of these objects.

But how could we solve this problem in the future? It must be pointed out that the revolution in the field of design under way in our country is still in progress. I believe Comrade Nesti Nase, your ambassador to China, has been able to see that the Renmin Ribao newspaper every day publishes a special column covering the field of design. Many materials on the revolution under way in this field have been published there. In the near future we will also organize a national conference covering design matters. We saw this as necessary because many of our specialists in this field, after finishing their studies, are appointed to a position and then for a long time, sometimes even for 7 or 8 years, design only from their offices and never go out in the field. At most, during this period they only go out two or three times. Furthermore, there are those amongst them that have never been out where the objects are actually being built. Naturally, there are also common objects that could be built anywhere. They are the kinds of objects that the implementing officials could adjust to any area. But even these projects need to be adjusted to the countries where they will be put to use, their climatic and geographical conditions and their size because there are countries that are large, others that are small and others with conditions completely different from ours. So, the project needs to be readjusted to the actual conditions of each country. Let us look at the building of a petrol processing plant, for example. In this case many savings could be achieved if we keep in mind the characteristics of the terrain, such as if it will be built in a mountainous or flat area. But the studies must be done first and then the design process for the plant can be started. In other words, the project must start after you have gone to the actual spot, after having familiarized yourselves with the terrain and all the necessary field data, etc. Only thus could possibilities for further savings be discovered.

The issue of the design of your industrial objects must be seen from this point of view too. It is necessary to go to the place where the object will be constructed. This is an important point. There are also Chinese specialists that work on these projects and they should have knowledge of and should first have all the necessary data. This requires that they visit Albania to familiarize themselves with the Albanian terrain and conditions. This will also help them teach and assist each other and, at the same time, prepare a group of Albanian design employees. This is a problem that requires an urgent solution. It is an actual problem. Otherwise, the work for the design of the other projects cannot start.

Our third shortcoming is in the area of sharing experience. Another reform taking place in China is in the area of petrol, but our comrades have not brought this over to your country. I am talking about the way we have organized work in the oil

field of Daqing in Northeast China. There we took a really big step. The Romanian comrades who know quite a lot about oil were there. This year we may achieve an extraction of 10 million tons of unrefined oil. This happens as a result of the leap we took during these last four years. During the design process we did not suspend work on refining. We did both at the same time. Investments were made and the work continued on exploitation, in other words, on both group A and B. Generally, these two groups conflict with each other and often hinder each other's work processes, but in Daqing this has been avoided. On the basis of the proletarian philosophy we must rely on democratic centralization. We have kept this in mind and have discussed the problem at length, and then, after centralizing the process, by relying on this principle we have started to accomplish the task. Doing things this way quickens very much the work rhythm. I trust that the Albanian ambassador to China has noticed that during the meeting of our People's Assembly I have reiterated that we must learn from the work spirit in the oil field of Daqing, but our shortcoming is that we have not notified you of this experience.

Our fourth shortcoming is that we still are at a low technical level. Our industrial equipment is relatively old, while countries like Albania request that they be equipped with objects of an advanced technical level and that they are as perfect as possible so that savings in every possible area can be achieved.

It must be noted that during the last ten years, i.e. after Khrushchev's rise to power, the Soviet Union in both the field of design and the field of technical assistance has behaved badly toward us and that has had an impact on our technical level. Of course, in order to raise our technical level we must draw from the experience of other nations and take advantage of the advanced technology of Western nations, while at the same time developing it further. This means that when we build a sufficient base, we should also be able to create and advance technology on our own, because the Western nations have also advanced their technology starting from scratch. We, then, must rely on our own forces. For example, during the development of the oil sector in our country, we have not had anyone's help and have had very little equipment for both the extraction and the processing of our oil. But in the end we learned, gained experience and developed some advanced methods for the production and processing of petroleum and achieved some successes. When [we] visited Romania last year, the Romanian comrades highly valued our experience in the area of petroleum. We must admit that we have achieved some things, but we have plenty to do in both the field of chemical production, [and] the production of synthetic fibers. In these sectors we are still weak, thus we must do much more in the multi-tiered exploitation of oil. In this area the Romanian comrades have paid more attention, so they are more advanced than we are and have achieved successes.

I mentioned all this to show you that the equipment of the

objects that are being constructed here with our help are of low technical level, are not as advanced as they should be, and this is not favorable to you. This happens because the level of their mechanization and automatization is relatively low. As a result of greater work force and investment, the costs will be higher and the time needed to start the exploitation of these objects will be longer. The time until the recovery of investment capital due to their depreciation will also be longer. As a consequence, the quality of the products is not so high.

My visit last year to Africa left a deep impression on me. It is well known that the Arab and black African countries have a relatively low technological level. The technologies in these countries are not very advanced, while the refineries with the capacity of one million tons a year in Morocco and Ghana, the plant for the liquidation of gas or the mechanization of the vehicle assembly and repair process in a plant in Algeria are of a higher technological level in comparison with the other plants in the area. They are very economical because they save a lot of labor and time and are very easy to run. Such enterprises are favorable for these countries. Of course, the construction of such enterprises in these countries has required the use of foreign capital, but this is another matter that has to do with the regime in these countries. Nevertheless, constructions of this technological level would also be favorable to your country.

The fifth of our shortcomings is that we have not done a multi-tiered study for the entire system of the objects. In other words, we have drafted the design for each of the projects and then drafted the plan for the supply of the object. We have simply not done a multi-level organizing of the objects, on the basis of which we could streamline the objects keeping in mind the necessary raw material they require etc. For example, for the construction of some factories and plants the raw material necessary for utilizing them may depend on another object or some of its processes may be related to an object that has still not been constructed. As a result, the object that has been built first will require the import of raw material. A well-studied organized and streamlined process for this goal is necessary but so far we have not achieved any success in this area.

I believe that these five shortcomings that I have mentioned are among the most prominent. Naturally the effectiveness and method of work or our specialists in Albania reflects this. There may be some flaws here but I am not aware of any. That is why I will reserve judgment, because our ambassador in Albania has yet to inform me on this matter.

In fact, there are six shortcomings in our relations with you, but I do not have any information on the sixth one. My information is incomplete so I reserve judgment. I think we should keep the first five in mind as to the objects that you are building in your own country with our help.

Judging from what Comrade Enver Hoxha said when

he spoke two days ago and the letter sent to us by Comrade Mehmet Shehu, the request which we will discuss and agree on with Comrade Spiro Koleka when he visits China are related to your fourth five-year plan. In order to talk about your five-year plan we must first talk about the present situation. In other words, about the 37 or 39 objects on which this plan should rely. Hence, I would like that before Comrade Spiro Koleka comes to China he does a thorough examination on them, because on these 37 objects, I believe, your future five-year plan should be based.

As to the order of business, this can be in four groups:

First, the objects that have been constructed and completed [within the] last year or that are in general forecasted to be finished this year.

Secondly, the objects whose assembly has started. These are ten objects, the assembly of which can start this year and which can start to be utilized this year or the next.

Third is a group of eleven objects. Work is continuing on these objects and they are forecasted to be finished by 1965, 1966, and by 1967. Work may be extended on a few of them until 1968.

Fourth is a group of six objects that are still in the phase of data gathering, project design, or in the preparatory phase for the beginning of construction. These objects are forecasted to be finished probably some time during 1966, 1967, and by 1968.

In order to judge whether these groupings of the objects that you will build with our help are correct, I would like Comrade Spiro Koleka to conduct a thorough study of these problems before he comes to China.

This was the first issue.

Secondly, according to the general evaluation that we have conducted, we think that all these objects will occupy a total area of 660,000 square meters. A question comes to mind: is it possible to still save some land? Of course it is possible. This requires that an even more detailed study be conducted because we still do not know well the conditions of the terrain on which the objects are being built. From this perspective, the objects may not be suitable for construction. A more thorough study would give us better results in saving land, work force, construction volume, investments etc.

Thirdly, for the whole construction land, for labor, for the assembly of machinery and equipment, for the construction of buildings, for machinery and the entire necessary activity that will be spent for these works are some of the 11, 800 million leks will be required. Of course, this is only a general evalua-

tion we have done.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We have done the budget and it appears that we will need 9, 900 million leks.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Very well, this can be studied. What I am mentioning here is a general valuation of the 37 objects, so the comrades of the State Planning Commission can do a more exact study.

From the information that we have it appears that until the end of 1964, a volume of work of only 2.5 billion leks has been achieved. This means that not even a quarter of the work has been completed. A calculation must be done of the volume that may be achieved by the end of the year to figure out what would remain to be completed during the fourth five-year plan. A grouping of all these objects must be done. I already separated them into four groups but whether this is correct or not, naturally, needs to be studied.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: According to our calculations, only 43.5% of the work will remain for the fourth five-year plan, in other words, less than half.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Naturally, I only mentioned what had been completed until the end of last year.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Correct, you did say [that].

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Now on the fourth issue, which is the supplying of the equipment and materials that you will need to start up and utilize the objects. According to the data we have on the construction and exploitation of these objects, starting from this year, i.e. from 1965 up to 1968, a transportation volume of around 100 thousand tons will be required. Aside from transportation, during these four years, in construction and assembly—according to our estimates—you will need around 9 thousand people. After these 37 objects are completely or fully built, we foresee that to start their utilization you will need around 15 thousand production workers.

The fifth issue has to do with electrical energy. After we finish the 37 objects, in the first days of their utilization your capacity to supply energy during the draught months will not fulfill the needs. Certainly, for this goal the construction of a thermo-electric power station in the city of Fier with the capacity of 74 thousand kilowatt is planned to be built. If the thermo-electric power station in the city of Fier will be built quickly, you will have at your disposal a large amount of energy, despite the fact that it will be utilized mainly for the needs of the nitrogen fertilizer plant.

Let us move on to the sixth issue, that of transportation. The problem of transport exists not only during the construction and assembly activities of the works, but it is a problem

that will continue to exist even after starting the utilization of the objects because the transportation of the raw and other materials will be necessary, both those that will be imported and those that will be brought from different areas within the country, and certainly for the distribution of products. The total need of these 37 objects will require an annual transportation volume of 66 million tons/km. The railways in Albania are still insufficient and, as a result, in order to support this great volume, the road infrastructure will be heavily loaded.

What I am saying, naturally, is very exact. In other words, the data for the grouping of objects, the total land area required for building them, the construction activities, the volume of supply equipment and material, the labor required during the construction and assembly of the objects, the labor required for their utilization, the electric energy and finally the transportation for all these items, is drawn from the information we have so far. As to the volume of transport of 66 million tons/km that I mentioned will be needed for the 37 objects we are talking about the external and internal transportation.

All these items are drawn on the basis of initial and general calculations and I would like the Albanian State Planning Commission to make more exact calculations so that the pace of construction at all levels in your country increases by simultaneously also relying on the shortcomings that I mentioned earlier. Hence, it is necessary that a general inspection of these 37 objects is conducted.

I would like these eight issues on which I spoke in general and others that you might encounter later, to be made known to the specialists that come from China, with the intention that they familiarize themselves with the situation of the place they are working at and to keep them in mind so they know on what to concentrate in their work. In the future we will make a generalization of the work we have done in the past.

The second issue is related to planning for the future. I think that for the fourth five-year plan we must determine how many objects will be built so that we may determine whether there are more or less of them compared to the past plan and whether these objects are or are not favorable to the building of socialism in Albania. In the letter that Comrade Mehmet Shehu sent to us it is clear that you will try by all means not to overload your plan too much. The letter mentions 13 new objects and the expansion of 15 existing units and objects, making a total of 28 constructions objects. This means that there will be fewer objects than the 37 that are in construction today. Aside from these, there are eight objects for which the studies will start later, because their construction will start the fifth five-year plan. But whether these 28 objects that you foresee including in your fourth five-year plan are going to be favorable to your economy I cannot give you a definitive answer yet because:

First, some objects that have started to be constructed dur-

ing the third five-year plan will start to be utilized in the fourth five-year plan. Is such an order favorable at all? Furthermore, this does not even include all the objects that Albania will built on her own, with no outside help.

Second, I spoke before about the four shortcomings that can be seen in our work but the main thing is that in the past we have not studied as we should have the general data and we had not seen a systematic organizing of the issues. I think that in the future this should be kept in mind and we should grasp these problems better.

Third, during the construction of the objects, which are numerous and of different kinds, is the Albanian side able to fulfill all that is required for their construction? In other words, can they ensure the land area that these 28 objects will occupy, the volume of labor and investments, a part of which will be covered by the Albanians themselves, the labor required during construction and assembly as well as later during the utilization of the objects, the electric energy, and the transportation capacity?

The fourth issue has to do with the Chinese side, which will not only continue to supply the design and the equipment for the existing objects, but will also be required to do the same for these other 28 objects for which we need extra efforts so that their equipment and technology will be satisfactory to your request and match the level of an advanced technology. The question that comes up next is whether our side is able to fulfill all these requests. This is also a problem that requires analysis. We must first of all deliver the economic assistance that was decided on previously. There is no doubt that for the 37 objects which we need to build here we will continue to assist you, but the expenses for their construction will be over budget and we will need to increase the loan. Of course, these 37 objects are not completely finished. We have been notified by our specialists of this. The materials required for them have yet to be fully delivered because a part of these objects are forecast to be finished around 1967.

By our calculations it seems that for all the design, construction and utilization of the 37 objects and their supplying with materials and specialists, plus the usual goods that we will give you for trade, will altogether reach the sum of 2 billion yuan. We have yet to make the calculations in rubles, so as a result this sum may not be exact. This sum, compared to the assistance that we give to the other socialist countries and the countries of Africa and Asia, is second highest. Vietnam is in the first place and Albania comes second. The assistance that we give to Albania surpasses that which we give to DPRK.

Keeping in mind the work on the objects that we are building at the moment, and the military and other materials, I think that when we talk about new assistance in the future we should keep in mind the five shortcomings that I mentioned earlier so

that we can undertake each construction [project] rationally, save as much as we can on investments, build as much of the advanced technology as we can, and achieve as fast an effect as possible through our construction. We think that all this will be in your favor.

We should work on these four problems but they will be clarified better when the issues are discussed in more detail. In other words:

First, when the generalization of the experience of the past 37 objects is done.

Secondly, once it will be determined whether the order of these new objects is correct, and once they are studied in a thorough manner to evaluate whether they are in sync with the rhythm of the development of Albania's economy.

Thirdly, once it is determined what the concrete capacity of the Albanian side is to respond to the needs that emerge in connection with to these constructions.

Fourth, once it is determined how far the capability of the Chinese side reaches.

I also enumerated here before you our side's shortcomings in the past.

Then I also enumerated in general lines the eight data points. To determine how correct they are, you must conduct an analysis. When you reach conclusions in this matter, I would like you to notify our specialists why these differences exist between the data on each side so that they may take measures for what they are responsible. As I have said before, the 28 new objects constitute a separate plan. For all I said here I was relying only on our own experience. I mentioned it for your information and I think that when we deal with these issues, they may help you in your work.

Finally, I wanted to talk to you about the course of our reconstruction. Last year, when I visited Albania, we arrived at a common viewpoint that the general course of economic reconstruction, the dynamic of the economic development, shall be: Having agriculture be the foundation of the economy with industry as an important lever; building in such a way as to have the construction respond to the particular reality and capabilities of the country; going forward based on one's own forces; and building an independent economy.

Of course, executing such a course in Albania is not easy. The conditions in your country warrant a longer time for such a plan, because Albania is a small country and the fulfillment of all the needs of the country is a difficult task. Hence, Albania's request that it cooperate with the other brother countries is unavoidable, not only because of the reasons we mentioned

above, but also from an international trade point of view. Hence, relations with other countries are very necessary.

I will speak on the course of construction based on the experience of the PRC and for this I need to put forward a few premises.

First, the issue of the economy having agriculture at its foundation and the industry as a central lever is very important. The order of importance, of what must be given precedence in agriculture or industry (for example, heavy or light industry, etc.), should be carefully studied. This is a difficult problem.

For Albania, as we also mentioned last year, it is important that agriculture secure the bread for the country and that it should, step by step and gradually, also secure the necessary reserves. From what I noticed in your fourth five-year plan, it seems that the issue of securing the bread for your country is estimated to develop at a slow pace, though you have emphasized this matter in your plan. On this topic I have a thought. Would it not be better to produce bread in the lands you have slated for tobacco production?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We could plant grains on the lands where we plant tobacco, but the efficiency would be low. We would only produce four quintals per hectare corn or wheat because they are poor lands, but if we planted tobacco, we would get more and this is more profitable.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: On this problem regarding the tobacco lands, we have in the past conducted experiments and during the last few years we have expanded the planting of tobacco to these poor lands that do not produce much wheat. In the past we planted grains in these lands, but according to our calculations, it seems that their efficiency was very low: 4-5, or a maximum of 6 quintals of grains per hectare, while the same lands produce tobacco at higher efficiency. We have stopped planting tobacco in all the lands that can produce grains.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have conducted a classification of all our lands and in all those lands suitable for grain production we do not plant any tobacco.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: It seems that you want to fulfill not only your own needs, but also the [needs] of export[ers], with the tobacco that you plant. There is one thing that is not clear to me. The kinds of tobacco you plant correspond with outside demand. They are wanted and can be sold abroad, such as in Europe, etc. From what we know, we in China are not used to the kinds of tobacco you produce. They are not suitable for us, because we are used to smooth kinds of tobacco, hence, when we sell your tobacco in the market, we are forced to compensate the price by paying for it from our own till.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Generally, we sell most of our

tobacco to you.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I wonder whether you could plant tobacco seeds of various kinds more suitable for export on the lands you already use for tobacco production.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We could plant them. If you want, we could give that a try.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We could also try to plant Chinese seeds.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: My intention is for us to try every possibility so that you can fulfill your country's needs for grains. This seems to me to be a task that should come before all others. Obviously, you should also keep in mind here that other food products should also be considered, such as beans, meat, etc. so that in case communications with the outside world are severed, you would then be prepared and would be able to rely mainly on your own internal capabilities.

Just as an order of importance should be created in the agricultural sector, giving precedence, as I said, to bread grains, so you must also create such an order for the industrial sector by figuring out which branch should be developed first, where should the work pace be increased and what objects would be postponed for later. This means concentrating all our forces on solving the key issue, in other words to destroy an enemy and achieve the goal by progressing with concentrated forces. For example, for you the central points are the oil, iron-chrome, iron-nickel, chemical fertilizers, and electric energy sectors. These should be the first priority. But even in the area of the problem of electric energy, I think that the solution should be calculated carefully. Should you first build thermal-power stations or hydro-power stations? You could also study this issue.

We think that for your country these sectors are key issues with regard to both the development of industry and the development of agriculture. What we said should be studied. You should think about the matter of where forces should be best concentrated to solve these issues on time, while the others should be left to be studied later. Naturally, solving these issues requires time, investments, labor, equipment, etc. This is why resources should be concentrated around them so that they may be solved as soon as possible.

Naturally, great work shall be required to accomplish these tasks and studies should be conducted to uncover the country's resources and the size of these resources. For example, if we would like to increase petroleum production, we must first know the sub-terrestrial reserves; if we plan on developing the electric energy industry, we must first find out which approach is more profitable and whether the hydro-power stations are enough and for this we must first study all the hydro-geological data in the country. In China, aside from the neces-

sary large capacity objects, we are also building more medium or small capacity objects. Following this course of construction is very profitable to us because this allows us to spread these objects out and finish them at shorter periods. We think that our experience would also be valuable to construction in Albania, because large objects not only require a longer period to be finished, but they are also more concentrated, require large investments, etc. and, as a result, are not profitable.

Obviously, medium and small size objects cannot have a very wide range of capability to produce various kinds and assortments of products. We also know that cooperation between enterprises is more important in Albania, because production is not very developed here. Nonetheless, we think that since Albania has already gone through several five-year plans, it has also been able to create a mechanical base and as a result it should be able to establish some sort of cooperation between mechanical industry centers. One thing to keep in mind is that we do not have to build everything comprehensively. In China we fight against the tendency that the objects be comprehensive and large.

The fourth issue is in relation to the combined enterprises. These are destined to only produce by combining their activity with other enterprises. In our country we have principal enterprises that combine their activities with other principal enterprises. We also have medium or second category, enterprises which combine their activities with principal enterprises. As a result we have two categories of enterprises. This is imperative, because in order for an enterprise to work it must be supplied with the necessary materials, whether with materials produced in-country or with those we can only secure through import. The other issue is that we should also be prepared to face every eventuality by ensuring that enough reserve materials are on hand for the enterprise to continue working. This requires that at the present we should also have some enterprises which can be converted to combine their work with principal enterprises. In relation to this point, you can build the soda factory in your country first and then build the others later. Of course, this may have some influence on raising the living standards, but it is not a principal difficulty. So, in conclusion, we must first build those enterprises which will later serve as the source of the basic materials needed by other enterprises, this way the basic materials are secured in-country.

The fifth issue has to do with capital construction in Albania. I think that in this area Albania should profit from China's experience. The point is that construction projects should be done in such a way that they can be useful in both peace time and in war time. We must foresee and keep such a thing in mind. That is why the objects that you are thinking of building should be, as I said before, spread out and more or less in hidden places.

The sixth issue has to do with the request that the enterpris-

es you are building with our help be equipped with advanced technology. Obviously, we should assume responsibility in this area and you, Albanian comrades, must compel us to raise the technological level and equipment quality of the objects you are building. This will require a long time to be achieved, but we think that if we allowed the construction of objects with a low technological level, that would require more labor and higher investments, and their economic effect would be much smaller. Obviously, such a thing would not be favorable to your economy. But were we to postpone the construction deadline of an object until we secure a higher technological level for it, it would be more favorable to your economy. Raising the technological level becomes necessary for you as well as for us.

The seventh issue is in relation to technical capabilities, technical cadres and specialized employees. In this area measures should be taken that the cadres and specialists be prepared, because they are the ones who must master the new technology. Aside from measures to prepare new cadres and specialists, measures should also be taken to prepare the existing ones too. This is an important point for raising work efficiency. Of course, alongside the work for technical preparedness, we should also not leave behind the work for the political education of these people. The political education should take a commanding importance here, while alongside it we should also take measures for the technical preparation and qualification of cadres and specialized employees.

In this area, there are huge reserves within the working masses. It only depends on the work of the leaders whether these reserves will be tapped. This means that, first of all, the leadership should not be conservative. It should not be content with today's level of technology preparedness, but should strive toward further progress. Secondly, it must not seek to achieve the qualification and education of the people through punitive measures or through reassignments from one place to another. This is not favorable to the spreading of experience. You can find examples of the kind in our country. For example, in some objects in our country the work progresses quite well, while in others construction goes on for a longer time, the people are less energetic and the cadres are replaced often. We must have trust in the masses, because everything is achieved by their hands. Hence, we must work better with them and must place great importance in, first of all, their education. We must educate them better, combine them as appropriate, give them the gathered experience, and should not become conservative. We must strengthen political leadership of the masses and effectively educate the people so that this activity better serve the reconstruction of our country. Doing otherwise would be to our detriment. When I was in Romania, I visited a chemical industry center, a refinery. There I saw that the workers of this refinery had mastered the advanced technology well. I am convinced that if a good job is done following the directions I gave above, your people here in Albania can also master the technology very well. Learning and mastering technology

has nothing to do with a person's nationality. Regardless of who has mastered a technology at the moment, we must learn from those that are more advanced, but we should always keep political preparedness at the forefront. Politics should be in command and leading the education of the workers and our cadres, so that they become conscious of the tasks they are given. In China, while we have progressed well in some sectors, such as in the petrol sector and in some others, there are some areas where we are progressing slowly.

The eighth issue has to do with economizing resources. In both China and Albania, as well as in all the socialist countries, the issue of economizing is absolutely one of the key issues for the construction of socialism. Our countries should always raise this issue. We must, first of all, carefully protect the machinery and objects we build, because getting them in the first place is not an easy task. In the case of Albania, this problem takes on an ever greater importance because of the weak economy. That is why we need to work hard in this direction and try to avoid as much as possible any kind of damage to them. In our country we have placed great importance to economizing, but still unsatisfactory events have befallen us. For example, during the first five-year plan we had imported some machinery for the construction of a heavy-machinery plant. We found the machinery and delivered this to the spot, but the plant was not constructed right away and the machinery was not secured; it was left outside for a long time, and it was heavily damaged. We discovered this and took appropriate measures, but the damage had been done. This is only one example, but we have others, too. This is part of the experience we have garnered during these years of building socialism in our country. I told you that I considered it necessary that I notify the Albanian comrades of this matter because it may help you in your work.

I also want to touch upon something else in relation to your fourth five-year plan, having to do with how much we can impose on each other. During the construction of this five-year plan and later during the fourth plan, our country is facing some difficulties before it can fulfill all your requests. We see that you seek to build many objects with our help, but we are unable to fulfill all of them; be they the requests in the area of trade, or those that you want through loans; be they grains for bread, or other goods. There is no doubt that we will continue to assist you in the field of economy, but you intend to make too many investments. So, in order to solve these issues we need to enter into concrete talks; taking into account our capabilities we can achieve real conclusions and then we can commit, within our capabilities, to what you request. In other words, we can commit to how many objects and how much economic assistance we can offer. At the moment we are not able to give you a concrete answer on this.

Of course, as Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out and as I also mentioned in the beginning, the three starting points men-

tioned are correct. Relying on them we can say that more assistance is necessary and you are right to ask us for even more help. But I propose that we put the issue forward as follows: What will be more favorable to you and what is the extent to which we will commit?

It seems very clear that many of the 37 objects that you are building will require imported materials to work once utilization starts. Obviously, we will supply them for you but we need to determine how much you will receive through clearing and how much through loans. As a result of these imports, we will also have to face the problem of their shipping. Of course, it would be more prudent that a part of these materials be ascertained in-country, but by looking at this problem in general lines, I can say that it will be a long time before these materials can be produced here. That is why you need to calculate these things and include them in the fourth five-year plan, especially those issues related to import, foreign trade and economic assistance through loans. As to the matter of loans, factories should not be built and then remain without work only because they do not have the materials needed for production.

Finally, I have a question: When do you think is a good time for Comrade Spiro Koleka to visit China? Until now the group of Albanian specialists at the moment in China has conducted two series of talks with our people. Of course, they are instructed by your party and government on the matters they will bring up so we understand that we cannot change the course of the talks. In other words, they are not prepared to answer, for example, where we can make reductions or even changes. We understand the position of these comrades. We have had frequent contacts with the Albanian comrades, they discuss issues with us energetically, but at the end we achieve common agreements and, thus, we fulfill our needs. My question is whether it will be possible for you to send to China a group of comrades who are able to decide on such problems and whether it would be possible that they remain in China for longer periods of time, because it is more difficult for our comrades of this rank to come here. Last year, when I returned to China after my visit to 14 countries, we created the Committee for Economic Relations with the Outside World. We have appointed Comrade Fang Yi as the chairman of this committee, but this institution has only been in operation for six months, it has just started its activity, so it is still encountering difficulties. The countries that receive economic assistance from our country today number more than 30, so, if we can reduce the load of the committee on some of the issues, it will work better. Under these conditions it would be difficult for Comrade Fang Yi to leave China because the business of the committee would be slowed down.

We are now preparing for the second conference of the countries of Asia and Africa. There, amongst other things, we will reiterate the importance of economic cooperation between the countries of these continents. We will strengthen even

more our work for carrying out the eight principles of economic cooperation that we have raised during my visit last year to the countries of Asia and Africa and will concretely start to execute these principles, which we will put up against imperialism and modern revisionism. We have one good thing in our practice. When we discover that we have made mistakes, we accept them and set out to correct them. If we would operate differently, instead of progressing, we would remain behind.

In relation to our common problems, as far as our economic cooperation with our Albanian comrades for your fourth five-year plan goes, I think that we will need a longer time to succeed. As to the course we need to take to solve this problem, we implore you Comrade Enver Hoxha, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Comrade Spiro Koleka and the other Albanian leadership comrades to also give us your thoughts on the matter. These were the problems I had thought of discussing. I want to say once again that my points of view may not be suitable for your conditions. I could be wrong or all of the information I am relying upon may not reflect your reality. But mistakes can be repaired. What is not suitable to your reality may be eliminated completely. What does not satisfy you, we could pick up and discuss again. Comrade Beqir Balluku has experience in this area.

This is all I had to say.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We could take a little break.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I agree.

(After a short break, the proceedings of the last session were held. The floor was held mostly by Enver Hoxha.)

Comrade Enver Hoxha: If you would allow us, Comrade Zhou Enlai, we would like to express in a few words our point of view on the opinions that you expressed.

Through the words of Comrade Zhou Enlai we understand the desire of the Chinese comrades to assist us in the area of the economy—which is one of the most vital areas in the life of our country—through correct, fraternal, and Marxist-Leninist criteria. We recognize in Comrade Zhou Enlai a particular interest in making sure that China's assistance is very effective to our country's economy, that it strengthens our economy, that it achieves an increase in the living standard of the Albanian people, and that it also assists as much as possible in our homeland's defense at any moment and in any eventuality. The care that the Chinese comrades and Comrade Zhou Enlai show is correct and we thank you very much for it. We also thank you, Comrade Zhou Enlai, for the fact that you—as it is your custom and of which we have no doubt—express your opinions openly as they should be expressed amongst friends and as we also express ours to you.

The economic issues, as it is well known, preoccupy us, Albanians, very much, just as they also preoccupy you, Chinese comrades. This is a preoccupation of both sides. But after we discuss them from all angles—first of all from the political side, but also from the economic point of view of concrete numbers and data, as Comrade Zhou Enlai rightly pointed out—we are confident that we will find a just solution that is suitable to both the needs of our country and to China's capabilities. In our requests we always keep in mind the heavy load that China must bear in its obligations to the 36 countries it assists, as you pointed out in your presentation.

We consider correct the issues that Comrade Zhou Enlai raised when he chronologically and correctly enumerated the latest developments. The Chinese government is right in creating a Committee for Economic Relations with the Outside World. This will play a great role in the area of assistance to the other socialist and democratic nations of the world with which China has and will develop even further great economic relations. This is in itself one of the most powerful factors in our war against imperialism. By assisting and strengthening these countries, a great contribution is made to the strengthening of the forces of democracy, peace and socialism. This is an issue of great importance.

As far as we Albanians are concerned, it is fair that in view of China's great assistance to us it should be our duty to facilitate the work of your Committee for Economic Relations with the Outside World in all areas and especially in those that Comrade Zhou Enlai spoke about. For example, we should help in securing for the committee the data and information it deems necessary. It is only fair that the data be provided by us not only to your specialists, but also to your committee, so that they can arrive at as perfect solutions as possible and that we garner the great and concrete experience of the Chinese specialists in these areas. So, both our [leadership] and the Chinese leadership will be fully capable of judging the real capabilities that our country may possess in best utilizing the assistance that China will offer us and the real capabilities that China possesses for assisting our country's economic development.

Comrade Zhou Enlai asked that we take a closer look at the objects that we are building. This is a fair request because in the area of object construction we have only been cooperating with each other for a very short time. If we look at this cooperation in general, it has been fruitful and has produced results, even though there are shortcomings and delays on our side, which do not exist on the Chinese comrades' side. As to the projects at hand, delays from your end have never been more than two, three, or at most, four months. We understand these delays. But the more important issue is that (as we see it) based on this experience and the results we have achieved, we strive to create such a future five-year plan that will not only rely on them, but will also be built upon methods and criteria which are well studied and stable or—as you rightly pointed

out and we fully agree with you—to draw the positive from within our disadvantages. We must work in this direction with the intention of achieving results, building faster, and ensuring the solvency of the problems of raw materials, transportation, etc. etc. In other words, we should make sure that while studying these problems we include such reliable data that whatever we decide to build during our future five-year plan is within our capabilities and conditions, as well as within those that China possesses and will give to us.

On this issue, we think that the conditions that our country faced after severing relations with the Soviet Union and the other European people's democracies (i.e. after the blockade) should be kept in mind. The new situation following that period had strong repercussions for our economy and our investments. The fraternal, internationalist readiness shown by China was a great thing, but a period of time was still needed before that assistance could start to have an effect. This was a great preoccupation for the Chinese comrades. Nonetheless, it is our opinion that since the beginning of our cooperation in object construction, a great job has been done by the Chinese comrades and designers, as well as by us in carrying out these projects. Within two years and within the real existing capabilities, we managed to achieve satisfactory results. To us, Albanians, this has a warming effect; it encourages us, and makes us realistically and optimistically appreciate the fourth five-year plan drafts.

In general, we can say that we have conducted a few analyses of the work going on in the new projects. We have stayed on top of these issues and in general we can say that it has not gone badly, on the contrary, it has gone quite well. Nonetheless, not everything has been in order and some unexpected things have happened, and that is something that has from time to time worried the Chinese government in some areas, as Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out. Some things were not estimated well during the design process, but we cannot blame the Chinese comrades for this, because their capabilities were limited during this time and it has mostly been our fault. I can bring you one example: The paper factory for cement packaging in Shkodra was completed on time and has lately started operating, but it had not been planned where the industrial waste would go. We do not blame the Chinese comrades for this, but the problem is that the industrial waste was mixed in with the drinking water of the city, and this forced us to close the factory for two weeks. We have not had any other such problems. Nonetheless, we can draw a conclusion from this example, and we agree with what Comrade Zhou Enlai said. Is it not so, comrades? It is because of these reasons that we say that the Chinese comrades have not done a bad job in the area of design. In general you may be right in all you said, but as far as our projects go, we have no reason to complain about you. The Chinese specialists that have worked and are still working here have done a good job.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Regarding the case that you men-

tioned, the paper factory in Shkodra, the blame rests with our designers. They should have anticipated where the industrial waste would go.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The problem is that they had no time to think about this issue. They had not come here before designing the project, so they were not familiar with the place. Furthermore, they were forced to work very fast.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Khrushchev gave neither you nor us time to work. We were caught unaware by him and we were precluded from giving you much time for the design process. Khrushchev gave us no time.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: OK, but since then three years have passed, so the matter of industrial waste disposal at the paper factory that Comrade Enver Hoxha mentioned is a big problem that should have been solved.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It will be solved. But it should be mentioned that serious problems have come from our side. So, for example, last year we had not anticipated well our need for building materials, especially cement. As a result, at a certain moment we found ourselves in a very difficult situation and were forced to suspend deliveries of cement to certain projects we were building so that work would not have to be stopped in the construction of other more important industrial projects. This happened because of our technicians fault. We took the appropriate measures and dealt with the situation, but the fact remains that this happened and we were forced to postpone some projects. At the same time, this also served as a good experience for us to understand the importance of a better study of project construction plans in the future.

During the cooperation between our people and the Chinese specialists in Albania, and their initiative and continuing interest in building our objects as well and as fast as possible, we have noticed another interesting fact. Thus, for example, during the construction of the caustic soda factory, at a certain moment, it was not possible to supply the appropriate iron and concrete frames at the necessary time. The Chinese specialists thought about it, and, in order not to slow down the construction, took the initiative and replaced the iron and concrete frames with other kinds of iron frames. Their contribution allowed the workers not to suspend construction, on the contrary, work continued normally.

Comrade Zhou Enlai was right in raising the issue of design. We understand the importance of the correct design of large industrial or agricultural works for China, a colossus where investments are of a very large scale. But such a thing is important in our country too. The experience that Comrade Zhou Enlai gave us is a great one and we will continue to get this experience from China. But the matter of project design, of planning methods, and of ordering the constructions by

their economic importance, as Comrade Zhou Enlai enumerated, has always preoccupied our party and government. We have continually kept in mind those principal points of which Comrade Zhou Enlai spoke. For us they are always an acute problem, because if we had not always thought about them, they would, like you said, have caused us a lot of damage.

Let us look at one of the principal points of which Comrade Zhou Enlai spoke, that of the economizing of lands for grains. The issue of these lands has always been one of the most pre-occupying ones, because we have a limited amount of land. This is why we follow this problem with the highest of care, not only when we are thinking of building large objects, but also when we are planning smaller ones. In fact, even an application for a new house by a peasant is put under the strictest control by the appropriate government organs and construction is always done by authorization. We do not allow the peasant to build wherever he wants or outside the areas we have appointed in every village for construction. We have strictly appointed areas where the peasants are allowed to build new houses. We are even stricter in the cities. The intention here is not to occupy bread land with construction. We have already decided the criteria for areas where buildings can be erected and no one can change them unless it is done by government order. So, as far as bread lands go, we pay a lot of attention and try very hard to economize them to the maximum. We have had to deal with this matter in the past when the projects were designed by the Soviets. In fact, we have even had squabbles with them over this because they had the tendency not to only build large and waste too much land on the construction of objects, but they also overloaded the objects with extra non-producing construction, unnecessary annexes, etc. They asked for 200 hectares for the nitrogen fertilizer plant. We gave them only 100 hectares. The Chinese comrades only asked for 60 hectares, but after discussions with them we decided to only use 20-30 hectares and now the object is being built over only 9.5 hectares. With this I want to point out that the orientation you have given us converges fully with our direction and practices. You can easily see the results that can be achieved through cooperation based on solid foundations like the one that exists between our two sides. Reducing the land area from the 200 hectares that the Soviets asked for building the plant to 9.5 hectares is no little thing for us.

The example that you brought up about the use of arable land for airports is definitely correct. It can be guessed that for the airports we have built with the Soviets' help we have been asked for hundreds of hectares, but we have not granted them. We have only built runways where the airplanes need to land. On this topic, I want to give you an example. We have been able to save 100 million leks on the construction of the Rinas airport runway, the same one you landed on when you came. This was proposed to us by an air force captain, who was not even an engineer, but only a mid-level technician. The Soviets proposed their design to us requiring 100 million leks more for

concrete, but our captain intervened. He urged us not to accept the Soviets' proposal and took the responsibility upon himself in front of the party and government offering to be shot if he did not produce satisfactory results. He promised that he would build this project with 100 million leks less in expenses than the Soviet design and also make the airport able to have planes of the TU-104 type land on it. A great Soviet specialist, with a doctorate in airport construction, came here for this airport and asked Comrade Beqir Balluku about the level of education of the officer making this proposal, about his place of study, etc. Comrade Beqir answered that the officer had not graduated from a higher institution and that he had only been a partisan in the mountains, but he had with him the party's resoluteness and inspiration. We decided to build the Rinas airport as our captain had proposed. The airport was built, and today even large airplanes can land without any danger. Not only that, but we are even working the land outside the airport runway. We have worked hard in this direction. This is what happened to us with the Soviets. The example that you, Comrade Zhou Enlai, mentioned about saving arable land areas occupied by airports is correct. It is a lesson for us. In this area we still have a lot of work to do and a lot of experience to gain from you. And when we have the same problem, we need to correct our mistakes and look at this matter in all our construction projects, because such mistakes happen everywhere. I want to say once more that, as far as the matter of saving bread land is concerned, we are in full agreement with Comrade Zhou Enlai. We constantly keep this matter in mind; we have sought to correct our mistakes, and will continue to do so in the future with rigor because it is a very important problem.

We have never forgotten the possibility of a war, which is the reason for which as we contemplate the construction of objects, we always keep in mind that they may be bombed and destroyed and we will be left without them. That is why for our objects in general, and especially those built with the assistance of the PRC, we have tried to find (and have more or less found) the most suitable and most protected areas. If we have failed to do this for some objects, this has only happened after considering the cost of the raw materials and labor required by the object. But in general they have been built on suitable, defensible areas. Let us, for example, look at the great textiles combined plant "Mao Zedong" in Berat. For its construction, we have chosen an area at the foot of a mountain so that it not only would use very little bread land but also that in the eventuality of a war we could defend it from bombing. The same can be also said about the cement factory, the explosives factory in Elbasan, etc. which are also built in suitable areas. The orientation that the CCP has given to its specialists converges with our party's and government's and we have been able to combine our efforts in this important issue as well. In particular, the cement factories we are building in Kruje and Elbasan are placed in mountain gorges, in other words, in places where enemy air force cannot easily enter to bomb them and would not have much interest in going where the danger would be higher for it. So, in this area

we have made attempts and in the future we will make even more to carry out this orientation and build in suitable places.

At the construction projects we have carried out with the Soviets' help we have also made mistakes in this regard, but we did not have experience then, and, furthermore, they never took our objections into account. I will give you one example. When we tried our best to plant as much wheat and corn as possible, Khrushchev would ask us, "What do you need grains for? What do you need to plant wheat and corn for? Plant oranges and lemons, olives and fruits, because we can give you all the wheat and corn you need. The rats in our silos eat the same amount of grains Albania needs." Look at what they were urging us to do! They wanted us to plant fruit trees in bread lands. Through this method they were trying to get us to abandon our course, but we did not fall for it. The orientation that the Soviets were giving us was subversive in all directions.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: What you say about the rats eating the Soviets' grain is true. In 1960 when we went through hard times for bread, we exchanged our rice with the Soviet Union for wheat, because wheat is cheaper and, by giving rice, we could get a larger amount of wheat from them. They gave us wheat from their reserves. It was a sort of black wheat that should have been called rye, not wheat, and at a very high price. However, their wheat was filled all over with rat droppings. This shows that they protect their storage areas badly.

Comrade Beqir Balluku: They would give you wheat with rat droppings, but would ask for rice of the highest quality from you.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: When Khrushchev would tell us to plant as much fruit as possible on bread lands and not preoccupy ourselves with grain problems, Comrade Enver Hoxha immediately issued a guideline and, according to it, we decided that the planting of trees would not be allowed where grains could be planted. In other words, we did the opposite of what Khrushchev wanted. Since then, the planting of trees, even for only 100 of them, can only be done through government authorization. We have strict legal parameters for this. What you saw at the Rinas Airport was nicely planted.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: As to the matter of the raw materials that will be required for the objects in construction once they are put to use, and the problems with transportation, we think that the preoccupation of the Chinese comrades is correct. This is a big problem for China, but it is also a very big problem for us. When we design the objects we will build, we try to make sure that our enterprises are able to work as much as possible with our country's raw materials and that if possible they be built in areas from where the transportation distances are as short as possible, so that the transportation volume becomes as small as possible. Of course, in this area we have also had some bitter experiences so this has always been

a preoccupation for us. Hence, we are in full agreement with your remarks and orientation. What you said to us was correct. We will try to increase our efforts in this direction, and with your specialists' help we will continually perfect our work and strengthen our cooperation.

Nonetheless, we have had and continue to have this problem in our minds, because we are a small country. Furthermore, our conscience does not allow us to burden the PRC by asking for things we are able to produce in our country. We try to use our capabilities fully and not burden you more than necessary. But even when China gathers abundant supplies of all sorts, we will and should think carefully, because we are far from each other and everything that we ship here from China costs us too much. In addition, we should also keep in mind the possibility of war. For example, the situation in Vietnam gets complicated even further. In that case our difficulties with raw materials would multiply. Under these conditions, we should keep in mind the issue of producing as much as possible in-country. This is a great preoccupation for both you and us. This is why we are also in full agreement with Comrade Zhou Enlai on this issue as well.

On the matter of ensuring we have enough labor for our projects, we are fully in agreement with you and have worked hard in this direction as well. We try not to build our factories by keeping in mind only the larger, national interests, but, as you rightly pointed out, by also thinking of the local interests. We have also looked at this problem while considering the small size of our country. We here in Albania have certainly been interested not only in building objects, but also in assessing the assistance that these objects could give to the population of the area, the development that would ensue, the help with transportation vehicles and mechanic shops, etc. so that when an object is built the whole area benefits from it, the agriculture does not suffer and the peasantry does not get any poorer. For example, when considering the building of the textiles combined-plant "Mao Zedong" in Berat we have now designed a concrete annual plan for the labor it will require in future years and the time when it will be put to use. We have hard numbers in this plan. For example, we have calculated how many workers will come from this or that village, how long they will stay, etc. The brunt of the labor force for this object will come from the urban area. Of the 6,000 people that we project to work in this plant, only 300 will come from the villages. We have designed strict rules for this matter and we execute them rigorously.

The issue the Comrade Zhou Enlai brought up about the coordination of activities and the cooperation between the various industrial enterprises is also very important. This is also a very appropriate remark with which we are in full agreement. This principle will always lead us in the construction of enterprises, especially in the building of mechanics plants. We are following this correct principle and fully agree that, together with the Chinese comrades, we should take a look at

enterprises with mechanic shops to see what can be done in this direction. In the past we have decided that a mechanics plant should produce many types of products, or have decided not to allocate new types of product to other plants. The Chinese comrades suggested that the plant making spare parts for tractors—the one which Comrade Zhou Enlai visited—should be given the task of also making new types of product. We agree to look into this matter with the intention of keeping these shops profitable while, at the same time, fulfilling our needs. So, this principle is also correct and we will keep it in mind. With his presentation Comrade Zhou Enlai gave us great knowledge, but, as he also pointed out, the framework in China is one thing and that in Albania is another. It is a smaller, narrower framework. Nonetheless, a principle is a principle and this one is correct.

What Comrade Zhou Enlai said about the design process is also correct. In your country this concerns a wide range of activity, while in our country the work with project design is in its infancy. This sector is still weak here. Often design activities have been independent in the past. Now we have concentrated them at the Ministry of Construction, but are also thinking of creating a separate institution for this matter. The experience that Comrade Zhou Enlai gave us will be of great assistance to us. It is imperative and a correct principle that the designers familiarize with the terrain. In our country, too, the project employees design from their desks, and then the execution of the design is done by others, while the designers are very little interested in it. In our country even the foremen are little interested in this matter. This shows that in this area we have many shortcomings, hence, your experience will assist us greatly in the future when we utilize it in the construction of the objects we will build with your help. When Comrade Spiro Koleka comes to China, he will discuss this concretely with your specialists, because the experience we possess so far in this matter warrants getting correct advice from you. We will try our best to improve the situation in this sector too.

We, Comrade Zhou Enlai, are very happy (and it could not have been different) that you also agree with the three principles for the development of our economy. This encourages us and for this we thank you. We are also very happy that we are in full agreement with your opinions, because we see these issues the same way you do, in other words, we agree that we should place the highest importance on the construction of principal and vital objects, considering this task as an important lever where we must concentrate our forces, as you pointed out, particularly in the sectors of iron-chrome, iron-nickel, oil, hydro power stations, chemical industry, etc. This makes us extremely happy and opens up the right perspectives for us. In order to act concretely on the basis of this orientation, we must obviously discuss matters in greater detail, as you pointed out, taking into account all the conditions, your capabilities, and ours.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I would like you to clarify one thing

for me: On the matter of electric energy which I asked about, what would be better for you, to ensure it through thermal or hydro power stations?

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Agreed. We will study this matter also. I do not want to enter into details, but would like to express our opinion on this matter. The Chinese specialist comrades in cooperation with our specialists working on the research of the hydro-power station at Vau i Dejes, have encouraged us on the plans for this object and it seems that this encouragement is correct. They told us that on this matter the issues of equipment or machinery are not important. What is important is the concrete analysis of the terrain, the hydro-geologic studies, and the preparation on the spot of this analysis of the project. The Chinese comrades have told us that the Albanian specialists should take over this matter. This is great trust that is being placed in us by the Chinese comrades. It is an encouragement and a great school for us. The Chinese comrades have also told us that they would give us assistance through 100 specialists and the necessary equipment for this object. But increasing the pace in the power station's construction depends above all on the study that the Albanian side will conduct. We are able to build this object and will concentrate all our resources on achieving this goal. This will be a great education for us. As far as your question of which would be more profitable for us, the thermal or the hydro power stations, we will make our calculations in this matter too.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have made the calculations on it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But we must make them known to the Chinese comrades, too.

We understand you correctly, Comrade Zhou Enlai, on what you considered to be vital problems, and important at the same time. We also understand that they cannot be solved, much less executed, within a year. That is the reason that a few of them we have slated to be completely finished by the fifth five-year plan. In other words, for these objects we have not compiled a five-year plan. Instead, we have compiled a longer, eight-to-ten year plan, because these are large and very important objects, so the time for finishing some of them must necessarily spill over into the other five-year plan.

Tell Comrade Mao Zedong that we are keeping in mind his advice that we need another 10 or 15 years of peace.

Of course, when building these objects securing the raw material is also very important. Here we include the iron-nickel also, which is a material of first-rate importance to us. That is why we are basing the construction of heavy metallurgy objects mainly on our own raw materials. Maybe Comrade Spiro Koleka could look at this matter more closely because it may be possible that the Chinese specialist comrades are not

fully aware of all that pertains to this, and it is our duty to notify them of it. It is quite clear to us that it is not profitable for our country to bring the raw material for our metallurgy from China, as Hungary does by bringing it from Krivoy Rog [Kryvyi Rih].

The remarks on oil were also correct. We must carefully study the issue of whether we have petrol or not. For this we must give you as detailed of an idea as possible on the reserves over which we will be working. As to the studies we have conducted over the iron-nickel reserves, we could give you a good idea right now. The perspectives on petrol also look good. The Soviets had cut our hopes, while during the last year we have found petroleum fields that stretch for kilometers. Just today, the Minister of Geology gave us the good news that at a spot where the Soviets had doused our hopes by saying that there was no sign of petroleum, we found petroleum of good quality and rich in oils. We have ascertained that the olive area where Comrade Mehmet Shehu was born, aside from the olive oil, also hides in its bosom subterranean oils.

We find entirely correct the importance that Comrade Zhou Enlai places on the issue of basing the development of our economy on our existing capabilities. It is our duty to let you know as clearly as possible that we will base our construction in the future on these capabilities.

We also find entirely correct the desire of Comrade Zhou Enlai that you send to Albania equipment of a high technological level. Here, the prestige of the PRC is not the only issue. That we have also kept this in mind is very true, but Comrade Zhou Enlai also sees the other, more important side of the matter, the matter of our economy, because the advanced technology can help in economizing the labor force, raising the profitability of the enterprise, and producing goods of a good quality. We understand your preoccupation with this very well and thank the Chinese comrades very much for it. But we ask you to also keep in mind within this framework our country's immediate interest. It would always be good to get the most perfect machinery possible for the objects we are building, but since these objects are very important for our country, we cannot afford to extend the deadline for their construction until equipment of a better technology is available. In these conditions, our comrades must also discuss with you this issue and we are confident that the two sides will find the best ways for solving this problem.

During our bilateral discussions it may be determined that one of the objects we have planned is not profitable. It cannot be ruled out that for one of them we have erred in our calculations, because we do not have all the necessary experience. In that case, we can eliminate one of the objects or combine them with others. This is a matter we must look at carefully. For example, we find it prudent that we follow the advice of some of the Chinese specialist comrades who say that for some of

the factory shops or enterprises that we have requested from you, we should only get the equipment from China, and let our project employees design the construction since the Chinese comrades are not familiar with our terrain. Here we are talking about some simple machinery that can be put to use right away and that can even be assembled in temporary areas. We also welcome this encouragement as it is a good school for our project employees.

Regarding agriculture, Comrade Zhou Enlai, as Comrade Mehmet Shehu emphasized in his letter to you, and as I touched upon shortly in my presentation, we will spare no effort to intensify our work on the development of agriculture, as a primary task, and, along side this task, we will also try our best in the area of clearing new arable land. For this, we have created numerous teams of specialists who during the past year have criss-crossed the country, especially the mountainous and hilly areas, in search of new lands. These teams, comprised of a combination of cadres, specialists, heads of agricultural cooperatives, and experienced peasants, have gone from village to village to study the situation and to present to the CC and the government the real situation of the possibility of reclaiming new arable land. This is one thing. They are also looking at evaluating the hilly and mountainous lands, existing lands, and lands that will be reclaimed. In addition, they are studying the needs for irrigation of these lands and the possibility of enriching our pasture lands. The enrichment of our pasture lands in hilly and mountainous areas and their correct assessment that will allow us to reclaim as much bread land as possible are very important to us. We are led by the principle that you suggested to us last year—which is a just principle—that in the event of a war, our mountains, as they have always been, will in the future, should a war befall us, remain the castles of our defense and victory over our enemies. That is why, in order for us to secure our bread in-country we will try, first of all, to get the villages, which at the moment we supply with bread, to work so that they can secure their own bread. We foresee that by 1970 we will have solved this issue. This is one of our principal preoccupations. We have conducted the study for this—we will take a look at it in the CC—and have taken measures on it. We will also create special loans for the hilly and mountainous areas. In other words, the issue of securing our bread in-country shall continually remain our principal preoccupation. But we will not be able to secure our bread in-country during this five-year plan. Should a war start, we will obviously introduce a ration system. Either way, the chemical fertilizer plants will also give a boost to the production of grains in our country.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Nonetheless, should a war start, we have taken measures from now and will ration the distribution of bread and other foodstuffs.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: As to the issue of tobacco and some other agricultural products, we are keeping in mind that they

should not be planted so as to take over lands that can be used for grain production. We plant tobacco in lower quality lands, such as in sandy or rocky lands, etc. In other words, in such lands that if we would use them for planting grains, would give very low returns, whether in corn or wheat. Our calculations show that in such lands it is more profitable for us to plant tobacco because this is the most suitable product for them. We could also keep these lands for pasture, but this is not as profitable as tobacco for us. Nonetheless, I cannot say that no changes can be made, such as by switching to another crop, but the matter of efficiency should always be kept in mind. For example, in the Korça fields, if we are able to ensure higher efficiency in the production of beets, then we could make a switch. We could reduce the area planted with beets and, thus, be able to save hundreds of hectares of land, which we can use for bread.

We are in full agreement with your opinion that the matter of bread is the most important. This will be a continuing preoccupation for us. And by lowering the amount of grains we import, we will also be facilitating things for you, because you have to also buy bread for yourselves and also give some of it to us. Of the amount of grains we received from you, we have been forced to set some of it on the side as a reserve for dangerous times, because before that we did not even have one kernel set aside. We are very grateful to you for this and in the future our preoccupation will continually be the bread issue.

As to the matters simply of military nature and the defense of our country, with your help, we have taken measures and will continue to do so in order to be ready at all times. In this direction we are led by both our experience and the situation, taking into account especially the attempts that the American imperialists and the others are making to start a new war. On the matter of our need for food, clothes, and other needs in times of war, we have compiled a special plan for how distribution will be conducted and the amounts that will be needed down to the smallest detail, such as labels, rations cards, etc. Furthermore, we have also compiled a plan for the quick transformation of the economy from that of peacetime to one in the service of war. We have determined which industrial objects would be kept intact and which would be disassembled and transferred elsewhere to be used for supplying the military and the people with necessary items. These plans have been studied and obtained by the CC and the government.

On the problem of economizing, which you mentioned as one of the important factors of the economy, the protection of the machinery, on the maximal utilization of our factories and plants, on all these issues that we know are key issues of primary importance, we have and continue to place a continuing interest. You are also quite right in your opinion on these matters and we are trying hard in this direction and have achieved successes. But, just like in your case, errors and shortcomings can be noticed in our country too. It happens, for example,

that while in some areas we have achieved good results in the utilization of machinery, (sometimes we have even been able to surpass their technical capacity) there are other cases that for reasons of under-par technical mastering of the machinery, because our cadres lack the necessary education and preparedness, or because of their low professional capacity, the utilization of the machinery is not to the extent it can be. All these are preoccupying problems for us and in this regard we still have a lot of shortcomings. This is why we have and will continue to make efforts to fight these shortcomings.

Your remark that we should be patient with the people is also correct. We must understand this problem correctly. The people solve everything, but they must be educated; they must be helped. Not everyone who makes a concession is an enemy. Many of those who make mistakes just do not know any better. We also have sluggishness here. Here is an example: When you visited Albania last year, we discussed our need for publications and you sent us a printing shop. This is a great help to us, but we must admit that we are behind in constructing this object. Our specialists have not done the designs for its construction. That is why all of the machinery that you sent to us, has been sitting in Durres for the past six months. From the moment that we made the request to you for it, and you promised that you would send it to us, we should have started the planning, design and construction so that once the machinery came, it could go straight inside and we could start utilizing it.

You were right, Comrade Zhou Enlai, in saying that we should base our future five-year plan on the objects we have today. We should look at those that have been finished, those still in construction, and the measures we have taken for the execution of the 8 remaining objects. It is our duty to notify your specialists in detail so that you may be informed about the situation in the objects that have been finished, in those that will be finished in 1965 and in the 8 that will be left for construction during the future five-year plan. Along with these data, it is also our duty to give you information on where we base our requests for these objects. We think that it is necessary that we do this so we can harmoniously achieve possible and satisfactory conclusions, as well as determine clearly what your capabilities and ours are. We are certain that as you have always looked at our requests to you, this time too you will look at these new requests for our fourth five-year plan with a friendly, generous and internationalist spirit, and that you will, Chinese comrades, within your means assist Albania. We, for our part, taking into account that this is colossal support, in the interest of our country and in the general interest of socialism, take it upon ourselves to finish successfully and at the required time this national, and, at the same time, international task.

Judging from all that was said here, we agree with your opinion that our specialists currently in your country do not have the authority to decide and make changes. Comrade Spiro Koleka's visit together with Comrade Koco Theodhosi

to China, we believe will solve this red tape on our part. We accept Comrade Zhou Enlai's opinion that Comrades Spiro Koleka and Koco Theodhosi, instead of just coming there to sign an agreement, should stay a relatively long time in Beijing and go over details with you on specific matters so that the only thing that remains is a final consultation on your side and ours. So whenever you see it suitable, they could come, but we think that based on the perspectives and discussions we had here together, it would take Comrade Spiro Koleka about a month to prepare and that a suitable time to come to China would be toward the end of April.

So, Comrade Zhou Enlai, in conclusion, our opinion is that in this vital issue, too, just like in all others, we are in full agreement with you. In the name of the CC and our government I thank you, personally, the other comrades here present, the CC of the glorious CCP, your government, and our dear friend Comrade Mao Zedong, who have always supported us and have looked and will always look at the Albanian issue in the prism of an unbreakable Marxist-Leninist friendship. For us, Albanians, this is colossal help which strengthens us to continue ever forward. This is how we see this issue. I am finished, Comrade Zhou Enlai. Forgive me for having gone on for so long.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We will welcome comrades Spiro Koleka and Koco Theodhosi sometime at the end of April and the beginning of May. It is possible that they will remain there for a relatively long time and I believe this to be a good thing so that we can familiarize ourselves with the data they will give us and we can discuss the problems together. This way we will be able to solve them better. Obviously, it is not possible to solve all the problems right away. There will be some things that will have to be left for later.

(Here the talks were concluded.)

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL BRANCH OF THE CC

Haxhi Kroj
[Signed]

1. *Editor's Note:* For more information on Kosygin's 4-11 February 1965 trip to Beijing and Hanoi, see Lorenz Lüthi's article in this *Bulletin*.

2. *Editor's Note:* On 22 March 1965, the NLF issued its Five Points statement via its own Liberation Radio which declared that talks could not begin until US forces had been withdrawn from Vietnam.

3. *Editor's Note:* President Johnson's 25 March remarks on Vietnam were printed in the *New York Times*, 26 March 1965, p. 5.

4. *Editor's Note:* Johnson said: "It is important for us all to keep a cool and clear view of the situation in Vietnam. [...] I am ready to go anywhere at any time to meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress forward and an honorable peace."

5. *Editor's Note:* In response to Ulbricht's visit to Cairo, West Germany cut off all aid to the UAR and established full diplomatic relations with Israel.



DOCUMENT No. 15

Memorandum of Conversation between the Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Led by Comrade Zhou Enlai, and the Leadership of the Party and Government of the People's Republic of Albania, 24-28 June 1966 [Excerpts]

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1966, D. 13. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

[The first three sessions discussing ideological issues are not printed here. For a complete version please see <http://www.cwihip.org>]

THE FOURTH SESSION OF 27 JUNE 1966
9:00 am

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yesterday I mentioned how the year 1962 was a defining year for us, both in the domestic front and the international one.

Since the liberation and until the period of 1958-1959, thanks to a series of wars and struggles we waged in the international arena and on the domestic front, and by always keeping as a cornerstone the class struggle, we gave the masses a spiritual and material stepping stone, laid down the general course for the construction of socialism, and executed the organization of the popular communes in the village and the Great Leap Forward for the development of the national economy.

Starting from the second half of 1959 and during the 1961-62 period, for about three years in a row, we suffered heavy damage due to great natural disasters. Aside from these damages, we also suffered very heavy damage caused by the Soviet revisionists. In addition, we had just started talking about moving forward by relying completely on our own forces, but due to the lack of experience in our work we saw an array of shortcomings and errors, a few of which were avoidable and others unavoidable.

All these events caused great difficulties for us in the domestic front, while in the international arena, Khrushchev and his followers had at that time reached the top of their ascent. They openly attacked the ALP at the 22nd CPSU Congress, without taking our advice into account. After this congress, the Soviet revisionists also exerted pressure on us. At that period they had

really reached their zenith, but at the same time they had also started their descent. That is why as soon as the 22nd CPSU Congress ended its proceedings, Comrade Mao Zedong made the evaluation that I mentioned earlier, which, in fact, time showed that he had been correct.

Facing such a situation, a determined, revolutionary, and a truly Marxist-Leninist party, must be decisive in leading the masses in the struggle against these difficulties. Based on the lessons of Comrade Mao Zedong, this is the course our party's Central Committee took. But the rightist elements, both within and outside our party, brought forth a series of programs with an opportunist, rightist, and revisionist character, as I already mentioned earlier.

In the summer of the year 1962 Comrade Mao Zedong laid down his theses on the situation in the international arena and the domestic front, on the contradictions between classes, and the class struggle, which I also mentioned yesterday. By keeping Marxism-Leninism as a basis of action, by thus helping our party at that time to be strong and to undertake effective measures, [we can] overcome the difficulties of the struggle against the rightist elements.

In May of 1963, at the suggestion of Comrade Mao Zedong, our party laid down the 'Ten Theses on the Work in the Village.' I believe we have also given this material to you.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Yes, we have read it.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This document stressed that at that time class struggle already existed in China, which was a serious, ferocious struggle between the classes.

In these 'Theses,' there are the following nine points:

The First Thesis: The landowners, the *kulaks*, the counter-revolutionaries, and the bad elements exploited our difficulties and engaged in counterattacks to take revenge on the peasantry, to settle the accounts with them, and wait for the opportune moment to act, despite the fact that many of them worked themselves in the communes. Some of these counterrevolutionaries, after being sentenced for their enemy activities, were sent to the popular communes for hard labor sentences under the supervision of the working peasantry, because it was not possible for us to kill them all.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: No, as far as the killing goes, no one is killing them. We have not killed them all either.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We shredded those that took up arms and fought against us during the war.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We have not killed those that we caught during the war, either. I believe you have seen some of

the prisoners of war in our country.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: What is your Emperor doing now?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: He is sick with cancer, so I do not believe he has long to live. Nonetheless, we have allowed him to be one of the members of the Political Consultative Conference. If he dies, there would be one less member of the categories of which we are talking about.

The Second Thesis: The landowners and the capitalists have infiltrated even the highest levels of the party and the state, the state economic enterprises, and the popular communes. We arrived at this conclusion around the period of 1962-1963. Of course, in the beginning, these elements were but a few in these institutions, and later increased in numbers gradually, because usually the contradictions start very small but later tend to increase little by little.

In 1957 we engaged in a campaign against the elements of the right. At that time there were more than 400 hundred of them. Of course, the people known by this epithet, in other words as elements of the right, cannot engage openly in activities by themselves, but they had surrounded themselves with people who, while not carrying the above epithet themselves, listened to them and were acting in the rightists' interest.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We have not allowed such elements even to be cashiers; we have given them the pickaxe, for example, and forced them to open trenches.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I said that we have placed them to work in different positions. But having the epithet of an element of the right does not mean that they can work independently at any time, because, as I said before, very often these people, i.e. elements of the right, stay behind the scenes and urge others to engage in activities to execute their plans. In addition, despite the fact that they may be sent only to open reservoirs and trenches, if they can find the right moment, they will engage in activities against you, and can even be able to sabotage your work.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Yes, it is precisely so. The bad elements can also continue to be active in such circumstances. The only thing is that in our country they are under the control of the working class. If they worked in various institutions, they would be under the control of the bureaucrats.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: These elements, by infiltrating by various means our institutions and our communes, have worked hard to corrupt our cadres. Let us look at one example: the landowners, the *kulaks*, or the capitalists are working, and their children are also working. Of course, they could not but have influence on our cadres, because they and their children have a higher level of education than the others due to the fact that in the past they have had the means to go to school and to

gain more knowledge than others. In addition, they also dress and look better, so their girls would marry our cadres.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: In relation to this point, from the moment we opened our state university, we have not allowed the children of the bourgeoisie, of the landowners, and of the *kulaks* to attend school there. Only during the past two years have we allowed some of them to attend and they have only been of the ones who have proved themselves [loyal].

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In total these amount to around 25 people.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Each of these people, before entering the university, must not only go through a screening by the party committee in the area where his family works and lives, but also through a higher level check here at the CC of our party.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In some cases the matter has even been brought before Comrade Enver Hoxha for an opinion.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes. Of course, here we are talking only about the origin, but in reality the matter cannot be entirely so. Education cannot be completely separated from the past. For example, in the universities the manners of the bourgeois education still have an influence even over the children of a working-class origin. That is why the issue is not only about the origin of the students.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: That is correct.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Chinese students, who have studied abroad and have returned to the fatherland with knowledge in various fields, have been assigned to employment. How could we have been able to detonate the atomic bomb so quickly in our country? It is precisely because we utilized the knowledge and the abilities of the Chinese bourgeois scientists. We can say that in the field of science and technology these scientists have done a service to their fatherland, and even to socialism, but there is no doubt that as far as their mentality goes, they are still bourgeois.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have no people of this kind here.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This is the reason why such elements exert an influence, through their mentality, over our new generation. For this reason that we are also in the process of waging a great socialist revolution in the field of culture.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Correct, you are quite correct to do so.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Third Thesis: In the village there exist strong tribal, family and social circle relations, which

lead to counterrevolutionary activities.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This remainder of the past also exists in our country, and even within the ranks of our party.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: So, this is an exhibition, a phenomenon of the bourgeois ideology.

The Fourth Thesis concerns reactionary religious activity. Of course, in our country religion does not exert as serious an influence as in other countries. But in China there are many different religious currents, which exploit the fervor of the most fanatical elements.

The Fifth Thesis concerns counterrevolutionary elements who are still staying hidden, who still remain masked, but who engage in activities, such as murders, sabotage, burning of storage depots or houses, etc.

The Sixth Thesis concerns speculators of the cities and the villages, who, when chance presents itself, partake in the black market. Amongst these one can also find rich peasants or workers of a dubious origin, but most of those who engage in these kinds of activities are generally merchants, capitalists, landowners, *kulaks*, etc.

The Seventh Thesis: In some rural areas there are rich peasants, who, having somewhat higher income, lend money with interest to the poor peasants. Despite the fact that they also work in the popular communes, a few of those who are able to clock in a few extra days of work, and thus have higher incomes, engage in speculative activities and create for themselves possibilities for lending money with interest to the poor peasants. There are also cases in which some of them, of course illegally and secretly, keep laborers for pay, who from the outside seem to be simply people who work with them, but in fact work for them for pay.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In other words, these people are exploiting the work of others.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Eighth Thesis: New bourgeois elements have recently appeared in the state economic enterprises and the popular communes, especially in the commerce sector, who engage in speculative activities. These are mostly coming out of the ranks of the artisans and the members of the popular communes, in other words from the ranks of the small-scale producers.

The Ninth Thesis: Degenerate elements have appeared in the managerial organs of the party and the state, which carry out policies which are foreign to the party. They do not strike against the elements mentioned above. Instead, they allow them to operate and engage in bad actions, in the process becoming themselves agents of these elements, i.e. the bourgeoisie.

Aside from these nine theses, we see today that we must also add another category, that of the new and old intellectuals of the bourgeoisie who work in the sectors of culture, of science, of the press, the publishing, etc. These intellectuals, such as the ‘Black Band,’ that exist today, account for up to one million families, when we include administration employees. In other words, there are not too many of them, but as they exploit their so-called authority in the field of education, etc., and they draw to themselves other people as well. In this case, by teaching others through their pedagogy, they influence the masses in the area of spirituality and mentality toward changing their points of view. They so seek to change all, whether they have a good origin or a bad origin. They are thus helping the birth of new bourgeois element by preparing some people as their offspring or successors. Even in the academic, philosophical or scientific fields, they exploit their knowledge and use it to exert their influence, especially over the youth.

This is why at that time, according to the directives that were given, we waged, especially in the rural areas, the campaign for the socialist education and put forth the three great revolutionary movements—the class struggle, the struggle for production, and the struggle for scientific experiment—of which you are already aware. The same work was carried out in the cities as well, but it was especially geared toward the villages. The goal of this campaign was the uprooting of revisionism.

After this campaign, in 1964, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth the issue of preparing successors, or those who would continue the work on the construction of communism. Not only should we fight to uproot revisionism from the present, but must also fight for the future, for the new generation, because the bourgeoisie also fights to make this generation its own. For this reason we came up with *The Five Conditions for the Nurturing of the New Revolutionary Generation*.

In the same year we also waged a campaign in the cities for revolutionizing theatre within the parameters of the Cultural Revolution. On this issue, Peng Zhen, alongside some of the other members of the secretariat of the party committee of the city of Beijing and alongside Lu Dingyi, secretary of the secretariat and director of the Directorate of Culture and Propaganda of the CC of the party, waged resistance against the Cultural Revolution. Of course, at that time they worked in secret and publicly they left the impression that [we] were in agreement and in support of the movement, and that was the reason why it was their task to lead and be responsible for this work in Beijing.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In other words, as a wise phrase of our people says, you “hung pieces of meat on the neck of a wolf.”

Comrade Zhou Enlai: In our country we say, “Hang up a

lamb's head, so you can sell the dog meat quicker." Nowadays, a political term we use for this situation is, "Under the red banner, against the red banner." This is how they operated.

On the issue of the Great Cultural Revolution we have already given [you] some of our material. Those that were against this Cultural Revolution were five members of the steering group chosen by the party's Central Committee. All of them have already been burned, all that remains now is Khan Zhen, who was the one to uncover those other four; otherwise their exposure would have been left for a later time.

In 1964, we put forth the issue of preparing the successors, or those who would continue the work on the construction of communism.

Luo Ruiqing, who had several functions—former secretary in the Central Committee Secretariat, deputy chairman of the Council of State, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff—came out with great ambitions claiming to take the post from Comrade Lin Biao, who was not in very good health. Comrade Lin Biao, as you well know, is the deputy chairman of the party's Central Committee, and one of the most eminent comrades of our party's leadership, a mature man and one who has correct command of the ideas of Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Is Comrade Lin Biao very sick?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Physically he is fine. He only suffers from a [neurological] disease. Because of the long time he participated in the war, he has developed some nervous habits. He cannot even drink water, because he gets ill. In order to take the necessary amount of water, he eats fruit. In other words, he takes his water through fruit. When it rains, or whenever he has to look at a lot of water, his reflexes come back, and he very quickly develops diarrhea. The change in atmospheric pressure makes him sweat a lot. Despite the fact that he is generally not in very good health, Comrade Lin Biao continues to work. He had instructed Luo Ruiqing to only take care of the everyday matters pertaining to the military. As far as the actual political and military leadership of the military, Comrade Lin Biao always took care of that himself.

In 1956, we brought forth the *23 Theses for the Socialist Education of Workers* and decided that, in the cities as well as in the villages, we should wage this campaign. We have also delivered this material to you.

The same as the period 1963-1964 and in 1965 when we made a critique of, in the field of philosophy, the theses of the unification of two into one and brought forth the idea that "the one be divided into two." This is a thesis of Comrade Mao Zedong, which he has greatly analyzed in his article "On the Contradictions."

In the ten theses, which were published in 1963, we laid forth the necessity of popularizing philosophy, with the intention for it to become adopted by the masses; that the wide working masses, the workers, the peasants and the military people absorb philosophy; for philosophy to come out of the narrow and limited frame of academia; and for it to disperse broadly within the working masses. But the leading cadres of the various institutions do not always engage in attempts to study philosophy and make propaganda for it. In these 23 theses this need is accented with great urgency, metaphysics and scholasticism are criticized, and emphasis is placed on the need for the absorption of the materialist dialectics. Peng Zhen, who was at the forefront of the group which opposes the Cultural Revolution, resisted this. During the critique that we made two years ago of the theses of Yan Zhan Hsian, former deputy director and later director of the party school, who was against the thesis of the unity of the two opposites, Peng Zhen came to his defense. Even Luo Ruiqing has had relations with him. Lu Dingyi had a different nature. He was against the study of the works of Comrade Mao Zedong, against the absorption and execution of his ideas, and their close and strong insertion into everyday life and practice as our party contends they should.

Comrade Lin Biao has emphasized the need for all the military to study the works of Comrade Mao Zedong, to absorb and execute them as appropriate, inserting them closely in life, practice and the conditions of the military. For this reason, and in order to help with this practice, Comrade Lin Biao has even prepared a brochure in which he has gathered a great number of citations drawn from the works of Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Was that the brochure which you had with you here last night?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes, because I also use this brochure myself.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Is there a version of it in the French language?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: No, we do not have a French version, but I will give you a copy of it. In this brochure citations are gathered which have to do with communist education. (Comrade Zhou Enlai offered a copy of the brochure in Chinese as a present to Comrade Enver Hoxha.)

The opponents of the Cultural Revolution attack us and accuse us that the Cultural Revolution is a vulgarization of philosophy and an operation in labels and simplifications.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: It is the same as what Khrushchev did after Stalin's death. He harshly criticized all those that cited Stalin and Lenin, calling them "citation maniacs" and proclaimed loudly that there must be a war against "citation mania."

Comrade Zhou Enlai: While at the same time he allowed widespread use of the citations from his own speeches.

Lu Dingyi was against the ideas of Comrade Mao Zedong and against Stalin, but not against Khrushchev. In the field of education he was also against the orientation of the CC, but was for the establishment of the bourgeois education system in China. He was not in agreement with our revolution in the field of education. He was one of the few members of the CC of our party who had attended a higher education school. His origin is of one of the feudal families.

This year we brought forth the idea of the Great Cultural Revolution, but the truth is that the preparations for the practical side of this program already started some time ago. This year we took measures to criticize in a more concentrated way the incorrect points of view of Peng Zhen. We have given all the pertinent materials on this issue to Comrade Mehmet Shehu.

The Great Cultural Revolution touches the people deeply in their souls. This is a true class struggle in the ideological field. It is the widest, deepest, fiercest, most complicated, and longest class struggle.

Speaking from our own experience, today we are not able to say that there is no more class struggle against the classes that are still existent; we cannot say that the exploiting classes do not exist anymore and that only their remnants are still around; we cannot say that the danger of the restoration of capitalism does not exist, because we should not have the issue of ownership of capital as the starting point and think that since the only ownership that dominates today is the socialist property, which is property owned by the entire people, or the collective property, which is property that rests in the hands of the workers, then the classes have ceased to exist. In addition, we cannot start off from the fact that these exploiting classes are small or large, or are spread out or not, because, as I mentioned before, the members of these categories are many, despite being spread out in various areas of the country; we cannot start off from the fact that the outside forces that help them are not even close in influence in comparison to the measures that we have undertaken toward the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must look at this issue in greater detail; we must look at it especially from the ideological side, from the mentality and the great influence that all of this has on the broad masses of the workers. By looking at the issue from this point of view, it appears that their influence on the workers is even greater, because, they, no matter where they are, engage in activities for inserting their venom and for damaging us as much as possible inside the country. The elements of the exploiting classes, with their spiritual points of view, exert an influence in every field, especially in the cultural, education, press, publication, and scientific fields. These elements that have been able to insert themselves even in the organs of the party and the state, in the mass organizations and the enterprises will even undertake

reactionary activities, which will of course be not only in the open, but also in secret. As Lenin has said, during the period of the transition from socialism to communism, the overthrown exploiting classes will agree with the newly created situation but will always attempt restoration. The difficulty is that these elements stay hidden, and in fact some of them are active in a very cunning way against us.

We must fight against the old habits, the remnants of the past. Though we might all be people of work ethic, though we might all be workers grown and educated in the socialist society, these habits and old remnants continue to exist and influence even our best people. That is why we place a lot of importance on the issue of the education of the people in a new style, the reformation of their conscience with new life habits and mores and in a struggle against the old ones. Comrade Mao Zedong has said that without using a broom, the dust will not go on its own. But there are people who say that if a typhoon of a scale of 12 goes by, the dust will be gone. But that is not entirely so, because if you close the doors, the dust cannot go away. This has to do with the souls of the people, with the habits and the mores of their lives. That is why we must wage a great and continuous struggle against these remnants of the past.

It is important that we also see this issue from the framework of the position and the role of our people who have been influenced by the old mentality. These people become the agents of the bourgeois ideology. The groups I mentioned earlier have within the ranks of the important cadres of the party, the state, the state enterprises, the various institutions and agencies, the popular communes, the military, the mass organizations, etc. of the socialist country their own supporters. The policy that they follow helps in the preparation for the restoration of capitalism. This policy is not that of the Marxist-Leninist party.

In other words, we must not only look at the outside, the shape of the issue. We must look at the inside, the essence.

Despite the fact that the people I mentioned earlier have been influenced by the others, be they bourgeois or not, despite the fact that they might be people of work ethic, despite the fact that they might be conscious or not, all of them are tainted by the bourgeois ideology and serve it. This has to do with Marxism-Leninism; it is dialectics and does not depend on the will of people. As long as we accept the fact that the class struggle continues, we must accept that there exist class activities represented by the bourgeois class; we must accept that classes necessarily exist. We, therefore, must not look at the issue in an absolute, isolated, calm, and unchangeable way, but must look at it as a developing one; we must not look at the issue only from the point of view of ownership, but in an all-encompassing way and from an economic basis, especially from the point of view of a superstructure.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: (Addressing the translator.) What

Comrade Zhou Enlai said, that as long as we accept the fact that the class struggle exists, the classes also exist, is that only in reference to China or does it have a universal essence and include all of the socialist countries?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Of course, so far I have only spoken in reference to China.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Well, the thing is, you mentioned all the socialist countries.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I will speak of this issue right now. The issue is such that we must not look only at the internal factors, but also the external factors, and this has been emphasized in the Moscow Declaration.

In the socialist countries which have a revisionist leadership, we know very well that there is no doubt about what I said previously. It is very clear that classes exist in these countries, because in the villages of these countries, except for in the Soviet Union, the collectivization of agriculture has not been fully completed, and that is why there is now doubt that the exploiting class of the *kulaks* exists.

And what is the situation in the semi-revisionist countries? Cuba, for example, is walking toward revisionism. We had a chance to converse with your ambassador in Romania, who has also spent four years in Cuba. He told us that exploiting classes exist in Cuba. Or in the case of Romania where aside from the mountainous regions, which make up about 6% of the arable land in the country, everywhere else collectivization of agriculture has been completed, but in fact, as you have also pointed out, the bureaucratic stratum, the stratum of the privileged elements and rich peasants is being created.

As far as our two neighbors go, Korea and Vietnam, the situation there develops as it does in other countries, even more so because they have not been able to achieve the unification of the country. In the southern part of these countries the exploiting classes are in power, and people from North Korea and North Vietnam still have family ties to the southern Koreans or Vietnamese, and as a result there is a direct influence being exerted on them by the exploiting classes.

So we are only left with Albania. It is possible that only elements of the exploiting classes continue to exist here, in other words isolated individuals, but I think that you will agree with what I said regarding the influence of the strength of the habits passed down by the old society in your country.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Yes, these habits also exist in our country.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: As a result, it is impossible that we will see none of the ten phenomena that I mentioned. In other

words, the class struggle exists here, also in unison with the activities of the exploiting classes who are representing their own interests. Their goal is the restoration of the rule of the exploiting classes and, as you, Comrade Enver Hoxha, already mentioned, the birth and the formation of the bureaucratic and privileged classes will help the exploiting classes return to power, in other words for the restoration of capitalism, if we do not give them continuous strikes and destroy them completely beforehand.

So, here, only the manner, only the outside appearance differs. You lay down the issue in a different manner, in a different form, using as a starting point the concrete situation in your country, but in essence for both our countries this is still simply a class struggle. It may also be that I am a bit wrong because we have only exchanged thoughts on this matter twice, once with Comrade Mehmet Shehu when he visited China, and the other time is the present conversation.

On the basis of the thoughts of Comrade Mao Zedong who says that in all the socialist countries there exist, somewhere more and elsewhere less, bureaucratism, the revisionist and dogmatic elements, old and new, at this moment in time the main danger is that of revisionism, which serves imperialism, the reactionaries and is their agent. This is the important part of the issue where the opinions amongst us are the same.

In our socialist countries, as Comrade Enver Hoxha also pointed out, the manners of the restoration of capitalism may be varied and many. It is not possible that all these landowners, *kulaks*, and capitalists have handed over all the property they had, both in land and in riches, with pleasure. They will try to come up with different methods to overturn our system. This comes up as a new phenomenon. It may even be possible that in a socialist country, even after all the elements of the exploiting classes have died, new elements, representatives and descendants of those classes may be born, and they will try to restore the exploiting capitalist rule.

Comrade Mao Zedong, while evaluating the situation in the socialist society and the perspectives of it, as Comrade Mehmet Shehu mentioned in the meetings we held, points out that in a socialist society two possibilities exist.

One of the possibilities is that the modern revisionists will take over the power by force, as did, for example, Imre Nagy in Hungary, who rose for a counterrevolutionary state. If an answer would not have been found to the counterrevolution there, he would have won and Hungary would have passed since that time to the West.

The other possibility is that the revisionists, through peaceful revolution, will usurp the leadership of the party and the state, as it happened in the Soviet Union or in Hungary with Kadar, in Poland with Gomulka, and in the other countries

where modern revisionism is in power today.

These two methods make up one single category. They are possibilities of taking over the power.

Another possibility is the policy of peeling off the bamboo skin. It is known that bamboo has many layers, which can be removed one by one. This is what must be done to avoid the possibility of the birth of revisionism and of the restoration of capitalism through a putsch. The “bamboo layers” must be cleaned up one by one.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We must throw away these “bamboo layers.”

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We burn them off completely.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: After we remove them, we must burn them and turn them into fertilizer.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: But if you leave them in the leadership, they will still remain dangerous.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: When we burn them, we must take care not to burn the bamboo itself too.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Burning them is not the safest method. The issue is what kind of method to use. Of course, this is something that depends on the conditions and the stages of development in each country.

Until the present, this has been the course followed by the CCP after it took over the power in China. During these past 17 years, three anti-party groups have appeared. The first was the Gao Gang and Rao Shushi group, which appeared in 1953. Gao Gang had links to the internal organs of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In other words, he was their agent.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: And Rao Shushi was an ally of Gao Gang. Had they achieved a takeover of power, they would have very quickly lined up on the side of Khrushchev, and they would have transformed China into a country of the type of the Soviet Union today.

In 1961, at the time when the proceedings of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU were held, Khrushchev, while having a quarrel with me, told me that in the Soviet Union they will put the Gao Gang portrait everywhere.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Didn't this one commit suicide?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I will talk about it.

The second anti-party group is that of Peng Dehuai, which was discovered in 1959. Peng Dehuai during his entire life has been against the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong. He sought to take over the direction of the party for himself and sought to transform the party and to follow the course of bourgeois transformation. Peng Dehuai had for a long time been in cooperation with Gao Gang, but only after 1959, exploiting the newly created very difficult situation of that period, did he rise up against the general line of the party and the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong.

Peng Dehuai was for a long time involved in military matters, and that is why he had some sort of influence there. As you well know, he led the war of the Chinese volunteers who came to the aid of the Korean people that was at the time at war with the American imperialists. During the war he made many errors, and did not abide by or take into account the direction of Comrade Mao Zedong. Toward Peng Dehuai we acted in a different way. We needed a period of time to uncover him and to learn about his activities and to unmask them. This is why the modern revisionists, the imperialists and the Guomintang all mention Peng Dehuai more often than they mention Gao Gang.

The third anti party-group is this last one, which we have uncovered since the November of the past year. This group came out directly against the line of the party with a program designed by the revisionists. Comrade Mao Zedong has spoken about this group to Comrade Mehmet Shehu when he visited China. This is a group of four people which includes Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun. The latter used to be a candidate to the secretariat of the CC of the party and chief of the general sector of the CC. He has twice been sent to international conferences as a Secretary of the delegation and has also been in the delegation to the Moscow Conference. For a long time now, Yang Shangkun has had links to Wang Ming, whom Comrade Beqir Balluku mentioned before and who is to this day to be found in the Soviet Union, has kept his links with the above-mentioned people, and was waging secret anti-party activities in this way. Based on the information we possess, Yang Shangkun has had links with the Soviet revisionists.

Of course, with each of these anti-party groups we have acted differently, according to the conditions at hand. For example, we expelled Gao Gang and Rao Shushi from the party and later Gao Gang killed himself.

With the members of the second group we have followed a different course of action. For example, we relieved Peng Dehuai of his function as deputy chairman of the Council of State and sent him to work on another task, with the intention of uncovering him as he was doing his work and also to put

him on a test.

With the members of the third group we acted faster and more fiercely. We relieved them all completely from the functions that they had.

Outside of these two possibilities which I mentioned, we do not yet see a third possibility, in other words the possibility that in a socialist party or state, no revisionist elements will be born.

Despite the fact that in China we follow the policy of the removal of the bamboo layers, Comrade Mao Zedong, looking at this problem more even deeply, as he also mentioned to Comrade Mehmet Shehu in their talk, emphasizes that we must place special care on the generations to come, so that in the future there may not be any counterrevolutionary coup d'états against us, and not to place the entire burden of the struggle against the birth of revisionism on the leadership of the party, but to go to the entire people, the entire masses, for help.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is very correct.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We must teach the communists and the masses that if the smallest signs of revisionism appear, not only in one individual, not only in one local party organization, but even inside the CC of the party itself, then all the party organizations of the other regions should rise to their feet and with revolutionary zeal overturn the counterrevolutionary coup d'état.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Very correct too...

Comrade Zhou Enlai: As you also mentioned, Comrade Enver Hoxha, this is a Marxist-Leninist action.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Comrade Mao Zedong sees this issue very correctly. This is a great Marxist lesson for all the Marxist-Leninists of the entire world.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: But if we did not have the lessons drawn from the events that took place in the Soviet Union, we would not have been able to arrive so quickly at these conclusions.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is how it should be done. We must teach the party to also react on its own, just like Comrade Mao Zedong says.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This is why we should always follow the line of the masses, so that the leadership and the correct ideas of the party are connected to the masses. Only by always operating in this way shall we be able to overcome all the bad things.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is a genius' vision of the future that teaches us not only how to uncover the bad things, but also

how to fight and clean them up.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes. We have now drawn lessons from the events that took place in the Soviet Union.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: You have done well. The masses are those that make history, and the masses are what the party itself really is.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This is a principle that Marx mentioned long ago, that Lenin emphasized, and that we are taking even further.

But as long as the masses are led by correct ideas, these ideas will transform first of all in a great spiritual force and later into a great material force. Many party members in our country could not really understand how it is possible that the spiritual force may be transformed into a material force and then the material force back into a huge spiritual force.

This is how the situation stands today with the Cultural Revolution in our country. This is a very great, wide and deep revolution, unlike anything ever seen before in history. And it is only the beginning. Without a doubt, in the cities this activity encompasses tens of millions of people, because in this revolution everyone is a participant, in it even the high-school students are participants, and sometime even the pupils of the higher classes of the elementary schools are participants, because they are able to criticize their teachers. In the meanwhile, in our villages this activity encompasses hundreds of millions of people.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The Cultural Revolution in China is terrifying the revisionists, the bourgeoisie, and the imperialists.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: The Cultural Revolution in your country is in the hands of the masses.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: In the cities, in every enterprise and every institution we have started to insert *Da Zi Bao* [Big Character Posters] in big letters in their newspapers. The Cultural Revolution is an indication of the broad socialist democracy. Of course, the positive side of the *Da Zi Bao* stands in uncovering the contradictions between us and our enemies. It helps in the uncovering everywhere the anti-party, anti-socialist, and counterrevolutionary elements. Your ambassador in China, Comrade Vasil Nathanaïli, can himself go and look at these newspapers in the various centers of work and see how the contradictions are uncovered and solved in our country in the midst of the people.

Of course, our enemies can also come up with *Da Zi Bao* but their work has an undermining character. It is directed against us. They can make these kinds of provocations and calumnies, but they are the minority and the masses will uncover

and unmask them. When the masses know you, they will initially criticize you, and if you continue, they will unmask you.

This is why at the same time that in our country this great movement is going on, we cannot spend too much time outside the country. It is for this reason that we must return to China soon.

Now I will talk about The Third Issue: The international communist movement and the war against the modern revisionism.

I am in full agreement with what Comrade Enver Hoxha said that in various countries the revisionists of different colors are coming out, according to the various conditions of each country.

The Titoist group is the first one. It is the forward guard of modern revisionism, but Khrushchevian revisionism is the “commander-in-chief.” It is for these reasons that in the international arena we must, from a tactical standpoint, concentrate our forces and direct them against the “commander-in-chief.”

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Agreed, but we must also not forget the forward guard, because it is also very dangerous.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes. Whereas the rear guards, their followers, we must consider separately, differently. We must keep in mind that they will quarrel like dogs with each other, there are contradictions among them which we can and must utilize to instill rifts between their ranks. In other words, we must uncover and continually utilize the contradictions between them.

Sometimes it happens that some of them say to you that they are also fighting revisionism, basing this on the fight that someone from their ranks is waging against Titoist revisionism. This may happen, but this kind of fight does not have that same weight that the real fight against modern revisionism must have. For example, the Vietnamese often attack the forward guard and speak out against Titoist revisionism, but they never raise their voice against the “commander-in-chief.” There is a contradiction here. Of course, we must also fight against the Tito line that supports the American imperialists’ campaign for “peaceful” talks. Vietnam is in reality against such talks, which are also supported by the Soviet revisionist leaders, but Vietnam does not say anything against the “commander-in-chief.”

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The “commander-in-chief” cannot be separated from the forward guard.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: In the speech that I will give this afternoon at the meeting, I will touch upon this issue in one of the paragraphs.

When I was in Romania recently [prior to the 24 June

Albania visit], I told the Romanian leaders that I would speak against Tito in Tirana. Maurer was very happy as long as I did not speak about this while there, while [RCP Politburo Member Emil] Bodnaras pointed out that if I wanted I could also speak about it while there, but [RCP General Secretary Nicolae] Ceausescu jumped up immediately and criticized him.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Either way, it is expected that Tito and the Yugoslavs will protest.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I have been prepared for a long time for my reply. I will say that when I leave from here, I will not pass through Yugoslavia but will go through Greece. (Laughter)

There are also those that are semi-revisionists of many colors, who are also in a process of transformation. When you said that Romania is a semi-revisionist country, or the country of a new form of revisionism, you made an impression on me. This is true, and in our opinion it should be studied. The Romanian leadership generally is revisionist, but it also has some contradictions with the Soviet Union. This is why the Romanian leaders do not want there to be loud positions taken against China in their country, like the rest of [the East Europeans] do. We have told them that until now we have not attacked each other, but that in the future, with the increasing divergences between us, we cannot guarantee that we will not use open polemics, even against them.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Even against the Romanians?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes.

Since they, for the time being, are not engaging in an anti-Chinese campaign, the enthusiasm and the sympathy of the Romanian people for our people was highly manifested during my visit there. That is why I was warmly received everywhere I went, such as I had not seen in any other revisionist country. Even in the Soviet Union, when I visited I did not receive such a warm reception.

Despite the fact that we have great disagreements, we must still continue to work with them, but the Romanians are very afraid of openly speaking against modern revisionism, in fact they are even afraid of speaking against great power chauvinism.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Because they, themselves, are small-country chauvinists. (Laughter)

Comrade Zhou Enlai: It is because of the reasons I mentioned above that the speeches we held at the receptions, though we transmitted their full text by cable [prior], were only published in summary by the Romanians in their newspapers, and that was because in those speeches I included many stingers, such as, for example, on the relationships between the

socialist countries, on great power chauvinism, on the Warsaw Pact, on the Council of Mutual Economic Aid, against modern revisionism and its cooperation with American imperialism, on their betrayal of the Vietnam War, on the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, on the banning and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. The Romanian leaders did not want me to speak openly about these problems because they were very afraid, and that is why they continually sought to remove such issues from our speeches.

We also noticed that in Ceausescu's speeches there were ideas we do not agree with, but he omitted some of them, because he also wanted us to remove some of ours. This way we were forced to make some concessions for the sake of reciprocity. In their speeches they said good words about our successes in the construction of socialism. We also pointed out their successes, because amongst the revisionist countries the Romanians have progressed well in the field of construction of socialism. Of course, in the future this will not last long, as long as their leadership remains revisionist.

Before we spoke at the rally, we were forced to get into a heated discussion for two whole hours with the Romanian leaders. This forced the people gathered outside to wait, and see that no one was coming out onto the stage. [T]his was because we were debating each other. At last, considering that the masses outside were waiting, we arrived at a compromise that both sides would hold short, unprepared speeches. Ceausescu spoke for only eight minutes and I spoke for only nine minutes, including translation, which was very slow. We spoke and mainly praised the people and the party without mentioning the leaders at all. They also did not say a word about Comrade Mao Zedong. Of course, the foreign correspondents that were attending the rally must have kept good notes on what happened and which must have made an impression.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: They must have photographed each and every word.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Both sides also removed the mutual declaration, where we mainly spoke in support of the war of the people of Vietnam. The declaration was generally good, but we did not want to embellish it so we decided to only publish a short informative article.

This is why the Western press trumpets that Zhou Enlai completely failed in front of a small country. But it can say whatever it pleases, because at the end of the day it reflects reality, it shows that between two countries there exist contradictions and that is a good thing. Nonetheless, in front of the people, the Romanian leaders act as if the relations with us are still amicable.

And while Korea has mutual enemies with us, they, as you, Comrade Enver Hoxha, said two days ago in your presenta-

tion, avoid contact with us while going into secret meetings with the Soviet leaders.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The Korean leaders are acting very incorrectly.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Last year, as soon as the [22 June 1965 normalization] treaty between South Korea and Japan was signed, the foreign minister of Japan went to the Soviet Union for a visit. The Koreans were afraid of this, and that is why they immediately requested that a special envoy of Kim Il Sung come to us to ask for help, because there was nowhere else in the socialist countries they could go. We accepted this immediately and gave the Koreans aid in the form of grains and petrol.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: May your help turn into dust on the Koreans, may they never merit this Chinese largesse! Because, the Koreans are making secret deals with the Soviet revisionists, breaking their word of honor, while China shows her generosity and helps them on rainy days.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Of all the aid that China gives to other countries, Vietnam tops the list, and Korea comes in second. In other words, it is very close to the aid we give to Albania.

But why does this happen with the Koreans? It may be because the Soviet revisionists have blackmailed them by saying that if they get closer to China, the war might spill over even to North Korea, but if they got closer to the Soviet Union, it may be possible that the war would be avoided.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is very possible that this is what has happened.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The so-called special envoy of Kim Il Sung also went to Moscow where he signed an agreement for economic cooperation between the two countries. The Soviets promised to help even more in the development of Korea's industry, but not in the development of agriculture. Today in Korea, as far as we know, there are great shortages of bread grains and the Soviet Union does not give any aid to Korea in this field.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But the Koreans have said that they produce one ton of grain per capita.

Comrade Spiro Koleka: And they have said this publicly.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We have calculated how much it produces. The annual production of grains in Korea does not even reach three million tons. Last year they produced 2,600,000-2,800,000 tons of grains.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Which means only 2-2.5 quintals

per person.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes. We should keep in mind that in Korea the population in the cities is much larger than that of the villages. That [city] population makes up around 60% of the entire country. Now, with the “help” that the Koreans will get from the Soviet Union for the further development of the industry, the population of the cities will increase even further.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: In other words, the Korean village will become deserted.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: A characteristic of the situation in Korea is that it is even more serious than it is in Vietnam.

In Vietnam there are also some changes from the previous positions. Despite the fact that the Vietnamese find themselves confronted with powerful enemies, the American imperialists, and they have fought in a revolutionary way against them, Soviet revisionism has recently infiltrated there. What we have said about the new Soviet revisionist group, the followers of Khrushchev, being even more cunning than Khrushchev ever was, has been demonstrated in Vietnam. This has caused disruption in Vietnam. It has caused dissipation from the upper echelons of the leadership to the lower levels of the base, in other words a separation into the left, the center, and the right. One group supports the continuation of the war against the American imperialists and the other supports the cessation of war. The group for continued resistance is also separated into two groups. While one of them is for the achievement of victory through a quicker war, the other favors a lengthy one.

As we have said before, Comrade Enver Hoxha, based on the current situation in South Vietnam it seems more possible that the war will continue and the country will be wholly taken in by it.

But after the great infiltration of Soviet revisionism in Vietnam, the process of liberalization in this country has quickened and that is exerting a great negative influence on the relations between Vietnam and China. It has caused the cooling of these relations despite the fact that Comrade Ho Chi Minh does not accept this. It is quite visible that this is a fact.

If the war in Vietnam continues for longer, it is clear that there will be new difficulties to be faced there. It does seem that the war will continue because the conditions in which the current American government will accept defeat and will withdraw from Vietnam have not ripened yet.

In this case two possibilities exist: First, the war in Vietnam will intensify even further, and second, the war will expand even further to North Vietnam and later to the all of Indochina and even to China. The Americans are increasing their bombardment of North Vietnam for the time being and are making attempts at blockading it to force it to accept the condi-

tions they are setting for a capitulation dictated by American imperialism.

If the Vietnamese leadership will be steadfast in its war of resistance, we will make all possible attempts to help it, but in the existing conditions we are also facing some difficulties, because the Vietnamese, being under the influence of the Soviet Union, are very afraid of our help and especially of the intervention of Chinese troops into Vietnam to enter the war against American imperialism. Why is this so? It is because the Soviets are scaring the Vietnamese, telling them that when the solemn meeting to celebrate the victory is called, Vietnam will not exist anymore, because all the Vietnamese will have perished.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: According to them there will be neither victors nor losers.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The Soviet leaders are telling the Vietnamese that it is China that is causing them all the trouble and that they will perish. They are replaying all the theories and the blackmailing that Khrushchev used to use.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: They are telling them that the Vietnamese will all be killed and that in their country there will only be Chinese. But this is not fair at all. History has always debunked this claim. There is proof that before World War II Romania had a population of 19 million people, and despite the great massacres that the Hitlerians and the home-grown fascists undertook there, the Romanian people did not perish, but continue to live.

If Chinese troops enter Vietnam, the Vietnamese will certainly not have the right to command them, because there is no way for them to supply our troops. If there is some kind of compromise reached as a result of a betrayal by the Soviet Union, the revisionists might denounce us, saying that we did not help the war of the Vietnamese people as much as we should have.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: In fact, they will announce that you were the reason why Vietnamese blood was spilled for no reason.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: That is why we are not saying that in Vietnam the possibility of “peaceful” talks is completely nonexistent. We must be consciously prepared for this eventuality as well. What happened in Laos cannot happen in Vietnam. The war must go on. The only thing is that greater sacrifices will be needed.

We must also draw lessons from this situation. These positions happen because one of the leaders there, Le Duan, changed course. Until now he had been a leftist.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We understood his change of course from the speech he held in Moscow. As soon as we read

his speech, we immediately said, "He is gone too. He has gone to the side of the "National Front."¹

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The Japanese Communist Party and the Cuban Party have gone even further.

In the past the Japanese Communist Party had planned to translate the works of Comrade Mao Zedong into Japanese, but now they are forbidding the members of the party from reading these works and the various materials and documents [produced] by the CCP. It seems that the Japanese communists are thinking about a "peaceful cross-over."

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Like [Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party (1951-1960) and Diet Member] Suzuki [Mosaburo] and [Japanese Communist Party and Diet Member] Shiga [Yoshio].

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Regarding the Cuban Party you already know that it has gone even further.

The Indonesian Communist Party is undergoing a transition. There does not exist any leadership in the middle and lower ranks of the party. The former party leadership did not prepare the masses for an armed war. They are now rising up spontaneously. The party masses are taking into their own hands the leadership of the armed war. They are, little by little, taking to the mountains and organizing the resistance of the people.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: The leaders of the party, such as [PKI chairman Dip Nusantara] Aidit and the other comrades have all been killed?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We know that Aidit, [PKI CC Vice Chairman] Njoto and [PKI CC First Deputy Chairman M.H.] Lukman have been killed. The only one left is [PKI General Secretary] Sudisman. But, until now, the CC of the Indonesian Communist Party has not published any materials in which the lessons that should be drawn by the entire party from the events [the crackdown on the PKI, communist sympathizers, and ethnic Chinese that followed the kidnapping and murder of six anti-communist generals] that took place after 30 September are mentioned or in which it expresses any political thoughts on the events taking place at the moment inside or outside the country. For this reason many Indonesian comrades are lamenting over the situation, because all they can do at the moment is operate in the international arena—join the leftist parties and groups—but are not able to do anything inside their country.

As far as the situation of the communist movement in the other countries, Comrade Zhao Yiming already talked to Comrade Ramiz Alia about it.

All the modern revisionists now fight against Albania and

China, against Marxism-Leninism. It is a well-known fact that the divisive activity of the Soviet revisionists and all of the other revisionists started long ago. This gives us the right and the chance to enter into contact with many leftist groups in many countries.

Of course, we are against the theory of polycentrism, but we also think that the time has not yet come for the creation of an international organization of leftists, or that there should be a multilateral meeting, and you are also of this opinion. We think that it is better that we wait. We should continue to develop further the contacts or the bilateral relations with leftist parties and groups, and carefully follow the development of these groups and parties.

In the international field, as you Comrade Enver Hoxha also mentioned earlier, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, by their nature, are each under the control of one of the superpowers, which means that the former is under the control of the USA and the latter under the control of the Soviet Union. It is the same situation, with the only difference that the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, which are controlled by the Soviet revisionists, will not be able to order the people of those countries as they wish.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is exactly so.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The revisionists are hoping that in case of an aggression, they will be strong enough to face it easier if they are united. But there is also an opposite direction within them. The Soviets are trying to get all the states of the Warsaw Pact to link up with the West, especially with the USA, but they are meeting a lot of resistance because the wider masses of the people are not in agreement with this course.

Albania has, in fact, been expelled from the Warsaw Pact. As we well know, you do not agree to be a part of this Pact as long as they do not accept the errors they have made at your expense, and this is a very correct request.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Even if they accept the errors they have made toward Albania publicly, we know very well what they are. That is why we will not be part of this Pact even if they engage in self-criticism. Our declaration is a tactical move.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: You have publicized this condition and have placed it on them.

Today we must encourage the tendencies of those countries that are against the betrayal of the Soviet revisionists, so that we may bog down their forces, otherwise the Soviet-American cooperation will get quicker and easier, the treasonous activity of the Soviet revisionists will be helped, the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be achieved, the USA will be

helped in removing their forces from Europe and Asia, making the situation in Vietnam even graver, the achievement of a compromise will come sooner, and the Americans will be freer to strike our forces directly.

The development of the revolution in the different countries or the activity of the leftist groups and parties will be done according to the conditions, the degree of consciousness, and the rate of increase of the subjective forces there. We must support and have contacts with these leftist parties and groups according to the on-the-ground conditions, but in no way should we instill in them the impression or the concept that they should rely more on the external forces. In this area, we would like to exchange more information and thoughts with them.

We are very happy for the revolutionary measures that your party has undertaken and wish you continuous successes.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu told us that you are going to make some changes to the draft of your fourth five-year plan. You, Comrade Enver Hoxha, told us yesterday that the draft, after you analyze it at the party CC plenum, would be taken to the masses for discussion, and at the end, it would be offered to the 5th Party Congress for approval.

According to our experience, the five-year plan is just a program. All the plans, including the annual ones, must change and change or continually become better according to the newly created situation in the country. Before we used to say that the five-year plan was a law, it is unchangeable. But life does not happen this way. This is our experience; development and progress require that the plan adjusts to the times.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: This is our opinion also.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The problem is that the people during the execution of the plan must also increase their work skills. It is because of this reason that we have not yet published our new five-year plan. In other words, we have not publicized it to the world, but we have made it known to the masses domestically so that they can discuss it and make the necessary suggestions for it to improve.

This is all I had. I apologize for having gone on for so long.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It is nothing. We also thank you very much. I was thinking we could take a short break, and then I could speak once more.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I agree, but if we are going to go on, I propose that we cancel the visit to the tunnel.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: I think that you can still make the visit to the tunnel, because I will not go on for too long. I may speak for a total of about 15-20 minutes. If we calculate the

same amount of time for the translation, then I will not take more than one hour. (The time is now 12:30 p.m.)

(The break lasts 15 minutes.)

[...]

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I thank you, Comrade Enver Hoxha, for the words you said about these problems and for the further explanation of some of your points of view.

We must, in fact, recognize that when it comes to drawing conclusions from the internal factors which led to the birth of Soviet modern revisionism, there are some things that are not convergent between our two parties. This, according to my opinion, comes as a result of the differences between our two countries from a historical perspective. From the framework of the analysis of this issue, we have between us a distance, a divergence. I do not want to mention here the external factors, because on that point we have the same points of view.

As far as the internal factors that led to the birth of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union go, I would like to reiterate once more that Khrushchevism is not a phenomenon that has nothing to do with the Stalin period.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It does have a connection with the Stalin period, and on this, both our sides are in full agreement.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: You, Comrade Enver Hoxha, have not denied that, during the time that Stalin held the leadership position, no principled mistakes were made.

It is truly correct and necessary that we continue the studies in relation to the historical internal factors, the social and societal conditions, that led to the birth of revisionism in the Soviet Union, of which Comrade Enver Hoxha spoke about, and that is why I agree that we should continue the studies in this area.

I will transmit the proposal of Comrade Enver Hoxha that both our sides should continue the studies and the exchange of opinions on these issues to the CC of our party and to Comrade Mao Zedong. Of course, this is not a very urgent need, but it is imperative and we must accomplish it, because revisionism was born in the first socialist state in the world, in the country of Lenin. This is an imperative need for the communist movement of the world. Today, the CPSU is not able to accomplish this study. That is why it is left to us, the revolutionary parties to accomplish it and gain from this experience. And in fact, as I mentioned in my presentation, we have already gained from those events because, as I mentioned, had we not had the path which Stalin trod, we would not have had the chance to deeply understand the reasons that led to the birth of revisionism in the Soviet Union or to draw the lessons for measures that should

be taken to avoid a future counterrevolutionary *coup d'état* by the revisionists against our socialist countries.

But the objective situation of that time in the Soviet Union and the influence and the consequences that it had inside and outside the country cannot be studied as it must, without including the sympathies that we might have or not have for the persona of Stalin.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: That is very correct.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The CCP has a few reservations toward the persona of Stalin, and Comrade Enver Hoxha probably knows something about it. In 1958, we talked with Comrade Mehmet Shehu a bit about this issue while traveling by airplane when we visited Moscow.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: On the airplane we spoke about issues pertaining to Baltic and Atlantic countries.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: To tell you the truth, openly, we do not know anything about this issue, and it is precisely because of this reason that we are not saying anything about it. You may be right about the positions you are taking, but we are saying that we do not know anything about it. We only know what has been written. We know nothing further. We only know the official Soviet position on the Chinese Revolution, on the issue of Jiang Jieshi, on the support given by Stalin, and whatever else has been written in books. And books on these issues we have read plenty.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: I do not remember having spoken to Comrade Zhou Enlai in 1958 about the Stalin issue. We have only spoken about the issue of Jiang Jieshi, something I had forgotten to mention to you.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The event took place in 1945, at the end of World War II. At that time, Jiang Jieshi was preparing to ignite the civil war in China. Then Stalin, as soon as he found out, sent a telegram to the leadership of our party and state. This telegram was sent in the name of the CC of the Russian CP. Russia at that time had a CC. The telegram emphasized that there should not be a civil war in China, otherwise the Chinese people would be wiped out.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: And the facts proved that it was not wiped out.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Also, in the telegram it was said that Comrade Mao Zedong should go to Chongqing to have talks and reach an agreement with Jiang Jieshi. That was the time when in China we had just finished the 7th Congress of our party. The entire party was monolithic and determined to fight, but we also faced difficulties because the Americans were helping and urging Jiang Jieshi into a bloody war against us

in the name of the Allied governments. The intention was for the troops of Jiang Jieshi to be sent to occupy the coastal areas that were still being held by the Japanese. But at that time near these coastal areas there were our forces, which were fighting against the Japanese. As a result, it was our right to take over after the Japanese capitulation all the troops and materiel of the Japanese militarists.

Of course, with the intention of making him happy, we accepted Stalin's advice of sending our representatives to Chongqing with Comrade Mao Zedong at the helm to initiate talks with Jiang Jieshi. In fact, we had been holding talks with them for years without any results. I have personally talked several times and could have still gone this time, as long as Comrade Mao Zedong, who had since 1927 never left our bases in the Huangshan Mountains, did not have to go. We surmised that his going to Chongqing for talks with Jiang Jieshi was a very great risk for our party to take. As it is well known, the Comintern did not exist at the time, and, of course, we had the right to act mainly according to the decision and opinion of our party and not to accept the advice that Stalin gave us. But in the end we decided that this would not be a good thing.

Either way, looked at objectively, it may be said that Stalin has great merits for his activity during World War II. He has helped the revolution immensely and the Chinese Revolution has also gained from it. Looking at the issue from this prism, we arrived at the conclusion that despite the fact that this was an erroneous advice on the part of Stalin, it would not be a good thing to rebuke him. This position would not be in our favor, despite the fact that the entire party was against Comrade Mao Zedong's going for talks so close to the Jiang Jieshi headquarters. That is why Comrade Mao Zedong decided to go to Chongqing, but we were all very worried about this. Many comrades were even crying because they were afraid that something could happen to Comrade Mao Zedong.

Another comrade and I went to Chongqing with Comrade Mao Zedong. Of course we were there mostly to be his guards, because we were very afraid that the Jiang Jieshi-ists, as agents and spies of the Americans and as our enemies, might try to do something to him. Before he left, Comrade Mao Zedong gave Comrade Liu Shaoqi the responsibility of replacing him if something would happen to him, in other words if the Jiang Jieshists would arrest or kill him. In addition, he also instructed [them] that if we would all get arrested or killed, they would not think about rescuing us, but only continue the war with determination until the end. Comrade Mao Zedong said to Comrade Liu Shaoqi, "If you fight well, then we will not have died."

As soon as we arrived in Chongqing, Jiang Jieshi invited Comrade Mao Zedong to the villa where he lived. All of us comrades that were behind him would stay close to him because we were afraid that they might do something to him.

You could expect anything from them. They could even put some poison in his food, because we were not able to control the food they were giving us, because we neither prepared it, nor served [it]. In addition, Jiang Jieshi has the habit of eating like the Europeans, on separate plates and could have instructed his people to put poison in Comrade Mao Zedong's plate.

Utilizing the chance that Comrade Mao Zedong was staying in Chongqing, Jiang Jieshi, with the help of the Americans, sent his troops to the coastal areas I mentioned above. Comrade Mao Zedong immediately sent a telegram to Comrade Liu Shaoqi and instructed him not to care in the least about us, but to send forces immediately wherever it was necessary and possible, without taking into account whatever battles might be initiated. And it was precisely at that time that one of our infantry armies, commanded by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, went wherever it was ordered to go and completely decimated two of Jiang Jieshi's armies. It then returned to Yun'an.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Comrade Zhou Enlai, our party is a young party, founded in 1941. You know the methods of the CPSU well. I am trying to say that the Soviet leaders did not keep us up to date on such matters.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: They never consulted with us either.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: But what do we know? We only know those things that have been written. As to how the issues have been discussed, how the events have taken place, etc. we do not really know. So how can we judge better than your party on these issues, on one position, or in another that you have taken in those situations?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Before the departure of Comrade Mao Zedong from Chongqing, Jiang Jieshi served lunch. Before we went there, we discussed the situation carefully because we were wondering that since this was the last lunch that we were going to have at Chiang Kai-shek's, he may put delayed action poison in our food, but if we did not go, it would not be a good thing for us since he would not allow us to leave.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: It sounds like what happened to us with Khrushchev in 1960.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: But we had with us, Zhang Zhizhong, who now is the deputy chairman of the permanent committee of the National People's Congress, and we held him there on purpose, despite the fact that he wanted to leave. There was also an American general [General Joseph Stilwell] who acted as a general "advisor" to Jiang Jieshi.

We returned to Yun'an on a special plane of Jiang Jieshi. We did this on purpose so that, if something were to happen to us, the responsibility would rest on Jiang Jieshi. After Comrade Mao Zedong left Chongqing, I stayed over there for a while

longer.

My point is that while at that time we took the advice that Stalin gave us, we also took double-sided measures. We tried to achieve success in the peace talks, but we did not place trust in them because we had amassed a 20-year experience in meetings with Jiang Jieshi, and that is why we were not trustful of the talks or of his "assurances."

Stalin also tried the [negotiation path] with the help of the Americans. In the framework of these attempts, General [George] Marshall was also sent to China [in December 1945] as a go-between in the talks between us and Jiang Jieshi. Thus was organized the tri-partite group, composed of Jiang Jieshi, our party, and the Americans, in which the American representative would be the primary player. Stalin and Herlin [probably Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley], the Truman envoy, had reached an agreement in Moscow [in April 1945] that the representative of Jiang Jieshi in these talks would be his premier, T. V. Soong. Of course, at that time it was impossible for us not to accept the talks, despite the fact that it was very clear to us that the Americans would support Jiang Jieshi. Our primary responsibility was, at the time, to undertake measures to prepare against Jiang Jieshi, so that in case he would attack us, we would be prepared to offer him determined resistance.

During the period of 1945–1946, for a time span of about one year, we made propaganda on the "success" of the peaceful talks and of the coalition government, while at the same time we followed three policies:

First, we decided to initiate an agrarian reform in the liberated areas of the country. Of course, this was a toned-down reform, intended to secure the production of bread and the mobilization of the peasants around the party.

Second, we decided to further increase the military ranks.

Third, we decided on training for the armed forces, with the intention of being ready for war.

And, in fact, Jiang Jieshi, after he took over all the large cities and after he acquired all the armaments of the defeated Japanese, ignited a war against us. From the beginning of the war ignited by Jiang Jieshi and until our final victory, we fought for about three years or so. This was a defining moment for us because we acted completely contrary to the advice of Comrade Stalin. In fact, it seemed as if we were carrying out his advice because we accepted that Comrade Mao Zedong should go, which he did, to Chongqing and we accepted the tri-partite talks, with the American General Marshall as a mediator. From the start of the talks and until their falling apart, a time of about one year passed. I, myself, took part in the talks, but these were only a formality. This means that in this defining moment, we did not consider Stalin's actions correct, and we think that this

is one of the errors in principle that he made. Nonetheless, we still say that Stalin was an internationalist revolutionary.

After we entered Beijing, we immediately sent over Comrade Liu Shaoqi to Moscow. During the personal talks between the two, Stalin told Liu Shaoqi that his telegram had caused us damage. Liu Shaoqi told him that it had not. After that, the Soviets sent many people to China to see firsthand and to be convinced that China was really a communist country because they could not believe it. This disbelief was due to the great propaganda that the Americans were waging that purported that the CCP was an agrarian party and not a proletarian one. Of course, the purity of the people Stalin sent was low, there were also provocateurs amongst them, who, everywhere they went, would ask questions about everything. They were trying to find out whether in China the same things were happening as in Yugoslavia, in Tito's country. Even our ambassador in Moscow was being asked, mainly by employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, whether we were following Tito's course. Such Soviet behavior instilled great dissatisfaction amongst our cadres at that time.

In the winter of 1949, Comrade Mao Zedong himself went to Moscow on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday. But Comrade Mao Zedong, aside from giving his best wishes for Stalin's birthday, could do nothing while there. All he did was tell Stalin that at that moment China was still not fully liberated, but [he] also assured him that we would fight until it was completely free.

At that time, [still] an alliance treaty existed between old China, in other words, Jiang Jieshi's China, and the Soviet Union. For this reason Comrade Mao Zedong told Stalin that now, that China was liberated, it would be logical to sign a new treaty with a New China. For this, since Comrade Mao Zedong was the chairman of the republic, he proposed that I, Zhou Enlai, go to Moscow to sign the treaty, as I was the chairman of the Chinese government and at the same time the minister of foreign affairs. But Stalin answered to Comrade Mao Zedong that it would not be a good thing since the president of the republic was to be found in Moscow at the same time. If the chairman of the government and minister of foreign affairs would also come, the Western propaganda would say that the Chinese government was transferred in its entirety to Moscow, along with the chairman of the republic who was already there.

The truth is that, at that time, Stalin did not have faith in us that we could liberate the entire country on our own. Aside from this, he was unsure whether we were on the side of the Americans, or maybe following the course of the Yugoslavs. That is the reason he did not want to sign the treaty that we proposed.

Noticing the situation, Comrade Mao Zedong then told him that there was no other reason for him to stay in Moscow,

because all he was doing was eating, drinking, and going to the bathroom, and that is why he needed to leave.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: This is precisely the issue that we had briefly spoken about together on the airplane.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Well, two days later, England recognized the People's Republic of China. At that time, France had also decided and was ready to recognize us. India also, urged on by England, sent us a telegram in which they notified us that they recognized our new state. This was a stimulus to Stalin, who was noticing that the imperialists were recognizing us, which means that they accepted that we would win. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union also agreed to recognize us.

The correspondent of the Soviet press agency TASS asked Comrade Mao Zedong, "Aside from the best wishes on the occasion of his birthday, what else did you talk about with Stalin?" Comrade Mao Zedong answered that he had talked with him about the possibility of signing a new friendship and alliance treaty with the Soviet Union and that he was ready to return to return for a few more visits to see the development of the country.

So, the Soviets finally agreed to sign the treaty. For this reason, after the request of Comrade Mao Zedong, I also went to Moscow and, in fact, the Chinese government did not transfer to Moscow as Stalin told us.

But during the talks that we had on the signing of this treaty many problems arose. The Soviets requested that the Soviet Union have under its sphere of influence Xinjiang and Northeastern China, and that foreigners be forbidden to go there. I told Stalin that we would not allow citizens from imperialist countries to go there, but what would we do about the citizens of fraternal countries that were to be found there? There are many Koreans, especially, who have been there for a long time, and our party cannot do anything to them, we said. Nonetheless, he made an exception here and the treaty was signed. Still, the Soviet leaders continued to have doubts about us. Only after the war against American imperialism started in Korea and we came to the aid of the Korean people, did this disbelief on the part of the Soviet leaders start to dissipate little by little.

Despite all this, despite these positions toward our party that I was talking about, we still say that Stalin is a great warrior, a Marxist-Leninist, a teacher of the world socialist revolution. Khrushchev removed Stalin's portrait from the Soviet Union, but we have not, and that is only due to this opinion we have of him. The placing of Stalin's portrait in Tiananmen Square is a reason for the entire world to say that China rests on Stalinist ground. This is how we have acted since 1956 and until now, for ten years in a row and we are very proud to have done so.

Our party and its leadership, despite the few discontentments that it has with Stalin, will never follow the course that Khrushchev took, because that is a revisionist course. The party of the Khrushchevians in the Soviet Union is today a revisionist party. But we see the situation more widely, more deeply. We have been given the task of defending the interests of the world revolution. Khrushchev, by opening a war against Stalin, is in fact fighting against Marx, Engels, and Lenin, against Marxism-Leninism, against the Marxist parties. Khrushchev is a traitor, a counterrevolutionary. That is why our position is open, it is against him.

So Stalin, as it appears, has made errors in principle. These mistakes we do not hide, with the only intention of drawing the necessary lessons from them, so that if possible both we and the new generation will not make mistakes of the same nature. Furthermore, we do not proclaim openly to the world that Stalin has made these errors in principle, because it would not be correct. Additionally, by clarifying these errors in principle only to ourselves, it does not have the effect of lowering the prestige of Stalin in the international arena. Lenin, in his article "Left-Wing' Communism: an Infantile Disorder" has pointed out that a strictly serious party is not afraid to look at its errors right in the eye. On the contrary, it accepts them, draws lessons from them, and fixes them.

While speaking of the errors of Stalin, I only addressed the period in which our party was under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong. As to the previous period, during the time when the members of the Comintern were in the "leftist" group of Wang Ming, who today is to be found in Moscow, Stalin even then used to give us a few mistaken pieces of advice.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: He is to be found in Moscow at the moment?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Yes. Even at that time Stalin used to give us incorrect advice, but the principal fault lies with us, because we simply accepted it and did not go deeper into it. It is for these reasons that we exercised self-criticism in every material of ours and point out the reasons why the Party CC accepted it. By accepting that advice, we only punish ourselves, because no one forced us to accept such a thing. Even then we could have accepted the advice just for show, just like Comrade Mao Zedong did in relation to the advice for talks with Jiang Jieshi, while at the same time following the correct course.

We will continue to study the errors in principle made by Stalin. One thing needs to be clear though: We will in no way accept the calumny that Khrushchev cooked up about the period of the repression of the counterrevolutionaries. But we must also accept that he repressed the counterrevolutionaries only through administrative means and through the methods of the Ministry of the Interior, and absolutely without relying on the

masses and on the party line, which is the line of the masses. Maybe this is also a case where Stalin made errors in principle? In this case we also hold that we are right, because it has great importance, and we have said this since 1956. All the ministers of the interior in the Soviet Union, with the exception of Dzerzhinsky, from Jagoda to Beria have been killed. The problem is not only that they have made mistakes and misdeeds. The important thing is that the entire structural system of the organs of the ministry of the interior in the Soviet Union did not correspond completely to our socialist system, it was not in order. Regarding this problem, when we have the chance, we can continue to exchange opinions between our two parties.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Agreed.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: There are many comrades who have worked in the organs of the interior ministry in the Soviet Union. They have brought back to our Ministry of Public Order many work methods from the Soviets. But on this issue I only spoke on general lines.

As to the second issue that Comrade Enver Hoxha brought up, you are right, but I still wanted to clarify two points of this issue:

First, when I was talking about the problem of the classes, the class contradictions and the class struggle, Comrade Mehmet Shehu asked me what I was talking about; whether I was talking about our country, or about other countries too. I, naturally, was talking about our country primarily, and about the other socialist countries in general, but the possibility for exceptions in this issue remains.

Secondly, if we accept the class struggle, the issue of what is the character of this class struggle must necessarily come up. The class struggle in today's world is being fought between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. In our country the overturned exploiting classes try to restore their power. This, then, is a struggle between the two courses: between the socialist course and the capitalist one. Without clarifying this point, the character and content of this class struggle cannot be clarified.

And finally, I wanted to say that, as Comrade Enver Hoxha also pointed out, the talks we have had these past four days have been very good. They will help, first of all, in our two warrior parties, who stand fast with determination by the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles, knowing each other even better, in uniting even more strongly, and in intensifying their war against the enemies of socialism. This we will also express before the masses at the rally that we will have this afternoon.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: Of course.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: The discussions between us are normal procedure that may happen at any time. In fact, it would be strange if there were none of them. In that case there would be no contradictions, something which is impossible, because internal contradictions exist everywhere. Even in the mind of a person, taken by himself, there is a continuous struggle between a correct thought and an incorrect thought. If we would think otherwise, we would be idealists.

I, once again, thank very much all the comrades of the Politburo of your party and Comrade Enver Hoxha who gave us the time and the chance to talk.

Comrade Enver Hoxha: We also thank you very much.

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL BRANCH OF THE CC

Haxhi Kroj
[Signed]



DOCUMENT No. 16

Memorandum of Conversation between Albanian Council of Ministers Chairman Mehmet Shehu and Mao Zedong, 30 September 1967

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1967, L. 19, D. 20. Obtained by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF THE DELEGATION OF THE ALP AND GOVERNMENT OF THE PR OF ALBANIA, HEADED BY COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU, WITH COMRADE MAO ZEDONG ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1967

On 30 September 1967 the delegation of the ALP and of the government of the PR of Albania, headed by the member of the ALP CC Politburo and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, was received by Comrade Mao Zedong.

The following Albanian comrades took part in the meeting: Comrade Ramiz Alia, Comrade Mihalaq Zicishti, Comrade Rahman Perllaku, Comrade Tonin Jakova, Comrade Agim Mero, Comrade Foto Cami, Comrade Piro Bitra, and Comrade Vasil Nathanaili.

The Chinese side was [also] represented by: Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Kang Sheng, Comrade Liu Ningyi, Comrade Liu Xiao, Comrade Luo Wei Bo.

The conversation started around 4:15 p.m. and continued

until 5:15 p.m.. The translation from the Chinese was done by Fan Tzen Xuo. The report was recorded by stenograph by Sadik Myftiu and was transcribed with the participation of Sotir Naci. The final editing was done by Piro Bitra.

Comrade Mao Zedong: When was the last time you visited China?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Last year, in May.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Did we meet in Shanghai then?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Yes, in Shanghai.

Comrade Mao Zedong, allow me to bring the most heartfelt and revolutionary greetings of the Albanian Labor Party, of the Central Committee, and of Comrade Enver Hoxha personally, as well as of the entire Albanian people. We are extremely happy that we are given the opportunity to visit your country at the eve of the celebrations for the 18th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, and at a time when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is at the highest stage of its development. In the name of our people, of the party, and of Comrade Enver Hoxha, we greet you on your great anniversary, on the final victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and we wish you, Comrade Mao Zedong, a long life, a long, long life.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I thank you very much. With all my heart I welcome you, and all the comrades of the delegation of the party and the government headed by you, once more to our country.

Last year your delegation was not as large as this.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Yes, it was smaller than this one.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Please, introduce me to the comrades.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: (After he introduced one by one the comrades of the delegation that were present at the meeting, said): the other comrades that take part in our delegation are representatives of the working class, of the cooperativist peasantry, etc.

Comrade Enver Hoxha and the party's Central Committee and government, have given our delegation a great mission and a very important task: the further strengthening of our friendship with the great People's China, led by Comrade Mao Zedong; they have also given us the task of once more expressing our solidarity and our full support for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution initiated and run by you, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I thank you very much. The impe-

rialists do not support us, neither do the revisionists; nor have the reactionaries of the various countries, including here Jiang Jieshi, supported us. Only you support us, and some sister parties and communist groups around the world; there are also some democrats in the countries of Asia and Africa that support us. So, for example, the Communist Party of the United States of America is against us, but there is there another organization, the Progressive Labor Party, that supports us. The same also happens in France and Italy, for example, where the communist parties are against us and against you, but [other] communist groups and the new party that was just founded in Italy, support us.

Our task is, first of all, to accomplish our duty at home well, as you have done by taking so many measures.

Do you remember the conversation we had together last year in Shanghai? Were you also there, Comrade Kang Sheng?

Comrade Kang Sheng: No, I was not there. I was at the meeting this year [February 1967] when you met Comrade Hysni Kapo and Comrade Beqir Balluku.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: I was there and so was Comrade Lin Biao.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Between our meeting last year and the time Comrade Hysni Kapo and Comrade Beqir Balluku came here, I have thought of the situation in our country as very serious. I told them that, first of all, the danger of the failure of the revolution exists, and also that the other possibility, us emerging victorious, also exists.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: You spoke about this with our delegation in Shanghai too, Comrade Mao Zedong. I remember this being one of the principal issues that you emphasized in that meeting.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I told Comrade Hysni Kapo that after three months we could probably see a little more clearly what the movement's shape will be in the future. But what happened after that? The months of February, March, April, May, June, July, August, and September; in other words, 9 months. Now I can tell you two comrades and to the other comrades that we can see not only the general shape, but the actual form and matter of victory. Now the possibility of us emerging victorious is the only likelihood. Nonetheless, we must also be prepared for the other possibility, the danger of failure, because no harm will come to us if we are also prepared for such a possibility.

During the course of more than one year, China went through a great commotion. But there is not much confusion. There is not much confusion in Beijing either; it is quite a civilized city. Lately, I have been making visits to many provinces.

I could say that they are a bit restive. But the greater and more complete the restlessness, the better it will be. It happens that in a [industrial] plant the workers are separated into two large groups. Why? Because one group is supported by some people while the other group is supported by other people. In other words, the leftist group is supported by the Marxist-Leninists, while the other is supported by the revisionists. Sometimes the clashes might seem catastrophic. A great clash happened these past 3-4 months, meaning since the end of June until now.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: Since the time that the 6 June circular came out.

Comrade Mao Zedong: After the victory in 1949, we have had in our society not only people that were trained by Guomindang [Kuomintang] and bourgeois people, but we have also had some bad people that entered our party. You also had such a member of your Political Bureau, Liri Belishova [expelled from the Central Committee in September 1960].

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We had not just one, but several. Liri Belishova was one of the last of our enemies that fought us from inside the party and the Central Committee. Since its founding, our party has consistently waged a long and unremitting struggle against these elements; it has cleaned up its ranks through that struggle. During October of last year we expelled from the party a member of the Central Committee for enemy activity against the line of the party.

Comrade Mao Zedong: This is the dialectic law of things and phenomena.

A party that is the exception and does not have rightist elements in its midst cannot be conceived.

Why was the First International of Marx and Engels dispersed? Did it not happen because the Marxists were the minority and the anti-Marxists were the majority? Was it not so? At that time, Proudhon, Blanqui, Lassalle, etc. came out from the ranks of the First International. As a result, in the end, the First International was dispersed.

But can it be said that there were no good and resolute people in the world after the dispersal of the First International? As it is well known, later, the socialist parties were created in the various countries: the Social Democratic Party in Germany, the Socialist Party in France, the Labor Party in England, the Socialist Party in Italy, and the Russian Workers' Social Democratic Party in Russia. The same thing happened in other countries too. All these parties joined together at the Second International. All of them considered themselves Marxist parties. But in the end it became apparent that those that were truly Marxists were only Lenin and his group. In that time in Europe, in the majority of the parties, only some elements or certain groups supported Lenin, while the rest of the Second International became a tool

of imperialism. Was this a very bad thing, perhaps? I think it was not because, later, the Third International was formed. The small groups that existed in Germany, France, Italy, etc. were transformed into large parties. I do not speak of Russia here, where we know well which party was formed.

But what do these parties of the Third International look like today? Now we see that the situation seems bad only in appearance. Are there now people that say that only your party and ours still exist? It is my opinion that in your country things might get better, while in our country it will be difficult for things to go well. This is proved by the history of our party. The first general secretary of our party, Chen Duxiu, made mistakes of rightist deviation. During the first internal revolutionary war, the Guomindang turned from an ally into an enemy and it waged the white terror. The Guomindang attacked us unexpectedly and broke our party into floating debris. After the terror only around 10 thousand communists were left. We drew lessons from these events. We had two teachers in this: Jiang Jieshi and Chen Duxiu. It was then that we understood that it is not enough that the movement be waged through mobilizing the masses alone. At that time we had representatives of our party in the government, we had some millions of workers and tens of millions of peasants under the leadership of our party, but what happened as a result? Within one morning we were completely destroyed. So we very often have pointed this lesson out to the representatives of the sister parties. But they did not pay the necessary attention to this. We have told them that even if you have many party members, many organized peasants, and many union organizations, and even if you have representatives of your party in the government, you still should not think that you are safe.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: I believe you are talking about the Indonesians?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, I am talking about them.

Comrade Kang Sheng: As far as I remember, Chairman Mao has discussed this issue four times with Aidit.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I have told them many times to never believe any of the good words the bourgeoisie tells them, because we already know where that leads. I have spoken to them about armed struggle. I pointed out that our first war lasted for 10 straight years and during these 10 years we made mistakes three times. The first mistake was a "leftist" mistake; it was made by the party's Central Committee when led by Xiang Zhongfa.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We have also had some persons of this kind; in fact, more than one.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Later we discovered the rightist

mistakes of Li Lisan. And even later, the line of Wang Ming came out; he is now to be found in Moscow. We have not formally expelled him from the party, but in fact he is an enemy. Later, during the Long March, we had the meeting at Zunyi. We have corrected the mistakes of that course in general lines. At that time, for 10 years in a row, the general secretary was Zhang Wentian. He led the party.

I became chairman of the party in 1945, in the year of the defeat of Germany and Japan. I do not want to say with this that I have done a good job as leader of the party, because one can be divided in two. But if someone would accuse me of being an anti-Marxist, a Trotskyite, a nationalist, or a capitulator in front of American imperialism, that is something that I cannot accept. Neither the American imperialists, nor the Khrushchevian revisionists or the Jiang-Jieshists believe this. I have not met the leaders of American imperialism, but I personally know N. Khrushchev, Kosygin, Nehru, and Jiang Jieshi, an old friend of mine; but the Earth still revolves.

We have managed some tasks well in China, and some others we have not. If everything in our country had gone well, then why would we need to wage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? This means that in our country there are some people that are still in the dark. It is precisely towards this segment that we need to direct our revolution. You now know against whom this revolution directs its [knife] edge. You also know well the manner of its activities.

Comrade Ambassador, how long have you been in Beijing?

Comrade Vasil Nathanaïli: I have been here for a year and a half.

Comrade Mao Zedong: You have come precisely at the time when the Cultural Revolution started. During the summer of last year those that supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were few. The working class had yet to be mobilized at the time. Pressure was being exerted on the students. The Red Guard had just been born and the struggle was in its initial stage. Now the situation has changed greatly: the working class has risen to its feet; the majority of the students are now revolutionaries; in the majority of the provinces, autonomous regions, and the larger cities under the authority of the center—there are a total of 29 of them—the work is going well.

Many people say that the cult of personality exists in our country; in other words, my cult exists here. They also say that the same goes on in your country with the cult of Comrade Enver Hoxha. In fact, my cult of personality only developed here this year. Before that not only the foreigners, but even the Chinese did not listen to my words. This was due to the fact that the bourgeois ideology existed in our country. We used to have the Liri Belishova of China.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In our party we have had enemies even more dangerous than Liri Belishova. Liri Belishova can be considered on a par with Lu Dingyi, but we have also had elements like the Khrushchev of Albania.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Then I overvalued Liri Belishova.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: The Khrushchev of Albania, if we may say this, was Koci Xoxe. He was the deputy secretary of the party's Central Committee, the second person after Comrade Enver Hoxha, [he was also] deputy prime minister and minister of internal affairs. He directed the organizational work of the party. He was an agent of Tito, linked spiritually and ideologically with him. So, Koci Xoxe was exactly like N. Khrushchev and the Tito of Albania. He had inserted his own people into the party, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the army, in the administration, everywhere. This happened immediately after the liberation of Albania. From November of 1944 until 1947 he was able to control many key positions and was trying to isolate Comrade Enver Hoxha. His intention was to liquidate Comrade Enver Hoxha along with all the other comrades that stood on healthy Marxist-Leninist positions. During that time many comrades were expelled from the Central Committee.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Was this man that fierce?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Yes, he was very fierce.

Comrade Mao Zedong: He appears to have been like our Liu Shaoqi.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: If you would allow me, Comrade Mao Zedong, without going into much detail and without taking much of your time, I could talk to you a bit about this issue. A very dangerous situation was created in our party at that time. Many good comrades were expelled from the Central Committee, and everyone was put under the control of the security apparatus. The enemies created a grave and unbearable condition around Comrade Enver Hoxha. One member of the Politburo that could not take the pressure committed suicide. I, for example, was expelled from my position as candidate member of the Politburo and expelled from the Central Committee; they were preparing to put me in jail. Comrade Enver Hoxha, and all comrades who stood faithful to his line and the Marxist-Leninist view were accused as anti-Yugoslav elements because they were opposing the attempts by Tito to turn Albania into a Yugoslav province, in other words, his attempts to take away Albania's independence; they opposed Tito and [remained] faithful to Stalin and to the Soviet Union. This situation continued for about three years and it reached its peak at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee in 1947. The decisions of this plenum were truly revisionist. Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other comrades fought in a resolute way during the whole time against the decisions of the 8th Plenum,

and thanks to this long and difficult struggle and with the arrival of the famous letters by Stalin on the issue of the revisionist course and stance of Tito, it became possible that at the 9th plenum of the Central Committee, in October 1948, the opportunist and reactionary course of Koci Xoxe and of his followers was destroyed and their plotting against the party, its Marxist-Leninist leadership, and against socialism in Albania, was uncovered. Once unmasked openly to the party and people, Koci Xoxe and his group faced a public trial in May 1949; that trial sentenced him (only Koci Xoxe) to death, and that decision was executed in June 1949.

Comrade Mao Zedong: (with irony) He went to paradise.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: That is why I said that he was the first N. Khrushchev of Albania, though N. Khrushchev had not arrived on the scene yet. Aside from this person, we have also fought other anti-party and enemy elements in our party. We have expelled from the Central Committee and the party tens of enemies, who have had more or less the same course and activity with Liu Shaoqi and his followers. Now we see well how Liu [Shaoqi] Deng [Xiaoping] have operated in China, and we also know many things which we did not know last year; their treason and the necessity for a struggle to the end against them are very clear to us.

Forgive me, Comrade Mao Zedong for taking so much of your time with these issues.

Comrade Mao Zedong: No, I want to listen to you.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: During the last throngs of the Italian occupation in 1943, when we created the National Liberation Army and the National Liberation Front led by the party, and when in many areas of the country we had taken power, there were two organizations in Albania that called themselves nationalist and acted as if they really wanted the liberation of Albania from fascist occupation. Though the party knew the intentions of these organizations well, it made every effort to cooperate with them against the [foreign] occupier—naturally without wanting to merge with them and seeking to preserve its independence and the hegemony of the National Liberation Front at any cost. In the framework of these efforts, a meeting was held in which the representatives of these two organizations met those of our party. The delegation of our party was headed by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee called Ymer Dishnica. Instead of defending the line of the party and carrying out the clear orders given to him by Comrade Enver Hoxha, this person capitulated and accepted the ideas of the two nationalist organizations—led by reactionaries—to disperse the National Liberation Army and to include the Communist Party of Albania and these bourgeois organizations as equals in the emerging government. In this meeting, they drafted and distributed a joint declaration, which the traitor Ymer Dishnica signed in the name of our party. I

remember that it was precisely August of 1943 when Comrade Enver Hoxha received note of the joint declaration. I was with him at that time in a mountainous region of southern Albania. Immediately, Comrade Enver Hoxha declared it a traitorous action. The aforementioned declaration was declared unacceptable by our party. Ymer Dishnica was expelled from the Central Committee and later from the party; now he works as a doctor. But the damage he caused to the party, at that moment when the war was getting fiercer, after the Italian occupation of Albania had just been replaced by the Nazi one, was quite grave. I mention these facts, Comrade Mao Zedong, because there are similarities between the activities of our traitors during the war with the activities and the points of view of Liu Shaoqi. Liu Shaoqi wanted to surrender the Red Army to Jiang Jieshi. Ymer Dishnica in our case wanted to surrender our National Liberation Army to the "Balli Kombetar" [National Front] and "Legaliteti" [the Albanian monarchists]. Liu Shaoqi wanted to take part in the government of Jiang Jieshi and to force the party into hiding. Ymer Dishnica wanted to do the same thing in our country, etc.

I do not want to take any more of Comrade Mao Zedong's time because people such as these have existed in our country by the scores at different times. If you have more time, as Comrade Zhou Enlai mentioned, to meet one more time, I could speak in more detail about these issues.

I wanted to point out that in our party too, since its founding and until the present, there has continually been a fierce struggle for the preservation of the purity of its line. The struggle of the opposites as a general law of progress cannot but happen within a party too and this has also been true in our country.

Comrade Mao Zedong: This struggle is an indication in the party of the class struggle that goes on in society, because the bourgeoisie exists, and so does the feudal class, and they insert their representatives in our party too. In the ranks of the party there have been some people who for a long time have not been communists, but agents in the service of the enemy and we did know about them. For example, Liu Shaoqi since 1929 committed treason by signing a declaration in front of the enemy. This has been uncovered recently by the Red Guardians. Later he, along with Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, An Ziwen, and others, betrayed [us] once again. Peng Zhen was a member of the Politburo, a secretary of the Central Committee, first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, chairman of the Executive Committee of Beijing, and vice chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Assembly. Bo Yibo was a candidate to the Politburo and deputy prime minister that dealt with the industry sector. An Ziwen was for 20 years in a row a director of the Organizational Directorate of the CC. They have issued declarations while they were in prison and have sworn loyalty before the portrait of Jiang Jieshi.

The Red Guards made many errors and [had] shortcomings,

but their general orientation is correct.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: You have said that revolution is not knitting. We have all made mistakes, some of which we are able today to consider stupidities.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I have also committed some stupidities. But the [Red] Guards are educated during the process of war. In the past the entire education system in our country was in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The majority of the newspapers, including those that were masked as communist, were in the hands of the bourgeoisie. They had even wrapped their hands around the *People's Daily* newspaper.

For many years in a row now, I have noted several times that the newspapers must change their appearance, but no one heeded my call, because they did not accept my advice. On 1 June of last year we took over the *People's Daily* newspaper. Before that time we only had two military divisions in Beijing, but then we doubled them to 4 military divisions, and in this way in May of 1966 we dared to reorganize the Beijing party committee. In the months of May, June and half of July of that year I was not in Beijing. Shall we end it here?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We apologize, Comrade Mao Zedong, for having tired you so much. As you can see, we are never tired of coming to see you and talk with you.



DOCUMENT No. 17

Memorandum of Conversation between Albanian Labor Party Delegation and the CCP Leadership, 12 October 1967

[Source: Central State Archive, Tirana, AQPPSH-MPKK-V. 1967, L. 19, D. 20. Obtained for CWIHP by Ana Lalaj and translated for CWIHP by Enkel Daljani.]

12 October 1967
Second Meeting

CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU AND THE
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION OF THE
ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY AND THE ALBANIAN
GOVERNMENT WITH COMRADE MAO ZEDONG AND
OTHER LEADERS OF THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
12 OCTOBER 1967

The conversation took place during the reception that Comrade Mao Zedong organized for the delegation of the ALP and of the government of the People's Republic of Albania, led

by Comrade Mehmet Shehu.

In the conversation there were present: Comrade Lin Biao, Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Chen Boda, Comrade Kang Sheng, Comrade Li Fuchun, Comrade Liu Ningyi, Comrade Yang Chengwu, Comrade Liu Xiao, Comrade Luo Guibo, and Comrade Wu Faxian.

Along with Comrade Mehmet Shehu there were also [present]: Comrade Ramiz Alia, Comrade Mihallaq Zicishti, Comrade Rahman Perlaku, Comrade Tonin Jakova, Comrade Agim Mero, Comrade Foto Cami, Comrade Piro Bitia and Comrade [Albanian Ambassador to China] Vasil Nathanaili.

The conversation took place in one of the conference rooms of the building of the People's Assembly.

The translator was Fan Zenshuo.

The stenographer was Sadik Myftiu.

Edited by Piro Bitia.

The conversation started around 6:00 p.m. and continued for 1 hour and 30 minutes.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Were you threatened by any danger during your visits? Did someone hit you? (Speaking to Comrade Ramiz Alia) Did you take part in any fighting?

Comrade Ramiz Alia: On the contrary, the masses showed us great love.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We cannot say with certainty that after you left they did not start the fighting once more. To you they were speaking nicely, but after you left they began fighting again. But what you saw in Yan'an should not be considered a bad fight. Were the masses armed with rifles and artillery, or did they only have knives, pikes, and iron bars? In Wuhan the masses were armed with rifles and artillery, which they used during the fighting. But Wuhan is not a province where the fighting happened with cannons and heavy artillery. The worst fighting took place in Shaanxi, and the second-most in Shenyang, Hunan, Anhui, and Nanjing.

I suggested to the Congolese Prime Minister (B) [Republic of Congo (Brazzaville); likely Ambroise Noumazalaye] to visit the mine of Hunan where a fierce battle between two groups took place. There are 10 coal mines in that region, and the production in the past reached up to 45 thousand tons of coal a day. After the battles the production fell down to 10 thousand tons of coal a day. As our prime minister told me, later the production fell even further, in fact it went down to 400 tons a day.

Only a little time after the great revolutionary alignment, the production increased again to 25 thousand tons of coal a day. The workers are now assuring us that they will surpass the production goal of 45 thousand tons of coal a day. The prime minister of Congo (B) seems to have read some Marxist-Leninist books, so I recommended to him that [he] come to our country to see the issues in person.

Why are you rushing to leave so early? Why do you not desire to help us a bit more? Stay a few days more, go to some other areas around the country, and help us in some other regions.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: (Jokingly) This is an easy thing, Comrade Mao Zedong. Send a telegram to Comrade Enver Hoxha, and we will be happy to stay for another 6 months.

Comrade Mao Zedong: No, it would suffice if you stayed here one more month. I will send you to all 29 provinces and autonomous cities of our country, including to Tibet as well as Shijiazhuang, where the problem has yet to be resolved, and you can help us. In Shijiazhuang there are two large and divided groups that are fiercely fighting each other; in fact they even celebrated the national holiday by organizing separate events.

Starting from the last third of the month of September, the majority of the national level organizations have joined forces. There is a minority that still needs to join. In general, the workers, the peasants, the students, and the clerks are tired of the fighting and quarrelling, so they no longer want to continue. But for a general solution to the problem we will need a few more months. But for a permanent solution to the problem, we think the revolution will continue for three more years.

Since 1 June 1966 when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution started, less than a year and a half has passed. It is this: wherever we had the greatest disturbances the problems are easier to solve, but wherever it neither hurts nor itches, the problems are solved with greater difficulty.

As the comrades have reported to us, in northeastern and south-central China the Red Guards battled with soldiers of the People's Liberation Army. In these regions 10 thousand people have been killed, wounded, or beaten. But can this scare us? In the south-central provinces of China, in Hunan, Guizhou, and Jiangxi, 32 cadres of the army have been killed and 2-3 thousand people have been wounded, a few thousand more have been lightly wounded. In other words, 32 people went to meet Marx. Seven thousand more were hurt only lightly, so they were strengthened.

In northeastern China there were [illegible] killed, while many others were wounded or touched only a little.

Comrade Lin Biao has set four rules for the military:

- a) Do not strike others, even if they strike at you first.
- b) Do not curse others, even if they curse you first.
- c) Do not anger others, even if they are angry with you first.
- d) Do not fire at others, even if they open fire against you first.

These rules are based on the premise that one has to face the popular masses here, where it is hard to pinpoint who is a revolutionary and who is a counterrevolutionary; that is why one cannot open fire on the people.

It is due to this that the masses have great trust in the People's Liberation Army. Why do the masses fight the military? Because they know that our military resolutely carries out the four rules set by Comrade Lin Biao. In this case they have no reason to be afraid of the military. (Speaking jokingly in the direction of Comrade Rahman Perlaku) Do not be afraid.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Only a military well-prepared ideologically and politically, can carry out these four rules in practice.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In general, our army is as you describe it. But there are also many units that are not like that. You did not have a chance to see all this, so after you go, we may keep Comrade Ramiz Alia and the Comrade Ambassador here [so they can] visit a few more regions. Do not be afraid of this, because there is no danger; the problem has now been solved. There were 300 hundred thousand rifles looted in all of China. Some people say that there were more likely 600 hundred thousand rifles looted. Do you believe that these rifles were looted by the masses? No, the people that support leftist organizations gave rifles to those with leftist leanings, while those that support rightist organizations armed the rightists; they want to take over power. This is how the fighting started. It is important that the issue be solved gradually. This is called a sort of a civil war, because you have two groups fighting each other. If we include the *Da Zi Bao*, the fighting with fists, and the armed battles, then we can say that the entire country is in the midst of fighting a true civil war. After such battles is the time to see who the leftists are and who the rightists are. Some time ago the rightists proclaimed the slogan of "the village must surround the city." This has been our slogan in the past. But they wanted to trick the peasants and convince them that the workers and the students are bad, so you must go and fight against them. They tried to scare them by saying if they would not go to the city, their land would get smaller or their work days would decrease. Those that would go were promised 0.5 to 2 yuan a day, and for those that might get killed in the battle, they promised to give their families 100 yuan on the spot; so for them death costs 100 yuan. These elements exert pressure and force the peasants to go to the city. This campaign lasted for some time. But the peasants are not so able to leave the village, because they have work to do in their homes and in the

fields. There is one good thing in this, because there are many peasants who have never seen the city and now have a good chance to do so. The slogan "the village must surround the city" has a good sound to it, but it is very difficult to achieve. When we came out with this slogan, the cities were occupied by Jiang Jieshi and we were attacking them from villages and seizing them; now the cities are under the control of the revolutionary communists, workers, and students.

For this reason, on 13 July we issued an order which prohibited peasants from coming to the city. This is how the plan of the rightists was doomed.

The rightists are doomed to failure.

We have created military sections at every institution in the [agricultural] communes and in [industrial] plants. We have done the same in the districts. This is part of the popular militia. One company has 100 people. Then there is the branch for the military zones that deals with the military forces of the 10 districts comprised of about 10 thousand soldiers. Then there is the military zone of the province. For example, the Hubei province has two such military zones; one of the Hubei province and the other of Wuhan. This zone covers the provinces of Henan and Hubei, which have 86 million inhabitants. The highest institution is the Ministry of Defense and is headed by Comrade Lin Biao.

The problem cannot be solved without such an upheaval. We have used this to prevent the rightists from occupying solid ground. Chen Zaidao (former commander of the Wuhan garrison), could not remain in Wuhan, came to Beijing where he is studying. Initially, the servants, the guards and the secretary of Chen Zaidao had sentenced him to stand for 3-4 hours with shoulders bent and holding his hands behind his back; they called this punishment "the jet plane." (Comrade Mao Zedong stands up and shows this punishment by bending his body.) In Wuhan there were two court martials against him. When Comrade Kang Sheng went to Wuhan he said to him, "Old man Kang, you better shoot me because I can no longer stand this." Then we did some work with his servants, officers, and secretary.

Presently we are unable to distinguish our communists and the top or middle cadres that are revolutionaries from those who are backward, centrists, rightists, or revisionists. The same goes in the administration and in the military. This is a very grave test for the military too.

During the past 18 years we have not done a very thorough work with the masses. Those that have high posts, high wages, cars, and comfortable apartments, I think are not dangerous when they have these four things for as long as they remain revolutionaries. But there are some people who when they get a hold of these four favors do not remain revolutionaries and

during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution they took the side of the rightists. By detaching themselves from the masses, they turned from people at the base and from soldiers to grand lords. That is why you are correct to fight against bureaucratism. This time the struggle was waged right over their heads. Chen Zaidao mobilized the Regiment of the “100 million” and we rewarded him with the “jet plane.” (He takes the position of the “jet plane.”) We are not able to take measures to help these people everywhere, be it me, or Comrade Lin Biao, and Comrade Yang Chengwu (the Chief of Staff), because we have a large country and an army of over 2 million people. We have not been able to help 99 percent of the people and the military. It is different in your country, because you are able to keep close relations with the people and your soldiers. There is a good chance to educate and strengthen the cadres.

Did you visit the Polytechnic Institute of Wuhan, and did you get to see the fortifications?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We were there, but we did not see any fortifications.

Comrade Mao Zedong: They may have destroyed them.

Comrade Kang Sheng: When we were there, the square where the fortifications used to be was renamed “The Square of Sino-Albanian Friendship.”

Comrade Mao Zedong: This school posed a great resistance against Chen Zaidao because it is a polytechnic school and can produce its own chemical and other kinds of weapons. (Turning to Comrade Zhou Enlai) Are there any numbers as to how many in total were killed on the part of the leftists there?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: We do not have those numbers.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Hundreds and thousands of the rifles that were looted from us have been returned; by now over 30% of the weapons looted have been returned to us.

Comrade Yang Chengwu: In the province of Jiangxi almost all of them have been returned.

Comrade Mao Zedong: There are provinces where the people have turned in large caches of weapons and munitions. First they looted these weapons from us, and now they are coming and turning them in themselves. It is strange! They looted them and now they are returning them. Now they say that they had the need and the desire to be armed because they could not resist without weapons. While to the rightists the weapons were given by rightist and conservative elements in the military. But later the people that had the weapons started to be scared that the enemy could take the weapons from them and use them to kill them. So they came and turned in the weapons. We are planning to arm the workers and the leftists in a sys-

tematic way. We have yet to start arming them in Wuhan.

Comrade Zhou Enlai: This has started as an experiment.

Comrade Mao Zedong: That is why the foreigners are saying that all of China is in shambles. In this they are somewhat right, and the reports they are giving are not entirely lies. But, I think, in some areas there was not enough disorder in place. But why are we not afraid of disorder? It is because without disorder, the many contradictions that exist will not come out. This is not a bad thing. The issue is not only Liu Shaoqi. He still has many other followers, but they still do not comprise the majority; they are a very small minority when compared to the popular masses and the revolutionary cadres.

A year ago we were in the minority; the wider popular masses were still being oppressed. At that time—even in Chinese land—only a minority would listen to my words. The majority of the people did not know what I was saying. Comrade Lin Biao, who is for my cult, published in 1962 the red book with my quotes. But my words started having their true effect only in January of this year. Then how can I be called a dictator, when even in Beijing I could not exert my authority. Even the *People’s Daily* newspaper editorial office did not listen to me.

Now the situation, in comparison to last year, has changed considerably. A turning point has been passed.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: A great upheaval has taken place.

Comrade Mao Zedong: (Speaking to Comrade Zhou Enlai) Did you speak to the comrades about how the events in Wuhan took place?

Comrade Zhou Enlai: No, we have yet to tell them.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Those events were my doing, because from 14 to 21 July I was in Wuhan. I entered the beehive, and when you bother the bees they will sting you. But they could sting neither me nor the Prime Minister, who was also at Wuhan at the time. This way the problem there started to move toward a solution. There are also many other such examples. At the military sector of Wuhan the commander and the commissar were both replaced. The same for the military sectors of Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Wuhan, Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan, as well as the city of Chengdu—a total of 11 provinces and cities; the former commanders or commissars there were removed, and the bad people were replaced by others.

Now we are starting to open study courses in which the cadres will study for one or two months. [Classes] will be opened in the provinces, districts, locales, as well as in the military regions and sub-regions. We have a total of 29 military sectors at the level of the province or independent city; we also have 13 large military areas in which several provinces are included.

Why do you want to leave at any cost the day after tomorrow? Why do you not care about China's issues anymore? Could we not keep Comrade Ramiz Alia along with the ambassador and your philosopher?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: We thank you very much for this [invitation], but we must leave the day after tomorrow. We are also paying a short visit to Pakistan. We thank you very much, Comrade Mao Zedong, for the very warm reception, we cannot find the words to describe our feelings about [your hospitality]. Wherever we went we were afforded a very warm and fraternal reception. We especially want to thank you for the invitation to visit Wuhan.

During the short time we stayed in your country we immensely increased our knowledge of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and have tried to learn as much as possible. This is a great and valuable experience that will be useful to us in developing and deepening even further the revolutionization movement in our country.

We are deeply touched by the feelings of fiery love that the Chinese people have for the Albanian people, for Comrade Enver Hoxha, and for our country.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Wherever you go, the people applaud and cheer and leave their quarrels aside. But whenever you leave, the fighting starts again.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: In Wuhan the revolutionary organizations of the masses had disagreements among themselves, but when it came to defending Comrade Mao Zedong and his idea and revolutionary course, they all were ready to give even their life. We saw this with our own eyes everywhere we went. Though they have disagreements between them, those are internal disagreements and are not antagonistic; they are solvable, and it is precisely because of this that the fighting is occurring.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Is that what they said? They are only making declarations now, but are not coming together. The principal issue that has yet to be solved is in what way the reunification should happen and who should be the nucleus of this reunification. The main thing for them is to get to know each other. I think that the slogan "Let the reunification happen in one month" is not militant enough. The slogan "Let us reunite with me as the nucleus" is not fair either. The others must accept and recognize you as the nucleus; you should not seek this for yourself. But this can only happen in the course of the war. Comrade Enver Hoxha did not call himself the nucleus leader, but he is nonetheless such a nucleus and this happened in the course of a decades-long war.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: They said that they will fight against the egoism of the group. Of course, from saying something to actually doing it is a very long process. Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kang Sheng directed them to exercise

more self-criticism and to study the works of Comrade Mao Zedong, so that they may achieve reunification.

Comrade Mao Zedong: They should employ self-criticism and not curse the other side. They are all leftists and are not fighting the conservative organization of the "one million men" anymore.

I wanted to say this to you one more time: We foresee that in the next year or in 1969 we will have a party congress. We will reorganize our party, but in order to do that we will need to do a lot of preparatory work. We are thinking of having the Party Conference of the Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai in May 1968. At the moment, events are developing at a very fast pace, and the two fronts are becoming more distinguishable from each other. Without even including the *Da Zi Bao*, only the small newspapers published by the Red Guards and various organizations reach in the thousands. Many of these newspapers, or better said their organizations, are waging a fight to seize the publishing houses. So, for example, the newspaper of the Hubei province falls in the hands of one group at one point, and on those of another just a bit later. Both sides use it to influence the public opinion. In the Hubei province, the newspaper was in the hands of the leftists at the beginning, but later Chen Zaidao took it over and, later still, the leftists took it over once more. Now everyone is against the newspaper being published again, so it has stopped coming out. In its stead, there are all kinds of small papers being published in factories, plants, schools, and institutions. In the past there were two newspapers in this province, now that one has been closed there is only one left, the "Yangtze River."

I am very happy that many newspapers were liquidated because they had fallen in the hands of bourgeois intellectuals. Now there are places where they do not publish any newspapers at all, such as in the provinces of Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, etc. Wherever the bourgeois intellectuals have gathered around the newspaper it is better that it never gets published. In the schools and the educational institutions, where there are many intellectuals, the press and the sound centers [radio stations] are today in the hands of one group, while tomorrow they fall in the hands of another.

During this movement the organs of security, the police, and justice, will be destroyed too. I am very happy because of this. They include, of course, many good people; but there are also bad people there. Now revolutionaries are coming out from the midst of these institutions. In Wuhan now the organs of security, police, and justice are divided into two groups. As it appears, and it is reality, the prestige of the professors and of the intelligentsia has decreased. That is why Radio Moscow is accusing us that we are, allegedly, destroying the culture.

Comrade Ramiz Alia: In Moscow they are troubled because in China you are destroying the bourgeois culture.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, we are eliminating culture in part; that which belongs to the sphere of the bourgeois ideology.

In other words, in the organs of the press, education, culture, art, and literature, a part of the people already there will not remain, because they have been left there since the Guomindang. There was nothing we could do about it then, and that is why we had to use them. Was it possible for me, or Comrade Lin Biao, or Comrade Zhou Enlai to come and take care of such a task? We were not able to do this, so we were forced to use them. The majority of the students educated by them are good, but there are some people who have been heavily influenced by them. For example, some of my children, nephews, and nieces, which have finished higher learning schools, have been deeply infected by the poison of the bourgeoisie. They consider themselves to be of the left, but I tell them not to rush to this conclusion. One of them graduated from the University of Beijing and his brain is full of Western kings and prime ministers. He also likes European 18th and 19th century novels. I have told him that this is also a good thing, because if you would not read such novels, you will never know what feudal society is, and what the bourgeois society is; they are valuable as materials that increase knowledge. In philosophy, the writings of the English philosopher Berkeley, of the German philosophers Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, etc, must also be read; as will the reading of the French materialist mechanics; by knowing Newton and Copernicus we will enrich our knowledge. That is also how Marx learned about such things in the beginning, but afterwards he came up with the critique of idealism and metaphysics.

Do you feel tired?

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: No, we are not tired; we are listening very attentively to you.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Did you sleep well last night? You returned to Beijing at night.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Thank you very much for your interesting conversation. We took a lot of your time, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I told you the same things I told you when we met last May, but there were a few new things.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: A conversation with you is a very important thing. We will report all about it to the Central Committee and Comrade Enver Hoxha.

I take this opportunity to once again thank you for the special care that you, Comrade Mao Zedong, as well as Comrade Lin Biao, Comrade Zhou Enlai, and the other comrades, have shown for the correct solution of the military issues that have to do with our letter of June of this year; we consider your answer fully satisfactory.

During the stay in your country we had conversations with Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Kang Sheng, and the other comrades about many issues. Our conversations were very interesting; we exchanged our points of view and shared our experiences on the problems of the international communist movement.

At the same time, in these conversations, we brought forth some problems of the perspectives of the development of our country. I do not want to waste your time with those issues.

Comrade Mao Zedong: You have yet to talk about one thing: you have yet to finish the conversation you started the first time we met about the history of the struggle in the midst of your party.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: If you, Comrade Mao Zedong, have the time, we are ready to continue the conversation.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Today we do not have time to continue that conversation, because you also have to go to the concert. So when you come back to China another time, we will continue that conversation. You had just started that conversation, and I forced you to sit and listen to my speech on the situation in China.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu: Your presentation was very valuable to us.

Comrade Mao Zedong: (Speaking to Comrade Vasil Nathanaili). Do you go on a tour often, Comrade Ambassador? I recommend that you visit the provinces of Jiangxi, Wuhan, Sichuan, and Anhui; you should come and look at the disturbances where they happen and how the problem is being solved there. Staying in Beijing only is not interesting.

Comrade Vasil Nathanaili: In March of this year, at your recommendation, Comrade Mao Zedong, I visited the provinces of Shaanxi, Shandong, and Heilongjiang.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Did you go by yourself?

Comrade Vasil Nathanaili: Yes, I went by myself.

Comrade Mao Zedong: You could also take some of the comrades of the embassy with you. Beijing is quiet; when I say quiet I mean that it is not experiencing any fierce fighting. The same goes for Shanghai, which does not have any fierce fighting or skirmishing. Did you see any rifle battles? Or were there only fights with fists, rocks, and knives, or other weapons of ancient times?

(At this point all stood up and the conversation was over.)



Excerpt from the forthcoming CWIHP e-Dossier:

“Much Listening, Little Speaking: Chinese Foreign Ministry Documents on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 23 October – 4 November 1956

by Peter Vamos

Record of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Hungarian Ambassador to China, [Ágoston] Szkladán, 2 November 1956 [Excerpts]

[Source: PRC FMA, 109-01038-02. Obtained by Péter Vámos and translated by Péter Vámos and Gwennyth A. Jones.]

Ambassador Szkladán: I come to bid farewell in a difficult situation. My train leaves on Sunday, I shall leave Beijing and travel to Moscow. In Moscow I shall see what the news is, and then I shall decide [whether to return to Budapest].

Premier Zhou: The Chinese people maintain a friendly relationship with the Hungarian people, and we hope that the cause of socialism in Hungary can proceed. Have you read the Soviet government's [30 October] declaration, and our [1 November] statement in connection thereto?

Szkladán: I have read the Soviet government's declaration, and heard the Chinese government's statement only from the translation of Chinese-speaking comrades. At present, the situation in Hungary is still unclear. We also receive news from home, but these news items contradict each other in turn. Revolutionary committees are being formed everywhere, and the Foreign Ministry is not functioning.

Zhou: Has a revolutionary committee also been formed in the Foreign Ministry?

Szkladán: We receive telegrams and instructions from the Foreign Ministry's Revolutionary Committee.

Zhou: The people in their entirety want to follow path of socialism, this is laid down in the constitution, and not imposed by others.

Szkladán: Yes.

Zhou: But then if you leave the socialist camp, this will damage the people's interests.

Szkladán: This is Hungary's tragedy. After the liberation, three million peasants received land, and the workers gained power. If those who criticized the government in the past saw that this is the restoration of capitalism, they would be sorry.

Zhou: Nagy has declared neutrality, he wants [Hungary] to leave the Warsaw Pact, and demands that the four great

powers assure its neutrality.

Szkladán: We also received this news from the Revolutionary Committee. When [they] see that this is restoration, they too will stand bravely on the side of the Soviets.

Zhou: Nagy's statement yesterday is that he wants to leave the socialist camp.

Szkladán: The people around Nagy think this way, but the vast majority do not agree.

Zhou: I hope that conscious people will be able to reverse the situation. How do you see it?

Szkladán: I myself don't know how this situation could be resolved. According to the most recent news, the workers have declared that if their demands are not met, they will not resume work. They have economic demands, and it is possible that they have political ones too.

Zhou: What is Comrade Kádár's opinion? I spoke with him at the time of the eighth congress.

Szkladán: Kádár is First Secretary of the Party, member of the Cabinet, he reorganized the Party and changed its name. The president of the Social Democratic Party, Anna Kéthly, is a long-time opportunist.

Zhou: And Kádár?

Szkladán: In general, I would say that Kádár is a serious man. He has spent time in prison but can cast aside his personal passions, and he approaches problems on the basis of principles. When we came to China together, I too spoke to him on the airplane. I also agree with the speech he delivered at the Chinese Party congress.

Zhou: When I spoke to Kádár, I said that Hungary proceeded calmly against Comrade Rákosi. Along with pointing out his errors, his achievements were also pointed out at the same time. Comrade Kádár also agreed with this opinion.

Szkladán: Comrade Rákosi also practiced self-criticism.

Zhou: Hungary committed some serious errors in the past, under the influence of Stalin. The masses demand that these errors be rectified. But the present leadership has led the masses in the opposite direction. How about Nagy?

Szkladán: There were continuous problems with Nagy. Rákosi frequently criticized him. He however thought that Rákosi was criticizing him for personal reasons, while these were all questions of principle. It now appears that Rákosi was right. Who would have thought that Nagy would waver like this? It is possible that he was scared. He said there were a few things that he did not do. He said that when he first gave a radio speech, it was because others forced him to do it. It is possible that the Revolutionary Committee forced him.

Zhou: Is the Revolutionary Committee not the seven-member Cabinet?

Szkladán: The Revolutionary Committee is something different, it is not the seven-member Cabinet. They say

that they convey the opinion of the people, demand that the Soviet army should leave, and so on. In other words, they are those counter-revolutionary elements.

Zhou: Is Nagy in the Revolutionary Committee?

Szkladán: He is not. The Revolutionary Committee presents its demands toward Nagy. It appears that Nagy's position is between the Party and the Revolutionary Committee. What sort of people constitute the revolutionary committees? Of the National Revolutionary Committee, I do not know Dudás, I have never heard of him. The Foreign Ministry Revolutionary Committee has seven members, of whom I know some. When I was ambassador to Moscow, one of them was my secretary, but as he was a believer and wanted to be a pastor, I sent him home. Another is the son of a factory owner, who was earlier dismissed from the Foreign Ministry, and only regained his position later. A third [Sándor Józsa] is from the Far East Department. They are all lower-ranking people.

Zhou: Have they all been rehabilitated, irrespective of what kind of errors they committed?

Szkladán: Yes. The Foreign Minister, [Imre] Horváth is a communist, and has now been replaced. Nagy himself acts as Foreign Minister.

Zhou: From whom does the Embassy now take orders? Those of Nagy, or of the Revolutionary Committee?

Szkladán: When we received the message from the Revolutionary Committee, I advised that we should not accept it, but the "revolutionary" youth supported [it].

[...]

Zhou: At the Embassy, are those who agree with the Revolutionary Committee's initiatives in the majority or the minority?

Szkladán: They are in great majority.

Zhou: Are you the minority?

Szkladán: Yes. There are many debates within the embassy. Yesterday we held an assembly with the participation of more than fifty people, and debated the matter of forming a revolutionary committee. I did not agree with the formation, and said that if it came into being, it could become the object of ridicule. Some experts agreed with my opinion. In the end it did not come into being. Now they slowly come to understand that the people's democracy is in danger.

Zhou: What is the situation with the counselor [József Száll]?

Szkladán: He has gone to Japan. I think he too agreed with the initiatives of the Revolutionary Committee. He too has been dissatisfied with the party in the past. With the sole exception of attaché [József P.] Szabó, all diplomatic staff of the embassy are party members. The position of First

Secretary Endre Galla is unclear. To what I say, he does not oppose; to what others say, he does not oppose. The Second Secretary, Barna Tálas, is a wild revolutionary, his wife is Polish. He says that we must follow Poland's example.

[...]

Szkladán: Those who are rallying and demonstrating are primarily young people, students, and writers.

Zhou: Are the workers also going on to the streets to demonstrate?

Szkladán: The workers are on strike, but I have not come across any trustworthy news items according to which the workers too would go out onto the streets to demonstrate. There are some foreign news agency reports of such, but it is not certain that they are true.

Zhou: Have not many people who emigrated come back home?

Szkladán: Yes. According to the public figures the number is not great, but the Austro-Hungarian border has been opened, and it is certain that a good few have entered.

Zhou: How many had left?

Szkladán: Between twenty and thirty thousand people, the precise number is difficult to say.

Zhou: They are dissatisfied with socialism, and defying authority.

Szkladán: Clearly. Nagy said that the current riots are economic in character, but this is not true. Paris radio said that there are many people in Hungary who acquired military training on the Austrian border, and that they would return once again to Hungary.

Zhou: Among the demands of the crowd, there may those of economic character, but the bourgeois reactionaries and the imperialists want to overthrow the authorities. The leaders must unite with the great majority of the crowd, and they must fight against the reactionaries. But at this moment they are heading in the opposite direction.

Szkladán: The imperialists sow discord in the middle, want to profit from the middle. Unfortunately, upright people also took part in the demonstrations, they were too naive, perhaps now they will see more clearly.

Zhou: Are there many in the crowds' number who follow the Revolutionary Committee?

Szkladán: A rather large part of them do. But as people come to see clearly the character of the Revolutionary Committee, they will see that they are striving for restoration, and it is possible that they will no longer believe in the Revolutionary Committee. In the embassy this is precisely the situation. As they see this danger, they will come to stand on the side of the Party.

Zhou: To what extent are the people dissatisfied with the Soviet Union?

Szkladán: As far as I can tell, more and more bitterly.

Zhou: Is this because of the past, or because the Soviet army is now helping to re-establish order in Hungary?

Szkladán: The Revolutionary Committee successfully fanned the flames of anti-Soviet sentiments. They say that the relationship between our countries is not equal, and so on. They say that Hungarian-Soviet friendship must be developed on the basis of equality.

Zhou: How many Party members are there?

Szkladán: 750,000 people. Some have been killed, and we are receiving an ever increasing number of names of Party members committing suicide.

Zhou: Some have been killed?

Szkladán: Yes. I do not know the exact number, but the number is growing.

Zhou: There is surely reactionary activity.

Szkladán: Yes.

Zhou: Is it not the case that the counter-revolution was not put down thoroughly in the past?

Szkladán: It is.

Zhou: During the suppression of the counter-revolution, the crowds were not mobilized, and not as Comrade [CCP Central Committee member] Luo Ruiqing said at the 8th Party congress?

Szkladán: Yes. Many people have been rehabilitated.

Zhou: Are there many rehabilitated among the intelligentsia?

Szkladán: Yes.

Zhou: Are the old intelligentsia many?

Szkladán: Their number is many. They constitute the majority of the intelligentsia.

Zhou: And the old intelligentsia are many in the scientific, educational and industrial institutions?

Szkladán: They all stayed there.

Zhou: Have you carried out ideological re-education work?

Szkladán: We have tried.

Zhou: As in China?

Szkladán: No. Only on a rather superficial level. We gave out some honors and medals, this is how we wanted to win them over, we carried out very little ideological training work.

Zhou: We only took up the intellectuals' question afterward, and proclaimed the Hundred Flowers policy once the counter-revolutionary suppression campaign and ideological re-education had run their course.

Szkladán: We also suggested many times that we should learn from China's experiences, but it is too late now.

Zhou: We also paid insufficient attention to you. Naturally, our experiences cannot be forced upon others, they are not wholly applicable to others. In the past, we did very little in the area of becoming acquainted with and researching your real situation.

Szkladán: [Our experiences are] not wholly applicable, but we can learn from each other. Comrade Kádár likes

Comrade Ho Chi Minh's attitude very much, he also wants to learn from Comrade Ho Chi Minh's attitude.

[...]

Zhou: An exceptionally difficult period is ahead of you.

Szkladán: It is very unfortunate. We hope that we can find a way out.

Zhou: It will be very tough.

Szkladán: Yes. It is my personal opinion that the fraternal countries might extend a little assistance to Hungary in the economic sphere, so that we avoid Hungary relying directly upon America. In the past, investment during the course of [national] construction was too much, and the total of our debts to the western countries is very high.

Zhou: Whether the West's control will materialize in the sphere of economics, that is only one question. But what is even more important is politics. You want to leave the socialist camp, you want to exit the Warsaw Pact – this is dangerous. There may be such people who are against this, and there will be more struggles in the future. The future is very tough. The question is whether it will be possible to organize the conscious people and continue the fight for the reversal of the situation. The Chinese people support the Hungarian people, and the struggle of Hungarian Party members for democracy, equality, independence and socialism.

Szkladán: Thank you.

Zhou: The people fighting for socialism and the party membership can count on the support of the Chinese people and party.

Szkladán: Thank you.

[...]

New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War

Translation and Introduction by Sergey Radchenko¹

On a freezing November afternoon in Ulaanbaatar (Ulan Bator), I climbed the Zaisan hill on the southern end of town to survey the bleak landscape below. Black smoke from *gers*—Mongolian felt houses—blanketed the valley; very little could be discerned beyond the frozen Tuul River. Chilling wind reminded me of the cold, harsh winter ahead. I thought I should have stayed at home after all because my pen froze solid, and I could not scribble a thing on the documents I carried up with me. These were records of Mongolia's perilous moves on the chessboard of giants: its strategy of survival between China and the Soviet Union, and its still poorly understood role in Asia's Cold War. These documents were collected from archival depositories and private collections in Ulaanbaatar and beyond, and were publicly presented for the first time at the *Mongolia and the Cold War* conference in March 2004.²

Now I wanted to read through these materials once again and put them into a proper context. Zaisan offered an almost perfect place for contemplation. The only sound structure here was a socialist-era monument paying tribute to the Red Army. This circular structure, vandalized by the inevitable autographs of visitors, features a mosaic portraying the heroic history of Soviet-Mongolian friendship from the Russian revolution to the space age. A Russian soldier towers over the structure, glaring towards Ulaanbaatar with the blank but resolute countenance demanded by socialist realist sculpture. Not even the thick smog from the *ger* district could shield the Chinese embassy from his stern gaze. The other side of the monument has been appropriated by the Mongolian mountain god - the *ovoo*, a tall pile of stones with blue Buddhist scarves tied here and there. This *ovoo* grows from year to year. He might after all prove to be the real ruler of Zaisan. I sat down near the *ovoo* and pulled out the documents.

These documents (printed below in translation) represent a small glimpse into Mongolia's complicated foreign relations during the last century. In earlier times, Mongolia was considered a menace to its neighbors: in the 13th century, both

China and Russia fell under the Mongolian sword. However, after being conquered in the 17th century by the Manchus, the land of the Mongols was divided into two parts—called “Outer” and “Inner” Mongolia—and reduced to provincial status. The inhabitants of Outer Mongolia enjoyed much greater autonomy than their compatriots across the border, and after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Outer Mongolia asserted its right to nationhood. Weak and disorganized, the Mongolian religious leadership appealed for help from foreign countries, including the United States. But the first foreign troops to appear were Russian soldiers under the command of the notoriously cruel Baron Ungern who rode past the Zaisan hill in the winter of 1921. The “bloody baron” wore a Mongolian robe, practiced Buddhism, and perhaps planned to use Mongolia as his base for anti-Bolshevik pursuits. He soon engaged in battle with Chinese regular forces stationed in the capital and, while he defeated them, his triumph was short-lived, as he was pursued by Red Army regiments. In the process, the Bolshevik Red Army helped “liberate” Outer Mongolia from the “yoke of feudalism” and clear its path to socialism.

The first years of the Mongolian People's Republic (as Outer Mongolia now called itself) proved tragic and tumultuous. Religious reforms were marked by the curtailment of Buddhism, demolition of temples, and mass execution of lamas. Expropriationist state policies undermined the livestock economy. Prosecution of mostly imagined “enemies of the state” and “Japanese spies” silenced all opposition. Mongolia followed closely in Soviet footsteps, and political initiative was severely constrained. Prime Ministers Peljidiin Genden and Anandiin Amar, who dared to oppose Stalin and criticize, if implicitly, Soviet policies, discovered the limits of Mongolia's independence: they were arrested and executed in Moscow in 1937 and 1941, respectively.³ By the 1940s, political power was in the hands of Soviet-supported Marshall Khorloogiin Choibalsan, Mongolia's “Stalin.”

Despite his Soviet connection, Choibalsan did not lose sight of Mongolia's national purpose. He hoped to wrestle Inner

Sergey S. Radchenko is a visiting professor at Pittsburg State University. He received a PhD in history from the University of London in 2005, with a dissertation on “The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Towards the People's Republic of China, 1962-67,” to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press later this year. He is the author of “The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 42; and “The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 47.

Mongolia from China's control. He also sabotaged efforts by a number of Mongolian intellectuals and political figures to accede to the Soviet Union.⁴ Choibalsan wanted a strong, united Mongolia on friendly terms with the Soviets. He reasoned that a closer relationship with the Soviet Union was a better option for Mongolia than being a Chinese province, since the Soviets supposedly did not pose a threat to the existence of the Mongolian nation.

China, on the other hand, posed a very real threat in the eyes of the Mongolian leadership. Indeed, were it not for the help of Russian bayonets, Mongolia might not have escaped the embrace of its southern neighbor. The Mongolian leaders' suspicions of China's designs were not erased by the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the fall of 1949 the two countries established diplomatic relations, officially inaugurating a 'new era' in their relations. But their friendly public statements barely obscured underlying mistrust on both sides.

Sino-Mongolian relations developed intensively in the 1950s, helped by the growth and strengthening of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.⁵ The Chinese supplied labor-strapped Mongolia with construction workers and credits and helped build factories, apartment buildings, and even a power station.⁶ When Mao Zedong received a Mongolian delegation in September 1956, he claimed that it was China's duty to aid Mongolia: "Our ancestors exploited you for three hundred years" [**Document #2**]. China thus had to "repay the debt." Mao said he was "ashamed" of the insignificance of Chinese aid to Mongolia and promised much more once the PRC overcame its own economic difficulties. Mao's explanations apparently made a strong impression on his Mongolian visitors; Dashiin Damba, first secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), felt the need to repeat at least three times during the conversation that Mongolia was grateful for Chinese aid and in no way considered it a historical "debt." But Mao insisted: "In the past we oppressed you, but now you don't even have a word of complaint. The aid we are giving you is small. It is repayment of debt and not aid." In due time he promised to send between 100,000 and 300,000 Chinese workers to Mongolia.

The prospect of having so many Chinese workers was daunting to the Mongolian leadership. Since the country's population was only 800,000 at the time, if Mao's offer were to be carried out, Mongolia would be left with far more ethnic Chinese that it could ever hope to assimilate. No wonder that Damba hurried to say that such an event would require long-term preparation so that the Chinese workers could be properly housed. Fortunately for the Mongolians, Mao Zedong did not insist on any immediate measures and suggested that in the meantime the Mongolians take measures to end their nomadic lifestyle and work on hydraulic engineering projects in the desert.


Mao's conversation with Damba had an important and striking subtext. The Chairman put Mongolia on the same footing as Chinese national minorities. He emphasized that China's

policy towards Mongolia paralleled its policies towards Chinese non-Han nationalities. In all cases, the government sought to "repay debts" incurred through the years of Qing exploitation of minorities: "We not only do so with you [repay "debts"], but *with all national minorities inside the country*" [my italics]. In this respect, Mongolia was hardly different, in Mao's view, from the peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang. In the new China, these nationalities had nothing to fear, for the communist party undertook to root out "Great Han nationalist thinking" and promote "equality of nationalities." Mao suggested that the Mongols should "educate" those Chinese workers who had not reconciled themselves to the official policy and still tried to "ride roughshod" (literally, pretend to be "kings and overlords") over their Mongolian hosts.

Mao also dwelled extensively on the historical links that connected the ancient Chinese and Mongolian peoples. Weren't Mongolians descendants of the Gaoche tribe long noted in China for their "tall carts," Mao asked? Damba's only recourse was to comment that historical records in Mongolia were still being studied with Soviet help. Significantly, Mao circulated this important record of conversation as a policy document to all provincial, city, and district party committees because all provinces, cities, and districts had their own nationality problems, which were to be resolved in the spirit demonstrated by Mao in his approach to the Mongolian nationality.

A few words should be added here about the acquisition of this record of conversation. I knew for some time that an important meeting between Mao and Damba took place in September 1956, but the Mongolian Foreign Ministry flatly refused persistent requests to provide me with the memoranda of conversation. By accident, I located a summary of this conversation in the Government Archive in Ulaanbaatar, as telegraphed by Ambassador Ochirbat to Foreign Minister Dashiin Adilbish on 26 September 1956. Marked "mash nuuts" (top secret), Ochirbat's report highlights important points of the conversation, although it clearly overlooks the national minority subtext and claims that Mao offered to send at most 200,000 workers to Mongolia.⁷ Then it occurred to me to check the Internet for information on the history of Sino-Mongolian relations written in the Chinese language. In ten seconds, I was reading the Chinese version of the conversation on my laptop; in another two minutes, I had downloaded volume six of *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, published in China several years ago. The volume contained the records of conversation between Mao and Damba, as well as Mao's comments on that record. Even a trip to the famous Central Committee bookstore in Beijing proved unnecessary.

China's offer of thousands of workers to drive forward Mongolia's economic construction created a dilemma for Ulaanbaatar. Choibalsan's successor, Prime Minister Yumjaagiin Tsendenbal, was happy to receive the Chinese workers but preferred to have them sent from Inner Mongolia and for permanent residence rather than a short stay.⁸ Having lost hope of ever retrieving Inner Mongolia from Chinese possession, Tsendenbal wanted at least to retrieve the ethnic



Mongolia and the Cold War: International Workshop, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, March 2004

Malcolm Byrne (NSA), James Hershberg (GWU), and CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann outside the conference ger near Ulaanbaatar.

Mongolians from across the border. The relevant request was made through Chimeddorjiin Surenjav, a senior Mongolian official who headed a delegation to Inner Mongolia in the spring of 1957.⁹ Premier Zhou Enlai received Surenjav on 7 May 1957. He turned down Ulaanbaatar's request, citing the shortage of ethnic Mongols in Inner Mongolia, who were outnumbered by Han Chinese by about seven to one.¹⁰ Instead, he allegedly offered to resettle Mongolian families from the Gobi desert in order to allow Chinese farmers to cultivate the land. Surenjav's reaction was predictably sharp: "Most of our livestock are in the Gobi and the steppe. Although there is little vegetation in the Gobi, the vegetation is nutritious. And the climate is warm. Thus, it is suitable for both cattle and people. And they will not move anywhere [else]. We don't have any surplus land."¹¹ In sharp contrast, that very same year, Tsedenbal agreed to hand over a vast track of land in northwestern Mongolia to the Soviet Union, overruling the objections of his own foreign minister.¹²

Tsedenbal's apprehension towards China was not without reason. The Sino-Mongolian friendship resembled a cat-and-mouse game, with Mao privately pushing levers to return the former province back to China. The Chairman did not discuss the question of Mongolia's sovereignty with Tsedenbal, anticipating the latter's negative reaction. Instead, Mao repeatedly approached Moscow. For instance, during the visit of CPSU CC member Anastas Mikoyan to Xibaipo for secret consultations with the Chinese in February 1949, Mao asked for Soviet acceptance of Mongolia's return to China. Mikoyan replied that Mongolia had "long grown accustomed to the taste of independence and was unlikely ever to surrender that independence voluntarily." Mao hurried to say that he "did not of course defend the Great Han chauvinistic line and would not raise the question of Mongolia's reunification."¹³ After Stalin's death, however, the Chinese leadership probed the Mongolian issue again—in a still classified conversation with Nikita Khrushchev in the fall of 1954, and in a conversation with

Anastas Mikoyan in April 1956 [Document #1]. The Soviet leadership repeatedly turned down these requests.¹⁴

The record of Mikoyan's April 1956 encounter with senior CCP CC Politburo member Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou Enlai shows how the Chinese leadership hoped to connect Mongolia with the question of Stalin's "mistakes" and thereby cancel its independence in the wake of Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's personality cult. Liu drew a parallel between Mongolia and Ukraine, with Mongolia being China's "Ukraine." Liu suggested that when Russia and Ukraine were "reunited" (i.e. following the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654), Mongolia was already a part of China. In 1954, Khrushchev had celebrated with much fanfare the reunification of Russia and Ukraine, while China was left with the "historical injustice" of an independent Mongolia—an injustice that "deeply pained" the Chinese people. Mikoyan was not impressed by the analogy and pointed to the different cultures and ethnicities of the Mongols and the Chinese: "in Mongolia there is a completely different nationality." Liu and Zhou were disappointed and hinted that China might return to the question of Mongolia at a later stage. Passing through Ulaanbaatar on his way back to Moscow, Mikoyan warned Tsedenbal about the Chinese approaches, thus deepening the latter's suspicions of Chinese intentions.

Chinese claims on Mongolia did nothing to strengthen proletarian solidarity between the two parties. While relying on aid from the PRC to help economic construction in Mongolia, Tsedenbal maintained an unequivocally pro-Soviet political orientation. His outlook owed much to his personal background: he had graduated from a Russian university, visited Moscow several times a year, married a Russian, and spoke excellent Russian (indeed, his children never learned Mongolian). Tsedenbal enjoyed the personal friendship of both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. By contrast, Tsedenbal had no Chinese connections, and his infrequent encounters with Mao Zedong left him with the impression that the Chinese leader was trying to "buy" the trust of the Mongolian leadership with his "purely Chinese ceremoniousness."¹⁵

In the early 1960s, Mongolia's relationship with China took a turn for the worse, following the curve of the Sino-Soviet split. Faced with the choice to back one side or the other in the quarrel, the Mongolians placed all their eggs in the Soviet basket.¹⁶ This choice was not the only one available. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet split changed the rules of the game in the socialist bloc, with North Korea, Romania, and Albania easily exploiting the weakening lines of authority in the communist bloc to assert independent policies and maintaining equal distance between Beijing and Moscow. Kim Il Sung was in fact the master of the game, managing to receive economic and military aid from both his neighbours while claiming complete self-reliance in the political, economic, and military spheres.¹⁷ But circumstances were different in Mongolia. Its ties to the Soviet Union and its suspicion of China—imperial or proletarian—made Mongolia's choice quite predictable.

China, for its part, exerted considerable political and eco-

conomic pressure to win Mongolia's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. Such pressure became particularly problematic for Ulaanbaatar because of its economic reliance on China and particularly on Chinese workers. Mikoyan had presciently warned Tsedenbal in March 1956 against over-reliance on Chinese workers: "In order for you not to end up with a mainly Chinese working class, you should develop your own working class."¹⁸ Tsedenbal would have been happy to follow that advice, but Mongolia's acute labor shortage left him with little room to maneuver. Tsedenbal's economic thinking centered on hopes of creating an "industrialized countryside" with machines milking cows and shearing sheep, while nomadic Mongolians pushed buttons from plastic *gers*.¹⁹ Such dramatic economic breakthroughs in the countryside would have freed up a work force for industrial construction. In the meantime, Chinese workers were a necessary evil. They arrived in Mongolia in the 1950s, and by the early 1960s, their number had reached 8-10,000. By this time open disagreements between Mongolia and China began to surface.

In December 1962, when Zhou Enlai met with Tsedenbal [**Document #3**], the Chinese premier threatened for the first time to withdraw the Chinese workers if Mongolia continued to oppose the Chinese "struggle against Soviet revisionism." Tsedenbal reportedly almost came to blows with his Chinese interlocutor, barely managing to maintain a resolute posture. "We will not retreat in ideological terms and will not change the correct policy line of our party because of 8,000 workers," he told Zhou. Zhou followed up on his threat, and pulled the workers out of Mongolia. In a bid to get them back, Deputy Premier Sonomyn Luvsan visited China in September-October 1964. He again insisted on having workers from Inner Mongolia (i.e. ethnic Mongols), but Zhou turned down the idea. The Chinese premier promised, though, that in the long term "good relations will set in and then the PRC will be able to provide aid to Mongolia" [**Document #6**].²⁰

Tsedenbal's meeting with Zhou Enlai on 27 December 1962 (the final meeting of the two premiers) went well beyond the issues of Sino-Mongolian relations and offers new insights into the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Soviet split. The record of the meeting (or rather meetings) illustrates difficulties encountered by Cold War historians in multi-archival research. An East German copy of a transcript of a conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai on 26 [sic] December 1962 published in the CWIHP *Bulletin*, represented for a time the only published "Mongolian" document on the Cold War.²¹ It was not a rare occurrence for the Mongols to share such records with socialist allies.²² The record of conversation presented below partially overlaps with the German record. Tsedenbal met with Zhou Enlai three times: on 25, 26, and 27 December 1962.²³ But Mongolian Ambassador Dondongiin Tsevegmid, in summarizing the records of the conversations to his Soviet colleague Stepan Chervonenko, apparently lumped together the contents of the conversations on 26 and 27 December 1962, hence the overlap. It is reasonable to say that whereas on 26 December the two premiers talked main-

ly about the Sino-Indian dispute, the following conversation explored Sino-Mongolian relations and the Sino-Soviet split. I retrieved the document presented here from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF). The original Mongolian Tsedenbal-Zhou memorandum of conversation remains inaccessible to foreign researchers in the Foreign Ministry Archive in Ulaanbaatar.²⁴

Tsevegmid's summary relays in vivid detail how Zhou accused Tsedenbal of trying to "teach" him, how Tsedenbal "asked Zhou Enlai not to be angry," and how later Zhou "calmed down somewhat." Although the ambassador probably presented a somewhat distorted picture, one can at least surmise that the two premiers had a very tense conversation. The discussion began with the Sino-Indian border dispute. In the fall of 1962 skirmishes occurred along the Sino-Indian frontier, and on 20 October, the Chinese launched an attack on Indian positions, occupying border regions of Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency. In taking a hard line on India, Mao was ostensibly more concerned with the ideological imperatives of "the struggle against revisionism and imperialism" than with border issues *per se*.²⁵ But as tensions on the border escalated, the Chinese leadership hurried to improve Beijing's position by concluding border agreements with neighboring countries, including Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Burma. Zhou Enlai tried to win Tsedenbal's support for China's stance in the conflict with India. However, Tsedenbal merely expressed "regret" over the two great powers' tensions, angering the Chinese premier. Zhou reportedly said that the Chinese "did not like this attitude of the Mongolian comrades." It is interesting to note that some of the sharper comments, allegedly made by Zhou in the discussion of Sino-Indian relations, were not reflected in the German record. Perhaps Tsevegmid explained to Chervonenko what, in his opinion, Zhou *meant* to say, as opposed to what he actually said.

Tsedenbal did not merely parrot Khrushchev's formulations on the Sino-Indian conflict. In fact, in the fall of 1962 Khrushchev tended to support China, disappointing Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and undermining Soviet-Indian relations. Soviet support for China was not so much a consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but part of Khrushchev's efforts to repair relations with Beijing.²⁶ As the Soviet leader told PRC Ambassador Liu Xiao on 13 October 1962, he was not yet certain "which way India would go." Indians were merely "friends," while the Chinese were "brothers." In Khrushchev's view, "in relations between us [China and the Soviet Union] there is no place for neutrality. This would be a betrayal. [...] We shall always be in one camp and share joys and sorrows."²⁷ Tsedenbal, by contrast, was far from such expressions of comradeship. Even the conclusion of the Sino-Mongolian border agreement did not alleviate his suspicions of China's irredentism. After returning to Ulaanbaatar he scribbled in his diary: "the Chinese are preaching feudal isolation. However, their goal is different. In reality, they want to make other countries into their satellites."²⁸ Tsedenbal therefore sympathized with India more

than he was willing to tell Zhou.

In the second part of the conversation, probably on 27 December, Zhou and Tsedenbal discussed the Sino-Soviet disagreements. The Chinese premier accused Tsedenbal of “blindly follow[ing]” the Soviet leadership and asked sarcastically whether he also “loyally follow[ed] Stalin.” Tsedenbal replied self-righteously: “We [Mongolians] are convinced in the rightness of the CPSU, we are deeply convinced in and committed to the endeavor carried out by the CPSU.” Tsedenbal and Zhou clashed over the issue of Sino-Soviet polemics; the Chinese premier complained that Mongolia only printed the Soviet side and ignored both the Chinese and Albanian materials that criticized Soviet “revisionism.” Tsedenbal in turn praised Soviet efforts to reach a compromise with Albania and blamed the Chinese for encouraging Tirana’s anti-Soviet rhetoric. In Tsedenbal’s view, “the Albanian question became a kind of a compass, a kind of a test of the sincerity of everyone towards the CPSU.” China had evidently failed the test and had abandoned Marxism-Leninism. Tsedenbal’s line on Albania was in fact tougher than Moscow’s policy at the time. Leonid Brezhnev, in an encounter with Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili in January 1963 (only days after Tsedenbal’s meeting with Zhou), diplomatically abstained from criticizing China’s handling of the Albanian issue and even asked for Beijing’s “help” in bringing Tirana back to its senses. Brezhnev asked “what bug has bitten the Albanians” and said that the Soviets did not want Albania “to become a reason for staining our relations with the CCP.”²⁹

Tsedenbal was much more abrupt and direct. He even went as far as to “remind [Zhou] what constituted the ABCs of Marxism-Leninism,” implying that the Chinese premier had abandoned Marxism altogether. By a curious coincidence, only a week later Khrushchev also spoke about the “ABCs of communism” in a meeting with the Chinese ambassador. But unlike Tsedenbal, the Soviet leader claimed an affinity of views and similarity of ideological conceptions with the Chinese.³⁰ Therefore, if Tsedenbal was a puppet in the Sino-Soviet split, he was dancing to his own tune; his split with China was deeper and wider than ideology. Keeping China at bay was, in Tsedenbal’s mind, at the core of Mongolia’s strategy of national survival.

In July 1964, Mao suddenly announced that much of Siberia and the Far East once belonged to China and had been unfairly annexed by the Russian tsars.³¹ That, of course, put Mongolia on Mao’s “unsettled bill” and embarrassed the Chinese diplomats who now had to reconcile the Chairman’s statements with China’s foreign relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi had difficulty explaining Mao’s remarks to Mongolian Deputy Premier Sonomyn Luvsan, who visited China in September-October 1964.³² Chen Yi blamed “confused” publications in Japanese and Western newspapers for misrepresenting the Chairman’s thought and claimed that China “does not want to seize [territory from] others.” Zhou Enlai, in a meeting with Luvsan on 3 October 1964, also tried to avoid the issue [Document #6]. He “talked about the necessity of living in

friendship, although disagreements will persist for a long time, [he said that] the main thing is the unity of our countries.” Mao Zedong also spoke about “unity” when receiving Luvsan. On the whole, the Chinese leaders “tried to create an atmosphere of exceptional warmth, hugged [and] kissed” the Mongolian visitors. At the same time, Zhou Enlai politely refused to provide economic aid to Mongolia, making it clear, however, that if Mongolia adopted a more flexible line in the Sino-Soviet split, Chinese aid would resume.

As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, Mongolia’s relationship with the Soviet Union acquired strategic significance for both countries. Mongolia provided a military platform that would be indispensable in the event of a war with China. Partial mobilization of Mongolian troops was apparently underway by the fall of 1964 [Document #6], though Tsedenbal claimed that the army only carried out “construction work” [Document #5]. As early as July 1963, Mongolia had sought membership in the Warsaw Pact, which, at the time, appeared to be an anti-Chinese move. The secret MPRP Politburo resolution on Mongolia’s application to the Warsaw Pact made no mention of China and instead dwelled on the threat of a US buildup in the Far East after a renewed security treaty with Japan [Document #4]. However, the resolution made it clear what Mongolia wanted to get from the Warsaw Pact: the “modern weaponry and technology” enjoyed by member states. The date of the resolution—15 July 1963—is significant, as it came five days after Khrushchev’s letter to Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka recommending Mongolia’s admittance to the Pact. Tsedenbal apparently decided the issue of application in principle with Khrushchev and then sought the support of his own Politburo after the fact.³³

The Soviet military presence was another noteworthy dimension of the Soviet-Mongolian “friendship.” It was assumed in the West that the decision to send forces to Mongolia was Moscow’s alone; Ulaanbaatar simply had to comply with Soviet military priorities. But newly available Mongolian documents paint a much more complex picture. On 1 December 1965, the MPRP Politburo decided to approach the Soviet leadership with a request to station “an appropriate unit from the Soviet armed forces” on Mongolia’s territory at Soviet expense [Document #7]. The letter to the Soviet leaders prepared on the same day outlines the rationale for the move: “the deteriorating situation in the East” raised concerns in Ulaanbaatar as to Mongolia’s capacity to defend itself against Chinese encroachment. Although Mongolian military forces were trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, they were deemed insufficient to repel “potential sudden attacks.” Moreover, lacking appropriate reconnaissance capabilities, they could not predict the timing of such “attacks.” Soviet troops were therefore “insistently” invited in order to “further strengthen” Mongolia’s defense capabilities.

The circumstances of the Politburo letter suggest that the request for Soviet troops was Tsedenbal’s initiative, not a fig leaf for Moscow’s “imperial” ambitions. The post-Khrushchev leadership bent over backwards to repair the Soviet position

in Asia: Premier Alexei Kosygin travelled to China, North Vietnam, and North Korea in February 1965 in an effort to improve relations. There was a sense in Moscow that with Khrushchev's flamboyant persona out of the picture, the underlying problems in Sino-Soviet relations could be overcome with patience. Hanoi and Pyeongyang were also reassured of the Soviet intent to respect their dissenting ideological views. Under such circumstances, sending troops to Mongolia would cause problems for Soviet diplomacy in Asia. Moreover, in late 1965 China was not yet as great a threat to the Soviet Union as it would become a few years later during the Cultural Revolution. Tensions had certainly escalated, but the Soviets continued to make offers of reconciliation to Beijing well into early 1966. It was not until the embassy siege crisis of August 1966 that the Chinese problem alarmed the Soviet leadership. For Tsendenbal, alarm bells were ringing all along; he wanted Soviet troops in Mongolia as a measure of additional security against perceived Chinese militancy.

Tsendenbal expressed his concerns about the Chinese military build-up on the Sino-Mongolian border to Brezhnev when he visited Ulaanbaatar in January 1966 [Document #8]. Brezhnev relayed that the Soviet leadership "replied positively to the request of the MPRP CC about aid in strengthening the defense capabilities of the MPR." That statement suggests that Moscow had agreed in principle to station forces in Mongolia. Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky was instructed to coordinate all details. The next record we have concerning Soviet forces in Mongolia comes a year later, on 4 February 1967, when the CPSU Politburo adopted Resolution P32/32op on "stationing Soviet forces on the territory of MPR" [Document #9]. This decision came on the heels of violent demonstrations in Beijing and the siege of the Soviet embassy by Red Guards. On the same day, the Politburo adopted several other decisions on strengthening Soviet forces in the Far East, in line with a reassessment of the Chinese threat. It appears that despite the earlier talks with Tsendenbal, it was only when the crisis point was reached in Sino-Soviet relations that the Soviet leadership decided to send troops to Mongolia. The development of the necessary infrastructure, such as barracks, airfields, and garages, was a long-term project. It was not until 26 April 1967, for example, that the Politburo arranged the logistics for sending construction troops to Mongolia to prepare military bases. According to one recent publication, the first train carriages with 800 Soviet tanks (mainly T-76) crossed the Soviet-Mongolian border in March 1968, startling Mongolian peasants nearby.³⁴ By the early 1980s, the Soviets had firmly established a presence in Mongolia, ready to repel any Chinese intrusions.



It was getting late on top of Zaisan. I started down the steps, leaving my stone companions to themselves. Halfway down, I looked back and met the gaze of the Russian soldier. He was

still there, sinking slowly into the evening shadows. These documents, too, were in the shadows, silent witnesses of dramatic events. They raised important questions about the roles of culture, memory, and ideology in Mongolia's recent history. Tsendenbal's anti-Chinese inclinations were not Soviet-dictated; the Mongols had their own reasons to fear China, which were much more deeply rooted than ideology. Marxism-Leninism did not adequately address the vital concerns of a small nomadic nation at the fringe of a vast, established civilization, especially fears of cultural obsolescence and unwanted assimilation. Deeply rooted anti-Chinese sentiments were reinforced for many Mongols by the collective memory of China's imperial rule and the difficult struggle for independence in the early 20th century.

Thus, for Tsendenbal and other Mongolian leaders, closer ties with the Soviet Union were important for two reasons. First, the Soviet Union helped safeguard Mongolia's independence. Clearly, Mao considered Soviet intransigence a major obstacle to Mongolia's return to China in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Second, the USSR brought Mongolia a promise of material prosperity. Three hundred years of Qing rule had left the nomads as poor as they had ever been, while closer relations with the USSR furthered economic development. The Russians landed the first airplane in Ulaanbaatar in 1925; in 1949 the first train line connected Soviet Naushki with Ulaanbaatar; in 1981 the first Mongolian cosmonaut flew into space aboard a Soviet rocket. Soviet-Mongolian friendship seemed to offer Mongolia a bright future among advanced nations, a chance to escape the "backwardness" that threatened national survival. And even if it failed in every other respect, the long-standing relationship with Moscow at least helped assure Mongolia's continued national existence.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the following archives for providing relevant documents: *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* and *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii* (Russia), *Mongol Ardyn Khuvsgal Namyn Arkhiv* and *Mongol Ulsyn Zasgiin Gazryn Arkhiv* (Mongolia). Many individuals helped bring the Mongolian project to fruition; among others, I would like to thank James Hershberg, Christian Ostermann, Odd Arne Westad and Balazs Szalontai for their encouragement and support.

2. Conference, "Mongolia and the Cold War," 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, co-sponsored by the Cold War International History Project.

3. Genden even accused Stalin of being a "Russian tsar" and reportedly broke the Soviet leader's pipe in anger at a drunken reception. Amar also insisted on Mongolia's sovereign rights, albeit in a more diplomatic way. Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Baabar), *The Twentieth Century Mongolia*, ed. by Christopher Kaplonski (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999): 348.

4. The proposal to accede to the Soviet Union was formulated by prominent intellectuals and political figures S. Avirmed, B. Badarch, G. Galbadrakh, D. Tumor-Ochir, Ts. Dugersuren and L. Tsend in a letter to Choibalsan dated 3 July 1950. The letter is reprinted in

“BNMAU-yg Zuvlult Kholboot Ulsyn Bureldekhund Oruulakh Asuudal Tav’san n”, *Unen* No. 178, 17708 (31 July 1990): 3 and *Unen* No. 185, 17715 (8 August 1990), 3.

5. For a recent account of the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: the Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

6. As of 1966, Chinese aid to Mongolia amounted to 103.55 million rubles (67.5 million rubles in credits and 36.05 million rubles in grants). By comparison, China’s aid to North Korea for the same period amounted to 400.15 million rubles, and to North Vietnam - 496.8 million rubles (nearly 4 and 5 times higher, respectively). These figures do not include military aid. Regarding PRC aid to socialist countries (28 May 1966), See AVPRF; fond 0100, opis 59, papka 529, delo 37, list 27.

7. Ochirbat to Dashiin Adilbish (26 September 1956), Mongol Ulsyn Zasgiin Gazryn Arkhiv; fond 1, dans 4, kh/n 5, khuu 173.

8. Conversation between Vasily Pisarev and Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (29 November 1954), AVPRF; fond 0111, opis 36, papka 235, delo 3, listy 57-58.

9. Report on trip to China in spring 1957, Surenjavyn Tuvshin’s personal archive. Surenjavyn Tuvshin is the grandson of Chimeddorjiin Surenjav.

10. Mao Zedong officially confirmed this position in his letter to Dashiin Damba dated 20 May 1957. See “Letter to Damba” in *Mao Zedong Wenji*, vol. 7 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993-9), 300.

11. This document was obtained from Surenjavyn Tuvshin, grandson of Chimeddorjiin Surenjav, and apparently represents recollections written by Surenjav many years later. In all likelihood, the account was based on original notes, but its reliability has not been verified.

12. Foreign Minister Sodnomyn Avarzed (1922-1989) reportedly opposed Vyacheslav Molotov’s demands for territorial concessions and subsequently lost his job for being “anti-Soviet.” The charges of anti-Sovietism were lifted in 1990, shortly after Avarzed died after being hit by a truck. Chuntyn Boldbaatar, *XX Zuuny Mongolyn Uls Turiin Zutgelmuud* (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2004): 13. See also Boldbaatar’s paper, “Was Sodnomyn Avarzed an Anti-Soviet?” presented at the CWIHP Conference on Mongolia and the Cold War, 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

13. See Soviet records of these exchanges on pp. 144-145, 154 of this *Bulletin*. For an account of Mikoyan’s visit to China in January-February 1949, see Andrei Ledovsky, *SSSR i Stalin v Sudbakh Kitaya* (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1999): 62. For a recent analysis of Mikoyan’s discussion of Mongolia with the Chinese leadership, see Xiaoyuan Liu’s paper, “The Structure of Bloc Politics: Stalin, Mao and Mongolia’s Independence” presented at the CWIHP Conference on Mongolia and the Cold War, 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

14. During the CPSU CC Presidium (Politburo) meeting on 19 August 1964 Khrushchev and his colleagues recalled the details of the 1954 discussion with Mao on Mongolia in the following terms: Khrushchev [...] Mao Zedong used to say...—we talked about this back in 1954, when a party delegation visited Beijing. They said then, how do you look at this, Mongolia used to be a part of the Chinese state [?] I replied then, yes, this is so, but now Mongolia is an independent state, it will hardly want to accede to China. In general, this is the Mongolian ques-

tion. And, he says, what do you think about this? I remember that [Andrei] Gromyko was there. I said, what can we say?—they will hardly want this.

Andropov: It was said that they had become used to independence.

Khrushchev: This was all.

Andropov: [We] even refused to discuss this question.

Source: “Meeting of the CPSU CC Presidium” (19 August 1964), in Aleksandr Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS: 1954-1964* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003), 848-849.

15. Leonid Shinkarev, *Tsedenbal Filatova Khoyor: Khair Durlal, Erkh Medel, Emgenel* (Ulaanbaatar: Munkhiin Useg Khevelekh Uildver, 2004): 134-135.

16. For Mongolia’s pioneering initiatives in the Sino-Soviet split see Sergey Radchenko, “The China Puzzle: the Soviet Policy Towards the People’s Republic of China, 1962-67,” PhD Dissertation, University of London, 2005.

17. For an account of Kim Il Sung’s position during the Sino-Soviet split, see Bernd Schaefer, “North Korean Adventurism and China’s Long Shadow, 1966-1972,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 43 (October 2004), and Sergey Radchenko, “The Soviet Union and the Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 47 (April 2005). Romania’s self-proclaimed neutrality in the split is discussed in Sergey Radchenko, “The China Puzzle” and in Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny (eds.), *China and Eastern Europe, 1960s-1980s, Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese–East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24–26 March 2004* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2004).

18. Budyn Sumya (ed.), *Gerel Suuder: Yu. Tsedenbalyn Khuviin Temdeglelees* (Light and Shadow, From Yu. Tsedenbal’s diary) (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn Kheveleliin Kombinat, 1992): 91-94.

19. Tsedenbal described his vision for Mongolia’s economic future in his diary, Budyn Sumya (ed.), *Gerel Suuder: Yu. Tsedenbalyn Huviin Temdeglel* (Ulaanbaatar: D. Sukhbaataryn Neremjit Ulsyn Kheveleliin Kombinat, 1991): 19-20. Balázs Szalontai details Mongolia’s plastic ger initiative in “Tsedenbal’s Mongolia and the Communist Aid Donors: A Reappraisal,” *IIAS Newsletter* 35 (November 2004), Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies: 18.

20. For record of Luvsan’s meeting with Chen Yi see “Conversation between Sonomyn Luvsan and Chen Yi” (30 September 1964), Mongol Ulsyn Zasgiin Gazryn Arkhiv; fond 1, dans 16, kh/n 299 (1965), khuu. 92-98.

21. Conversation between Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai (26 December 1962), *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 8-9 (Winter 1996-97), 266.

22. In a move reflecting Tsedenbal’s efforts to advertise his “Marxist-Leninist” posture, the MPRP Central Committee Politburo approved a special resolution to share records of Tsedenbal’s meetings with Zhou Enlai with “some fraternal parties,” as well as with members and candidate members of the MPRP Central Committee. See On the Results of Visit to China by Chairman of the MPR’s Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the MPRP comrade Yu. Tsedenbal, Politburo Resolution No. 22 (30 December 1962), Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив; fond 4, dans 26, kh/n 6b, khuu. 16-18.

23. Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив; fond 4, dans 26, kh/n 6b, khuu. 18. Chinese sources confirm that there were three meetings. See “Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,” *Zhou En-*

lai Nianpu, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997): 521; and Liu Chongwen et al., *Liu Shaoqi Nianpu: 1898-1969*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998): 567.

24. Foreign Ministry Archive (Ulaanbaatar), fond 0,6, kh/n 39. Tsedenbal's meeting with Zhou is briefly discussed in Chuluunay Dalai and Irgy Shima, *Otnosheniya Mezhd MNR i KNR, 1949-1985*, internal circulation (Prague and Ulaanbaatar: Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Oriental Studies of MPR Academy of Sciences, 1986). The archival reference is taken from that book. See D. Shurkhuu, "Sino-Mongolian relations in the 1960s," paper presented at the CWIHP Conference on Mongolia and the Cold War, 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia for an additional account of Tsedenbal-Zhou meeting, based on research in the Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive.

25. Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 27-28.

26. For a contrary view, i.e. that Khrushchev wanted to improve relations with China in October 1962 mainly because of the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Mikhail Prozumenshchikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives" in the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 8-9 (Winter 1996-97): 251.

27. Quoted in Sergey Radchenko, *The China Puzzle*, p. 31.

28. Budyn Sumya (ed.), *Gerel Suuder*, p. 99.

29. "Conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and Pan Zili" (15 December 1962), AVPRF; fond 0100, opis 55, papka 480, delo 4, listy 44-46.

30. Sergey Radchenko, *The China Puzzle*, p. 52.

31. "Beseda Mao Tszeduna s Yaponskimi Sotsialistami," *Pravda* (2 September 1964): 2-3.

32. Conversation between Sonomyn Luvsan and Chen Yi (30 September 1964), Mongol Ulsyn Zasgiin Gazryn Arkhiv; fond 1, dans 16, kh/n 299 (1965), khuu. 92-98.

33. Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Wladislaw Gomulka (10.07.63), Modern Records Archive (Warsaw): KC PZPR, XIA/103, k. 521. Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network.

34. Leonid Shinkarev, *Tsedenbal Filatova Khoyor*, p. 304.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Information Memorandum, "About the Claims of the Chinese Leaders with Regard to the Mongolian People's Republic," by USSR Far Eastern Department First Secretary, I. Kalabukhov, 30 January 1964

[Source: CWIHP Collection (www.cwihip.org).]

TOP SECRET. Copy No. 1

About the claims of the Chinese leaders with regard to the Mongolian People's Republic (information)

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of



Mongolia and the Cold War: International Workshop, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, March 2004:

Sanjaasuren Bayraa, Christian Ostermann (CWIHP), Vojtech Mastny (PHP), Margolzata Gnoinska (GWU), and A. Tuvshintugs inside the conference get outside Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

the Soviet Union], [CPSU CC member] Comrade [Anastas] Mikoyan visited the People's Republic of China [PRC] and had conversations with the leading comrades of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. During the conversation between Comrade Mikoyan and [PRC Vice Premier] Liu Shaoqi and [PRC Premier and Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai on 7 April 1956, the issue was raised that Mongolia was at one time part of China. Zhou Enlai, having reminded him that in 1949, during Comrade Mikoyan's stay in China, they [the Chinese leaders] raised before Stalin the question of the possibility of returning Mongolia to the PRC and that Stalin, through Comrade Mikoyan, gave the wrong answer, and asked whether we consider this answer one of Stalin's mistakes.

(Note: In February 1949 during the confidential trip of Comrade Mikoyan to Shijiazhuang [Mikoyan in fact visited Xibaipo, a village 50 miles to the northwest of Shijiazhuang, in Hebei Province] ahead of the 3rd March Plenum of the CCP CC, [CCP CC Chairman] Mao Zedong in his conversation with the former, in the presence of Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, raised the question of uniting the two parts of Mongolia. Comrade Mikoyan replied that, taking into consideration the territorial integrity of China, this would not be in China's interests because a large part of the country—Inner Mongolia—would break away. Mao Zedong then commented that he had in mind the unification of Mongolia with its accession to China. Comrade Mikoyan declared that the Mongolian people have tasted the fruits of sovereign existence and will hardly agree to abandon independence; in any case, this question was the business of the Mongolian people. This note is based on the oral report by a referent of the CPSU CC Department [for Relations with Socialist Countries], Comrade A. N. Katerinich, who has seen the transcript of Comrade Mikoyan's conversation. On this trip, Comrade Mikoyan was accompanied by [CPSU CC emissary to the PRC] Comrade Ivan Vladimirovich Kovalev.)

In response to Comrade Mikoyan's objection that he then considered and still believes that Stalin was right, that is—that Stalin gave a correct answer—Zhou Enlai said that, formally, Stalin really did answer correctly saying that the Mongolian comrades should be asked about Mongolia's accession to China because only they can solve this question. But in accordance with party principles, Stalin should have answered differently. Zhou Enlai supposed that Stalin should have expressed his opinion, because it was a conversation between communists, and then he could say that the Chinese should talk to the Mongolians. Zhou Enlai believes that Stalin evaded this question and did not express his opinion. Comrade Mikoyan explained that Stalin's answer should be interpreted in the sense that Stalin in effect spoke against raising the question about Mongolia's accession to China, but since he did not want to get into an argument with the Chinese comrades on this question, he suggested that the solution of this question be left to the Mongolians.

During the same conversation, Liu Shaoqi added that the Chinese people allegedly are very deeply pained by Mongolia's secession from China. He noted that when the Soviet Union was celebrating the 300-year anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, [some people] said in China that 300 years ago Mongolia was already a part of China and asked whether it could be reunited with China. The Chinese, Liu Shaoqi continued, consider Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of their territory.

Comrade Mikoyan replied that it is wrong to equate Mongolia with Taiwan. Chinese [people] live in Taiwan, but in Mongolia there is a completely different nationality. Mongolia was not a *de facto* part of China even under the tsar. It acquired independent existence as a state after the October Revolution, and the Mongolians, having learned the taste of national independence, will now hardly want to abandon it. We, continued A. I. Mikoyan, never considered joining Mongolia to the Soviet Union. When the Japanese occupied a part of China and decided to grab Mongolia as well, we defended it with weapons in our hands.¹ When the danger passed, we pulled out our forces from the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] and helped the Mongolians create a national army to defend their own country. Moreover, at the time some Mongolian comrades raised the question of joining Mongolia to the USSR as a Soviet Republic. We categorically refused this. Finally, continued Comrade Mikoyan, the Chinese communists should not be worried about the existence of regret in the PRC regarding the MPR's secession from China because the very act of Mongolia's formal secession from China was carried out by Jiang Jieshi's [Chiang Kai-shek's] government, and not by the PRC government, and this act was correct and proceeded from the [de facto] situation.

Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi concluded that they are not raising the question of reuniting Mongolia with the PRC, this could

be done later. But they considered it expedient to express "the opinion of the Chinese people on this question." In April of the same year, when he was in Ulaanbaatar, Comrade Mikoyan informed the Mongolian friends about the content of the above-mentioned conversation with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. [MPR CC Secretary Yumjaagiin] Tsendenbal, on behalf of the members of the Politburo of the CC MPRP, declared that they agree with the stated position of Comrade Mikoyan and emphasized that they stand for the independence of the MPR.

1st Secretary of the Far Eastern Department of the USSR
/I. Kalabukhov/

3-ov/IK

1. *Editor's Note:* Mikoyan refers here to the major fighting between Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese forces at the border post of Khalkhyn Gol in 1939.



DOCUMENT No. 2

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and the Delegation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MRPR] and Comments on the Distribution of the Memorandum of Conversation, 24 September 1956

[Source: *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, Vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992): 213-222. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

One. Memorandum of Conversation.

Date: 24 September 1956

Participants:

Mongolian side: [MPR First Secretary Jebtsun] Damba [Khutukhtu] (head of the delegation), [MPR Foreign Minister Munkh-Orgil] Tsend, [MPR Head of State Punsalmaaqiyn] Ochirbat (Ambassador), Hashengangbai, Tsevsamba;

Chinese side: Chairman Mao Zedong, [CCP CC Secretariat] Wang Jiaxiang.

Chairman Mao [Chairman]: You got tired over these few days, didn't you?

Damba [Da]: No, we are not tired, we are very comfortable.

Chairman: Mongolian comrades are good comrades, good friends. You are a friendly nation, a friendly party!

(Chairman sends regards to Comrade Tsendenbal)

Da: He is very well, he and Comrade [Jamtsarangiyin] Sambuu send their regards to you.

Chairman: Thank you. Please give them regards on my behalf.

Da: Thank you. We appreciate your aid to us.

Chairman: No, you should not say so! China is a big country, it is our duty, and it is your right. I always hear you talk this way, and at the same time I see documents worded this way, and my heart feels uneasy. We should do our duty, because our ancestors exploited you for three hundred years, oppressed you, they ran up quite a debt; therefore, today we want to repay these debts. In the past our national minorities were also oppressed this way, and we also want to repay our debts to them—this is our duty. One million two hundred thousand of our Tibetan population are actually in Lhasa, another million are scattered across Qinghai, Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and other places. How is the religious situation in Mongolia? Are there many *lamas*? What is the general population?

Da: There used to be many, but there are extremely few now. In the early period of the revolution some *lamas* did bad things, and they were dealt with. Some have engaged in labor and other work. There are still a small number of *lamas*. Our country's general population is 800,000.

Chairman: How is the development of industry and agriculture in Mongolia?

Da: Before the revolution we were a very backward nation, but during the revolutionary era, owing to enthusiastic help from the Soviet Union, our people have attained good development in the spheres of industry, animal husbandry, culture, and education.

Chairman: And Mongolian agriculture developed as well?

Da: We only began to develop agriculture this year.

Chairman: Is there enough water?

Da: In our country water is scarce.

Chairman: How about rainfall?

Da: In an average year, we have 120 to 300 millimeters of rain (of these, 300 millimeters fall in the forest belt, and the desert belt has 120 millimeters).

Chairman: What about drilling wells?

Da: In the desert belt, it is difficult to drill wells.

Chairman: In this case, create some reservoirs, store up water, and use it when needed—why don't you try it this way?

Da: This would be difficult in the desert region—water does not stay and quickly seeps into the ground.

Chairman: What big rivers do you have on your territory?

Da: Selenge, Onon, Herlen, etc.

Chairman: Which ones flow in the northwestern direction?

Da: Onon and Herlen.

Chairman: Where did Mongolian history and culture develop?

Da: In the region of the Onon and Herlen rivers.

Chairman: Can't you construct dams, reservoirs, drainage, etc. on these rivers?

Da: The people and all of us urgently demand to have it done so, but we do not have enough strength.

Chairman: We also have some difficulties now. But in a few years we will help you in this regard.

Da: Thank you.

Chairman: This year Hebei suffered from flooding, thirty million *mu*¹ of agricultural land were devastated by water. In China, hydraulic engineering work did not develop greatly until now; another ten years will pass before [this problem] can be resolved. But in this regard we will help you; you need not wait ten years.

Da: Last year you gave us a lot of aid, [you] sent thirteen thousand workers and technicians, and this gave an impetus to industrial and other construction. In addition, this year [you] gave [us] a grant of one hundred and sixty million rubles. Therefore, the Mongolian people feel elated.

Chairman: No, no. I already said it before: it is our duty. These numbers are too small. When you raise this I feel ashamed.

Da: Connecting the two [railroad] lines had a great effect on our country's development.

Chairman: How is Mongolian agriculture now?

Da: Now, compared with the past, it has developed somewhat; but due to the lack of manpower, large tracts of land have not yet been opened up for cultivation.

Chairman: This is not good. Uncultivated land should be

opened up. Have you settled down?

Da: Settling down would be very advantageous for our agriculture and animal husbandry, but [we] have not yet settled.

Chairman: This cannot be accomplished at once, but has to be done gradually, because grass is limited in any one place. In our country there are provinces with a similar situation. With settling down, one can grow vegetables and cultivate crops. This way the population can increase.

Da: Right! (Pointing to Tsend) He is responsible for the National Planning Committee. These suggestions of yours are of great help to our future planning work.

Chairman: Develop agriculture and animal husbandry; first of all one should develop hydraulic engineering work, and this includes dams, reservoirs, drainage, etc. On the other hand, pastures are very important; for your future, “grass is oil.” You should cultivate pastures, using the deep plough method; this way the grass will grow tall and there will be much more of it. This will create conditions for you to settle down.

Da: That’s right! We attach importance to your words.

Chairman: You can start some hydraulic engineering work early. This aspect includes geological prospecting work, physical resources, etc. Financial resources are not that important. Manpower is the most important, most critical. You should first do the most pressing, most needed work. For example, you fixed up a modern highway from Ulaanbaatar to the country’s western border, but you use it very rarely. This is unnecessary.

Da: Only seven years have passed since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Before that time the people of our two countries did not have much contact. Thirty-five years have passed since our revolution, but because our country was very backward, we have not been able to develop well in these thirty-five years (although we have had successes). Therefore, one can say that industry and agriculture in our country have not developed well.

Chairman: You should be self-sufficient.

Da: Currently we cannot manufacture many everyday products.

Chairman: This is not good. [You] should expand this aspect of industry.

Da: Japanese imperialism’s invasion of our country also influenced development in this regard.

Chairman: How many troops do you still have?

Da: About one division.

Chairman: That’s enough. Now you do not have enemies around you.

Da: We are right now training demobilized soldiers from these troops to become drivers, construction workers, etc.

Chairman: This is good. This is a production army! Then, how is the written language?

Da: Now we are using new (Russian) letters; all adults are literate.

Chairman: Very good. Inner Mongolia is now doing the same thing.

Da: That is what they say. With regard to the written language, we can help Inner Mongolia.

Chairman: Right. It must be done this way. Do you have direct links with Inner Mongolia?

Da: We do not have direct links now. We only have links through the Central [Committee].

Chairman: Shouldn’t there be direct relations?

Da: There must be direct relations, but we did not go through formalities.

Chairman: You can do so. You can establish your consulate in Inner Mongolia. If you do so, you will not have any costs! You can take several people from your embassy and send them there, this would do. The Soviet Union does this. They have consulates at Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyang, Guangzhou, etc. However, I am only speaking about the aforementioned things as a private individual, perhaps [I am] incorrect, because I have not consulted with the government and responsible people at the Foreign Ministry. By the same token, you also have not consulted with your government. But I think these things can be achieved.

Da: Thank you! We never even gave a thought to the historical “debt.” We only want to thank you.

Chairman: No! One must pay debts—we repay debts incurred by our ancestors. You, the Mongolian nation, are the third nation. The first nation were the Xiongnu. They settled in Xinjiang and the northern part of Huanghe, and some had crossed the Huanghe. The second nationality was the Tujue. They seized Armenia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Greece, and some other nations, and founded a big empire. But that nation was subsequently defeated by the Mongolian nation. Therefore Mongolia is the third nation. Until now we have not

clarified the origin of your ancestors. Is it in Siberia?

Ochirbat: Ah! That is what they say!

Chairman: Siberia used to have the Gaoche [Tall Cart] nationality, it is said that they all sat upon great tall carts. Are the Gaoche nationality your ancestors?

Da: Old people say that when ancestors moved their homes, they used tall carts to move all their things.

Chairman: Do you have records of this?

Da: As for the records prior to the 12th century, we have none now; we have records after the 13th century. The Soviet Union is helping us with work in this regard. Mongolia's pre-13th century history is intimately related to Chinese history; therefore, in the future we will possibly need to conduct joint research with you in this regard.

Chairman: Very good. Today we talked about many things related to history.

Da: Our prospects are very bright, because we have fraternal aid from the Soviet Union and China. From now on, we will work even harder and more diligently.

Chairman: You should develop well.

Da: I again express our sincere gratitude. Your aid to us is great fraternal aid. We cannot look upon it as a "debt."

Chairman: But we think this way. We have equal coexistence with all countries. In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we oppressed them; therefore, if we now do not admit our mistakes, we cannot root out Great Han nationalist thinking and implement [principles of] equality of nationalities. This is [our] basis, not pretty words. Isn't that so? In the past we oppressed you, but now you do not even have a word of complaint. The aid we are giving you is small. It is repayment of debt and not aid. Only this way can we attain mutual trust. You say "aid"—this is also good; when you say so, you also express equality.

Da: We express gratitude for your aid, which you have given and will give to us. The Chinese and Mongolian working people have always been friends; things done by the reactionary classes are a different matter.

Chairman: Some Chinese workers have gone to Mongolia. You should carry out propaganda work with them so that they do not commit the error of Great Han nationalist thinking, so that they do not ride roughshod over you [*chengwang chengba*]. If the Chinese workers or laborers there commit mistakes, you

should make this known to us.

Da: The majority of the people are very good, though a small number of people sometimes make mistakes, but not intentionally. At the same time, everybody might have some shortcomings.

Chairman: You should educate them; if anyone commits grave mistakes, they should be punished in accordance with the law. You should take the attitude of hosts and educate them.

Da: Among Chinese workers there, there are two hundred party members, and they lead the others to do good work.

Chairman: Good! How many workers are there altogether?

Da: 13,000 people, counting the family members. Of the former overseas Chinese, a part returned to the homeland, now only 45,000 people remain; but these people are all old.

Chairman: Are the Mongolian people directing them?

Tsend: Yes! The Mongolian people direct them with the attitude of hosts in their own country.

Chairman: Are there any carpenters among the Chinese workers?

Da: Yes. There are also brickmakers and all other professions.

Chairman: Do you let them train Mongolian apprentices?

Da: They certainly train apprentices!

Chairman: Later, with regard to agriculture, we may use our manpower to aid you. The number may be one hundred thousand, or it can be two hundred thousand; it can even reach three hundred thousand. Of these, some people could also help you with animal husbandry.

Da: Right, but beforehand we should fully complete preparatory work and planning work. Otherwise, after we receive these people, we will have difficulties in housing and other aspects.

Chairman: Right! You should gradually carry out this work. You have 800,000 people, therefore you can develop agriculture and begin hydraulic engineering.

Da: We have more than 52,000 workers.

Chairman: 52,000 workers out of a population of eight hundred thousand—this number cannot be considered small. Do they use machines?

Da: They use semi-automatic machinery.

Chairman: Do they have automation?

Da: They do not.

Chairman: Then you can install some in the future. On this question, we can have a talk in the future.

Da: Owing to your aid, we now have a match factory and a porcelain factory, but boxes for matches, etc. are still made by hand.

Chairman: What is the scale of the production of matches?

Da: The country requires 20 million boxes of matches, next year production can reach that number. But they do not sell very well inside the country.

Chairman: How is your market?

Da: As for the market, we have it, but it is very small.

Chairman: We talked well today.

Da: We thank you for your attention to us, thank you for taking some time out of your busy schedule to meet with us, thank you for giving us very important suggestions, thank you for giving us very useful ideas. When we return home, we will now be guided in our work by the words you spoke tonight. As we part, I once again extend our heartfelt respect to you on behalf of my party's Central Committee and the entire people.

[...]

Two. Comments on the distribution of the memorandum of conversation.

Foreign Ministry:

This conversation should be sent to our embassy in Mongolia, to the Party Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and to each province, city and district party committee, because all provinces, cities and districts have issues relating to the minority question. Also, [it should be sent] to the United Front Department and the party group of the National Committee. Please handle jointly with [CCP CC Member] Comrade [Yang] Shangkun.

Mao Zedong. 16 December.

1. *Editor's Note:* A *mu* is a Chinese unit of land measure equivalent to approximately 0.1647 acres (0.0667 hectares).



DOCUMENT No. 3

Record of Conversation between USSR Ambassador to the PRC S[tepan] V. Chervonenko and the MPR Ambassador to the PRC D[ondogiin] Tsevegmid, 1 January 1963

[Source: Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). fond 0100, opis 56, papka 495, delo 7, listy 1-19. Obtained and translated for CWHIP by Sergey Radchenko.]

Embassy of the USSR in the PRC

Top Secret

"15" January 1963

Copy No. 1

Outgoing No. 82

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

Comrade Gromyko

Enclosed is the copy of a record of conversation with the MPR ambassador in the PRC, D[ondogiin] Tsevegmid, which we sent to [CPSU CC Secretary] Comrade [Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov.

Attachment: as mentioned, 19 pages (top secret).

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC

[Signature] (S. Chervonenko)

Top Secret

1 January 1963

Ambassador Tsevegmid, after his return to Beijing (he accompanied the government delegation of the MPR headed by Yu[mjagiin] Tsedenbal, who left Beijing for the motherland on 27 December 1962 after the signing of the border treaty between the MPR and the PRC), at his [own] initiative, as he said, with Tsedenbal's instruction, visited the Soviet embassy and confidentially informed [us] about the conversations that took place between Yu. Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai on 25 and 27 December 1962.

Tsevegmid said the following:

On the day of the arrival of the Mongolian delegation in Beijing—25 December—all conversations and meetings, including the conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai, had a formal character and stayed within the framework of discussion of the border treaty. Conversation with Liu Shaoqi on 27 December, before the signing of the treaty, also had a pointedly formal character; none of the big, principal questions were touched upon during that meeting.

After the signing of the treaty and a large demonstration on 27 December the second conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai took place. Evidently, the Chinese side carefully prepared for this meeting since the conversation touched upon important principal questions that not only concern relations between the PRC and the MPR, and between the CCP and the MPRP, but also relations with other parties, including the CPSU.

At the beginning of this conversation, Zhou Enlai remarked—continued Tsevegmid—that the signing of the border treaty between the PRC and the MPR had great meaning, not only for our two countries but for other states as well, and would positively influence the international situation in general. After the demarcation of the borderline, the official border would be established. Then, touching on the Sino-Indian dispute, Zhou Enlai stressed that formerly the official border had not been established; therefore the two sides stuck to the historically formed traditional border. Now the issue was to establish an official border between China and India. Zhou Enlai also dwelt briefly on the Sino-Pakistani talks, noting progress on this issue and stressing that the Pakistanis take a correct stand on defining the border. However, the United States was worried about the favorable progress in talks between China and Pakistan. The US did not like this. Zhou Enlai remarked that, given the successful negotiations between China and Pakistan on the border question, the contradictions between India and Pakistan would, understandably, worsen, but that he still hoped that in the end this dispute, too, would be settled. Zhou Enlai—Tsevegmid said—tried to prove that the position of the Chinese side in the Sino-Indian dispute was the correct one and that India allegedly tried by all means to have this question solved with help from the outside, including the Soviet Union. India speculated on this help. It made a public effort to receive help from the US and England, but this would not save Nehru's position because the truth was on China's side and the main thing, as Zhou Enlai remarked, was that the people of Asia and Africa supported them—the Chinese.

Tsevegmid remarked that in his opinion this part of the conversation looked like a lecture, which Zhou Enlai tried to read to the Mongolian delegation.

Having finished this statement of his, Zhou Enlai said that allegedly, you, Comrade Tsedenbal and the MPR government, expressed regret in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Tsedenbal responded affirmatively and declared that we in Mongolia really do regret that the Sino-Indian dispute was not cut short at the very beginning and [instead] grew into a major military clash.

Zhou Enlai said that they, the Chinese, did not like this formulation of the Mongolian comrades about regret in connec-



Mongolia and the Cold War: International Workshop, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, March 2004

Organizer Sergey Radchenko (LSE), Yvette Chin (GWU) and other panelists

tion with the conflict. Here, Zhou Enlai, having reminded [us] about his meetings with Tsedenbal after 1959, said that when in 1959 Tsedenbal was passing through India and expressed [his views] in connection with the Sino-Indian conflict, he, Tsedenbal, was evidently already not standing on China's side. Zhou Enlai again repeated that they, the Chinese, did not like this attitude of the Mongolian comrades toward the Sino-Indian dispute.

Tsedenbal pointed out that one must approach the resolution of such questions flexibly and carefully, and that life and facts had shown how important it was to show flexibility in these cases. Further, Tsedenbal stressed that in the future, should socialism and communism win in the entire world, border disputes would be looked upon as a thing of the past [*perezhitkov proshlogo*]. This is how a communist should approach border disputes and conflicts, in my opinion [Tsedenbal said]. Continuing on this subject—said Tsevegmid—Zhou Enlai again tried to prove that the Chinese were not to blame in the Sino-Indian dispute, that they wanted from the very beginning to solve the border dispute by peaceful means and that China, for its part, did everything in order not to take this dispute to the stage of a military confrontation.

Tsedenbal pointed out in this connection that one should look at the results of the military clash, and one should think with precision [*trebovatel'nost' yu*] and accountability on what the [consequences of this] conflict are in India, where currently the atmosphere of nationalist passions has heated up to the boiling point, and [that] this has considerably complicated not only the position of the communist party of this country [i.e. India], but [also] of all democratic, progressive organizations and people; repression in India was now raging wild, reactionaries and rightist elements had become active, and they openly put pressure on Nehru.

At this point Zhou Enlai hurried to interrupt Tsedenbal and

again tried to prove that the Chinese were not to blame for any of this. Then, he started to say that the Chinese managed to agree on the border with almost all countries except for India, and started to praise the results of the negotiations between the PRC and the MPR.

These negotiations, he remarked, have been successfully concluded as a result of mutual understanding and mutual concessions by both sides. Here Zhou Enlai—according to Tsevegmid—stressed that, allegedly, China, taking into consideration Mongolia’s interests, made appropriate concessions. [Zhou Enlai] expressed the hope that in the future, in possible border questions, both fraternal countries will meet each other half-way. For instance we hope that if there is a request from our side to allow the grazing of cattle on the Mongolian territory adjacent to the Chinese border, this will not become a big question. We, on our part, will also be happy to satisfy your requests. When this part of the conversation was about finished—said Tsevegmid—Tsedenbal raised some questions of an interstate nature.

1. He told the Chinese comrades that as of late the workload of the railroad which passes through Mongolia into China and the freight of transit goods had decreased sharply. We would like to request an increase in the volume of freight by the Mongolian railroad if the Chinese comrades consider this possible.
2. Having remarked that the preliminary talks of the trade experts had now been concluded, Tsedenbal pointed out that the Mongolian side is worried that the Chinese side will considerably decrease trade operations with Mongolia in 1963, and this breaks the framework already created for the mutual supply of goods. As a result of this, unexpectedly for the MPR, questions arise that could not be foreseen ahead of time. These questions are connected with the supply of the Mongolian factories with certain types of raw materials which used to come from China.
3. He expressed gratitude to the Chinese government for help in construction work in the MPR, including sending workers from China. Tsedenbal remarked that currently 8,000 Chinese workers are working at different enterprises in the MPR together with Mongolian workers. Unfortunately, more and more frequently these workers refused certain types of work. They did not know the Mongolian language, and for this reason, too, some misunderstandings and troubles arise. Tsedenbal stressed that now, as well as in the near future, the MPR would have a great need for a workforce and that therefore Mongolia welcomed the presence of the Chinese workers at their enterprises. However, those Chinese workers who are presently in the MPR did not know the Mongolian language. Would it not be possible to send to the

MPR more workers from Chinese Inner Mongolia, who know the Mongolian language? This would be important as they would be able to work with greater productivity.

Having listened to Tsedenbal, Zhou Enlai said that during the conversation the Mongolian comrades raised three questions and that he would try to answer them. First, he said, I consider it necessary to remark that Mongolia supplied China with considerably fewer goods than what the PRC supplied to the MPR. We, indeed, were forced to decrease the supply of certain goods, especially cotton textiles, because we ourselves have internal difficulties, including those that arose from the drought and bad harvests that unfortunately happened in the last three years. Even if we did not export a gram of raw materials for the cotton textile industry abroad, and used it entirely for the production of textile, still these raw materials would only be enough to produce 3 meters of textiles per person. Generally speaking, Zhou Enlai said, we are now suffering ourselves, and we cannot promise to supply the cotton textile industry of the MPR with raw materials at the level of previous years. As far as rice, tea, silk, and to some extent wool are concerned, in general, we could send you these goods; let the trade representatives discuss these questions among themselves.

Further, Zhou Enlai said that the MPR was asking to have 17 million rubles worth of goods (on the new price scale) supplied from the PRC. The PRC now, apparently, would only be able to supply 6 million rubles worth of goods.

Next year, continued Zhou Enlai, the Chinese side would try to increase the freight of goods via the railroad across Mongolia. As a result of this, the income of the MPR would increase to a certain extent. Then Zhou Enlai said that the Mongolian comrades promised to sell China 100,000 horses. We have certain difficulties that have come up, and we would like to ask your help in solving them. Tsevegmid explained that these difficulties amount to the Chinese asking to supply horses only across two border points. This makes the MPR’s position more difficult, as this is connected with great financial expenditures. We are suggesting to the Chinese that we supply horses across those border points that are economically most beneficial for Mongolia. What the Chinese suggest amounts to collecting horses from all corners of Mongolia at only two border points.

Secondly, Zhou Enlai touched on some issues of construction in the MPR and put the question in such a way that, allegedly, Mongolia, in implementing its plan, naturally ran into some difficulties. Perhaps, he said, the Mongolian comrades, in light of the fact that they would not have certain types of raw materials, would consider it appropriate to re-examine certain questions. For example, the MPR had difficulties with the cotton textile factory, and with other enterprises as well. To implement the plan was a good wish, but one had to base oneself on the possibility of getting raw materials and other materials for

enterprises. Therefore, Zhou Enlai advised, some enterprises should perhaps be frozen for a certain time.

Tsevegmid commented that in connection with the fairly well-formed attitude of the PRC toward Mongolia, the latter really did have serious difficulties in implementing the five-year plan since in accordance with this plan the Chinese were supposed to build 25 economic objectives. In order to carry out this construction work in Mongolia, besides the 8,000 Chinese workers who work together with the Mongolian workers, there are also 5,000 Chinese there independently, from the Chinese construction companies.

Third, Zhou Enlai touched on the question of the Chinese workers. He remarked that sending workers from China to the MPR was a new thing in the relationship between socialist countries and that was a good thing. However, the Chinese government has certain difficulties. Zhou Enlai stressed the historical community of China and Mongolia, touched on the friendship between the two countries, the development of which allowed them to send Chinese workers to the MPR beginning in 1950. These workers worked in Mongolia for a long time. In 1960, after the end of the period of their stay in the MPR, the government of the PRC not only lengthened this period for many workers but sent new Chinese workers to Mongolia. When sending our workers to the MPR, said Zhou Enlai, we were worried and thought a lot about this. In particular, we thought a lot about the fact that the Chinese workers did not know the Mongolian language and did not know the customs of your people, and this could lead to the emergence of various questions. One should say, however, that in the first five years of their work in the MPR, despite some misunderstandings that arose, we easily solved them. But recently certain new aspects emerged and cases of workers refusing to work became more and more frequent.

Here Tsedenbal, making use of these words of Zhou Enlai, said, you see, you are yourself saying that the Chinese workers refuse to work and that they know neither the Mongolian language nor the customs of our country and that this sometimes to some extent leads to certain misunderstandings, including misunderstanding of each other.

Zhou Enlai declared in response that in China a situation existed whereby Chinese workers, if the conditions of work did not correspond to their demands, were allowed to refuse to work, that is, they were allowed to conduct a kind of strike.

In this connection, Tsedenbal pointed out that Mongolia has its own laws. We cannot agree that some workers can break and ignore the established order. Such a situation could, in the end, negatively influence the Mongolian workers.

Zhou Enlai, having heard this, said that our countries were not ideologically united in everything, and this influenced

both inter-state and inter-party relations. Above all, there were major disagreements on principal questions between our fraternal parties. Now we would not like to dwell on the question of what precise aspects we would agree on. At the time of the 22nd [CPSU] Congress [October 1961], I, Zhou Enlai, made a statement there and tried to the best of my ability to restore unity between parties in order not to show our disagreements before the enemy. However, this effort was unsuccessful, and disagreements subsequently deepened even more. Further, Zhou Enlai remarked that in the Chinese media they published equally both Albanian and Soviet materials on the questions of disagreements. These materials were also published in [North] Korea, in [North] Vietnam and in some other countries. The MPRP, in his view, took an opposite stand, that is: Mongolia published materials with criticism directed against Albania, and did not publish Albanian articles. Zhou Enlai expressed the anxiety of the Chinese side with the fact that the disagreements thus were becoming more and more open and engulfing an ever greater range of parties. He pointed out that the CCP came under open criticism at the congress of the Italian Communist Party [PCI]. The materials of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCz] congress were published in Mongolia, he continued, but the statement of the CCP representative was not published. The CPSU and Khrushchev criticized the CCP, not directly, but indirectly. Khrushchev's speech was naturally published in China, and we also published our reply.

In this connection, Zhou Enlai again declared that those Chinese materials, which contained replies to the statements at congresses of different parties, were not published in Mongolia. Of course, Zhou Enlai said, it was the Mongolian party's business what attitude to take on this. We would not impose our opinion, even less so make another party act in a way we, for example, considered correct. Further, he expressed himself to the effect that the internal policy of the CCP was the business of the Chinese, and nobody should interfere in the internal affairs of the PRC. However, our disagreements over key questions, because of someone, became known to the enemy. The dispute did not need to be deepened. In our opinion, one could not go further down this road. As if summarizing, Zhou Enlai again emphasized that the CCP and the MPRP had different points of view on a series of important problems; they followed two different directions. Having changed the topic of the conversation to the relations between the PRC and the MPR, Zhou Enlai stressed that in general these relations were still good. Touching upon the issue of sending workers from China to the MPR, he declared that they could send other workers to Mongolia, but the question was that this was connected with different approaches to important questions as a result of which we encounter difficulties of an ideological nature. It is difficult for us, Zhou Enlai continued, to conduct political work with our workers in Mongolia. In China, we conducted political work of a certain direction among the workers. If we were to conduct mechanically this work with the Chinese workers in the MPR, then a whole range of questions could come up.

As they were in touch with the Mongolian population, they are familiar with the Mongolian press, and this caused certain difficulties. 8,000 Chinese workers were in the midst of the Mongolian population. Zhou Enlai stressed that a man was not an inanimate commodity [*mertvy tovar*], but a living, politically thinking individual. We brought our people up in such a way that if they did not like something, then they could give up work. Therefore, we allow such order [of things]. Now, let's look at the situation of the Chinese workers in Mongolia. What you publish in Mongolia disposed the Chinese workers critically towards the PRC. This caused difficulties. What are we to do with these workers? Leave them in the MPR? But I already said these are people and not commodities.

Tsedenbal asked what, in the end, should be done about those workers who refuse to work.

Zhou Enlai replied that we should think about this together in order not to allow complications to arise in the relations between two neighboring states, the MPR and the PRC, because of this question. If the situation remained as it was, conditions would remain for the occurrence of troubles, misunderstandings, and unfavorable events.

Tsevegmid remarked that the conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai took on a more and more hostile form, and at times he even thought that the custom would be set aside and they would come to blows [*skhvatyatsya za grudki*].

Having listened to Zhou Enlai, continued Tsevegmid, Tsedenbal declared the following. Above all, he said, Comrade Zhou Enlai gave us Mongolians a series of recommendations regarding our further construction. I would like to say that our difficulties arise at those sites that China is building, and also with those for which China, in accordance with previously reached agreements, had to supply appropriate goods, especially raw materials. This is what our construction difficulties are connected with. Then, Tsedenbal remarked that the Chinese workers helped Mongolia a lot in her construction, especially up to 1961. The Chinese workers lived and worked together with the Mongolian workers; however, difficulties about which Zhou Enlai spoke did not arise here. Beginning from 1960, and especially from 1961, "difficult questions" began to arise. We cannot transfer to the MPR the practice established in the PRC. In accordance with this practice, as Comrade Zhou Enlai said, workers in China can give up their work and even bring factories to a standstill, conducting, to use Comrade Zhou Enlai's expression, strikes. If you allow this, other countries do not. But the main thing is why the Chinese workers refuse to work in the MPR. This is the result of, as Comrade Zhou Enlai said, different ideological bases of our parties. You said this correctly, Comrade Zhou Enlai. You speak about the relations between parties and about the attitude of parties towards the Albanian question. I would like to tell you, emphasized Tsedenbal, that the Mongolian party has a principled, correct stance with

regard to the policy of the Albanian leadership. The leadership of the A[lbanian] P[arty of] L[abor] by its actions really did begin to break the unity between fraternal parties, initiate a split in the international communist and workers' movement and depart in its line and its statements from the principles of internationalism, from the principles of the cohesion of parties. We believe that the MPRP's position is the correct one. Our party will continue to maintain this correct objective position, will conduct a resolute struggle against those who want to split the communist movement. The Mongolian party, Tsedenbal said emphatically, fully agreed with the line of the CPSU and supported its struggle for the unity of the international communist movement.

You, Comrade Zhou Enlai, are saying that it was impermissible to air publicly the differences between parties. But, as you know, the CPSU took drastic measures and took a big initiative with regard to the APL, calling on it to take the stand of unity. You, Comrade Zhou Enlai, and all Chinese comrades undoubtedly know full well about this. You cannot help but know that in 1960 the Soviet leaders tried several times to talk with [APL CC First Secretary Enver] Hoxha and [APL CC Chairman Mehmet] Shehu. Comrade Khrushchev personally took a series of steps to stop the Albanian leaders. But they, as you know, not only refused to heed these sincere wishes of the Soviet leaders, but, on the contrary, rudely, in a hooligan manner, rejected all proposals of the Soviet comrades. After this, the Soviet leaders naturally no longer thought it necessary to place the main emphasis on a meeting of a closed nature. I would like to tell you, Comrade Zhou Enlai, that the actions of the Albanian leadership are directed not only against the CPSU, but also against the entire international communist movement; they not only slander the CPSU, but also the entire international communist and workers' movement. This means that the Albanian leaders through their splittist actions themselves departed from the international communist movement.

You, Comrade Zhou Enlai, Tsedenbal continued, reprimand us for not printing the Albanian materials. This is actually true. But I would like to note that in the future we will not print such materials either. You also said that we did not publish the Chinese materials. We print and will print only Marxist-Leninist materials. We respect very much the leadership of the CCP. You, the Chinese communists, have come a long way, lived a long political life. Nevertheless, we consider that you follow an incorrect line. I recall the year 1960, the meeting of the fraternal parties in Moscow. I would like to say that then you contributed greatly to the unity of international communist movement, and I will tell you frankly that I still hoped that you would not depart from the agreed line and would go forward together with the CPSU and other parties. Commenting on his attitude towards these questions, Tsedenbal told Zhou Enlai that what he said in no way suggests an intention to sharpen relations. This is what I, Tsedenbal, would more than anything like to avoid. However, you, the Chinese comrades, support Albania, encouraging it

thereby to slander the Soviet Union in a rude manner.

Further, Comrade Tsedenbal spoke about the Chinese workers. He emphasized that we cannot change our ideological line, and have no intention of [doing so], because of 8,000 Chinese workers in Mongolia. However, we would like to assure you that we do not carry out any political work among the Chinese workers. As far as the press is concerned, we cannot help but print what we consider correct.

Without concealing that he was angry and nervous, Zhou Enlai interrupted Tsedenbal and asked whether he could ask him one question. Having received an affirmative answer, Zhou Enlai said that if articles with direct or indirect criticism addressed at the PRC were printed in the Mongolian press and if the Chinese workers read them, then what attitude should they have towards this? Tsedenbal replied that he did not deny the presence of difficulties of this sort. Zhou Enlai asked how, then, should the question of workers be solved?

Tsedenbal said that, as he understood [the point raised by Zhou Enlai], Zhou Enlai was taking the issue in such a direction [*vedet delo k tomu*] that the Chinese workers would not work in the MPR. Zhou Enlai replied that he did not mean the old workers, but he was asking what was to be done about the new workers. Tsedenbal again declared that we would not retreat in ideological terms and would not change the correct policy line of our party because of 8,000 workers.

Zhou Enlai said that he did not demand to change the party line. You are yourself saying that the CCP should change its political line. You call yourself a Marxist and you criticize me. Tsedenbal pointed out that Zhou Enlai was the first to raise this question.

Zhou Enlai declared that he spoke about other things—about how to solve concrete questions in the relationship between our countries. But you, he said, wanted to teach me. I do not accept your instructions [*poucheni*]. Tsedenbal replied that he did not teach and had no intention of teaching Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai declared in irritation that Tsedenbal talked about changing the party line all the time. Tsedenbal stressed that what Zhou Enlai said did not correspond to the spirit of the meeting of the fraternal parties.

Zhou Enlai said to this: “I did not violate the Moscow treaty. The Moscow treaty was violated by Khrushchev and his followers.”

Tsedenbal asked Zhou Enlai not to be angry. It was bad when one gets angry, he remarked. The MPRP was created and builds its entire existence on the basis of the great experience of the CPSU. The party reflects the thoughts and feelings of the international communist and workers' movement [and] enjoys its support. For the entire 40 years since the creation of the MPRP,

the entire Mongolian people unreservedly go together with the CPSU. We would like to affirm to you that nobody will be able to shake the unity of the Mongolian party and the CPSU. This unity is forged by blood. We are deeply convinced in the correctness of the political line of the CPSU. We believe in the CPSU—the party of the great Lenin, the vanguard of the international communist movement.

Zhou Enlai asked Tsedenbal—does this mean that you blindly follow the CPSU?

Tsedenbal replied that this was not so, we were convinced of the rightness of the CPSU, we were deeply convinced of and committed to the endeavor carried on by the CPSU. Zhou Enlai asked a question: Did you do the same thing during the period of Stalin's cult? Did you loyally follow Stalin as well? Did you look at all questions this way during the cult of personality?

Tsedenbal asked Zhou Enlai what questions he had in mind. What questions in particular did he have in mind when he talked about Stalin? Zhou Enlai replied that Stalin was correct on some questions, as is known. Tsedenbal said that the Soviet leaders themselves many times declared that Stalin was correct on some questions. By all means, the Soviet comrades did not vulgarize all of Stalin's deeds, they gave him due credit, pointing at the same time to his crimes, to his mistakes.

Zhou Enlai changed the conversation to the Chinese workers in Mongolia.

Tsedenbal declared that inasmuch as the Chinese comrades were worried about the fact that the Chinese workers in the MPR were in the midst of the Mongolian working people, this could be corrected. 8,000 Chinese workers could be placed separately and put into the same situation as the 5,000 Chinese workers who organizationally belong to independent Chinese construction companies.

Zhou Enlai, having calmed down somewhat, replied that this question could be discussed in detail by the appropriate representatives of the MPR and the PRC, for example, by the officials of the PRC embassy in Ulaanbaatar and Mongolian organizations. My goal, he stressed, was to tell you what kind of difficulties we encountered and to make sure you understand us correctly. Tsedenbal declared that the above-mentioned Chinese workers should probably be concentrated at one site. If the PRC embassy in the MPR was appropriately instructed, we, for our part, would find people, they would conduct the necessary negotiations and we would solve this question. Zhou Enlai, having agreed to this, said that he was not offended and that he did not get angry, but he insisted again that allegedly Tsedenbal for over 40 minutes tried to teach him.

Tsedenbal emphasized that the Mongolians respect the CCP, value the struggle of the CCP for the establishment of the rule

of the working people and value their efforts in the endeavor of building socialism. He remarked that the CCP, in comparison with the MPRP, is more experienced and that he merely reminded him what constituted the ABCs of Marxism-Leninism.

Zhou Enlai told Tsedenbal that he did not need not be shy and pitiable [*ne pribednyalsya*]. You, Tsedenbal, he declared, are a leader of a state and a party. Ambassador Tsevegmid said that Tsedenbal, taking into consideration the atmosphere of the meeting, and also keeping in mind that the time had almost come for the reception which was hosted by the Mongolian side in connection with the signing of the treaty, wanted to end the conversation at this point, and on behalf of the entire Mongolian delegation thanked the Chinese comrades for their hospitality [and] for the useful exchange of opinions that took place.

Zhou Enlai said something to the effect that Tsedenbal supposedly did not respond to the questions he touched upon. He again remarked that his goal was only to acquaint Tsedenbal with the situation and with the difficulties that arose, that he did not raise any questions. Moreover, Zhou Enlai began to insist that Tsedenbal allegedly criticized him.

Tsevegmid remarked that this was done in a clearly Chinese manner—when one thinks up an allegation against oneself and then attributes it to one's interlocutor. Then Zhou Enlai, Tsevegmid continued, said that in 1961, when he was in Moscow, he advised the CPSU not to take the disagreements beyond the framework of communist parties and to conduct consultations with the APL. The CPSU measures with regard to the APL, of which you, Comrade Tsedenbal, spoke, were taken before the 1960 meeting. Unfortunately, the CPSU did not accept our position and during its 22nd Congress not only failed to remedy the situation, but on the contrary started to criticize openly another party. Thereby the disagreements were exposed before the enemy. Therefore the main one to blame is the CPSU, and not the APL. Some parties, attacking the CCP, even claim that the CCP departed from the line of the Moscow treaty, but we do not agree with this. It is precisely the CCP that tried to preserve unity and tried not to take the disagreements outside of the circle of the communist parties. Criticism against the CCP was slander. Those who criticized our party took a wrong stand. As time was limited, we could not continue the conversation now. However, if there was a need, Zhou Enlai declared, this conversation between our parties could be continued. Zhou Enlai emphasized that what Tsedenbal talked about concerned relations between parties and did not concern inter-state relations. I, he continued, did not intend to touch on a series of questions, but you, Comrade Tsedenbal, criticized me, and I had to reply to you. I believe, for example, that the MPRP follows a wrong line. However, I am not demanding that you change your line. If there is a meeting of fraternal parties in the future, I would ask you, Comrade Tsedenbal, not to strike me with a blow again (Zhou Enlai pointed to his right cheek with his hand). You, Comrade Tsedenbal, made a state-

ment at the 1960 Moscow meeting and said that Zhou Enlai tried to persuade you to follow the Albanian Labor Party. I told you then that in Albania there were different internal forces, that one should be attentive to this country. You, however, presented the encounter in such a way as if I tried to persuade you to follow the Albanian road. I will not go into details now, but I do not accept this accusation you threw at me at the 1960 meeting.

Then Zhou Enlai said that although our two parties were communist, we had different views on some ideological questions. However, we should not let our ideological differences carry over into inter-state relations. Perhaps, Zhou Enlai declared, we would transfer our ideological differences to inter-state relations with some other countries, but we would not do this with regard to Mongolia. (Tsevegmid remarked that perhaps this phrase was not translated exactly).

Tsedenbal, touching on his statement at the 1960 meeting, which Zhou Enlai had mentioned, said that he has no intention to talk about this now. He noted further that he knew about the presence of disagreements between the CCP and other parties, but now, in his opinion, was also not the time to talk about this. If we were to talk about disagreements, then the attitude towards the APL reflected two different approaches, two different lines. Zhou Enlai raised a question in this connection: Why was it so? Wasn't the Albanian Labor Party a communist party?

Tsedenbal remarked that the Albanian question became a kind of a compass, a kind of a test of sincerity of everyone towards the CPSU.

Zhou Enlai said that both the Albanian question and other questions should be solved jointly. Some parties and countries were not big, but one should not disregard them, one should not disrespect them. Further, Zhou Enlai said that N.S. Khrushchev allegedly used to tell him: We should, allegedly, solve everything between ourselves, that was—between the CPSU and CCP, and the small parties did not count. Questions of small parties also should not be solved by two big parties.

Having listened to all of this, Tsedenbal worriedly expressed himself to the effect that the border treaty had already been signed, and he understood a lot in this connection. When I went to Beijing, he continued, I was convinced that the signing of the border treaty would have a certain positive meaning for the friendship between our two countries...

Ambassador Tsevegmid remarked that though Tsedenbal did not finish his thought, he later expressed in the circle of Mongolian comrades that the signing of the border treaty, as far as one can judge, did not in the slightest improve relations between the MPR and the PRC.

Concluding the conversation, Tsedenbal again expressed his thanks for the reception given to the Mongolian delegation, remarked that he considered the exchange of opinions useful, but it was already 6 p.m. and one should go and receive the guests invited to the reception.

With this, Tsevegmid said, the conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai ended. Later, during the reception and at the farewell neither side raised any major principal questions. Ambassador Tsevegmid asked to take into account that he did not rule out the possibility of some inaccuracies in the translation, as, in his opinion, the interpreters were not qualified enough. At the end of the conversation Tsevegmid said that because of the refusal of the Chinese side to meet its obligations, construction of some enterprises would not be finished, and some other enterprises that could operate, would not be able to operate because of the lack of raw materials.

I thanked Tsevegmid for this information. The record of conversation was written down as closely as possible to the account presented by Ambassador D. Tsevegmid.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

[Signature] (S. Chervonenko)



DOCUMENT No. 4

Resolution of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee [MPRP CC] Politburo on Joining the Warsaw Pact, 15 July 1963

[Source: Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив (Archive of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's Central Committee), фонд 4, данс 26, кх/н 306б, кхуу. 40-41 Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO RESOLUTION [MPRP CC Politburo]

15 July 1963 Ulaanbaatar No. 24

ON JOINING THE WARSAW PACT

At present, international reactionary forces headed by the American imperialists are intensifying preparations for war, and increasingly threaten the peace and security of the socialist camp countries and the people of the world.

In particular: the fact that the American imperialists are increasingly using the "security treaty" concluded between the USA and Japan [on 19 January 1960] in order to turn Japanese



Secrecy and Freedom of Information Roundtable Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, March 2004:

CWIHP Senior Scholar Bernd Schaefer, CWIHP Director Christian Ostermann, and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive) discuss declassification issues at the Mongolian Foreign Ministry.

territory into their own military base, that they are trying to equip the Japanese army with nuclear weapons—creates a real threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the MPR, and to the efforts of the Mongolian people to construct socialism.

In such threatening circumstances, it is increasingly necessary to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp countries on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The Warsaw Pact, concluded between European socialist countries in 1955, has in reality become a reliable guarantee of freedom, sovereignty, peaceful construction of socialism and communism, of peace and security of peoples of all socialist countries. The armies of Warsaw Pact states are equipped with modern weaponry and technology, have mastered its usage, have strengthened their defense capacities and honestly carry out their duties on behalf of the international communist and workers' movement.

Being conscious of the aforementioned threat, and noting the necessity of strengthening this country's defense capacity, especially by training our people's army in the use of modern military weapons and technology, and by allowing its generals, officers and fighters to master modern military science, the MPRP Central Committee Politburo RESOLVES:

1. Consider it appropriate for the MPR to join the Warsaw Pact, which has become a reliable foundation of freedom, sovereignty, peaceful construction of socialism and communism, of peace and security of peoples of all socialist countries.
2. Instruct the Council of Ministers / C[omrade] Tsedenbal / to put, in the proper form, a request to join the Warsaw Pact to the depository of the Warsaw Treaty, the government of the P[olish] P[eople's] R[epublic].

POLITBURO MEMBERS

T[sagaan-Lamyn] S. DUGERSUREN
N[yamyn] JAGVARAL
D[amdinjavyn] MAIDAR
D[emchigiin] MOLOMJAMTS
J[amsrangiin] SAMBUU
Yu[mjaagiyn] TSEDENBAL
L[uvtsantserengiin] TSEND

POLITBURO CANDIDATE MEMBERS

N. LUVSANRAVDAN
[MPRP CC Secretary] B. LHAMSUREN



DOCUMENT No. 5

Record of Conversation between Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal and the PRC Ambassador to Mongolia, Zhang Canming, 24 September 1963

[Source: Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив, фонд 4, данс 28, kh/n 182, khuu. 70-80. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN
YU[MJAAGIIN] TSEDENBAL AND THE NEW CHINESE
AMBASSADOR TO MONGOLIA, ZHANG CANMING.

Ulaanbaatar, 24 September 1963.

Tsedenbal: [...] In the future relations between our two peoples can develop according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. They must develop on that basis. People will certainly approve if friendship between our two peoples is developed on the basis of these great principles.

Zhang: The border between our two countries is not only delimited by the mountains and waterways, but is also connected by the Gobi desert. It is not merely a matter of delimiting the border by mountains and waterways.

Tsedenbal: The border between our two countries is 4,500 km long.

Zhang: That's very long.

Tsedenbal: Now work is underway to erect border markers. It should be finished soon.

Zhang: This work is being carried out very successfully. This is an expression of friendly relations between our two countries.

Tsedenbal: Now the two sides' commission is working. I have not had a chance to become acquainted with the latest situation. You probably know the work situation yourself. Now they are putting up these border markers. In the future, during the communist period, borders will not be needed anywhere. They will remain as historic reminiscences for young people to study.

Zhang: This is the law of dialectics. For example, now we have a proletarian dictatorship. Its aim is to annihilate classes. Now we are erecting border markers. Their aim is to annihilate borders in the future.

Tsedenbal: Yes. It has to be like this. Borders are a product of class society. During that period, nation states separated from each other. Now such borders are also needed. In the future, in the communist period, they will not be needed. In the future there will be no nation states that close themselves up in a box.

Zhang: In the communist period, the world will be one big family.

Tsedenbal: Yes, society, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, will develop further, and there will be no regard for people's nationality and skin color, there will be one language and one culture.

Zhang: Now all work we are doing is directed towards the building of communism. [...] Now your army expenses have been cut down a lot?

Tsedenbal: They have been. They can't compare with the previous period.

Zhang: There are only socialist countries around you.

Tsedenbal: Our army does mainly construction work.

Zhang: As for us, along with construction work, we have to resist the imperialist threat, and so we need appropriate forces. For example, imperialists are occupying our Taiwan.

Tsedenbal: Today's weapons are very dangerous. Today's bombs are several million times more dangerous than previous bombs. Today's weapons are as dangerous as nothing seen before, and therefore all honest people must strive towards preventing war. The weapons that protect the entire socialist camp and all people are the Soviet nuclear weapons. This is the force that restrains the imperialists. When there are weapons in the Soviet Union that protect our camp and all of humanity, there is no need for countries like ours to have such large military forces as before. Instead of this, young people can engage in peaceful labor and soldiers can be used for construction work.

Zhang: [...] How many soldiers do you have now?

Tsedenbal: About 14,000. With the air force included, not more than 15,000.

Zhang: These soldiers are probably used mainly for construction work?

Tsedenbal: Almost [all] do construction work. The weapons that protect Mongolia, China, the entire socialist camp and all peace-loving peoples are in the Soviet Union. [...]



DOCUMENT No. 6

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to the PRC Stepan V. Chervonenko and MPR Ambassador to the PRC Dondongiin Tsevegmid, 7 October 1964

[Source: CWIHP Collection (www.cwihp.org).]

[Excerpt]

From the diary of
S[tepan] V. Chervonenko

Top Secret

7 October 1964

Record of Conversation with the MPR Ambassador to the PRC [Dondongiin] Tsevegmid

[...] Tsevegmid said that on 30 September, as he was receiving the [Mongolian] delegation,¹ [CCP CC Foreign Minister] Chen Yi many times expressed his gratitude to the MPR government for sending a delegation to [participate] in the 15th anniversary of the PRC. When the Mongolian delegation arrived in Beijing, Chen Yi and other Chinese [officials] tried to create an atmosphere of exceptional warmth, they hugged, kissed, etc., said Tsevegmid.

[...]

Tsevegmid explained to me that the MPRP CC Politburo instructed [MPRP Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Erdenechuluun] Luvsan to make use of his participation in the festivities in China to probe the position of the Chinese regarding their sincerity with regard to the MPR on a series of questions—territorial claims of the Chinese, sending of the Chinese workers to the MPR. [...]

Tsevegmid then informed [me] about the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Luvsan that took place on 3 October of this year (at this meeting, besides the two of them, only Tsevegmid

was present).

In the beginning, said Tsevegmid, Zhou Enlai spoke to the effect that the disagreements between the MPR and the PRC were not the main thing, the main thing was unity. Zhou Enlai cited Mao Zedong's words to the effect that socialist countries could have disagreements, but that this was a secondary question, and in the struggle against imperialism socialist countries must be united, and this was the main thing. If imperialism attacked one socialist country, all socialist countries must come forward united in this struggle. To this, Tsevegmid said, Luvsan replied that Mongolia always spoke out and speaks out for unity on a principled Marxist-Leninist basis. Everyone knows, continued Luvsan, that with the help of the USSR, the PRC and other countries, the MPR achieved considerable successes; we must also live in friendship in the future. Then, Tsevegmid said, Luvsan, having noted the aid provided by China, pointed out that at a certain point in time the Chinese government began to take unfriendly actions toward the MPR. As an example he pointed to the recall of the Chinese workers. Now we were forced to mobilize youths from the countryside for the construction, and there, in the countryside, difficulties also appeared. Right away Luvsan passed on the request of the government of the MPR to the Chinese government to send to Mongolia no less than 10 thousand herders for 3-5 years. With this, Luvsan stressed that it would be preferable to have the PRC herders sent from the regions adjacent to the border of the MPR.

This would simplify the solution of many problems we had to face when workers were sent from various remote regions of the PRC (household and language difficulties, payment of transit across the entire PRC territory, etc). Tsevegmid commented that raising the question about provision of workers from the border regions was in essence a probe of the Chinese position on the question of Inner Mongolia, because he was in fact talking about the Mongolian herders from Inner Mongolia.

Tsevegmid said that Zhou Enlai, apparently, was not ready to answer, and in connection with that he began to ask many secondary questions, thinking about an answer in the meantime. Then Zhou Enlai said that he understood the thought of Comrade Tsedenbal. After the establishment of the PRC, he continued, diplomatic relations were established between it and the MPR. In former times, before the victory of the revolution, there were questions between China and the MPR left over by history. But this was a thing of the past. We had a border and have exchanged documents to this effect; [we] exist as sovereign states. We, Zhou Enlai further said, also had a treaty on friendship, which had to be observed by both sides.

As far as economic aid was concerned, continued Zhou Enlai, China had provided it to the MPR for a long time. With this, said Tsevegmid, he reminded him that Tsedenbal visited the PRC three times and during the first and the second visits was

received by Mao Zedong, who told Comrade Tsedenbal that “a country should be given aid until it becomes economically independent.” At Mao Zedong’s initiative, continued Zhou Enlai, we provided economic aid to the MPR, several treaties were signed (Tsevegmid said that at this time Zhou Enlai began to account in detail for the aid provided by China to Mongolia).

Then, Tsevegmid said, Zhou Enlai highlighted the question of the Chinese workers, stressing that various practical misunderstandings existed earlier, but the Chinese government did not pay attention to this because the ideological positions of both countries were generally the same. In recent times, continued Zhou Enlai, the question of the Chinese workers in the MPR became a sharp one, and this was explained by the ideological disagreements between the MPR and the PRC. We, Zhou Enlai said, strove not to transfer the inter-party disagreements to the inter-state relations; however we brought up our people in one spirit and you, in the MPR, in another spirit. Therefore when the Chinese workers met with the Mongolian workers, they had disagreements. This could take on an aggravated form, especially now, when the disagreements became open, because as a result of this the circle of people participating in the disagreements widened more and more. Already incidents had begun to occur (Zhou Enlai had in mind the murder of a Chinese worker at one of the construction sites in the MPR).

Under these circumstances, continued Zhou Enlai, the idea arose to return the Chinese workers to the motherland. We based ourselves on the fact that the departure of the Chinese workers would remove the ground on which our disagreements sprang up. If new Chinese workers were to be sent now and they were brought up in the spirit of our ideas, then this could lead to even greater disagreements than before, clashes may take place, [and] there might be even wider killings.

Your press was criticizing China, and what were the Chinese workers who do not agree with this criticism to do, especially since you already criticized the Chinese leaders[?] If herders were sent, this meant that the disagreements could spread even further, transfer to the countryside, and therefore the question about the sending of the Chinese workers should be temporarily postponed. Of course, said Zhou Enlai, this would to a certain extent harm the construction, but it was better to delay construction than aggravate relations between us. We were thinking about helping you, but there were difficulties in the current situation, stressed Zhou Enlai. You, he said unexpectedly, were a neighbor of the Soviet Union, which provides you with a lot of aid. Then Zhou Enlai began to say that the disagreements, however, would be gradually resolved, good relations would set in, and then the PRC would be able to provide aid to Mongolia. One must wait patiently, one must not lose hope that in the future we will live in friendship, but for now, while the disagreements had not been resolved, we had to act in such a way as not to deepen them, to strengthen friendship

between the peoples. Tsevegmid said that Zhou Enlai time and again repeated that the Mongolians had a right to ask for aid from the PRC, and China would necessarily help, but now was not the time and the right conditions for [aid] were not there, one would wait. We respected the idea of Comrade Tsedenbal about sending herders, said Zhou Enlai, but now was not the time to implement it. The Chinese government would study this question and give an answer through the ambassador of the MPR in the PRC. We would not look at this question as if it were a simple one, we would not leave it, stressed Zhou Enlai; [he should] pass this on to Comrade Tsedenbal.

Tsevegmid told me that Zhou Enlai invited the delegation to a dinner during which he talked about the necessity of living in friendship; although disagreements would persist for a long time, [he said that] the main thing was unity of our countries. The solution of all questions in mutual relations between China and Mongolia should be directed towards this. Zhou Enlai also said several times that the concrete questions raised (the payment for the transit of workers, etc.) were of a different character, they were secondary and this was not the main thing. Zhou Enlai hinted that the main thing was the nature of relations between the MPR and the PRC.

Tsevegmid remarked that Zhou Enlai was exceptionally polite and delicate with the Mongolian delegation; he tried in the course of the conversation not to allow the slightest aggravation and asked several times to convey his greetings and wishes to Comrade Tsedenbal.

When he received the delegation, Mao Zedong spoke about unity as being the main thing and also asked to convey his personal greetings to Comrade Tsedenbal. When the delegation was leaving for the motherland, said Tsevegmid, the Chinese leaders stressed many times at the airport that both countries were sovereign states and had to leave in friendship [and] respect each other, etc.

Summarizing all of the above, Tsevegmid expressed his thoughts to the effect that the Chinese in the conversations with the delegation tried to say carefully that they were ready to provide greater aid if the MPR departed from its firm principled position, which it took in the course of the current struggle in the communist movement. The MPR, the ambassador continued, probably very much stood in the way of the Chinese implementing their line among the countries of Asia and Africa, because the MPR’s example was in many respects very unpleasant for the Chinese. Unfortunately, Tsevegmid remarked, we did not have enough strength yet, we would need to develop further our economy to really demonstrate in contrast the example of prosperity before the Mongolians from Inner Mongolia and before other Asian countries, which would further frustrate the plans of great Han chauvinism and vanguardism in Asia and on other continents.

Tsevegmid also told me that the statement by Mao Zedong in the conversation with the Japanese socialists very much undermined the authority of the PRC and of Mao Zedong personally, that even the nationalists who did not agree on all the questions of the internal and external policies of the MPR leadership, [who] expressed doubts in the policy of the MPR leadership with regard to the Chinese leaders, now speak about the above-mentioned statement of Mao Zedong with indignation and resentment.

[...] Informing about all of the above, we would like to stress that the current Chinese approaches with regard to the MPR are part of an important, well thought-out new round of cunning, more refined tactical steps and actions of the Chinese leadership, directed towards widening the “swamp” in the socialist camp and in the communist movement, towards the separation of fraternal countries from the USSR (they insistently tried to create an impression among all the delegations from the socialist countries that they were the “sincere protectors” of the unity of the peoples of the socialist camp, many times and at all levels declaring that, allegedly, “disagreements are not the main thing, nobody dies from discussions, the main thing is unity,” etc. [CCP CC Member] Peng Zhen had a conversation along these lines with a Polish delegation for over 4 hours on 6 October. [...] The Chinese are trying again to flirt with the Germans, telling them that, allegedly, “you are the forward post of the socialist camp in the West, and we—in the East, therefore, we must be united.” The top leadership of the PRC stubbornly worked with the Romanian delegation, though, as ambassador [Ambassador Dumitru] Georgiu told us, no joint documents were being planned.

Taking all of this into consideration, we would suppose it expedient to, with an eye to the next few years, specifically look at the MPR question in terms of further securing its position as a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, of more effectively and systematically using it to frustrate plans of the Chinese leadership, especially of their play on racial and nationalist strings of so-called Afro-Asian unity. ([This should] include the question regarding measures for bringing closer to the CPSU, aside from Tsendenbal, other, especially authoritative, influential Mongolian leaders, so that the firmness of Soviet-Mongolian relations depended to a lesser extent on one or two persons who are currently in power.)

Perhaps the time is ripe to look at the question of a visit of the leadership of the CPSU to the MPR, timing it to some big action with regard to the MPR which would strengthen and develop our alliance with it. At the same time, one must not fail to take into account the necessity of weakening a certain Mongolian fear in connection with the great power chauvinist pressure from the Chinese, which shows through in the conversations of the Mongolian comrades with us.

The ambassador of the MPR Tsevegmid, for example, confi-

dentially informed us that a partial mobilization is underway in the MPR (although for the Chinese and other foreigners they were inventing a version that under the pretext of mobilization into the army, countryside youths were being mobilized for industrial construction), that special posts had been installed on the Mongolian side to observe the actions of the Chinese on the border, etc. [...]

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC
[Signature] S. Chervonenko

1. A Mongolian delegation headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Luvsan visited China in September-October 1964 to participate in the 15th anniversary celebrations of the PRC's founding.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Resolution of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee [MPRP CC] Politburo, 1 December 1965

[Source: *Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив, фонд 4, данс 28, kh/n 173b, khuu. 35-37. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko. The resolution was written in Mongolian and the addendum in Russian.*]

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO RESOLUTION

1 December
1965

Ulaanbaatar
No.

ON REQUEST FOR AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO STRENGTHEN MPR'S DEFENSE

MPRP Central Committee
Politburo RESOLVES:

Taking into consideration the deteriorating situation in the East, and the worsening international tensions, considers it appropriate to strengthen this country's defense. For this purpose, considers it appropriate to put a request to the Soviet Union's Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet government to provide an appropriate unit from the Soviet Union armed forces to be stationed in this country and be maintained at their own expense.

MPRP Central Committee Politburo members, candidate members:

Ts. Dugersuren	D. Molomjamts
N. Jagvaral	J. Sambuu
S. Luvsan	Yu. Tsendenbal
D. Maidar	B. Lhamsuren
N. Luvsanravdan	

Copy is correct.

Top Secret

TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CC
Comrade BREZHNEV Leonid Il'yich
TO CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF
USSR

Comrade KOSYGIN Alexei Nikolaevich

Dear Comrades!

Taking into consideration the deteriorating situation in the East, and the worsening international tensions, the MPRP CC and the MPR government are taking measures to strengthen the defence capabilities of the country. With generous help from the Soviet Union, we are equipping the Mongolian people's army with modern technology and weapons, and with the help of Soviet specialists, we are training army personnel in new means of struggle.

However, these measures are insufficient to safeguard us from all sorts of incidents and possible sudden attacks. Our army units do not possess the means of detection that would allow us to learn about the activities of the enemy at a considerable distance from our territory.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, and with the aim of further strengthening the defence capabilities of the MPR, the MPRP CC and the government of the MPR are turning to the CPSU CC and the Soviet government with the insistent request to consider the question of providing a battle unit (formation) from the armed forces of the USSR and maintaining it on the territory of the MPR at the cost of the Soviet Union, having supplied it with modern powerful military equipment and arms, housing, as well as cultural facilities, amenities, and all other necessary items.

The place of stationing of a military unit and other concrete questions can be additionally discussed.

We are firmly convinced that the CPSU CC and the Soviet government will look into our request with understanding and make a positive decision on it.

With communist greetings,

On the instruction of MPRP CC and the
government of the MPR

Yu. Tsendenbal
First Secretary of MPRP CC,
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the MPR

1 December 1965

[On the opposite side added by hand: Tsendenbal *darga* gave it to Namsrai *darga* on 6 December [1979?], Namsrai *darga* received it / in the secret fond /. Signature, 7 December 1979]



DOCUMENT No. 8

Information about the Visit of the Soviet Party and Government Delegation to the MPR, Headed by the First Secretary of the CPSU CC C. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in January 1966 [Excerpt]

[Source: AVPRF: fond 0111, opis 48, papka 287, delo 12, listy 21-38. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

Secret. The only copy.

About the visit of the Soviet party and government delegation headed by the First Secretary of the CPSU CC C. L[eonid] I[lyich] Brezhnev to the MPR in January 1966.

Information

[...]

On 13 and 15 January [1966] the delegations of the two sides held official talks.

Comrade [Yumjaagiin] Tsendenbal, welcoming the Soviet delegation, stressed its exceptionally high level and the great importance of the visit of the Soviet leaders. [...]

Comrade Tsendenbal expressed warm gratitude to the CPSU CC and the Soviet government for the quick and effective dispatch of working forces in 1964, when a particularly difficult situation with [regard to] labor resources occurred in the MPR in connection with the departure of the Chinese workers from Mongolia. [...]

All the workers of the MPR warmly support the policy of the party and the government. True, Comrade Tsendenbal remarked, some members of the MPRP CC had deviations in the direction of pro-Chinese views, but they were given a resolute rebuff. In general, all members of the party support the line of friendship with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries.

In the sphere of international politics, Comrade Tsendenbal stressed, our two countries had one line. [...]

Comrade Tsendenbal praised highly the help of the Soviet

Union to Vietnam and censured the position of the Chinese on this question. [...]

Recently the Chinese had been building up their forces at the Mongolian-Chinese border. Now there were 73 so called "stations" with military garrisons along the border with the MPR. There were 4 large Chinese garrisons on the western border; in the Xinjiang region, on the railroad at the Erlian border station, in the East, close to the meeting point of the three states (MPR, USSR and PRC) there were large Chinese garrisons, two of which arrived in the beginning of 1965.

Comrade Tsendenbal pointed out that there are cases of PRC nationals crossing the Mongolian-Chinese border. Mainly, the people who cross are of Mongolian nationality, live in Inner Mongolia and were looking for a refuge in the MPR from the harsh conditions of life in China. In 1965 there were 30 crossings, during which 48 people crossed into Mongolian territory.

Responding to the relevant question of members of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Tsendenbal said that about two million Mongolians and nine million Chinese lived in Inner Mongolia; at the same time, there was a policy of active assimilation of the Mongolian nationality by the Chinese. [...]

Comrade [Leonid] Brezhnev on behalf of the Soviet delegation expressed his gratitude to the Mongolian comrades for the warm, hearty welcome [the delegation] received in the MPR, and also thanked Cde. Tsendenbal for the information.

Having noted the firm character of the Soviet-Mongolian friendship, Cde. Brezhnev stressed that our parties have common views on questions of foreign policy, the struggle with imperialism, the national liberation movement, the unity of countries of the socialist commonwealth, and on questions of the international communist movement.

Comrade Brezhnev expressed gratitude to the MPRP CC and the Mongolian government for the support of our foreign policy, and, in particular, for support of the Soviet Union in the question of participation in the Second Conference of the Afro-Asian countries.

Touching on the economic relations between the USSR and the MPR in the next five years, Brezhnev remarked that not all questions had been fully solved yet. He noted that one should not rule out amendments to the agreements reached. He stressed the necessity for the Mongolians themselves to make the best effort to use in the most effective way the credits and aid provided by the Soviet Union to Mongolia. [...]

Brezhnev said that the CPSU CC Presidium looked at the question of providing aid to Mongolia in the intensification of its external political activities. A decision was made to help the

MPR in the preparation of the necessary staff, translators, diplomats, and journalists for the publication of literature about the MPR, with translation in different languages for dissemination abroad. It was decided to provide, with the aim of the intensification of the activities of the MPR on the international stage, three million dollars for use in cases when the MPRP CC and the MPR government consider it necessary to spend this money.

He also said that the CPSU CC Presidium positively replied to the request of the MPRP CC requesting aid to strengthen the defense capabilities of the MPR. [Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Yakolevich] Malinovsky has been instructed to coordinate the details of this question. [...]



DOCUMENT No. 9

List of Questions Discussed and Adopted by the CPSU Politburo in the First Five Months of 1967

[Source: *RGANI, fond 2, opis 3, delo 67, pp. 150-151.*
Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

List of questions, discussed and adopted by the Politburo in the first five months of 1967 [...]

In the first five months of this year, 118 decisions of the Politburo pertaining to defense questions were discussed and adopted (list attached) [...]

14. About strengthening forces in the Far East, Zabaikal'ye and Eastern Kazakhstan (4 February 1967) [P32/31op]

15. About stationing Soviet forces on the territory of the MPR (4 February 1967) [P32/32op]

16. About strengthening border protection between the Soviet Union and the PRC (4 February 1967) [P32/33op] [...]

18. About building protected points of control of the armed forces of the USSR (4 February 1967) [P32/35op] [...]

38. On sending military-construction units to the MPR (26 April 1967) [P39/137op]



Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964–1966

Annotation and Introduction by Lorenz M. Lüthi

Studying Hanoi's foreign relations during the early Vietnam War is a mystery within a riddle. Given the paucity of Vietnamese internal or archival sources, the use of substitute documentation, be it Chinese, Russian, or East European, is the only way to approach Vietnamese thinking. Moreover, the leadership of the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) not only was careful not to antagonize any of its many, mutually antagonistic allies, but also seemed to be skillful at disguising internal disagreements in its dealings with foreigners. Vietnamese leaders often tended to make vague or general statements on their relations or conflicts with other countries.

The parallel escalation of the Vietnam War and of the Sino-Soviet Split in 1964-1966 makes this period central to our understanding of Hanoi's, Beijing's, and Moscow's positions and mutual interactions. The documents presented here fill a gaping hole in our knowledge, especially for the period from August 1964 to the summer of the following year.¹ Yet, for several reasons, they should be used with caution. They do not replace the actual transcripts of talks between the three. Most are at least one step removed from the actual events. More than half are Soviet reports to the East European allies on talks with the Chinese or Vietnamese, and some are based on intelligence gathering or, to a lesser degree, well-informed hearsay. Yet, already existing information, as for example the excerpts of Sino-Vietnamese talks published earlier by *CWIHP*, is corroborating many of them.² Finally, the documents also speak much for the fact that the Soviet and East European diplomats in Beijing and Hanoi confronted many of the problems historians face today when they try to understand the period—a lack of reliable evidence. Thus, as we can glean from the documents, they tended to work as a team, gathering and sharing information with each other whenever possible.

The Sino-Soviet split inevitably shaped the course of the early Vietnam War. Sino-Soviet ideological disagreements became public with the release of the so-called Lenin Polemics in April 1960, in which the Chinese communists accused their Soviet comrades of ideological revisionism. Over the course

of the early 1960s, these polemics became more vitriolic, largely as a result of their function in domestic Chinese politics. Especially after the summer of 1962, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong linked his internal adversaries—PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi and CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, above all—rhetorically to the supposedly revisionist Soviet comrades who, in his view, not only had betrayed Joseph Stalin, other fellow communists, and even the national liberation movement in the Third World, but also were restoring capitalism at home. The twelve months before the launch of the Cultural Revolution in August of 1966 witnessed a quantum leap in these attacks, especially once Mao Zedong had left Beijing in the fall of 1965 for southern China. From there he observed the events in the Chinese capital he had triggered, gathered like-minded supporters against what he called the revisionists in the Politburo, and prepared for his jubilant return in August of 1966 to humiliate his internal opponents.³

In this context, the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was near impossible. Since 1962, various communist parties had tried to nudge the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CCP to agree to another meeting of the international communist movement like the one held in Moscow in late 1960. Yet, Sino-Soviet disagreements over the process of summoning this meeting were at the heart of the deadlock. While the CPSU wanted to follow the process of 1960—first Sino-Soviet talks, then convening the so-called Editorial Board consisting of 26 major parties, and finally the gathering of all parties—the CCP demanded changes that would benefit its ideological positions. In fact, Mao also used this maneuvering to provoke Nikita Khrushchev to call a rump-meeting which Mao had already publicly declared to be splittist. By early 1963 Mao had already decided on the necessity of a Sino-Soviet split, but, as he said himself, the only problem was how to shift the blame on Khrushchev: “We should make Khrushchev instigate the split, let him assume the responsibility for it.”⁴ A series of polemics from the late summer of 1963 to the summer of 1964 achieved that goal; on 15 July 1964,

*Lorenz M. Lüthi is an Assistant Professor at McGill University in Montreal. He is the author of *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) and articles on *China and the Warsaw Pact (1955-1963)*, *Chinese defense policy (1964-1966)*, and *the Vietnam War (1971-1973)* will be published soon in *Cold War History*, *the Journal of Cold War Studies*, and other publications.*

Khrushchev announced the meeting of the Editorial Board for 15 December.⁵ After Khrushchev's fall at the October Plenum, his successors Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin downgraded it to consultative status and rescheduled it for 1 March 1965. But for Mao, Khrushchev's call was the opening he had sought to gather like-minded parties in Beijing for the purposes of creating an anti-revisionist bloc against the Soviet Union **[Document #3]**.

Realizing that a Sino-Soviet split might have detrimental effects on the unfolding conflict in South Vietnam, the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) mediated—with success—from August to October of 1960, and—to no avail—in early 1962 and late 1963.⁶ Given Mao's increasing rhetorical stress on revolution and national liberation since mid-1962, the VWP seemingly moved closer towards Mao's ideological positions in the period prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident (2 August 1964), which triggered the US escalation of the Second Indochina War. For example, in March 1963, the secretary general of the VWP, Le Duan, openly rejected the Soviet position on peaceful coexistence with the United States. And in late 1963, the VWP's 9th Plenum formally turned toward Mao's concept of national liberation wars, directed mainly against 'US imperialism' in the Third World. Yet, although the Vietnamese party differed with its Soviet counterpart, Le Duan, unlike Mao Zedong, was not willing to openly break with the CPSU.⁷

The immediate reactions to the Gulf of Tonkin incident revealed the different approaches of the CCP and the CPSU towards the conflict in Southeast Asia. The People's Republic of China (PRC) declared that "no socialist country can sit idly by while it [Vietnam] is being subjected to aggression."⁸ Within a couple of days, China sent older MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters, though without pilots, to the DRV.⁹ Beyond Chinese military assistance, Mao also provided political advice, calling the Gulf of Tonkin incident a result of mistaken judgment and incorrect information, and counseling for a protracted guerrilla war and against negotiations with the US in case of a further escalation.¹⁰ The Soviets, by comparison, were much more cautious. Khrushchev proposed to bring the issue to the United Nations, for which he got publicly criticized by the PRC and DRV—both non-members in that organization.¹¹ Moscow's reluctance to support Hanoi might have stemmed from the impending domestic leadership struggle, but also from the fact that the Soviets were much more skeptical about the chances of a North Vietnamese success than almost everyone else in the socialist world. **[Document #1]**

Khrushchev's fall from power in mid-October did not lead to a reversal of any of his foreign policies, *except* the one on Vietnam. Yet, this event apparently puzzled the North Vietnamese leadership, as we can see from the *Hoc Tap* Affair¹² **[Documents #2 and 3]**. The Chinese Communists tried to use the changes in the Soviet Union to shape politics and ideological debates within the international communist movement by calling for a gathering of the twelve ruling communist parties in Moscow for the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution. The meeting sent mixed messages to the Vietnamese. On the

Moscow's reluctance to support Hanoi might have stemmed... from the fact that the Soviets were much more skeptical about the chances of a North Vietnamese success than almost everyone else in the socialist world.

one hand, Kosygin, as the new Soviet chairman of the minister council, promised economic and military aid, as well as a possible visit to Vietnam.¹³ At the same time, the tentative Sino-Soviet ideological armistice after Khrushchev's fall collapsed in renewed disagreements and polemics.¹⁴ On his return from Moscow, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong talked neither with Deng Xiaoping, who had to come to the airport to greet him during his refueling stop in Beijing,¹⁵ nor with Soviet embassy personnel in Hanoi. **[Document #3]**

Yet, despite all the uncertainties of the Soviet embassy in Hanoi on the new direction of Vietnam's foreign policy, the Soviets were able to perceive Sino-Vietnamese disagreements developing in late 1964 **[Document #4]**. Worried about a direct clash with the United States, Mao's PRC had started to scale back its initial commitments to the DRV; the volunteers he had promised in the summer for frontline battle, turned into regular troops permitted only to secure the Vietnamese hinterland.¹⁶

Kosygin's trip to East Asia in February of 1965 has long been shrouded in mystery. **Document #5** summarizes not only his talks in Hanoi and Beijing but also reveals the open differences in opinion. Sino-Soviet ideological disagreements (mostly about the summoning of the Editorial Board in Moscow in March) put Vietnam into a sensitive position between the quarreling communist great powers.¹⁷ But Kosygin's talks in Beijing appear to indicate that both the CPSU and the CCP were willing not to let their ideological disagreements endanger the North Vietnamese war effort.

However, events in late February and throughout March proved otherwise. Some days after Kosygin's return to Moscow on 16 February, the Soviet Union came forward with four proposals: the call for a new Indochina conference, the release of a joint statement of support by the socialist countries for Vietnam, the dispatch of urgently needed anti-aircraft guns to Vietnam by air across Chinese territory, and the stationing of Soviet missile troops and of an interceptor aircraft squadron in North Vietnam and southern China, respectively. The four proposals are conveniently summarized in **[Document #11]**, but numerous other Russian archival documents corroborate many of its aspects.¹⁸ With the exception of the first proposal (Indochina conference), the North Vietnamese agreed to the Soviet suggestions—the shipment of anti-aircraft guns by air had anyway been requested by Pham Van Dong—while the

Chinese rejected all of them completely. As one Soviet participant later admitted, the proposals had come too quickly and did not take into account Chinese security needs.¹⁹ However, much of the Chinese argument was based on ideology, or was, as in the case of the Chinese claim that the Vietnamese did not agree with any of the proposals, an outright fabrication. **[Documents #6 and #10]**

By late March of 1965, only a Sino-Soviet railroad transport agreement had been signed²⁰ while the US had been pouring weapons and troops into South Vietnam for months. Although Hanoi was willing to continue the fight, the lack of military aid apparently caused problems **[Document #7]**. At the same time, the Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal of early April to carry out trilateral talks to solve the supply problems with the argument that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the CCP would not allow them to sit together with the Soviets at the same table **[Document #9]**. Chinese obstructionism was clearly based on ideologically motivated reasons, which in turn frustrated the Vietnamese greatly **[Documents #8 and #10]**. After fruitless talks in Beijing in early April, a Vietnamese delegation headed by Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Thuy Thinh left the Chinese capital for Moscow to ask for more aid **[Document #8]**. On their way back, the Chinese comrades accused them of cooperating with the Soviet revisionists **[Document #9]**.

The constant Chinese polemics—such as the claim that the Soviet Union was rendering insignificant aid **[Document #10]**—compelled the Soviet comrades to send a letter **[Document #11]** to the fraternal parties to set the record straight on past and current aid to Vietnam. Together with the following document, it also alluded to Chinese obstructionism with regard to the use of Soviet military equipment once it had arrived in Vietnam. Vietnamese frustration about China's uncompromising positions—"the Chinese are ready to fight to the last Vietnamese but otherwise are content to be left alone by the Americans" **[Document #13]**—has been corroborated by an internal Chinese source which deplores the fickleness of the Vietnamese comrades with regard to Soviet revisionism and to negotiations with the United States as well as expresses the need to lead them subtly back on the correct path.²¹

A series of visits by Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh to Beijing and Moscow in the fall of 1965 **[Documents #14 and #15]** reveal the increasing influence of the approaching Cultural Revolution on Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Having left Beijing for southern China, Mao Zedong cooked up the fantasy of an all-out national liberation war against US imperialism throughout East Asia. Lacking any material basis to support such a massive conflict economically or militarily, the Chinese leader used bravado to fulfill his need of stressing revolutionary credentials against the Soviet revisionists and their supposed allies in the Politburo, headed by his deputy Liu Shaoqi, in Beijing. Numerous propaganda documents, such as Chen Yi's speech on the 16th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC for example, promoted during that time the claim that China was encircled by four enemies—the imperialist US, mil-

itarist Japan and India, as well as the revisionist Soviet Union, which supposedly coordinated their actions to destroy China and the national liberation movement in the Third World.²²

It was in this context that, in January 1966, both Poland and the Soviet Union sent delegations to the PRC and the DRV to find once more a solution to the complicated problems facing the Vietnamese war effort **[Documents #16, #17, and #18]**. The Michalowski mission was partially induced by a worldwide diplomatic offensive by the US to break the deadlock over Vietnam,²³ while the Shelepin mission was designed to negotiate on further aid and prod the Vietnamese towards more sensible positions with regard to ending the conflict. Both reveal the rigid Chinese position that had developed over the course of 1965, disagreements between the VWP and the National Liberation Front (NLF), Vietnam's over-optimistic outlook for victory in the war, and Polish-Soviet calls to engage in a diplomatic counter-offensive with the aim to isolate the United States.

Against Chinese advice, the VWP decided to send a delegation to the 23rd CPSU Congress (29 March to 8 April 1966). The Chinese apparently punished the Vietnamese with a partial and temporary stop of supplies **[Document #21]**. Both the Vietnamese and the Soviets decided not to pour more oil into the fire of Sino-Soviet disputes; their speeches to the congress were devoid of any negative comments on China.²⁴ In a private conversation after the congress on 11 April, Brezhnev asked Le Duan to convey to Mao the desire for a meeting to clarify bilateral disagreements.²⁵ During his stopover in Beijing, Zhou Enlai accused Le Duan of being anti-Chinese. **[Document #24]**

China's subsequent hard line in the Vietnam War stemmed from both its dissatisfaction with Vietnamese behavior and its domestic need to create an atmosphere of international crisis in order to launch the Cultural Revolution. **[Documents #19 and #20]**. Once the Cultural Revolution with its attacks on established structures of authority had started, the Vietnamese had to walk a tricky path **[Documents #21 and #24]**. Although Hanoi dismissed the Cultural Revolution as an internal affair of the PRC, it certainly was aware of the political dangers of China's political radicalism in international affairs and in domestic politics.

This was the background to Pham Van Dong's visit to Moscow in August and to the stay of a high-ranking Czechoslovak delegation in Hanoi in September **[Documents #22 and #23]**. Both reveal the insecurities of the Vietnamese about the future of the conflict. Rhetorical boldness in describing the military situation stands side by side with the recognition of the difficulties of the NLF in the South and requests for more urgently needed military aid. The two documents also show the dissatisfaction of Vietnam's allies with China's obstructionism of aid to the DRV, while they also register the sobering recognition that a harder line towards Beijing would only damage Hanoi's war effort.

Note on document translations:

The following documents have been translated as literally as possible. Mangled syntax has been rendered into English as closely as possible. In rare cases, when the meaning of the sentences was threatened to be lost, the author rearranged the syntax, though as little as possible, to allow for better comprehension.

1. Many of the Soviet and Chinese documents for this period are not accessible, see for example: Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 17-33. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 130-134. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 212-221.

2. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Yu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., "77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 22* (1998).

3. See extensive coverage in: Lorenz Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

4. Wu Lengxi, *Ten Years of Debate, 1956-1966: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations* [*Shi Nian Lunzhan, 1956-1966: Zhong-Su Guanxi Huiyulu*] (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1999), 552-556.

5. "To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," 15 June 1964, Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, MOL), 288 f. 9/1964/22 e, 37-56.

6. For the first mediation attempt, see: Wu Lengxi, *Ten Years*, 344-349, 398-415. For the second mediation attempt, see: "Note on a talk with the Hungarian Ambassador, Comrade Martin, on 31 January 1962," Beijing, 2/1/1962, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (Foundation); SAPMO-BArch), Berlin, Germany, DY 30/IV 2/20/124, 1-3. "Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam," 4/7/1962, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3606, 68-74. For the third mediation attempt, see: "Declaration by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party on the unity of the communist world movement," 2/10/1963, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/437, 1-6.

7. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, 123, 125.

8. The official English version of the statement is reprinted in: *New York Times*, 7 August 1964, 7

9. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, 132, 135.

10. Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 208, 213-214. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 213. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, 133. "Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, Beijing, 5 October 1964 7-7:50 (p.m.)," Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations," 76.

11. "Record of Conversation with the chargé d'affaires of the DRV in the USSR Do Fat Kuang," August 6, 1964, Arkhiv Veshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; AVPRF), Moscow, Russia, fond 079, opis 19, delo 4, papka 40, 5. Chen Jian, "Personal-Historical Puzzles about China and the Vietnam War," Westad et al., eds., "77 Conversations," 30.

12. The *Hoc Tap* was the theoretical organ of the VWP.

13. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*, 19-20.

14. See chapter 9 of Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.

15. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bestand: Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Political Archive of the Office for Foreign Affairs, Files: Ministry for Foreign Affairs; PAAA-MfAA), Berlin, Germany, Abteilung Ferner Osten - Sektor China, Microfiche A 6835, 1-4.

16. Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, 134. Li Danhui, "Sino-Soviet Relations during China's Resist-America-Aid-Vietnam War" ["Zhong-Su guanxi yu Zhongguo de yuan Yue kang Mei"], *Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 3 (1998), 112. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*, 16.

17. Another East German document, based on talks by GDR ambassador to North Korea Horst Brie, reveals Hanoi's desire that Moscow and Beijing come to an agreement for the sake of the Vietnamese struggle against the Americans. See: "Note on two conversations with the minister council of the DRV embassy, Comrade Hoan Muoi, on 1/26/1965, in the Cuban embassy and on 1/27/1965 on the occasion of a goodbye visit in our embassy," January 27, 1965, PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 332, 45-50.

18. Most of the documents can be found in: AVPRF, fond 079, opis 20, delo 12, papka 45 and papka 46, and fond 0100, opis 58, delo 5, papka 516.

19. A. A. Brezhnev, *China: The Thorny Path to Good Neighbourhood: Reminiscences and Reflections* [*Kitai: Termisty Puti K Dobrodstvu: Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), 104.

20. On 30 March 1965, the PRC and the USSR finally signed a transport agreement that allowed for the supply of military aid to Vietnam through Chinese territory. Beforehand, Beijing had allowed the transport by rail of those anti-aircraft guns which it had refused to transport by air in late February.

21. Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Vietnam 'Peace Talk' Activities," 19 August 1965," Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-1968: new evidence from Chinese sources," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 18* (June 1997), 33-34.

22. Speech is summarized in: "Information No. 51/65 to the members and candidates of the Politburo," 10/2/1965, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/220, 1-2.

23. For more background on the Polish delegation, see: James G. Hershberg, "Who Murdered 'Marigold'? New Evidence on the mysterious failure of Poland's Secret Initiative to start US-North Vietnamese Peace Talks, 1966," in *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 27*; and Hershberg, "Peace Probes and the Bombing Pause: Hungarian and Polish Diplomacy During the Vietnam War, December 1965-January 1966," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5:2 (Spring 2003), 32-67.

24. "Report by the First Secretary of the CC, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev," 29 March 1966, 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Bulletin* No. 1, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History; RGASPI), Moscow, Russia, fond 593, opis 1, delo 1, 21-56. "[Speech by the First Secretary of the] Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, Comrade Le Duan," 30 March 1966, 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Bulletin* No. 3, RGASPI, fond 593, opis 1, delo 3, 36-48.

25. "Zapis Besedi" [Record of Conversation], *Istochnik* 1998 (3), 129.

DOCUMENT No. 1

**Note on a Conversation by Tarka, Jurgas and Mile¹
at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, 10 September 1964
[Excerpts]**

[Source: *Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; AMSZ), Warsaw, Poland, zespol 24/71, wiazka 2, teczka D. II Wietnam 2421, 2-4. Translated from Polish by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

[...]

The conversation took place in the embassy of the USSR on 2 September 1964 at the initiative of the Soviet comrades, especially of the military attaché, General Major Ivanov. Apart from him, the embassy counselor Soloviev was present, as well as the assistant attaché, a colonel of the air force.

[...]

We provided information to the Russians on the situation in the south after 5 August, according to the instructions of Comrade Ambassador. On the request by our interlocutors we added information we possessed on the basis of our knowledge of the topic of economic, political, religious, individual, and social relations with the South. The [Soviet] comrades were interested in, as deep and comprehensive as possible, an understanding of the problems. We feel that the comprehensive information was even more necessary for the development of each other's opinion on the perspectives of the evolving situation in Vietnam, and on the fundamental prospects of the warring parties. They themselves provided us with the following opinions:

1. Friendly relations between the DRV and China are currently almost absolute, mainly as a result of pressure from China. At present, they² are conducting an internal party campaign accusing the Soviet Union of insincere relations to Vietnam. They propagate the thesis that just at the present, when the DRV and the NLF are a few steps from victory, the USSR put together a statement and protest against the US, just for the sake of creating for itself the opportunity to share in the fruits of their victory.

2. The Tonkin [Gulf] incident was a general test for the durability of political agreements and the strength in South East Asia. They [the Soviets] are convinced that the initiators of the incident were the Chinese.

3. The Soviet comrades in general do not share the optimism of the Poles. They consider that:

a) the military situation in the south is difficult for the NLF at the present, especially with regard to the shortage of military technology;

b) the losses of the Americans during the aerial attack of 8/5 [5 August] were a lot lower than the Poles were told [by the Vietnamese?] (according to the Polish side the Americans lost 11 aircraft shot down—the Soviet comrades thought 2—based on the anecdotal evidence and photographic material. The authorities of the DRV refused to provide details to Soviet cor-

respondents: the number and types of aircraft as well as the last names of allegedly captured and killed pilots);

c) the Americans are [usually] in a position to settle, to their own advantage, every military conflict in this region, including the one in Vietnam. Cde. Ivanov expressed the opinion that for the Americans political victory is more at stake than military victory and that their aim in Vietnam above all is to achieve that. Ivanov claimed that both China and the United States avoid taking military steps [against each other] because both sides foresee the serious after-effects of such steps. According to Ivanov, China's military is currently not very powerful, owing to a complete lack of new technology, but its human potential has great significance.

Ivanov and Soloviev consider that the currently complicated situation will not allow the making of even a tentative estimate. The Soviet comrades predict that the escalation of the military situation might lead the US to use tactical nuclear weapons. Americans currently need firing ranges for their weapons. We were given the understanding that this event is not likely if the USSR [threatens to] respond to [US] nuclear measures, such as to the introduction of atomic weapons to Vietnam or a direct [nuclear] attack on China.

A topic of interest for the Soviet comrades was the NLF as a political and military organization. We provided them with the little information we had concerning the quantity and kind of military formation on the NLF as well as on some of the latest military operations. The Soviet comrades were puzzled why until this time the NLF had not appointed a provisional government and if it was possible to predict that they would do this in the near future.

With regard to the internal affairs of South Vietnam, the Soviet cdes. think that in the end the present political crisis had its origins essentially in tyranny. They were interested in political parties and the possibility of their accession to power. It is possible that they [the Soviets] don't have an opinion about both the military situation in that region as well as on the weakness of these parties.

[...]

1. The identity of these three is unknown. Since the document was written in Saigon, they probably were affiliated with the Polish delegation to the International Supervision and Control Commission on Vietnam. No information was found on Ivanov or Soloviev.

2. Refers probably to the Chinese, since Mao had instigated recurrent anti-Soviet campaigns in the CCP since the early 1960s.



DOCUMENT No. 2

Remarks by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on the Article in *Hoc Tap* No. 11/1964, 12 November 1964 [Excerpts]

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (Foundation); SAPMO-BArch), Berlin, Germany, DY 30/IV A 2/20/442, 57-58. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

We have already informed you in a telegram about the publication of the article “Long Live the October Revolution in Russia” by Hong Chuong, the withdrawal of that piece as well as its basic contents. Now we send you a partial translation (some paragraphs without significance are missing).¹

In this context we would like to summarize once more, how the withdrawal of the article occurred. Shortly after the publication of the piece, the Soviet ambassador [Ilya] Shcherbakov made a visit to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. He asked what Cde. Pham Van Dong thought about this article. Cde. Pham Van Dong evaded a clear reply. In the following days, representatives of the editorial board of *Hoc Tap* visited diplomatic missions, removed the copies already delivered, and replaced them with new ones, from which the article had been cut out. When Cde. Shcherbakov shortly thereafter made a visit to the first CC secretary of the VWP, Cde. Le Duan, the latter remarked in the course of the conversation that the article had been a mistake, and apologized for it. He added that there are people in the party, who have no understanding of the situation and thus make mistakes and shoot beyond the target.

...

On 14 November the press attaché of the Hungarian embassy, Cde. Benyei, told me that he knew from Cde. Fourniau,² a correspondent of *L'Humanité*, who the author of the article was. Cde. Hong Chuong is vice director of the pedagogical university in Hanoi; he apparently lived for more than 10 years in France and visited a French school there. He is supposed to be very intelligent and knows the European situation well. His articles, in Cde. Fourniau's view, are always very interesting, since he usually represents the line of the VWP leadership, but sometimes reveals details that provide nuances in official policy.

Estimate by the Soviet embassy

The article was an open attack on the policy of the Soviet Union and, especially, the 20th and 22nd Party Congress.³ In China it is impossible to admit such mistakes or apologize for them. We agree with this opinion. We still have to wait [to see] how things develop. Yet, it is already clear, that at least on the surface a change in the attitude towards the USSR has occurred. Signs for this were, among others, that Cde. Le Duan stayed for a long time at the Soviet reception for the anniversary of the

November [October] Revolution and, while there, embraced a Soviet artist after she had sung a song in Vietnamese, and that, after a long time, speeches by Soviet comrades were published in the media (it relates to the speeches by comrades [CPSU Secretary General Leonid] Brezhnev and [Soviet Minister Council Chairman Alexei] Kosygin at the reception of the cosmonauts and the speeches by Cde. Brezhnev and [Soviet defense minister Rodion] Malinovsky on 7 November—both verbatim).

1. The partial translation of the *Hoc Tap* article (not included here) is attached as an addendum to the original document.

2. Charles Fourniau was a journalist permanently accredited to the DRV from 1963 to 1965. Due to the political closeness of *L'Humanité* (the daily of the French Communist Party), he had some privileged access to information in Hanoi.

3. The 20th party congress took place in February 1956, the 22nd in October 1961. At both, Khrushchev denounced Stalin.



DOCUMENT No. 3

Note No. 131/64 on a Conversation between the Soviet Embassy Counselor, Comrade Privalov, and Comrade Bibow on 11/23/1964 in the GDR Embassy from 10:30 a.m. - 12:45 p.m., 10 December 1964 [Excerpts]

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/442, 1-5. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

The conversation occurred on request of the Soviet embassy. [...]

Comrade Privalov at the beginning talked about the attitude of the DRV toward the SU [Soviet Union] following the October plenum.¹ He asserted that the improvements that have occurred, and were especially obvious during the days around 7 November, apparently have only temporary character. The changes were evident in the speeches and articles, which the Vietnamese side, on the occasion of the 47th anniversary, held and published, respectively. They became very clear through the withdrawal of the article in *Hoc tap* on the October Revolution, which happened on Le Duan's immediate directive. Some days later Le Duan apologized to the Soviet ambassador in the course of a conversation and called the article a mistake, after Comrade Shcherbakov had raised the issue.

The trip of the Vietnamese delegation headed by Pham Van Dong to Moscow² expressed the fact that the Vietnamese comrades study attentively the policy of the Soviet Union after the October Plenum and wanted to obtain clarity on the policy changes in the Soviet Union with their own eyes. The delegation was able to convince itself in Moscow that the CPSU still works on the implementation of the decisions of the 22nd CPSU Congress. Pham Van Dong made only some general remarks at the airport after his return from Moscow,

when he said that he was content with the trip. He avoided any concrete comment. Even at the dinner, to which he had been invited by the Soviet ambassador, the counselor Privalov, and their wives, it was impossible to direct the conversation towards concrete questions. The conversation remained within the framework of general, protocollary politeness. An invitation, which the Soviet ambassador made for the whole delegation, was accepted by Pham Van Dong only with hesitation, since he apparently wants to avoid any conversation on the trip to Moscow. The delegation must have understood—Privalov continued—that there were no changes in Soviet policy and that the attitude of the Soviet Union remains unchanged with regard to the decisions of the 22nd CPSU Congress in all essential questions. Precisely that is why the changes in the Vietnamese attitude towards the Soviet Union must be judged temporary. In a *Red Flag*³ article, the Chinese have already expressed their disappointment over the unchanged Soviet policy, of which Zhou Enlai convinced himself in Moscow. As before, they [the Chinese] act in all questions against the line of the CPSU and use Khrushchev's resignation as a tool to oppose his successors. Apparently this article is the beginning of a struggle against the CPSU CC following the short interruption after the October Plenum. It is also possible and probable that the DRV might return to the Chinese line. Comrade Privalov does not exclude the possibility that the withdrawn *Hoc Tap* article will be republished (maybe in reworked form). A short version has been published in the Chinese newspaper published here. It thus is necessary to follow the Vietnamese press attentively in this respect.

[...]

Comrade Privalov then asked if we knew about the meeting in Beijing in the context of the 15th anniversary of the PR China. When Comrade Bibow negated the question, Comrade Privalov explained: After 1 October a meeting of representatives of approximately ten countries (China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Korea, and others) occurred, on which the attitude of the communist parties of these countries were discussed in view of the meeting of the editorial board on 15 December. It was decided to create an anti-imperialist bloc. A confirmation exists with regard to [the creation of] this anti-imperialist bloc. A short while ago, the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the DRV held a meeting on the implementation of the foreign policy tasks of the DRV in the first half of the year. The meeting was chaired by [DRV Foreign Minister] Xuan Thuy. He claimed that the main task of foreign policy in the current situation was the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, and formulated the aim to contribute to the creation of an anti-imperialist bloc, which was also directed against modern revisionism. Xuan Thuy's statements in that regard have been made accessible to the Soviet embassy. If they were still in the embassy, he was willing to make them available to Comrade Bibow.[...]

1. Refers to the 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee ple-

num which formally dismissed Khrushchev from all of his positions.

2. Pham Van Dong visited Moscow during celebrations of the October Revolution taking place around 7 November 1964.

3. Theoretical organ of the CCP.



DOCUMENT No. 4

Note No. 2/65 on Conversations with Comrade Shcherbakov about the Developmental Tendencies in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on 22 and 28 December 1964, 6 January 1965

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/442, 8-10.

Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

During my [GDR ambassador to the DRV, Wolfgang Bertold] conversation with the Soviet ambassador at the reception of the 20th anniversary of the Vietnamese People's Army, Comrade Shcherbakov explained that some changes in the DRV have been felt since 15 October. In the past 2 months, approximately 20 Soviet delegations were in the DRV, and at this time 6 Soviet delegations are in Hanoi. That was unthinkable some months ago. Even in the speeches and articles in recent times, new tones are being heard. That does not mean that the VWP has moved away from its position. In this respect, I referred to the fact that Comrade [Vo Nguyen] Giap has made comments, more wide-ranging than usual, in his speech on the German question, and that the GDR again is ranking ahead of the national liberation movement in his text. Comrade Shcherbakov replied that such new tendencies can be discerned everywhere. In this respect I added that we observed that the possibility of negotiations with the US is mentioned more often in articles, and talked about some articles in the central organ. Comrade Shcherbakov thanked [me] for the reference, and we agreed on a meeting in the Soviet embassy in order to talk about some problems, and stated that we should exchange our opinions more often. Comrade Shcherbakov asked for permission to include some other ambassadors in these talks.

During the next conversation on Monday, 28 December, to which the ambassadors of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic], Bulgaria, the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], and Hungary showed up (the Polish ambassador had not come despite an invitation), he [Shcherbakov] picked up on the comments above and said approximately the following: Among some Vietnamese cadres, doubts about the sincerity of the Chinese leaders and the possibility of aid have occurred. Some start to think about the possibility that the Chinese only use the Vietnamese as a tool for their own, Chinese policy. Such doubts have emerged, among other issues, as the consequence of the events in August and of the related, insufficient aid from the People's Republic of China and also of the general, insufficient aid in the economic sphere. While the Chinese assert that

they are ready to support the DRV ("Four Chinese can stand on each square meter of the DRV"), they demand from the Vietnamese to focus on the South. Such comments have caused some Vietnamese to ponder [about the situation], and especially the South is disappointed, so that the NLF is again returning to carrying out individual actions, since it is not in a position to carry out larger military actions without efficient aid. One can view the [Vietnamese] readiness to negotiations with the US in that context. They are even ready to talk about the neutralization of the South. In that respect, they think about a transitional solution in the form of a coalition government. In that respect, they mentioned two steps: 1. withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam and subsequent negotiations, 2. unification of the country on the basis of the Geneva agreements. That means, they move away from the adventurist plans of the Chinese leaders. On the other hand, they carry out trilateral talks with military delegations from China and the DPRK. These talks probably had been prepared during the visit of [Korean Workers' Party General Secretary] Kim Il Sung a few weeks ago and now are carried out by the Korean defense minister. They assume that, in case of an aggression by the US, joint actions will be implemented, and that those will be coordinated, so that in this given case the Koreans start actions in the south of their country. Furthermore they believe that the Koreans can gather experience here [in Vietnam] for the implementation of a guerrilla war.

The Chinese try hard to build up a similar front, consisting of the countries of North Korea, China, the DRV and including Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia, opposite to the front of the US in East Asia, which stretches from South Korea to Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. In this context, it is interesting to observe the attempts by the US vis-à-vis Great Britain to get pledges from the English imperialists to participate in the struggle in South Vietnam.



DOCUMENT No. 5

Information No. 098 by the CPSU CC to the SED CC, 24 February 1965 [Excerpts]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 146-156. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The initiative taken by our party to establish contacts with the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been supported actively by the Vietnamese comrades, who have turned to the CPSU CC with an invitation to send a Soviet delegation to the DRV. By accepting this invitation, the CPSU CC proceeded from the necessity to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the increasing American aggression.

[...]

The results of the negotiations by the Soviet delegation with leading personalities of the DRV and the DPRK have

been published in joint declarations.¹ The CPSU CC considers it necessary to inform the fraternal parties additionally about the talks with the Vietnamese and Korean leaders as well as with the leaders of the CCP in Beijing.

First. During the stay in Hanoi, an exchange of opinions with the Vietnamese leaders on the situation in Vietnam and possible measures with regard to aid and support of the DRV connected to the danger of an American armed aggression occurred: on relations between the USSR and the DRV as well as between the CPSU and the VWP; on the unity and unanimity of the communist world movement, including also questions about the meeting of the fraternal parties on 1 March of the current year.²

In the talks with the Soviet delegation, the Vietnamese leaders raised their concerns in connection with the intensification of the aggressive actions of American imperialism against the DRV, the broadening of the war in South Vietnam, and stressed the great significance of aid and moral-political support by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to the successful completion of the struggle of the Vietnamese people for freedom, independence, and reunification of the country.

It was explained to the Vietnamese comrades that the Soviet Union is ready to supply additional aid for the increase of Vietnamese defense readiness by providing some modern means of anti-aircraft defense and of coastal defense.

The Soviet delegation and the Vietnamese leaders had an exchange of opinion on the possibility of a joint statement, in which the violations of the Geneva agreements of 1954 by the Americans would be condemned, by the USSR, China, the DRV, and other socialist countries as well as some Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma. The leaders of the DRV explained that they probably would provide a corresponding draft [statement] soon.

The leaders of the VWP stressed that they see many new elements in how the CPSU CC and the Soviet government approach foreign and domestic questions after the October Plenum, and explained that this brought the VWP closer to the CPSU. The proposals for an improvement of relations between the CPSU and the VWP were accepted by them with understanding. They explained that the measures of the CPSU CC and the Soviet Union with regard to the assault of the American air force on townships in North Vietnam have been acknowledged with satisfaction by the whole Vietnamese people.

In the talks with the Vietnamese leaders, questions on the Communist world movement and on the struggle for a solution of the existing differences in opinion were touched. The leaders of the VWP valued the attempts the CPSU CC had taken after the October Plenum in the interest of the consolidation of the unity of the international communist movement. After the new character of the meeting of the fraternal parties on 1 March 1965 had been explained to them, the Vietnamese comrades explained that they, as before, were of the opinion that the restoration and consolidation of unity of the communist movement depended especially on whether the CPSU and the CCP could find an agreement. They remarked that, on the

whole, they had nothing against the meeting on 1 March, but for understandable reasons could not participate.

The talks with the Vietnamese leaders have shown that certain ideological differences in opinion with the leadership of the DRV still continue to exist, and that, obviously, time is required for their resolution. This is also the opinion of the Vietnamese comrades themselves. At the same time they stressed that, following the decision of the October Plenum, they see real avenues for the solution of these differences in opinion.

According to the instructions of the CPSU CC, the Soviet delegation reassured the Vietnamese leaders that the Soviet Union in the future will supply active aid to the Vietnamese people for its struggle against American aggression and [that it will] increase economic cooperation between the USSR and the DRV. An agreement was reached to continue contacts between the two countries and parties. The Vietnamese leaders accepted our invitation to send a governmental delegation to the USSR for a return visit.

Second. [...]

Third. During the trip to the DRV and the DPRK, the Soviet Union had two stopovers in Beijing, which it used to continue contacts with the leaders of the PRC and the CCP. Our delegation had been instructed by the CPSU CC to exchange opinions with the Chinese comrades on the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and on the resolution of the differences between the CPSU and the CCP. It was planned, in case the situation was suitable, to deal with concrete questions of our bilateral relations, the coordination of cooperation in the international arena, as well as individual problems of the communist movement: the termination of open polemics, factionalism, measures with regard to the preparation of the international meeting of fraternal parties.

During the stay of the delegation in Beijing it was possible to speak with the Chinese comrades on a series of important questions. Among others, an exchange of opinion on the coordination of aid efforts for the Vietnamese people occurred. On the way to Hanoi, our delegation informed the Chinese leaders about the aims of its visit to the DRV and on the return trip from there on the events of the trip and on the measures taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the increase of aid to the Vietnamese people in its struggle against American aggression. A common point of view arose in this question. Cde. Zhou Enlai declared that in this question "the positions of the CCP and the CPSU are very close, respectively are congruent." But the Chinese side did not support the proposal of a joint posture by the USSR, the PRC, and the DRV with a statement unmasking the violation of the Geneva agreements by the United States of America, and justified its refusal with the differences in opinion in the question of the realization of the consultative meeting by representatives of the fraternal parties on 1 March.

The Chinese leaders spoke positively about the trip of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the DRV and about our aid to Vietnam. But they did not inform us on their steps and mea-

asures to aid concretely the Vietnamese people. Comrade Mao Zedong remarked: "The people of South Vietnam are fighting well even without us. Consequently they will drive away the Americans by themselves." On the occasion of the American bombing of North Vietnam, Cde. Mao said: "These are the stupidities of the Americans. Their bombardments caused only a small number of victims," there is "nothing terrible that a number of people was killed." The Soviet delegation did not agree with this position and expressed the opinion that China indeed could provide Vietnam with essential aid. Both sides agreed that the most recent provocations of the US in Indochina are a serious threat to peace and that the Soviet Union and China should exchange information on the question of aid to Vietnam. In the course of the talks, the Chinese leaders stressed firmly that they intend to carry out an unfriendly struggle against the ideological positions of the Marxist-Leninist parties. They confirmed that they, in their policies, still proceed from the position that tensions in the world are increasing and that world war is inevitable. "If we manage to secure peace for 10 to 15 years," Cde. Mao Zedong explained, "this would be favorable. We are against a world war, but we are not the general staff of the imperialists." He stressed that "it is necessary to create a revolutionary, military situation."³

1. Kosygin's delegation was in Beijing on 5-6 February, in Hanoi on 6-10 February, in Beijing on 10-11 February, and in Pyeongyang on 11-14 February.

2. The meeting of the so-called Editorial Board of 26 communist parties, which like in 1960 was supposed to prepare a meeting of all communist parties of the world, was called by Khrushchev in the summer for 15 December 1964, to discuss the ideological problems within the international communist movement. For years, the CCP had opposed its convention since Beijing feared it would be used to censure the PRC. After Khrushchev's fall from power in October of 1964, the new Soviet leadership decided to postpone it to 1 March 1965. It was attended only by a third of the Editorial Board members.

3. A Polish translation of the Mao-Kosygin meeting on 11 February 1965 is in *Archiwum Akt Nowych* [Archive of Modern Records; AAN], Warsaw, Poland, KC PZPR, XI A/10, 514-533, and was published in an English translation at the CWIHP/GWCW conference "New Central and Eastern European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia" (Budapest, 30 October - 2 November 2003). A copy of the document is available in the National Security Archive's RADD/READD Collection.



DOCUMENT No. 6

Oral Statement of the PRC Government, Transmitted by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Liu Xiao to the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the PRC, Cde. F. V. Mochulskii, on 27 February 1965

[Source: *Arkhiv Veshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 1, papka 516, 1-2. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

On 16 February [Soviet] Ambassador [to China Stepan] Chervonenko, in the name of the Soviet government, asked for the opinion of the government of our country with regard to the establishment of a new international conference on Indochina. I have been entrusted to give the following reply:

The Chinese government consistently came forward for convening a conference on Indochina, the safeguarding of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 and the peaceful solution of the question of Indochina. However, at the current time, the US, on the one hand, increases its armed aggression against South Vietnam, bombs the Democratic Republic of Vietnam without pause, makes noises about the broadening of the war, and makes the appearance that it does not want to carry out peaceful negotiations; but, on the other hand, by various means they develop the idea on the possibility of cessation of fire and peaceful negotiations, attempting to win time for a respite. The people of the southern and northern parts of Vietnam, filled with high fighting spirit, carry out a heroic struggle against the American imperialists, and win one new victory after the other. It is evident that the proposal, promoted by your side, on convening an international conference would mean a manifestation of weakness in front of American imperialism in these circumstances, and would help it to escape the difficult situation. This can only strengthen the aggressive revelry of the US and damage the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people in its struggle against American imperialism, which would be highly unfavorable for the struggle of the Vietnamese people. Therefore the proposal of the Soviet government on convening a new international conference on Indochina is not sensible in the current situation. The Chinese government cannot agree.

To compel American imperialism to adhere strictly to the Geneva agreements and to withdraw all its armed forces from the region, so that the people of all countries of Indochina can solve their problems by themselves—this is, according to the Chinese government, the only correct path of solving the question of Indochina. The Soviet government also agreed [to that in 1954 and 1962]. Currently conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe. The US continues to make noises about the broadening of war, and asks that the Vietcong must cease infiltration and aggression against South Vietnam, and [that] only then it will be possible to carry out peaceful negotiations. Why do you so hastily raise the proposal on convening a new international conference under such circumstances? In the case that all inter-

ested countries, including the US, will stand for convening an international conference on Indochina, we think that then it will be necessary with regard to our general position to raise the following: first, all armed forces of the US and of its satellites must cease their aggression and intervention, and must completely withdraw from this region; second, it is necessary, that on the international conference South Vietnam is represented by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, and not by the American puppets—the South Vietnamese authorities. It is necessary to insist on these two points to the end and not go for a compromise, which [only] would lower [our] own demands.

Convening a new international conference by itself is a question of great importance, and the proposal for a convention of such a conference can be raised only after achievement of unity by way of consultation between the interested countries. It is said that the Soviet government already has taken steps in favor of convening such a conference; what concerns us, we do not know, how much these talks conform to reality.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Note by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on a Conversation with Ambassadors of the Other Socialist States in the Soviet Embassy on 2 April 1965, 25 April 1965


[Source: *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bestand: Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Political Archive of the Office for Foreign Affairs, Files: Ministry for Foreign Affairs; PAAA-MfAA), Berlin, Germany, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 331, 77-79. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

The latest developments in Southeast Asia were deliberated in the conversation, during which Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov reported on some talks with leading Vietnamese comrades. He was informed by Comrade Pham Van Dong that the CC would convene, as well as the minister council and the national assembly. In that conversation he said that the situation will intensify further if the US increases its attacks, [and] that the DRV has to react. Hence developments could spin out of control. He [Pham] had already told Kosygin [in February] that the DRV has no interest in expanding the war. The struggle is carried out by the NLF, but the DRV has to support its fellow citizens in the South. In its statement, the NLF has declared its right on the struggle against the US and its right to ask for aid in other countries and to ask for volunteers.¹ The government of the DRV has not replied to this appeal. Instead, the CC of the Fatherland Front² of the DRV has promised its support in a statement.

It was asserted in the talk that the new aspect of the situation rests in the fact that the US increases its war material and troops in the south, and intensifies the attack. Apart from the amplification of bombing attacks, it increasingly also includes

Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the Cold War
 edited by Priscilla Roberts
 Cold War International History Book Series (James G. Hershberg, Editor)
 Copublished by Stanford University Press and Wilson Center Press

Based on new archival research in many countries, this volume broadens the context of the US intervention in Vietnam. Its primary focus is on relations between China and Vietnam in the mid-twentieth century; but the book also deals with China's relations with Cambodia, US dealings with both China and Vietnam, French attitudes toward Vietnam and China, and Soviet views of Vietnam and China. Contributors from seven countries range from senior scholars and officials with decades of experience to young academics just finishing their dissertations. The general impact of this work is to internationalize the history of the Vietnam War, going well beyond the long-standing focus on the role of the United States.



its own troops in battle action. One can say that the US participates in equal parts in the operations of the South Vietnamese government troops. New is also the statement of the NLF and its right to accept aid from all sides. At the moment, the Vietnamese comrades state that it is not yet necessary, for example, for volunteers from other countries to join in. But it is necessary that the struggle is coordinated. Vietnam is a homogenous country and the Vietnamese nation is a homogenous nation, that's why the Vietnamese have the right to carry out this war jointly and to help each other. This attitude has not been that openly stressed by the Vietnamese in the past. Cde. Shcherbakov remarked that Cde. Giap has explained in a talk that "now the raids in the South have to be increased, regardless if the US is going to increase its attacks on the DRV." Since neither the NLF nor the DRV at the moment is ready [to carry out] major actions, [because], for example, the deliveries from the Soviet Union have not yet arrived, all measures now must be decided here. The enlarged Politburo meeting, which will deal with the new situation and the tasks for the party that will derive [from it], serves this purpose. The mobilization of youth and the declaration of a state of war will be debated. The national assembly will also take the necessary decisions. The 2nd Five-Year Plan will be discussed in this context as well. On the surface, it is supposed to be kept as it is, but for the first three years it will be altered into a Three-Year Plan for defense. All means, which have been set aside for the Five-Year Plan, will be subordinated to the interests of defense. Defense is now first priority. Cde. Shcherbakov added that the Vietnamese comrades will probably approach the fraternal parties in the near future with a request for material aid. Furthermore a decision is being prepared [requiring] all South Vietnamese living in the DRV to go to the South.

The question of negotiations was estimated in the talks as follows: There are signs in the US that they attempt to establish contacts for future negotiations. Such tendencies could be seen in the speeches of [US President Lyndon] Johnson, [US Defense Secretary Robert] McNamara, and [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk. If the Vietnamese reject contacts, one has to reckon with a broader bombing of the DRV. With each day, one can expect the bombing of Hanoi. In that respect, the bombing

of military targets and transportation routes will stand in the foreground, but next industrial centers in the North could be attacked as well. The near future will determine if it is possible to establish contacts.

Thus the following situation is unfolding:

The DRV has the right to defend its motherland. The Americans see that the DRV has not yet received aid. The attacks thus unfold without impunity. The situation is growing more and more complex, and if the Vietnamese lose their head, as Comrade Shcherbakov said, "it will be difficult for us to help." If the Vietnamese make decisions, they should inform the Soviet comrades and they should consult with them more often, so that we all know what we should do. One should expect that they speak openly, and that they don't hide their positions. Even Pham Van Dong has said only general things on the CC session and provides no concrete information. He told Pham Van Dong that the Vietnamese comrades should inform us regularly and comprehensively, so that we know which measures could be taken on our side. "They probably say more to the Chinese, who slander us [saying] that the Soviet Union pursues only its own interests with weapons deliveries, and [that the Soviet Union] wants to draw the PR China into the war." The Chinese comrades supposedly said that if they allowed the transport of supplies through the PR China, the US had a reason to attack China. When Cde. Shcherbakov told this to Pham Van Dong, the latter was completely dispirited and only shook his head. Cde. Shcherbakov told him that the Vietnamese people suffer the most from these differences in opinion. The Vietnamese had asked for weapons and the Soviet Union had been ready to help, while the Chinese refused to transport them through Chinese territory with the slander that the Soviet Union wants to subjugate the Chinese people. On the other side they claim that the Soviet Union is making a pact with the US. If it comes to a joint statement on support [for Vietnam] with the Chinese, one could talk about a new [level of cooperative] quality. Pham Van Dong replied that one had to convince the Chinese. One has to have patience. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is far away. "What shall we do?"

Pham Van Dong did not state [that he was] against negotiations, but one needs to have guarantees that the US disappears

from Vietnam. Since this is not possible, one cannot reckon with peace in the current moment. The situation of the US is difficult, and if the Vietnamese continue to fight, it will be more difficult for the US.

1. NLF statement made on 22 March 1965. Text can be found in: *Peking Review* 14, 2 April 1965, 15-20.

2. Umbrella organization uniting all pro-government mass organizations.



DOCUMENT No. 8

Note by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on a Joint Conversation with the Ambassadors from other Socialist Countries in the Hungarian Embassy on 4 May 1965, 12 May 1965

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 319, 1-5. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

Present: the ambassadors of the GDR, USSR, HPR [Hungary], MPR [Mongolia], PRP [Poland], PRB [Bulgaria]

Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov proposed to inform the ambassadors about the contents of the talks of the party delegation of the VWP with the Soviet comrades in Moscow.¹ He said the following:

After the comrades of the CPSU CC proposed some time ago in a letter to the VWP² to declare the position of the parties with regard to the Vietnam question with a trilateral declaration of the Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese comrades, because they [the Soviets] proceeded from the assumption that it was unlikely that all parties would agree to such a general statement in short time; the leadership of the VWP has declared its readiness for a general as well as for a trilateral meeting and statement. Le Duan especially advocated this. He expressed the opinion that one had to persuade and win over the Chinese first. At the moment, they are against multilateral, even bilateral declarations.³ In the expectation that the Chinese comrades would express readiness to [sign] a bilateral declaration with the Vietnamese on the Vietnam problem, it was decided at the departure to Beijing of comrades Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh that space should be left in the central organ *Nhan Dan* for the bilateral declaration. No declaration was agreed upon [in Beijing]. Only then the Vietnamese comrades expressed readiness to fly a party and government delegation to Moscow, after the Soviet embassy in Beijing had been informed about this decision. In Moscow, agreements were reached, which led to [the publication of] a joint [Soviet-Vietnamese] declaration.

In these talks, the Soviet comrades emphasized the coordination of help from all socialist countries. They proceeded from the idea that the Chinese comrades have to be included as well. The Vietnamese comrades, who reported on the situ-

ation in Vietnam, explained that they were determined to lead the struggle to its victorious end with both military and political means. They hinted that they were ready for talks with the US, if the US imperialists terminated the bombing of the DRV. They were even ready for talks on South Vietnam, if the NLF would be included into the talks. The Soviet comrades supported this position, because they recognized that the Vietnamese comrades now took up a more realistic position regarding the solution of the Vietnam question.

In the talks following this report we assessed that Johnson's declaration⁴ recently has revealed a certain retreat. Some circles in the US recognize that the continuation of the current policy of aggression can lead to serious consequences. They recognize that they don't have the unrestricted support of their allies, and that this policy meets greater and greater opposition even among those young national states that have followed the US in the past. The Vietnamese comrades see that as well. They don't condemn those states, which have signed the declaration of the 17 non-aligned countries.⁵ Apparently they first awaited the [negative] position of the Chinese comrades, and now have to acknowledge that many leaders of these states feel disparaged because of the [negative] position of the DRV on this declaration, and express that they don't know if one can help the DRV [at all]. This situation provides the Vietnamese with food for thought.

Concerning the aid of the SU to the DRV, according to Comrade Shcherbakov's opinion it is extraordinarily comprehensive. The outfitting of the Vietnamese army costs many millions of rubles. This aid is not affected by the 100 million rubles of aid which [Politburo member] Comrade Le Thanh Nghi has requested lately. Now it is important that the military cadres learn to operate the modern weapons. In recent times, the number of Soviet military specialists has increased significantly. Furthermore, numerous [Vietnamese] military cadres traveled to the SU. But the measures taken will have no effect until fall. Due to the attitude of the Chinese and shortcomings, for which the Vietnamese are responsible, this aid will affect [the situation only] with delay. The Vietnamese relied too much on Chinese aid, but eventually had to recognize that they could not rely on their neighbor. Now the Chinese exploit this situation and demand millions of rubles for the transit.

This development led the Vietnamese to estimate the situation in more realistic terms and to start to draw conclusions from the differences in opinion. Our [differences] with the Vietnamese started to shrink, so it is possible that things will get back to normal with the Vietnamese. But the propaganda apparatus is still completely in control of the pro-Chinese forces, which intensify their activities and at the moment spread rumors that the Soviet Union is delivering out-dated weapons. When the central organ *Nhan Dan* did not report adequately about the Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations, Comrade Pham Van Dong had to remind and even accuse the chief editor that he was implementing his own line, which contradicted the line of the party leadership. One also has to recognize that the Chinese render more pressure. Now, they suddenly want to increase

their aid. They promise, among other things, food, consumer goods, chemical fertilizer, and electrical appliances.

In further talks it was determined that there are different reasons for our disagreements with the Chinese and with the Vietnamese. Now it is relevant to analyze these reasons. Le Duan told Comrade Kosygin that the Vietnamese comrades have waited for a long time for a high-ranking Soviet delegation. On my remark that [Soviet Presidium Chairman] Comrade Mikoyan had visited the DRV, Comrade Shcherbakov replied that at that time Mikoyan had not yet as high a function as he has now. He also hinted that Comrade Khrushchev did not pay the necessary attention to developments in Vietnam. Comrade Le Duan did not hide his dissatisfaction with the Chinese leaders in the talks. There are three questions, where he does not understand the position of the Chinese.

1st, why the Chinese reject so firmly a joint declaration of support for the struggle in Vietnam.

2nd, why they estimate the role of the national liberation movement higher than the role of the socialist camp.

3rd, why the comrades in Beijing and Tirana believe they are the only true Marxists.

In the further discussion we talked about the existing differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese opinions which should be examined even further. The following differences in opinion were determined:

The Vietnamese are against a continuation of polemics [against the Soviet Union],

they are for a joint declaration,

they are for meetings on the highest level,

they affirm the construction of communism in the USSR,

they are not against contacts between the SU and the US on a governmental level, but [insist that] one has to be careful,

they are not against contacts between the SU and Yugoslavia, but what concerns relations between the communist parties and the LCY [League of Yugoslav Communists], a conference like in 1957/1960 must decide [this question].

Comrade Shcherbakov remarked that Comrade Pham Van Dong mentioned that the communists, in the interest of the unity of the communist world movement, must struggle bravely and decisively for the decisions of the two conferences in 1957 and 1960. One could acknowledge that the Vietnamese comrades on the basis of their complicated situation and in connection with the talks with representatives of the fraternal parties start to rethink their position. But one has to push them a little bit without hurrying them too much.

About the changes in the government [of the DRV] it was assessed that Pham Van Dong's central position was strengthened with the aim to coordinate better the organization of the struggle. Various circles had expected that [former DRV foreign minister] Comrade Ung Van Khiem would be moving into the foreground and [DRV Vice Premier] Truong Chinh would get another function. That this was not the case confirms that the

pro-Chinese group still has strong positions. Comrade Truong Chinh at the moment seems to be the most pronounced representative of the Chinese line in the VWP. At the end of the 1950s, he walked down that path. The incorrect Chinese ideas in agriculture led to sectarian errors in the implementation of ground reform in Vietnam. At that time, more than a hundred rural specialists assisted him, but they disappeared from Vietnam with the replacement of Comrade Truong Chinh as party secretary.

The appointment of Comrade [DRV Foreign Minister] Nguyen Duy Trinh as foreign minister leads to speculations that Comrade Pham Van Dong wants to exercise more influence on foreign policy. After 1954, when Comrade Pham Van Dong served as foreign minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh as minister-at-large was for a long time the closest assistant to Comrade Pham Van Dong.

1. A Vietnamese delegation consisting of Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh was in Beijing on 8-10 April, in Moscow on 10-17 April, and in Beijing on 18-23 April.

2. Refers to identical letters written by the CPSU CC to the CCP CC and the VWP CC on 3 April 1965, see: *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3610, 1-4, and *AVP RF*, fond 100, opis 52, delo 13, papka 220, 18-19, respectively.

3. Refers to the Chinese reply letter of 11 April 1965, see: *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3610, 5-8.

4. Probably refers to Johnson's speech in Baltimore (7 April) when the President proposed negotiations without conditions while simultaneously pledging to defend the independence of South Vietnam.

5. 17 non-aligned countries, mostly from Africa, met in Belgrade from 14 March to 1 April 1965, demanding the start of immediate and unconditional negotiations to end the Vietnam War.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Note by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on a Conversation of Comrade Jarck with the Attache of the CSSR Embassy, Comrade Freybort, on 2 June 1965, from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., in the Embassy of the GDR, 3 June 1965 [Excerpts]

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, Abteilung Sowjetunion, Microfiche G-A 331, 83-84. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The conversation happened on our request.

[...]

Afterwards we talked about the current situation in the DRV. Comrade Freybort made the following comments:

1. During the talks, which Comrade Le Duan had in Beijing following his visit to Moscow [18-23 April], he was accused by the Chinese side that he has joined hands with modern revisionism too much.

Apparently Le Duan replied that the CCP had even entered into a pact with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] against the Japanese,¹ and that he did not understand why the DRV cannot

expand and strengthen its relations to a socialist country.

2. During the same talks, Le Duan proposed to coordinate aid supplies from the USSR and the PRC in trilateral negotiations. Such negotiations could lead to the joint coordination among all socialist countries. The Chinese side rejected the proposal with the justification that the ideological differences in opinion with the CPSU are so big that it is not possible to sit at the [same] table.

3. Following Le Duan's return to Hanoi it was attempted to convene trilateral talks between the DRV, the USSR, and the PRC on the coordination of aid measures once more. For that purpose, Ho Chi Minh apparently had been in Beijing and had talked with Liu Shaoqi and other old revolutionaries with whom he had personal relations.² Even these talks did not lead to an agreement on the coordination of aid measures.

4. The PRC apparently increased its aid offers to the DRV significantly. Apart from military aspects, the PRC supposedly offered to the DRV:

- bigger aid supplies in the sphere of transport, i.e. railroad tracks, sleepers, track workers, repair corps, etc.
- an increase of deliveries of artificial fertilizer
- bigger supplies of food, etc.

5. At the moment, the railroad from the Chinese border to Kep (halfway on the way to Hanoi) is being reconstructed, so that in the future it will have three rails, that means, it will be useable for Chinese-gauge as well as for Vietnamese-gauge railroad cars.³

The highways from Hanoi to the Chinese border via Lao Cai and Lang Son are supposed to be renewed and widened.

6. 100 to 130 Korean specialists, who wear the uniform of the DRV air force, allegedly have been living in the hotel for foreign specialists "Kim Lien" in Hanoi for some time. It is assumed that they are ground personnel and technicians.

1. This refers to the so-called 2nd United Front of 1937 between the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese communists in the anti-Japanese War.

2. Ho Chi Minh was in Beijing on 16 and 17 May 1965. For excerpts of these conversations, see Westad, et al., eds., "77 Conversations," p. 86-87.

3. China uses the a rail gauge of 1435 millimeters, while Vietnam uses a 1000 millimeter standard.



DOCUMENT No. 10

Oral Statement by the Head of the Department for the USSR and for the Countries of Eastern Europe of MFA PRC, Yu Zhan, Transmitted to the Embassy on 8 June 1965

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 1, papka 516, 3-8. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]

On 12 May, the head of the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet MFA Sudarikov made to the PRC ambassador in the USSR Pan Zili a statement with regard to the talks, which had occurred from 13-21 April between the leaders of China and the former Soviet ambassador in the PRC.¹ This statement contains slanders against the CCP CC, the PRC government, and the leaders of China. We categorically reject this statement and give the following reply:

1. We always stood and [still] stand for the united struggle of the PRC, the Soviet Union, and the countries of the socialist camp against the enemy—American imperialism. In February of this year, when Kosygin arrived in Beijing, we again raised the hope that the Soviet Union adopted a position united with Vietnam and China in the struggle against American aggressions, [and] would not seek an exit for the US and bargain with them on the Vietnamese question. Comrade Kosygin stated then that he completely agreed with our opinion. However, two days after Cde. Kosygin had returned to Moscow, the Soviet side, breaking its own words, raised to China and Vietnam the proposal of convening an international conference for [the purpose of] negotiations with the US. Moreover, without having heard the Vietnamese reply or waiting for a Chinese reply, it started with activities in favor of carrying out peaceful negotiations behind the back of the PRC and the DRV. On 22 February your ambassador in France had a talk with the President of France on the question of convening an international conference for the resolution of the Vietnamese question. Your ambassador in France talked about this publicly with journalists, [and] this was transmitted in the communications of TASS and was supported in talks with high officials of France with representatives of the press.² These all are facts, which you cannot deny.

From that it is clear that the absence of coordination of actions by the Soviet Union with the actions of China and Vietnam on the Vietnamese question is explained solely by [the fact] that the Soviet side stubbornly insists on its mistaken policy of Soviet-American cooperation for the solution of international problems, and tries to bargain with the US on the Vietnam question. If you do not give up this policy, neither a trilateral conference of China, the USSR, and Vietnam, nor any other conference will occur to coordinate your actions with ours.

2. We repeatedly stated that we greet the allotment of your aid to Vietnam in conformity with its needs and are ready to render you the greatest possible assistance. Our position is consistent and unchanged. However, at the same time you carry out activities in favor of peaceful negotiations you informed us about your plan to send through the territory of the PRC 4,000 combatants for stationing in Vietnam without agreement by the Vietnamese comrades, and to establish a military base for Soviet military forces in the Chinese city of Kunming which could not be used for covering all of Vietnam's air space at all. Besides, you intentionally told the West about your so-called plan to render aid to Vietnam. Moreover, violating the promises made by yourself to preserve secrecy and referring on the

apparent request from the side of Vietnam, you requested from us to agree to the passage through Chinese territory of 45 airplanes for the delivery to Vietnam of an insignificant quantity of out-dated and commonly used armaments. It is completely clear that the aim of these and similar actions of yours is not to render real aid to Vietnam in its struggle against American imperialism, but to put China and Vietnam under your control and acquire for yourself capital for bargaining with the US. This wholly and completely goes against the interest of the struggle of the Vietnamese people resisting against American aggression and rescuing the motherland. The Vietnamese comrades do not agree with your actions. It is completely clear that we reject these actions. You spread, in every way, the rumor that China put up obstacles to the transport of Soviet arms, designed for Vietnam in the form of aid, through Chinese territory. Speaking plainly, this cannot but hurt us greatly, and this only unmasks your true nature—the nature of people who insist on their mistakes and intentionally create new discord between China and the Soviet Union.

3. [...]

4. The Chinese leaders, receiving the former ambassador of the USSR to the PRC, who made a farewell visit to them, organized a dinner in honor of his departure and did not think at all of carrying out with him disputes on questions of discord between the Chinese and the Soviet side. Only after he [the Soviet ambassador] provoked the quarrel, the Chinese leaders were forced to give the necessary answer. As a response, we criticized you for the fact that you break your word, carry out a mistaken foreign policy, and create new difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations. All these questions concern the interests of the people of China and the Soviet Union, the interests of the people of the whole world, and are not the internal affairs of one country—the Soviet Union. We have the complete right to criticize you on these questions, and our criticism is correct. We never intervene in domestic affairs of other countries and do not teach others, which you very much love to do. But you cannot expect that we will keep quiet with regard to your actions, which go against the interests of the socialist countries and the interests of the revolutionary people of various countries.

We sincerely hope that you, with your sincerity, consider our opinion in the interests of overcoming the split, of the consolidation of unity, and of carrying out our joint struggle against imperialism.

1. "Record of Conversation by the Ambassador of the USSR S.V. Chervonenko with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai," 13 April 1965, AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 5, papka 516, 101-127. "Record of Conversation with the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the Vice Chairman of the CCP CC Liu Shaoqi, acting Premier of the State Council of the PRC, General Secretary of the CCP CC Deng Xiaoping," 21 April 1965, AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 5, papka 516, 133-152.

2. In a meeting, Soviet ambassador to France, Sergei Vinogradov, was instructed to tell President Charles de Gaulle that the Soviet Union would support the DRV in all its policies. Moscow thereby

intended to warn Washington through Paris of a further war escalation. Subsequently, as *New York Times* articles from the period reveal, the media misrepresented the talks as a Soviet attempt at mediation. No positive evidence that TASS carried such articles could be found. For instructions of Andrei A. Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, to Vinogradov, see: "CPSU CC," 17 February 1965, AVP RF, fond 079, opis 20, delo 12, papka 46, 12-17. For a summary of the talks, see: "Oral Communication to the Ambassador of the DRV in Moscow (draft)," [February 1965], AVPRF, fond 079, opis 20, delo 12, papka 46, 24-25. For the faulty press reports, see: *NYT*, 24 February 1965, 1, 3; 25 February 1965, 2; 26 February 1965, 2, 4.



DOCUMENT No. 11

Unofficial Translation of the Letter of the CPSU CC to the SED CC [undated]¹

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 179-186. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government in recent times have undertaken a series of steps [aimed] at the intensification of aid to the Vietnamese people for the struggle against the imperialist aggressors of the US. We deem it necessary to inform you about them.

The Soviet Union has provided great economic and military aid to Vietnam already in the past. From 1955 to 1964 the Soviet Union has provided economic aid of 317 million rubles altogether, including 95.4 million rubles at no cost and the rest as long-term credits under preferential conditions. Approximately 70% of the Soviet aid was used for the development of principal industrial branches in the DRV—energy, coal mining, chemical plants, machine construction, etc. The plants constructed with aid of the Soviet Union play an important role in the creation of the material-technological basis of socialism in the DRV. These plants have produced, relative to the overall industrial production of the DRV: 92.6% of black coal, 80% of metal-utilizing machines, 100% of tin, apatite, and super phosphate. The capacity of the power plants put in service through the aid of the Soviet Union consists of 40% of all power plants in the DRV. During the last 10 years, the Soviet Union has sent to Vietnam over 2 thousand specialists in several economic fields. 3 thousand Vietnamese students, doctoral candidates and young scientists studied at Soviet universities and institutes in 1963-1964.² During a stay of the Soviet governmental delegation headed by Comrade Kosygin in February in the DRV, an agreement on technical aid by the Soviet Union for the enlargement of existing power plants, of coal pits, for the construction of pumping stations, of a diesel engine factory, of state farms, and of other industrial and agricultural objects was signed. The Soviet Union has forgiven the interest on the loans given to Vietnam, and has declared

its readiness to postpone the deadlines for repayment of the DRV's main debt on Soviet loans.

The Soviet Union has also supplied significant aid to the DRV to strengthen its defense readiness. From 1953 to 1964, weapons and military equipment worth 200 million rubles were delivered at no cost. Aircraft, helicopters, small arms, anti-aircraft guns, field weapons, ammunition, tanks, armored personnel carriers, small anti-submarine vessels, torpedo boats, communication equipment, engineering and other military equipment has been delivered. The USSR provides aid at no cost for the construction of many military schools in the DRV, and for the training of officers as well as of maintenance personnel for the equipment delivered.

In the face of the increasing US aggression against the DRV, the CPSU CC and the Soviet government have undertaken measures to enlarge the overall aid, especially the military aid to the DRV to strengthen its defense readiness.

Following the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin (August 1964), the government of the DRV has turned to the Soviet Union with the request to supply additional military aid for the strengthening of the battle equipment of the Vietnamese People's Army. The Soviet Union has discussed these requests and supplied the DRV with military aid worth 32 million rubles (artillery and small weapons) in October 1964.

In December 1964, the decision was taken to supply the DRV with additional aid at no cost in the form of SA-75 anti-aircraft missiles. Soviet military specialists were sent to the DRV to assemble these weapons and to train the Vietnamese personnel.

With the aim of aiding the government of the DRV in the defense against American aerial strikes, the CPSU CC has undertaken a series of measures. Following a request of the Vietnamese comrades, the proposal was put forward to them to cover the region of Hanoi and Haiphong with Soviet troops against aerial attacks. For that reason the Soviet government intended to send an anti-aircraft brigade and a squadron of interceptors of the type MiG-21. Around four thousand men of the Soviet armed forces were scheduled to come to the DRV for the handling of these modern aerial defense systems.

In the context of this aid to the DRV, the Soviet government turned to the government of the PRC on 25 February 1965, with the request to permit transports of goods and personnel through the territory of the PRC as well as to organize a speedy transit to the Vietnamese border.

Also, the request was made to provide an aerial corridor for the transport by airplane of the MiG-21 PF interceptor and other weapons, as well as [to provide] one or two airports near the Sino-Vietnamese border, in order to assemble the MiG-21 PF there and possibly to station Soviet fighter airplanes. Moreover the request was made to take up measures to keep strict secrecy, so that these deliveries would not be discovered by the Americans.

Replying to the request of Comrade Pham Van Dong to supply urgently anti-aircraft guns by air, the Soviet government asked the PRC government on 27 February to allow the over-

flight across the territory of the PRC of 45 [Antonov] AN-12 aircraft in order to transport the cargo.

The Chinese side has refused to implement these measures, which have been undertaken by the Soviet Union with the aim of [rendering] speedy and effective aid to the DRV for the struggle against aggression. We received a reply note from the PRC MFA, which consisted of a brusque refusal of the Soviet proposal. In order to justify somehow their position, the Chinese comrade claimed that the Soviet Union, through their aid deliveries to the DRV and the proposal to transport some of the equipment by air across China, tried to establish "Soviet control over the territory of China and Vietnam." Since the Chinese authorities have refused to agree to the transport of weapons via air, the military goods destined for the DRV had to be transported by rail, which, given the distance between the USSR and Vietnam, took a lot of time. The Vietnamese people could have certainly been spared superfluous sacrifices, if the Soviet military equipment had arrived more quickly in the DRV.

The Politburo of the VWP CC and the DRV government welcomed the decision of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government to deliver additional air planes, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, field guns, naval vessels, radio transmitters, tractors and other military equipment. At the same time, the Vietnamese leadership requested that [we] should send a small number of instructors, who could teach the use of Soviet military equipment to Vietnamese personnel on the spot within a certain time period (3 to 6 months), as well as quantitatively small crews instead of complete Soviet crews for the handling of anti-aircraft missiles.

With regard to the dispatch of a squadron of MiG-21 PF to the DRV, the Vietnamese comrades expressed that it would be better if these air planes would be handed over to the Vietnamese side. The DRV intends to have pilots of the Vietnamese People's Army, who [already] fly the MiG-17, be trained in the USSR. Afterwards they could return together with the air planes. The Soviet Union has approved the request of the Vietnamese comrades.

Following the decision of the CPSU CC on 27 March 1965, the Soviet Union supplied military aid worth 150 million rubles at no cost to the DRV for the strengthening of its defense readiness. A special Soviet military delegation was in the DRV for concrete negotiations on the equipment to be delivered to the DRV, on dates of delivery, etc.

Since the CPSU CC and the Soviet government took into account the further intensification of the situation in Vietnam and proceeded from the attempt to aid the Vietnamese people in the defense of their country, they made the proposal on 3 April of this year to carry out a meeting of representatives of the VWP, the CPSU, and the CCP on the highest level, assuming that one could coordinate joint actions and determine further measures to aid the DRV in its struggle against the aggression of the American imperialists.³ The leaders of the PRC have rejected our proposal. The Chinese leaders replied on 11 April to the letter on this question by Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev

and [Alexei N.] Kosygin.⁴ Their letter included general statements [such as] China is “already prepared” and would “fulfill its duty of proletarian internationalism under all circumstances, without any wavering from its duty,” it was ready “to render military, economic, and political aid, according to the events, needs, and requests of the Vietnamese comrades.”

The letter also said that the PRC and the DRV had already negotiated on “how universal aid and support must be granted to the Vietnamese people,” and thus “there is no need to negotiate again.” On the aid of the Soviet Union to Vietnam, the letter said also that “the aid rendered by the Soviet Union had been too insignificant,” and that “the question, of how the Soviet Union should help Vietnam, had to be decided by both sides, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, it had to be discussed by the Soviet Union and Vietnam in a bilateral meetings, and we have no reason to participate.”

While the Chinese leaders refused to participate in a joint meeting, the VWP CC and the government of the DRV sent a delegation headed by Cde. Le Duan to Moscow. The CPSU considers the Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations, which happened on 11-17 April of this year, to be an important step on the path of a further coordination of the positions of the USSR and the DRV in the struggle against American imperialism, as a new, real contribution to the strengthening of the defense readiness of socialist Vietnam, [and] as aid for the people of South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese comrades asked for an increase of Soviet military aid during the negotiations in Moscow. Taking into account this request, the CPSU CC and the Soviet government decided to render new military aid to the DRV worth 145 [million] rubles at no cost. Various equipment of modern military technology has been assigned to the DRV, including engineering equipment for the construction of airports.

All in all the military aid of the Soviet Union for the DRV has reached at the current moment 486.5 mill. rubles, of which 300 mill. rubles have been provided in the last 3 to 4 months.

During the negotiations of the delegations of the CPSU CC and the VWP CC in April of this year in Moscow, the Vietnamese comrades were told that the Soviet Union will provide the DRV with larger quantities of materials and railroad technology, including 120 km of tracks, special scaffolds for the repair of bridges, necessary equipment for the repair of automated and semi-automated railroad equipment, track-laying machines, lifts, 300 cars, 40 movable power plants, etc., in case of the destruction of railroads. The value of this equipment is not included in the amounts mentioned in the negotiations in April this year.

At the moment, deliveries of Soviet military technology, equipment, and engineering goods to the DRV are made according to the agreements with the Chinese side in accordance with the agreements signed by the USSR and the DRV.

Apart from the aid supplies to the DRV, the Soviet Union also provides military aid to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Following a decision by the Soviet government, weapons worth 2.5 million rubles have been handed

over to the South Vietnamese patriots.

Last fall, the DRV received aid at no cost in the form of special technologies destined for the Vietnamese People’s Army with the aim that the Soviet fire-arms that have become available as a result of the modernization [*Umrüstung*] [of the Vietnamese People’s Army] should be handed over to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

It is well-known that the Soviet Union has expressed readiness to send Soviet volunteers to Vietnam.

The question of dispatching Soviet volunteers to Vietnam was discussed with the delegation of the DRV during the negotiations in Moscow. The Vietnamese comrades thanked the CPSU CC for the readiness to send Soviet people to the joint struggle of the Vietnamese against the American aggressors, but explained that at the moment there is no necessity to send volunteers to Vietnam.

The equipment for anti-aircraft defense and other weapons and military equipment, which the Soviet Union has provided to the DRV for the strengthening of its defense readiness and for the strengthening of the armed forces of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, have partially arrived in Vietnam. They have not yet entered action in full, because it will take some time until the Vietnamese troops have acquainted themselves with the special military equipment delivered and until they can use them successfully for the defense against attacks by the aggressors. The anti-aircraft missiles and other means of anti-aircraft defense as well as means of coastal defense are supposed to enter service according to the state of training of the crews of the Vietnamese People’s Army.

A necessary number of Soviet military specialists, which was determined by the Vietnamese themselves, has been sent to the DRV, and they do everything to train the Vietnamese armed forces personnel as quickly as possible. Training centers have been established with the help of Soviet instructors, and the training of Vietnamese cadres has already started there.

The CPSU CC and the Soviet government still have a resolutely firm attitude with regard to the general aid and moral-political support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people. This position has been displayed in the declarations of leading persons of the CPSU and the Soviet government, in the joint Soviet-Vietnamese communiques of February and April of this year, and in other documents. Within its own country as well as in its foreign relations, the Soviet Union implements a series of measures aimed at the broad moral-political support of the Vietnamese people in its struggle against the American aggressors. The Soviet Union informs its allies about these measures constantly. We are striving to undertake everything to increase aid to Vietnam and for the moral-political isolation of the American aggressors. This is where we see our international duty before the Vietnamese people.

1. No date, but probably early July 1965.

2. As a comparison, the Soviet Union sent ca. 11,000 specialists from 1949 to 1960 to China, a country almost 20 times bigger in pop-

ulation. See: T.G. Zazerskaia. *Soviet Specialists and the Formation of the Military-Industrial Complex of China (1949-1960)* [*Sovetskie spetsialisty i formirovanie voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Kitaia (1949-1960 goda)*] (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University, 2000), 60, 67. From 1949-1959, China sent 11,000 students to the Soviet Union, see: Dmitrii Shepilov, *Not Having Sided* [*Neprimknuvshii*] (Moscow: Vagryus, 2001), 378. Afterwards, due to the ideological differences, the number of students sent to the Soviet Union dropped off dramatically.

3. "To the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Mao Zedong, to the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Zhou Enlai," 3 April 1965, *AVP RF*, fond 100, opis 52, delo 13, papka 220, 18-19.

4. "Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and State Council of the People's Republic of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers," 11 April 1965, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3610, 5-8.



DOCUMENT No. 12

Note on a Conversation with an Unnamed Representative of the International Department of the CPSU CC on the Situation in Vietnam, 9 July 1965
[Excerpts]

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3667, 433-434. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The Soviet comrade explained that the Soviet Union is in a complicated situation in Vietnam, because, due to China's attitude, it is not in a position, despite its efforts, to support Vietnam, to contribute directly and quickly to a change in the situation in Vietnam. The Soviet Union supplies the most modern weapons (the most modern jet fighter aircraft, missiles, and anti-aircraft guns), but they are not used because Chinese "advisers" to the general staff of the Vietnamese army and to the ministry of defense subvert the use of Soviet weapons. The weapons have been delivered and, as a rule, have been deposited somewhere, or are being only partially used for the establishment of Hanoi's defense system. The stationing of Soviet weapons, especially of heavy weapons, in provinces to the south has been prevented by the Chinese side.

Under China's pressure, the Vietnamese government does not allow Soviet pilots, missile specialists, and other specialists necessary for the use of modern military technology to enter the country, although the technology sent by the Soviet Union cannot be used without its personnel.

The army as well as large parts of the people in Vietnam increasingly understand the real situation. There are also a mounting number of cases, in which Vietnamese, even officials of the party and government, speak openly about the difficulties which have occurred in Vietnam due to the attitude of the Chinese leadership, which wants, as before, to let the US

and the Soviet Union clash on Vietnamese territory. However, there are also different opinions. One cannot speak of a uniform line.

The Vietnamese leadership, especially the realistically thinking forces, think that, due to the obstructionist policy of the Chinese and [due] to the fact that Vietnam has no common border with the Soviet Union, it is necessary for Vietnam to give in partially to the Chinese policy and propaganda, at least to maneuver [around it]. In Vietnamese circles, the fear of a Chinese occupation is very big.

The hands of the Soviet Union are tied to a very great degree. It cannot unmask the pernicious [*verderblich*] policy of the Chinese leadership, because Vietnam would suffer most from it, since the Chinese are in a position, and are probably willing, to create even bigger difficulties for the Vietnamese.

The situation is similar with regard to the political solution of the Vietnam problem. In general, one has to acknowledge that the US, the Soviet Union, and also the Vietnamese themselves would move forward toward negotiations, even if [they have] different positions and different approaches.

The Soviet Union advocates a political solution because the continuation of military actions in Vietnam will provide fertile ground for reactionary developments in the US. The Chinese leaders resist a political solution with full vigor.

[...]



DOCUMENT No. 13

Note by the GDR Envoy to Moscow, Rossmeisl, on Talks with Unnamed Soviet Vietnam Specialists, 19 August 1965

[Source: *PAAA-MfAA*, Minister Kiesewetter, Microfiche A 17445, 1-3. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The aid the Soviet Union renders to the DRV is worth 1 million rubles a day. Apart from modern missiles and anti-aircraft guns, MiG fighters are provided as the most modern weapons. The training of the Vietnamese pilots takes place in the Soviet Union, on the one hand, because the DRV does not have the necessary conditions (in reality, there is only one airport suitable for military operations), [and] on the other hand, [because] the pilots need special food during training, and this cannot be guaranteed in Vietnam. Regarding the delivery of aid by trucks, transport goes well even when thoroughfares are destroyed.

The aid, which the Soviet Union renders, is increasingly acknowledged and understood by the population of the DRV. The Chinese propaganda that the Soviet Union does not render aid increasingly loses ground. This [however] is not the case in South Vietnam. The fighters of the National Liberation Front still have the view that only the PR China renders aid. Despite the opposition of the Chinese and of the pro-Chinese circles (especially Truong Chinh has been mentioned), the thought of

negotiations, if necessary conditions are given, wins increasing ground with the leading, sensible comrades.

Given the Chinese policy that promises much in words and does little in reality, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and other leading comrades are more and more convinced of the view that the Chinese are ready to fight to the last Vietnamese but otherwise are content to be left alone by the Americans.

Not only the Vietnamese, but also the Korean comrades, have drawn [these] conclusions from the attitude of the Chinese. The Vietnamese comrades at the moment not only express opinions that do not concur with Chinese [opinions] but there are also signs of criticism of the Chinese attitude in Vietnam. One can hear Le Duan, even if not directly, make such critical remarks aimed at the Chinese.



DOCUMENT No. 14

Excerpts from a Note by GDR Ambassador to the DRV Kohrt on the Current Policy of the Chinese Leadership, 11 December 1965

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, G-A 353, 1-9.
Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

During a two-week stay in China, Cde. Ho Chi Minh met Mao Zedong twice.¹ Especially in the first talk, Ho Chi Minh explained the position of the DRV with regard to the developments in Vietnam, and tried to get an increase in Chinese aid. In the course of the second talk, Mao spoke for the most part. According to Mao Zedong's opinion, China was convinced that Vietnam would win. The US is for a peaceful solution because it has been forced to accept it through objective circumstances. One has only to convince the Americans that the stay of their troops in Vietnam is without a perspective for the US—that alone would be half a victory. The war currently fought is strengthening the Vietnamese people. China is ready to render economic and weapons aid, [but] the largest [part of the] aid should be rendered to Southeast Asia (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia) with the demand to carry out active military actions against the US. Thereby, one increases the anti-American front and simplifies the conduct of war of the DRV. The struggle of the Vietnamese people would be easier if modern revisionism would not work against it. Thus, the struggle against modern revisionism is the international duty of all Marxist-Leninists. One has to stand up to and unmask it, as well as demand from it to fulfill its international duty as often as possible. The Vietnamese Workers Party must render an even larger contribution to the struggle against modern revisionism. At the moment, a struggle takes place within the international communist movement, and the Chinese Communist Party is convinced that the new Soviet leadership will resign. [The Chinese] don't claim that everybody in the Soviet leadership is a revisionist. That's why the Vietnamese party has to consider

in what kind of a situation it will be once revisionism has left the stage. The Soviet leadership delivers a certain quantity [of aid] to the DRV because it can't do otherwise and [because] it was forced to do so. Vietnam now does more for the revolution than the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries, since the Vietnamese people are at the forefront of the struggle. Thus the DRV has the right to demand aid, not only military [aid] but also aid for the reconstruction and development of the economy. The equipment for the development must be ready, so that Vietnam can make an immediate jump ahead. The DRV has a right to demand from the Soviet leadership machines and equipment for its factories in order to be ready for construction after the withdrawal of the Americans. If the Vietnamese at the moment cannot store this equipment, China is ready to take that task unto itself.

The Politburo of the CCP has decided to render strong pressure on the modern revisionists. An article will be published (note: [this] happened on 11 November²), the impending CPSU congress³ will be taken into account, and other materials prepared.

Recently, a CC plenum of the VWP took place, during which Ho Chi Minh expressed some disappointment about his talks in the PR China. He did not agree with the statement of the Chinese leaders that capitalism is being restored in the Soviet Union, but had been unable to reach any agreement on this question. According to him, it is a surprise that those who do not always agree with the position of the DRV in all questions rendered more and less self-serving aid. Those forces, with which the DRV shared many common views (i.e. in question of war and peace, the development of the revolutionary movement in Asia, etc.), at the time would render less support to the DRV than they could, given their possibilities.

The Party General Secretary Comrade Le Duan, pointed out at the plenum that under current conditions negotiations could not be carried out, but in principle he advocated negotiations (internally, Le Duan expressed that he himself is for negotiations. But he has to be forced to the negotiation table because both he himself, as well as many of his followers, come from the south of the country, and there, the unfailing continuation of the war is demanded).

Cde. Pham Van Dong advocated negotiations. As before, there is still a strong pro-Chinese group, headed by Truong Tinh [Truong Chinh]. These forces obstruct every initiative on negotiations, and even gathered troops at the 17th parallel without the approval of the Politburo. This group plays the Chinese declaration on the enlargement of the anti-American front in South East Asia as a major trump card in order to justify their position.

1. Dates not clear, but Ho met Zhou Enlai in China on 8 November 1965, see: Nguyen Vu Tung, "Interpreting Beijing and Hanoi," 58, footnote 82.

2. Refers to: People's Daily and Red Flag Editorial Departments, "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action'," 10

November 1965, *Current Background* 776, 1-17.

3. The 23rd CPSU Congress took place from 29 March to 8 April 1966.



DOCUMENT No. 15

Report by the Adviser to the Bulgarian Embassy in Beijing, Ivan Dimitrov, to the Bulgarian Ambassador, Khr. Stoichev, 14 December 1965

[Source: *Arkhiv na Ministerstvoto na Vnishite Raboti (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Relations; AMVnR), Bulgaria, Sofia, opis 22, a.e. 1549, 7-9. Translated from Bulgarian by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

In recent times there has been much talk among the specialists of the socialist countries on the meeting between Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The conversations boil down to the following:

It is said that at the beginning of the month of November the chairman of the minister council of the DRV, comrade, Pham Van Dong, was on an unofficial visit to China.¹ The conversation did not lead to any result whatsoever, considering that after his visit to Moscow,² he posed some questions which the Chinese leaders did not like, and, for that reason, he returned to Hanoi highly irritated.

Toward mid-November Ho Chi Minh went secretly to China.³ The meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the city of Wuhan, where he [Mao] has resided repeatedly [in the past]. It is thought to be certain that Ho Chi Minh raised the following three questions:

1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam thinks that it is advisable that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is transformed into, and declared as, the official government of South Vietnam, so that the majority of the territory and population finds itself under its control and rule.

2. The new government in South Vietnam requests through a declaration or appeal to all the governments and nations of the world to send aid in [the form of] equipment and volunteers for its struggle against the aggression of the United States.

3. The new government of South Vietnam could start negotiations with the puppet regime of South Vietnam.

Chairman Mao Zedong accepted the first point of the proposals raised by Ho Chi Minh. On the second point he said that it is too early to grumble and to demand volunteers. The Vietnamese nation is 30 million [strong], it has not yet unleashed its [full] strength, and its sacrifices from military action and bombardments are low. It might grumble in case it has lost at least half of its population. In case of raising the demand of volunteers, it is not necessary to turn to the world for assistance, because China as always will provide volunteers. But Mao Zedong again mentioned that it is too early to call for volunteers. Moreover he said that the Chinese volun-

teers will never agree to be together with volunteers from the Soviet Union or from other revisionist countries.

On the third point, Mao Zedong expressed his disagreement; he was against conducting negotiations in principle. For the Vietnamese it is necessary to implement consistently the promotion of the "four points"⁴ for the solution of the conflict.

From his side, Mao Zedong implored Ho Chi Minh that the Vietnamese comrades display clearly and decisively their standpoint with regard to revisionism. In this respect, he once more demanded strongly from Vietnam to commit itself.

Mao Zedong talked [in a] similar [vein] to such a point [?] [;] that he [even] told Ho Chi Minh that he [Ho] should not think that the war would really last 10-15 years. The war might end at any moment, as soon as it has reached a favorable situation.

Thus, it is advisable to keep in view that the Vietnamese comrades think from the present on about the situation in which they will find themselves after the end of the conflict. The entire industry, a great part of transport and communications of Vietnam will be destroyed, the government will not possess any resources; this will put them [the Vietnamese] in yet a more difficult position. Mao Zedong recommended to Ho Chi Minh to increase from this moment on the demands for aid from those European socialist countries that are rich. The Vietnamese must not demand weapons for themselves, but machines and equipment for the outfitting of the new industrial enterprises and the rehabilitation of the old industry which suffered from the bombardment. It is not necessary that these materials be delivered to Vietnam; the Chinese government takes up the task to store them in China, and after the end of the war will give them to Vietnam.

It is said that Cde. Ho Chi Minh was left with much disappointment and pain after these talks with Mao Zedong.

1. This unofficial visit could not be verified through other sources.

2. Pham Van Dong was in Moscow after official talks in Beijing on 9 October 1965. See: "Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 4 p.m. 9 October 1965," Westad, et al., eds., "77 Conversations," 89-90.

3. Dates not clear. See **Document #14**.

4. Pham Van Dong presented the so-called Four Points on 8 April 1965, as a proposal to end the Vietnam War through negotiations. They contained the following points: US troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, respect for the 1954 Geneva agreements, the demand that internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese themselves in accordance with the program of the NLF, and the requirement that the peaceful reunification of Vietnam must be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves.



DOCUMENT No. 16

Reception by Soviet Vice Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov for the General Director of the PRP FMA, Cde. Jerzy Michalowski, 24 January 1966

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 59, delo 5, papka 525, 1-6. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]

I received Comrade Michalowski [on 15 January 1966] at his request.

Michalowski said that in addition to the information on his talks in Beijing and Hanoi,¹ which he has already sent to Moscow, he would like to give his impression on the course of the talks on the whole. In his opinion, regardless of the lack of concrete results, the trip was useful. The Vietnamese comrades did not conceal their astonishment about the candid expositions of views, which were characteristic for the talks by Comrade Michalowski in Hanoi. They constantly stressed that they trust the Polish side and highly value its help and attention.

In the words of Comrade Michalowski, the character of the meetings and talks with the leaders of the DRV sharply contrasted with the reception that had been given in Beijing, when he conferred with the vice minister for foreign affairs of the PRC, Wang Bingnan, and the head of the PRC FMA department, Yu Zhan. Michalowski remarked that he briefly laid out to them the contents of the talks with [US Ambassador-at-Large Averell] Harriman in Warsaw, but did not say anything about the Polish point of view. The Chinese sharply criticized the American 14 Points aimed at solving the Vietnamese problems, which they characterized as yet another trick, aimed at the masking of their preparations for the broadening of war in Vietnam. They also greatly stressed that the Americans run into great difficulties in the course of their military activities, that even within the United States the wave of protest against the war in Vietnam increased and that the Vietnamese cdes. threaten the well-being of the military allies of the US in view of the negative views of some of the partners on the American policy in Southeast Asia. In the words of the Chinese, peaceful negotiations are in principle possible, but only after a military victory, because “nobody [ever] won [a war] at the green table.” Wang Bingnan, in particular, stated that he cannot speak for the Vietnamese, but he believes that they [will] answer in a similar way. He raised the astonishment that the Polish comrades transmitted such “one-sided proposals,” [and] that they refuse to expose and condemn the maneuvers of the Americans. It is noteworthy, Comrade Michalowski said, that, on the day of my arrival, an article on “the black spirit, which flies over Asia” was published in one of the Beijing newspapers.

Furthermore, Michalowski talked about his meetings in Hanoi, where he was received by cdes. [Pham] Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh, and also conferred with the vice prime minister and minister for foreign relations, Cde. Nguyen Duy Trinh. According to the words of Cde. Michalowski, he spoke in detail on the talks with Harriman and laid out, without any reference to

the PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party], their [the American] point of view on the question.

The essence of the answer by Cde. Nguyen Duy Trinh was similar to the Chinese. In essence, he said that we have to wait, that a new victory of the type of the battle of Dien Bien Phu is necessary, and only then can [one] dictate one's own conditions.

In Comrade Michalowski's evaluation, the talk with Cde. Pham Van Dong was the most interesting. The latter stressed that the Vietnamese leaders “think day and night of how to end the war,” however, they consider that “it has been still insufficiently proven to the Americans how difficult this war is for them, the Americans.”

Cde. Pham Van Dong attentively listened to the communication by the Polish side about [the view] that a more complicated, peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem [will] follow [only after] the further escalation of the war in Vietnam, [and] that the DRV negates the possibility of the American public to speak out against the war. As an answer, he said, the DRV trusts the PUWP, that the Polish friends acted correctly, giving the DRV the contents of their talk with Harriman, and that he [Pham] does not agree with regard to the criticism of the Chinese.

The talk with Cde. Ho Chi Minh left a hostile impression on Michalowski. It was a pathetic moment; he spoke in pompous, vague phrases. Comrade Ho Chi Minh stated that the situation is well known to him, but the DRV [will] win the war, that at their time the French also were strong, but there was Dien Bien Phu. Now the DRV has become much stronger, and it has a great socialist family. Cde. Ho Chi Minh also mentioned his disagreement with the Chinese criticism with regard to the mediation of the PPR [Polish People's Republic], however, this was the only critical statement at the address of the Chinese.

The minister for foreign affairs, Cde. Nguyen Duy Trinh, in the course of the talk stated that, although now is not the time for talks, one should not let slip the banner of political struggle from the hands. It is necessary to conduct political work as well, and the statement of the DRV MFA of 1 January of this year should be judged just on that level. He gave to understand that the Vietnamese comrades do not completely reject the thought of the possibility of negotiations. What concerns the trip of the American public figure [Norman] Cousins, he said that the Vietnamese comrades agree to speak with him, but only outside of Hanoi. It will be better if he turns to one of the ambassadors of the DRV in any country. It would be good if he also would meet with representatives of the NLF.

Comrade Michalowski further said that he has the impression that, besides the channels known to them for contacts of DRV representatives with Americans, the Vietnamese comrades still have some possibilities to maintain direct contacts with the American side. This, in particular, the vice-head of the permanent representation to the UN [Charles W.] Yost gave to understand at the time of the meeting in New York with the permanent representative of the PRP to the UN, [Bohdan] Lewandowski.

As a result, Cde. Michalowski gave the following conclusion.

1. The Vietnamese leaders see their situation in a rosy light, overestimate their military successes, do not realize the readiness of the US for war on a broad scale, [and] underestimate the military potential of the US

2. The Vietnamese comrades do not see that they lose on a political level [by] turning down negotiations, do not take into consideration the changes in the correlation of forces in Asia and Africa (the events in Indonesia, the military revolutions in Africa), and overestimate the possibility of public opinion in the US to speak out against the war in Vietnam.

3. The Vietnamese friends understand the serious character of their difficulties, but do not want peaceful negotiations at the current time. They fight against a peace conference, because, in their views, the start of peace negotiations will be perceived in the whole world as capitulation of the DRV.

4. The impression emerges that relations of the DRV with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, whose leaders are under great influence of the Chinese, are highly complicated. Hanoi fears that if the DRV joins negotiations, the NLF could perceive this as a concession from the side of their northern allies [in exchange] for the cessation of [American] bombardments of the DRV. They [the North Vietnamese] observe that success is making the leaders of the NLF increasingly dizzy. They [the NLF leaders] think that, [after] winning light battles, they could go from victory to victory. Besides military action, they do not know other possible means of struggle.

They [the NLF leaders] are frightened by the possibility of the establishment of a coalition government, which supposedly would lessen the influence of the NLF. The complicated character of relations between Hanoi and the Front, in particular, was supported by the talk with the minister of defense of the DRV, Vo Nguyen Giap, who is most often forced, given his position, to deal with the leaders of the NLF.

Furthermore Comrade Michalowski remarked that a great part of armaments of the South Vietnamese patriots at the time are Chinese-produced since Soviet armaments remain in the DRV.

5. It is felt that some people in the DRV do not agree with the Chinese; however, the influence of the PRC on the Vietnamese friends remains still great. This can be shown by the negative answer of the DRV to the Polish mediation. According to a series of signs, one can judge that the Chinese tried to render pressure on the DRV before the trip to Hanoi of the Soviet delegation headed by [CPSU Secretary] Cde. [Alexander N.] Shelepin and at the evening of the preparations for the 23rd CPSU Congress.

According to the evidence we have, a center for the coordination of armed activities in Southeast Asia was created not long ago in Beijing. Given Beijing's view of the war in Vietnam, one of the units is called "struggle against imperialism."

6. In the talks, the Vietnamese friends hinted at the desirability that the socialist countries render more aid to the DRV. If they said earlier that they do not want to drag the socialist countries into a world war, now they do not stress that proposition. Moreover, Cde. Nguyen Shu Chin stated in one of the talks that, if the Americans broaden the conflict and unleash a

great war, then this will be a war of the socialist camp against the capitalists.

7. The Vietnamese comrades, using their channels of contacts with the Americans, will try to delay in every way the resumption of the bombardments of the DRV, [and] strive to suspend the unfolding of the American military machine.

According to Cde. Michalowski, on the way back he was informed in Delhi that in the last days, large military actions from the side of regular parts of the Army of Liberation could not be observed in South Vietnam. It is possible that this is simply a coincidence of circumstances, Cde. Michalowski said, but it is [also] possible that this is the response to Harriman's proposal "to lower the temperature in South Vietnam."

At the end of the talk, Cde. Michalowski was interested in our opinion on how the Polish side should act with regard to Johnson's communication and how they should reply to the Americans. According to the words of Cde. Michalowski, when he asked Cde. Ho Chi Minh, what to transmit to the Americans as an answer to their communication, he advised them [to read] the statement of the representative of the DRV MFA of 4 January 1966. In addition, cdes. Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong stressed in the talks that a temporary cessation of bombardments of its [North Vietnam's] territory is not convenient for the DRV because the Americans must [first] stop the constant blackmailing of the DRV through air raids.

I thanked Cde. Michalowski for the information. I remarked that his conclusion corresponds to our conclusions. I said that we can give a more complete answer to Michalowski's question after the Soviet delegation headed by Cde. A. A. Shelepin returns to Moscow; the Polish side will be given corresponding information about the results of that visit.

[...]

1. Michalowski traveled from Warsaw to Moscow, Beijing, Hanoi, and returned via India through Moscow and on to Warsaw between 30 December 1965 and 15 January 1966.



DOCUMENT No. 17

Letter from GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer to [SED Politburo Members] Comrade Walter Ulbricht, Comrade Willi Stoph, Comrade Erich Honecker, and Comrade Hermann Axen, 8 March 1966 [Excerpts]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 197-204. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi]

Below I transmit excerpts of a piece of information on the visit of a Soviet delegation to Hanoi headed by Comrade Shelepin, which the ambassador of the USSR in the DRV, Comrade Shcherbakov, provided to some ambassadors of the socialist countries.

Comrade Shcherbakov explained, among others, the following:

Some questions related to the rise of aggression were planned to be discussed, questions with regard to negotiations and questions with regard to aid, which had remained open after [the visit of] the Le Thanh Nghi delegation.¹ Another task was to clarify the attitude of the Chinese, especially in relation to the publication of the article of 11 November 1965. Even the Vietnamese maintain that the moment has come to demonstrate close bonds to the Soviet comrades, and this especially with regard to the US 14 Points.²

Yet the [Vietnamese] views on the delegation were not uniform. Individual Vietnamese comrades, who stand for close bonds to China, had raised concerns about the visit. They gave reasons to ponder that the Soviet Union exerts some pressure on the DRV to force it to capitulate to the US imperialists. The forces, which were against the visit, spread the rumor that the SU wants to detach the DRV from the PR China [and that the SU wants] to receive the support of the DRV for the 23rd party congress. The proponents of the invitation eventually carried the day on the basis of the situation mentioned. The opponents to the visit of the delegation had to realize that their concerns were unjustified. Apparently Comrade Truong Chinh was the one who the most stubbornly raised ruckus against the delegation. But he had no influence on the attitude of the Politburo, as all of the discussions were conducted in an extraordinary warmhearted and considerate way. Comrade Truong Chinh, as a delegation member, took part in the welcome of the [Soviet] delegation, but did not attend the discussions due to "health reasons," and did not receive, in his function as president of the national assembly, the delegation of deputies of the Supreme Soviet, which accompanied the Soviet delegation, but was replaced for the said reasons. In the same way, [National Assembly Standing Committee Vice-Chairman] Comrade Hoang Van Hoan, who is on medical treatment [*Kur*] in China, was missing.

Four or five encounters had been planned.

While Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap reported on the military events in 1965, Comrade Pham Van Dong gave the general political report on the overall development and on the conclusions, which had been drawn during the December plenum.

[...]

On individual questions:

They [the Vietnamese] repeated that with their activities in the south they had wrecked an American attack. The NLF prevented the unfolding of actions by US units. The Soviet comrades replied that they believe that the Americans have not yet launched a major attack, but that only skirmishes [*Vorgefecht*] had occurred that had gone awry for the Americans. The Americans simply are not yet ready with their preparations for a major attack. It has also been revealed that their 11 bases have not yet been completely established. And they have recognized correctly that their forces are not yet sufficient, and that there are difficulties in South Vietnam with the use of

modern technology, whose employment in South Vietnamese conditions is complicated. The Vietnamese comrades do not estimate the situation correctly. The American troops still need three to five months of experience.

The Vietnamese comrades explained that they checked the weak and strong sides of the adversary, and that they know them now. The breakdown of the Saigon army and regime can be noticed; that is why the Americans have shouldered the most difficult battle tasks. The majority of the people are against the Americans. The moral strength is to be found with the NLF, while the fighting morale of the Americans as well as of the Saigon troops is low. That's why they concluded that the American units can be beaten and defeated. Now, individual strikes are executed in order to break their measures step by step and to attack their bases. But since the US potential is big [and] that of the Vietnamese small, one cannot bring about a Dien Bien Phu.

The initiative is and remains in the hands of the NLF, even the diplomatic initiative. (The Soviet comrades expressed the view that this opinion is not correct and that they [the Vietnamese] overestimate their own strength, while they underestimate [the strength] of the Americans.) From that one has to conclude, the Vietnamese comrades said that the war will carry on and that it might come to a broadening of the war. They deduced that the bombing of the DRV in the past year had brought no victory for the US, while the defensive forces of the DRV on the basis of aid by the SU and the other socialist countries have increased multifold. The losses of and damage to the DRV are relatively small. The population has put up with the bombing, so that even here the losses are irrelevant. (According to the opinion of the Soviet comrades this does not conform to facts.)

The Vietnamese are not interested in broadening the war but want to limit it to South Vietnam. But the US wants to blockade the DRV and South Vietnam from the sea; and even blockade China as well as the roads to Laos. Furthermore, the Ho [Chi Minh] Trail is supposed to be smashed.

Further, it is planned to intervene in south and central Laos, whereas Thailand serves as jumping board, and the blockade of Cambodia supposedly has been tightened. That is why it is necessary to turn to the socialist countries for aid also in 1966. For 1966, the Vietnamese plan a series of raids in the south in order to convince the Americans that there is no question about their victory and that the solution of the Vietnam problem is only possible on the basis of the Vietnamese program. Following the [December] plenum, they are convinced of the correctness of their position. That's also what they wanted to convince the [Soviet] delegation of. They are concerned only about the passive attitude which the countries of Asia and Africa assume.

Questions on the solution of the Vietnam question

Basically both sides agree to the necessity of solving this question. The Vietnamese comrades do not deviate from the four points; but they say that the right moment has to be

awaited. They think a lot, Pham Van Dong explained, about how a peaceful solution, a political solution could be brought about, and [how to determine] when the opportune moment has come. (In that regard, Comrade Shcherbakov remarked that it is new that they consider these questions, which had not been the case some months ago.) They are not against the initiatives of the Hungarian³ and Polish comrades, but [actually] value them. In this respect, they also are different from the Chinese, Comrade Shcherbakov added, because they acknowledge the necessity of creating a diplomatic and political front against the Americans. They consider the 14 Points proposal as a step, one which does not bring anything new, but is only a bluff, because the Americans are in a complicated position. The Soviet comrades replied that one has to see it as a measure to escape the affair, because [the Americans] realize that there is nothing for them to win, and that maybe now the moment has come [for the Vietnamese] to take them by the word and to unmask [them]. This is not a capitulation, but a struggle with other means. How one should approach [this], the Vietnamese comrades explained, they themselves are not completely clear about, and they have made no decision yet. Thus they want to counsel with the Soviet and Chinese comrades, what [moment] should be judged as the right moment. Tentatively, they will keep up the contacts, but [they will] not rush. "We will always think about it."

SU-DRV Relations

[...]

In general, the talks with the Vietnamese comrades were heartfelt and sincere, and there were many consenting declarations on basic questions. For example they said that they completely agree with the Soviet policy towards America and with the efforts of the Soviet comrades to maintain peace. The Soviet comrades estimate that [their] relations [with the Vietnamese] have improved through these bilateral talks and that a significant step forward was taken. There are some among the Vietnamese comrades who did not say openly their opinion. They desired that we support the Vietnamese policy completely in the communique. They also wanted us to appreciate [*würdigen*] Chinese aid. The Soviet comrades pointed out that negotiations are taking place between the CPSU and the VWP, and thus a reference to Chinese aid is inappropriate. Furthermore they conveyed [the opinion] that the Vietnamese comrades should not underestimate the US with regard to its military strength. They [the Americans] are in a position to destroy Vietnam completely. It is in the interest of the socialist camp and of the struggle for peace that the war stays limited to South Vietnam, and the Soviet comrades believe that the Vietnamese comrades do not want to give the Americans the opportunity to broaden the war. In this respect the Soviet comrades proposed to increase the number of specialists who [could] strengthen and re-organize anti-aircraft defense. Moreover, they desire that the Soviet specialists have the opportunity to gather experience and to study the tactics of the Americans [in the battlefield]. At the same time, operational assistance could be provided [in

return]. The Vietnamese did not reply immediately.

On the question of the solution of the Vietnam question, the Soviet comrades advised that the Vietnamese comrades increase their initiative and explain the Four Points much more to the world's public. The front against imperialism must be enlarged, and the SU will provide any aid for that purpose. One has to fight the Americans on all positions. They [the Vietnamese] were clearly told [by the Soviets] that the Americans would not leave Vietnam solely on the basis of the outcome of the war. Thus it was urgently necessary to increase political activities through talks, solidarity, collective actions of the socialist camp. The US has to be checked on its readiness [to negotiate]. Now is the moment when one has to launch [such] measures actively. For that purpose, trilateral talks should be discussed again and the necessity [should be] recognized to focus on a collective defense. That is the weakness of the socialist camp. The Vietnamese comrades have recognized this as well, but asked the Soviet comrades to talk to the Chinese ("We agree with that and approve of it"). They explained that they had to find out in talks with the Chinese that the latter reject their proposals.

Comrade Shcherbakov explained that the Vietnamese comrades agree too quickly with the Chinese comrades in talks and do not appear tough enough. The influence of the Chinese and the dependency of the Vietnamese [on them] is too great. The Soviet comrades explained the damaging attitude of the Chinese to the Vietnamese comrades. As a matter of fact, the Chinese help to increase the aggression of the US, and thus they shoulder a heavy responsibility toward the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese always stress that they are a small country and a small party, and they hint that they could not stand up to the Chinese. They emphasize that the Chinese help them politically, morally, and economically, especially with food and labor. Later Ho Chi Minh explained in a private talk that the military aid of the Chinese is insignificant. They say that the Chinese have difficulties with their transport system. The Soviet comrades replied that they are ready to help at once. But they could not agree [to the circumstance] that the Chinese wanted to force them to carry out transports by sea. In the end, the Gulf of Tonkin is a war region, where the SU could clash with the US immediately.

Comrade Shcherbakov concluded that one could ascertain that there is no unity within the leadership of the VWP on these questions. Apart from comrades who follow the Chinese line, there are also comrades who recognize that the Chinese harm the national interests of the Vietnamese and that the great power interests of China clash with the national interests of Vietnam. They are on edge over the fact that the Chinese carry the disagreements [with the Soviets] over into the Vietnamese question. They harbor the great hope for aid from the CPSU and the other socialist countries. Even if they appear to be timid, they are for collective action. The Chinese for their part are on edge that the Vietnamese comrades waver and are not hard enough in the question that only the war can solve these questions, as much as they have expressed this attitude before. That's why

the Chinese spread slander with regard to the policy of the SU. That's why they have sent to the NLF [their own] representatives, who were supposed to render pressure so that the NLF would not listen to Hanoi, because it is wavering.

Le Duan held back in the talks, made only remarks. Comrade Ho Chi Minh acted similarly; [Politburo member] Le Duc Tho said absolutely nothing. The talks were carried out only by Pham Van Dong. The vice head of the CC department for international relations, Cde. Tran Chi Hien, also appeared positively [in the talks].”

1. Le Thanh Nghi was in Moscow in late December 1965.

2. Pronounced by Johnson on 29 December 1965, as a basis for negotiations.

3. In early 1966, the Hungarians as well as the Mongolians, the Czechoslovaks, the Bulgarians and the East Germans sent letters to the Chinese trying to nudge them to assume a less uncompromising attitude with regard to the Vietnam War. See Hershberg, “Peace Probes and Bombing Pause.”



DOCUMENT No. 18

Note on Two Conversations with the Minister Counselor of the DRV Embassy, Comrade Hoan Muoi, on 26 January 1966, in the Cuban Embassy, and on 27 January 1966, on the Occasion of a Farewell Visit to Our Embassy, 27 January 1966 [Excerpts]

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 332, 45-50. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

Comrade Hoan Muoi expressed the desire to meet the Cuban ambassador and me for a relaxed conversation in the Cuban embassy before his departure. It took place on the evening of 26 January 1966 in the Cuban embassy. On this occasion he also expressed the desire to visit me in our embassy on 27 January 1966 for a goodbye visit.

Contents of the opinions expressed by him on some questions and certain [pieces of] information:

[...]

2. On the proposal by the Polish party and on the letter¹ by [PUWP First Secretary] Comrade [Wladislaw] Gomulka:

This letter has been written in true “communist spirit,” and he considers it to be a sincerely intended document. As much as the Vietnamese party desires the implementation of the proposals mentioned in the letter, he believes that this is currently not possible. Vietnam will not participate in any international conference, which will not be attended by either the PR China or the Soviet Union. He considers the acceptance of the Polish proposal on the part of the CCP completely impossible. Anyway, the question exists that, if the PRC might even be

ready to attend such a conference, its success is cast in extreme doubts. A failure of such a conference would have unfavorable consequences for the struggle in Vietnam.

3. On the visit of Comrade Shelepin to Hanoi:

Two political questions were especially discussed by the Vietnamese side during the visit of the delegation: the further strategy and tactics of the Vietnamese party for the struggle in Vietnam, and questions of the situation in the international communist world movement.

Regarding the first question, the Vietnamese party expressed its standpoint that it will continue the struggle against US imperialism decisively, and holds the opinion that this struggle will be terminated successfully with the support of all socialist countries. At the same time, the Vietnamese party is ready to start negotiations at an opportune moment, possibly combining negotiations with the continuation of the struggle for some time.

Concerning the second question, the Vietnamese party leadership stated that the Soviet Union itself especially has to try to normalize the relations with the CCP. Shelepin replied that the CPSU has already done everything, but without positive results.

The Vietnamese comrades expressed the standpoint that, nonetheless, the CPSU should improve relations especially with China but also with Albania and the Japanese Communist Party. In this regard, Vietnam cannot start a special initiative if such an initiative could raise the danger of a worsening of relations with China.

On this question he also wanted to express a personal opinion: Vietnam at the moment has to subordinate all questions to the conduct of a successful struggle against US imperialism. Each misstep could have grave consequences for Vietnam. A unilateral bond to either the Soviet Union or China would greatly damage this struggle. Both socialist great powers see questions of the communist world movement with different eyes and with a different attitude from the small socialist states. Both want to gain influence in Vietnam. According to his opinion—and the opinion of the Vietnamese party—China’s reservations against Soviet aid are unjustified. This aid is a significant strengthening of the Vietnamese position in the struggle against US imperialism and means in no way that Vietnam subordinates itself to the Soviet Union. Comrade Shelepin did not make any such conditions with regard to the increase of Soviet aid.

Khrushchev greatly damaged the communist world movement, especially with regard to relations with China and Albania. If the CPSU does not publicly evaluate Khrushchev’s mistakes, it will be very difficult to normalize relations with the PR China. Khrushchev’s mistakes had great emotional impact on the cadres of both parties. This feeling has to be taken into account in concrete politics. During a visit to the PR China, the Chinese comrades took him to the Soviet-Chinese border. He could convince himself how tense relations between the Soviet Union and China are. He could see strong military units on the Chinese side, on the Soviet side barbed wire, tall observa-

tion towers, and powerful floodlights which beamed far into the Chinese territory.

The only positive opportunity he sees rests in the increased support of all socialist countries for Vietnam. In the course of this joint support of all socialist countries for Vietnam and [in view of] the expected victory of Vietnam, relations could be relaxed and mutual trust slowly restored.

[...]

9. He deems all attempts by certain parties to mediate between the Soviet Union and the CCP, [or] between other parties, problematic. The experiences of a trip of a Hungarian party delegation to the DPRK and, among others, its stay in China had proven that such attempts have more negative than positive results.

[GDR ambassador to the DPRK Horst] Brie

1. Letter was sent on 28 December 1965, announcing the arrival of a special envoy, Jerzy Michalowski, to Beijing and Hanoi with the purpose of starting international peace talks. Letter is in AAN, KC PZPR, XI A/10, 681-682.



DOCUMENT No. 19

Telegram from GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Hegen to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen, 8 July 1966

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/1222, 129-131. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

Dear comrades,

Enclosed I am sending you the copy of the telegram from our ambassador in Beijing, Comrade Bierbach, for your information.

With socialist greetings,

Hegen

Enclosure

During a stay of Comrade Ho Chi Minh in the PRC,¹ the Chinese side rejected a political solution [of the Vietnam War] and stated that this problem can only be solved by the crossing of the 17th parallel. The troops of the DRV should advance more actively into South Vietnam while Chinese troops in the DRV will be strengthened ([China] has already made preparations for [the next] four years). US aerial forays against Chinese territory are possible, but a great war on land is unlikely. The PR China in any case will be a reliable hinterland for Vietnam.

[The Chinese side continued that] the Soviet Union should

attack the 7th US Fleet and other US bases with missiles. Furthermore, Comrade Ho Chi Minh was assured that the PR China will not take any steps in South Vietnam behind his back [über seinen Kopf hinweg].

Evaluating remarks:

The facts mentioned above as well as the Chinese statement of 3 July and the corresponding editorial² in the *People's Daily* [Renmin Ribao] reveal the [Chinese] effort to exacerbate the Vietnam conflict in order to exploit it for [its own aims] in foreign policy and domestic affairs.

The DRV is being pushed to [undertake] actions in the South, while the Chinese side is able to station more troops in the DRV (there is no line which delineates the war), in order to strengthen its positions in the DRV and eliminate elements [there] it does not like. [The possibility of] a direct conflict [of China] with the US also would be [thereby] eliminated. As before, a political solution of the Vietnam problem is rejected.

The principal Chinese ambition is to provoke a confrontation between the SU and the US. The Chinese leadership seems to be ready, as the most recent developments in relations between the PR China and the Soviet Union reveal, to play up border questions with the Soviet Union and to exploit the theory of "SU-US cooperation" as a justification for the prospect of lesser help for Vietnam, etc.

The Chinese declarations on aid supplies, which we consider necessary, reveal that the Chinese leadership reserves for itself any decision [that is] in its own interest.

[signed] Bierbach

1. CCP Central Documents Research Office, ed. [Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi bian], *A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Life: 1949-1976* [Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976], volume 3, 37.

2. The Chinese condemned the US bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong on 27 and 28 June 1966, and announced that these acts would free China from any constraints to aid Vietnam. See: *NYT*, 4 July 1966, 1, 2.



DOCUMENT No. 20

Note on a Talk with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov, on 28 October 1966 in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, 10 November 1966

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 355, 11. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

Comrade Shcherbakov reported on the position of the Vietnamese comrades, that they are not always open and trusting, that in a series of questions, as e.g. with regard to the situation in South Vietnam and the economic and military situation in the DRV, they are reserved, even if they always talk about friendship and thank for aid. They emphasize their

independence and autonomy, and that they will make decisions without any [outside] influence.

But it has become known to the Soviet comrades that Comrade Ho Chi Minh last summer¹ had to promise the Chinese leaders that the Vietnamese comrades would not have any talks with the Americans without consultation of the Chinese, and that they would not request volunteers from socialist countries without consultation. Else, [the Chinese] would withdraw their “construction troops.”

After Comrade Ho had made that promise, the Chinese provided aid worth 700 million yuan. While 100 million are earmarked as military aid, food will be delivered for 600 million, namely [in the form of] 300,000 tons of hulled rice and 500,000 tons of unprocessed rice; moreover 500 tons of fabrics and cotton, and the [salary] payment for the road construction crews will eventually also be included in that sum.

1. Possibly the June 1966 visit to China.



DOCUMENT No. 21

Note on a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Sverev, on 8 July 1966 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, 9 July 1966

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 321, 13-16. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The conversation occurred on our initiative and took place in an extraordinarily open and comradely atmosphere [and] without any interpreter.

We first discussed questions which were related to the impending flooding and the possible bombardment of dams by the US imperialists. [...]

With regard to the question of the continuous change in the attitude of the party and the government of the DRV, Comrade Sverev made the following statements:

The great and constantly increasing aid of the Soviet Union has contributed to the positive changes in the attitude of the DRV. Unfortunately, one is unable to perceive this in daily life, because the propaganda apparatus of the DRV, important ministries, or rather their most important departments (defense, security), are still permeated by pro-Chinese forces. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook positive trends.

For example, the polemics against the USSR and the CPSU have ceased following the CPSU October plenum in 1964. The book sellers in the DRV have not carried any new Chinese literature published after 1965. Only those pieces that have been published before 1965 are still being sold. The splittist policy of the Chinese comrades does not fall any longer on fertile ground in the DRV, but meets growing incomprehension and

increasing refutation. The Vietnamese comrades start to turn around their propaganda, stressing more and more the unity of all communist parties.

While the VWP CC has commented unanimously on “modern revisionism” during the 9th plenum of the VWP in November of 1963, a significant change has taken place in the VWP CC as a result of the difficulties of the war, Soviet aid, and the peculiar attitude of the PR China—that means as a result of the hard realities of life. The bloc of the opponents of “modern revisionism” does not exist any longer. Pro-Chinese forces in this bloc have taken up centrist positions, at any rate (Comrade Sverev did not mention any names).

With its unselfish solidarity aid, the USSR has contributed much to the changes in the positions of the Vietnamese comrades. They [the Vietnamese] regard the support of several 100 million rubles (500 million rubles/year) highly. In contrast, the policy of the PRC appears suspicious in the eyes of the Vietnamese comrades. Before the bombing of the DRV [started], the PRC boisterously claimed that it would consider each attack on the DRV as an attack against itself, [now] it has become more and more restrained while the escalation of American bombardments increases. Conversely, it pressures the DRV to continue the war.

During the 23rd CPSU Congress, the PRC reduced its aid to the DRV and supplied only food.

The Vietnamese comrades hinted to Soviet representatives that they consider the Chinese attitude as reprisal for their political flirtation with the SU, and that they [now] were in a position similar to the [one of the] Cuban comrades at the beginning of the year (when the Chinese stopped rice [deliveries]). Comrade Sverev emphasized the incomprehensible diffidence of the government of the PR China following the bombardments of Hanoi’s and Haiphong’s suburbs.¹ While the SU and other fraternal countries protested already on 30 June and 1 July the PR China only came out against it on 5 July 1966.²

The contradictions between the DRV and the PR China on principled questions are mounting. The PR China for example increasingly pressures the DRV not only to continue the war but also to expand it. It is well known that the DRV does everything to prevent the war of aggression from spilling over to its neighboring countries.

On the basis of realistic conditions, one has to state that the position of the DRV toward “Mao Zedong ideology” in the most recent “Cultural Revolution” must be judged to be negative. Contradictions on such principled questions like the attitude toward the international communist movement, the SU, the polemics, aid, and tactics in South Vietnam are obvious.

Of course, the comrades of the DRV do not think about severing their close contacts with the Chinese, but they want to document that they like to decide those questions that concern Vietnam by themselves. They want to protect their independence in all principled questions.

The Vietnamese greetings to the CC on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the CCP can be judged as an interesting reaction to Chinese attempts at blackmail. Whereas exuber-

ant greetings, signed by Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Pham Van Dong, were sent to Mao and the corresponding persons [in the CCP] in the previous year, the greetings this year were only from CC to CC, without signatures. Furthermore, neither members of the Politburo nor of the CC took part in the celebrations in Beijing or Hanoi.

Moreover, it is also illuminating that the Vietnamese comrades view Chinese propaganda with astonishment, [such as, for example, the claim that] Mao is a second Lenin.

The Vietnamese reaction to the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" is also reserved. In talks, Vietnamese comrades dismissed it as the internal affair of the PR China. Chinese demands that the DRV support the "Cultural Revolution" were not adhered to.

Comrade Sverev stated that according to their [Soviet] information more than 200,000 Chinese soldiers are stationed between Hanoi and the Chinese border. Their task is to repair damaged thoroughfares, to construct military bases, and to assume anti-aircraft defense [tasks] in some of the aerial corridors.

Seen: Bergold
Ambassador

Schumann
1st Secretary

1. Refers to US bombing raids on 28 June 1966 and after.

2. China actually published its protest on 3 July. See: *New York Times*, 4 July 1966, A1, 2.



DOCUMENT No. 22

Information, [undated].¹

[Source: *Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Records; AAN)*, Warsaw, Poland, KC PZPR, XI A/81, 530-538. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]

On an especially entrusted order, [we hereby] inform [you] that, on the invitation of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government of the Soviet Union, a party-government delegation of the DRV, which arrived in the following composition, was [in Moscow] from 10 to 16 August of this year: Prime Minister of the DRV and Member of the VWP CC Politburo Pham Van Dong, Defense Minister and Member of the VWP CC Politburo Vo Nguyen Giap, Deputy Prime Minister of the DRV and Member of the VWP CC Politburo Le Thanh Nghi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV Hoang Van Tien, and Ambassador of the DRV in the USSR and Member of the VWP CC Nguyen Van Kinh.

As it is known from information which has been sent to the Polish friends at the time, meetings between the Soviet and Vietnamese sides have occurred repeatedly last year on the

level of party-government delegations, and have dealt mainly with questions connected to the moral-political support rendered by the Soviet Union and to material aid to struggling Vietnam. In the current case, the new reason to invite a delegation was the question of providing the DRV with military and economic aid in 1967, which, as the Vietnamese comrades told us, they were prepared to discuss with the Soviet side.

Instead, this time the CPSU CC and the Soviet government had the aim to obtain information from the Vietnamese comrades on the situation in North and South Vietnam and to exchange opinions with them on questions which flow from the situation that has currently emerged in Indochina. Such an exchange, in our opinion, was required in view of the widening American aggression in Vietnam, of the statement by the Chinese leaders on their rejection of the Geneva agreements and of their respect for the 17th parallel, and, finally, [in view] of the lack of clarity in the position of the Vietnamese leaders themselves on some questions related to the lack of relevant information from the leadership of the VWP CC and the DRV.

The CPSU CC made the proposal to carry out this meeting on the highest level, and invited Cdes. Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Pham Van Dong to participate. As a reply to the invitation, the VWP CC sent a delegation headed by the prime-minister of the DRV, Pham Van Dong, to the USSR. Cdes. [Leonid I.] Brezhnev, [Alexei N.] Kosygin, [Nikolai V.] Podgorny and other representatives of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government took part in all talks with the Vietnamese delegation.

During the negotiations, the Vietnamese comrades informed the representatives of the CPSU and the Soviet government on the situation in North and South Vietnam, [and] on their further plans to solve the Vietnam question. As before, they evaluated the situation in the north and in the south of the country optimistically, and stated that the Americans "constantly suffer defeat in military and political terms."

Like in previous meetings, the Vietnamese comrades think that the US imperialists are not successful in carrying out the task, which they took upon themselves, of unfolding an air war against the DRV. In their words, the Americans are unable to paralyze economic life in the [DRV]. Regardless of the destruction, communication links, which guarantee transport and are necessary for rendering aid to the South Vietnamese patriots and for the strengthening of the defense potentials and for the needs of the economy, continue to function. Regardless of the intensification of the bombardment, the number of victims among the population of North Vietnam and the soldiers of the NVA [Vietnamese People's Army] is not high; the number of killed and wounded stands at a little bit more than 20 thousand people.

"In their escalation [of the war] against North Vietnam," Cde. Pham Van Dong stated, "the American aggressors save special place [in their strategy] for strikes against Hanoi. The attacks on Hanoi, which is the capital of the socialist government, of course have a special meaning. What concerns the destruction which could be inflicted on Hanoi, it does not cause us any insecurities. We don't fear if they destroy dwell-

ings in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese comrades mentioned that the war potential of the Vietnamese People's Army grows in the course of repelling the American imperialist aggression. In that [struggle], aid from the socialist countries plays a big role. They underline the meaning of [their] statements, which had been sent to the congresses of fraternal parties [and] parliamentary sessions, and also of the statement of the Bucharest [Warsaw Pact] meeting.²

The delegation of the DRV was completely aware of the meaning of aid for the consolidation of the government of the country. "[...]Soviet aid has a very important meaning," Pham Van Dong stated, "your aid for the strengthening of the government is very valuable for the defense of North Vietnam. The forces of the government of the DRV rely on your aid, for the most part only on your aid [...] . We defend our own country—North Vietnam—and at the same time we continue to develop its economic potential. Given all of that, we are grateful for your aid.

Aside from Soviet military and economic aid, Soviet specialists who work in Vietnam make a very great contribution to our cause. These people participate together with us in our struggle, [some] among them were wounded and killed."

Reporting to the Soviet side on the situation in South Vietnam, the party-government delegation of the DRV stated that the American imperialists suffer defeats in their "special war," which they try to win using puppet soldiers. In the words of the DRV delegation, in recent times the US suffered military and political defeats in the local war, their losses grow incessantly and thus they have to intensify their aggression. The American imperialists are not successful in carrying out [their] basic task in South Vietnam: the destruction of the Liberation Army, the capture of the densely populated regions, and the stabilization of the Saigon regime. At the same time, the Vietnamese friends noted that the Americans intend to unfold a new offensive in the "dry season" and try to achieve some victory at the end of 1966 or the beginning of 1967 in order to compel the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the NLF of South Vietnam to negotiate in conditions that are beneficial to the Americans. The Vietnamese comrades said that, from their own side, they also are ready to defeat the enemy in the period of the "dry season" in 1966-1967. They intend to destroy the forces of the occupiers and of the puppet army. Another goal consists of preserving liberated regions, ensuring still a greater range of movement among the city population, and also preserving the supply routes to the South.

At the same time, the Vietnamese comrades acknowledge that the patriotic forces of South Vietnam now meet significant difficulties. However, as they say, in the opinion of the VWP CC Politburo, these difficulties are not insurmountable and they cannot prevent the task of fulfilling the above goals.

Proceeding from the situation that has emerged in North and South Vietnam in recent times, and also from the analysis of the forces that take part in the war, the delegation of the DRV states that their strategic line of the implementation of

war remains unchanged. Under these conditions, in the opinion of the VWP leadership, the following tasks stand before the DRV, the Soviet Union, and the other socialist countries:

"1. Fight to victory.

2. Mobilize the people of the whole world [and] world public opinion for wider and more powerful statements of protests against the American aggressors, in support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

3. Take up principled positions on the solution of the Vietnam problem and at the same time adopt flexible and soft tactics."

Over the course of the talks, the party-government delegation of the DRV stated that the Vietnamese, while striving for the victory over the American imperialists, try to organize the war in such a way that the framework in which it is currently carried out does not permit it to grow into a world war. It [the delegation] emphasized that the line of the VWP in this question remains unchanged. "We prepare for the possibility of organizing the war within a small framework while at the same time we defeat the American aggressors," Cde. Pham Van Dong said. At the same time, the Vietnamese comrades do not dismiss the prospect of a widening of the war. They said that in this respect the American imperialists, who endure defeat in South Vietnam and do not achieve their goals with bombing the DRV, might try to take their military actions to the territory of North Vietnam and Laos. In the DRV, according to their words, they have prepared for such a change of events, and they think that in this case the defeat of the Americans is inevitable.

In response to the question of the Soviet delegation to explain what the Vietnamese comrades understand under "flexible tactics" in the problem of a political solution, Cde. Pham Van Dong said that the Four Points of the government of the DRV and the Five Points of the NLF SV are "very correct slogans;" they "correspond to the interests of the Vietnamese people, and also to the interests of the security of the world and the safety of all people of Southeast Asia This is sacred, this is unchangeable, this is impossible to break." Concerning the "flexible tactics," according to the words of Cde. Pham Van Dong, this means "establishing contacts for the time it will be necessary to carry out negotiations" with the representatives of a government that raises the question of a political solution. Time and again, he stated that "flexible tactics" in the DRV now stand for support of contacts with the adversary, and not for raising any new proposals that differ from the Four [Points] and Five Points. As to the confirmation of "flexibility" of its tactics, the delegation of the DRV talked on a general level about the talks with [Jean] Sainteny, de Gaulle's representative, with the Canadian [envoy Chester] Ronning, and also with the American emissaries in Burma, Algiers, and in France. As one can see from this information, the Vietnamese prepared for the repeated emphasis of the well-known Four [Points] and Five Points.

In reply to our question the Vietnamese comrades repeated that the conditions for negotiations for the solution of the

Vietnam problem are still not ripe, since the US intends to talk with the Vietnamese "from a position of force." Under these conditions, the only conclusion, in the opinion of the leadership of the VWP, is the continuation of armed struggle with the aim to achieve a great military victory, which might change completely the correlation of forces.

In this regard, the Vietnamese comrades said that in the [currently] unfolding situation they need a further increase of Soviet military and economic aid.

They raised the request for additional supplies of Soviet armaments and equipment aimed at the strengthening of the country's government, in particular of anti-aircraft missiles and guns, fighter airplanes, coastal defense guns, various naval vessels, means of transportation, ammunition, etc.

Furthermore, they raised a series of requests regarding the supply of economic aid for 1967. The DRV requested the delivery of steel and metal structures, oil products, electricity generators, machine tools, automobiles, construction materials, transport equipment, fertilizer, food stuffs, etc. Attention was drawn [to the fact] that the Vietnamese request for aid for 1967 is the largest one the Vietnamese had addressed to the USSR at any time. In that respect, the Vietnamese side [also] presented a request for urgent, additional supplies in 1966 of means for the storage and transport of fuel-based lubricants.

The delegation of the DRV was told by our side that all requests by the Vietnamese friends will be considered attentively and satisfied according to [our] capabilities.

Over the course of the talks with the Vietnamese comrades the Soviet delegation expressed its complete solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people and informed it about the work, which we carry out in the USSR and in the international arena in support of Vietnam, underlining the usefulness of holding meetings and regular exchanges of opinion and of information on questions of mutual interest, and thanking the VWP CC for its high regard of Soviet military and economic aid.

Our opinion regarding three basic issues, which have been raised by the VWP Central Committee in recent times, was conveyed to the Vietnamese delegation.

The complete agreement of the CPSU CC with those positions which the Vietnam Workers' Party CC has raised was expressed. We agreed that it is necessary to continue the struggle and take it to the adversary with mighty blows. We agreed that it is necessary to make the effort to mobilize the world's public opinion in support of the just struggle of the Vietnamese people. We agreed that, while guarding one's own main, principled positions, it is good to publicize [more] the renowned Four Points of the DRV and the Five Points of the National Liberation Front, which we completely support, [and] it is necessary to use flexible political tactics.

The CPSU CC and the Soviet government, as before, raised the view to the VWP leadership that the war in Vietnam needs to be kept within a confined framework and the circumstance of letting it spill over into new regions or even more [of letting it] eventually grow into a world war should not be permitted.

The Soviet Union expressed its agreement with the first

of the proposals that we render and will render military and other aid to the DRV. What concerns the second proposal, we have already talked time and again about the implementation of work by our Central Committee and the Soviet government with regard to the organization of a united front of those forces that stand up against American aggression. In the future, we will take all [necessary] measures in that direction.

What concerns the proposal raised by the Vietnamese comrades regarding the principled position in the question of solving the Vietnam problem and regarding "flexible and soft tactics," our side said frankly that they have not been used sufficiently, as it seems to us. We supported and support the idea, which was expressed by Cde. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and other comrades in earlier talks, that, in the struggle against the aggressors, not only military but also political means should be exploited to a full degree. We are convinced that one should not give the Americans the possibility to trick the people. [But] the political struggle must be carried further to the point where the banner of peaceful negotiations, which [US President Lyndon B.] Johnson uses for the purpose of cheating [the people], is snatched from his hands so that it can lead him to the well-known fruits on the next stage.

We gave the Vietnamese comrades to understand that it is necessary to parry the political maneuvers of the American imperialists, for example, by publicizing [more] one's own positions, by raising the Four [Points] and the Five Points [with the aim] to start negotiations; or by entrusting some third country to carry out an exploratory mission [*sondazh*]; or by proposing to convene [a meeting of] all signatories of the Geneva agreements. Or else it should be demanded that negotiations start soon, [and one should] make one's own proposal for that point of time while [concurrently] unmasking the true aims of the US.

The Vietnamese delegation refrained from making any judgment on this question, stating that this point of view of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government will be conveyed to the VWP Central Committee Politburo.

At the time of the talks, the Soviet side turned time and again to the question of the necessity of coordination and unity of the forces of all socialist countries in the supply of support and aid to Vietnam.

We touched upon [the issue] that the military-political situation would be somewhat more beneficial to the Vietnamese friends, if China would participate in the coordination of agreements of the activities by the socialist countries. All efforts by the CPSU and other fraternal parties to achieve unity with China have ended, unfortunately, without result. Now we are forced to deal with a situation not only of a lack of unity with China but also of openly hostile positions of the PRC in relation to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Such is the position of China that, given the circumstance that the USSR and socialist countries of Europe are far away from Vietnam, not a single fraternal country, including China, provides airfields and military bases close to Vietnam, [thereby] weakening its ability to use the necessary number of air force squadrons and other defensive

means which would enable [Vietnam] to rebuff the American aggressors and to defend the DRV.

In the course of the talks with the Vietnamese delegation it was stated that the Chinese propaganda organs in recent times have embarked on an anti-Soviet campaign in relation to the war in Vietnam, [and] have slandered the Soviet military and economic aid to the DRV. The Soviet people do not understand why the Vietnamese comrades, who know that the attacks of the Chinese leaders are baseless, do not refute these slanders.

The Vietnamese comrades were told that the CPSU does not carry out polemics against the leadership of the PRC in any considerable way, because, taking into account the interests of Vietnam, it does not want to complicate the situation, in which heroic Vietnam carries out its struggle, even further. We strive to create conditions [beneficial] to the current effort of the socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese people.

The Soviet delegation mentioned that not long ago the Chinese officially provided us with the news that they cannot transport more than 9-10 thousand tons of our goods per month by rail through their territory to Vietnam, that means not more than 100-120 thousand tons per year; that means that our only ordeal ahead [for the remainder of the year?] is transporting 50 thousand tons, around 30 million projectiles, millions of bullets, 1000 missiles, tools and other military property and equipment. Furthermore, the aid from the socialist countries of Europe also has to be carried through Chinese territory.

Assuming that the Americans can completely incapacitate the harbor of Haiphong or blockade it with the forces of the [US Navy] 7th Fleet, the consideration concerning the value of having a reserve harbor in China close to the border of Vietnam, which in the first place [would serve] the unloading of oil products from ships, and which would deliver aid from the USSR and other socialist countries, was explained to the Vietnamese delegation.

The Soviet side proposed to the Vietnamese comrades that they themselves negotiate with the Chinese leaders on all these questions.

The attention of the [Vietnamese] delegation was also directed towards the unilateral statement of the leaders of the CCP that the Geneva agreements ceased to exist, that the 17th parallel does not play the role of a demarcation line. The party-government delegation of the DRV stated in their reply that the point of view of the VWP on this question remains unchanged: as before, the DRV believes that the Four Points are the concentrated expression of the Geneva Agreements. Concerning the 17th parallel, the DRV replied that the Geneva Agreements regard it a "temporary line of demarcation," and opposes the aim of the government of the US to convert the 17th parallel into a state border between North and South Vietnam.

At the end of the talks, the communique of the 9th [11th] plenum of the CCP,³ which, as it is well known, affirmed the complete agreement which was reached on the measures "intended for future action" in the support of aid to Vietnam against American aggression, was addressed and shown to the Vietnamese comrades. The Vietnamese comrades neither com-

mented nor refuted it, and said nothing about the understandings [the DRV had] reached with China.

[...]

1. Sent by the CPSU CC to the PUWP CC probably in early September 1966.
2. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met on 4-6 July 1966, in Bucharest, adopting resolutions on the Vietnam War and on Security in Europe.
3. Took place on 8 August 1966.



DOCUMENT No. 23

Information on the Visit of a Czechoslovak Party and Government Delegation Headed by [Czechoslovak Prime Minister] Comrade Lenart in the DRV, 24-28 September 1966

[Source: PAAA-MfAA, *Botschaft Moskau—Politische Abteilung, Microfiche 001170, 8-9. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.*]

Talks, whose contents we summarize here, occurred on several occasions between comrades of the embassy and [Czechoslovak] comrades, who accompanied the [Czechoslovak] delegation as specialists or journalists. The [following] comments should be considered as initial information. A more detailed report will follow after the receipt of information already announced on the results of the visit by the [Czechoslovak] MFA.

1. The Czechoslovak comrades gained the impression that leading Vietnamese comrades do not have a clear political conception on the solution of the national problem. In talks with them, no clear strategy or tactic of the party, bearing in mind national and international aspects and influences, could be discovered. The one-sided thesis of victory through people's war, on which political mass work is focusing, is dominant.

2. There are discrepancies between the evaluation (by the Vietnamese comrades) of the situation, especially in the military field, and the actual situation. The military successes of the heroically fighting Vietnamese people, which doubtlessly exist, are overestimated, while the military strength of the US and the possibility of the exacerbation of the situation by the US are underestimated.

3. During the complicated discussions on the contents of the communique, which lasted 44 hours all in all, different opinions on the attitude of China existed. The [Czechoslovak] comrades made a statement in which they condemned the Vietnamese position. The Vietnamese comrades did not accept the [Czechoslovak] point of view, and opposed to include a passage on the position of the leaders of the CCP in the communique, and pointed out that they receive aid from China,

among other things, rice for the provisioning of the population. According to the opinion of the [Czechoslovak] comrades, the Vietnamese comrades cannot adopt officially any other attitude, because otherwise effects will occur which they will experience negatively. But in personal talks, some Vietnamese comrades expressed that they don't agree with Chinese positions. The [Czechoslovak] comrades hold the opinion that a clarification process occurs [at the moment] within the leadership of the Vietnamese party in this question.¹

[...]

1. For Czechoslovak evidence see James G. Hershberg, "A Half-Hearted Overture: Czechoslovakia, Kissinger, and Vietnam, Autumn 1966," in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., *Vietnam: The Search for Peace in the Johnson Years, 1964-1968* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 292-320.



DOCUMENT No. 24

Note of Comrade Bergold, [GDR] Ambassador in the DRV, with the Polish Ambassador in the DRV, Comrade Siedliecky, 10 November 1966

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 213-214. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The visit had been requested by the Polish ambassador. After an exchange of opinion, he conveyed that the Polish delegation is not going to visit the DRV in November of 1966 but, at a Vietnamese request, in the first quarter of 1967. Then he provided some information on the statements of Comrade Le Duan, which I present here as they have been uttered.

He said that Comrade Le Duan was received by Zhou Enlai on his return [trip] from the 23rd CPSU Congress. The latter presented him with a list, on which all dates and places had been recorded, where Le Duan had made statements against the Chinese leaders. The Chinese comrades reject Le Duan. It was hence decided in Hanoi that Le Duan should not accept the invitation by the Soviet comrades, which had been directed to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Duan, this summer, in order to prevent the position of the Chinese towards the DRV from worsening.

Analyzing the reports of the 23rd CPSU Congress, after the August Plenum (before Pham Van Dong's trip to the Soviet Union) Le Duan made statements on a couple of questions, which party cadres have posed. On the question of what he has to say about the Cultural Revolution, he replied: "We don't support the Cultural Revolution, but we are not going to do anything against it. We let [it be] the internal affair of the Chinese."

On the question of what he could say about the policy of the SU with regard to the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic], to Japan and to India (with that [question] the supposed encircle-

ment of the PR China was hinted at), he replied: Our position towards the Soviet Union has not changed since the October Revolution. We would not sit here if the October Revolution had not occurred. My statements in Moscow are not new. If the SU makes the effort to build up good relations with India, then this complies with Lenin's advice. The SU had good relations with the MPR from the very beginning; that, too, is nothing new. What concerns Japan, he said, the DRV would make the effort to build up good relations with Japan, if Japan were the neighbor of the DRV.

Regarding the question of the economic policy of the DRV, he explained that each country, according to its situation, follows its own, independent economic policy. For example, the GDR had to react in its own manner [when it came] to strengthening its economy, [at the time] when it constructed the anti-Fascist protective barrier [the Berlin Wall] with the aim to defend its economy against the policy of West German imperialism.

On the question about Soviet revisionism, he supposedly replied: "The Soviet Union is like the sun. I want to label revisionism as clouds. Clouds sometimes can cover the sun, but it will always get through."

On the question of aid from the Soviet Union and China, he supposedly said: "The SU helps us from its heart and provides us with more than we can use, and China helps as well."

Finally, Comrade S. informed me that the composition of the party delegation of the VWP to the Bulgarian and Hungarian party congresses has been changed. Instead of Comrade Nguyen Duy Trinh and the Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow, comrades Le Duc Tho and Ung van Kiem have been designated.

This information is interesting because it would confirm our estimate that the position of Comrade Ung Van Khiem has been strengthened.



CWIHP Washington Seminars (January 2004 - September 2007)

Launched in 2007, Wilson Center OnDemand offers an interactive and engaging portal into the voluminous archive of the Wilson Center's multimedia programming. The portal will provide access to audio and video of CWIHP events going back several years. Upcoming events will automatically become part of the OnDemand collection available at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand>.

The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy

8 January 2004

Jeffrey Kimball (Miami University and Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar)

Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to Present

9 January 2004

Lawrence S. Wittner (State University of New York, Albany)

Computers and the Cold War

5 February 2004

Frank Cain (University of New South Wales, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra)

Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Video available)

24 February 2004

Steve Coll (The *Washington Post*)

Albania in the Warsaw Pact

18 March 2004

Dr. Ana Lalaj (Tirana University and Fulbright Scholar, Library of Congress)

The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom

29 March 2004

Andrzej Paczkowski (Polish Academy of Science), **Thomas Blanton** (National Security Archive), **Bronislaw Misztal** (Catholic University)

Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989

19 April 2004

Dennis Deletant (University College London), **Ernest Latham** (US Department of State)

Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963

28 April 2004

Ilya Gaiduk (Russian Academy of Sciences and former Wilson Center Fellow)

Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case (Video available)

8 June 2004

Bruce Craig (National Coalition for History), **Kai Bird** (former Wilson Center Fellow), **James Boughton** (International Monetary Fund)

Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Video available)

17 June 2004

Mark J. Gasiorowski (Louisiana State University) and **Malcolm Byrne** (National Security Archive)

Reagan and Gorbachev : How the Cold War Ended

21 September 2004

US Ambassador Jack F. Matlock Jr.

Caught in the Middle East: US Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961

6 October 2004

Peter Hahn (Ohio State University)

Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire

6 October 2004

Witney Schneidman (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs)

Edward Teller: Science and National Security (Video available)

25 October 2004

Lee H. Hamilton (Wilson Center), **Spencer Abraham** (Department of Energy), **C. Bruce Tarter** (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam

9 November 2004

David Farber (Temple University)

Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency

8 December 2004

Wilson Paul Dizard, Jr. (ret. US Department of State)

Red Spies In America: Stolen Secrets And The Dawn Of The Cold War

12 January 2005

Katherine A.S. Sibley (St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia) and **John Haynes** (Library of Congress)

Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971

24 January 2005

Francis Gavin (Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas)

Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, North Korea and the Kim Dynasty

9 February 2005

Bradley K. Martin (author)

Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

23 February 2005

Paul Lettow (author)

A Work in Progress Talk: Brazil and the Cuban Missile Crisis

9 March 2005

James G. Hershberg (George Washington University), **Peter Kornbluh** (National Security Archive)

Containing Arab Nationalism

23 March 2005

Salim Yaqub (University of Chicago)

New Evidence on the Slansky Affair

6 April 2005

Igor Lukes (Boston University)

J. Robert Oppenheimer: American Prometheus

20 April 2005

Kai Bird (former Wilson Center Fellow), **Martin Sherwin** (Tufts University), **Robert Norris**

Reassessing Detente: Ostpolitik as a Strategy of Transformation, 1966-1975

27 April 2005

Oliver Bange (University of Mannheim)

The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966

4 May 2005

Ronald J. Granieri (University of Pennsylvania)

Czechoslovakia, 1948-1951: A Problem of Intelligence

11 May 2005

Igor Lukes (Boston University)

Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam

25 May 2005

Gareth Porter (Independent), **John Prados** (National Security Archive)

The Ransom of the Jews. The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain between Romania and Israel

1 June 2005

Radu Ioanid (Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies), **Alfred H. Moses** (former US Ambassador to Romania)

"A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991"

9 June 2005

Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), **Vojtech Mastny** (Woodrow Wilson Center), **Gen. William Odom** (US Army), **Lawrence Kaplan** (Kent State University)

"Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light"

22 June 2005

Mitchell Lerner (Ohio State University), **Mark Lawrence** (University of Texas), **David Shreve** (University of Virginia), **Peter Hahn** (Ohio State University)

Prospects for Creating a Multilateral Security Structure in Northeast Asia

14 September 2005

Ambassador James Goodby (Brookings)

The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, Newly Revealed Secrets from the Mitrokhin Archive

[\(Video available\)](#)

27 September 2005

Christopher Andrew (Cambridge University)

Final Acts: A Guide to Preserving the Records of Truth Commissions

28 September 2005

Trudy Huskamp Peterson

Hungary in the Soviet Empire, 1945-1956: New Evidence, New Interpretations

7 October 2005

Laszlo Borhi (Indiana University)

The Cold War and Contemporary Conflict: Lessons From The Past

(Video available)

21 October 2005

Saki Ruth Dockrill (King's College London), **James Carafano** (The Heritage Foundation), **Tom Nichols** (US Naval War College)

Engineering Communism: How Two Americans Spied for Stalin and Founded the Soviet Silicon Valley

26 October 2005

Steven Usdin (BioCentury Publications)

Congress and the Cold War

(Video available)

1 December 2005 **Robert David (KC) Johnson** (Brooklyn College, City University of New York), **David M. Barrett** (Villanova University), **Congressman John B. Anderson** (Nova Southeastern University) **Walter Pincus** (The Washington Post)

Denmark in the Cold War: National Security Policy and the International Environment, 1945-1991

(Video available)

7 December 2005

Svend Aage Christensen (Danish Institute for International Studies)

Film Screening: Between the Lines

14 December 2005

Dirk Simon (director)

Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam

15 December 2005

Mark Atwood Lawrence (University of Texas)

Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age

10 January 2006 **Alasdair Roberts** (Syracuse University),

Thomas S. Blanton (National Security Archive), **David**

McMillen (National Archives and Records Administration)

North Korea Since 2000 and

Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations

(Video available)

17 January 2006

Dr. Park Jae-kyu (Kyungnam University)

Louis Johnson and the Arming of America

18 January 2006

David L. Roll (Steptoe & Johnson LLP)

Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan

27 January 2006

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (University of California, Santa Barbara)

Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: From Yalta to Maastricht

(Video available)

1 February 2006

Frederic Bozo (University of Paris)

Reconsidering the Cold War

(Video available)

2 February 2006

John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University)

Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era

15 February 2006

Balazs Szalontai (National University of Mongolia)

Nikita Khrushchev and the End of the Soviet Bloc: The Impact of the Secret Speech on East Central Europe

1 March 2006

Charles Gati (Johns Hopkins University), **Vladimir Tismaneanu** (University of Maryland)

Breaking Ranks: Andreas Papandreou, American Liberalism, and Neo-Conservatism

14 March 2006

Stan Draenos (Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation)

Can We Change North Korea's Negotiating Behavior?

(Video available)

29 March 2006

Kim Hyung-ki (Kyungnam University and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center)

US Foreign Policy and the Problem of Nation-building

11 April 2006

Klaus Schwabe (Technical University of Aachen)

The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust

18 May 2006

Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), **Walter Reich** (George Washington University)

Cold War International Broadcasting: Lessons Learned

(Video available)

25 May 2006

A. Ross Johnson (Hoover Institution and Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar) **R. Eugene Parta** (RFE/RL)

Henry Kissinger and the Dilemmas of American Power
(Video available)

27 June 2006

Thomas A. Schwartz (Vanderbilt University and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center)

Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt
(Video available)

12 September 2006

Charles Gati (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), **Congressman Tom Lantos** (D-CA), **James G. Hershberg** (George Washington University)

1956: The Aborted Soviet Invasion of Poland

12 October 2006

Krzysztof Persak (Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw)

Setting the Record Straight: Radio Free Europe and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
(Video available)

24 October 2006 with **A. Ross Johnson** (Hoover Institution and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center), **Kori Schake** (United States Military Academy), **Paul Henze** (ret, US Department of State)

America and the Return of Nazi Contraband: The Recovery of Europe's Cultural Treasures
(Video available)

7 November 2006

Michael J. Kurtz (National Archives and Records Administration)

The Truth Is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower And John Foster Dulles
(Video available)

15 November 2006

Chris Tudda (Office of the Historian, US Department of State)

At the Dawn of the Cold War
(Video available)

28 November 2006

Jamil Hasanli (Member of Parliament, The Republic of Azerbaijan)

Confronting Romania's Communist Past

17 January 2007

Vladimir Tismaneanu (University of Maryland)

Economic Statecraft During the Cold War
(Video available)

7 February 2007

Frank Cain (University of New South Wales, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra), **George E. Shambaugh** (Georgetown University)

From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981
(Video available)

5 April 2007

Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), **Douglas MacEachin** (Harvard University)

New Scholarship on Stalin and the Cold War
(Video available)

18 April 2007

Geoffrey Roberts (University College Cork), **Eric Lohr** (American University), **Steven A. Barnes** (George Mason University)

New Scholarship on the Truman Presidency
(Video available)

24 April 2007

Rev. Wilson D. Miscamble, **Robert L. Beisner**, **David Painter**, **Elizabeth Edwards Spalding**, **The Hon. Ken Hechler**, **Michael J. Devine**

40 Years Later: New Interpretations of the Six Day War
(Video available)

7 June 2007

Isabella Ginor (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), **Gideon Remez** (Jerusalem), **Yacoov R'oi** (Tel Aviv University), **Jordan Baev** (New Bulgarian University), **Ambassador Richard Parker**

US Economic Policy in the 1970s

2 July 2007

Duccio Basosi (University of Florence)

North and South Korean Strategies for Re-unification during the Cold War: New Revelations from the Archives
(Video available)

20 July 2007

Meung-Hoan Noh (Seoul), **Bernd Schaefer** (German Historical Institute), **Miryang Youn** (Wilson Center)

For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
(Video available)

25 September 2007

Melvyn P. Leffler (University of Virginia), **Robert L. Beisner** (American University).

Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1971: New Evidence from the Bucharest Archives¹

By Mircea Munteanu

Romania's story in the Cold War, especially in the first decade of Nicolae Ceausecu's twenty-four year-long reign, is one of Bucharest's increasing attempts to stake out its own foreign policy within the Soviet bloc. For ten years between 1965 and 1975, Bucharest wormed its way into the ante-rooms of the White House and the Western European chancelleries, tweaked the Soviet nose, and painted itself as a maverick communist state ready and able to serve as a bridge between the two camps. It did so by combining communist orthodoxy—especially in domestic policies—with public stances on the international stage that gathered increasing public support for the Bucharest regime.

Upon taking the reins of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) following Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965, Ceausescu entered the world stage cherishing his nonconformist role in the communist bloc. In this balancing act, he tried to depict himself as a valuable and reliable player in the world of diplomacy. From 1967 onward, Romanian foreign policy seemed to follow a different track than its Soviet counterpart, including the recognition of West Germany in January 1967, Romania's refusal to break relations with Israel after the Six-Day War in June, and its public, maverick support of China in the Sino-Soviet split. Bucharest's stance was not limited to refusing to follow Moscow's foreign policy line. Starting in the early 1960s, Bucharest moved increasingly toward reducing its economic dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Increased access to Western markets, also meant increased political access for the Romanian leadership, and, increased opportunities to put such access to use by attempting to mediate between the two camps. Of the numerous attempts at mediation by the Romanian leadership, the most telling for Bucharest's success at playing the independent card was the Romanian attempt to mediate the opening of Sino-American talks during the Nixon administration. By 1969, Bucharest was building on the well-received, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to mediate talks between the US and the North Vietnamese through the so-called Packers Channel.² The public closeness between Beijing and Bucharest offered the Romanian leadership a chance to sell itself as a valuable go-between in Nixon's triangular policies.

Bucharest's channel to Beijing has generally been discounted, until now, as doomed to failure. In his memoirs, former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger suggested that the Chinese "proved too wary [to discuss rapprochement through the Romanians], perhaps fearful of Soviet penetration of even a country as fiercely independent as Romania."³

The Romanian channel, however, should not be so summarily discounted. New evidence from the Romanian archives shows that, by the end of 1970, the Chinese leadership was willing to open discussions with the US, and was ready to do so through any available channel. At the time, the Romanians were not discounted as a possible intermediary by either the US or the Chinese leaders. Ceausescu's success in publicly projecting a strongly independent position from the Soviet line, and especially its support of China in the Sino-Soviet split, was viewed in Washington as conferring on the Romanian leadership the needed credibility to pass important communication to the Chinese at a level where such communications would get appropriate notice. The Chinese, for their part, left it to the Americans to decide the channel through which communications would proceed. The final decision, taken by Nixon and Kissinger in December 1970 and January 1971, was to use the Pakistani channel. That decision, at least in part, stemmed from a decision made by the Romanian leadership not to transmit a critical Chinese response to the US before that same message reached Washington via Pakistan. Given that the Pakistanis had been inadvertently delayed by national elections and the November 1970 floods in East Pakistan, Bucharest's decision to delay relaying the Chinese message is difficult to explain.⁴

First Steps: Nixon's Visit to Bucharest, August 1969

President Nixon's historic visit to Bucharest in August 1969 led to the first concerted effort by both the US and Romania to work together on Sino-American rapprochement. The Romanian leadership's interest in facilitating the normalization of relations between the PRC and the US went deeper than Bucharest's official statements regarding the need for equality and cooperation among all countries of the world. The RCP

Mircea Munteanu is a PhD candidate in history at the George Washington University and Program Associate at the Cold War International History Project.

leadership was in the midst of a struggle with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership over Bucharest's latitude in interpreting Marxist-Leninist dogma as well as Romania's freedom to establish and carry out its own foreign and domestic policy. Against the backdrop of the expanding Sino-Soviet conflict, which had flared into actual fighting along their disputed frontier earlier in 1969, Bucharest sought to ensure that it would be able to resist whatever pressure Moscow would bring to bear.⁵ Throughout the mid-late 1960s, Bucharest sought to position itself outside the sphere of direct Soviet influence, and use that position to facilitate the implementation of its own policies, whether regarding economic development, foreign and defense policy within the Warsaw Pact, or the Vietnam War or Sino-Soviet polemics.⁶

The reasons for the Romanian leadership's desire to carry out a more independent foreign policy varied. Like all other Soviet satellites, Bucharest had at first unwaveringly followed the Kremlin position, irrespective of its contradictions. Yet by 1960, economic plans put forward by Bucharest began clashing with those developed in Moscow. Nikita Khrushchev's vision of an economic cooperative zone of the communist countries, and the socialist division of labor that that cooperation required, relegated Romania to an unenviable position: that of an agricultural hinterland to the more industrially developed East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Bucharest, on the other hand, was interested in heavy industrialization and urbanization. The Romanian leadership viewed both goals as a means of gaining legitimacy with the people, especially as its collectivization of agriculture was finalized in the late 1950s. What began as a clash over economic ideas soon after expanded into other areas including inter-party relations and foreign policy. Starting slowly, Bucharest became increasingly assertive in the mid-late 1960s. By the end of the decade, Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership had become a public relations thorn in the side of the Soviets and a *cause celebre* in the West.⁷

During the 2 August 1969 discussion between Nixon and Ceausescu in Bucharest, the US president's interest in gauging Romania's policy latitude was apparent. Several times Nixon reiterated US interest in maintaining Romania's independent position within the Soviet bloc and voiced concern that the close US-Romanian relationship could cause Moscow to place undue pressure on Bucharest. Ceausescu and Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, however, dismissed Nixon's concerns, confident that they would be able to continue the balancing act between signaling their differences with Moscow and stressing their similarities.⁸

Nixon's message was simple: the US was ready to open discussions with the PRC over a broad range of issues of mutual interest, and hoped that, due to the special relationship between Bucharest and Beijing, the Romanians would be able to facilitate an opening between Washington and Beijing. What the Romanians did not know at the time—and would not find out until two years later—was that Nixon had passed the same message to another friend of the Chinese leadership, Pakistani president Yahya Khan.⁹ This was the beginning of a dual chan-

nel to Beijing that would ultimately lead to the biggest diplomatic coup of the Nixon administration—Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and Nixon's groundbreaking visit the following February.

The Bucharest discussions covered a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) credits for Romania and the perennial Romanian desire to obtain Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Yet discussion of Vietnam and China took priority in the conversation between the two leaders. This was not the first time the topic of Sino-US relations was approached between the US and the Romanians. Two years earlier, during Nixon's visit to Bucharest in 1967, this time as a private person, he had met with the Romanian leadership and discussed his ideas about the People's Republic of China (PRC). Both Ceausescu and Maurer had listened closely to Nixon's idea about the need to engage China and pushed wholeheartedly the idea of engagement. Even before that, on the occasion of a discussion between Maurer and US Ambassador to Bucharest William A. Crawford in 1965, the Romanian prime minister had brought up the idea that the PRC could no longer be ignored by Washington.¹⁰ The 1969 visit, however, was the first time that the discussion had taken on such importance for both sides.

Following the discussions with Nixon in Bucharest, the Romanians turned their attention back to dealing with the Soviet Union and the fallout of the US president's visit. The visit had been arranged abruptly, forcing the Romanians to postpone their party congress by several days. On 4 August 1969, Ceausescu informed the RCP CC Permanent Presidium (RCP Politburo) of the discussions he had with Nixon, including those on Sino-American rapprochement. Though Ceausescu did not go into detail regarding Nixon's desire to use the Romanians as an intermediary for messages to the Chinese, he did mention Nixon's concern over the Sino-Soviet border conflict and his interest in ending China's diplomatic isolation. Just as importantly, Ceausescu believed he was creating a good personal rapport with Nixon. Both Ceausescu and Maurer seemed impressed that Nixon and his team were attentive to Bucharest's interpretations of the status of the international system. "[The Americans] developed on a different basis and do not have this feudal mentality, bureaucratic lordship, that you can even see with certain communists," Ceausescu told the Politburo. Nixon especially had made an impression on Ceausescu. "[Nixon and his staff] were lacking the arrogance which afflicts others, even though he is the president of a great power, not just of a capitalist country, which today, to be honest, is the greatest economic power in the world. He did not come here from the position of a great power, we went to the market, [Nixon] shook hands with all the farmers. Of course, he, too, was a farmer; until 20 years old he sold vegetables. From the point of view of social origins, he has a better background than many communists. His wife is a miner's daughter. [...] Many called him 'comrade' Nixon [...]."¹¹

[Document #4] The Romanian leaders' impression of having a personal rapport with Nixon would affect their handling of

US messages later on, as well as their understanding of the role Romania was to play within the White House's initiative.

Maurer's October 1969 Trip to Asia and his Meetings with Zhou Enlai

A few weeks after Nixon's discussions with the Romanian leadership, the communist world was shaken by Ho Chi Minh's death in Hanoi. The Vietnamese leader had deftly played the Soviets and the Chinese off each another to ensure that the Vietnamese would receive as much aid as possible from both sides. In death, he would play a role in bringing the two communist powers together once more.

Ho Chi Minh held an almost mythical position, not only among the Vietnamese communists, but also among other communist parties. His funeral brought to Hanoi a procession of foreign leaders and delegations from all the communist parties. For the first time since Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1965 the Soviet leadership met with their Chinese counterparts. The funeral also provided the first opportunity for the Romanian leadership to meet with the Chinese leadership following Nixon's visit to Bucharest in August. Since the Chinese leadership had excused itself from sending a delegation to Bucharest for the 25th anniversary of Romania's joining with the Allies in World War II, Ho's funeral offered the first and best chance Bucharest had to pass along Nixon's message to Beijing at the top level. Against the backdrop of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese had informed the RCP leadership that they were unwilling to participate at the 10th Congress of the RCP and the 25th anniversary of 23 August 1944, due to of the participation of the "traitorous cliques, led by the Soviet revisionists" at these events. The Romanian DCM in Beijing, Ion Dorobantu, who reported the answer to Bucharest on 18 July 1969, stressed that the refusal had been firm but delivered in a friendly atmosphere by Cheng Jian, the general secretary of the International Relations Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC). The reply from the Chinese leadership expressed the hope that Beijing's refusal would not sour relations between the Chinese and Romanian people.¹² To reinforce the Chinese desire for maintaining good relations with the Romanians, Zhou Enlai, Vice Premier Li Xiannian, and other Chinese leaders attended the reception organized for the occasion by the Romanian embassy in Beijing, and openly stressed the friendly relations between the Romanian and Chinese people.¹³ **[Document #5]**

The Romanians had previously informed the Chinese leadership, in general terms, of the discussions with Nixon in Bucharest. But when Ceausescu met with the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, he did not go into detail, preferring to pass the information directly to the Chinese leadership through a high-level delegation.¹⁴ Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the president of the Council of Ministers (effectively the Romanian prime minister) and Zhou Enlai's official counterpart, was chosen to lead the delegation traveling to Beijing and Hanoi.¹⁵

[Nixon] shook hands with all the farmers. Of course, he too was a farmer [...] From the point of view of social origins, he has a better background than many communists [...] Many called him "Comrade" Nixon.

The Romanians and Chinese met twice during Maurer's trip to Hanoi, both times during Maurer's stopovers in Beijing. The first meeting, took place shortly after the Romanians arrived in Beijing on 7 September, and lasted several hours. Maurer informed Zhou of his and Ceausescu's discussions with Nixon. There were strong tendencies in the US toward normalizing relations with the PRC, Maurer told Zhou. US Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman had talked to Maurer about this issue, as had Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith on behalf of Robert Kennedy before the latter's assassination. While the Romanians had informed the Chinese before of Washington's desire to improve Sino-American relations, Maurer wanted to make sure that the Chinese premier clearly understood the context of the August discussion between Ceausescu and Nixon in order to understand the importance of the message sent by the White House. Bucharest, Maurer added, believed that the message represented a genuine desire on behalf of the top US leadership to open a dialogue with Beijing.¹⁶ **[Document #6]**

Nixon was also concerned with the continuation of the Vietnam War and with a possible escalation of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, Maurer explained. The Vietnam War, especially, held Nixon's attention, and, according to Maurer, Nixon believed that if the Vietnamese would not negotiate in good faith by November 1969, the Americans would be forced to "reassess" the situation. The most likely explanation of Nixon's comments is that Nixon was sending a warning through the Romanians in August 1969 to ensure that the actions he would order in October 1969—the readiness increase of US nuclear forces—would be noticed in the Soviet Union (and possibly in China as well). The Romanian prime minister had no idea what Nixon had in store, and it is unlikely that, if he did, he would have been so open in his praise of Nixon's desire to resolve the Vietnam conflict through negotiations.¹⁷ Following the discussion on the Vietnam War, the conversation turned to relations within the socialist bloc, and Soviet pressure on Romania.

Zhou Enlai's answers focused on the Vietnamese issue. Advising the Romanians to stay out of the cauldron as much as possible, Zhou stressed that the Chinese position remained that it was up to the Vietnamese leadership to decide whether to end the war through negotiation or fighting. Zhou did not concentrate on the message from Nixon, other than to say that

the US and China could discuss various issues in Warsaw.¹⁸ **[Document #6]**

The second discussion, which took place on 11 September, as the Romanian delegation returned from Hanoi, focused even more on the Soviet Union than the discussions during the first meeting. After four polemical years of political, and military clashes, the Soviet and Chinese premiers, Kosygin and Zhou, had just met in Beijing.¹⁹ While their meeting did not resolve any of the outstanding issues between the two superpowers, it did at least lead to an agreement to pull back some of the troops on the Sino-Soviet border in order to prevent future border clashes that might otherwise escalate. Maurer arrived just minutes after the departure of the Soviet delegation and was again received by Zhou at the airport. Aside from a brief exchange about Kissinger's personality—Maurer described Nixon as being very trusting of Kissinger—the discussion concentrated on the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.²⁰ **[Document #8]**

Apparently, the message from Nixon had come a little too early. Mao Zedong was not yet fully ready to reach a rapprochement with the Americans.²¹ The Chinese also worried about their status in the international communist movement, and were worried that any rapprochement with the Americans would be interpreted as a reaction to fear of the Soviet Union. But Mao had already started the process by which he was to justify the incoming policy shift. Changing the focus from American imperialism to the dangers of Soviet revisionism combined with the emergence of the new concept of “socialist imperialism” to allow the Chinese leadership to maintain its revolutionary credentials while pragmatically dealing with the geo-strategic dangers it faced from the Soviet Union. It also fit into Mao's ideological view of the international system.

To the White House it seemed feelers to the Chinese had been rebuffed. Yet starting in February 1969, Mao Zedong, through Zhou Enlai, had ordered four Chinese marshals who had been marginalized during the Cultural Revolution to study the problems of the international system and produce options for consideration by the Central Committee and at the CCP Congress. Shortly after Chen Yi's 17 September report, a decision was made that contacts with the US were to begin.²² The Nixon administration was also moving toward forcing a beginning of contacts. Walter Stoessel, the US ambassador in Warsaw, had been directly instructed by Nixon to attempt to make contact with the Chinese chargé, Lei Yang, possibly at a reception.²³ Having done so—and been rebuffed by the Chinese diplomat—Stoessel decided to wait until the Chinese embassy received guidance from Beijing.²⁴ On 11 December Lei and Stoessel met informally at the Chinese embassy, where the US ambassador proposed the resumption of ambassadorial-level talks. While in his report to Beijing, Lei Yang suggested that the Chinese adopt a “wait and see” attitude to the American proposal, Mao met with the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing and asked that a message be passed to the US that “if President Nixon intends to resume contacts with China” he should first try to use “the official channel of communication in Warsaw.”²⁵ Pakistani ambassador

to the US, Agha Hilaly, met with Kissinger on 19 December to deliver that message.²⁶

On 17 December, two days before Mao's message through Pakistan was to be relayed to the White House, Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu met with Kissinger in Washington to discuss bilateral relations, the Vietnam negotiations, and China. According to Kissinger's notes, Macovescu began his presentation by saying that the Chinese were interested in the possibility of contacts with the Americans, but offered no specifics.²⁷ He then moved on to the Vietnam issue.

Without access to Macovescu's instructions, it is difficult to judge why Zhou Enlai's message, given to Maurer on 7 September 1969 and suggesting possible discussions through the Warsaw ambassadorial channel, had apparently not been transmitted to Washington. It is possible that Macovescu had not been fully briefed on the Maurer-Zhou discussions in Beijing. He was not a member of the politburo and would not automatically see the full minutes of conversation when they were distributed to the other politburo members. Even his boss, foreign minister Corneliu Manescu, was merely a candidate member to the politburo and thus invited to participate only in certain discussions. Much less likely is that Macovescu, given his involvement in the Vietnam War issue over the previous two years, overlooked the importance of the message and concentrated more on the messages from Hanoi.²⁸ Kissinger certainly would have noted and recorded any comments from Macovescu suggesting that the Chinese leadership would approve a resumption of contacts in Warsaw. Though the only record available is the US version of the memorandum of conversation, it is unlikely that Kissinger would miss something that important given his interest in the subject and the resumption of unofficial contact in Warsaw only a week earlier. Whatever the reasoning behind it, the Romanians failed to transmit the Chinese leadership's interest in holding exploratory discussions in Warsaw. It was the first of a series of decisions taken by the Romanians about their timing that would ultimately lead to their exclusion from the secret contacts, and, at least partially, affect their standing with the Chinese.

Ceausescu's Trip to Washington in October 1970 and the Renewal of the Romanian Channel

Though initial Sino-US discussions in Warsaw showed progress, a series of unfortunate coincidences delayed the resumption of talks indefinitely. The public nature of the ambassadorial talks, and the bureaucratic procedures that the White House had to follow to clear messages for Beijing through that channel, hampered substantive exchanges. The White House went through the good offices of Pakistan to send another message to the Chinese, suggesting the establishment of a secret communication channel between Washington and Beijing, a channel in which information that could be effectively controlled by the White House staff. The Chinese, however, delayed their response to the overture.²⁹



Mircea Munteanu (CWIHP/GWU) presents his findings on Romanian diplomacy in the Cold War at the State Department conference on Sino-American Rapprochement, October 2006.

The 25th anniversary meeting at the UN in October 1970 offered the chance to renew the secret messages to the Chinese, again through the highest levels. Both Ceausescu and Yahya Khan came to New York and Washington, and both met with Nixon in the Oval Office for detailed discussions with the president on various issues, including reopening a channel of communication with the Chinese. Nixon sent the same message through both interlocutors: the US, and he personally, remained interested in discussing avenues of normalization with the Chinese leadership, including potential high-level meetings, an ease of trade and travel restrictions, and other issues short of full diplomatic relations. This, Nixon stressed in his discussion with Ceausescu, was to be accomplished at a later time, after the two countries had established a rapport. Ceausescu promised to pass along any information that Nixon deemed necessary to send to Beijing. If the US had specific proposals, he would also pass them along. The Romanians, Ceausescu said, had been trying to persuade the Chinese for 15 years to improve their relations with the Yugoslavs, and finally relations between the PRC and Yugoslavia had improved. Sino-American relations, too, had to begin somewhere.³⁰

While Nixon had not made any additional concessions to the Chinese, his messages through the Romanian and Pakistani channels certainly reiterated his interest in renewing contact. Nixon remained interested in maintaining contact, the Romanians told the Chinese, first through the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, and later, directly to Zhou Enlai during the trip of Gheorghe Radulescu, the Romanian vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers (deputy premier) to Vietnam and China. Radulescu's primary mission to Beijing was to negotiate the further development of Sino-Romanian economic cooperation and obtain credits for freely convertible currency and turn-key factories. Yet Radulescu was also instructed to give Mao Zedong a letter from Ceausescu and describe to the Chinese leadership the conclusions reached by

the Romanian leadership following Ceausescu's trip to New York and Washington. He met with Zhou on 21 November, his first day in Beijing, and had a four-hour conversation with the Chinese premier. On 12 December 1970, in a report to Ceausescu following his return from Beijing, Radulescu recounted his conversations with the Chinese leadership. While the minutes of that meeting are not currently available, Radulescu quoted extensively from the minutes of his conversation with Zhou in his report. After receiving Nixon's message indicating his desire to restart the dialogue, Zhou, according to Radulescu's report, stated that "Nixon knew that Comrade Ceausescu would inform the Chinese leadership of this message. What the Americans say now is not of any major consequence. Between China and the US there is only one problem—the issue of Taiwan." Radulescu asked if this was what the Romanian leadership should transmit to Washington. Zhou responded that, after having discussed this issue in the Central Committee, and stressing that this was authorized by Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, the message the Romanians should transmit to Washington was verbatim the message that the Chinese would send through the Pakistani channel, including an offer for President Nixon to visit the PRC.³¹ **[Document #9]**

A few days later, Zhou Enlai repeated the same message in a discussion with Yahya Khan.³² Preoccupied with the East Pakistan floods and the Pakistani national elections (which began on 3 December 1970), Khan delayed transmission of the message to Washington until the first week of December. Pakistani ambassador Hilaly would deliver that message to Kissinger on 9 December. Not having heard anything, either from the Pakistanis or from the Romanians, Kissinger had thought that the Chinese were once again delaying their response, and that, at the very least, Khan's visit to Beijing had not revealed any new Chinese reactions.³³ It might have been that the Chinese, and Mao specifically, had another message in store, and that they had requested from both the Pakistani and the Romanians to delay transmission of the message to Washington until a later date.³⁴ Whatever the reason for the delay on the Pakistani side, the Romanian delay was even more puzzling.³⁵ The Romanians waited until 11 January 1971, when Corneliu Bogdan, the Romanian ambassador in Washington met with Kissinger and told him of the Chinese communication.³⁶ Just as in September 1969, Bucharest took its time passing the message to Washington.

Choosing the Pakistani Channel

If there had been a reason for the Chinese to request that the Romanians (and the Pakistanis) delay transmission of Mao's message to Nixon, that delay will remain a reason for continued speculation unless a more complete set of discussion transcripts emerges from the Chinese side. Whatever the reasons, the Chinese also used other means to ensure that the US "got the message." The invitation extended by Mao to American journalist Edgar Snow, and the coverage received by his visit

and meeting with Mao in the Chinese press can also be interpreted as a message that the Chinese leadership was preparing for contacts with the US. The White House, however, missed the message. Kissinger later recalled that “the inscrutable Chairman was trying to convey something. [...] Eventually, I came to understand that Mao intended to symbolize that American relations now had his personal attention, but by that point it was a purely academic insight: we had missed the point where it mattered. Excessive subtlety had produced a failure of communication.”³⁷ But the message was also meant to be seen in China, and was also directed at the Chinese people.³⁸

When Ambassador Bogdan met Kissinger on 11 January 1970 to deliver the message from Zhou Enlai and the Chinese leadership, the cards had already been dealt. Nixon, hopeful that the Pakistani channel would continue to work better than the Romanian channel, told Kissinger to cool contacts with the Romanians as to “not appear too eager [to the Chinese] and wait for them [the Chinese] to respond to our initiative.”³⁹ No message was sent again through the Romanian channel. On 29 January, Bogdan called again on Kissinger to inquire, prior to his departure to Bucharest, if a response was forthcoming from the White House. Kissinger only suggested that the US was prepared to talk, wherever the Chinese were willing, and that the US was not committed to having discussions through the Warsaw channel.⁴⁰ This was simply a courtesy response to the Romanian ambassador. Part of the reason for the US reticence toward responding via Bucharest was a fear in Kissinger’s inner circle that the Romanian leadership had been penetrated by the Soviet intelligence services. Given the premium on secrecy the administration placed on the rapprochement with the PRC, the fear that the Soviets (and subsequently the media and the Taiwan lobby in the US) would find out about the thaw between Beijing and Washington before the administration was ready to make it public effectively closed the door on the Romanian channel.⁴¹

Washington was not the only place where the Romanians found themselves excluded, as the Chinese also cut off communications through the Bucharest channel. On 23 March 1971, when Vice Premier Radulescu was again in Beijing to finalize the economic agreements reached in the fall of 1970, he informed Zhou of Bogdan’s discussion with Kissinger. Zhou simply thanked the Vice Premier, stating that similar messages had been delivered through other channels, and that, given the difference between the US and Chinese positions on Taiwan and Indochina, China had nothing to talk about with the United States.⁴² **[Document #10]**

Preparations for the historic meeting between Kissinger and Zhou were made via Pakistan, while the Romanians remained on the outside. When Ceausescu visited Beijing in June 1971, during his meeting with Mao, the Chinese leader asked what Ceausescu thought of his “ping-pong diplomacy.”⁴³ Concerning the Sino-American rapprochement, the discussion with Mao was limited to a few comments. The conversations with Zhou and other Chinese leaders have not yet been released in Romania or China. However, given the

advanced nature of discussions through the Hilaly channel, it is unlikely that Zhou would have mentioned anything of substance to the Romanian delegation. The special relationship between the Romanians and the Chinese did offer Bucharest a small success: on 16 July, a few hours before the world was to learn that Nixon and Kissinger had succeeded in the opening to China, the Romanian ambassador was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he was told about Kissinger’s secret visit and the agreement for a presidential visit.⁴⁴

Communication Breakdown?

It will remain a matter of speculation what would have happened had the Romanians transmitted, in a timely fashion, the two communications they received from the Chinese in September 1969 and November 1970.⁴⁵ The question remains as to how far the Chinese were willing to go through the Romanian channel, knowing full well the balancing act the Romanians had to perform in order to maintain their independence of action vis-à-vis Moscow. Throughout the discussions between the Romanians and the Chinese, Beijing asked if Bucharest had informed the Soviets of the American position; the Romanians answered affirmatively. It is unclear how much the Romanians had actually told the Soviets, most likely passing on general ideas without any specifics.⁴⁶ Even so, the Romanian channel was much more open to Soviet influence than the Pakistani channel, something that both Washington and Beijing were keenly aware of.

What the documents—some of which have been translated and are included below—do make clear is that the Chinese were not, as previously thought, entirely averse to using the Romanians as a liaison. Having adopted the marshals’ suggestion to “play the US card,” Mao was willing to use whatever means at his disposal to make sure that the US did not miss his message. Concerned or not about Soviet penetration, the messages the Chinese were sending through the Romanians and the Pakistanis were, until the final decision, virtually the same. For all of his mistrust of the Romanians, Kissinger too was ready to deal with Bucharest. Yet the Romanian delay in transmitting the messages meant that the situation would, in the end, resolve itself: Pakistan had been the preferred option, and now it seemed like Pakistan was better able to play the role of an intermediary. By 11 January 1971, Nixon had already decided to cut the Romanians out of the loop, and Bucharest remained on the outside until the end.

Unless evidence surfaces that the Chinese had requested that Bucharest not pass the messages on to Washington until after a certain date, Ceausescu’s decision to delay transmission remains inexplicable. Possibly Ceausescu decided to transmit the message based on his own schedule, hoping that he might be able to combine a successful Romanian initiative with additional requests for foreign aid and preferential treatment from the White House. Such an explanation would take into account the increasing self-importance Ceausescu was beginning to display in his dealings with the world.

It is also possible, though unlikely, that Ceausescu intentionally delayed the transmission of the message so as not to be faced with the possibility of being held responsible by Moscow for bringing the Chinese and the Americans together. That Romania was openly arguing that Sino-American rapprochement would aid world peace was one thing, and Ceausescu relished the position of a maverick in the Communist bloc. Yet he may have considered the possibility of the Soviets holding him responsible for bringing Washington and Beijing to the discussion table as too high a personal risk. More information from the Romanian archives on the internal discussions of the issue are needed to shed additional light on this question.

What seems clear from the documents is that Bucharest chose, for its own reasons, to delay passing Chinese messages to the White House. Even so, Bucharest's decision did little to affect its relations with Washington. The Romanians were able to maintain open channels of communication with the White House, and continued to secure support from the administration on its requests for credits, and economic aid. In the end, however, the White House was unwilling to spend any political capital to push for MFN status for Romania. While it supported Romania's admission to GATT in November 1971, it made little to no effort to push Congress to pass any exemptions for Romania from the Fino Amendment. As several international crises were coming to a close in the early 1970s, Bucharest's importance to the Nixon and subsequent administrations began to diminish. With the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the signing of the Helsinki Accords, human rights began to take center stage in East-West relations rather than the *realpolitik* on which Ceausescu's room for maneuver was based. With few exceptions, Ceausescu's domestic record began moving to the forefront, and by the 1980s his maverick foreign policies could no longer outweigh his gruesome domestic human rights abuses in the world's eyes.



Notes

1. The author is grateful to the efforts made by Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura in Bucharest for the declassification and publication of Romanian documents on Romanian-Chinese relations. The collection he edited, *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974, Documente*, (Bucharest, 2005), provides the basic documentary text for those interested Sino-Romanian cooperation. Information on the collection is available on CWIHP's Romanian Initiative webpage, which can be reached from www.cwihp.org.

2. The "Packers Channel" was a State Department codename for the Romanian attempts to convince the North Vietnamese to begin negotiations with the United States. Benjamin H. Read, Special Assistant to Secretary Dean Rusk recalled during his oral history interview that the channel was codenamed after the Green Bay Packers "because it looked like a winner." (BHR interview II, p. 20, available at the LBJ Library online, www.lbjlib.utexas.edu).

3. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown, and Co, 1979), p. 181. He repeated this view in 2004 during a short conversation with the author at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

4. The Pakistani version of the Chinese message was transmitted to Henry Kissinger at the White House on Dec. 9, 1970, nearly three weeks after it had been received by President Yahya Khan; see F. S. Aijazuddin, *From a Head, to a Head, through a Head* (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 43-44.

5. For additional documents on the Sino-Soviet split and its effects on the Sino-American rapprochement see Chen Jian and David Wilson, "All Under The Heaven Is Great Chaos" in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No. 11, pp. 155-176; Christian Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1969-71" in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7, pp. 186-193. For discussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its effect on the Chinese position toward the US, see Chen Jian, *Mao and China's Cold War* (UNC Press, 2000), also William Burr, "Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Toward Rapprochement" in *Cold War History*, 1:3, pp. 73-112, as well as the documents in this issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.

6. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From de-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* No. 37, www.cwihp.org, and *Stalinism for All Seasons* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003), chapter 7, pp. 187-232; see also Liviu Tirau, *Intre Washington si Moscova: Romania 1945-1965* (Bucharest, Tribuna: 2005), esp. p. 453-498.

7. See Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for all Seasons* and Tismaneanu, CWIHP Working Paper No. 37. See also Mihail Ionescu and Denis Deletant, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* No. 43, and Tirau, *Intre Washington si Moscova*.

8. Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and President [sic] Nicolae Ceausescu, Aug 2, 1969, Bucharest, Nixon Presidential Materials Project [NPMP], National Security Common Files [NSCF], Box 1023, Memcons—President Nixon—President Ceausescu August 2-3, 1969, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

9. See Aijazuddin, op. cit., and Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

10. The conversation was described by Mircea Raceanu, former political officer in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the US desk and later political officer in the Romanian Embassy in Washington during a discussion with the author. Raceanu participated at the Maurer-Crawford meeting as a translator and note-taker on the Romanian side.

11. Minutes of the Meeting of the RCP Politburo, 4 August 1969. ANIC, Chancellery, RCP CC, 109/1969, republished in Budura, op. cit., p. 936, available also in the CWIHP Virtual Archive at www.cwihp.org.

12. Telegram from Ion Dorobantu to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Re the Reply of the Chinese Communist Party, AMAE, Telegram, Peking, vol. II, 1969, p. 212-13. Republished in Budura, op. cit., p. 928-9; available at www.cwihp.org.

13. Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Re discussion with Zhou Enlai, Premier of the Council of State of the PRC, 23 August 1969, AMAE, Telegram, Peking, vol. II, 1969, pp. 264-68. Republished in Budura, op. cit., p. 939-41; available at www.cwihp.org.

14. The minutes of the conversation between Ceausescu and the Chinese ambassador was not located, however, Maurer refers to it in his conversation with Zhou Enlai in 7 Oct. 1969.

15. While Maurer was in fact the Prime Minister, and, at least

theoretically, in a higher position than Ceausescu—who was the Secretary General of the RCP—there was no doubt that Maurer was not, in any way, a contender to Ceausescu's power within the Party. The distinction is, however, important because of a quote that has been extensively publicized concerning Zhou's reaction to the message from Nixon through Khan: "this is the first time this message has been received from a head [of state], to a head, through a head."

16. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 7 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, p. 4-30; Republished in Budura, op. cit., p 943-59; available at www.cwihip.org.

17. Nixon had not explained how he would reassess the situation, and, so Maurer was unable to tell Zhou anything other than the fact that the White House would be reassessing its position vis-à-vis negotiations. It now appears likely that Nixon was referring to the 1969 "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test" of October 1969, an attempt to test "the Mad-man theory" and push the Soviets to change their policy in Vietnam for fear that Nixon was ready to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. For more information, see William Burr's analysis and Electronic Briefing Book at the National Security Archive www.nsarchive.org.

18. Zhou was making a reference to the possibility of opening up a dialogue with the Americans through ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, which while still ongoing on paper, had not been held for years. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 7 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, p. 6-30; Republished in Budura, op. cit., p 943-60; available at www.cwihip.org.

19. See Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965. New Chinese Evidence," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7, p. 232-42, and esp. 239-40;

20. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 11 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, pp. 35-65; Republished in Budura, op. cit., p 963-82; available at www.cwihip.org.

21. For a detailed discussion of the Chinese thinking on Sino-American rapprochement see "The Sino American Rapprochement, 1969-1972" in Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (UNC Press, 2001), p. 238-76. See also Nikolas Khoo, "Realism Redux: Investigating the Causes and Effects of Sino-US Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, 4:5, November 2005, p. 229-49.

22. Chen Jian, op. cit., p.249.

23. Memorandum of Conversation, "Conversation with the President," Sept 9, 1969, RG 59, SN 67-69, POL Chicom-USSR; copy from the National Security Archive.

24. US Embassy Cable 3706 to SecState, December 3, 1969, "Contact with the Communist Chinese," RG59, SN67-69, POL Chicom; copy from the National Security Archive.

25. Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 251

26. Memorandum of Conversation, Agha Hilaly and Henry Kissinger, White House, December 19, 1969, NPMP, NSCF, box 624, Pakistan Vol. II; copy from the National Security Archive.

27. Memorandum of Conversation, Gheorghe Macovescu-Henry Kissinger, December 17, 1969, NPMP, NSCF, CF-Europe, Box 704, Folder Macovescu (Romania) [December 1969-November 1973].

28. Macovescu had been the lead Romanian Foreign Ministry official involved with in the Packers channel, and had traveled several times between Hanoi and Washington during the Romanian efforts to jump-start negotiations. The discussion on China accounts

for a mere 1.5 pages while the Vietnam discussion takes up two thirds of the nine pages memo.

29. For a discussion of the Pakistani channel and the messages sent during 1970, See Aijazuddin, op. cit., pp. 27-44; see also Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 254.

30. Memorandum of Conversation, Nicolae Ceausescu-Richard Nixon, Oval Office, October 26, 1970, NPMP, NSCF, box 936—VIP Visits.

31. Report by Gheroghe Radulescu to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the RCP CC, "Regarding the visit of the Romanian governmental delegation in the PRC and DRV from 15 to 26 November 1970," 12 December 1970, ANIC, RCP CC Foreign Relations Section, 98/1970, p. 6-35; published in Budura, op. cit, pp. 1021-42; available at www.cwihip.org. The text of the Chinese message is well known, and has been published repeatedly. See the text of the version given to the Romanians in the documents below. For the version given to the Pakistanis, see Aijzuddin, *op. cit.* As there was no break in the discussion with Radulescu—and thus Zhou Enlai had no chance to confer with Mao and Lin Biao—it should have been clear that the Chinese had received a similar message from other sources, and that the Romanians were, in effect, competing for the leadership of the channel to Beijing.

32. See Aijzuddin, op. cit., pp. 42-43. Aijzuddin gives the date of Zhou Enlai passing the message to Yahya Khan as Nov. 23, 1970. See also Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 254. Using Chinese sources, Chen Jian gives the date of the conversation as 14 November 1970. It is likely that Khan transmitted Nixon's message on 14 November but he received his reply from Zhou to the message only on the 23rd.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 45; Kissinger, op. cit., p. 700

34. Kissinger raises this possibility, Kissinger, op. cit, p. 700; Chen Jian suggests that this was the reason why the Romanians and the Pakistani did not transmit the information, Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 254. There is no mention of that request in Radulescu's report to Ceausescu—though certainly that could have been transmitted orally to Ceausescu prior to writing the report.

35. There is a mention of a meeting between Deputy FM Macovescu and Kissinger on 17 Dec 1970 in the FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XVII, pp. 239-240. Most likely that editorial note refers to the 17 December 1969 meeting between Macovescu and Kissinger. If indeed, a meeting took place between Macovescu and Kissinger in December 1970, Macovescu would have had to transmit the Chinese message to the White House.

36. Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, Re: Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan, 12 January 1971, NPMP, NSCF, box 1031, Exchanges leading up to the HAK Trip to China, Dec. 1969-July 1971 (1); copy from the National Security Archive.

37. Kissinger, op. cit., 699.

38. Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 256

39. Memorandum for the President, January 12, 1971. Nixon wrote his comments on the border of the memorandum.

40. Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Bogdan and Henry Kissinger, The White House, January 29, 1971, NPMP, NSCF, box 1033, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK trip to PRC, July 1071, copy from the National Security Archive.

41. Author's conversation with William Smyser, former NSC assistant to Henry Kissinger, 24 October 2006, Woodrow Wilson Center. Mr. Smyser suggested that Kissinger was concerned with the possible penetration of the Romanian leadership by the KGB; given the possibility of using the Pakistani Channel, there was no need to

to the Vietnamese problem falls under the jurisdiction of the Vietnamese comrades.

Qiao Guanhua expressed his opinion that the contradictions remaining between the US and the Saigon regime only concern secondary matters, while their principal positions continue to be identical (the American intention of staying in South Vietnam and the wish of the Saigon regime to support the Americans).

Referring to the National Liberation Front, the Deputy Minister assessed that this represents a significant political and military force, adding, however, that the force will not be capable of reaching its goal if a deficient political road is taken (alluding to the politics of negotiations).

4. Sino-Indian Relations.

The recent incidents on the Sino-Indian border had no particular significance. If the Indian government truly wants improved relations with China, it should have not used these cases as propaganda. China had a confrontation with India (in 1962), it knows what it can do, and that is why it does not pay any more attention to these incidents.

As a matter of fact, the Indian propaganda around these incidents is coordinated with the Soviet [propaganda] in order to present China in an unfavorable light in front of international public opinion.

According to the Chinese government, India cannot give up its anti-Chinese propaganda because it would not be able to enjoy American and Soviet aid.

Recently, the Soviet leadership undertook new actions with the purpose of bringing about an Indo-Pakistani rapprochement targeted against China. These attempts are bound to fail since the Kashmir problem will never allow such a rapprochement.

5. Certain aspects of China's relations with the European socialist countries.

Currently, in certain European socialist countries a strong anti-Chinese campaign is taking place regarding the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the incidents at the Sino-Soviet border. The most active are the Bulgarians, the Poles, and the Germans, while the Hungarians are the most moderate. The Chinese side understands the influence played by the presence of Soviet military forces in the territory of these countries on their attitude towards the People's Republic of China.

6. China's position on Israel

Israel is an artificial creation and represents an instrument of imperialist politics. The People's Republic of China does not recognize this country and does not maintain any relations with it.

Currently, certain Arab states have a reconciliatory position towards Israel under pressure from the Soviet Union, which is pursuing the consolidation of its position in the Near East.

Israel has committed an aggression and the People's Republic of China is supporting the cause of the Arab states against this aggression; however, China differentiates between Israel's leading circles and Israel's people. The Chinese gov-

ernment does not support the idea of annihilating Israel, yet it considers that under current conditions, supporting Israel's existence as a historical reality implies support for aggression.

To sum up, Qiao Guanhua informed that the Chinese side is working on sending an ambassador to Bucharest and hopes that he will arrive in his post before 23 August.

(ss.) A. Duma



DOCUMENT No. 2

Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu Concerning the Information Passed to the PRC Foreign Ministry Regarding the Organization of the 10th RCP Congress and the Intention of Certain American Senators to Visit China, 3 June 1969

[Source: A.M.A.E., *fond Telegrams, Beijing, vol. II, 1969, f. 74-77. Published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 921-923. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.]*

No. 56 228

3 June 1969, Beijing

Confidential

1:30 pm

Urgent

1. During the meeting on 2 June of this year, I presented to Qiao Guanhua, Deputy Foreign Minister of People's Republic of China, the contents of the decision concerning the convocation of the 10th Congress of the RCP and the CC theses for the congress of the party.

Qiao Guanhua carefully listened to my exposition but did not ask any questions or express his opinion. He thanked me for it and declared that the document composed by the RCP CC would be closely examined by the Chinese leadership.

Furthermore, the deputy minister inquired about the state of the Romanian economy. I briefly mentioned to him our current concerns regarding this matter.

2. On the occasion of the same visit, I informed Qiao Guanhua about the intention of certain American senators to make an unofficial visit to China.

The deputy minister expressed thanks for the information and made the following comments in regards to it:

"You are familiar with the position of the Chinese government towards the US. It is known that in February 1950, Truman, the American president at that time, declared that the Taiwan issue is China's domestic problem, but only a few months after this declaration, the Americans occupied this Chinese territory and the Taiwan Strait with troops, and eventually announced the idea of creating two Chinas.

We support peaceful coexistence with all states, including the US, but the principles of this policy cannot be applied to a state that occupies a Chinese territory and leads a policy hos-

tile to China.

In our opinion, the American initiatives towards bilateral relations with China do not represent a new policy, but rather new methods of the Nixon administration, which realized that the US was not able to obtain results by promoting power politics vis-à-vis China. In fact, Nixon's policy is still reactionary, warlike, and hostile towards China.

The Chinese nation has not accepted the American policy towards China even in the past, when it was even less prepared both politically and economically. Thus, it will be even less disposed to accept this policy now.

In regards to the creation of two Chinas, even Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] is against this but, of course, also for other reasons. On one side, he aspires to regain China, and on the other side, he expresses the general feelings of Taiwan's population, which does not wish to live separately from China.

It is [interesting] to point out that the Soviets are vigorously pushing towards the creation of two Chinas; a convincing example attesting to this is the participation of the Jiang-Jieshi-ists at a conference in Bulgaria. We consider that there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will send an ambassador to Taiwan."

In response to my remark that the main problem would be the American withdrawal from Taiwan, Qiao Guanhua pointed out that "prior to the American withdrawal from Taiwan and from the Taiwan Strait, a problem discussed at the ambassadorial level for over ten years, the tensions in Sino-American relations cannot be reduced [and] other matters cannot be discussed." He then continued, stating that "the Chinese government never believed that the Americans could ever be driven out of Taiwan by diplomatic means [alone]. We consider that this problem will not be solved for a long time to come, due to the fact that the Americans will not easily renounce their hostile policy towards China."

Referring to certain aspects of the situation in Taiwan, Qiao Guanhua stated that at the Guomindang [Kuomintang] Congress that recently took place, Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] was named as successor of his father, Jiang Jieshi. He added that, even though the alliance between Taiwan and the US is very close, Jiang Jieshi does not allow American control of his army. In fact, the deputy minister underlined, there are not many American troops in Taiwan, but this territory is controlled by the American Navy, which patrols the Taiwan Strait.

While relating the above mentioned issues, Qiao Guanhua spoke in a [calm] distinguished tone.

I pointed out the fact that the deputy minister did not declare that he would inform the leadership about the American senators' intention to visit China and did not promise that he would give an answer.

3. On a separate note, Qiao Guanhua pointed out that the Soviet reaction to the Chinese government's declaration on 24 May of this year, concerning the border issues between the two countries, temporarily manifested itself as an intensifi-

cation of the provocations at the border. Regarding the Joint Commission for Navigation Issues, he mentioned that the Chinese side agrees that it should meet in June, but he did not specify whether the Chinese government has accepted the 18 June date proposed by the Soviet side.

When asked about the visit to Beijing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris talks, the deputy minister indicated that he made contact with Chinese officials and emphasized that the Chinese side knows about the Vietnamese problem better than is depicted in the press. Qiao Guanhua stated that, according to some statements, the Vietnamese are determined to fight until they obtain final victory. He underscored that as long as Vietnam would continue the fight, the Chinese government will strongly support it. (I believe he was alluding to president Ho Chi Minh's recent speech before the higher military leaders, which was fully published in the 30 May 1969 edition of the *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*] newspaper.)

The meeting, which lasted an hour, took place in a close comradely atmosphere. From the Chinese side participated Li Lianqing, deputy director, and a Ministry Official as translator. I was accompanied by First Secretary I. Dorobantu.

(ss.) A. Duma



DOCUMENT No. 3

Telegram from Ion Dorobantu, Romanian Charge d'Affaires in Beijing to Corneliu Manescu Regarding the Reply of the Chinese Communist Party to the Invitation to Send a Delegation to the 10th Congress of the RCP, 18 July 1969

[Source: *A.M.A.E., fond Telegrams, Beijing, vol. II, 1969, f. 212-213. Published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), p. 928. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.*]

No. 56 312

18 July 1969, Beijing

Confidential

Urgent

On 18 July of this year, Sheg Jian, general secretary of the Foreign Affairs Department of the CCP CC, presented me with the letter of reply from the CCP CC to the letter signed by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP CC, in which a delegation of the CCP CC is invited to participate at the meetings of the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party.

The Chinese letter holds the date of July 1969, it is addressed to the RCP Central Committee and begins with "Dear comrades."

In the first paragraph of the document, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee confirms the receipt of

the letter from the RCP Central Committee and expresses its gratitude for the extended invitation.

In addition, the letter contains the following [text]:

“As we know, the traitor cliques together with the Soviet revisionists will participate at the congress of your party. We do not wish to be seated next to them, these acolytes of American imperialism, traitors of Marxism-Leninism.

Under these circumstances we do not feel comfortable sending a party delegation to your congress. We hope that you will understand our motivation.

China and Romania are allies, the Romanian people and the Chinese people are allies, and the Chinese people will support, as in the past, your struggle to defend your country. We express our conviction that the relations between our countries will continue to grow.”

I assured Sheng Jian that I would immediately pass on the message of this letter in the country.

In answer to a question, the interlocutor stated that the CCP CC Foreign Affairs Department did not receive an answer from the leadership of the communist parties in Thailand and Burma to the letters addressed to them.

The consultation took place in a close, friendly atmosphere.

We mention that diplomats from the socialist countries are persistently inquiring about the reply of the Chinese Communist Party to the invitation to send a delegation to the X Congress of the RCP.

I replied that I am not aware of a response from the Chinese side to this invitation.

We kindly ask you for [further] instructions.

(ss.) I. Dorobantu



DOCUMENT No. 4

Minutes of the Meeting of the RCP CC Executive Committee Regarding US President Richard Nixon's Visit to Romania (2-3 August), and the Discussions that Took Place on that Occasion, 4 August 1969

[Source: A.N.I.C. fond CC of RCP—Chancellery, file 109/1969, f.2-10. Obtained by Mircea Munteanu. Also published in *Published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974]*, edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 929-936. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.]

Transcript
of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the RCP CC
4 August 1969

[Excerpts]

[...]

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu: We thought of making a short presentation of Nixon's visit and the discussions we had.

In regards to the visit, you are familiar with the way it took place, so I can't tell you anything more about it.

The discussion took place on two occasions due to the short time available. Comrade Maurer represented us in the discussion of the more important issues, while Kissinger represented the Americans. Other participants from our side were the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade and from their side several of Nixon's deputies and counselors who discussed in greater detail economic issues and the development of relations in the fields of culture and science.

During the discussions we had with Nixon, we tackled two main sets of issues: the first one involved bilateral relations while the second dealt with international issues.

[...]

Regarding more general international affairs issues, he [Nixon] began with a broad statement regarding his visit to Romania, saying that he considered this visit to represent an expression of the American wish to develop relations with Romania and other socialist states and that he did not come to Romania with the intention of contributing to a further deterioration of relations between Romania and other socialist countries, but on the contrary, he wished for Romania to have good relations with the other socialist countries. He stated that they understood that Romania had a different social regime, but that they were determined to respect Romania's independence and social regime, and that they wished to develop relations under these conditions.

I told him that if we had believed that this visit would have as an ulterior motive the deterioration of relations between Romania and the other socialist states, we would have not agreed to the visit.

He subsequently stated: “let's talk like we did when I wasn't president.” In fact, he is a man who does not show disapproval when told things he does not agree with or when he has a different point of view, like others do.

Therefore, first of all, I would have told him not to come if I had had this impression. Then, I told him that we also view this visit in the spirit of cohabitation between us and states with other forms of social regimes.

In the discussion of international issues, more general issues were discussed, in a more theoretical setting [*pe principii inalte*] so to speak, regarding the principles that relations between states should be based on; the prospect of the development of international life; we spoke more broadly of principles such as the equality of rights, sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs; we tackled the fact that the US supports a set of reactionary, retrograde, and feudal regimes, and we do not understand why the United States of America, which was itself supported by France in the fight for national freedom and considered this as fair, is supporting today reactionary regimes.

In principle, he stated that they, too, believe that relations

should be based on mutual respect, on respect for sovereignty, and on the right of every country and nation to develop independently, and that they are prepared to, and wish to, respect these rights of every nation.

He spoke to us about the visit to India and Pakistan, about the concerns he had regarding the conflict between India and Pakistan, and conveyed that they were making use of extensive resources for arming themselves even though they had a low standard of living and could make better use of their resources to develop their economies. However, the situation was rather complicated and he could not see signs that the conditions existed for these problems to be resolved. And so he got to China.

He asserted that according to the American view, the People's Republic of China leads an aggressive policy in its relations with neighbors and referred particularly to the border conflict with India and Chinese intervention in Korea.

Here we brought up history and further discussed the issues. Kissinger, being a historian, stated that there were no instances in India's history when it led an aggressive policy. Here the Korean issue was also raised. I told them that the Chinese intervened there under special conditions, during war, but that after the armistice they withdrew, proving that the Chinese were not interested in territorial gains.

I explained to him that, in our opinion, it was necessary to renounce the policy of refusing to recognize China and admit it to the United Nations, since this policy did not help in solving international problems, considering not only issues in Asia, but even broader issues, a point with which he agreed. He asserted that in 25 years China would have a billion inhabitants and would certainly be a great power.

In this context, he also expressed his concern in regard to the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union, underlining that the main reason they were particularly concerned was that a conflict between China and the Soviet Union would not limit itself to these two countries and would have grave consequences. Thus, they were worried by the possibility of an escalation of this conflict.

At this point, I explained our position and told him that it would be truly serious if the situation escalated into a conflict, but that we believed things would not get to that point, and that if anything was to be done, it should be finding a way to avoid such a situation.

I say here what Nixon said and I don't know what he truly thinks, but in any case, this was his point of view and his analysis of the situation.

Since we are here—I am not following the actual order of discussion—I will move to the Vietnam issue. In fact, this topic took us the whole morning yesterday. The Vietnam issue occupied a very important place in our discussions. He broadly explained the point of view of the United States. Surely, it is not the history [of its involvement that matters], since we agreed that it is not necessary to talk about history, but of how to conceive a solution to this problem. He declared several times that one of his goals is to bring this war to an end. He

explained that they felt that progress had been made but that they did not manage to start actual talks with North Vietnam and with the National Liberation Front, and that this worried him, given that they would have to reevaluate the situation to see what they can do next if within the next three months—until November when there will be one year since the cessation of the bombardments—they would not manage to reach a resolution. He said that they were ready to withdraw their troops within a year, under the condition that North Vietnam withdraws its troops and a newly elected, internationally-controlled government was accepted.

Of course, the discussion was more complex and I don't want to get into any details, but we asked questions. We explained our point of view and the fact that we understood that North Vietnam was ready and wished to reach a solution through negotiations, but that this involved the cessation of the war, the withdrawal of troops and putting together a coalition government, as the National Liberation Front demanded. There was a longer discussion surrounding this topic with questions and answers.

What mainly resulted from this is that in the end, it is possible to have discussions and the solutions can be diverse, but the main point is finding a solution. Their main concern is that these discussions will take into consideration the existence of [South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van] Thieu, the government in the South. He talked about a commission and said that, in any case, they did not interpret this as abandoning the Thieu government and that they definitely wished—and he repeated this even during the meal—to end this war, but on reasonable terms that would not harm American interests or reputation.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Generally, he stated that the government would definitely be the result of elections, but they would not accept a solution that would eliminate Thieu without popular consent.

[...]

Ceausescu: To what extent he will go all the way, we will have to see.

We explained to him that, according to the contacts we made with United States allies, we also noticed in their case a wish to find ways to sort out relations and build up European security and we consider that this would be very important for the future development of relations, by leading to a lasting peace—as they say they desire.

These were the issues approached in our discussions.

The following could be said as a general conclusion:

First, it was a manifestation of the American interest in developing relations with Romania. He expressed several times that they truly wished that this visit would lead to the growth and progress of relations between our countries. Then, he expressed his desire to expand relations with all other socialist countries of Europe and even revealed his wish and intention to visit other European socialist states. During the exchange with the Bulgarian and Yugoslav ambassadors he



China and Eastern Europe from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24-26 March 2004

Former East-bloc diplomats Doncho Donchev (Bulgaria) and Joachim Schroeter (Germany) at the conference sponsored by the Parallel History Project. For more information see <http://www.cwihp.org>

actually stated that he hoped to have the opportunity to visit these countries. He also told [Soviet Ambassador to Romania Aleksandr] Basov that he wanted to visit the Soviet Union. Basov wanted by all means to find out when, but did not manage to get an answer. Overall, I left with the impression that the United States was contemplating a policy that would create conditions for the improvement of relations with the socialist countries and, while placing relations with the Soviet Union at the forefront, it wishes to simultaneously develop relations with the other socialist countries, a correct position in my opinion. I believe that if these opportunities will be used wisely we will have a lot to gain, generally vis-à-vis relations with socialist countries and world peace.

Another conclusion that I drew from these discussions—from the official ones and from the ones on the road and at the dinner—it seems that they are preoccupied to a certain extent with reorienting their policies in a way that would help them find solutions to disengage militarily from Vietnam and avoid engaging in similar military actions in the future. Of course, it is probably not only his position but also the position of America's leading circles, which are beginning to understand that this military intervention strategy has no prospects, that it has not had any positive results so far and that in the future it is unlikely to provide any results at all. In fact during the general conversation—in 1967 and now—I made the following comment: “The US is definitely the leading power now; but in the future there will be others.” He asked: “And China?” I told him: “yes, China, too.” I explained to him that this situation was not permanent, a fact that he agreed with. He said that they were of the same opinion, that circumstances were forcing them to renounce their old ways and look toward a new approach. Of course, this does not mean that they will fully abandon their policies, but that they will simply look for new means that will bring better results than the military approach. I believe that this fact is not without importance and proves

that they are approaching the situation wisely and realistically.

I think that we can conclude that Nixon's visit to Romania was good and useful, not only for the expansion of relations between Romania and the United States, but also because it contributed to the creation of a better environment for cooperation, proving that it is possible for two countries with distinct social orders and size to develop good relations if they abide by certain principles we know and practice, a fact confirmed several times by both sides. They even publicly confirmed this fact. We believe that in the context of the current international environment, this visit has a broader significance that is not limited to Romania. It seems that the United States understands it the same way and confers on it the same significance.

These were broadly the issues we discussed. If Comrade Maurer has anything else to add or if he has any other questions...

Maurer: I have nothing to add.

Cde. Ianos Fazekas: I propose to agree on this.

Cde. Gheorghe Stoica: I fully agree with the tone set by these discussions and I think we can congratulate Comrade Ceausescu and Comrade Maurer who achieved these results. Of course, imperialism remains imperialism.

However, we should not forget that Vietnam taught the Americans that it is better to take the chestnuts [out of the fire] with someone else's hand.

Ceausescu: They talked more about the fact that the third goal of American foreign policy was supporting developing countries.

He told us that there were 35,000 killed and 200,000 wounded in Vietnam, if the translation was correct.

Maurer: Yes, it is true, indeed; they have 200,000 wounded.

Stoica: It is very interesting, now they realize they cannot go on this way.

Ceausescu: They are concerned with the state of affairs in Asia and Africa, or the countries left behind, and it is in this context that he was looking at the one billion Chinese. I told him that this was not only about the one billion Chinese, but also the Indians, Pakistani, even the Japanese, who are all Asian and who will, always, remember this situation and show solidarity. It seems like they are starting to think more about these realities, not so much [about] today, but what things will be like tomorrow, and thus look at things from the point of view of the future and the changes that will intervene.

They are surrounded by many scholars and scientists who think [about tomorrow] and make all kinds of calculations. Generally, all of them were young. They are all people from university environments who evaluate, who compare; they cannot ignore all these [facts] and the future.

He started telling us what things could be like when China's population would reach one billion and then I told him that there would actually be even more [in number] since the other Asians should also be counted.

Stoica: I suggested to Comrade Dalea to forward the toast Cde. Ceausescu made during lunch, which is not without

significance.

Ceausescu: One thing that I would like to point out is that generally, we were able to discuss most things openly with Nixon. In the toast I also mentioned Vietnam, however, without mentioning that I discussed this topic with him. He knew beforehand what I would say during the toast about this and he did not say anything, but stayed and listened.

Naturally, they openly expressed their opinions as well. They simply concluded that this was the situation and that nothing more could be done.

As you saw, I took them to the market. They were quite lacking in the haughtiness that characterizes so many other leaders, even though he [Nixon] is the president of a great country, not only capitalist, because to be honest, today, from an economic standpoint, it is the most powerful country in the world. He did not come as if he was representing a great power, but went to the market and shook hands with all the grocers. From the perspective of social origin, he has a better background than some communists. His wife is a miner's daughter.

Cde. Dumitru Coliu: At the lunch, I sat next to [Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J.] Sisco, and during discussions with him, he told us about his life, and he told us that: "You know, if I lived in Romania, I would be the best communist." He said his father was a peasant.

Ceausescu: You know, they developed in a different way, they do not have the same feudal mentality of a bureaucratic liege [*birocratie boiereasca*], that you can find with some communists. Of course, here is not only a question of people, but rather a question of the changes that are taking place in American society. The fact that they landed on the Moon, that they reached such results in scientific exploration, cannot be without repercussions in the way people think. There, 70 percent of the population is made up of the working class. They are the most industrialized country. And, on top of that, the percent of intellectuals also grew, and these people cannot stop thinking, cannot be without influence.

I had a meeting with that group of American professors. There were about 50 professors there.

Stoica: All of them are simple people.

Ceausescu: I was looking at them, you would not believe that they were professors, based on how they dressed. Thus, from this point of view, we can learn some things from the imperialists. They were very modest, they asked questions, I answered them, at the end they applauded. I gave them that interview, the one you read. Of course, it's difficult to convince them that they need to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. They understand socialism, but not the way it's manifesting here, or in the Soviet Union, or China. It is, after all, difficult for them to grasp it. This is not understood even by the people who live there [in the US]. As a matter of fact, they will never reach socialism, if they continue with this [Western] mentality.

Cde. Leonte Rautu: The communists do not exist in the US.

Cde. Ilie Verdet: Kissinger stated that at least half [of the

CPUS] are members of the security services [FBI], and do not worry that their life is not secure. They only do one thing: report on one another; some report to the police, some report to the party.

Ceausescu: That's about it. Many called him "Comrade Nixon," including the radio announcer. The Americans liked the buildings they saw in the neighborhoods we visited.

Rautu: It is a very important success.

Ceausescu: We will inform our friends about these discussions. I already informed Basov, it took me an hour and a half. I told him all these things. Even Basov said that [the Americans] are straightforward people [*oameni simpli*].

That's it. The session is adjourned.



DOCUMENT No. 5

Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu Concerning the Conversation with Zhou Enlai, 23 August 1969

[Source: *A.M.A.E., fond Telegrams, Beijing, vol. II, 1969, f. 269-270. Also published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 939-941. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.]*

No. 56 349

23 August 1969, Beijing

Strictly confidential

Urgent

During the reception organized on 22 August of this year on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Romania's liberation, Premier Zhou Enlai sent his greetings to the Central Committee of the RCP and sent thanks for the reply to the message of the Chinese Communist Party addressed to the 10th Congress of the RCP and wished Nicolae Ceausescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and the other Romanian party and state leaders new successes in the fight for building the nation and defending the national independence and sovereignty. He stated that the Chinese government and people support this fight and consider it just.

[...]

With regard to Sino-Romanian relations, the premier stated:

"Smaller or larger clashes occurred at the Sino-Soviet border, permanently or systematically. The Soviets are pursuing several aims: intimidating China, internationally portraying China as the aggressor and convincing the Soviet people of the Chinese threat. According to our opinion, all these will turn against them. As far as we know, the Soviet people are unhappy and concerned by the anti-Chinese actions organized in the Soviet Union. We noticed on different occasions, for example, during the presence of the delegation in Khabarovsk at the meeting of the Joint Sino-Soviet Commission regarding the navigation

on border waterways, that the Soviet population and even the Soviet soldiers have a friendly attitude towards China.

The Soviets often talk about negotiations with China, but in practice they proceed in a different way. They prearranged incidents, even during the workings of the Joint Commission, concerning navigation on border waterways. The scope of these incidents was to delay the workings of the Commission. We made a great effort towards reaching an agreement at least in technical matters, which was obtained. According to the maps attached to the Sino-Soviet treaties, the region where the last incident occurred—Xinjiang—belongs to China. The Soviets do not recognize this anymore; with the help of 50 tanks they interrupted circulation in that particular passage, which belongs to China and connects to Chinese districts. Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership continues to take measures and to treat these conflicts with gravity. Only internal preparations and a stern opposition could temper the Soviets. We are intensely preparing to defend ourselves, but we are not excluding the idea of negotiations and we will not be the first to attack. The problem is that the Soviets have not shown honesty regarding the issue of negotiations.

We are currently preparing an answer to the Soviet declaration [made in] June, which was addressed to the State Council of the People's Republic of China by the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Besides this declaration, sent through a verbal note, we have not received any other messages from the Soviet leadership.”

Referring to the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the premier stated:

“As of now, no concrete plan of action in this regard has been established, since the *Fight! Criticize! Reform!* movement prevails in everything. Such a plan will be discussed in the near future, but for now we don't even know the site [for celebrations] of this anniversary.”

In my interventions I talked about the significance of the act of 23 August 1944,¹ about the domestic and foreign policy of the RCP and the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, particularly underlining the special documents adopted at the 10th Congress of the RCP.

During the discussions the atmosphere was relaxed, close and friendly, and the premier was kind and in good spirits.

(ss). A. Duma

1. *Editor's Note:* Romania officially declared war on Nazi Germany on 23 August 1944.



DOCUMENT No. 6

Minutes of Conversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu Mizil, Zhou Enlai, and Li Xiannian, 7 September 1969

[Source: *A.N.I.C., fond CC of RCP—External Relations Division, file 72/1969, pp. 4-30. Published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 943-959. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.*]

Minutes of Conversation

between Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the RCP CC Permanent Presidium Executive Committee, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania Council of Ministers and Comrade Paul Niculescu Mizil, member of the Permanent Presidium Executive Committee, secretary of the RCP CC,

[and] with Comrade Zhou Enlai, Chinese Communist Party CC Politburo Permanent Committee member, People's Republic of China State Council Premier and Comrade Li Xiannian, People's Republic of China CC Politburo member, State Council Vice Chairman.

– 7 September 1969 –

Witnesses to the discussions: Qiao Guanhua, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yu Zhan, director of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Department for the Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries, Ding Yuehong, Romanian translator, Ion Dorobantu, Chinese translator and Viorica Ivascu, stenographer.

The discussions began on 7 September 1969 at 11:45 p.m. and ended on 8 September at 2:20 a.m.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: First of all, I wanted to send greetings—and I am glad I can do this—to Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Lin Biao, to you personally, and to the other comrades, from Comrade Ceausescu and our party and state leaders.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: I thank you for these greetings. How is Comrade Ceausescu doing?

Maurer: He is in good health.

Zhou Enlai: I noted from the photo that he seems very healthy. How is Comrade Bodnaras doing? I heard that he is not doing too well.

Maurer: He had a heart attack but he was able to get through it. He is convalescing right now.

Zhou Enlai: He did not participate in your congress.

Maurer: No, because it took place while his heart attack was announced so he could not participate.

Then this sad event occurred in Vietnam, spurring this trip in order to express our condolences. And we thought that on

this occasion it would not be a bad idea to make a quick political tour. We haven't seen each other in a long time, Comrade Zhou Enlai. Many events have taken place in the world since then.

Zhou Enlai: We haven't seen each other in two years.

Maurer: But a lot has happened in the world in these past two years and we figured it would not be a bad idea to make a little tour.

First, we wish to thank you for participating in the festivities that we had this year at the Congress of the Party celebrating the 25th anniversary of the liberation of our country. The participation of the Chinese state and party proved your strong support during the difficulties we encountered in trying to establish fair rapport between socialist countries. We thank you for this.¹

Zhou Enlai: I noticed that the telegram I sent you caused the Soviet revisionists to leave the room where the congress was taking place.

Maurer: If you would have sent another one... (laughs).

Zhou Enlai: We are afraid we could cause you further difficulties. Even though our telegram was written in rather moderate terms, they have put pressure on you.

Maurer: The problem now is this: we view your position towards us as one that has been of use to us and that has helped us.

Likewise, we also appreciated the fact that things were expressed with great care and we would like you to know that we are grateful for your support and count on it. It is exactly for this reason that we wish to expand relations, obviously, within the limits of mutual interest and possibilities. We have previously talked about this matter. We talked with your comrade ambassador to our country and with the comrade deputy minister of foreign trade.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, on the occasion of the visit he made to Romania.

Maurer: We showed our interest in further developing relations; this refers to economic relations, exchanges of merchandise, an eventual cooperation in production and in special production. Of course, we have to look at all these in a reasonable and realistic manner.

Our political relations are developing. We never tried to hide our desire to develop these relations. On the contrary, we have affirmed our wish to develop these relations as an essential element of our policy.

I insisted on making a couple comments concerning our bilateral relations so you could meditate on them and see what we can do to develop these relations multilaterally. Of course, we wished to make this tour in the light of certain recent political developments. It seems to me that Nixon's visit to Romania has raised much interest and that is why I wish to begin with this.

Comrade Ceausescu communicated through your ambassador the content of this visit. I told the ambassador, however, that there are certain aspects that could be better explained during a direct conversation, so this is why I will concentrate on

this visit. Of course, since the discussions with Nixon were so long, several things were discussed during the visit. Some of these, such as European security, would probably be of less interest to you; others are of more importance to you.

First of all, Nixon expressed without any reservation his wish of finding a way to normalize relations with China. He articulated this very clearly and asked us to help in this matter if we can. I am not sure how we can help (smiling); I told him that what we can do is inform the Chinese leadership about the situation. I told him, however, that it seems to us that there is a series of issues towards which the Chinese leadership has taken a stance and for which you should find solutions, and maybe, by seeking solutions for these problems, will find a way to normalize relations with China. One of these problems is Taiwan (Zhou Enlai laughed).

Of course, we didn't discuss any details such as what has to be done with Taiwan or what doesn't. It is not our business to discuss such matters. If you will set a date to discuss this, then this discussion will be between you and them, but the man expressed this wish.

Our impression was that this wish was sincere, in other words, it corresponds to certain important American interests. We could not figure out what the American interests corresponding to this wish are. We know well that in the opinion of the American public, the wish to normalize relations with China has been present for quite some time. They talked to us about this wish several times. At one point, [Harvard economist John Kenneth] Galbraith conveyed to us Robert Kennedy's wish, when he was still alive, to come and discuss with us, among others, this problem and see what our opinion is vis-à-vis this situation. The visit never took place due to particular circumstances; later it didn't take place due to Kennedy's tragic end.

It was during the discussions with Harriman that I became aware of this preoccupation with establishing normal relations with China. I had a pretty long discussion with Harriman.

Somebody has already communicated all these things to you, but I want to explain them in this context, because I am under the impression that Nixon—and this is our opinion and the reasoning of the party leadership concerning this issue—that Nixon wants to implement this tendency that is rather markedly present in public opinion and certain leading circles.

In relation to this issue, we also discussed the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Nixon stated firmly that he did not intend to support the Soviet Union in any way if it has any aggressive intention against China.

He talked about the Soviet Union's wish to achieve this Asian security pact. Nixon showed us that the United States would not enter this [pact] in any way and that, in the discussions he had in the countries he visited—India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand—he revealed this position to his varied interlocutors. During these discussions, he clearly showed the United States' position, which does not wish to enter this system or to support in any way the creation of this Asian security pact.

He was very concerned by the possible escalation of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union and noted that

in his opinion, if this escalation would tragically lead to a confrontation, this would be the most serious threat to world peace. I understood, according to Nixon's remarks, that he did not make a secret out of this before the Russians. He didn't express it directly but he said it in such a way as to make his position known to the Russians.

On multiple occasions, Nixon expressed his wish and concern with finding a way to normalize relations with China.

Of course, within the framework of these discussions, we deplored the fact that as a result of a series of prior acts, China did not participate in the United Nations, because in the end none of the major international issues could be resolved without China's participation. Considering this, we deemed as fair his wish to normalize relations with China. This was one of the problems. Of course, we could not discuss any actual means, but estimated that Nixon's intention of normalizing relations with China was a positive sign.

We explained to him: it seems to us that the analysis of the problems between the United States and China sets the tone of this normalization. If these problems are resolved, normalization will ensue and we told him that we will communicate this discussion to the Chinese government.

In regards to this matter, Nixon categorized the Vietnam issue as being another element that worsens the international state of affairs and that bores the United States which wishes to liquidate it.

He told us that he reached the conclusion that the Vietnam issue could not be solved militarily, that they had concluded that the situation in Vietnam would have to be resolved through political channels and that he was prepared to find a political solution. He said that at the moment the most important thing was not trying to decide whether they made a mistake or not by engaging in Vietnam or if they made a mistake in the way they conducted the Vietnam War, but the problem was how to find a solution.

Due to a confluence of favorable conditions—he stated—they reached the Paris talks. However, for a while now, the Paris talks have been idle, so to speak. He said: "We are willing to discuss absolutely any problem from the ten points of the provisional government to the four points of North Vietnam government and the eight points that we, the Americans, proposed, to any other point that could come up, but we want to discuss these to reach a conclusion and move forward. But for a while now we have been coming up against an attitude in Paris and we reached the conclusion—he said—that probably the Vietnamese realized that they have to apply the following strategy: to delay the peace talks and to set in motion a military offensive in South Vietnam hoping that this way the American public opinion, which was against the war, would become increasingly strong and would force the United States to capitulate and withdraw troops under unfavorable conditions." Nixon continued with the following remarks: "If the Vietnamese reached this conclusion, they are wrong. It is true that a good part of the American public opinion wants the end of the Vietnam War, and I myself want the end of this war—

Nixon said—but the Vietnamese are mistaken in thinking that this war will end by having the American public force the president of the United States to capitulate or accept unfavorable conditions."

He said: "I am willing to wait until November, when there will be a year since the beginning of the Paris talks. If the current discussion won't make any progress by November, the United States will be forced to reassess its position."

Of course, we asked: "And what does this reassessment of your position entail? Does it mean that you will further intensify the war?"

He didn't say yes or no. He only said that the situation will need to be reevaluated.

Naturally, we tried to show: but look, they want to propose a solution, to install a provisional government in which all the sides in Vietnam would participate and that, after your withdrawal, they would organize elections. We asked: "Do you think that the election that will take place under the presence of American soldiers in South Vietnam will be free and fair?"

To this he replied: "I am willing to withdraw from there, of course, under the condition that North Vietnamese troops will also withdraw. I have nothing against respecting the decision of the Vietnamese people. If the South Vietnamese people say: the government in Saigon has to leave, I am not against it. If they say that they want to unite with North Vietnam, I will not be against it but this decision has to be made freely, under international watch and with all possible guarantees."

I said: "If the government in Saigon remains there, will the election be free?"

He said: "Saigon should not organize the elections."

"Then why are you not agreeing with the solution of the provisional coalition government?" we asked.

He said: "We cannot agree with this, because this provisional coalition government will not include any of the Saigon government officials, and if I would agree to this it would mean condemning the Saigon government before the Vietnamese people could express their position, and—Nixon said—I cannot agree with this."

So what can we conclude? This is our interpretation: the man is searching for a solution. This is all. The reasons why he is looking for a political solution are pretty clear to us at this time: the war in Vietnam is becoming increasingly unpopular in international public opinion as well as in the American public opinion.

The man has all the interest, then, to find a solution. We think that this is why he is looking for a solution. Of course, he is looking for a solution that will be as convenient as possible. But in the end, since he is looking for a political solution, this war, too, will have to end. It is a good thing if it ends as a result of discussions, and in our opinion, a solution could be reached that would respect the fundamental aspirations of the fight of the Vietnamese people. Of course, the discussions won't be easy and will take place over an entire evening session. But there are some objective conditions—in our opinion—to force the American administration to make

concessions over the course of these discussions. In our opinion, this should be tried. Of course, it is not something that will be solved quickly, but it is a matter which, if approached rationally and skillfully, could lead to the mobilization of large popular masses that could push the United States to make these substantial concessions that have to be won by the Vietnamese peoples, either during the discussions or militarily. We believe that promptly solving the Vietnamese issue is very indicated under the current circumstances, Comrade Zhou Enlai. Of course, not any solution will do. Nobody is thinking about this, but this needs to be settled under the condition that it assures that the Vietnamese people will have the possibility of taking control of their own future.

Why do we think that under the current circumstances there is an additional reason to wish that the conflict in Vietnam will be solved more quickly? We want this because of an escalation of the conflict between the Soviet Union and China and we are afraid that the existence of this war in Vietnam—I tell you exactly what we think about the situation—could encourage the Soviet Union to do something hasty. It would not be the first time that this would happen. Ultimately, it's only been a year since the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which, in our opinion, first of all, was the direct result of the fact that they did not think beforehand and did not analyze the situation or the consequences of their actions. In other words, we are very close to a situation which shows us that the Soviet leaders take action, at least sometimes, in very critical instances and circumstances, literally, in a manner other than rational, calm or wise. They are not capable of evaluating the situation realistically or having a sensible vision of the future. That is why we think that this ongoing conflict in Vietnam could be considered by these people as something that invites a hasty act. They're probably thinking that the Americans are on this side, China supports South Vietnam [NLF], we are coming in the North and doing a little cleansing, a preventive action—or whatever else you could call it. There are a couple other hypotheses but facts show us that very often these people are not able to evaluate situations and particularly their consequences in a rational, judicious manner.

This is why we think that this is the moment to find a solution to end the conflict in Vietnam as quickly as possible. It is clear that this solution, to a certain extent, represents an advantage for America. The fact that America ends the war in Vietnam is a good thing for it. The question is, how will it bring it to an end? If it finishes it ensuring that the Vietnamese people will be able to decide their own fate, then this solution is, in our opinion, more advantageous to the Vietnamese and all of us, than to the Americans. We also think that this solution might be reached during the discussions. What is important, though, is to conduct these discussions with enough skill and to take into consideration the fact that what probably constitutes for them—so to speak—the major holdback is [the need] to save the prestige of the United States, so that the United States won't come out of this completely humiliated. If a solution that will ensure this is found, it is our opinion and conviction



Zhou Enlai with Ion Gheorghe Maurer, on a visit to Romania in June 1966 (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives)

tion that during these discussions, the fundamental objectives of the Vietnamese people can be reached.

In any case, we think that this has to be tried. This does not mean that the armed conflict has to end as a result of initiating more involved discussions regarding this matter; this can continue as long as a more acceptable result is reached. What we are not in favor of is the stalemate of the Paris talks.

This is what I wanted to express in regards to this matter, which I believe is one of the most important problems.

We tried to open discussions with him on the subject of the Near East. He showed relatively very little interest concerning this matter.

Zhou Enlai: Why?

Maurer: I don't know.

Zhou Enlai: It's very interesting that he didn't want to discuss this matter with you.

Maurer: The point is that the longest discussion centered on the problems that I just described.

Zhou Enlai: Couldn't the fact that they didn't want to discuss this issue with you mean that they have already reached an agreement with the Soviets?

Maurer: I don't know if they did or if they didn't. The only thing he said about the Near East is that if they did not find a way to eliminate this problem, this could become a dangerous matter. But how or what will it be...?

More than that, during the official address, we approached the Vietnam issue openly and very publicly, the way we normally do it, including the issue of American troop withdrawal. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated this very clearly in his speech. Nixon very briefly mentioned this issue in his public speech. He didn't say yes or no. He said that the United States wanted peace, but would respect the commitments it had made. Basically, he avoided any polemic directed at this chapter. He did not want to make any public declaration or to take a public position, and this is how we concluded that the man was looking to facilitate the possibility of an arrangement.

These are the issues in Asia, as they resulted from the discussions with Nixon.

Of course, other than these, we also discussed issues related

Zhou Enlai: "What results from these facts is that all current Soviet leaders are the same, and they are all crazy."

to European security and the United Nations... and on this occasion I told him: "How do you think you will be able to solve issues related to the UN, to disarmament and nuclear disarmament and all other problems without China? He admitted that it was impossible to solve the major international issues without China and said that they have to find a way to normalize relations with China. This was the discussion with Nixon and the conclusions that we drew in the light of this discussion.

Of course, Nixon's visit to Romania set off some problems and I would like to inform you of those as part of this discussion.

On the occasion of the visit we made to Moscow, at the international conference of communist and workers' parties, it was decided that Brezhnev and Kosygin would come to Bucharest to sign the Friendship Treaty.

Cde. Paul Niculescu Mizil: The Friendship Treaty that has been agreed on for several months now and is ready to replace the one which expired over a year ago.

Maurer: We told the Soviets that Nixon would come here [to Romania].

Niculescu Mizil: They sent an official letter signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin to the Romanian side, informing us that they would come here on 15-16 July and asking for our consent. We consented immediately and the visit was arranged.

Maurer: And when Nixon's visit took place we made it known to them. Later, we received another letter also signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, in which they stated that they regretted that they could not make it on July 15-16 due to unforeseen circumstances that would prevent them from coming.

Niculescu Mizil: The extent of their concern is what they didn't foresee... (laughs)

Maurer: Yes, this concern does not allow leaders at their level to come here. They said that they regret this since the treaty, which has particular importance, was going to be signed during this visit, but that they plan on doing this in the fall.

Niculescu Mizil: They proposed to sign the treaty in the fall.

Maurer: At a date that would be later established though common accord.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, unforeseen events... On the occasion of President Ho Chi Minh's death, Kosygin cancelled the reception of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, but later changed his mind and received him; this means that he granted more importance to Japan than to you. They do not keep their word to a socialist country.

When they found out about the death of President Ho Chi Minh, they decided to leave immediately for Hanoi. But, after-

wards, when they heard that we were in Hanoi and that the funeral was taking place later, they postponed their departure. After finding out that we had returned, they rushed again to leave for Vietnam.

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was received as soon as he arrived in Moscow. We can see what attitude they have towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a militant country like Japan, to which they grant so much attention. In their heads the only countries that exist are the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and then England and France. Those are their greatest friends.

This is the main problem.

Maurer: In any case, what we are concerned with is that during this whole affair our independence and sovereignty are respected.

Zhou Enlai: In our bilateral relations, we respect these principles and this is a condition that favors our friendship.

I have told you before and I want to tell you again, I also told the same thing to our Vietnamese comrades, that our guiding principle is not interfering in Vietnam's domestic affairs or asking them to continue the war or start negotiations. We will support them when they will ask us, when they need our support, according to our capabilities. I told the same thing to the current Vietnamese leadership.

Ho Chi Minh was a close friend of ours during periods of conflict; there were strong class feelings between us. However, the Vietnamese Party and state have solved and continue to be able to solve their problems independently.

Comrade Ho Chi Minh has participated at the revolutionary movement in China in 1920-1930-1940. President Ho Chi Minh's passing represents a loss not only for the Vietnamese nation, but also for the Chinese and nations around the world.

As you are aware, I wasn't able to leave the country for three years because of daily preoccupations. Yet these strong ties between our parties and the Chinese and Vietnamese nations determined me to leave the country for one day to go to Vietnam. Li Xiannian will lead the delegation that will participate at the funeral. Not attending the funeral would be a sign of disrespect on our part. I wasn't able to stay there more than a day; even though I was there during the first day, I was late. When I arrived the body was being embalmed.

When they found out that I was back in Beijing, the Soviets were relieved. They cannot understand these ties between us. There is not only a difference in our position but also in our feelings. This means that we are not going in the same direction.

What do you think of Soviet policy? They exercised so much pressure against Czechoslovakia! Likewise, they are putting great pressure on you and East Germany, while they allowed elections in West Berlin, which means selling out West Berlin. Currently, a large number of troops are concentrated to the north of China. They are trying to do too many things at once. Just as the Americans, they are involved in too many issues; they are active in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, not to speak of the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic, and

they have even been in the Caribbean for a while.

Maurer: This is true, and we too are thinking of all these things, Comrade Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai: What results from these facts is that all current Soviet leaders are the same, and they are all crazy.

Maurer: We are thinking the same thing, Comrade Zhou Enlai. But there is one difference. We are smaller than China, much smaller actually, and the care with which we are looking at all these things is much greater than theirs.

I want to tell you that there are many things that are very hard to explain or the explanations are very sad. But we have to take in account that the Soviet Union is right next to us. The only thing dividing us is a river not even 40 meters wide. The Soviet Union has great military capabilities. The crazier its leaders are, the more dangerous it becomes. Of course, we are by no means trying to cause a conflict. We are trying to find some common ground with the Soviet Union, not just in any way, but based on a set of principles. If the Soviet Union tries to do in Romania what it did in Czechoslovakia we will fight back. Of course, we don't have the pretension to crush the Soviet army, to reach Moscow and dictate peace in the Kremlin...

Zhou Enlai: You can't have these pretensions.

Maurer: ... We cannot do this, but we will fight in Romania the same way that the Vietnamese are.

Zhou Enlai: Just like you, we don't have these intentions either, even though they say that we are some sort of successors of Genghis Khan. We tend to ignore this calumny and we can tell you that we don't have these intentions either.

Maurer: Now, the truth is that we are worried about the deterioration of relations between China and the Soviet Union and I can tell you why: because this can cause the Soviet Union to do something stupid in China, but it can just as well do something stupid in Europe just to be able to say: my hands are free, I can do whatever I want to do there.

This situation does not only worry us but many others, too. I believe that many countries are worried about this situation; their preoccupation revolves around finding a solution to help avoid the conflict between these two great powers. Not to mention how this would affect socialism. It would be the war that started between two very powerful socialist countries and that could end up endangering international peace. We are taking this very seriously, Comrade Zhou Enlai, very seriously. The Soviet Union has put a lot of pressure on us, you know this well, to take the Soviet Union's side, to embrace its points of view, to be able to say: China leads a policy of aggression. It hasn't been easy but we thought we had to do this, it is mandatory to do this.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, we know this, and both the party and our nation appreciate your position because this is a fair position. It is not easy for you.

Maurer: We thought that for us, the only fair position is our main position.

Niculescu Mizil: And we clearly specified in the discussions between comrades Ceausescu and Brezhnev that we

would never be the ones advising the Soviet Union to fight China, or the Chinese to fight the Soviets. In our opinion, the position that corresponds to the Soviet Union's interests—because we were discussing this with them—and international peace and socialism is trying not to intensify the conflict.

Maurer: Declarations of this nature have not been received calmly, Comrade Zhou Enlai. This is clear. But we thought that it is good to do this and I think that one of the things we accomplished at the Moscow talks, that took place the way it did, is that there was a fairly large number of communist parties that stood up against condemning China. It is not a secret for anyone that one of the objectives of this conference was to denounce China. When? After we agreed that there would be no denunciations at the conference. The Paraguayan was the first to stand up.

Niculescu Mizil: The Paraguayan... this was the form.

Maurer: Yes, the form. Exactly.

Niculescu Mizil: Comrade Ceausescu had a discussion with Brezhnev before the conference.

Maurer: Comrade Ceausescu stood up and said: "This is something that we will not accept," and he wasn't alone. In my opinion it was a significant occurrence, maybe one of the most notable of the entire conference as certain things were prevented that could not previously be stopped. Comrade Ceausescu and Comrade Mizil, who talked for a long time with an entire group of parties, detected the preoccupation of an important number of parties with finding ways to improve relations with the Chinese Communist Party. The Italians expressed this wish together with the Spaniards and others.

Niculescu Mizil: This is where the following happens: certain actions undertaken by the Soviet Union, especially the intervention in Czechoslovakia, had a good side too—if we can put it this way—in the sense that they woke up a number of communist parties. An extremely important aspect, Comrade Zhou Enlai, was what I had the possibility to discover during the contact we made with various parties. This relates not only to the problems in Czechoslovakia, because there are parties that, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, are examining their position [in the communist world] in more general terms. You see, we are giving much importance to the fact that in Moscow, a significant number of parties presented their own point of view and they clearly affirmed a party's right to independence, a fact that led to the [Soviet] failure to achieve the initial goals of the conference. The initial plan was to bring together a large number of parties that could all raise their hand in approval of the same idea, with the same discipline—so to speak—in front of which there could be only one leader. And this is not what happened since an important number of parties clearly exposed their own positions.

I have to tell you that according to the contacts I made with numerous other parties, many of the comrades in the leadership of these parties and central committees are reexamining the way they have perceived the Chinese problem until now. It is also an important aspect of the international communist scene.

There are parties, as I have informed you about some of these at the time, serious parties, which consider that it would be good to find a possibility to contact you, to hold discussions and meetings with the Chinese Communist Party and that affirm in official documents their wish to reexamine their former positions vis-à-vis the Chinese Communist Party. I am referring to the Spanish Communist Party, the Italian Communist Party and the Indian Marxist Communist Party with which I had a few meetings and which came to our Congress. I am referring to parties that are not necessarily big, but that hold a certain position, such as: the Communist Party from Reunion, a series of European communist parties, the English Communist Party, the one in Switzerland and the ones in the Nordic countries. We decided to develop contacts with these parties. I can honestly tell you, since our relations are based on complete sincerity, that the Chinese Communist Party could offer support in this process of building new relations within the workers' movement, against the infringement of principles of norms dictating relations, such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Maurer: The affirmation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine.

Niculescu Mizil: Limited sovereignty.

These are some interesting reactions and we think that, as far as we are concerned, we should closely follow and stimulate them.

Regarding the same matter, I wish to tell you that during the contacts I made I had the opportunity to notice that many communist parties are concerned with the conflict at the Sino-Soviet border. There is a great effort to present China in a negative light. This is why, during the discussions we had with these parties, we clearly showed our position to the effect that we would not take the position that our Soviet comrades were trying to dictate [their views] and that our attitude centered on the effort to do everything possible to avoid a potential intensification of the conflict and to try to solve it by political means.

I want to underline that changes are occurring in Latin America, in the Dominican Communist Party, the Mexican Communist Party—we have good relations with both. There are some interesting positions even within the Communist Party of Venezuela, even though there are still some possibilities to maneuver things there. And there is a progression of tendencies and new aspects in the workers' movement that are worthy to mention and sustain.

Finally, with regard to the question that you posed, Comrade Maurer responded but I want to add one thing: our position is very clear. We will militate for the development of relations with all socialist countries. We will not do anything to worsen these relations, but we will firmly base these relations on the principles that we believe in and that we have already affirmed. And, to publicly state these principles, independence, the right of every nation, of every party to decide in its own country; you realize that, given our situation, it is not easy, but very difficult. I am telling you this for two reasons.

First of all, to show you that we are aware of the difficulties that we face; [but] we believe [in] stating these prin-

ciples—and this is clear not only for a group of people, for Ceausescu, Maurer, for a few others, it is clear for the entire Central Committee, for the entire party, it is clear for the entire nation. The congress that we just organized, we organized it in this spirit, to clearly portray our position and that of the entire nation regarding this problem.

The second reason that comrade Maurer pointed out is the fact that we consider the development of relations between Romania and China to be extremely important in this context. In other words, we believe that the development of economic, political and military relations between China and Romania is not just another issue, or just another set of bilateral relations between two countries, but a matter that at the same time represents an important element in the promotion of the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality of rights and that helps Romania to promote these principles.

Maurer: All these show in our opinion, Comrade Zhou Enlai, that there are developments in the international communist and workers' movement, and in our opinion, it would be wise for the Chinese Communist Party to see if it could do something about these things. This is one of our concerns that we have emphasized. We believe that an intervention by the Chinese Communist Party within the framework of this debate on principles that is shaking up an entire group of parties could help clarify it, and this is why we believed it proper to raise these issues with you.

Of course, there are many problems in this world, but if we are going to discuss all of them, we would never get to sleep. But these are some of the issues that we wanted to bring to your attention. Maybe we will see each other upon your return, if you have anything to communicate to us.

Zhou Enlai: Will you stay here another night?

Cde. Gheorghe Maurer: But why not?

Niculescu Mizil: We can spend the day here, too, not only the night.

Cde. Gheorghe Maurer: Why not? If we've come all the way here and we made this trip, we can at least sit down and talk. It's clear.

Zhou Enlai: Your stop in Beijing is interpreted as a very unpleasant event by many people in Moscow.

Cde. Gheorghe Maurer: This is true.

Zhou Enlai: Considering the fact that you are the only ones stopping in Beijing. The Korean comrades have also stopped here. The others traveled through Afghanistan, Pakistan.

Cde. Gheorghe Maurer: This is exactly why we wanted to go through Beijing and why we wish to stay here another day.

Zhou Enlai: The Korean comrades will also stay.

Niculescu Mizil: I said: we first of all prefer this road because we know it and we prefer to take the roads we are familiar with rather than the ones unknown to us.

Secondly, I heard that several delegations took the same flight.

Maurer: All, except the Soviet delegation.

Niculescu Mizil: We preferred to take our own plane.

Zhou Enlai: And the Koreans came on their own plane, too. Albania, being a smaller country, could not send its del-

egation on its own plane but had to travel on a foreign plane.

We understand very well that you are in a difficult situation. Is it inevitable to have these Warsaw Pact maneuvers on your territory?

Maurer: Now I want to tell you one thing, so that we can be very clear. We had certain agreements—regarding the clarification of the Warsaw Pact problems—which were very rigid and gave the Soviets the right to do almost everything until the end. We asked that these agreements be abandoned and that a new agreement be signed that would ensure the rights of every state participating in the Warsaw Pact, [as well as] the [Military] Command. The discussions took approximately two years. They were very heated, but in the end we imposed our point of view that no troops can be deployed from one state or on the territory of a state without the consent of that state. Of course, this new agreement establishes joint exercises, in other words, the Command is responsible for organizing the preparation for battle of the armies participant in the Warsaw Pact. During this preparation, the armies do various exercises. We agreed on an exercise on our territory right before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which other states were meant to participate. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, we decided to postpone the exercise until the fall of this year. Now they came and said: “it’s time, let’s do the exercise.” Our Chief of the General Staff is in Moscow right now. He has instructions to show clearly that we cannot hold any military exercises this year because we had a series of [other military] activities [*serie de actiuni*], so military exercises are out of the question. He also has instructions to sustain the idea of staff exercises, only the commanders, on the map, without troops.

Niculescu Mizil: In any case, we told them that during the fall of this year we simply cannot do any exercises.

Maurer: And we wish to only have general staff exercises even in the upcoming years. However, we think that until the very end we will push these exercises further and further. In any case, this is the position we are taking. It is clear that they cannot impose these exercises on us. It is true that the operating rules of the Command give it the right to organize exercises, but they do have a say in the way the exercises are done and in all these other aspects. Or, we are determined to push further the military exercises involving troops on our territory.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: I wish to thank you for this report at such a late hour. Even though there might be differences in our points of view, such a direct exchange of ideas between our countries is necessary. As you said earlier, when you will return here, we will talk more about a series of issues. Now I briefly want to deal with certain issues.

First of all, regarding the Vietnamese issue. I can tell you clearly: whether the resistance movement against the Americans continues or whether the Paris talks continue, it all depends on the Vietnamese. We exchanged opinions on a couple topics with them, especially on the topic of South Vietnam and the resistance fight against the Americans. This exchange of ideas referred to the way we are going to support them and what we can learn from this. In regards to the way this war

will continue, what proportion it will have, greater or smaller, these are their problems. Considering that our countries are neighbors and that our nations are connected by a long, revolutionary friendship, it is natural for us to help them. Vietnam is a neighboring country and I told them that China represents the back of their front. The nation of South Vietnam, of only 14 million inhabitants, operating on a limited surface of only 170,000 km squared, has been able and continues to resist an army of over 1,100,000 soldiers, including 500,000 Americans. It is amazing that such a small country has been able to put up resistance against such a big army for over five years. Because of this, there is nothing else we can do other than offer our financial and moral support. Considering that this is their war, our help can only be indirect. The situation is different in the Korean War where we directly participated with troops.

We believe that the Vietnamese people thus contribute to the cause of the proletarian internationalism, to the fight of nations across the world against imperialism. We talked about this several times in the past. This idea deserves to be emphasized by all of us, especially the Chinese nation. The Vietnamese people deserve our respect.

Regarding the Paris talks, we have never intervened in this matter. We don’t have to intervene. We did not intervene and we do not want to intervene; not only that, but we are not interested in the way these talks are unfolding, if they are stalling or not. We know a few things about these negotiations from the reports that our Vietnamese comrades present us.

In connection with this issue, I wish to make one proposition: it is necessary for you to make known the position of the Americans concerning the Vietnamese problem, considering that you have discussed this with the Americans and that you would not be peaceful if you did not. But when looking at the way the talks are unfolding, I think it is better that none of us interferes.

Maurer: But we can’t even do it, we don’t know.

Zhou Enlai: Maybe the Soviets are interested to have the treaties go faster in some situations and slower in others.

Matters like the West Berlin, the Middle East, and the Vietnamese and Czechoslovak issues are viewed by the Soviets as advantages in their negotiations with the Americans. It is likely that a number of well intentioned parties hope that the Americans will withdraw their troops from Vietnam and stop this war of aggression, but the Soviets do not look at things in this way. All their problems are subordinated to their external affairs, and their external policies are based on their alliance with the Americans, and this way these two big countries will determine the world’s fate. They are building a friendship with the Americans but are at the same time clashing with them. This is why today’s world is full of contradictions. In the context of these contradictions, your situation is more difficult than ours. We understand this. It is extraordinary how by promoting an independent foreign policy, you are not following the Soviets in their anti-Chinese acts and do not consider China as an aggressor country. We thank you for that.

If the war in Vietnam will end as a result of negotiations

with unfavorable results for the Vietnamese people, the Soviets will be responsible for this, not us or you. If you would intervene in this matter, they would blame it on you. They would say that the Romanian comrades intervened in this matter and spoiled everything. You can express these good intentions, but without getting involved. We clearly told the Vietnamese comrades, as Comrade Mao Zedong clearly told Comrade Ho Chi Minh, that the way this war will be conducted—fight or negotiations—will be decided by the Vietnamese. We also told them that if they will need our help in continuing this war, we will offer them this help, according to our possibilities.

Regarding the relations between China and the United States, you know that there are direct contracts between us and the Americans. You said it that, as a matter of fact, it is about China's place at the UN and Taiwan. We are discussing these problems with the Americans for the past 14 years. In any case, they know our position very well, and we know theirs. You put it very well that one day, sooner or later, these problems will be solved. Kennedy could not solve them. If Nixon won't solve them, there will be a Kennedy II and a Nixon II. In any case, we do not owe them anything, they owe us; they took over Taiwan and have to recognize the fact that Taiwan is ours.

In regard to our relations with the Soviet Union, I can tell you concisely that the border incidents that took place in the past months have been deliberately provoked by the Soviets. Their goal is to divert the population's attention from domestic problems.

Our first principle is not to provoke and the second is to resolve issues through equitable treaties. You know that we sent a delegation to Khabarovsk. In the beginning, they did not want to reach an agreement in not even one of the technical issues. However, we did reach an agreement in the end. They didn't foresee this so they proceeded to a number of calumnies.

Our attitude is based on not refusing negotiations, better said, on looking for equitable negotiations. We expressed this position in our declaration: until the issues are resolved the status quo shall be maintained and incidents shall be avoided. This is our position. During the last incident, which took place in Xinjiang, they took two prisoners and killed 22 of our people. They don't want to free the prisoners, not even the two in Xinjiang or another who was taken prisoner in the eastern sector of the border.

On the subject of the Soviet propaganda [claiming] that we would start a nuclear war, not even the Western press believes it. You understand that the only reason why we are trying to develop nuclear weapons is so we could destroy their own nuclear monopoly. Every time we tested nuclear weapons we published communiques stating that we will not be the first to use these weapons and that we seek the convocation of a conference bringing all countries together in order to ban these weapons altogether. Now they are making propaganda that they will bomb China's nuclear bases. But doesn't this mean war? Doesn't this mean an undeclared war? This will be war, it is an aggression, it can't be something else. They can say that

the Americans are the first to have started bombing and now they can do the same.

In February 1965, this Mr. Kosygin stopped in Beijing on his way to Hanoi. His visit coincided with the beginning of the bombardments. At that time, Kosygin did not have any objections towards this. If the Soviets will take the same stand towards China as the Americans did towards Vietnam, we will not stand quiet, we will not allow this.

Vietnam has its own situation. They wanted to separate the war in South Vietnam from the bombardments in North Vietnam. They wanted to separate the two areas of Vietnam. You were in that country and are aware of this. China's situation is, however, different. China is a united country. In spite of this, there might be a number of crazy leaders who are considering taking action against our country. Maybe this is why Brezhnev said that it is time to create a collective security system in Asia. But we can discuss about this later, when you will return.

Vietnam needs our help.

Let's stop here and continue when you will come back.

Cde. Ion Gheoghe Maurer: This is what we will do. We will stop by upon our return and we will try to continue our discussions about the most relevant topics and if you are interested we will also update you on other issues. Maybe you have specific questions.

One last thing, Comrade Zhou Enlai. Maybe we would not have anything against sending a press announcement stating that we have met and discussed. If it doesn't bother you, we could do this.

Zhou Enlai: It doesn't bother us.

Niculescu Mizil: It is better, so nobody will say that we had a secret meeting.

Zhou Enlai: You stayed in Beijing, we saw each other...

Maurer: Yes, that we stayed in Beijing and had a friendly conversation.

Zhou Enlai: Go ahead.

1. *Editor's Note:* The Chinese did not participate, but sent a message to the RCP Congress. Soviet delegate Konstantin F. Katushev walked out of the Congress and returned only after the message had been read.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Note of Conversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Zhou Enlai, 11 September 1969

[Source: A.N.I.C., fond RCP CC—External Relations Division, file 72/1969, f. 31-34. Published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974]*, edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 943-959. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.]

Note

concerning the conversation of Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer, RCP CC Permanent Presidium Executive Committee member, Socialist Republic of Romania Council of Ministers President, with Comrade Zhou Enlai, Chinese Communist Party Politburo Permanent Committee member, People's Republic of China Premier, which took place on 11 September 1969 at 4 p.m. in the car from the Beijing airport to the guesthouse.

Premier Zhou Enlai stated that, according to the previous agreement, he is ready to continue the discussions started on 7 September 1969 and proposed they begin as soon as they arrive at the guesthouse, so that the Romanian delegation, according to its wish, will be able to leave Beijing during the morning of 12 September. The premier mentioned that during the evening of the same day, after the conversations with the Romanian delegation, he will also have a conversation with the delegation led by Comrade Toi En Ghen, who expressed this wish.

Comrade president Ion Gheorghe Maurer agreed with the proposition.

Further, premier Zhou Enlai referred to Kosygin's visit to Beijing, stating the following:

"I said goodbye to Kosygin 15 minutes ago, after a three hour conversation that I had with him at the airport. He came to Beijing by making a great detour. This is because he didn't receive our consent to pass through China until pretty late, three hours after his flight's take-off. After receiving our consent, he continued his trip through the capital of one of the Central Asian republics. Having arrived here, he contacted Moscow, had consultations with the other leaders and later headed for Irkutsk, from where he arrived in Beijing.

The decision to come to Beijing demonstrates that the Soviets consider that Sino-Soviet relations are too strained and intend to ameliorate the situation in order to use this to attenuate the numerous internal contradictions in the Soviet Union.

As part of the conversation I had with Kosygin, several other problems were tackled, but, most of all, we discussed aspects of our bilateral relations, particularly the border conflicts.

I will discuss the conversation with Kosygin in greater detail during the exchange that we will continue at the guesthouse where Comrade Kang Sheng will also be present. Right now, I only want to present the main points of the discussions.

Regarding the border conflicts, we reached a verbal agree-

ment which contains the main points of our position, that I described to you on 7 September, more exactly, as the maintenance of the status quo until a final solution is found for the problems at the border and avoiding clashes.

I added one more point to this: the withdrawal of troops by both sides from the contact areas.

We agreed that I will notify Comrade Mao Zedong and our Politburo about this agreement, after which he will notify the CPSU Politburo and, after approval by both leaderships, this will take the form of a written agreement.

I explained to Kosygin that in order to resolve the issues at the border, one has to recognize the inequitable character of the border treaties imposed on the Chinese and Russian nations by the imperial and tsarist regimes, under conditions in which both nations were devoid of rights. I also explained to him that China has no territorial aspirations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but only wishes to settle the issues through an equitable treaty that will replace the unfair old ones. I told Kosygin that we wish to use the unfair treaties as a starting point of the negotiations and that during these we wish to find a solution, in the spirit of mutual understanding and concession, to the problem of the ownership of the currently disputed territories. This resolution has to account for the national sentiments of the inhabitants of the respective territories as well as for the economic activity that they have been conducting for generations.

I also agreed with Kosygin that we have a two-week deadline to exchange the drafts of the agreement on the discussed matters.

I showed Kosygin, as I told you on 7 September, that the flagrant violation of our land and air space, or the bombing of our nuclear facilities, will be considered acts of aggression and will mark the beginning of war.

Regarding the possibility that China will undertake a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union, I told him that not even the Western propaganda believes this idea, which is meant to incite the Chinese and Soviet nations against each other.

Kosygin did not attempt to defend the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the troop concentration at the Sino-Soviet border, including the Mongolian border, and did not even deny this fact. He refused to engage in conversations on this subject, proposing to leave aside those particular matters. His effort to avoid a polemical discussion was evident.

I told Kosygin that there are great differences between us in political and ideological matters that cannot be easily settled, but that they should not hinder the attenuation of tensions between states or the settlement of certain aspects of our bilateral state relations.

Kosygin also brought up the issue of aerial and railway transport as well as the subject of trade between our countries. He deplored the fact that there is no trade agreement between China and the Soviet Union, but only contracts and expressed his wish to start negotiations for concluding a trade agreement by 1970. He also solicited consultations and negotiations for a trade agreement over the extent of the upcoming five-year plan. He asked for the improvement of the balance

of exchanges of goods, in which the Soviet Union is currently running a deficit.

I replied to Kosygin that the one responsible for the current state of trade relations is not China but the Soviet Union, which annulled a number of treaties, and used the example of the cancellation of the agreement on supplies of pork products (the Chinese side) and supplies of wooden products (the Soviet side). In regards to commercial exchanges for the future five-year plan, I told him that we are not ready for it.

Kosygin brought up the issue of Czechoslovakia, showing that the acts undertaken in this country were just, since it [the Soviet Union] was convinced of the fact that socialism in Czechoslovakia was at risk.

I replied that we cannot accept this point of view and that our opinion remains different than theirs.”

Comrade president Ion Gheorghe Maurer intervened, showing that we have also expressed our point of view, which differs from the one of the Soviet leadership, in this matter.

Premier Zhou Enlai continued, pointing out: “I told Kosygin that there are many, very many, too many problems, which would take not three hours to discuss but three months.”

Comrade president Ion Gheorghe Maurer expressed his opinion that, even though the problems are numerous and complex, the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kosygin represents a good start that will possibly lead to a solution towards solving some of these problems.

The conversation lasted 40 minutes.

The translators were Ding Yuanhong, translator in the People's Republic of China MFA and Ion Dorobantu, First Secretary at the Socialist Republic of Romania Embassy in Beijing, Chinese translator.



DOCUMENT No. 8

Minutes of Conversation between the Romanian Delegation to Ho Chi Minh's Funeral, Led by Ion Gheorge Maurer, and the Chinese Delegation, Led by Zhou Enlai, 11 September 1969

[Source: A.N.I.C., fond RCP CC—Foreign Affairs Department, file 72/1969, f. 35-65, published in Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 963-982. Translated for CWIHP by Madalina Cristoloveanu.]

Minutes

Minutes of conversation between comrades Ion Gheorghe Maurer, RCP CC Permanent Presidium Executive Committee member, Socialist Republic of Romania Council of Ministers President and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Permanent Presidium Executive Committee member, RCP CC secretary, [and] with

Zhou Enlai, CCP CC Politburo Permanent Committee member, People's Republic of China State Council Premier, Kang Sheng, CCP CC Politburo Permanent Committee member, National General Assembly Permanent Committee Vice President and Li Xiannian, CCP CC Politburo member, People's Republic of China State Council Vice Premier.

The following individuals were [also] present at the conversation that took place on 11 September 1969 between 4:50 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.:

- from the Chinese side: Qiao Guanhua, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yu Zhan, MFA, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Department, Director; Han Xu, MFA Protocol Department Acting Director; Ding Yuanhong and Deng Gaozhong, MFA translators.
- From the Romanian side: Stefan Peterfi Istvan, RCP CC Candidate Member, vice president of Council of State; Duma Aurel, the ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania in Beijing, Gheorghe Rosu, RCP CC, Foreign Relations Division Chief; Ion Dorobantu, First Secretary of the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] embassy in Beijing—Chinese translator.

Referring to his conversation with the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. Kosygin, which took place in Beijing on 11 September 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai related the following:

Kosygin briefly talked to me about the Vietnam issue. He stated that, in his opinion, Nixon wishes to leave South Vietnam, but that the US president is relying on the Saigon government. Kosygin continued by saying that he considers this support as unfit, but did not go into details and did not express his opinion regarding [possible] solutions for solving the Vietnamese predicament. It was clear from this that he tried to avoid a contentious discussion.

Kosygin tackled the situation of the Near East, showing that this is very complicated. He said that recently, Israel organized attacks against the UAR [United Arab Republic; Egypt] along the Suez Canal. I did not ask any questions on this subject and he didn't make any assessments.

I told Kosygin that the disaster in the UAR in 1967 was the result of the Soviet attitude. He did not admit this and stated that the defeat occurred because the UAR was too weak. Kosygin also asserted that the US will not be able to obtain favorable results in the Middle East.

My conversations with Kosygin were centered on the main theme of Sino-Soviet relations.

During the conversation I tried everything in order to obtain the weakening of the tensions at the Sino-Soviet border. We agreed that the status quo will be maintained until the final resolution of these border issues, that clashes will be avoided and that troops from both sides will be withdrawn from the contact areas. This way we agreed on a ceasefire. This means that the Soviet military ships should not undertake any instigating acts against our ships, that their airplanes should not violate the Chinese airspace etc. Through this, Kosygin admitted that they

organized the previous instigating acts.

We agreed that in the disputed territories, the economic activity in which the Chinese population has been involved for generations will no longer be disturbed. This, however, does not signify the establishment of a border. We decided to report to the Politburo of our parties the contents of the agreement that we reached and to later transform it into a document that we can sign.

Kosygin raised a number of issues as I also did. He tackled the issue of the amelioration of tensions in our state relations.

I told him that there are many divergences of principle in political and ideological matters, divergences that cannot be suddenly solved but that should not hinder the talks on relaxing tensions.

Kosygin agreed with this, but asked us to refrain from using insulting appellations when referring to the Soviet Union.

I reminded him of the way Lenin fought against revisionism during his time. I told Kosygin that there are many problems between us that would necessitate three month discussions not a three hour discussion.

Therefore, in regards to the border disputes, we agreed for now on certain temporary measures. Concerning the way in which the negotiations will take place and what problems will need to be solved, I told him that we will state our opinion in a more ample document taking in consideration that their declaration analyzed a period of 2000-3000 years. This document will be prepared by the MFA and will constitute the answer to their declaration.

Kosygin expressed his wish that China will respond as soon as possible to the Soviet declaration and that the document won't contain offensive words.

Kosygin didn't deny the concentration of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border, including the People's Republic of Mongolia, but asked not to discuss this matter.

Intervening, Comrade Kang Sheng pointed out that the Soviet Union has 69 divisions concentrated in those areas.

Carrying on, premier Zhou Enlai stated: "I asked Kosygin against whom these troops are concentrated and I told him just as I told you on September 7 what a Soviet attack against China would mean. I mentioned to him that this would mean the beginning of the war. And the 69 divisions can only fit in Central China.

In regards to the possibility of an atomic attack by China directed against the Soviet Union, I told him that everyone laughs when they hear about something like this. He did not defend himself but asked not to discuss this issue.

During the conversations, Kosygin approached the issue of Czechoslovakia. He stated that in this country there was a real danger of a coup and this determined the Soviet Union's intervention.

I replied that, in our opinion, the situation in Czechoslovakia was different from the situation in Hungary in 1956, when it was necessary to overthrow the Hungarian government. I told him that, undeniably, in some socialist countries there is the danger of a coup and I added that even the peaceful evolu-

tion towards capitalism, which is taking place in certain socialist countries, represents the possibility of instating capitalism without a coup. In this matter, the discussion was polemical. I could see from the discussions that the Soviets are in a very tense state. It can be affirmed that there are people in the Soviet Union who want war. Until now, no decision has been taken in this matter and this is why Kosygin was in a hurry to take action in the direction of easing up the tension.

It can be said that this act of Kosygin's was only probing. We don't know what they will do in the future so that is why we have to be vigilant.

Cde. Kang Sheng: As far as I know, Nixon stated that it is very hard for his kind of people to avoid mistakes. This represents an instigation.

Do you know [Konstantin F.] Katushev, what kind of man he is, what he occupies himself with?

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Katushev was with Kosygin. It seems like he is very young. He is approximately 41 years old. We haven't seen him until now.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: As a matter of fact, he has become part of the leadership only recently.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is he in the Politburo?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: No, he is secretary of the Central Committee.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: He is secretary of the Central Committee and works with the socialist countries. [Boris] Ponomarev works on relations with communist parties in communist countries. Katushev is an engineer.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: There might be no more noise at the border anymore.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: From a certain perspective, China and Romania are in a similar situation: they're neighbors in the same way with the Soviet Union. There is a difference, though: you are very big and we are very small. However, what unites us is the respect for the principles of independence and self-determined development. If the USSR will ensure that these principles are respected in its relations with China, this will mean an alleviation of their respect for us too. This is a support for us.

Cde. Kang Sheng: India is a large country, but it is not unified; Romania is a small country, but it is unified. Which is the bigger country in this case?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course, we can look at the issue this way.

The fact that we looked at things [in a] very determined [way] during difficult times protected us from very, very difficult hardships. We said at that time: If someone will come in [our country], we will fight. We will see how it will turn out, but we will fight. And we are convinced that this firm attitude was very, very rational; it wasn't an adventurous act, lacking reflection, but a rational act.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is it possible, maybe, that the discussions and a weakening of tensions with us, even if just formal, could be used to put pressure on you?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: If the tensions between you



Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, 9 July 1971, during Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing, courtesy US National Archives and Records Administration

will weaken, it will become harder to put pressure on us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: So you are seeing things different then us!

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Yes!

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Do you see another justification that they could use against you?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: For us, the situation will become very tense, very serious if the tension with you would become greater, because at this time, the Soviets would say to us: you [must] choose between China and the USSR. As a matter of fact, they already told us. At this invitation, we answered as always: we do not choose. We have good relations with China that we are seeking to develop, just like the relations with the other socialist countries. We want to develop relations with the USSR also. This is why we tell them: you can't pose the issue this way. We will not take a position against China. We believe that whoever takes a stance against China is making a mistake.

If the situation becomes very tense between you, then the problem would become more acute for us.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Our party supports a relaxed evolution of relations with China, a point of view that we have always sustained.

There were also attempts to condemn China, but we opposed them. In Budapest, as part of the Warsaw Pact, so in a military alliance, an anti-Chinese resolution was proposed. Romania said: no! Ceausescu and Maurer opposed this and obstructed the adoption of such a resolution. After that, a resolution on the issue of European security was adopted, which is something completely different. We clearly expressed our point of view in relation to China during the discussions between Brezhnev and Ceausescu: we have to take the approach of weakening tensions; the policy of tensions and clashes at the border does not serve well Romania or the Soviet Union.

Later, the international conference of communist parties took place. The entire world knows that Romania firmly stood up against such a trend. I participated at the conference and found out with this occasion that a large number of parties were categorically against the resolution condemning China. And the

Soviets are aware of this. Even some parties that attacked China in their speeches, did this as a result of great pressure; certain parties showed this in intimate circles and said that they do not agree with such an attitude, but that they are forced to do this. The Soviets, of course, have to take this into account. The Moscow Conference was not, however, successful in its fundamental tendency of condemning the Chinese Communist Party.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: This was the main unsuccessful objective.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Could it be possible that they are trying to use the same pretexts as in Czechoslovakia, in other words, to maintain that there is chaos and liberalization [in your country]?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The political mood in our country is very good. I could say it hasn't been better. Never in the way people are rallying around the leadership. There were moments of popular enthusiasm during the takeover of power, a period with a wide mass audience. This was followed by difficult periods that determined a cooling off, until people started understanding some things. Today, a granite-like unity has formed around the leadership and one of the causes of this unity is our orientation towards defending fair principles in relations between states—independence, sovereignty, equality of rights, and noninterference in internal affairs. It is not the only reason, but it is one of the main reasons for this unity.

Therefore, if at this moment, we would analyze the possibilities of provoking an internal act, we would have to ascertain the following: this has no base within the framework of the party; not in the general party, not in the leadership. We don't have a right or a left, so it is impossible to provoke something.

There are problems that could be speculated, by looking to cause divergences between the co-inhabiting nationalities—Hungarians, Germans, but this is not something feasible. We have been very careful in judging the status of these nationalities and we can say that from this point of view, a stirring up of one of these nationalities is impossible. The remnants of chauvinistic nationalism that might have existed among the Romanian nationalities are of zero significance.

From the perspective of the large social categories—workers, peasants, and intellectuals, we can say the following: building socialism is not void of difficulties; there are difficult moments in one area or another. We have not had, though, any kind of widespread dissatisfaction among the workforce, no type of manifestations from unhappy unions—not among workers, or peasants or intellectuals. We have been very careful with these groups: being hard to come from the outside with their tanks to teach us, they could reorient themselves and try to organize something from within.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The events that took place here in the summer of 1968 are interesting. We were among the first socialist states to find out, accidentally, from our correspondent who called us from Prague around 2 a.m., that Soviet troops had invaded Czechoslovakia. As a result, during the morning of August 21 we already held a meeting of

the Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Plenary of the Central Committee. The members in the leadership of the party went throughout the entire country: we discussed this with all social classes and found out that they are all supporting our position. We organized the workers' guards. We gave weapons to workers, peasants, intellectuals; Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, all nationalities. The problem was that we were unable to cope with the organization of all the people who wished to join the guards. These weapons are held until today in the workplace.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: It is very light armament, infantry type.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: What is the approximate size of these armed squads?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Approximately 300,000. Besides these, there are the army units. There is close collaboration between the military units and the patriot guards. These are instructed by officers; instruction is done regularly, including shooting. The mobilization plans include: the troops of the armed forces, the militia, the Securitate, the armed guards, and the patriotic formations. We have now moved to the organization of schools for the personnel of the fight formations in the patriotic troops for preparing military leaders.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: This is an aspect.

Another aspect is that some have said that [Czechoslovak leader Joseph] Smrkovsky has ties with the West and that he has his people organized in Czechoslovakia. Do you think that there is a possibility to use the same pretexts in other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course there is a possibility to use pretexts, but they've proved to be illogical and unrealistic. You know the story of the lamb and the wolf. Pretexts can always be invoked. But not even in the smallest trace of reality is such a pretext possible in Romania, under no circumstance and in relation to no one. Of course, you are familiar with the reproaches made to the Romanian Communist Party. They usually are: nationalistic orientation; then some maintain that the party is becoming intellectualized, which is rather unrealistic from a data perspective; there is a number of intellectuals in the party, but the categories of workers and peasants are predominant, approximately 70%. Thus, from this point of view they can find no real hope of making such an accusation plausible.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The accusation of nationalism is based on the fact that we sustain the principles of defending national independence. We were even told in a discussion: why are you talking so often about defending national independence? What, is someone attacking you? And we replied: if there is no problem, the more we don't see why we are being reproached for the fact that we emphasize these ideas!

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: From this perspective, it seems to us that there is no potential to justify suspicions of such nature.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: In connection with the possibility of embarking on the road to reinstate capitalism, the imperial-

ists, too, wish that socialist countries in Eastern Europe will adapt to their demands and embark on the way to capitalism. If there is even a reduced number of such people—which can be said of Soviet Union also—could this matter be solved in those countries? How do you look at this problem?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I will tell you what the situation is in our country and what the situation was in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The development of socialist industry poses the question of organization. It is normal, in any society that develops, that leadership issues start to come up. One of these issues is the organization, planning, and leadership of the national economy. In Czechoslovakia, a number of issues were raised in the Czechoslovak economy concerning the difficulties that existed at the end of Novotny's period of leadership, which convinced many specialists and party members to think of different ways to solve them. One of the people who wrote a book and militated for a number of measures for the improvement of planning and management of the economy was [Czechoslovak economist] Ota Sik.

He stipulated a method for the planning and management of the economy that placed more emphasis on market laws and represented the introduction of a system of broad liberalization of the economy. The Soviets accused the acceptance of this point of view by the Czechoslovak leadership as being a possibility of returning to capitalism. No ideas exactly like Sik's, but ideas fairly close to his were introduced in the management and the planning of the Hungarian economy. In fact, these ideas were sustained and experimented with by the Soviet Union. Even now, they are discussing in the Soviet Union about the need to revisit the methods of planning and management of the economy. However, these do not have at all the character of a so-called liberalization that Sik's system had and that Hungary's current system has. Never, not even in one Soviet publication has there ever been a critical remark about the measures for improving the management and planning of the economy taken in our country. The measures that we've taken in order to create a property of an economic activity are of minimal importance from an economic standpoint and cannot become the object of criticism. For example, instead of giving employees of the establishment the possibility to sell ice cream or refreshment in the streets, we gave it to people who do it for a commission. But these cannot be considered as measures of reinstating capitalism.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Our position, both theoretic and practical, was to criticize liberalism in the management of the economy. We did not openly criticize Lieberman's concepts, or Ota Sik's, or the Yugoslav ones. There was, however, a very clear indirect polemic in which we emphasized the role of the state and of the planned management of the national economy, while our measures of perfecting the management of the economy are based on perfecting the role of the state as the organizer. We reaffirmed this theoretical and practical position at our last congress. Therefore, they can't criticize us here either.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nor concerning the people's earnings. Raising the standard of living has a general character.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We took measures to eliminate great disparities in income.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: What is the difference between the highest and the lowest income?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nine times.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We have also worked on raising the social salary, eliminating the assistance unconnected to work, rent differences, taking measures against illicit earnings.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is the situation in Hungary similar to the one in Czechoslovakia?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I don't think so. In Hungary, the opposition against the official government policy is rather pronounced. In Hungary, the opposition toward the participation at the intervention in Czechoslovakia is expressed rather openly. It can be seen in theater production and jokes.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: To what extent is Hungary's economy relying on the Soviet Union?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Hungary has wide external economic ties with the Soviet Union, but it also develops these ties with the Western countries. It concluded a number of treaties with the Japanese, with the Federal Republic of Germany, with the United States. Hungary is not the only one doing this. Poland, the German Democratic Republic, the majority of socialist states have a volume of foreign trade that surpasses ours.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Does Poland rely more heavily on the Soviet economy?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The economies of Poland and the German Democratic Republic rely to a great extent on the Soviet economy, especially when it comes to raw materials, but the Bulgarian economy relies on it overwhelmingly.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: This is interesting: the Hungarian troops that entered Czechoslovakia and were sent to the regions inhabited by a Hungarian population were very poorly received by the Hungarian population. This had a very bad resonance in Hungary. We shouldn't forget the fact that Soviet troops have been in Hungary for 13 years. In 1956, as part of the Declaration of the Soviet government it was shown that the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary was dictated by the circumstances of the time and that they will be withdrawn. Thirteen years have passed since then and the troops are still there. So this also carries a certain weight in the mood of the Hungarian population.

Cde. Kang Sheng: It was communicated in the press that the countries which participate in the Warsaw Pact will use Bulgaria's national day—September 9—to hold a conference. Do you know anything about this? This conference, even if it takes place without you, will discuss the attitude towards you.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The international press wrote about such intentions in the past. These things are not impossible. They could happen. At this moment, however, such a

meeting is not likely, at least from a logical perspective.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: In Czechoslovakia's case, though, logic did not function at all (laughs).

Cde. Zhou Enlai: On September 7, when the discussion with you took place, you were saying that your Chief of the General Staff will go to Moscow for discussions. Has he gone to Moscow?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: He was supposed to leave for Moscow on Monday, and we left Saturday, so I don't know what has been discussed.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Has [Marshal Andrei] Grechko, the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops, come to see you?

Cde. Zhou Enlai: And Zaharov?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Grechko is not the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops. He is the War Minister of the USSR; he wasn't here last year or this year. But [Marshal Ivan] Yabukovski was here a couple times. He is the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops. Zaharov was here also during his vacation and as part of the delegation sent to the 25th anniversary of Romania's liberation. I had long discussions with Yabukovski regarding the organization of the statute of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. These were heated discussions. On one side [was] the Soviet Union and the other countries, on the other side, Romania. The Soviet Union and the other countries had the intention of drawing a statute that would totally subordinate all the armies of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact to the supreme commander, which was supposed to be a Soviet officer. It is true that it stipulated that he can be changed, but only a Soviet officer could be elected.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: So a supranational organization.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Clearly.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: This issue was brought up for the first time in Bucharest at the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in 1966. Back then, the issue of the statute was a very relevant issue. A document was presented which strengthened the role of the commander and subordinated the national armies to him. We showed that we do not agree and all was delayed, following that the ministers of the armed forces would start a preliminary, preparatory work. In Sofia in 1968, they tried to reintroduce this statute. We opposed discussing it and it was decided that the ministers of the armed forces would work again.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The discussions took place on several levels. The discussions of the Ministers of the Armed Forces were followed by discussions at a higher level and so forth. Until the very end, the statute was drawn taking in consideration the Romanian point of view. We declared that we will not sign such a statute, the way it was conceived. During these discussions, Yabukovski came to Romania several times. Ceausescu and I received him. We discussed, we bickered, and, at the very end a statute that did not include such dispositions was adopted. It anticipates that the national armies are under the command of the party and the government of that country, which establish a system of relations and col-

laboration during peacetime and also certain attributes of the supreme commander; he has to study and bring forth proposals to member countries concerning organization and armament, after which the countries will make the decisions.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Any measure regarding the armed forces is taken only by the government or the organizations responsible in that country.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Procedures for wartime are also outlined: the countries will assemble and decide how the commander will exercise his function. There are also special texts, in the sense that no foreign military unit can enter the territory of another country without the permission of that country and based on certain preliminary procedures showing the way to station and withdraw these [troops].

Cde. Kang Sheng: Usually, the Soviet Union does not respect these. They could respect them in the case of Romania, but when it comes to the other countries, what do you think?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I have doubts even when it comes to Romania!

Cde. Kang Sheng: Romania can use this statute to fight for its observance; but the other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: We did not sign an act that they can use to come to our house whenever they want to.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Romania can therefore do something like this, but the other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The other countries agreed with the draft statute that we fought against and did not accept.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Can the other countries fight to keep the statute if pressure will be put on them?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I think that until the very end it is impossible for people who believe in socialism not to rise against this unjust policy. When and how this will take place, I don't know. In any case, there are signs. There is discontent in Hungary, in Poland, in the German Democratic Republic; there is discontent even in the Soviet Union. It is hard to say how widespread or strong these are, but there are signs of this discontent. I found out from certain reports that a few days ago in the Red Square there was a demonstration against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It might have not been big, there might have not been ten thousand people, but the fact is that a number of people got together and demonstrated against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is a sign. Kang Sheng, you know the Soviet Union well and for a very long time; I know it too.

Cde. Kang Sheng: A number of writers from the magazines *Youth* and *New World* oppose the intervention in Czechoslovakia. On the other side, the magazine *October* is situated on the *Pravda* side.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: These phenomena don't occur only among writers. I saw some reports about an entire series of other categories. There is a strong enough opposition towards an entire series of acts.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Recently, there was a meeting of literary figures during which they were asked to write about the

fight against China in the Far East. The writers asked: "what should we write?" They were told to write about the tension and even war. One of them said: "If the Chinese are taken prisoners, how will their food be ensured?"

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: It is normal for these reactions to different things to exist. People [in the USSR] ask themselves: we don't get along with China, we don't get along with Czechoslovakia, the same with Albania, with Romania. Likewise with large communist parties.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: These issues were raised during certain party briefings.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: These issues will inevitably arise. Likewise, communist countries in capitalist states such as: the Spanish party, the Italian party, parties that fight in Latin America—Dominican, Mexican. People wonder: is this policy fair, if it leads to strained relations with an entire world, and first of all with the socialist countries?

Cde. Kang Sheng: In the Soviet Union there is a fairly large number of people who think about these problems. We have proof from Soviet passengers who pass, even from soldiers, who showed us these things.

It is true that Suslov was not that active during the June conference in Moscow?

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: These can be only impressions. You cannot know what hides behind them. I, too, have the impression that Suslov, both at the preparatory meeting and at the international conference played a much smaller role than at the first conference in Budapest. This is my personal opinion since I participated in Budapest and at the other meetings. I cannot figure out what significance this could have.

Cde. Kang Sheng: We had the same impression, too. We are not sure about the real meaning though.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Last time, when we discussed, you told us that Nixon also discussed with you the issue of European security. Has he showed you how he sees things in this matter? Does he see European security as a result of the agreement between the two military sides?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nixon said that this is a problem in whose discussion the United States should also participate. Nixon showed that he believes that it is useful to organize European security and that adequate preparations need to be made in this sense. We raised this issue because it was more in our interest and [we] wished to show him our point of view concerning the organization of European security.

The main point was that European security has to be organized not between military pacts, but between countries, and all countries should equally participate in this. In addition, during the discussion we emphasized the fact that we don't believe it is fair for the organization of European security to be accomplished by two pacts: Warsaw and NATO—and even less to let the organization of European security be the result of discussions between the two great powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. We showed that this would mean the creation of an area of hegemony, which would not lead to a lasting solution to the problem.

He showed interest and listened. Nothing was concretely discussed, though. Nixon said that the United States is willing to get in touch with all the states that want this. He is willing to speak with the other socialist countries the same way he is discussing with Romania. The only problem that he raised is that the United States has to participate in the organization of European security. This is indeed a problem that many European states have raised; almost all European states that are not socialist that we talked to raised this issue: [i.e.] Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Was the Soviet Union informed about your point of view?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course, the Soviet Union knows our point of view. Ceausescu informed the Soviet ambassador about the discussion with Nixon. But the Soviet Union knows our position even from before.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is the Soviet Union unhappy with the fact that you are members of the Warsaw Pact but develop an independent foreign policy at the same time?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union tends to organize all acts of foreign policy. There was the tendency to create within the Warsaw Pact a branch that would decide, with a majority vote, foreign policy affairs. The tendency to establish supranational bodies existed: in military affairs—in the organization of the United Commandment; in economic affairs—in the organization of Comecon as a supranational body, as well as in external political affairs. We opposed all these tendencies and said: the treaty that established the Warsaw Pact shows that the participant countries will consult on matters that they deem important and that they agree to consult on. Therefore, every country, as an expression of its sovereignty, has the right to practice the foreign policy that it wishes to practice, taking in account the engagements it made. I think that the Soviet Union is unhappy with the fact that we are leading an independent foreign policy. We had a different position from the Soviet Union on an entire series of issues. To answer your question, I don't believe that the Soviet Union is pleased with us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: There is some news showing that Nixon considers that he cannot monopolize European affairs through NATO and that he would wish to secure certain rights in Europe with the help of European security.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I couldn't answer. Many states, including members of NATO, embrace the idea of European security, in the sense that this has to be accomplished not through the understanding between two pacts, but through an understanding among all states. This point of view, being embraced by many European states, including members of NATO, could make Nixon believe that he has to take part in the organization of European security, especially since a number of countries asked for this. Stewart told us that if the Soviet Union would participate in the Pact on European security while the United States would not, a disproportion or influence gap would result. Denmark, Sweden, and Italy told us the same thing.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The socialist countries' members of the Warsaw pact discussed the topic of European security several times. There are two basic documents on this theme: the one from Bucharest from 1966 and the one from Budapest from 1969. There also was an idea to ensure European security between two pacts. Our categorical position was that we see in European security not the strengthening of the existing military treaties, but the organization of European issues with the participation of all European states, including the German Democratic Republic—an organization that would lead to the dissolution of NATO—and, in this case, as we jointly declared, we are prepared for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. These documents have the signature of all states in the Warsaw Pact. This is how we interpret European security.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: And this is not a secret.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: This is a lengthy issue. Nixon said that so long as the issue of Vietnam is not solved, the issue of the Near East won't be solved, nor the issue of European security, including the one of West Berlin.

Has Brezhnev talked to you about the security system in Asia? He has not even raised this issue with us in today's discussion. He talks [*trambita*] about it though. They are taking action in this direction, but there are not concrete ideas. They are following the creation of a pact of countries that are opposing China, but it is not easy.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I also think it is not easy. This results from a report we received: it seems that during a conference, as part of the discussion between [US Secretary of State William] Rogers and [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, the United States will declare that they do not support the idea of organizing Asian security and that they should not count on US support in the escalation of the conflict with China. I told you that Nixon talked to us very clearly about this matter and showed that the United States, during the discussions it had with countries in Asia through which it passed on its way to Romania—more exactly Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and India—does not support this.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The Rogers-Gromyko meeting is set to take place in September.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Has Rogers come to see you, have you met him?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: No.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Have you met Kissinger?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Yes, he came with Nixon. He is a close friend of his. Kissinger gives the impression that he is a very well-informed person. He is a close collaborator of Nixon's; he [Nixon] had very appreciative things to say about Kissinger. He always presented him as some kind of celebrity "the famous Harvard professor." He is a history professor, a great specialist in matters of history, a great scholar. During the discussions I think he proved he has an analytical, penetrating character. He rarely intervened in the discussions.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: At the previous meeting you were saying, Comrade Mizil, that you wish to discuss certain issues on a party line. Comrade Kang Sheng is present, so we can

discuss.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: I would like to say a few things. First of all, how do we interpret the meeting that took place in Moscow? You are aware that the initiative of the meeting dates a long way back. We had a point of view that we maintained until the end, more exactly that the conditions for a meeting of communist and workers' parties are not met.

First of all, a large number of parties from socialist countries are missing, among them being some frontline parties in the fight against imperialism; parties from capitalist countries are missing; serious anti-imperialism movements from Africa and Asia—that have generally been weakly represented—are missing. The most important fact that led us to this conclusion is the existence of the tense situation in the international communist movement. In spite of all these, we decided to participate at the conference. The way events took place reinforced this initial opinion. By participating at the conference, we had the possibility to tell our opinions more broadly and to reaffirm our point of view concerning the necessity of certain relations between communist and workers' parties, based on mutual respect, independence of parties, noninterference in the affairs of other parties, the right of every party to decide its internal issues, its political stance and its entire activity. The event in Czechoslovakia had the opportunity to reinforce this position. In Budapest, in 1968, we were the only party that expressed such a point of view. Later, a great number of parties expressed the point of view with clarity.

In regards to the meeting itself, it was seeking, first of all, to obtain a condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party. In spite of all these, the well known attacks took place during the meeting. We believe that one clear thing in this issue is that they did not manage to obtain a condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party. A resolution condemning the Chinese Communist Party was proposed by the party from East Pakistan—I am not even sure such a party exists; I did not see its representative at the Moscow meeting.

Cde. Kang Sheng: He is Indian.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We intervened and demanded that this project not be discussed by any branch. Comrade Ceausescu demanded and had a discussion with Brezhnev on this subject. He asked clearly not to discuss this project, under any circumstance, not in the conference, nor in its committees.

We realized with this occasion that a large number of parties, even some of the ones that spoke against the Chinese Communist Party, did not agree with such a resolution. In the end, this project was not even discussed in the preliminary commissions. At the Secretariat meeting, the Soviet representative said that, since the issue is not on the agenda and we are too busy, we should not even bother with it.

The first conclusion that we reach is that the plan to condemn the Chinese Communist Party did not succeed.

Secondly, this conference was summoned with the goal of reestablishing a certain discipline among the communist parties, of reestablishing the supremacy of the CPSU in the

communist movement. In our opinion, not even this objective was reached in the end. A large number of parties—14—either didn't vote for the document, partially voted, or voted with reservations. If during the preliminary meetings the idea of subduing the minority in front of the majority frequently appeared, during the conference, almost no party invoked this principle. They realized they had no chance to win.

We consider the right of every party to participate or not participate at a conference, the right of every party to be sovereign in its decision, to sign or not to sign the documents, was recognized at the meeting.

The third thing that we consider important is that during the conference, a number of parties largely expressed their opinions openly concerning the relations between socialist countries, between communist parties. These were: the Romanians, the Spaniards, the Dominicans, the Swiss, the one from Reunion and others. These points of view were published in the press—and this thing is extremely important—including, partially, the Soviet press.

We interpret as positive the fact that the main document contains the principles of relations between socialist countries, between communist and workers' parties. Regarding this, we had a large number of propositions that were included. Of course, this document contains some things that we don't agree with. But the fact that these principles are written in a joint document has a certain political significance; if they will be respected or not, this is a different matter.

Finally, we consider extremely important the principle of the development of relations between the parties that participated and even parties that did not participate at the meeting. This hints at new possibilities of development among communist parties. In what we are concerned, we give great attention to this principle. Both parties that were at the meeting and parties that were not at the meeting participated at the congress of our party.

We don't have any illusions and realize that the affirmation of the new principles in the communist movement will be the result of a long process. As part of this process we wish to have an active role, to develop relations with all parties, and especially, with parties that have new points of view concerning principles in relations between socialist countries and communist parties.

I wish to emphasize that we made contact with a large number of communist parties both during the preliminary conference and during the conference. We became familiar with new positions, new points of view in a series of parties regarding relations with the Chinese Communist Party. An entire series of parties share the opinion that the respective parties feel the need to revisit their previous positions on the Chinese Communist Party and their relations with it. A series of parties told us openly that they would want the Chinese comrades to know their opinion and their wish of having contacts and develop relations with the Chinese Communist Party. During this [meeting], we transmitted to you these wishes. Among these are, first of all, the Spanish party, Santiago Carillo came to

see us a couple times and discussed with Comrade Ceausescu; he raised this issue. The Italian Communist Party, with which we have good relations and in whose press we can observe a process of reevaluating their position towards the Chinese Communist Party. Likewise, the Mexican Communist Party raised this issue, the Workers' Party in Switzerland—I was in Switzerland a couple months ago and the comrades raised the issue of a possibility of contact with the Chinese Communist Party [while] the Communist Party from Reunion, whose secretary general we met in Hanoi, [raised the issue] the day before yesterday. Likewise, the Communist (Marxist) Party of India, which sent a delegate to our congress, mentioned that it wishes to have contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Also, the parties from Northern European countries, the Australian Communist Party and others.

We believe that it is our duty to inform you about this new element that has appeared in the communist movement, and that, in a series of parties, the process of fighting for the organization of their relations based on certain new principles is also associated with the wish of normalizing relations with the Chinese Communist Party. We also reached the conclusion that we laid out for you, that the Chinese Communist Party can bring, by respecting its relations with other countries, an important contribution to this process of respecting, within the framework of the communist movement, of equality of rights, noninterference in other [countries'] affairs, mutual respect and independence of every party.

Here is, in brief, what we wished to tell you.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Indeed, there are tendencies in the communist movement towards the independent development of parties instead of joint actions. The communist movement is developing in this direction. There was an Informative Office that functioned in your country. Between 1957-1960 we made efforts to bring a contribution to the development of the movement through the convocation of meetings and the adoption of declarations. It proved, however, that the declarations did not play any role for the communist parties. It was exactly these declarations that some parties did not accept. Since then, every party develops independently; there are problems that some see in one way, others in another way; there are divergences from a theoretical standpoint. These are a result of the fact that imperialism is headed for a fall, while socialism [is headed] for a victory. There are common and distinct elements between us. Even the common elements have to be looked at creatively, taking in consideration the concrete conditions in every country, not in a dogmatic manner. From this perspective, the role of the Warsaw Pact is of enclosure, of restricting the development of the participant countries. The Warsaw Pact functions in the same way as NATO, CENTO [the Central Treaty Organization].

All these point out that the world is transitioning through a period of discord. The communist parties are proceeding through a trying period. It will be proved which parties are capable of leading the revolution.

The international meetings cannot solve the problems. We

understood your intentions of opposing China's condemnation at the meeting, creating an organization, promoting the principle of noninterference. Only these parties that maintain the principles of independence can lead the revolution. The parties that follow others cannot do this—how the parties from Pakistan or Bagdad are just like many others. Presently, parties have to follow a policy of bilateral relations. Otherwise, it would mean letting the revisionist Soviet party work its magic wand.

We told you that we are not interested in this meeting. We have different points of view in this matter. Think that there are countries where there are more parties; actually, this is the way it was in Russia with the Bolshevik party. This is an inevitable problem in the development of the international communist movement, which has to go through this trial of the practice and that will show which grouping in that country is capable of leading the revolution. Even though we opposed the conference, Comrade Mao Zedong showed, several times, that we do not intend to call another conference. This is a matter of principle.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Between us there is the common point of view that the conditions for the convocation of the meeting were not met. But there are differences in the way we look at this conference. We showed that we are not interested. In fact, we didn't even publish anything regarding this conference. Our answer is actually included in the article published in March of 1965. We saw your good intentions of opposing the resolution condemning China. We consider that it doesn't matter if China is not condemned in the document, since after the conference an anti-Chinese campaign was unleashed. The declarations from 1957 and 1960 did not play a role. In this matter, our points of view differ. I am not even personally interested in this conference, even though in the past I participated at many conferences. I believe that it would have been better if at the conference a resolution condemning China would have been adopted. Of course, you wouldn't have signed. But if the Soviets want the gallows, it is better to give it to them, instead of reaching a situation where the condemned is neither dead nor alive. We do not want to deny the good intentions of the Romanian comrades, in the sense that they opposed China's condemnation at the conference.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: The Albanians had a different position and published a series of articles. If they want to criticize, they can criticize, we cannot reproach this to them. They did not participate. Yugoslavia did not participate either. We do not reproach to you the fact that you participated. If we would have published a serious critique, we would have raised the importance of the conference with this, and the Soviets would have been happy if we would have cursed at them.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We want you to know that we think the same on many topics that you presented to us. Regarding the document adopted at the conference, you shouldn't think that we give it too much importance. We didn't even publish the document in the form of a brochure. We filed it, we are keeping it, but if anyone will reproach us anything because of our relations with a party or another, then we can



Mao Zedong meeting Richard Nixon, 21 February 1972. The photo was airbrushed by the Chinese to conceal the presence, standing between Mao and Nixon, of Mao's personal secretary, Zhang Yufeng (courtesy US National Archives and Records Administration)

invoke this document at any time.

Even though the conference did not take place in appropriate conditions and even though it could not solve the numerous problems that our movement is dealing with, it was nonetheless an opportunity to clearly expose the points of view regarding the organization of relations in the communist movement based on the right of every party to decide on its own its policy. And this new development is valuable. An entire series of parties declared that they oppose the politics of coordination. It is true that there are numerous parties that do not oppose being coordinated, but a large number of parties, including some serious parties, said that they oppose this policy. And we believe that this is also valuable. Therefore, it is not the document that gives the conference its value, but the fact that the position of an important number of parties developed here.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu expressed clearly, at the end of the conference, our reservations concerning the document. We believe that the idea of developing bilateral relations is fair and we widely practice this method. We want to continue to develop relations with numerous communist and workers' parties, to discuss the new problems, what we have in common, what makes us distinct, our differences in opinion. This action has a very important value for our country. It gives us the opportunity to express our solidarity and to feel, in turn, the solidarity of other communist parties. In addition, it gives us the opportunity of affirming our party's point of view concerning the necessity of organizing relations of solidarity in our movement based on the principles that you have also mentioned.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: To sum up this discussion: the document adopted at the meeting is a model of lack of logic and of triviality. What is affirmed on the first page is contradicted on the second. From this point of view, the document has no value. At the same time, it can cause problems, since everyone can find something arguable within it. And since the most valid interpretation is that of the strongest, the document poses some risks.

We believe, however, that we did the right thing by going to the conference. The conference was dealing with two main

issues: reestablishing the conductor's baton [*bagheta*] and China's condemnation. We were interested in both issues. Whether China considers that its condemnation has a value or not, that is your problem. If nobody that was opposing this would have been present at the meeting the baton would have been established. We said: we are going to fight this, especially since we believe that many parties had an oscillating attitude. We adopted positions different that the Soviet Union concerning the baton and concerning China. And we succeeded. This does not mean much for China. For us, however, it is something big: we legalized the right of having a point of view—which can be good or bad. If it is bad, it is fought with ideas, through discussions, not with clubs. This is what we won in Moscow. If you won or lost something, you will analyze this. This was, however, our rationale when we went to the meeting.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: In the international communist movement at the moment there is the tendency of independent self development of parties. There will again come a time when there will be solidarity. There can't be a revolutionary party that has no influence in its country.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Let's not be naïve in relation to the fact that the document includes the principles of relations among parties. You said that the most valid interpretation is that of the strongest, so I don't know if the Soviets will respect them.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I am really afraid that it is true.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: You are right when you emphasize the fact that more and more parties do not listen to the baton anymore. You rose against the baton and fought against it from the inside, at the meeting. We fought against it from the outside. Let's fight so that all parties can develop independently!

A last problem before finishing up, since we have more discussions tonight with the Korean comrades, who are leaving tomorrow.

We will soon have the 20th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. We don't have the initiative of inviting guests from abroad, being preoccupied with the great cultural revolution, which continues. Additionally, we don't want to incur high financial expenses. If our friend countries wish to participate, then they can send delegations. For example, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam asked to send a delegation.

If you wish to send a delegation or to delegate your ambassador—we delegated our ambassador to you—then you can proceed as you see fit. In other words, we will salute the delegation or the ambassador. I believe you understand well what I am telling you?! We ask you to inform Comrade Ceausescu, the Romanian Communist Party CC Permanent Presidium about this matter and to decide as you see fit.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: We understood well the meaning of what you have told us and we will explain the meaning of the decision we will adopt. In any case, I am convinced that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party knows the extent to which the Romanian Communist Party values its friendship with the CCP. We told you: for us, the support of the Chinese people, of the Chinese Communist Party,

of the Chinese state in the promotion of our policy of independence, national sovereignty is extremely valuable. If there would be only this reason and we would show to what extent our people and our party are standing by the Chinese people and party at the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic. Of course, I will report this matter to our leadership and we will be careful to show in detail and in a clear manner why we will adopt a decision or another, being convinced that you will understand well he reasons why we will adopt that decision. There cannot be any misunderstanding.

09/17/1969



DOCUMENT No. 9

Memorandum of Conversation between Romanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu and Zhou Enlai, 12 December 1970

[Source: ANIC, CC RCP Fond, Foreign Relations Section, file 98/1970, p. 6-35; published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 1021-42. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.*]

(fragments)

Nr. 00127
Top Secret

12 XII 1970/1333

Memorandum about the friendship visit of the Romanian government delegation in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

At the invitation of the governments of the DRV and the PRC, a government delegation, led by Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu, member of the [RCP CC] Executive Committee, of the [RCP CC] Permanent Presidium, Council of Ministers Vice President, made a friendly visit in the DRV between 15-20 November 1970, and, between 20-26 November 1970, a friendly visit in the PRC. Other members of the delegation were Cdes. Radu Constantinescu, vice president of the Governmental Commission for Technical and Economic Cooperation, as well as Constantin Babeanu, Romanian Ambassador to Hanoi during the portion of the visit in the DRV, and Aurel Duma, Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, during the delegation's activities in the PRC.

[...] [text of the memorandum on Vietnam not translated] [...]

B. The Visit to the People's Republic of China

The purpose of this visit was to examine the possibilities of continual development of economic relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR) and the PRC. With

this occasion, a meeting took place between the leader of the Romanian governmental delegation and Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the PRC, during which—per the indication of the [party] leadership—the Chinese side was informed of certain issues of interest that arose from the discussions held by Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu during his activities at the anniversary session of the United Nations (UN), as well as from the discussions he had during his visit to the United States of America (US). During the same meeting, the leader of the Romanian governmental delegation informed the Chinese side of certain aspects concerning the activity of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

[...] [discussion of economic issues not translated] [...]

2. Other topics expressed by the Romanian side during the meeting with Cde. Zhou Enlai.

Before the start of the discussions, the leader of the Romanian delegation informed Cde. Zhou Enlai that he has a written message from Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu for transmittal to Cde. Mao Zedong. Cde. Zhou Enlai replied that both Cde. Mao Zedong and Cde. Lin Biao are in vacation and that during this period they have not received any foreign delegation, and asked that the message be delivered to Cde. Zhou Enlai for transmittal to Cde. Mao Zedong.

Following [that exchange], the discussions between the leader of the Romanian governmental organization and the Premier of the Council of State of the PRC focused on the following topics:

a. Certain issues regarding the legitimate role of the PRC in resolving the international issues touched upon by Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu on the occasion of the UN anniversary session and during the conversations he had during his visit to the US.

Regarding these issues, we told the Chinese side that, both during the meetings Cde. Ceausescu had with heads of state that participated at the UN anniversary session and during the discussions he had during his visit in the US, special emphasis was placed on PRC's role in today's world. Both at the UN and in the discussions during his US visit, Cde. Ceausescu argued firmly that without the participation of the PRC, of the great Chinese people, none of the major international issues facing today's world can be resolved.

The Chinese side was informed that, during the conversations with US President [Richard M.] Nixon, he stated that he understands this, and agrees with Cde. Ceausescu's position. Also, we pointed out that, during the discussions with R. Nixon and Rogers, it became clear that they are preoccupied by finding ways to normalize relations between the US and the PRC. As a matter of fact, R. Nixon stated that the US is ready to carry out negotiations on any issue toward the goal of improving Sino-American relations, in any way and at any

time, and asked Cde. Ceausescu to inform the PRC that the US desires the develop economic, technical, and scientific bilateral relations. R. Nixon let it be known that, if Warsaw does not prove itself to be the right venue for Sino-American contacts, the venue can be changed.

During the meetings Cde. Ceausescu had with representatives of the financial and industrial circles in the US, a clear concern was evident on their side for improving Sino-American relations.

It was expressed that, during discussions with R. Nixon concerning his speech at the UN, Cde. Ceausescu expressed his impression, and the impression of other heads of state, that the US president was specifically addressing the Soviet Union, in a way that implied that the US desires to discuss world problems exclusively with the USSR. Nixon denied such a thing, stating that it is not his intention to approach and resolve global problems this way, and stating that in the draft of his UN speech there was a passage that was favorable to the PRC, but that he took it out after his conversation with Gromyko, so as not to upset the Soviets.

In his response to the topics raised, Premier Zhou Enlai stated that the entire Chinese people express warm thanks to Cde. Ceausescu for the position to take at the UN regarding the need to reestablish the legitimate rights of the PRC in this organization and the removal of the Chiang Kai-shekist clique. Also, he stated that the Americans have been, for a long time, amenable to the reestablishment of the PRC's legitimate rights in this organization, under the condition that Taiwan remains a member of the UN, as an independent country. Some are of the opinion that Taiwan can become an autonomous region within the PRC, and remain a member of the UN, the same way Ukraine is a member. In a situation like this, India could ask that Tibet, which is an autonomous region within the PRC, also become a member of the UN. The Soviets could ask that Xinjiang, another autonomous region, also become a UN member. In this way, one can say that the PRC would end up having more votes at the UN than the Soviet Union. It could be said that, in the end, the UN would chose this solution to the issue of Chinese representation. The party, the government, the people of China would never be able to accept such a solution. Twenty five years have passed since the UN was founded, and in 25 more years things will be the same.

Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that this in no means precludes Romania's activities in the UN in support of reestablishing the legitimate rights of the PRC and toward throwing out the Chiang Kai-shekist clique from the organization.

Regarding this topic, Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that: "A right cause will always remain right, truth will always be truth." For example, the draft proposed by Algeria, Romania, and other countries, was adopted by 51 votes, 25 abstained, one country did not vote, and another representative went to get some coffee. But there was another resolution draft proposed there, the American one, which passed with 66 votes for, 52 against, and 7 abstentions. Because of this, the representative of Tunis stood up and proposed that the Chinese issue be sent

to the Secretary General as a special issue for consideration. On this issue, [Tunisian President Habib Ben Ali] Bourguiba tried to speculate, the same way he did on the issue of the Middle East. It is known that he sent the Prime Minister in Jordan on the premise of mediation, but that he was on the side of [Jordanian King] Hussein. The solution of transforming the Chinese problem into a special issue [for the Secretary General] is worse than the American solution of two-thirds of the votes. The Americans have made public the idea that China does not desire and has not requested membership in the UN. But it is well known that China is a founding nation of the UN. After the Second World War many countries changed their leadership. [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser made a republic out of a kingdom, and the most recent change took place in Libya. But no one had requested that these issues be considered important or special. France, Algeria, other countries, took a very just position on the issue raised by Tunis, which is why the representative of that country withdrew his proposal. As far as the Chinese party is concerned things will not stop here. The Americans will change their attitude on this issue only when Nixon, or another American president, will dig themselves into a hole.

Regarding what was sent through from Nixon, Cde. Zhou Enlai thanked Cde. Ceausescu, stating that "Nixon knew that Cde. Ceausescu will inform the Chinese party of these things." He continued by stating that: "What the Americans stated is not that important. Between China and the US, there is one main issue—the issue of Taiwan. Taiwan is an integral part of China, and this was recognized in many international documents, including the [27 November 1943] Cairo Declaration. After the surrender of Japan, the Chinese government of Jiang Jieshi took over the administration of Taiwan. [US President Harry S.] Truman sent troops to occupy Taiwan only after the start of the Korean War; but before that he too recognized that Taiwan is an integral part of China."

Referring to the presentation made by the leader of the Romanian delegation, that the American side is preoccupied with the normalization of relations with the Chinese side, Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that: "If Nixon truly wants and has the solution to resolve this key problem, then the Chinese government will welcome a special envoy [of president Nixon] to Beijing."

When asked if Cde. Ceausescu can pass this reply to Nixon, Cde. Zhou Enlai said that the following can be passed [to Washington]: "Taiwan is an integral part of China. Freeing Taiwan is an internal issue of China, and there can be no outside interference in this matter. The basic problem behind the tense Sino-American relations is that the US has occupied Taiwan and the Formosa Straits militarily. The PRC government has always come out in favor of resolving this issue diplomatically. This issue has been discussed for 15 years, without any results. Now, finding through Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu that Nixon desires to carry out negotiations with China, at any time and in any place, we reply that if Nixon truly has the desire and the solution to resolve this issue, then the Chinese government would welcome a special envoy [of President Nixon] to

Beijing.” Zhou Enlai continued by saying that “Nixon could even come to Beijing, not just a special envoy. He was able to go to Belgrade and Bucharest, so why would he not be able to come to Beijing?”

Cde. Zhou Enlai asked that we transmit to Cde. Ceausescu that the PRC leadership discussed the issue of Sino-American relations in the [CCP] Central Committee, together with Cdes. Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, and that [the above statement] is the position of the Chinese party and government.

[...] [CMEA and CSCE sections not translated] [...]

3. Certain topics presented by Cde. Zhou Enlai during the discussion with the Romanian delegation.

Premier Zhou Enlai also described certain Chinese considerations with respect to the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the rebirth of Japanese militarism, and [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] DPRK-USSR relations.

a. Regarding Sino-Soviet relations

Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that, during the meeting he had on 11 September 1969 with Cde. Alexei Kosygin, he discussed the issue of resolving border disputes “peacefully, without threats.” Concerning this, Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that: “the Chinese side suggested that, before the issues at hand be resolved, the two parties should finalize an agreement that would include: maintaining the status-quo at the border; avoiding skirmishes, disengaging from the disputed zones.

Cde. Kosygin asked what do we mean by disputed zones, he acted as if he did not understand. He was told that, on the basis of the accords agreed upon in the 19th Century, the two countries' borders drawn on their respective maps intersect at certain points. The territories between two lines are territories in dispute. In these territories, border guards from both countries continue to patrol, which is why there are skirmishes. The Chinese proposal is that the troops of both countries be withdrawn from these regions. When Cde. Kosygin asked what would happen to the civil administration now present in those areas, he was told that they should remain in place, as they are now, until the border is finalized. It was mentioned that, by agreeing to this, negotiations can begin on the main issues concerning the demarcation line. Cde. Kosygin agreed to the proposal, and asked for a draft [of the understanding], also asking how long it will take the Chinese side to come up with the document. He was told that the Chinese side can send the document in one week, and, on 18 September, the document was sent. After that, on 20 October, the negotiations began, but there have been no results to this day. The main topics discussed are the disputed zones, which are different in size—some smaller, some larger. In principle, we are talking about the islands on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Those [islands] are disputed because the Soviets do not accept the international practice regarding borders on rivers, meaning they do not accept thalweg [valley profile of the

river]. In the West, the area of the disputed zones is larger, the largest one is in the Pamir plateau. In that area, the border was never settled. The Chinese side said that its guiding principle in the negotiations is the following: starting from the situation on the ground, and through mutual understanding, the necessary changes should be made [to the border]. On the basis of this principle, [China] has resolved its border issues with all its neighbors, except for India and the Soviet Union. The Soviets refuse to accept border changes because they are afraid of a chain reaction. They have issues with all their neighbors, without any exception, starting with Japan and going to Finland, but are insisting that their present borders are just. They are very afraid to create a precedent.”

b. Regarding the revival of Japanese militarism

Regarding this issue, Cde. Zhou Enlai said the following:

“From an economic standpoint, Japan is now number two in the world, ahead of England, France, and even the [Federal Republic of Germany] FRG. Attention must be paid to the fact that the Japanese economy is not growing naturally. It does not possess raw materials, and it does not have a [domestic] market. In these conditions, it purchases resources from the US and the third world, and must find a market to sell its products. The Americans, for fear of competition from Japanese products, began adopting a protectionist tariff policy. Given the situation, Japan is orienting itself toward the markets of other countries, especially Asian countries. Last year, Japan had a trade surplus of approximately 4 billion dollars. This money came, especially, from Asian countries. Thus, Japan, as a country without raw materials and without a domestic market has no other options than economic expansion. It cannot do that without basing [its designs] on the support of a great power—the US. The economic expansion of Japan will be the source of military expansion.” That is why the US-Japanese security treaty has been extended indefinitely.

The Japanese economic expansion requires the expansion of its rearming plans. As it is well known, Japan had had certain rearming plans. The funds set aside for this goal for the 1972-1976 period are 15.8 billion dollars, thus twice as much as the total sum used in the period covered by the first three plans. Thus, their position as a great economic power will mean their expansion as a military power. In this context, it must be stated that the [Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku] Sato—Nixon declaration clearly states that South Korea and Taiwan are indispensable to the security of Japan.

The Japanese are very interested in Indochina. In the past 25 years, Japan has become very rich, taking advantage of the wars in this part of the world, which, even though they did not spread to become a world war, were, nevertheless, continuous. The first was the civil war in China, which lasted for three and a half years. This one, even though it was carried out with American equipment, was of great benefit to Japan, which gained transport [revenues]. Following that Japan benefited from the Korean War, where it participated with logistical support and reparations. In 1959, the Vietnam War started,

which expanded in 1965. This war is now carried out throughout Indochina, and there is a possibility that it be expanded to Thailand. Malaysia is also fearful that it might extend there.

Japan is not prepared for a global war, and even less so for a thermonuclear war. [Japan] is interested in the existence of limited wars. Presently, [Japan] is developing its naval and air forces with the declared goal of protecting the investments it has made abroad. The Japanese defense minister has publicly stated that the Malacca Strait is a vital [logistical] line for Japan. The same declaration was made prior to the start of the Pacific War.

Japanese militarism is being reborn, step by step, and Japan must be seen as a base for defending American interests in the Far East and Asia.

In this issue, the DPRK, the PRC, and the Indochinese countries—Cambodia, represented by [Cambodian leader Norodom] Sihanouk, and Laos, represented by the Pathet Lao—have common points of view.”

Cde. Zhou Enlai referred to the problem of Japanese militarism in the context of Soviet-Japanese relations, stating the following: “On the occasion of the recent meeting I had with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, I asked him: do you remember that we are part of an alliance, and against whom this alliance is directed? The Soviet ambassador replied that the alliance was created against Japanese militarism. Then I told him that, presently, the USSR has very intimate relations with the Japanese, that it opened Siberia’s doors [to Japan], and that would lead to [economic] concessions. The Soviet ambassador said that there were no deals reached yet, and said that China [also] has intense economic relations with Japan. The Soviet ambassador was told that [Japan]¹ is trading with private firms from Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam.

When the Soviet ambassador stated that Japan was the aggressor country, and that there is a danger of future Japanese aggression, not only against China, but also against the Soviet Union, I told him that we cannot speak only of possible future aggression, since that danger exists even now. Japan is moving toward the rebirth of militarism, which constitutes a great danger for the [Far] East, for [North] Korea, for China, for [North] Vietnam. The US is planning for the withdrawal of a part of its armed forces from South Korea (approximately 20,000 soldiers), first, under the condition that Japan and South Korea sign a military alliance, and second, under the condition of the creation of a political alliance—formally named the Consultative Conference—between Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.”

c. Regarding USSR-DPRK relations

Regarding this issue, Cde. Zhou Enlai said the following: “Why did the Korean comrades have a dispute with the Soviet comrades? As it is known, the Americans are behind the Japanese in the creation of a Japanese—South Korean alliance, and at the same time, they are behind the Seoul clique, supporting its provocations at the 38th parallel. For Indochina, there are already a series of decisions adopted at an interna-

tional conference, decisions that have, after all, already been trampled over, and regarding Korea, there is only an armistice, and no peace treaty. During the first part of the Geneva Conference, nothing was settled on the issue of Korea, that is why the [North] Koreans have no other choice but to continue fighting. But the Soviets, not only do they no longer deliver airplanes and cannon, and no longer deliver parts for weaponry, but they accuse them of capturing, downing, and sinking American and South Korean spy planes and espionage vessels. More so, the Soviets send a ship to help in the recovery effort of an American spy plane downed by the [North] Koreans. In such a case, how can the Korean comrades still consider the Soviet Union as a fraternal, socialist country?”

During the visit in the PRC, the leader of the Romanian governmental delegation had a conversation with Penn Nouth, the Prime Minister of the Royal Government of National Unity of Cambodia, since Prince Norodom Sihanouk was in a trip through certain provinces of the PRC.

On this occasion, [Penn Nouth] was told that the Romanian people remain united behind the just struggle of the Cambodian people against foreign, imperialist, intervention, and—in light of the speech given by Cde. Ceausescu at the Anniversary Session of the UN—the position of the SRR on the struggle of the Khmer people was expressed. Penn Nouth thanked [the delegation] for the communication, and for the sympathy and solidarity showed by the Romanian people to the Cambodian people, stating that, being convinced of the just nature of its goals, the Khmer people will continue their struggle until they reach victory.

During the official conversations and the negotiations, our interlocutors have repeatedly referred to the friendship and solidarity of the Chinese people toward the Romanian people, and to the strong and enduring relations between our parties and governments. The Chinese side manifested a clear desire that the negotiations reach a concrete conclusion, through the finalization of the [negotiated] accords. The Chinese side mentioned that, these accords reflect relations of mutual assistance, that they are not advantageous only for the Romanian side, but also for the PRC, because “Romania is on the same side of the battle line as the PRC.”

On the basis of the results obtained, and of the atmosphere in which the visit of the Romanian delegation took place, we conclude that the CCP and the PRC government are giving our country an exceptional level of attention, and are animated by the desire to continue the development of those relations in multiple respects. We also noticed that the internal and foreign policies of the Romanian party and government are well received, and receive the trust, appreciation and support of the Chinese party and state leadership.

1. The country mentioned in the transcription is the PRC. This is either an error by the transcriber or a mistake in the memorandum.



DOCUMENT No. 10

Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Zedong in Beijing, 3 June 1971

[Source: ANIC, CC RCP fond, Foreign Relations Section, file 39/1971, p. 3-29; published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974* [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974], ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 1064-71]. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

Cde. Mao Zedong: Welcome comrades.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu: Thank you very much. We thank you for the very warm welcome we received.

We would like to express our satisfaction with the possibility we have to visit the People's Republic of China, to meet with you and the other leaders of the Chinese party and state.

Mao: When was the last time you were here?

Ceausescu: Seven years [ago].

Mao: In these seven years some things have changed; did you notice this?

Ceausescu: We saw the people, hundreds of thousands of people; we visited Tsinghua University. We were impressed by the positive attitude and the joy of living displayed by the people in the capital; also, especially, [we were impressed] by the preoccupation with perfect education, to tie it to production, to life, to the construction of socialism.

Mao: That is the way we think about it as well; now we are experimenting.

At the same time, we have to continue to use older teachers and professors, bourgeois; we still don't have other people. They, however, have to listen to us, to listen to workers and peasants. In their words, they listen; however, in their mind, they blame. There is need for more time, slowly, slowly; 21 years passed since [the success of the revolution.] It's true, even in the past there were some successes in education; we can't negate everything. But in what you mentioned just now, the revolutionizing of education, this only happened in the past years.

With you[r country] the activity went forth with a lot of progress.

Ceausescu: It's true, in the past years we had good results. We are also concerned with changing education, to tie it better to production. We are preoccupied with attracting the working class to the management of the institutions, and tying the party to the popular masses.

We can say that, generally, things go forth in good order. Of course, we have lots of deficiencies, but we are trying hard, together with the working class, with the people, to ensure the construction of socialism.

Mao: If we talk about deficiencies, then we too can say we have plenty.

Ceausescu: There is not one country that does not have deficiencies. The difference is that some work to resolve them, while others try to hide them.

Mao: Deficiencies cannot be hidden, because sooner or later—in a day, a year, or future centuries—these deficiencies will be revealed. It is better if we tell people what's what; people cannot be deceived. [Deceiving] can only go on for a short time. People cannot be deceived for decades.

Ceausescu: This is very true, especially today, with today's communication and information methods, reality cannot be hidden for very long.

Mao: It is very true. Even they know this.¹

Ceausescu: After all, conflicts appear where they try to hide reality from people.

Mao: In some places, conflicts did not appear yet.

Ceausescu: But it is inevitable that conflicts would appear.

Mao: That is so.

Ceausescu: Of course, if they will take no action to straighten up things, and remove [deficits].

Mao: There are certain [communist] parties that insult other parties; they think that truth is on their side, that the other parties always make mistakes. We are called dogmatic, warmongers, that we have a dictatorship. That is what they say, that here we have a military bureaucratic dictatorship.

Ceausescu: Unfortunately, it is true, that there still exists this practice of name-calling, of insulting other parties.

Mao: There are certain parties, like yours, that do not say that. Recently, I read a speech of yours. In a very open way, there was the recognition that there have been mistakes in the past; other parties cannot come to terms with such things. Certain parties insulted us for over ten years, and we did not respond with even a word. They are forced to insult us. We can show understanding toward such occurrences. At the same time, we are happy that we have the quality of being insulted. This is very good. The meeting that took place in Bucharest in 1960, was that not imposed on you?² At that time, Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had lots of difficulties. Can we impugn you for this?!

Ceausescu: It is true that the meeting took place there, and in a way, we too are at fault, since we could have refused to hold that meeting. Today such a meeting could not, and does not, take place in Romania.

Mao: At that time it was hard to refuse to host the conference. On the occasion of the Chinese Communist Party's 8th Congress, which took place in 1956, I had an interesting conversation with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. He told me some things straight from the heart. It was, of course, difficult to put up with such things. The Cominform was disbanded then, and that gave rise to debates. Criticism was necessary for this to happen.

Ceausescu: It is true that there were some hard times; even today there are some hard times. There are new designs to create different leadership formats that would take away the independence of other states and parties.

Mao: It would be good if the whole planet would be the domain of one single country!

Ceausescu: It's hard; even what is available now it's too much.

Mao: Is it really too much?!

Ceausescu: We feel that the best way is to have relations based on equality among all nations in the world.

Mao: Irrespective of their size, even [countries] as small as San Marino, which has a population of 16,000 people; we were sincerely glad to be able to establish diplomatic contacts with such a country.

Ceausescu: Of course, on this globe there are countries that are very large, large, medium countries, small and very small [countries], but all nations desire to build their lives freely; of course, in close cooperation with other states, with other nations, but without subordinating one to the other.

Mao: There is another issue, and that is that, on the occasion of the [Party] congresses, there are other parties invited; during the congress, for example during the Czechoslovak congress, insults and blaming takes place. Would it not be better to change this practice? Better not to invite any foreign delegations to the congresses. We did not invite anyone to the 9th Congress. It is true that the sky did not fall.

Ceausescu: It is true that such a tactic could be adopted, as long as the congresses are being used for insults, to hurl insults at other parties.

Mao: Recently, the Korean Workers' Party did not invite foreign guests to their congress. Cde. Kim Il Sung visited our country last year; he asked us: "are you inviting anyone?" We told him: no, we are not inviting anyone; it is difficult to invite other people. The more they insult and judge other people, the worse things will go for them.

There are more guests present, and they do not have identical opinions; it is better to have bilateral relations, like, for example, the fight against imperialism; then we fight. They want to have united action; it is hard because there are different opinions. A few years back, we talked with a few comrades, we told them that we cannot reach such accords; even then the sky did not fall, and the planet continues to revolve.

Ceausescu: Of course, it would be good if we reached an end to the insults and labeling. I have to tell you that many parties are calling for this, that even at the [Moscow] congress of the [fraternal] parties in 1969, and at the CPSU congress, a lot of parties—even big parties—refused to ally with the condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party, and are trying to find ways to establish relations with the CCP.

Mao: It is better to do these things bilaterally, like for example the relationship between the two of us.

Ceausescu: This is exactly what these parties want, for example the Italian, Spanish, [and] others. When we left to come here, they asked us to transmit their desire to reestablish contacts.

Mao: We can reestablish them, but the question remains what we do with their debt to us, because they have cursed and insulted us a lot in the past.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: And there is the issue of interest on their debt.

Mao: We have such calculations. If they no longer insult us, at least they should say something about the debt they owe us, the same way you did. There is no need for much, just a

few words.

Ceausescu: Some have already said it, and we talked to them: they are ready to recognize that the past way was not good.

Mao: Not just that they were not good, they were wrong.

Ceausescu: Yes, wrong.

Mao: They were wrong. Things developed in an unbelievable fashion. What can we say of the great family, of the internationalist proletariat, of unity, when in reality there was a schism. It's not a big deal, if they want a schism, a separation in many parts. Even if the entire Italian party wants to come to China, they are welcome here. They are allowed to curse us in their newspapers and magazines, but they must allow others freedom of expression as well. We will respond to any who shit on our head (*isi fac scaun in capul nostru*), irrespective of the size of the country, irrespective of the number of bombs they have. You can visit our modern shelters. We have built them in case of a war.

Will you visit the North-West of China? We have to be prepared for any possibility.

Ceausescu: It is true that the schism has caused much damage. Of course, there have been many mistakes made, but we have to put right the mistakes and I believe that we all have to work in this direction.

Mao: We will not put anything right, and will continue in our dogmatism; even [for] ten thousand years.³ One time, when [Soviet Premier Alexei] Kosygin visited, we reduced that time by 1000 years; one time, during the visit of the Romanian delegation, we reduced it again by 1000 years; at once we reduced 2000 years from this period. It is very dangerous, there are only 8000 years left.

Ceausescu: We can reduce some more!

Mao: Not even one year can be taken off. They can sit on our heads, but we must answer back. We do not do this when it comes to small countries. We cannot say a word toward them, but with regard to the big countries, we do not take anything into consideration. We will not be moved by any messengers [*purtatori de cuvanti*], who give advice; the more advice they give us, the worse things will go, since we here, all of us, are bureaucrats and militarists, we betrayed Marxist-Leninism, we do not have the qualities necessary to be part of the great family. You do, we do not.

Ceausescu: Now we are nationalists.

Mao: You too are being labeled.

Cde. Ion Gheroghe Maurer: Fewer [labels], but there are some, Cde. Mao Zedong.

Mao: You have so been labeled because you are resisting the pressure. For us, the labels are not too many, and not too few—8000 years. Everybody should listen up. Now militarism has taken center stage—it is certain that we will no longer reduce [any years]; he (points to Lin Biao) is the head of the militarists. But I too, am part of the militarists and the bureaucrats. They are very smart. Khrushchev developed Marxism-Leninism in a very creative way. I asked [Kosygin], a man as good as Khrushchev, who developed Marxism-Leninism, why have you marginalized him? It was difficult for him to

give me any motives. Then I told him: if you no longer need him, give him to us; we invite Khrushchev to come to Beijing University, to hold classes on Marxism-Leninism. Kosygin could not answer then. I have to conclude that such a country is not a good one. I will tell you one thing: we publish [their] articles in our press, but they do not publish our replies in their press. Here there must be a reason. Articles published by dogmatists, by countries where there is a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, have to be repudiated. The entire Soviet people should know them, so they can repudiate them. But they did not publish them. In this instance, they are even behind some imperialist countries; American newspapers have dared publish our articles about them. Especially, I speak of the New York Times.

You have been in the United States of America, but all of us here, we have not been. We sent a ping-pong ball over there.

Ceausescu: It seems it was well placed.

Mao: Do you agree with this ball?

Ceausescu: We agree.

Mao: I read an article published in Budapest; even there they are showing their agreement with this ball. What is so great in the game of ping-pong? The US Vice President—[Spiro] Agnew—said that he is not for it. The leader of the ping-pong delegation that was here said that we do not play ping-pong, rather table tennis. He was trying a play on words.

Ceausescu: Yes, ping-pong is a very interesting game, especially since you have very good players.

Mao:⁴ But the leader of the delegation was stupid; we criticized him. They have done this thing chasing only prizes, thinking only to win; they did not want to lose; they took four of the seven medals, and they were not satisfied. How is that possible, to chase only prizes[?] The leaders from the Committee for Physical Education and Sport are, indeed, bureaucrats and great power chauvinists. Our country has such instances of great power chauvinism, quite widespread; they are always trying to defeat other countries. At the same time, they were incapable, since aside from the fact that we won, they boasted everywhere. One of them was here, and I had a fight with him. He said only good things about China. I told him that there is not truth in what he's saying. He gave the example of China's launch of a satellite. I told him that presently there are 2000 satellites revolving around the Earth, and we only placed one of them in orbit at that time, while you, the French, launched one, and Japan, another one, a total of three, and over 2000 satellites are launched by other countries. It is not good to gloat; how can we gloat?

Ceausescu: It is true, it's only a beginning, but it is a good beginning, because the other countries started with one as well.

Mao: That is very true. I agree, this corresponds to reality.

They even went to the moon; presently, we do not have such possibilities. At the same time, however, we do not have an interest in doing so, and we do not admire those who got to the moon. In this instance, we are equal in right; neither us, nor you, have reached the moon.

Ceausescu: We do not think of doing this in the future either,

it is very expensive.

Zhou Enlai: Especially since there is no water or air there!

Ceausescu: And without any results, aside from scientific ends, and out of curiosity.

Zhou Enlai: Not all issues here on Earth have been resolved, and they have already gotten to the Moon.

Ceausescu: But this race to the Moon is very expensive.

Zhou Enlai: The monopolists are making nice profits from this, because they receive orders; even the land of the Moon has been divided up.

Ceausescu: Even so, the people are paying a lot for this race.

Mao: All the people?

Ceausescu: Those who undertake it.

Mao: Two people. What are the superpowers?

Ceausescu: It's hard to give a definition.

Mao: Those that have more nuclear weapons and have taken over many territories; they can control other countries, while other countries cannot.

Until now we have only said unlucky words at the expense of others. We have begun by cursing the superpowers.

Zhou Enlai: In my speech tomorrow I will make a reference to this. They will not leave if we speak of the superpowers.

Mao: That's fine; they will not leave if we speak of socialist-imperialism. We gave it a name—socialist-imperialism. We did not say this, it was Lenin; in words they are socialists, in deeds they are imperialists.

Zhou Enlai: We began using this term with the occasion of the reception hosted by [Romanian] Ambassador [Aurelian] Duma on 23 August 1968. It was brought forth by the events in Czechoslovakia.

Mao: On the occasion of Cde. [Emil] Bodnarus visit here, he told us that what Cde. Zhou Enlai said with regard to these events was useful; we did not notice, we did not feel that; he told us it was useful.

Ceausescu: We appreciated the speech of Cde. Zhou Enlai, and looked at them as aid to our country and to the communist movement. After all, many, many parties have condemned the invasion.

Mao: I wonder what the reasons were for their invasion, to send troops there and to occupy places under cover of darkness; troops were parachuted in.

Ceausescu: We were in Czechoslovakia a few days before the invasion, and we met with the party leadership, with the working class, there was no danger to socialism.

Mao: But they said that there was a grave danger, that they have to defend socialism.

Ceausescu: There was only one danger, and that was that there were serious criticisms against the [Soviet] policy of domination.

Mao: Yes, that was it, and only this. At that time they had great plans, not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against you and Yugoslavia.

Ceausescu: Maybe they thought about it, but then, and now, we were, and continue to be, set not to accept any such actions.

Mao: Because you are prepared, especially in the military

field. If they shall come, you will fight first and foremost.

Ceausescu: We are a small country, but we do not want to live under [foreign] domination. Of course, we have friendly relations with everyone, we greatly appreciate friends and friendly relations, but we consider that Romania's problems are first and foremost to be solved by the party, the working class, the Romanian people.

Mao: In my opinion, that is good.

Ceausescu: If we work poorly, our working class, our people, will judge us.

Mao: If you are prepared, they will fear you.

Vietnam is also a small country; Cambodia is an even smaller country, and Laos is smaller still. They carried out a ten-year war, not including the war against the French. There are conclusions that we should be considered warmongers. We will respond to anyone who comes here. We are helping those who fight against the invasion. You are helping the fight of the Indochinese countries to save their motherland.

Ceausescu: From the very beginning we have helped Vietnam, Laos, and now Cambodia. We also offer aid to the fight of African people who fight against colonialism.

Mao: That is very good. We have identical positions.

Maybe we should stop here. Cde. Zhou Enlai said that you will speak this afternoon. Do fight with him!

Ceausescu: I don't think we will fight with him.

Mao: The third world war will start. The two of you will fight, I will not take part, since I am a bureaucrat.

Ceausescu: Well, that's good, then there will be someone to make peace between us.

Mao: With Cde. Maurer, we have similar names. My name begins with Mao as well.

Ceausescu: Then, it is even more important to have good relations, to collaborate well. We appreciate very much the relations between our two countries and parties.

Mao: Don't give it too much appreciation. Just so, it is well. We do not fight. Of course, sometimes we fight a little, like we'll fight this afternoon. There have to be discussions.

Ceausescu: I hope we'll have discussions, but I don't believe we'll fight.



Participants at the July 2006 Summer School at the Sighet Memorial for the Victims of Communism, Sighet, Romania.

At the summer school, CWIHP Director Christian Ostermann delivered a lecture and contributed to an international exhibit on the Cold War, created by Romanian scholars and activists Ana Blandiana and Romulus Rusan.

1. It is unclear who "they" are. Given the context of discussions, it is possible that Mao is referring to the Soviet leadership.
2. Mao refers to the Congress of the Fraternal Parties that took place in Bucharest, 26 June 1960. During the congress, the Soviet delegation attacked the Chinese delegation for deviationism and factionalism.
3. 10,000 years in Chinese has an idiomatic meaning of eternity.
4. The paragraph is somewhat confused, making it unclear which person or delegation Mao is talking about. The historic visit of the US team to China took place on 12 April 1971.



Excerpt from CWIHP e-Dossier No. 14:

“The History of North Korean Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons and Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Capability”

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1963

[Source: XIX-J-1-j Korea, 6. doboz, 5/d, 0011/RT/1963. Obtained and translated for CWIHP and NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) by Balazs Szalontai]

The December session of the KWP [Korean Workers Party] Central Committee passed a resolution to reinforce the defense of the country. According to the resolution, a strong defense system must be established in the whole country, the population must be armed, and the country must be kept in a state of mobilization.

From what I hear, large-scale work is going on throughout the country; not only entrenchments but also air-raid shelters for the population are being built in the mountains. As the Soviet Ambassador informed me, Kim Il Sung explained to him in a conversation that the geographical conditions of the country (a mountainous terrain) give a certain advantage to them in case of an atomic war, for the mountains ward off the explosions to a substantial extent, and a lot of such bombs would be needed to wreak large-scale destruction in the country. The construction of these air-raid shelters is presumably related to this theory.

The Czechoslovak ambassador informed me that the Koreans propagated a theory that cited the South Vietnamese events as an example. In that country, there is essentially a war against the Diem government and the American imperialist troops, and, as is well known, the partisan units have succeeded in winning over more and more territory from the influence of the Diem puppet government. In spite of all this, the Americans make no attempt to use atomic bombs. Does anything support the assumption that the Americans would act otherwise in case of a South Korean war, then? It is obvious that there is nothing to support such an assumption.

Czechoslovak Ambassador Comrade Moravec also told me that at the dinner party held by Deputy Foreign Minister Gim Daehui [...], Major General Jang Jeonghwan, the Korean representative on the Panmunjom Armistice Commission, approached him after dinner, and put the following question to him: “What would you do if some day the enemy took one of the two rooms of your flat?” Comrade Moravec replied, “Whatever happens, I would resort to methods that did not run the risk of destroying the whole building or the whole city [...]” Thereupon [Major] General Jang threw a cigarette-box he had in his hand on the table, and left him standing. [...]

I had a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Comrade Moskovsky about these issues. He told me the following: Recently he paid a visit to CC Vice-Chairman Pak Kumch’ol, to whom he forwarded a telegram from the competent Soviet authorities that invited several persons for a vacation in the Soviet Union. During his visit he asked Bak Geumcheol what his opinion was of the fact [...] that Park Chung Hee and the South Korean military leaders recently had a talk with Meloy, the commander of the “UN troops,” about the defense of South Korea. In the view of the CC Vice-Chairman, for the time being no adventurist military preparations were to be expected because of the following two reasons: 1) The transfer of power to civilian authorities was going on, that is, they were putting other clothes on the Fascist dictatorship, and they were busy with that. 2) The South Korean economic situation was difficult, and it was inconceivable under the circumstances that they would make serious preparations to pursue adventurist aims.

The CC Vice-Chairman also expounded their viewpoint concerning South Korea. After Syngman Rhee had been driven away, when Jang Myeon was in power, but even as late as the beginning of last year, their view on the South Korean situation was that a successful opposition to the Fascist dictatorship, led by the students and the intelligentsia, was possible. By now it has become obvious that there is no chance of it, and Park Chung Hee has even succeeded in improving the country’s economic situation to a certain extent. In these circumstances one cannot negotiate with the Fascist dictatorship on peaceful unification, and the process of the country’s unification drags on. [...]

As regards the resolution of the CC, Comrade Moskovsky also thinks that arming the population and keeping it in a state of mobilization is a rather unusual measure in peacetime. The economic situation of both North Korea and China is quite difficult, they have a lot of problems. Under the circumstances a military action is hardly to be expected from them. Or on the contrary? “Would their economic difficulties possibly plunge them into some adventure?” Comrade Moskovsky asked. It is not easy to say yes or no to such questions. The first sentence of the resolution of the December plenum begins as follows: The development of the international situation is favorable to the Korean revolution. However, the remaining part of the resolution tries to refute that, while Bak Geumcheol said they were not threatened by any southern adventurist provocation. If they look upon the situation in that light, [...] why are these unusual defense measures needed?

[...]

Jozsef Kovacs
(ambassador)

The full e-Dossier is available at <http://cwihp.org>.

New Evidence on North Korea in 1956

Introduction by James F. Person

Few events since the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War have had such enduring political relevance in the 60-year history of the North Korean party-state as the three-year dispute in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) over development strategies that culminated in the summer of 1956. Yet, due to the secretive nature of the regime and the paucity of documentary evidence from Korean and other archives, little has been known about this pivotal event until recently. While accounts of the episode have appeared in many histories of modern Korea,¹ they have largely focused on the August 1956 Plenum of the KWP Central Committee (CC), which is generally portrayed as the climax of a decade-long power struggle between four factions: the so-called "Soviet faction" composed of ethnic Koreans who lived in the Soviet Union and were sent to serve in administrative positions in northern Korea after 1945; the "Yan'an faction," made up of those Koreans who lived in China during Japan's colonial rule over Korea; the "domestic faction" of veteran communist Bak Heonyeong; and Kim Il Sung's own "Gapsan faction" of former anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. According to the standard narrative, following the purge of Bak and his supporters in 1953 for allegedly attempting to seize power, only Kim Il Sung's group and the foreign supported "Soviet" and "Yan'an" factions remained. Mirroring to a certain degree North Korea's official historiography, the August 1956 Plenum is generally portrayed as an abortive *coup d'état* orchestrated by the "Soviet" and "Yan'an" factions.²

Recent accounts by Russian scholar Andrei Lankov and Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai have shed additional light on the actions of key actors in the weeks and months before the August Plenum.³ Drawing on newly released materials from the Soviet and Hungarian archives, both scholars describe the clandestine efforts of the "Soviet" and "Yan'an" factions to challenge the KWP leadership, hastily organized during North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's absence from the country while on a month-long trip to fraternal communist countries. Their conclusions about the severity of the threat to Kim Il Sung, however, differ rather sharply. Lankov argues that from the beginning, Kim's opponents sought to unseat him.⁴ Despite agreeing with Lankov about the factional origins of the conflict, Szalontai, by

contrast, concludes that the attack on Kim Il Sung's policies at the August Plenum "was a desperate attempt to turn the tide rather than a serious challenge to Kim's rule."⁵

The documentary evidence on post-war North Korea has been greatly enhanced recently through the release of documents at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the post-Stalin Central Committee archive. These documents, some of which are presented below, originated with the Central Committee Department for Relations with International Communist Parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) own foreign policy organ.⁶ Some of the documents were also analyzed by Japanese scholar Nobuo Shimotomai, who accessed them in microfilm copy at the Slavic Research Center in Hokkaido, Japan. As I argue in CWIHP Working Paper No. 52,⁷ the new documents reveal that contrary to the common wisdom on factional power struggles, a myriad of factors and motivations played into the pivotal events of 1956. Kim and his opponents did not simply compete for raw power, they also had clear ideological and practical preferences and differences. Indeed, as the newly available materials seem to suggest, the precipitating cause of events at the August 1956 Plenum was not a factional power struggle or Kim Il Sung's prolonged absence from the country during the summer of 1956; rather, after a three-year dispute over socialist development strategies, opponents of Kim Il Sung's vision for modernizing the DPRK made a final, desperate attempt to convince the North Korean leader to adopt post-Stalin Soviet-style "New Course" economic reforms. Moreover, they sought to rid the party of nationalist elements hostile to foreign influences, and place limits on the growing personality cult in North Korea.

In light of the new documentary evidence, the events of 1956 can no longer be examined with a narrow focus on a power struggle between groups with diverse revolutionary backgrounds. Such an approach to a large degree mirrors North Korea's official historiography in that it is narrated "in terms of Kim Il Sung's supremacy over all [...] political challenges, from within and without."⁸ Factional rivalries, the documents suggest, were exaggerated by Kim Il Sung as a pretext to purge policy opponents. Rather than a factional power struggle, the events of

James F. Person is the coordinator of the North Korea International Documentation Project (History and Public Policy Program) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is currently completing a PhD in Korean history at the George Washington University, working on a dissertation on North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China from 1953-1962.

1956 have to be seen in the context of the broader theme of competing visions for socialist modernization, both inside the North Korean party-state and throughout the communist bloc. Another factor we must be mindful of is Kim Il Sung's determination to limit the influence of those he felt did not fully appreciate the realities of life in North Korea, i.e. the Soviet and Chinese parties, and their minions inside the KWP. This necessitates a comprehensive reexamination of the DPRK's history from the end of the Korean War in 1953 through the August Plenum of 1956.

The debate over development strategies in North Korea began within weeks of the 1953 armistice that brought an end to hostilities in the Korean War, when two policy lines (*gyeyeoul*) emerged in the wake of the Sixth Plenum of the KWPC. On the one hand, Kim Il Sung and his supporters advocated the Stalin-inspired development of heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer goods, and the rapid collectivization of agriculture. His opponents, on the other hand, most of who were Soviet-Koreans or those who spent time in China during the period of Japanese colonial rule, encouraged the development of light industry and consumer durables. The latter, given the appellation the "consumer goods group," vigorously encouraged Kim Il Sung to mechanically replicate modernization strategies promoted by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership in other fraternal socialist countries. Moreover, members of the "consumer goods group" supported North Korea's further integration into the international division of labor through the reinvigorated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

Kim Il Sung had very practical reasons for rejecting these appeals of his policy opponents, however. First, he equated industrialization with strength at a time when South Korean president Syngman Rhee continued to engage in saber-rattling and the Republic of Korea witnessed a massive influx of US aid. Moreover, he was certain a strong DPRK would appeal to left-leaning South Koreans. Furthermore, Kim recognized that integrating the DPRK's economy into the international division of labor meant foregoing industrial development since North Korea was expected to simply export its natural resources and marine products to COMECON member countries. Kim Il Sung was first and foremost a nationalist, and with Korea emerging from a centuries-old Sino-centric system of relations and 35 years of Japanese colonial rule, he would not willingly subordinate his country by entering into a new suzerain system of "serving the great" (*sadae*) with the Soviet Union.

As the documents presented in this section suggest, in February 1956, after nearly three years of debate over development strategies, members of the "consumer goods group" were boosted in their efforts by developments in the Soviet Union. During the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Nikita Khrushchev launched his attack on Joseph Stalin, condemning the former leader for his personality cult and violations of intra-party democracy. The "consumer goods group" seized the opportunity to level the same charges against Kim Il Sung, who was also guilty of many of the charges Khrushchev made during the so-called "secret speech." Emboldened by Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, the "consumer

A NOTE ABOUT THE REVISED ROMANIZATION OF KOREAN

CWIHP has adopted the Revised Romanization of Korean (2000), the official Korean language Romanization system in South Korea. Among the notable changes to the Romanization of Korean words and names, the breve has been eliminated and aspirated consonants (as in k', t', p', ch') have no apostrophe. Moreover, the "k," "t," "p," and "ch" are now with letters that are voiced in English: g, d, b, and j. With the exception of Kim Il Sung, the surname Kim is now rendered Gim. The surname Lee is now rendered as Yi or Li, and Pak (or Park) is written as Bak.

Pak Hon-yong — Bak Heonyeong
P'yongyang — Pyeongyang
Pak Chong-ae — Bak Jeongae
Kim Sung-hwa — Gim Seunghwa

goods group" added to its list of criticisms and openly questioned the advisability of disregarding fraternal experiences with de-Stalinization while continuing to encourage "New Course" economic reforms advocated by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. They also began to meet with the staff of the Soviet and Chinese embassies to encourage foreign communist leaders to intervene on their behalf and to admonish Kim Il Sung and the KWP leadership during "friendship visits" to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia in June and July.

During his trip throughout Eastern Europe in June and July 1956, Kim Il Sung admitted to the correctness of the comradely advice in the presence of fraternal leaders. Yet, upon returning to Pyeongyang in mid-July, he was reluctant to comply with the recommendations of Khrushchev and other foreign communist officials. His reluctance to make changes, at least at the pace his critics considered necessary, convinced members of the "consumer goods group" of the need to make one last appeal during the August plenum. Far from an attempted coup d'état, members of the "consumer goods group" attempted to bring their case directly to the Central Committee, stressing the need to learn from the experiences of fraternal communist parties and implement a post-Stalin Soviet-style development strategy in North Korea. They also sought to purge nationalist elements hostile to the influence of the Soviet and Chinese parties in the party. Believing that the majority of the CC would support their proposed reforms, Kim's policy opponents sought to accomplish this course change by engaging in pointed criticism and self-criticism, without removing Kim Il Sung from power so long as he complied in making the necessary changes. Indeed, as more than one document in this collection reveals, the most prominent members of the "consumer goods group" considered Kim a competent, if somewhat inexperienced leader, who deserved to retain his position at the helm of the North Korean party-state.

As the documents demonstrate, Kim Il Sung prepared well

in advance for what he apparently perceived as a showdown, and threatened those who sympathized with his policy opponents with blackmail. The members of the “consumer goods group” were thus easily silenced during the plenum. They were subsequently purged and declared factionalists. Curiously, the first mention of a “Soviet” or “Yan’an” faction does not appear in documents until after the so-called “August factional incident” of 1956. From late 1955 onward, Kim Il Sung came under increasing pressure from Khrushchev and other Soviet officials to reform the North Korean economy. He responded, throughout the months leading up to August 1956 by creating separate group identities for the members of the “consumer goods group,” based on their revolutionary backgrounds. He did this by launching broad-based attacks on the most contrived grounds. This was the case with the Soviet-Koreans in December 1955, when individuals were accused of supporting reactionary authors from the south while neglecting the achievements of North Korean authors with proper revolutionary credentials. After creating separate group identities for his policy opponents, by August 1956, Kim Il Sung could successfully declare them factionalists, making the existence of separate “Soviet” and “Yan’an” factions an ontological reality.

The joint Sino-Soviet party intervention of September 1956, led by CPSU CC member Anastas Mikoyan and PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, served only to further alienate Kim Il Sung from the socialist bloc. Thus, Kim hastened his transition from internationalist, fraternal socialism to an indigenous version of Marxism-Leninism, or “Korean-style socialism”⁹ and the anti-hegemonic *Juche* ideology.

Most of the documents presented in this collection are memoranda of conversations that took place between Soviet embassy officials and both North Korean leaders and Chinese embassy staff. Additional meetings occurred in Moscow between the North Korean ambassador and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials. The documents cover the period from March to October 1956, i.e. from one month before the KWP Third Congress to a few weeks after the September Plenum and joint Sino-Soviet party intervention led by Mikoyan and Peng. It is no coincidence that copies of many of the documents found in RGANI are also housed in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). As the CPSU’s analogous organ to the Soviet Union’s Foreign Ministry, and given the strong interest in preserving Marxist-Leninist principles in the foreign policy of the Soviet party-state, the documents of the Central Committee Department for Relations with International Communist Parties make RGANI as valuable a resource as AVPRF in studying Moscow’s relations with fraternal nations from 1953-1957. However, the arbitrary nature in which documents are either released or withheld from scholars at the Foreign Ministry Archive sometimes make the more systematic Central Committee archives, under the auspices of Rosarkhiv, more accessible once documents have gone through the declassification process.¹⁰ This appears to have been the case with documents pertaining to the opposition movement in the DPRK in 1956.

Document #1 in the collection is a memorandum of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, V. I. Ivanov, and vice premier and chairman of the State Planning Committee, Bak Changok. Bak, a prominent member of a group of ethnic Koreans sent to North Korea from the Soviet Union from 1945-1948, served in a number of influential administrative positions in both the party and state for over a decade. Much like other “Soviet-Koreans,” Bak maintained regular contact with the Soviet embassy throughout his career in North Korea. After the contentious issue of postwar economic rehabilitation placed Bak and many of his former compatriots in opposition to Kim Il Sung, the “Great Leader” responded by unleashing a smear-campaign against Soviet-Koreans in the fall of 1955 in an attempt to create a group identity for the Soviet-Koreans, making them easier to purge in the future. Most of Bak’s statements in the March 1956 meeting were designed to redeem himself in the eyes of Soviet officials after the KWP CC accused him of being anti-party. Yet, the account is nonetheless valuable in that it provides details of the anti-Soviet-Korean campaign and the inner workings of the KWP in the turbulent period that enveloped the communist world following the death of J. V. Stalin in March 1953.

Document #2 is a Soviet-edited draft of the KWP statutes adopted at the Third Party Congress in April 1956. The document is fascinating in that it reveals Moscow’s “New Course” in international relations by suggesting the elimination of language considered by the embassy to be of a “warlike character.” Just three years after a ceasefire effectively brought an end to hostilities on the Korean peninsula, however, the North Koreans, as well as the Chinese, were evidently troubled by the notion of peaceful coexistence with the West. Thus, many of the Soviet-suggested revisions, including the elimination of bellicose terminology, were simply disregarded in the final version adopted at the congress. Yet in partial recognition of the changed situation in the communist world, and as a minor concession to critical party functionaries, Stalin’s name was struck from the list of ideological bellwethers guiding party activities. The KWP now described itself as simply Marxist-Leninist.¹¹

Document #3, a memorandum of a conversation between Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, reveals that Bak Heonyeong, the veteran Korean Communist leader and former North Korean foreign minister who was accused of being an American spy and sentenced to death in 1955, was still alive in early 1956. Nearly every history of modern Korea claims that Bak had been executed swiftly following his December 1955 sentencing, nearly two years after his fellow conspirators were put to death for allegedly attempting to overthrow Kim Il Sung and create a pro-American government. Bak’s purported factional activities, which supposedly took place throughout the 1950-1953 Korean War, resulted in the demise of the group of Korean communists who had remained in the country throughout the 35-year Japanese colonial occupation. During the conversation, Ivanov informed Kim that several members of the DPRK government visited the Soviet embassy to consult the resident KGB advisor on Soviet interests in prevent-

ing the execution. Infuriated by this, and by Ivanov's personal observation that carrying out the sentence would be inexpedient, Kim suggested the party had already reached a unanimous decision on the matter, and that those making individual inquiries were in breach of the principle of democratic centralism. As this and other documents in this collection reveal, throughout the spring and summer Kim's patience was being tested by those violating the iron will of the party.

Documents #4 and #10 are memoranda of conversations between North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union, Li Sangjo, and two Soviet Foreign Ministry officials held shortly after Li returned to his post in Moscow following the Third Congress of the KWP. While both meetings were officially arranged to discuss Kim Il Sung's upcoming trip to the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, Li used the opportunity to voice his displeasure with the outcome of the Third Party Congress. By the time of the two meetings, Li was already an outspoken critic of Kim Il Sung's cult of personality, the post-war reliance on heavy industry, and the party's ideological work. These memoranda are significant since Li encouraged Soviet leaders, specifically Nikita Khrushchev, to criticize Kim Il Sung and the North Korean government delegation during their visit to Moscow. The promotion of Kim's nationalistic former guerrilla allies to leadership positions within the KWP was becoming so prominent that Li and other party officials, especially the Soviet-Koreans and those former members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), considered outside intervention necessary to complement the direct criticism of Kim and his ex-comrades-in-arms that was taking place inside the DPRK. The "consumer goods group" thus took a multi-front approach to encourage Kim Il Sung to adopt post-Twentieth Party Congress-style reforms and to purge the KWP leadership of nationalist elements: direct criticism at home, coupled with the dressing-down of Kim during his trip to the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia.

DPRK Deputy Prime Minister Choe Changik, who according to most accounts was the leader of the so-called "Yan'an [Chinese] faction," met with Ivanov twice in early June [**Documents #7 and #9**]. During these meetings, Choe expressed many of the same sentiments Li Sangjo shared with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials upon returning to his post in Moscow. Most notably, Choe also considered outside intervention necessary in order to correct the policies of the KWP, claiming that he did not see the necessary forces inside the party to do this on their own.

Choe also noted that the KWP leadership had developed the "harmful" practice of selecting cadres based not on their professional or political qualities, but based on their revolutionary backgrounds, i.e., those who lived in China, the Soviet Union, or remained in Korea. This practice, Choe alleged, was designed to engender "nepotism" and conflict among cadres. Prominent Soviet-Korean Bak Uiwan expressed the same concern with Ambassador Ivanov just days before [**Document #6**], noting that Kim Il Sung was dividing workers into "Soviet, local, Southerners, and partisans" and consciously sought to

maintain "proportions" in the party leadership.

Curiously, Choe also spent a considerable amount of time defending the Soviet-Koreans who had come under increasing attack since the end of 1955. Although it can be argued that Choe did this only because he was in the presence of the Soviet ambassador, this does not explain Choe's request for Soviet assistance which, along with the defense of the beleaguered Soviet-Koreans, seems to contradict the standard narrative which examines North Korean history through the lens of factional rivalry.

Document #11 is the memorandum of a conversation between the Soviet charge d'affaires, A. Petrov, and the North Korean head of the Department of Construction Materials under the Cabinet of Ministers, Li Pilgyu. Held on 20 July, the day after Kim Il Sung's return from his extended trip abroad, Yi's visit to the Soviet embassy was likely precipitated by the "Great Leader's" lack of response to the comradely advice he received while abroad. According to the DPRK ambassador to the USSR, as reported by Li, Kim Il Sung allegedly failed to give an account of the CPSU CC's recommendations to the KWP CC upon returning to Pyongyang. In Moscow, Kim "admitted to the CPSU CC the correctness of the comments addressed to the KWP leadership but on return to Korea he began to act to the contrary" [**Document #17**]. Li Pilgyu's meeting with Petrov was the first of four visits between 20 and 24 July to the Soviet embassy, three of which were apparently coordinated to inform the legation of events to come. Indeed, once the "consumer goods group" decided to take matters into its own hands, members visited not only the Soviet embassy, but also the Chinese embassy, though records of these meetings have not yet emerged [**see Document #13**].

Li Pilgyu, like numerous other members of the "consumer goods group," had moved to China during Japan's 35-year colonial occupation of Korea where he became active in the Chinese communist movement. Most scholars have labeled those who returned from China, like Li, as the "Yan'an faction," one of four so-called "factions" comprising the leadership of the North Korean party-state.¹² The other alleged groups included, as noted, the "Soviet" faction, the "domestic" faction, and Kim Il Sung's "guerrilla" faction. As I argue in *CWIHP Working Paper No. 52*, however, despite the history of factionalism in Yi Dynasty Korea and in the early Korean communist movement, there was no inherent antagonism or hostility, and certainly no "intense factional rivalry"¹³ among those who comprised the leadership of the DPRK.

The existence of four factions is not supported by the available documentary evidence. The widely held notion of four factions appears to be the direct result of Kim Il Sung's divide-and-conquer policies of the mid-1950s. Only after the purportedly factionalist groups were defeated, were they retroactively charged with the sin of factionalism. Before 1953, purges were targeted not at whole groups of functionaries with ties to either the Soviet Union or China, but at individuals. Following the war and the prolonged debate on development strategies, however, Kim began to attack those who had conducted their revo-

lutionary activities abroad (i.e. Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China), warning against attempting to “emulate or imitate others.” This was in response to what Kim perceived as the dogmatic adherence of the Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China to developments in the fraternal parties. As the prominent Soviet-Korean Bak Uiwan noted, “more than ever before, the Soviet-Koreans, Chinese-Koreans, and domestic Koreans, etc., [were] being separately defined. Dividing into groups [...] does not strengthen the party, but weakens it.”¹⁴ Bak Uiwan was not alone in observing this threat to party unanimity. Indeed, the alleged “factions” actually resented and resisted being categorized as such. For example, as DPRK Ambassador to Moscow Li Sangjo explained [Document #21], “Comrade Kim Il Sung and his supporters took revenge on the comrades who spoke [at the August Plenum], declaring them ‘the anti-party Yan’an group’ and ‘conspirators’ trying to overthrow the party and the government.” Moreover, “Korean Communists who had come from the USSR were called ‘the nepotist group’ [...] Only the partisans who had fought under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and members of the ‘Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria’ did not belong to groups and comprise the main backbone of the party.” “Characteriz[ing] under various names by groups,” he claimed, has “cast the shadow of anti-party activity on them.” Thus, according to Li Sangjo, “the so-called Yan’an group [...] which in fact did not exist in nature, was fabricated. As a result, intra-party democracy and party unity were undermined even more.” Those who were not former comrades-in-arms of Kim Il Sung, Li suggested, “must wear the stigma of factionalism.”

Although it has been stressed that Li Pilgyu’s visit to the Soviet embassy was highly irregular given his “factional” affiliation,¹⁵ it was in fact not out of the ordinary as other officials from the “Yan’an” group consulted Soviet embassy officials on both official and unofficial business. While there was certainly mistrust between individual functionaries with different revolutionary backgrounds (there were also well known conflicts within groups, such as the acrimony between Soviet-Koreans A.I. Hegai and Bak Changok), there does not appear to have been any widespread animosity between the Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China that would have prevented Li from visiting the Soviet embassy. Indeed, the manner in which the Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China cooperated in encouraging Kim Il Sung to learn from the successes of the Soviet and Chinese parties first in post-war economic debates should raise questions about the notion of deep factional divisions. Moreover, Li Pilgyu spent two years in Moscow at the CPSU Higher Party School shortly after Korea’s liberation; something that was not unusual for members of the other alleged “factions,” either.

Li Pilgyu appears to have been very forthcoming with the Soviet charge d’affaires during their meeting. He first clarified the range of criticisms being made against Kim Il Sung and the KWP leadership. These included the distortion of revolutionary history, encouraging the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, and cronyism. Second, Li indicated the extent to which the oppo-

nents were prepared to go in order to correct the course of the party. After engaging in sharp criticism and encouraging self-criticism, they sought to “replac[e] the present leadership.” Taken in isolation, this statement appears to support the claims that the group sought to carry out a *coup d’etat* or that replacing Kim Il Sung was their primary task. However, according to the record, Li then admitted that “Kim Il Sung will not likely be in favor of that way...” Had the intention of the “consumer goods group” been to overthrow Kim Il Sung, as some have suggested, then Li Pilgyu would have no reason to be concerned about the “Great Leader’s” attitude towards their method. Moreover, as suggested by the statements of other members of the consumer goods group, including Bak Uiwan and Li Sangjo, they sought to purge only Kim’s cronies who were perceived as being elements hostile to foreign influences. If, as Li feared, that approach failed, then as a last resort, “the second way” to resolve the situation was “forcible upheaval.”

The three other visitors to the embassy from 20-24 July were Bak Changok, who, as noted, was a Soviet-Korean, Choe Chang-ik, like Li Pilgyu of the Yan’an group, and Nam Il, another Soviet-Korean. Document #12 is a memorandum of the conversation Petrov held with Nam Il on 24 July. Nam Il was the North Korean foreign minister and a staunch supporter of Kim Il Sung. Nam Il’s visit to the embassy was not to inform the embassy of the group’s plans, but to seek advice on what position to take and to determine the mood of Soviet diplomats. This exchange is significant in that it illustrates the attitude the Soviet embassy took to the idea of criticizing Kim Il Sung and his allies at the plenum – one of skepticism and apprehension. Embassy officials even suggested that Nam Il dissuade Bak Changok and other Soviet-Korean opponents from taking part in the criticism since it might send the “wrong impression.” We can assume that what was meant by “wrong impression” is that the criticism would be misperceived as a Soviet attack on Kim Il Sung.

Although no records have yet come to light, it becomes clear that Nam Il’s 24 July meeting with Petrov was not his only encounter with Soviet diplomats following the return of the government delegation. On 28 July, Nam Il went to the embassy with another Soviet-Korean ally of Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and then once more alone on 1 August.¹⁶ According to an account later given to Ivanov by North Korean Deputy Premier Bak Uiwan, Kim Il Sung reportedly relayed the history of the “anti-party” movement in his closing speech at the 1 August KWP Plenum, stating that there were rumors of a Soviet official sent to the Soviet embassy in the DPRK to deal with the personality cult and to coordinate the activities of the “consumer goods group” [see Document #19]. Kim boasted that he sent Nam Il and Bak Jeongae to the embassy to determine the authenticity of these reports, which he alleged were false. Moreover, he claimed that the Soviet ambassador explicitly informed Nam Il that the Soviet government was opposed to any criticism of Kim Il Sung.

Document #14 reveals that after months of direct criticism, Kim Il Sung had fully expected the showdown at the

upcoming 1 August plenum and was prepared to go to great lengths to prevent it from occurring. On the eve of the August Plenum, Bak Uiwan met with Ivanov and explained that Kim Il Sung's report to the upcoming August Plenum was accepted by a meeting of the KWP CC Presidium although he claimed there were unnecessary references to factionalism within the party. Bak also noted that fellow Soviet-Korean and member of the "consumer goods group" Gim Seunghwa had been sent to Moscow to study just two days prior to the start of the plenum. According to Kim Il Sung, Gim Seunghwa was "mixed up in some unsavory business" and had to leave. This, and a 5 September memorandum of a conversation between Li Sangjo and N. Fedorenko, Soviet deputy foreign minister, [Document #17], show the amount of intrigue and coercion Kim Il Sung was capable of in his efforts to silence his critics. Li describes how Bak Uiwan was blackmailed into supporting Kim Il Sung at the plenum after being threatened with compromising material.

Kim's efforts proved successful at the party plenum. Not only were his critics silenced in an orchestrated display of unity, four actually fled to China in fear of retribution [see Document #16]. The most visible of the critics were purged from the KWP and expelled from their posts [see Document #15]. Document #15 in the collection is Kim Il Sung's personal account of the KWP CC Presidium meeting and the August Plenum as relayed to Ivanov on 1 September, the day after the plenum had concluded. Kim began by explaining that in preparation for the plenum, members of the KWP CC Presidium agreed that it would be best not to focus too much on the alleged cult of personality in the party. He proceeded to describe the actions of the opposition at the plenum, characterizing them as "anti-party" because of their criticisms of the leadership. Moreover, he depicted the KWP CC as being unified in its outrage over those who rejected the general line of the party during the plenum. Furthermore, Kim informed the ambassador of the flight of the four "consumer goods group" members to China and of their expulsion from the party for their anti-party and "criminal" activities.

Document #16 is the record of a conversation between the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors in the DPRK shortly after the KWP August plenum. Chinese Ambassador Qiao Xiao Guang first briefly described the amount of aid that Kim Il Sung had requested from the PRC at a recent meeting before proceeding to inform Ivanov of "an extremely serious event [...] concerning the relations between the DPRK and the PRC" – the flight of the four members of the "consumer goods group" to China. In their discussion of the events surrounding the August Plenum, the ambassadors provided more details of the activities of members of the "consumer goods group" even prior to Kim Il Sung's departure for Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia in June. Moreover, the document further reveals the level of ambivalence Ivanov initially displayed, even suggesting that the criticisms were unnecessary since, based on an earlier meeting with Kim [Document #15], he understood that "all of these issues were touched upon in the address of

Kim Il Sung and approved by all members of the Presidium." (This is ironic because by 1961, Kim Il Sung would allege that Ivanov personally orchestrated the moves of the "consumer goods group" from the embassy.¹⁷) In a concluding statement, the Soviet ambassador appeared to be seeking reassurance from the Chinese ambassador about foreign influence on the proceedings of the plenum by stating delicately that "the issues which arose in the KWP are serious and were not stimulated by any outside factors, Soviet or Chinese, but were a domestic process taking place within the KWP."

Document #17 is the memorandum of a conversation between DPRK Ambassador Li Sangjo and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs N.T. Fedorenko and a letter addressed to N.S. Khrushchev. Li sought a meeting with either Khrushchev or A.I. Mikoyan to press upon the Soviet leadership the gravity of the situation inside the DPRK and KWP CC following the August Plenum. In the letter, Li described in detail the actions of the party leadership after being criticized both before and during the August Plenum. Li suggested that the challenge was a democratic one aimed at eliminating the serious consequences of the personality cult and ensuring intra-party democracy and collective leadership, completely in accordance with the statutes of the KWP accepted at the Third Party Congress in April 1956. However, sycophantic and hostile elements in the party leadership "took revenge" on those who "courageously" criticized them. Li, who had long been a proponent of outside intervention, encouraged even further fraternal assistance. Despite the failure of earlier attempts to press upon Kim Il Sung the need to reform through comradely criticism by fraternal leaders, Li asked that a senior Soviet official be sent to Pyeongyang to call a new plenum with all present, including the purged members of the consumer goods group. Li also indicated that he had sent a similar request to Mao Zedong. As several documents in this collection discuss, two senior officials, A.I. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, were sent mid-September in a joint Sino-Soviet party intervention. [see Documents #18, #22-24]

Document #19, Bak Uiwan's account of the 6 September conversation with the Soviet ambassador, provides what is perhaps the most comprehensive record of the August Plenum available to researchers. In reading through this memorandum of the conversation, one is struck by the preparedness of Kim Il Sung's supporters for every move of the consumer goods group. For example, a seemingly nominal figure from a provincial people's committee, Gim Daegong, delivered a carefully prepared speech containing criticisms of the Ministry of Trade, including *ad hominem* attacks on Yun Gonghun, the trade minister and member of the "consumer goods group" who was scheduled to speak next. Undaunted, Yun Gonghun spoke out against the cult of personality and the lack of internal party democracy, though other members of the "consumer goods group" were less inclined to follow in his footsteps and the move to criticize the party leadership seems to have fizzled out in the face of the prepared counterattack. While Choe Changik mentioned the cult of personality briefly, it was almost completely absent from the speech of Bak Changok. Instead, Bak delivered a speech

denying his involvement with the “consumer goods group” and declaring his innocence in light of charges of factionalism made in a KWP CC decree earlier in the spring. Yet, all of the members of the consumer goods group, regardless if they spoke or not, were exposed in the speeches of Kim Il Sung’s cronies.

Mindful of likely repercussions of the plenum, Bak Uiwan, a Soviet-Korean, indicated at the end of his conversation with Ivanov that he desired to renounce his North Korean citizenship, regain his Soviet citizenship, and be reinstated in the ranks of the CPSU.

During a 10 September meeting with I. Shcherbakov of the CPSU CC Department of Relations with Foreign Communist Parties [Document #20], Ambassador Li Sangjo reiterated many of the same criticisms made during his conversation with Fedorenko and outlined in his letter addressed to Khrushchev and Mao Zedong [Document #17]. Once again, Li opined that the issues with which the party was faced could not be solved by the internal forces of the Workers’ Party itself, especially at a time when “honest, good communists are expelled from the party for criticism.” Li was informed that the Soviet delegation to the Chinese Communist Party’s 8th Congress [15-27 September 1956] (headed by A. I. Mikoyan) was instructed to investigate and meet with the North Korean delegation in Beijing. At the same time, Li was warned that while the Soviet party was alarmed by events in Pyeongyang, the Soviet and Chinese parties were limited in what they could do since the KWP was an independent party and meddling in internal party matters was inadvisable.

One of the most significant documents in this collection is the lengthy letter Li Sangjo sent to the KWP CC on 5 October 1956 [Document #21]. After failing to sway Kim Il Sung after the Third Congress of the KWP CC in April, during his trip to fraternal countries in June and July, and finally at the August Plenum, Li sought to appeal to the leadership of the KWP in a last ditch effort by expressing his disagreement and providing a history of failures and betrayals. Li’s letter provided an extensive description of the emergence of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult, locating its origins in Korea’s tradition of Confucianism and Japanese colonial rule. Among the consequences of the personality cult were the suppression of intra-party democracy and the growing number of Kim Il Sung’s former comrades-in-arms being appointed to positions in the party leadership while those who did not serve with Kim in the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggles, i.e. Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China, were declared factionalists. Moreover, Li alleged, the history of Korea’s struggle for national liberation had been falsified under the influence of the personality cult. Li was likewise critical of economic policies that did not address the material needs of the population and of “shortcomings” in the field of party propaganda. Interestingly, at the end of the lengthy letter on the crisis faced by the KWP as a result of the personality cult, Li indicated that “he [was] not against Cde. Kim Il Sung remaining in the party leadership.”

Documents #22-25 are Soviet reports that describe a conversation held on 8 October between Kim Il Sung and Ivanov

during which Kim rejected the Soviet and Chinese requests made during the Mikoyan and Peng mission that the KWP publish the proceedings of the August and September plenums in their entirety. During the joint Sino-Soviet party intervention in September 1956, Kim was urged to reinstate the members of the “consumer goods group” to the ranks of the KWP and publish a full record of the September Plenum reporting this action. These documents are of interest since they reveal aspects of the deal Kim struck with the Chinese and Soviet representatives, though it does not fill in the biggest gaps. The Sino-Soviet intervention is still the most mysterious aspect of the political turmoil surrounding the August Plenum, though it is certain that the actions and demands of the foreign communist parties greatly disturbed Kim Il Sung.

Document #26 is a second letter sent directly to the KWP CC from former DPRK ambassador to the Soviet Union, Li Sangjo. In this 18-page letter, obtained from Li’s family in its original Korean, the former ambassador sought to redress the issue of aid from the Soviet Union by reminding party members of the CPSU’s friendship and assistance to the North Korean people both before and after the war. Stressing the need for more transparency and accountability in the KWP leadership, Li disclosed Soviet criticism of Kim Il Sung’s economic policies and cult of personality during meetings held in Moscow in the summer of 1956. Moreover, echoing his earlier criticisms, Li insisted that the DPRK learn from the experiences of fraternal communist parties in economic planning and in their struggle with the cult of personality.

Documents #27 and #28 are memoranda of conversations between Ivanov and Chinese embassy officials, including Ambassador Qiao Xiaoguang. During their meetings, the Soviet and Chinese emissaries exchanged information on the political situation inside the KWP in the wake of the August and September plenums. Moreover, they discussed Kim Il Sung’s reluctance to comply with the recommendations of Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai. At the same time, we learn from these sources that Kim Il Sung did in fact reinstate the party membership of those who had fled to China, though they refused to return despite the concession. One of results of the Mikoyan-Peng Dehuai visit becomes clear in these documents. While in Pyeongyang, Peng Dehuai allegedly suggested that former KPA military commander and close friend of the Chinese, Bak Ilu, be released from prison to and permitted to travel to China to study. Chinese ambassador Qiao Xiaoguang informed his Soviet counterpart that the KWP CC Presidium had decided to release Bak from prison.

Document #30 is a Soviet report on conditions in Korea composed by the Soviet embassy in Pyeongyang. The document seems to take a much more objective approach to events leading up to the KWP CC August Plenum, less influenced by Kim Il Sung’s earlier account than previous reports to Moscow. Following Kim’s refusal to publish the proceedings of the August and September plenums in their entirety, and after receiving more detailed accounts from other participants, the document details the rise of discontent in the KWP leadership,

as well as the strained relations between the DPRK and the PRC following the joint Sino-Soviet intervention. In addition to suggesting that Pyongyang improve relations with Beijing, the document provided criticism of North Korean development strategies.




Notes

1. See for example: Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2002).
2. For accounts of the August Plenum of the KWP CC, see Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Koo Woo Nam, *The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1974); Dae-sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); and Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2002). For a description of the plenum as an attempt to replace Kim Il Sung, see Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 154.
3. See Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960*; and *Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005); Balazs Szalontai, "'You Have No Political Line of Your Own' Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 14/15 (Washington: 2004) and *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964* (Wilson Center Press: Washington, 2005).
4. Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, 154.
5. Szalontai, "'You Have No Political Line of Your Own,' 91.
6. Not willing to allow the state-run Ministry of Foreign Affairs to maintain a monopoly over foreign relations, the CPSU's International Department was created in 1943 when the Comintern was abolished to take over the task of uniting the world's Communist parties under the leadership of the Soviet party. From the spring of 1957, relations with

ruling Communist parties were handled by the newly formed Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties. The documents cited in this paper are filed under the Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties, although they in fact predate the existence of this Central Committee department by one year. For a history of the International Department, see Mark Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3. (July 1990), pp. 429-446.

7. James F. Person, "'We Need Help from Outside': The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956," CWIHP Working Paper 52, August 2006.
8. Young Chul Chung, "The Suryong System as the Institution of Collectivist Development" *Journal of Korean Studies* 12, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 47.
9. See Charles K. Armstrong, "'A Socialism of Our Style': North Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist Era," in Charles K. Armstrong and Samuel Kim ed., *North Korean Foreign Relations in the Cold War Era*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
10. Though it should be noted that documents this author worked with from 1998 to 2002 have since been reclassified and are not scheduled to be re-examined at least in the coming year. As the director of RGANI informed this author during a conversation in March 2006, a list of materials to be reviewed by a declassification panel is compiled one year in advance. Scholars can request that specific materials be included on that list by submitting a petition to the director of Rosarkhiv.
11. Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea: Documents and Materials April 24-29, 1956 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956): 387.
12. See Charles K. Armstrong, "The Myth of North Korea," in Bruce Cumings, ed., *Chicago Occasional Papers on Korea* (Chicago: The Center for East Asian Studies, The University of Chicago, 1991).
13. Andrei Lankov, "Kim Il Sung's Campaign Against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of *Chuch'e*," *Korean Studies*, Volume 23, (University of Hawaii Press: 1999): 45.
14. Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier Comrade Bak Uiwan, 24 January 1956. RGANI, f. 5, o.28, d. 412, ll. 67-69.
15. See Lankov's discussion of the Li Pilgyu visit in *Crisis in North Korea*.
16. Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, 163.
17. Memorandum of Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Manush [Myftiu], composed by Albanian ambassador to the DPRK, Hasan Alimerko, 4 Oct 1961, AQPPSH, MPP Korese, V. 1961, D4.



Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Role of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964
by Balazs Szalontai
Cold War International History Book Series
Copublished by Stanford University Press and Wilson Center Press

Concentrating on the years 1953-64, this history describes how North Korea became more despotic even as other Communist countries underwent de-Stalinization. The author's principal new source is the Hungarian diplomatic archives, which contain extensive reporting on Kim Il Sung and North Korea, thoroughly informed by research on the period in the Soviet and Eastern European archives and by recently published scholarship. Available from Wilson Center Press and local booksellers.

Pyeongyang in 1956

by Nobuo Shimotomai

This article examines Russian archival documents that illuminate how the Kim Il Sung regime reacted to the challenge posed by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's campaign against Stalin's 'cult of personality,' as well as foreign and economic policies launched in his famous secret speech at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) Twentieth Congress in February 1956. Khrushchev's secret speech sent shockwaves throughout the communist world; many regimes established under Stalin's banner viewed Moscow's "New Course" as a serious political threat. In North Korea, party members who opposed Kim Il Sung's political and economic decisions embraced Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin, using it as an instrument to restrict, or eliminate, the power of Stalin's Korean protégé. Their unsuccessful move against Kim Il Sung at the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Plenum in August 1956 marked an important turning-point in the political history of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). As a result of the failed challenge to Kim's authority, the regime in Pyongyang became firmly entrenched.

Russian historian Andrei Lankov presented the first account of these events based on documentary evidence, drawing from records held in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF).² He strongly suggested that factional elements existed within the KWP prior to the August 1956 incident. The documents printed below, from the CPSU Central Committee archive (RGANI), shed additional light on this still murky history.³ Since the CPSU International Department was responsible for relations with foreign communist parties, including the KWP, its records are a rich source for the political history of 1956. The most valuable documents are reports from the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, V.I. Ivanov, was a key figure in North Korean politics and the Soviet embassy remained, at least until 1956, an important arena for North Korean political drama. Kim Il Sung visited the embassy quite often. Some of his opponents, especially Soviet-Koreans, tried to meet Soviet diplomats. Moreover, ambassadors from other socialist countries with embassies in Pyongyang met regularly with Ivanov. The records of the meetings with

'fraternal' ambassadors are particularly revealing because in June and July of 1956, Kim Il Sung visited almost all the Soviet-bloc countries that faced a wave of unrest and political struggle in the aftermath of the CPSU Twentieth Congress. The detailed reports made by Ivanov and his colleagues at the Soviet embassy also contain valuable information about the political process in Pyongyang in September 1956, when Kim Il Sung was nearly ousted through an intervention by his patrons, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the RGANI documents available thus far do not include reports by Ambassador Ivanov from the latter half of September, though diplomat N.M. Shesterikov's diary is available and the contours of the dramatic foreign intervention can be traced indirectly.⁴

Postwar conditions in the DPRK

The Korean War of 1950-53, which brought vast destruction to the North Korean economy and society, had been protracted at the insistence of Joseph Stalin. The Soviet dictator's death in March 1953 thus made it possible to put an end to this conflict.⁵ Stalin's successors were committed not only to ending the war in Korea, but also to embarking on a new strategy of consumer-oriented economic development and 'peaceful coexistence' with the 'capitalist world.' Kim Il Sung, however, resisted Moscow's "New Course," inaugurating instead an ambitious three-year plan that aimed at increasing production by 150% from 1949 levels, with a focus on heavy industry. The largest faction within the KWP, the PRC-allied "Yan'an group," was in favor of increased production of consumer goods. The Soviet embassy likewise advised the North Korean leadership that more emphasis should be placed on developing small-scale industry. These voices went unheard, however, and the North Korean population continued to suffer from serious shortages of basic goods, especially food stuffs.

The Soviet leadership noted Pyongyang's deviation from its economic and political course. A resolution on the North Korean situation adopted in January 1955 by the CPSU Central Committee charged Kim Il Sung with creating a 'cult of per-

Professor Nobuo Shimotomai is a member of the faculty of Law and Politics at Hosei University in Tokyo. He is a specialist in Russian politics and history and is the former president of the Japanese Association of International Relations. He has written over a dozen books, including Moscow and Kim Il Sung (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006).

sonality,' consolidating under his authority all power within the party, government, and military, and with causing severe damage to North Korean peasants by forcibly confiscating grain.⁶ During his visit to Moscow in late April 1955, Kim's political course and economic policy were severely criticized by Soviet leaders, and Kim had to admit his errors by July, especially in regard to economic issues.⁷

In December 1955 a KWP plenum admitted that the country had suffered setbacks as a result of the flawed grain procurement campaign. Nonetheless, the plenum took an important step towards granting Kim Il Sung near-dictatorial power by appointing his comrade-in-arms, party vice chairman Choe Yonggeon, despite opposition by the majority of the KWP Presidium. Choe, who had been nominal chairman of the Democratic Party, was an 'old guard' Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member who had been close to Kim Il Sung during his years as an anti-Japanese partisan in Manchuria.⁸

These allegiances remained important in the development of the KWP which was formally established in 1949 by merging the South Korean Workers' Party with the North Korean Workers' Party. In reality, however, the northern party absorbed the southern party and the KWP remained divided into four factions: the "Soviet faction," composed of Soviet citizens of Korean ethnicity who had been brought to North Korea to meet the shortage of skilled cadres; the "Yan'an faction," composed of party members who had fought the Japanese alongside the Chinese Communist Party; the "domestic communists," who had remained in Korea during Japanese rule; and the "partisan faction," the small group who had, along with Kim Il Sung, taken refuge in the Soviet Union in the early 1940s.⁹

Beginning in the Korean War years, Kim Il Sung used Stalinist tactics against rival leaders, isolating them one at a time. Former Foreign Minister Bak Heonyeong of the domestic faction became the target of a show trial in 1953 and was sentenced to death in December 1955. Former Minister of Interior Bak Ilu of the Yan'an faction had been arrested at the beginning of 1955. Kim Il Sung claimed that the KWP had been weakened by the practice of admitting cadres upon recommendation by the Soviet and Chinese parties, and charged that Bak Ilu was "not armed with Marxism-Leninism and conducted anti-party activities from personal ambition."¹⁰ Alexander Ivanovich Hegai of the Soviet faction was criticized because he had an organizational base in the KWP Organizational-Instruction Department, where he was accused of "groupism."¹¹ The Soviet embassy became increasingly worried by the growing anti-Soviet atmosphere that followed the purge of Hegai. Indeed, after the December 1955 KWP Plenum, Kim Il Sung reprimanded Vice Minister Bak Changok and fifteen other Soviet-Korean high officials for allegedly being members of a 'Hegai' faction.¹² Even Bak Jeongae, a Kim loyalist, was reportedly doubtful about the existence of an 'anti-party faction' of Soviet-Koreans and attempted to persuade Kim Il Sung not to proceed against them, according to accounts leaked to the Soviet embassy.¹³

Khrushchev's secret speech and Choe Yonggeon's report

Khrushchev's secret speech at the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956 shocked DPRK politics. The DPRK delegation to the Congress was headed by Choe Yonggeon rather than Kim Il Sung. Kim explained to Ivanov that he could not go to Moscow at that time because he was busy preparing for the KWP Third Congress which would begin 23 April.¹⁴ Kim's initial reaction to the new Soviet approach at the Twentieth Congress seemed mixed. He told to Bak Uiwan that he regretted that he never went to Moscow and began to change his work style to regularize meetings, etc.¹⁵ When the Soviet ambassador returned to Pyongyang from the Congress, he gave Kim Il Sung a full report of the proceedings, as well as bulletins and materials of the Congress. The North Korean leader responded that the activities of the CPSU Congress were invaluable to the work of the KWP, but added that Moscow's new line should be studied carefully before it was adopted by the KWP.¹⁶ At the local level of the Korean party, however, cadres quickly realized that something more serious had occurred since Khrushchev had admitted that the Soviet Communist Party had suffered "defeats" instead of "failure," according to Foreign Minister Nam Il's report to Soviet counselor A.M. Petrov.¹⁷

On 20 March, Choe Yonggeon gave a three-hour report on the activities of the Twentieth Party Congress at a KWP CC Plenum that was apparently closed to Soviet embassy personnel.¹⁸ In his report, Choe omitted mention of the CPSU's centrally important decision regarding the 'cult of personality' issue. He stressed that Khrushchev had commented on the necessity of collective leadership, but stated that Kim Il Sung was in fact a leader who practiced collectivism. In addition he criticized the factionalism of Kim's opponents.¹⁹

Only three people gave a response to Choe's speech: Kim Il Sung, Nam Il and Yi Ilgyeong. Kim Il Sung's remarks were the center of attention. The North Korean leader explained that the party propaganda machine had emphasized his role and that the role of the masses should be stressed even more. He related the problem of the personality cult as applicable only to the worship of Bak Heonyeong in the southern part of the peninsula, not to the KWP as a whole.²⁰ The plenum adopted a resolution calling for rapid construction of socialism in the northern half of the Korean peninsula, peaceful unification, and independence. Cadres were instructed to distribute the materials of the Twentieth CPSU Congress.²¹ At the beginning of April, the KWP circulated a secret letter to local party organizations stating that the cult of personality was a phenomenon of the CPSU and was alien to the KWP. At most, it was related to Bak Heonyeong.²²

Analysts at the Soviet embassy reached a different conclusion, reporting to Moscow that Kim Il Sung had concentrated all the power of the party, government, and army in his hands. The roles of the Central Committee and the party congress had been diminished, and the Supreme People's Assembly, nomi-

nally the highest state organization, had not convened since 1948.²³ Moreover, Kim Il Sung was surrounded by ‘careerists’ and ‘yes-men.’ Journals and periodicals were filled with evidence of a ‘cult of personality.’ Ivanov noted that an article on the new party statute mentioned the name of Kim Il Sung twenty times.²⁴ The Polish ambassador similarly remarked that the cult of Kim Il Sung was enormous and the role of Gim Dubong as the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly was diminishing.

In the beginning of April, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a report “On the Cult of Personality in the DPRK” to all members of the Soviet leadership. The cult of Kim Il Sung was continuing, the report stated, even though it had been pointed out to Kim in May 1955, when the DPRK leader had visited Moscow.²⁵ Another report, entitled ‘On Several Problems of the Inner Party Situation in the DPRK,’ dated 14 April, moreover, drew a grim picture of the situation in the country. The Soviet embassy informed Boris Ponomarev, head of the CPSU International Department, that despite the fact that the severe political crisis of 1955 had to some extent eased, especially with regard to peasants, serious problems remained. “The condition of the citizens of the towns and countryside is severe; their democratic rights are curtailed, and the policy of the KWP toward the non-proletarian strata is incorrect.”²⁶ Moreover, the food shortage was grave. Private enterprises had almost been liquidated and the number of private traders had diminished sharply.

The Third Party Congress, April 1956

The KWP held its 3rd Congress on 23-29 April 1956, after an eight-year hiatus. If Kim Il Sung intended to use the congress as a display of party unity after purging the leaders of the other three factions, namely Bak Heonyeong of the domestic faction, Hegai of the Soviet faction, and Bak Ilu of the Yan’an faction, his effort was ill-timed in light of the de-Stalinization campaign unleashed by Khrushchev in February. The process of electing delegates at the local level, which began that same month, provided a forum for local cadres to criticize Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality and the lack of collective leadership within the KWP. As Foreign Minister Nam Il informed Soviet diplomats, local party members began to criticize the original draft of the KWP statute on the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, asking that Stalin’s name be eliminated.²⁷ There was also tension over the purge of critics such as Bak Heonyeong, who had been sentenced to death on 15 December 1955. However, he was still alive at least by 19 April 1956, when Soviet Ambassador Ivanov met with Kim Il Sung and discussed Leonid Brezhnev’s participation in the Third KWP Congress. The Soviet KGB in fact wanted Kim to refrain from taking extreme measures because Bak’s influence had been lost.²⁸ Kim Il Sung reacted with anger to Ivanov’s message that the Soviet KGB wished to save the life of Bak Heonyeong.²⁹ The Soviet delegate to the congress, future CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, mildly pointed out that replacing

the cult of personality with collective leadership was the new principle of the Soviet leadership, but Kim wanted to remain silent on this delicate issue. After watching the proceedings, officials from the Soviet embassy reported to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko:

- a) Leninist norms of the party and collective leadership were never observed, elections were held only once in these eight years.
- b) [It was claimed that] the cult of personality was related only to Bak Heonyeong and never to Kim Il Sung.
- c) The grain procurement of 1955 has broken the unity of the workers and the peasants, and violated socialist legality, but this was never mentioned.
- d) The secret letter to the KWP cadres stresses the struggle against formalism and dogmatism, but in reality it turned out to be an anti-Soviet campaign.
- e) The secret letter never noted the negative side of Kim Il Sung.³⁰

The embassy also pointed out that the DRPK had suffered serious setbacks in agriculture and stockbreeding; the number of livestock had diminished sharply from 1953 to 1955.³¹ The disguised agenda of the ‘struggle against dogmatism’ was, in the views of the Soviet diplomats, in fact an anti-Soviet campaign, as several ministers who visited the Soviet embassy observed. One manifestation of this was the curtailment of programs for teaching Russian language and culture. The new leadership elected at the Third Party Congress reflected these developments. Kim Il Sung loyalists such as Choe Yonggeon and Bak Jeongae were elevated to vice-chairmen, while Kim Il Sung and Choe Yonggeon further expressed dissatisfaction with the Soviet-Koreans.

Another significant issue was the fate of Bak Ilu, the most prominent figure of the Yan’an faction, who was also purged in 1955.³² Gim Dubong asked for his immediate release, while Choe Yonggeon insisted that he be shot. The result, according to Bak Uiwan, a minister with close contacts with the Soviet embassy, was the firm establishment of a policy of purging aliens, including Soviet-Koreans, from the leadership.³³ Vice-premier Choe Changik, of the Yan’an faction, also met with Ivanov while Kim was away from the country, and told him that even a vice-premier was not allowed to meet with Soviet officials.³⁴

From Kim Il Sung’s Trip to the USSR and Eastern Europe to the August Plenum

In order to resolve contentious issues directly with the Soviet leadership and secure economic assistance from Soviet bloc countries—particularly the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia³⁶—Kim Il Sung set out on 1 June for a two-month trip to the USSR, East Germany, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, and Mongolia, accompanied by some thirty compatriots. In his description of this trip to the KWP CC, Kim stated that the Soviet party had passed a resolution on the cult of personality to the effect

that “enemies were organizing anti-Soviet and anti-socialist campaigns using this ‘unhealthy phenomenon’ within socialism.” However, he argued, the Soviets decided that this cult of personality phenomenon was not the result of socialism itself. Moreover, the KWP had overcome the cult, because it was related to “Bak Heonyeong and his factional activity.”³⁷

However, it was not Bak Heonyeong’s domestic faction but rather the Yan’an faction, led by Vice Minister Choe Changik, that took action against Kim Il Sung while he was abroad. According to Foreign Minister Nam Il, who informed the Soviet embassy of the activities of the opposition, such prominent figures as Gim Dubong, Seo Hwi, and Minister of Trade Yun Gongheum met at the house of Vice Minister Bak Changok on 20 July, to discuss action to take against the leadership of Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Bak Geumcheol.³⁸ Foreign Minister Nam Il criticized Choe Changik and Bak Changok, associating this movement with the activities of the former oppositionist Bak Ilu, who was still in prison.³⁹

Once Kim had returned to Pyongyang on 2 August, the CPSU warned the Korean leader to correct the mistakes of the KWP.⁴⁰ The Soviet embassy was watching the political process with unease and alarm. For his part, Kim Il Sung was afraid that his opponents would capitalize on the CPSU intervention, though he admitted their oppositional activities had waned by the middle of August.⁴¹ On 13 August Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that the KWP Presidium had resolved to hold local elections by the fall and convene the Supreme People’s Assembly the following year. The Chinese ambassador informed his Soviet counterpart that Kim Il Sung would lead the DPRK delegation to the 8th CCP Congress.

However, Kim Il Sung’s optimism proved unfounded. At an 18 August meeting of the KWP Presidium, Choe Changok and others criticized Kim Il Sung, citing the letter from the CPSU. Gim Dubong’s mild but critical tone carried the majority.⁴² Five days later, Choe Changok again raised the issue of a purge of Bak Jeongae and Vice Minister Jeon Ilyong, members of Kim Il Sung’s faction. It was almost a frontal attack. On 24 August Bak Uiwan, a Soviet faction member and candidate to the Presidium, visited the Soviet embassy and confirmed these moves. Kim Il Sung had met with Bak Uiwan on 22 August and talked for three hours. He admitted the correctness of the criticism, but said these moves would only benefit South Korean leader Syngman Rhee.⁴³

The North Koreans never disclosed the contents of the August Plenum, despite requests to do so from the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. Nonetheless, Ivanov’s diary reveals the most important contents. On 28 August, at a presidium meeting prior to the plenum, Kim Il Sung declared that socialism had nothing to do with ‘cult of personality’ and that the KWP had discussed and eliminated this phenomenon, which was associated with the critic Bak Heonyeong. This point was apparently sharply contested by Gim Dubong and Choe Changik who said that the KWP should be more critical of the ‘cult of personality,’ according to an account by Bak Uiwan.⁴⁴ Gim Dubong also seemed disappointed with the tardy reaction

of the CPSU, knowing the ‘incorrect move of the KWP.’⁴⁵

The Plenum opened on 30 August. Kim Il Sung officially reported on his trip to the USSR and Eastern European countries. On the following day Kim informed Ivanov of the contents of the plenum, underlining that the focus was on cadre problems and not the ‘cult of personality.’ Gim Dubong raised the issue of the ‘cadres,’ which were shared with the ‘foreign party.’ Gim Dubong hinted that the ‘Soviet embassy was not wrong,’ though he refrained from specifying the name of the “foreign party.”⁴⁶

Bak Uiwan also leaked information about the plenum, reporting that Kim Il Sung had emphasized the priority of heavy industry and stressed that the cult of personality was only associated with the work of the oppositionist Bak Heonyeong, thus avoiding his own responsibility. According to Bak, the cult of personality issue was raised only in connection with the issue of party propaganda.⁴⁷ As the critics made their attack, Yun Gongheum charged that the work of the KWP Third Party Congress never reflected the spirit of the CPSU Twentieth Congress because of Kim Il Sung’s influence. He also complained that the elevation of Kim’s associate, Choe Yonggeon, to the vice chairman post violated party rules. This criticism was supported by Choe Changik.⁴⁸

Kim’s supporters then counterattacked. Kim Il Sung stressed that the Soviet embassy had never been involved in this campaign, though the critics tried to legitimize their move against Kim Il Sung as a campaign against the cult of personality.⁴⁹ Repressive measures were taken against the opposition. Its four leaders attempted to take refuge abroad. They were detained at the Chinese border by Chinese officials. Prominent figures such as Choe Changik were removed from the presidium, while vice minister Bak Changok was ousted from the Central Committee, though Kim Il Sung refrained from taking measures against Gim Dubong. Choe Yonggeon appealed to the Soviet ambassador that critics like Yun had made a malicious attack on the KWP leadership.⁵⁰ Kim Il Sung’s faction thus survived the frontal attack.

Li Sangjo’s Criticism of the Kim Il Sung Regime

Both the Soviet and Chinese communist parties were deeply concerned about the actions taken during the KWP August Plenum. Li Sangjo, an important activist of the Yan’an faction and candidate member of the Central Committee, serving as DPRK ambassador to the Soviet Union, had appealed to take up the issue of the ‘personality cult’ at the KWP presidium of the April 1956 congress. It was, however, in vain, according to Choe Chang-ik’s talk with ambassador Ivanov of 8 June.⁵¹ Choe Yonggeon and Kim’s loyalists even threatened that Li should be dismissed from the post of ambassador.⁵² Gim Dubong persuaded Kim Il Sung not to dismiss Li, and Li could return to Moscow.⁵³

Consequently, on 3 September Li appealed directly to Nikita Khrushchev in a letter.⁵⁴ In response, Soviet Vice Minister

of Foreign Affairs Nikolai Fedorenko met with Li two days later. Li asked that his letter to Khrushchev and his account of the present situation of the KWP be read by Khrushchev or Anastas Mikoyan. Li met again with the CPSU officials on 10 September and gave a fuller description of the political situation in the DPRK. Finally, he wrote a lengthy letter to the KWP CC in October, and its translation was given to Fedorenko.⁵⁵ Li pointed out in his lengthy letter that Foreign Minister Nam Il used the name of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to suppress criticism of Kim Il Sung and Choe Yonggeon. The actual advice given by the CPSU had been kept secret by Kim Il Sung, Nam Il and Bak Jeongae, and those who had addressed the cult of personality were expelled from the party.⁵⁶

Li attributed Kim's cult of personality to the unconditional subordination to authority that Koreans had experienced under Japanese colonial rule. Moreover, cadres were scarce and Korean feudal traditions also promoted the tendency towards a personality cult. In order to bring together the four factions into a united KWP, Kim's authority had been enhanced artificially. Careerists and flatterers prevailed. The image of Kim was elevated to the status of Lenin or Mao Zedong. Even the vice chairman of the KWP complained that "those who criticize Kim would end their public life, and the door of the jail is open."⁵⁷

Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il, according to Li, had tried to conceal the CPSU letter from the masses. Those who favored democracy were branded as conspirators or as members of the Yan'an faction, whose existence Li denied. "Is it a crime to speak against the cult and lack of democracy?" Li protested. "What is the difference between a king and Kim Il Sung, who is going to be a lifelong party leader and prime minister? Who appointed him as lifetime leader?"⁵⁸

Citing numerous individuals who were purged for speaking about political issues, Li declared, "We can no longer endure the fact that those communists who have no contact with Kim Il Sung are regarded as factionalists." Li pointed out that Kim's cult of personality violated both KWP and socialist statutes. He co-opted his followers by neglecting party rules, appointing Choe Yonggeon, formerly chair of the Democratic Party, as vice chairman and member of the KWP Politburo. This appointment meant a denial of the pluralistic party system, which rallied all patriotic forces into a united front. It also meant that all power was concentrated in the hands of Kim Il Sung. All key appointments, including those of Politburo members and vice ministers, were to be arbitrarily decided by Kim Il Sung.

Li cited numerous cases of violations of constitutional procedures within the party and the false arrest and imprisonment of more than 30,000 people. He noted the remarkable fact that one of every three hundred people in the DPRK were now criminals.⁵⁹ Even those who did no more than simply write on a picture of Kim Il Sung printed in a newspaper were deprived of freedom for five years. Kim even hinted that these persons should receive the death penalty.⁶⁰ Some peasants,

angry because all their grain was confiscated, complained to the local authorities. Pointing to the portrait of Kim, they said "You do not understand the real situation of the masses." For this they were deprived of freedom for seven years.⁶¹ Another example was Bak Ilu, Politburo member and minister of justice and a close associate of Kim Il Sung during the Korean War. Bak was arrested and jailed and his family sent to work in the mines because he opposed the tax in kind and the harsh measures against reactionaries.⁶²

Li also pointed out that Kim Il Sung falsified the history of the liberation from Japanese colonialism. Kim only mentioned the role of the Partisan faction, although the Chinese Communist Party had played an important role, especially in Manchuria. In fact, the Partisan faction had ceased to struggle against Japanese militarism in 1940. Moreover, this group had no roots among the toiling masses, while Chinese communists had taken an active role in underground activity. Li also cited examples such as the minor partisan attack at Bochombo, which resulted in the deaths of only 13 Japanese policemen but which Kim and his faction glorified as an epoch-making event in the struggle against Japanese colonialism.⁶³ Another case was the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria (KFRAM) (*Jaeman Hanin Joguk Gwangbokhoe*), which was depicted as having been set up at Kim's initiative, but which in fact originated in the United Front tactics of the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party. While Kim's supporters claim that this organization had spread into all Korean regions, it was in fact only a tiny organization of some 100 members.⁶⁴

Li charged that the cult of personality had also led to mistakes in economic policy. In particular, forcible grain procurement led 300 people to commit suicide.⁶⁵ The resulting food shortage was so severe that the tie between workers and peasants was destroyed. Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung maintained that his policy was correct, that only its implementation had been wrong.⁶⁶ Li Sangjo himself made an investigation at Kaesong and came to the conclusion that the proper target should be 150,000 tons of grain, instead of the official target of three million tons.

Moreover, food and consumer goods were expensive and the average living space for workers was only two and a half square meters.⁶⁷ During Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow, Soviet comrades pointed out these conditions and gave "comradely advice" that living conditions should be improved, that Kim's cult of personality should be eliminated, and that party history and propaganda should be corrected on the basis of truth. Li Sangjo declared that he would struggle against the cult of Kim Il Sung from the point of view of adherence to collective leadership and party democracy, and expressed the hope that the KWP central committee would examine the recommendations he made to the party.⁶⁸

The Reaction of the CPSU and CCP to the Korean Crisis

Observing the growing tensions within the DPRK, the CPSU Presidium discussed the North Korean issue on 6 September 1956. Mikoyan chaired in Khrushchev's absence, with Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voloshilov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Brezhnev and Gromyko in attendance. The Soviet leaders heard Ivanov's reports on the KWP's August Plenum. They concluded that Boris Ponomarev, head of the Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties, should consult with the DPRK ambassador, and the Soviet delegation to the 8th Congress of the CCP, scheduled for that month, should consult with the Koreans in attendance in Beijing.⁶⁹ Thus, Ponomarev and Mikoyan, who had taken the leading role in purging the Hungarian Stalinist leader Matyas Rakosi that June, were dispatched to Beijing. They would then travel on to Pyeongyang, since Kim Il Sung had canceled his plans to attend the CCP Eighth Congress.

After consultations in Beijing, the Soviets and Chinese decided to send a joint delegation to Pyeongyang, headed by Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, who had commanded Chinese troops in Korea during the war of 1950-53. The delegation went to Pyeongyang on 23 September 1956. Unfortunately, the available RGANI documents do not include any records on the Mikoyan-Peng mission. However, V. Kovyzenko, a Central Committee official who had been close to Kim Il Sung from 1945-48 and had accompanied Mikoyan to Pyeongyang, reported in an interview with historian Andrei Lankov in 1991 that Mao had asserted to Mikoyan during discussions in Beijing that Kim Il Sung had launched the "idiotic war and himself had been mediocre," and should be dismissed.⁷⁰ Peng Dehuai shared Mao's low estimation of Kim's military capabilities, while he highly praised Bak Ilu as a commander.

Attempting to preempt the Soviet and Chinese intervention, the DPRK leadership informed the Soviet embassy on 17 September, before Mikoyan and Peng arrived, that the KWP would reconsider its relations with the Soviet-Koreans.⁷¹ Mikoyan and Peng nonetheless asked Kim to convene a Central Committee Plenum immediately. At this September Plenum, Kim announced the revocation of the decisions of the August Plenum and engaged in some self-criticism. These resolutions were printed in *Rodong Sinmun* the following day.

Yet, Kim managed to remain in power as a result of the Soviet-Chinese intervention. Unlike the Hungarian case in June, Mikoyan was not well-informed about the situation in the KWP, and hence was less effective. Kovyzenko reported that Kim's faction had gained complete control over the party rank and file. There was no popular demonstration in support of reforms, since General O Chin-u had deployed the army to Pyeongyang to prevent such an occurrence. As a result, Mikoyan and Peng had to be satisfied with restoring the expelled dissidents to party membership and warning against further purges. Choe Changik returned to the capital, while Bak Changok was appointed manager of a cement factory. The

Soviet embassy reported that the September Plenum made a small step toward observance of Leninist norms.⁷²

Kim also managed to prevent the findings of the September Plenum from being published. Kim Il Sung, Mikoyan, and Peng Dehuai had agreed that all decisions of the plenum would be made known in the press. But Vice Chairman Bak Geumcheol explained to Ivanov on 27 September that a press release was not desirable, and suggested that they instead distribute special pamphlets to the local party branches. Bak explained to Soviet Charge d'Affaires V.I. Pelishenko that Kim had promised to publish the decisions, but the Central Committee was reluctant to do so. Even the rehabilitated party members were not informed of the decisions of the September Plenum.⁷³ On the day after the plenum, a short report appeared in the press, but important items were omitted.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, by October, Soviet authorities became preoccupied with the unrest in Eastern Europe. Consequently, Kim Il Sung and his supporters became bolder in resisting implementation of the decisions of the September Plenum. In a meeting with Ivanov on 8 October in Kim's suburban *dacha*, the North Korean leader declared that the promise to publish all the plenum materials should be revoked. He justified this action by claiming that there was no actual agreement to publish, but only an agreement to consider the possibility in the Central Committee, and the presidium had decided not to publicize the decisions.⁷⁵ In response to Ivanov's protests, Kim explained that the presidium thought that the advice of the Soviet and Chinese parties gave the impression of foreign intervention in the DPRK's domestic affairs. He added that if all the documents regarding the delegation of the fraternal parties were publicized, the DPRK regime would be damaged.⁷⁶ Thus, Kim requested that Mikoyan be informed that the KWP would not publicize the September Plenum decisions.⁷⁷

As the Hungarian reform movement turned into chaos and Soviet troops intervened to restore order, a backlash against the September Plenum developed in North Korea. The DPRK Foreign Ministry ordered ambassador Li Sangjo to return to Pyeongyang at the end of October.⁷⁸ Li's refusal exacerbated tension between Moscow and Pyeongyang. By 1957 Li began a position as researcher at the CPSU Higher Party School, which irritated the North Korean government. In March 1957 Foreign Minister Nam Il complained that Li's status in Moscow amounted to an indirect criticism of the DPRK on the part of the USSR.⁷⁹

By the end of 1956, the Kim Il Sung regime counter-attacked by criticizing the Soviet attempt at de-Stalinization. Gim Toman, deputy of the Central Committee's Agitation and Propaganda Department, stated that the Hungarian state and the party perished because they followed the Soviet model, they were ruined because they struggled against the 'cult of personality,' as did the Soviet authorities.⁸⁰

Concluding remarks

The political aftermath of the August and September plenums reveals that a nationalistic mood began to prevail in North Korea following the Soviet-Chinese intervention. Relations with China became so strained that a Soviet analyst in Beijing reported to Moscow that “at the present time, a lot of Koreans regard the Chinese Volunteer Army as an occupation army; Koreans assume that their long stay in the DPRK is no longer desirable and violates their sovereignty.”⁸¹

By November 1956, tension between Pyongyang and Beijing intensified. The DPRK sent a memorandum regarding a proposed solution of the Korean issue through United Nations intervention that was absolutely unacceptable to the PRC. After consulting with Moscow, Beijing sent a memorandum to the DPRK on 8 December 1956 stating that UN involvement in a Korean peace negotiation was unacceptable since the UN had been a tool of US intervention in Korean issues and all the socialist countries regarded the UN as an enemy on this issue.⁸² The fact that Kim Il Sung advanced the idea of inviting the UN to resolve the Korean issue was a striking sign that the Korean leader preferred his own diplomatic strategy to reliance on his socialist big brothers. The Chinese Volunteer Army withdrew from North Korea in October 1958.

On 28 December 1956 Ivanov summarized the North Korean situation in a lengthy report to the Soviet leadership.⁸³ The year 1956 was a major turning point for the DPRK, the ambassador concluded. The Third Congress of the KWP never reflected the most important decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, and at the KWP August Plenum, Kim evaded self-criticism. Kim labeled his critics a “faction aimed at power” and as a consequence, the serious defects of the party were not disclosed. Even though the CPSU and CCP sent a joint delegation headed by Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to rehabilitate the ousted leaders, the decisions of the September Plenum were not published and purges of leading cadres continued. The repressive character of the Kim Il Sung regime was thus never corrected. As for economic policy, the three-year plan resulted in the recovery of agriculture to 1949 levels, but the living conditions of workers, peasants, and intellectuals did not reach the pre-war level.

Ivanov reported that the KWP had no recruits from 1954 because of the economic crises, and the purges of 1956 weakened the party even further. The cult of personality was strengthening, repressive measures were being taken against Soviet-Koreans, and relations between the KWP and CCP were deteriorating. The DPRK did not express gratitude to the PRC for its aid, for which Kim Il Sung himself was responsible.

In sum, while the extent to which Kim Il Sung was a creature of the Soviet Union in the early years can be debated, there is no doubt that he was advanced to the leading position by the Soviet occupation forces. However, ten years after his elevation to power, he became a more independent figure by refusing to implement Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policies and Mao’s advice to orient toward the masses. By 1957 Kim had

become even more independent from his Soviet and Chinese patrons while his domestic control had become absolute.⁸⁴ His new position was reflected in the August 1957 election to the People’s Assembly in 1957, where participation as well as the support for the party was 99.92 percent. The replacement of Gim Dubong as Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly with Choe Yonggeon by October 1957 was only a nominal confirmation of the dictatorship Kim Il Sung and his partisan faction had established. The stormy wave of uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1956 gave Kim the opportunity to mobilize Korean nationalism to solidify his hold on power while carving out a greater sphere of autonomy within the communist bloc.



Notes

1. This essay was originally presented to the first conference on “the Cold War in East Asia” at the University of California, Santa Barbara in March 2005, as a shortened version an article published in Japanese. The author wishes to thank Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Kathryn Weathersby, and James Person for their advice and comments.

2. A. Lankov, *Severnaya Koreya*, Moscow, 1995; A. Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, Rutgers University Press, 2002; *Crises in North Korea, The Failure of the De-Stalinization 1956*, Univ. of Hawaii, 2005.

3. Russiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, or RGANI, esp. Fond 5, Opis 28 (otdel KPSS po svyazam s inostranymi kompartiyam).

4. N. M. Shesterikov diary from 14-24 September, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, l.301-306.

5. Kathryn Weathersby, “Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1998): pp.90-116.

6. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 24 May to 11 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo.411, l.215. Despite the coercion, the grain procurement campaign of 1955 yielded only 2,400,000 tons, a significant decrease from the 1949 total of 2,800,000 tons. To make up the shortfall, the Soviet Union and China agreed to give North Korea 200,000 tons of grain in aid.

7. Nobuo Shimotomai, *Moskva to Kim Il Sung* (Moscow and Kim Il Sung), Iwanamishoten, 2006, pp. 161-193.

8. Record of the talks with Vice Prime Minister and Presidium Member of CC KWP Bak Changok on 12 March, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, l. 76. Vice Minister Bak Changok leaked this fact to counselor S. N. Filatov.

9. Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 218.

10. Results of the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the KWP, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, l.15.

11. *Ibid.* It was Soviet Korean, Ho Kai or A. Hegai, who really made the institutional setup of the KWP. He had been associated with P. Postyshev, Stalin’s secretary in the early 1930s. (Nobuo Shimotomai, *Moscow Under Stalinist Rule*, MacMillan, 1991, p.24, 47.)

12. Record of the talks with Vice Prime Minister and KWP CC Presidium Member Bak Changok on 12 March, RGANI, Fond 5,

Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.79.

13. Record of the Talks with Gim Sunghwa (Minister of Construction) on 3 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, 1.129-130. Kim Il Sung persuaded her not to speak openly, because if she dared to do so, Nam Il and other famous Soviet Koreans would follow (l. 130).

14. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 8 Feb. to 27 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.163.

15. Record of the Talks with Bak Uiwan on 21 February 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, 1. 72, 74.

16. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 8 Feb. to 27 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.164.

17. Diary of temporary ambassador Petrov from 2 to 14 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.178. Ambassador Ivanov's report is absent between 19 February and 19th March due to a trip to Moscow.

18. Report of the CC KWP delegation to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.187-222. The activity of this plenum was revealed by Soviet Korean and Minister of Construction Bak Uiwan who often visited and gave interesting news to the Embassy.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 8 Feb. to 27 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.167

21. The Central Committee of the KWP, Decision of the March Plenum, 20 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.182.

22. Some Problems concerning the Study of the Khrushchev's Report at the 20th CPSU Congress, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.186-87. This letter was translated into only fifteen copies and was dispatched to first secretary N. Khrushchev and the CPSU. Ambassador Ivanov commented that 'friends' did not made a proper conclusion in his report on 19 April to Deputy Minister of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.138.)

23. In the South, by way of contrast, a presidential election was held in 1956.

24. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 2 February to 27 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.168.

25. On the Cult of Personality in DPRK, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.59.

26. On the Several Problems of the Internal Party Situation in the DPRK, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.137.

27. Diary of temporary Charge d'affaires Petrov from 2 March to 14 March 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.179.

28. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 18 April to 14 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, 1.215. Boris Ponomarev, head of the CPSU International Delegations Department, having characterized the personality and the case of Bak Hyeonyong, advanced the idea of raising this matter with Kim Il Sung during his visit to Moscow in May 1955. In fact, on 19 April 1956, Ambassador V. Ivanov told Kim Il Sung at the Third KWP Party Congress, that the KGB had advised that death penalty should be avoided. Kim seemed angry, according to Ivanov's diary (RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, 1. 215.)

29. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 24 May to 11 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.215.

30. Results of the Third Congress of the KWP, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.144.

31. *Ibid.*, 148.

32. To the CPSU CC, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, 1.214.

Record of the talks with Bak I.D. March-April 1955.

33. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 24 May to 11 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.204.

34. *Ibid.*, 1. 210-12.

35. Diary of ambassador Ivanov from 14 June to 20 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, 1. 254-60. He was educated in Japan and worked as a journalist in the South before he came to North to become a vice minister in 1948.

36. Report of the Work of the Governmental Delegation that visited Brother States and Several Tasks of Our Party (Report of Comrade Kim Il Sung at the CC Plenum of KWP 30 August 1956), RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1.227.

37. Report of the Work of the Governmental Delegation that visited Brother States and Several Tasks of Our Party (Report of Comrade Kim Il Sung at the CC Plenum of KWP 30 August 1956) RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, 1. 252.

38. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 6 August to 24 August 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 337.

39. *Ibid.*, 1. 345.

40. *Ibid.*, 1. 336.

41. *Ibid.*, 1. 342.

42. *Ibid.*, 1. 348

43. *Ibid.*, 1. 348.

44. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 29 August to 14 September 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 317.

45. *Ibid.*, 1. 318.

46. *Ibid.*, 1. 320.

47. *Ibid.*, 1. 318.

48. *Ibid.*, 1. 320.

49. *Ibid.*, 1. 330.

50. *Ibid.*, 1. 323..

51. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 24 May to 11 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 213; Li Sangjo letter to the KWP CC, Delo 412. 1. 238. Li asked for help from the CPSU in his meeting with the Soviet diplomat I. Kudryukov on 16th June.

52. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 24 May to 11 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 213.

53. Record of the talks with Kim Sek-pok (Ministry of State Control) on 31 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.223-24

54. Dear N.S. Khrushchev, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1.227-28.

55. Reception of DPRK ambassador Li Sangjo on 5 September 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 224, 230. Li Sangjo letter to the Central committee of the KWP (ll.238-295).

56. Li Sangjo letter to the Central committee of the KWP, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 250.

57. *Ibid.*, 1. 251.

58. *Ibid.*, 1. 260.

59. *Ibid.*, 1. 271.

60. *Ibid.*, 1. 271. Deputy Minister of Justice informed this to Gim Dubong.

61. Li Sangjo letter to the Central committee of the KWP, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, 1. 272.

62. *Ibid.*, 1. 273-274.

63. *Ibid.*, 1. 277.

64. *Ibid.*, 1. 278.

65. *Ibid.*, 1. 282.

66. *Ibid.*, 1. 283

67. *Ibid.*, 1. 288.

68. *Ibid*, 1. 295.

69. Presidium TsK KPSS 1954-64, tom 1, M., 2003, p.961; tom 2.2006, p. 421-422.

70. Vasilii Kovyshenko had been political officer of the 25th Army of the Red Army and was thus close to Kim Il Sung in 1945-8. Later, as a Japanese specialist, he was appointed by the March 1950 decision of the Soviet Politburo to watch the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), when the JCP was split by the Cominform criticism of S. Nosaka in January 1950. Perhaps he had been responsible in the CPSU Central Committee for both the JCP and KWP until 1963, when the JCP came closer to the CCP. He was to be replaced by the less sophisticated Japanologist I. Kovalenko.

71. N. M. Shesterikov diary from 14-24 September, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, l. 303.

72. On the situation of the KWP and DPRK, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 1-17.

73. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 27 September to 8 October 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 22.

74. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 11 October to 29 October 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, l. 344. Kim Il Sung said to ambassador Ivanov who came to convey the dissatisfaction from the Chinese and Soviet parties that they did not want to change the decisions by the pressure of the foreign parties (RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, l. 345). The families of the refugee members were provided with food ration cards again, but Gim Chang-man said that they should not return to the DPRK.

75. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 27 September to 8 October 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 28-34. Kim Il Sung told that the publication would only profit the South Korean authorities.

76. *Ibid*, 1. 36. Prior to this, the party meeting of the local party representative severely criticized the factionalists, according to Kim Il Sung.

77. *Ibid*, 1. 18; To the CPSU CC, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, l. 296.

78. Diary of ambassador V. I. Ivanov from 11 October to 29 October 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, l. 347.

79. Record of the Talks with DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il on 9 March 1957, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 72.

80. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 46.

81. Report of the Soviet Embassy of the Chinese Peoples Republic for 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 409, l. 142. Chinese secret sources told the Soviet Embassy in Beijing that Officers in the Chinese Volunteer army had negated this rule and engaged in criminal acts, and had intervened in the Korean domestic matters (RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 409, l. 412).

82. *Ibid*, 1. 141.

83. On the situation of the KWP and DPRK, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 486, l. 1-17.

84. This issue again is raised by scholars, especially after the emergence of new documents on the Soviet historical sources, among others by A. Lankov. See also B. Szalontai (*Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, Soviet DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism 1953-1964*, Stanford University, 2005).



DOCUMENT No. 1

Memorandum of Conversation with the DPRK Vice Premier of the Cabinet of Ministers and Member of the KWP CC Presidium, Bak Changok, 12 March 1956

[Source: Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (hereafter RGANI), Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 73-85. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

CPSU CC

Cde. Ponamarev B.N.

I am attaching for your consideration a memorandum of a conversation of the counselor of the embassy of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Filatov, with the Vice Premier of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, Bak Changok from 12 March 1956.

Attached: abovementioned on "12" pages, vkh. No 1288s-dv

From 16.4.56

/I. Kurdyukov/

"27" April 1956
No 615 / dv

[handwritten at the bottom:]

To the archive

The issue, stated in the memorandum of conversation, is elucidated in the information prepared for the delegation of the CPSU to the III Congress of the Korean Workers' Party.

I.S. Shcherbakov

7-V-56

[Illegible signature]

[Illegible signature]

From the diary of
Counselor of the Embassy of the
USSR in the DPRK
Comrade Filatov S.N.

Secret
Copy. No. 1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
with the Vice Premier of the Cabinet of Ministers of the
DPRK and Member of the KWP CC Presidium, Bak
Changok¹

12 March 1956

Having met at the initiative of the embassy, Cde. Bak Changok indicated that he had long prepared to meet with me to explain his thoughts about the decree of the Presidium KWP CC from 18 January of this year, “About the Future Struggle Against Reactionary Bourgeois Ideology in Literature and Art.”

Before sharing my thoughts on the abovementioned decree of the KWP CC Presidium, I would like to say that over the past ten years of working in Korea, that is, from the period of founding and strengthening the people’s authority in North Korea, I, of course, had shortfalls and made a number of mistakes. It is now easier to evaluate the path our party has already traversed; to assess the actions of individual party functionaries, hide the shortcomings and mistakes and outline a future course to strengthen the party as a guiding and leading force of the Korean people.

I always admitted to the mistakes that I made in my work, on numerous occasions, I personally revealed them and informed the Political Council and KWP CC Presidium.

It is necessary to point out, Bak Changok said, that in the Soviet Union I was involved in insignificant party work, but in Korea I was pushed into important party and state work. Without the necessary experience, I made a number of mistakes when deciding difficult matters of state. Furthermore, having arrived in Korea, I did not know the country, did not know the ruling officials of the party, and, it must be said, there were few, and when forcing me to take leading roles in work, I was faulted. What’s more, it must be said that the situation was complicated in Korea both before and especially during the war. A lot of difficulties continue to exist even now.

What I am going to tell you, Bak said, I have already declared on more than one occasion both in meetings of the Political Council and in the Presidium KWP CC.

Regarding the decree of the KWP CC Presidium of 18 January of this year, I would like to impart to you that I cannot agree with the line of accusations which were made against me in that ruling. First of all, Bak said, I never carried out factional struggle and never came out against the party line. I did not distort the party line in relation to the United Front, did not suggest reconciliation and collusion with enemies. I unselfishly struggled for the party line throughout all of the ten years I have worked in Korea

I asked Cde. Bak Changok how it can be explained that the KWP CC Presidium made such a decision.

He explained that the question of the work of Soviet-Koreans and especially of those who worked in the Political Council and the KWP CC should not be placed first. Even in 1953 after the death of [Former KWP Vice Chairman, Alexander Ivanovich] Hegai,² a number of local functionaries and especially cdes. [KWP Vice Chairman] Choe Yonggeon, [Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance] Choe Changik and Jeong Ilyong raised the matter of releasing me and Cde. [KWP CC Organization and Guidance Department Director] Bak Yeongbin from our posts in the apparatus of the KWP CC; but then Kim Il Sung did not agree with them and

spoke at the Political Council with criticism of their actions. In spite of this, Cde. Choe Yonggeon sought the dismissal of a number of leading army officers who came from the Soviet Union.

At the start of 1954, the above-mentioned functionaries once again discussed the need to dismiss a number of Soviet-Koreans from leadership posts. Cde. Kim Il Sung did not agree with them—however, after a month and a half he gave the order that a few functionaries from the Soviet Union should be demoted to more subordinate positions and this was done.

As you know, Bak declared, at the start of 1954, [KWP CC Vice Chairman] Gim Il and I served as vice-chairmen of the KWP CC, at the suggestion of comrade Kim Il Sung, we were reassigned to work in the Cabinet of Ministers—Deputy Premiers. At the same time I was confirmed chairman of the State Planning Committee and Gim Il as Minister of Agriculture. This transition did not go too smoothly. When Kim Il Sung spoke during a session of the Political Council with such a suggestion, [KWP CC vice chairman] cds. Bak Jeongae and [Supreme People’s Assembly Standing Committee Chairman] Gim Dubong expressed their opinions about the inexpediency of my and Gim Il’s move to positions in the Cabinet of Ministers.

My promotion to the post of deputy premier and chairman of the State Planning Committee brought me closer to Kim Il Sung. All matters related to the rehabilitation of our economy were decided in the government at the initiative of the State Planning Committee. Cde. Kim Il Sung always supported me and demanded that things be put in order in the ministries. I, said Bak, sought to neatly carry out the directives of comrade Kim Il Sung for which he repeatedly held me up as an example. This caused some stirring among a number of functionaries and especially among [Vice Premier and Minister of Heavy Industry] Jeong Ilyong, Choe Changik and others.

At the start of 1955 I started to notice that Cde. Kim Il Sung began to express dissatisfaction with me and my work. My attempts to determine the cause of his discontent in talks with Cde. Kim Il Sung did not lead to anything. Cde. Kim Il Sung did not desire to discuss this matter. I saw, said Bak, that someone had begun to influence Cde. Kim Il Sung. Furthermore, this influence adversely affected the work of the State Planning Committee.

It must be said that all of the members of the Political Council, with the exception of [KWP CC Cadre Department Chief] Bak Geumcheol, negatively related to Kim Il Sung’s suggestion about the appointment of Cde. Choe Yonggeon to the Political Council. Cde. Kim Il Sung did not strive to get the consensus of the Political Council in co-opting Cde. Choe Yonggeon into the Political Council and unilaterally went with the proposal to a plenum. It is necessary to mention that the majority of the members of the KWP CC recognized Cde. Choe Yonggeon as the head of a petty-bourgeois party and were surprised by his appearance at a plenum of the presidium.

I think that with his acceptance into the Political Council, the collection of materials against me, Bak Yeongbin, and

other Soviet-Koreans was started. Cde. Kim Il Sung began to express more and more displeasure with my work, the work of Bak Yeongbin, and even that of Bak Jeongae.

Last August, in my absence, Cde. Kim Il Sung summoned all of my subordinates in the State Planning Committee and ordered them to compile materials about the poor work of the State Planning Committee. Although they carried out his order, the material was so poorly prepared that Cde. Kim Il Sung decided not to even talk with me about the shortcomings in the work of the State Planning Committee.

On 21 November Cde. Kim Il Sung spoke during a meeting of economic advisors with harsh criticism of the work of the State Planning Committee and of me personally. I considered the points of his speech as guidelines and took measures to improve the work of the State Planning Committee.

Prior to the December KWP CC Plenum, Bak said, I was twice called to Kim Il Sung where he made a number of accusations against me.

First of all, he said to me that my attitude toward proletarian authors, including [Minister of Education] Han Seolya, was incorrect. I incorrectly supported writers who arrived from the south. He said that after the death of Hegai, I did not excuse a number of Soviet-Koreans from their posts who, together with me, composed a group, and all matters were decided like a family.

In response, I told Cde. Kim Il Sung that I did not do anything without the permission of the Political Council and his personal orders. Until the end of 1948, I was involved in inconsequential work and did not have any influence on the work of the KWP CC. Regarding those who came from South Korea, the Political Council of the Central Committee repeatedly made pronouncements demanding that the possibility to work be given to those people [southern Koreans] and that they be supported. Furthermore, you, Cde. Kim Il Sung, repeatedly instructed us and demanded support and correct relations with those workers who came from the south.

Regarding the Koreans who came from the Soviet Union, I did not place them in leading posts. That was done before me. Furthermore, all of them were confirmed by the Political Council and many of the functionaries were nominated to the leading posts at his, Kim's, initiative.

I directed Cde. Kim Il Sung's attention, Bak said, to the fact that all of the matters which he had raised related to the period 1947–1952, and that discussing them at the present time is hardly constructive, however, if at present a number of members of the Political Council consider that mistakes were made in these matters, then why must I carry all of the blame for these blunders? All of these matters were decided in the Political Council so it means that all of the Political Council should be responsible.

Cde. Kim Il Sung agreed with my thoughts and asked me to remain calm and continue to work actively in the Political Council and Cabinet of Ministers.

In spite of the meeting and agreement with my argument, at the end of the meeting of the December KWP CC Plenum,

comrade Kim Il Sung delivered a speech. His entire speech was devoted to the theme of the Soviet-Korean affair. I understood that political accusations were being made and I decided to once again speak with comrade Kim Il Sung and express my thoughts. In a discussion with me, comrade Kim Il Sung once again repeated the now notorious accusations. However, at the end of the discussion in which Bak Jeongae took part, comrade Kim Il Sung said you have already been criticized enough, continue to quietly work.

I learned that the speech Kim Il Sung delivered at the Central Committee plenum was distributed by the Pyeongyang City Committee, to all primary organizations, and it is being discussed in party meetings.

Bak said [that] on 27–29 December there was an enlarged plenum of the KWP CC in which over 400 people participated. At the initiative of comrade Kim Il Sung, I, comrades Bak Yeongbin, [Ministry of State Control Desk Officer] Gi Seokbok, Jeon Donghyeok and Cheon Yul were compelled to deliver speeches admitting our shortcomings. The gathering was prearranged; as I was the first to speak, I was given around 100 questions. I was accused of wanting to become the face of the state, and if not the face, then the second in command. For this, I rallied a number of dependable Soviet-Koreans cadres. Bak Yeongbin and I, taking refuge in the collectivity of the leadership, put ourselves forward and beseeched the role of the *vozhd*, Cde. Kim Il Sung. We were, as a number of participants demonstrated, conduits of bourgeois ideology to the Party.

I asked Cde. Bak Changok to describe the character of the speeches of a few members of the leadership.

Cde. Bak Changok explained that the speeches of Im Hae—representative of the Korean Communist Party attached to the KWP, and Han Seolya deserve mention.

Comrade Im Hae declared that he has at his disposal materials which describe the factional activities of Bak Changok, Bak Yeongbin, and other Soviet-Koreans.

Comrade Han Seolya said that Bak Changok wanted to become the first person in the state, advanced himself, and by his activities lessened the role of comrade Kim Il Sung. He said that Bak Changok and Bak Yeongbin did not permit the party and the people to express their good feelings and attitude to their *vozhd*, etc. Bak stated that all of these accusations I spurned as absurd and baseless.

At the end of the meeting, comrade Kim Il Sung delivered a speech that in an even harsher tone repeated what he said during the December Plenum of the Central Committee. He made a specific reference to 15 functionaries who arrived from the Soviet Union as followers of Hegai. His speech, like the previous one, was distributed to all primary organizations of Pyeongyang and the provincial committees and read aloud at party meetings. Once again the Soviet-Koreans were discussed everywhere.

On 30 December, Bak Changok said, I asked comrade Kim Il Sung to receive me and listen to my explanation. Cde. Kim Il Sung invited me to his home and we talked for over 5 hours. He produced the same accusations to me that he had previously. I

directed the attention of Cde. Kim Il Sung to the fact that only Soviet-Koreans are being discussed, then what of the mistakes made by local functionaries of which there is no mention anywhere. Furthermore, it has already been over two months that the party leadership and all local organizations have discussed the activities and mistakes of the Soviet-Koreans, distracting us from our primary duties.

Cde. Kim Il Sung argued with me for a long time. Later he invited cds. Bak Jeongae and Gim Il. He asked their thoughts on the question under discussion. They essentially agreed with me, and Kim Il Sung agreed with us that all of this needed to stop. He asked me to forget everything and continue to work actively in the post of deputy premier and head of the State Planning Committee.

However, on 18 January I was once again summoned to a meeting of the KWP CC Presidium where I was asked to read a draft decision of the presidium that had already been accepted by the Political Council. Cde. Kim Il Sung suggested that I express my opinion about the matter under discussion to all members of the Presidium. None of the members of the Presidium demonstrated that Bak Yeongbin and I had carried out factional anti-party activities against the party.

In my speech I did not agree with the abovementioned decision of the presidium but at the end of the meeting said that they should decide as they wish, and demanded that they relieve me from the duties of head of the State Planning Committee and demote me to ordinary work. I made this declaration because I was so worn out that I could not explain to the Political Council and comrade Kim Il Sung about the incorrectness of the line of accusations made against me and other Soviet-Koreans.

Kim Il Sung came out against my suggestion. On another day I once again asked to be relieved from all of my posts. Comrade Kim Il Sung considered my request as unwillingness to agree with the decision of the Central Committee Presidium. I twice raised the matter of being dismissed. The Political Council accepted my suggestion and released me from the posts I had occupied.

Bak explained that I once again asked comrade Kim Il Sung to send me to common work but he categorically rejected the suggestion.

Later, Bak indicated that comrade Kim Il Sung will soon become convinced of the incorrectness of several accusations produced against me, comrade Bak Yeongbin, and other Soviet-Koreans. He will also be convinced of what a few members of the Political Council are attempting to achieve through the removal of them/him, Bak Changok and Bak Yeongbin from the Central Committee and Cabinet of Ministers.

A number of functionaries who presently surround Kim Il Sung, I mean, Bak said, Choe Yonggeon, Bak Geumcheol and several deputy directors of the KWP CC are unqualified, and more importantly, are mean-spirited and un-objective workers.

Two days ago, Bak said, I was asked to visit comrade Kim Il Sung. All of the directors of the departments of the Central Committee were with him. Before them, he assigned me the

task of editing a section of a speech on industry to the KWP Third Congress. He ordered all with materials about the work of industry to deliver them to me. However, up to now, they have not given me anything. I informed Cde. Kim Il Sung of this. He promised to take measures.

I directed Bak Changok's attention to the address of Cde. Kim Il Sung in relation to the fact that he, Bak Changok, was on more than one occasion ordered to speak with criticism of his erroneous actions. Bak responded that no one had ever given him such an order. In October of last year during a conversation Cde. Kim Il Sung drew attention to the fact that I had to deliver a speech on the work of the union of writers of Korea. I replied that I am entirely unfamiliar with the literature of Korean writers. On that, the conversation ceased.

I asked Cde. Bak Changok to describe how the party functionaries in the KWP CC and the Cabinet of Ministers study the decision of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, the speech of cdes. N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin, and what influences and impressions did they get from the CPSU Twentieth Congress.

Bak answered that the majority of party functionaries were still silent. They are waiting until Cde. Kim Il Sung himself talks about the line of issues, and especially about the personality cult, collective leadership, observance of intra-party democracy, revolutionary legality, etc. All of these questions are of supreme importance to the future work of our party and its strengthening.

The praise of Cde. Kim Il Sung is especially widespread in both oral and print propaganda in Korea, and if anyone comments on this matter, they are subject to punishment. I must acknowledge that what we members of the Political Council did, though feebly and timidly attempt to come out against this, but because of this we were accused of coming out against Kim Il Sung. Recently, since Bak Yeongbin left from the Central Committee Department of Propaganda and Agitation, the praise of comrade Kim Il Sung has significantly increased, and members of the Political Council "compete" in this action, attempting to outdo one another. Cde. Kim Il Sung sees all of this and relates to it highly. At his command and in consultation with him, preparations are being made for a film about his struggle against the Japanese colonizers. The study of the history of the KWP is conducted through the reports and speeches of Cde. Kim Il Sung. It would be possible to give even more examples characterizing just how far the matter of praising Cde. Kim Il Sung has gone.

The leading members of the party, Cde. Bak said, at the present moment are studying the decision and materials of the CPSU Twentieth Congress; discussions are taking place everywhere on the question of the personality cult, and I don't doubt that the majority of the leading cadres correctly understand all of the matters and attitudes advanced in the decision of the Twentieth Party Congress and reach the necessary conclusions. I also think, he continued, that Cde. Kim Il Sung will largely change the forms and methods of leadership. Without that, the further strengthening of the party and reinforcement

of its influence on the masses is inconceivable.

At the end of our discussion, Cde. Bak Changok informed me that he had a hand in the composition of the memorandum which Choe Yonggeon delivered to the Soviet government in February of this year. In this note, the Korean government asks the government of the USSR about the deferment and partial write-off of repayments of credits the Soviet Union had previously given to Korea.

Furthermore, we discussed the question of approaching the Soviet Government with a request to render the DPRK further material assistance. We think, said Bak, that it is necessary for us during the upcoming five-year plan to receive material assistance in the amount of one billion Rubles; we assume that this assistance will be rendered in roughly equal portions by the Soviet Union and China.

During a meeting of the Political Council, Comrade Kim Il Sung said on this matter that it is not necessary to appeal to the Soviet government now with the simultaneous requests for the deferment and partial write-off of repayments of credits and additional material assistance. It is necessary to decide, he said, first the primary question—the matter of the deferment and partial write-off of the repayments of credits. If the Soviet government complies with our request, then after some time we will appeal to the government of the USSR for additional material assistance. Members of the Political Council agreed with Cde. Kim Il Sung's suggestion.

I thanked Cde. Bak Changok for the information.

The meeting lasted for 4 hours.

Comments:

1. From the meetings conducted with Soviet-Koreans comrades Bak Changok, Bak Yeongbin, [Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry] Bak Uiwan, [DPRK Minister of Construction] Gim Seunghwa, Gim Daewook, Jang Donghok, and others, it is clear that Cde. Bak Changok, much like Cde. Bak Yeongbin, Gi Seokbok, Jang Yul and Jang Donghok admitted to the fabricated charges made against them at the meeting of the Presidium of the KWP CC on 18 January on the grounds of what the KWP CC Presidium passed in the decree "About the Future Struggle Against Reactionary Bourgeois Ideology in Literature and Art."

It is necessary to consider that for over two months the KWP CC discussed the matter in plenary sessions of the CC Presidium and Political Council and also in primary party organs. The discussion of this matter, in point of fact, turned into a discussion of the activities of a number of leading Soviet-Koreans. What's more, coercive methods were employed in the discussions, creating an entirely incorrect public impression surrounding the Soviet-Koreans. All of this led to the abovementioned officials admitting to the accusations made against them.

2. For the past while, Cdes. Bak Changok and Bak Yeongbin tried to sort out the essence of the question under discussion and visited the embassy with the aim of explaining their thoughts on the well-known decree of the KWP CC Presidium from 18 January of this year. In the conversations

they denied their participation in factional and anti-party activities, and moreover in distorting the policies of the party in the realm of literature, art and the United National Front of Korea.

In altering their thoughts on the well known decree of the KWP CC Presidium, in my opinion, there were two influential factors: the historical decision of the CPSU Twentieth Congress and the change in the relations of the Political Council and Cde. Kim Il Sung himself in connection with cdes. Bak Changok and Bak Yeongbin and other Soviet-Koreans. It is well known that the Political Council repeatedly gave the order to provincial and city committees of the party to cease discussion of the activities of well-known Soviet-Koreans.

3. I think that the abovementioned Soviet-Koreans made a number of serious mistakes. First of all, they incorrectly and arrogantly associated with the local cadres, ignored them and did not promote [them] to leadership posts. Several functionaries such as Han Seolya and others were victimized.

However, in my opinion, one cannot accept the correctness of the decree of the KWP CC Presidium from 18 January 1956 in that cdes. Bak Changok, Bak Yeongbin, Gi Seokbok, Jang Yul and Jang Donghok carried out a factional anti-party struggle against the party and distorted party policies in the realm of literature and art.

Counselor of the Embassy

20 March 1956

S. Filatov

4 Copies sent

1- Cde. Federenko

2- Cde. Kurdyukov

3- Cde. Solodovnik

4- To the files

Composed by Filatov

1. *Editor's Note:* The document was composed in both the first and second person without quotation marks or any other indication of a change in person.

2. *Editor's Note:* Alexander Ivanovich Hegai was also called by his Korean sobriquet Heo Gai.



DOCUMENT No. 2

Remarks on the Draft Statutes of the KWP

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 22-25. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Secret. Copy No. 1

5 March 1956

Department of the CPSU CC

Comrade Shcherbakov, I.S.

I am sending you "remarks on the draft statutes of the Korean Workers' Party," prepared by the embassy of the USSR in the DPRK.

Attachment: referred to on three pages / your eyes only/
vkh No. 812s-dv/

Deputy Director of the Far Eastern Division of MFA USSR

/S. Suzdalev/

To the archive

The material was used in preparing the conclusion of the draft statutes of the KWP.

I-VP/NM
No. 567-DV
5.3.56

I. Shcherbakov
31-III-56

Remarks on the Draft Statutes of the Korean Workers' Party

The draft charter was studied by embassy officials and after an exchange of opinions it was decided to make the following remarks.

1st Paragraph 4. Remove the word "anti-Japanese" and substitute the following wording: "The Korean Workers' Party is the successor of the glorious revolutionary tradition of the masses of our country who fought for national independence and liberation against the foreign colonizers.

Such wording would more succinctly reflect the history of the national-liberation struggle not only against the Japanese, but also against the American colonizers and that this struggle was carried out not only by the working class, but also by the peasantry.

2nd Paragraph 3. Replace the wording with, for example, the following: "The Korean Workers' Party advocates all possible support to the people of south Korea in their struggle for lib-

eration from imperialism and feudal exploitation..." eliminate the words "American" and "pro-American."

Such a wording must not be interpreted as meaning that the KWP sets before itself a task with such a warlike character.

3rd Paragraph 1. The wording needs to be changed and the following given: "The Korean Workers' Party struggles for the future fortification of the peoples' democratic system and the defensive strength of the northern half of the republic, constituting the material base for the peaceful unification of the country and guaranteeing independence." Otherwise, the words "...and the military fortification of the revolutionary-democratic base" may be interpreted as a summons to an arms race.

In the 3rd paragraph the phrase "and for the strengthening of military preparedness of the country" should be eliminated since it is redundant.

4th Paragraph 1. The wording should be changed, making it similar to the analogous wording in the statutes of the CPSU: "Members of the Korean Workers' Party can be from any profession, being citizens of the DPRK, recognizing the platform and statutes of the party..." Such wording will not exclude from the Party craftsmen and the petty bourgeoisie.

5th Paragraph "b". In the expression "must wage an uncompromising battle with factionalists and all varieties of anti-party elements..." remove the words "attempting to divide the party" since it may be understood that there is a factional struggle within the Party and that it lacks unity.

In point "d" of the same paragraph, remove the stipulation: history, geography and customs of ones' native land.

6th Paragraph "v". Remove the stipulation "if a real reason exists, since it could serve as a well known loophole for suppressing criticism.

The third and fourth sections of the rules advisable to switch places, the fourth section place immediately following the twelfth paragraph and the third section in place of the fourth.

7th Paragraph "b". It is advisable to increase the length of party membership of those recommended to three years, and add, that those recommended must have known the recommender through association for not less than one year.

21. Remove from the rules entirely since it may be misunderstood by those without a party in the sense that the party conceals from them the offences of its members.

35th Paragraph 1: It is necessary to slightly alter the form and give the following version. "the extraordinary Party Congress shall be convened at the proposal of the Central Committee

of the Korean Workers' Party or at the request of no less than one-third of the total membership represented at the preceding Party Congress."

39th Paragraph 1: It is not necessary to elect vice chairmen to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party since it is a superfluous bureaucratic level.

45. The functions of the Central Auditing Commission are very limited: It has been reduced only to the auditing of finances. It is advisable to also grant it the right of inspection over the expediency and correctness of work of the central organs of the party.

63rd Paragraph 1: Give for editing: "The executive committee of the primary party organization shall be formed in party organizations when there are 15 or more party members. Remove the words "probationer members."

Please consider these revisions and inform us about the possibility of delivering them to our Korean friends as they had requested.

Charge d' Affaires of the USSR in Korea

A. Petrov



DOCUMENT No. 3

Memorandum of Conversation with Kim Il Sung, 19 April 1956

[Source: AVPRF, Opis 12, Papka 68, Delo 5, Listy 64-65. Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Ivanov V.I.

19 April

I visited Kim Il Sung and gave him the telegram from the CPSU CC with thanks for the invitation to the Third Party Congress.

Later I informed him that the CPSU CC approved the order of the formation for May 1st demonstrations. It was considered useful to decorate Red Square and other locations of workers' demonstrations, and also the party committee buildings with the portraits of Marx and Lenin. Participants will march in columns carrying portraits of Marx, Lenin, and leaders of the Communist Party and the government of the USSR and portraits of leaders of communist parties and governments of the Peoples' Republics.

Moreover, participants in the demonstration will be given

the opportunity to carry portraits of Stalin and other figures at their own discretion.

I said that I told him this in order to keep him informed. Kim Il Sung thanked me for informing him.

Later, having explained to Kim Il Sung that Korean comrades twice visited our head advisor from the KGB and were interested in his thoughts regarding the Soviet position on carrying out the death penalty in relation to [former DPRK Foreign Minister] Bak Heonyeong, I said to him that according to the Soviet position, it would be advisable to refrain from such measures in relation to Bak Heonyeong, keeping in mind that from the moment the sentence was pronounced, a lot of time has passed and that Bak Heonyeong is politically ruined, isolated, and that carrying out the sentence now might lead to undesirable repercussions both in Korea and also abroad.

Having listened to my thoughts about that, Kim Il Sung was clearly perturbed and vexed. He indicated that, even in his time, Ambassador Suzdalev inquired with regard to the situation of Bak Heonyeong, but no answer followed from Moscow and we considered that the matter of Bak Heonyeong to be of no concern to Soviet interests. I was obliged to explain that even now the Soviet position is not interfering in the matter of Bak Heonyeong, I was only expressing my opinion in connection with the visit of Korean comrades to the head advisor from the KGB. In this case it would be expedient to act taking into consideration the present situation, which speaks in favor of the corresponding stance.

Kim Il Sung said that the comrades who were interested in the thoughts of the head advisor of the KGB on the Soviet position on the future condition of Bak Heonyeong, acted on their own behalf at the same time there exists a party decree to carry out the sentence in relation to him. Kim Il Sung noted that he will find out why that decree has not yet been carried out since a month and a half has already passed since Bak Heonyeong was required to describe some additional circumstances, that the order was given to the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to carry out the sentence.

An open trial was conducted in relation to Bak Heonyeong, he said, and there are no grounds or signals about the incorrect conduct of the affair. He admitted to all crimes he was accused of, both in the preliminary investigation and in court; he is a spy and the death sentence will be carried out. The Korean people unanimously approve and there will not be any undesirable consequences abroad.

Kim Il Sung said that his personal feelings have come to this; that it is necessary to carry out the sentence and there is no need to reconsider. But since there are other thoughts on Soviet appeals, we will discuss these circumstances in the Political Council.



DOCUMENT No. 4

Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a Meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Li Sangjo, 29 May 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 190-196. Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Distribute to members and candidate members of the CC [Central Committee] Presidium and CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] CC Secretaries

30 May 1956 [illegible surname]

[Stamp:
CPSU CC
20340

[date too faded to read]
subject to return to
the CPSU CC General Department]

FROM THE JOURNAL OF
N. T. FEDORENKO

Top Secret Copy N° 10
30 May 1956
N° 104/nf

[Handwritten at the bottom of the first page: "To the archives. The document was used in the preparation of recommendations to the leaders of the DPRK arriving in Moscow in June 1956. V. Gorbunov. 25/VII. I. Shcherbakov. 23-VII-56. [one illegible signature]."]

RECEPTION

of LI SANGJO, Ambassador of the DPRK to the USSR

29 May 1956

[handwritten in the left margin:
"To Cde. Ponomarev. [M. Suslov]"

I received Li Sangjo at his request.

1. Li Sangjo reported that during his trip through Moscow on the way to the European people's democracies, Kim Il Sung is counting on meeting with the leaders of the Soviet government, at which time he intends to inform them of the difficulties being experienced by his country and to ask the Soviet Union for additional economic aid to the DPRK. During these meetings, the ambassador pointed out, the Korean delegation will raise the questions it has in order to discuss these issues on [their] return from Warsaw to Moscow after the Soviet

Government has studied them.

Li Sangjo then said that Kim Il Sung's trip to the European countries of people's democracy has as its goal an expression of solidarity for the aid which these countries are giving. In the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Kim Il Sung also intends to discuss several issues concerning trade volume between these countries and the DPRK.

In reply to the question of what specific issues Kim Il Sung intends to raise in Moscow, Li Sangjo said that evidently this will be about the economic difficulties of the country and the difficult material situation of the population of North Korea. The Korean leaders, said Li Sangjo, informed Cde. Brezhnev about this when he was in Pyongyang and Cde. Brezhnev said that if there are requests of the Soviet Union then it would be advisable to raise them before the Soviet Government.

2. Li Sangjo asked whether I knew about the upcoming trip to the USSR of a delegation of officials of the DPRK Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to study the work experience of the corresponding Soviet institutions. At the same time the ambassador asked that the corresponding Soviet organs devote some attention to this delegation and familiarize it with the latest approaches in the work of the USSR MIA. The ambassador stressed that the Korean officials of the public security organs are in great need of assistance from Soviet comrades inasmuch as an erroneous method of operation of the organs has existed to date in the DPRK and this ought to be decisively changed. It would be very important, said Li Sangjo, for these officials to become deeply familiar with and master in practice the CPSU CC's approaches regarding the strictest observance of revolutionary legality. They would understand what importance was attached to this question in the USSR and would draw the appropriate conclusions from this for their practical activity in the DPRK.

I replied to Li Sangjo that I will inform the appropriate organs about his request which, I hope, will offer the proper assistance.

3. In connection with the fact that Li Sangjo just returned from the DPRK, where he took part in the work of the KWP Third Congress as a delegate, I asked him to tell about the conditions in the country and how the Congress went.

Speaking about the conditions in the country, Li Sangjo stressed that the DPRK is experiencing very severe economic difficulties, a keen shortage of food, housing difficulties, a neglect of agriculture, etc. As regards the Congress, he continued, the KWP CC leadership thinks that the Congress "went well and revealed the complete unity of the party." But, Li Sangjo pointed out, this is only the official point of view of leadership of the KWP CC. Li Sangjo then said that as ambassador of the DPRK, he ought to have strictly limited himself

to this information. However, in fact, Li Sangjo stressed, there are other opinions and sentiments about this question and as regards his, Li Sangjo's opinion, he also thinks that there were substantial shortcomings in the work of the Congress that reflect serious abnormalities in the work of the [Korean] Workers Party and the DPRK government.

The unfavorable state of affairs is primarily indicated, Li Sangjo pointed out, by the fact that there was no genuine criticism or self-criticism at the Congress and that the Congress did not at all take place in the spirit of the issues raised at the CPSU Twentieth Congress. The leadership of the KWP CC thinks that the shortcomings in the matter of observing the norms of party life and in other areas revealed at the CPSU Twentieth Congress and, in particular, in the report of N. S. Khrushchev, "The Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," are characteristic of the CPSU and have no relation to the Korean Workers' Party. This policy of the leadership of the KWP CC also determined the entire course of the Congress.

However, many party members, including Congress delegates, said Li Sangjo, think otherwise but they decided not to say this openly at the Congress.

Moving then to an open discussion, Li Sangjo said that his position was quite delicate. As an ambassador he must not speak of these things, especially since he knows the point of view of the leadership of the KWP CC and he knows that one does not win plaudits for such conversations but, on the contrary, he also knows that as a party member he must talk with us about these issues openly and not conceal his opinions. Li Sangjo added at the same time that the leadership of the KWP CC knows his opinion since he has openly stated it and written about it to the KWP CC Presidium.

Li Sangjo then stressed that a cult of personality of Kim Il Sung actually prevails in the DPRK, there is no collective leadership in the KWP CC, everything is decided by Kim Il Sung alone, and the people around Kim Il Sung fawn over him.

The presentation of the issues of the revolutionary liberation struggle of the Korean people is done extremely one-sidedly and is directed at glorifying Kim Il Sung. Li Sangjo said that during the struggle in Korea against the Japanese colonizers, many partisan formations were active and underground revolutionaries operated in the cities, but now they talk and write only about the partisan forces of Kim Il Sung. The Museum of the History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Korean People in Pyeongyang, Li Sangjo noted, has been in fact turned into a museum of the story of Kim Il Sung. The majority of exhibits and works of art in this museum are devoted to Kim Il Sung personally. A painful impression remains, Li Sangjo pointed out, when you see how the results of the long years of the struggle of many workers and the heroic efforts of the people are ascribed to one person.

In the published works of Kim Il Sung, Li Sangjo continued, many articles have been published that were actually written by other people and, in particular, by some Soviet comrades. Biographic materials about Kim Il Sung abound in flattering epithets referring to him such as "iron commander," "great leader," "genius," "wise," etc. Some comrades in Korea, said Li Sangjo, compare the role of Kim Il Sung in the DPRK with the role of Mao Zedong in China, although it is clear that these are not comparable figures.

As one of the examples of what obvious distortions of reality the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung is bringing, Li Sangjo said that, judging from the biographical sketch of one of the handbooks, it seems that Kim Il Sung led the anti-Japanese liberation struggle of the Korean people even in childhood.

Describing the entourage of Kim Il Sung, Li Sangjo said that Bak Changok, who earlier strongly glorified Kim Il Sung and took part in drawing up his biography, has now been subjected to "persecution" by Kim Il Sung. Whereupon, Li Sangjo added, the real reasons for the removal of Bak Changok hardly consist of his "administrative style" or mistakes committed by him about questions of literature. These reasons might turn out to be of another kind.

Li Sangjo gave a critical description of such people in Kim Il Sung's entourage as [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Nam Il and Bak Jeongae, who showed themselves to be fawning and obsequious.

Describing the unpreparedness and casual approach to issues by leading Korean cadre, Li Sangjo told how the preliminary plan for construction sites was drawn up for inclusion in the national economic plan. This issue, which demanded detailed preliminary study, was discussed and decided by the leadership of the KWP CC in a casual manner: almost any enterprise that came into the head of the participants right there at the KWP CC Presidium meeting was scheduled for construction.

There are many underage [troops] and often simply incompetent cadres wearing high military ranks in the Korean People's Army, in the words of Li Sangjo. This creates serious doubt, said Li Sangjo, about how prepared these personnel are in the event of military surprises.

Li Sangjo said in passing that during the successes of the DPRK at the front in 1950, Mao Zedong warned Kim Il Sung that the possibility of an American invasion needed to be considered and appropriate ideological training conducted within the party for this circumstance, but proper attention was not paid to these warnings of Mao Zedong. Li Sangjo added that this fact is quite secret and three people in Korea know about it - Kim Il Sung, former DPRK ambassador to the USSR Yi Jooyong, and himself, Li Sangjo, who heard about this from Mao Zedong personally.

During the course of the conversation Li Sangjo at times spoke with great excitement; it was apparent that he is deeply worried over the abnormal situation in the KWP and in the DPRK government.

Several times during the conversation he stressed that there is a keen need for the CPSU CC to give substantive ideological and political aid regarding the dangerous blunders being made to the leadership of the KWP CC and to Kim Il Sung especially.

B. N. Vereshchagin, adviser to the DVO [Far East Department], was present at the conversation.

DEPUTY USSR MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

/N. FEDORENKO/

[signature]

30 copies were issued/ng
Distributed according to a list
N° 225-nf. 30.V.56



DOCUMENT No. 5

Memorandum of Conversation with Gi Seokbok, 31 May 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 222-223. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

From the journal of G. YE. SAMSONOV [USSR MFA stamp]: Secret
Incoming N° 2409 Copy N° 2
3/VI 1956

Memorandum of a Conversation
with Gi Seokbok, Desk Officer
of the Ministry of State Control of the DPRK

31 May 1956

I received Gi Seokbok, who visited the Embassy at his own initiative.

Gi Seokbok passed me his letter addressed to Ambassador V. I. Ivanov.

Gi Seokbok said that he would like to relate an interesting fact conveyed to him by Gim Seunghwa, DPRK Minister of Construction.

During the work of the KWP Third Congress, Li Sangjo, DPRK ambassador to the USSR, twice wrote notes to the Congress Presidium with a suggestion that the cult of personality that exists in the KWP be discussed. However, these notes were not publicized. After the Congress an important discussion was held with Li Sangjo at the apartment of Gim Changman, Deputy Chairman of the KWP CC. The former was accused of political carelessness and in desiring to mechanically apply the decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress to the KWP.

Li Sangjo rejected these accusations and in turn accused Gim Changman and officials like him of a reluctance to correctly understand the decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress.

Gim Changman informed Choe Yonggeon, [Party Cadre Department Chief] Bak Geumcheol, and Han Sangdu of this conversation, who favored recalling Li Sangjo from the post of ambassador to the USSR.

Having found out about such an opinion, Li Sangjo visited [Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly] Gim Dubong and told him the substance of the matter. The same day Gim Dubong expressed his disagreement to Kim Il Sung about the proposed recall of Li Sangjo and that this step was in no way justified. Kim Il Sung agreed with this and added approximately the following: Li Sangjo did not make any mistake, he simply openly wrote what he was thinking.

Only after this, said Gi Seokbok, was Li Sangjo permitted to return to the USSR.

Gi Seokbok said that the concluding speech of Gim Changman, Deputy Chairman of the KWP CC, at a meeting of the Pyeongyang City activists convened about the results of the KWP Third Congress contained threats against those who continue to talk about the existence of a cult of personality in the KWP. Gim Changman declared, for example, that whoever does not want to understand that there is now no cult of personality in the KWP would end up isolated and be repudiated by everyone.

Gi Seokbok also reported that some days ago he attended a lecture by Jang Gukil, Deputy Minister of State Control, in which he said in particular that Korea was liberated by the partisan detachments of Kim Il Sung, but Gi Seokbok said that this was a gross distortion of history.

Gi Seokbok was told that his letter would be passed to the ambassador.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY

/signature/

/G. Samsonov/

[Distribution list]:

4 copies sent
 1-Fedorenko
 2-Kurdyukov
 3-Solodovnik
 4-to file
 Drafted by Samsonov
 Typed by Fokina
 5.6.56

**DOCUMENT No. 6****Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry Bak Uiwan, 5 June 1956**

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 203-205. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK
 No. 179
 "13" June 1956

Top Secret
 Copy No. 2

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Ivanov V.I.
 For the period from 24 May to 11 June 1956.

Pyeongyang

5 June

I received Bak Uiwan at his request. Bak said that before the departure of the government delegation to the GDR he had raised the issue of leave with Kim Il Sung and asked to go to the Soviet Union since his wife needs a spa cure. At the same time, said Bak, he expressed doubt to Kim that, since he had accepted Korean citizenship, they wouldn't start accusing his trip to the Soviet Union of being a vacation. Kim agreed to the trip and said that he would give the necessary instructions to Choe Yonggeon.

I replied that the necessary steps would be taken to organize the cure for him and his wife.

Bak then expressed the hope that Kim Il Sung's trip would bring changes in economic policy and with regard to the people. He said that Kim had begun to change for the better but makes mistakes in leadership and it is hard for him to correct them and abandon them.

In maintaining his thought, Bak pointed out that three Soviet-Koreans were promoted to leadership posts at the 29 May political council meeting.

In recent times not one Soviet Korean was in leadership posts in the KWP CC apparatus since a certain policy had been pursued that only local Koreans ought to work in the Central Committee and therefore all Soviet-Koreans had been removed.

Completely unexpectedly for Bak, at the 29 May CC Presidium [SIC] Kim proposed the appointment of former chief of the First Department Go Himan as KWP CC Transportation and Construction Department deputy chief. Bak pointed out in spite of the appointment that Go Himan was not suited for this work. However, Kim did not agree and noted that Go Himan could be appointed Minister, he deserved it, but there were already many Soviet-Koreans in these posts, meaning Nam Il, Gim Seunghwa, Bak Hongseok, Bak Changok, and it was allegedly necessary at the same time to maintain certain proportions in appointing officials.

Bak Uiwan noted that Kim Il Sung continued to divide workers into Soviet, local, Southerners, and partisans, and thinks that necessary proportions need to be considered when appointing workers to leadership positions.

[Tak Yangik] was promoted to Deputy Chairman of Gosplan and Bak Wongu was promoted to the post of Deputy Minister of Machine building at this same CC Presidium meeting. Both of these comrades are Soviet-Koreans.

Then Bak pointed out that the Czechs are designing a general machine building factory for them, where cable products and electrical instruments are to be produced. At one time [Vice Premier and Minister of Heavy Industry] Jeong Ilyong had issued a plan to build a 300,000 m² factory. The Czechoslovak planners calculated and came to the conclusion that the cost of such a factory would be 200 million rubles. They can only give 100 million rubles in free aid. After long discussion it was decided to cut the amount of work in half, which made the Czechoslovak comrades very happy. However the issue of the construction is being delayed since the factory will have to be planned again.

Bak Uiwan also said that, when assessing [Deputy Prime Minister] Choe Changik, Kim Il Sung seriously insulted him in connection with the fact that Choe Changik had declared that worse than no position is taking a certain position in the party while feeling inside that he was not needed, a dead person, and he could not agree to such a role and was dissatisfied with his position.

Bak Uiwan also said that Hong Myeonghui is an eminent figure in Korea and the people consider him a genius. When

talking with Bak, Hong Myeonghui told him that he is 70 years old and, not being a party member, he does not serve just to make a living but because he loves the DPRK system. While he was younger he was not tempted by a Japanese offer and did not serve them. He was therefore surprised at the words of Kim Il Sung, who declared to Hong Myeonghui that he didn't work much, that there were many hard workers without him, and that they need him, Hong Myeonghui, as a figurehead [*figura*].



DOCUMENT No. 7

Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Changik, 5 June 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 206-207. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK
No. 179
"13" June 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 2

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Ivanov V.I.
For the period from 24 May to 11 June 1956.

Pyeongyang

5 June

A meeting was held with Cde. Choe Changik, Deputy Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers. Our conversation lasted one hour and 10 minutes.

Cde. Bobylev, the chief of the group of Soviet specialists engaged in the construction of the meat-packing plant in Pyeongyang, was present at the beginning of the conversation. He informed Cde. Choe Changik of the progress of the construction and turned to him with a request to increase the number of workers at the construction site by 200 men in order to completely finish the construction of all production facilities of the meat-packing plant by 15 August. Cde. Choe Changik promised to grant this request.

The conversation then turned to the topic of the visit of the DPRK government delegation to the European people's democracies and the USSR. In response to the question of what results were expected from the visit to the USSR, Cde. Choe Changik said that this visit, like previous visits to the USSR, would bring the DPRK favorable results in the matter of its economic and political development. I noted that the USSR had always and

would henceforth give material aid and moral support to its friends and that the visit of the DPRK government delegation to the Soviet Union would unquestionably bring great benefit to the Korean people.

In reply to Cde. Choe Changik's opinion about the presumed nature of the meetings between the DPRK delegation and the leadership of the Soviet Union, Cde. Choe Changik remarked evasively that he could only share his personal ideas about this issue. Cde. Choe Changik said that it seems to him that, besides economic issues, the issues touched upon would be those associated with the political leadership of the party and the country in the interests of accelerating the social development of Korea. In reply to this, I noted that at the present time the party and country were being led by people who had very rich experience in revolutionary struggle, experience in economic policy in the post-liberation period, and also experience in fighting external aggression in the period from 1950 to 1953, and that if the collective leadership develops further, the DPRK would achieve new successes in solving the problems which are common to all the countries of the people's democracies and the USSR.

Cde. Choe Changik agreed with this comment but noted cautiously that, in spite of all the successes that had been achieved, it would be desirable to improve work in this direction inasmuch, as he put it, different opinions exist about whether collective leadership has been fully developed in Korea or not. The conversation ended with this. It was evident that Cde. Choe Changik has his own ideas on this issue and in view of this I proposed a new meeting to Cde. Choe Changik. We agreed to meet at my apartment on the evening of 8 June.



DOCUMENT No. 8

Memorandum of Conversation with Gim Seunghwa, 7 June 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 210. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK
No. 179
"13" June 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 2

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Ivanov V.I.
For the period from 24 May to 11 June 1956.

Pyeongyang

7 June

[DPRK Minister of Construction] Gim Seunghwa, whom I had invited to dinner, visited the Embassy construction site in the evening. Gim Seunghwa passed on a letter from [Deputy Prime Minister] Choe Changik who asked [me] to organize a meeting with him at my apartment but expressed a desire that the conversation be conducted without an interpreter, with only him present.

I agreed with this proposal and set this meeting for 8 June at the dacha at Seop.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Changik, 8 June 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 210-214. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK
No. 179
“13” June 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 2

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Cde. Ivanov V.I.
For the period from 24 May to 11 June 1956.

Pyeongyang

8 June

I received Deputy Prime Minister Choe Changik at the dacha at his request. In the conversation Choe said that he intends to express his opinion about the unhealthy, in his view, situation which has developed in the leadership of the party and the government.

During the conversation Choe noted that established procedure does not even give him, a deputy prime minister, an opportunity to meet with foreigners. Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs has this right. However, like several other senior officials, he is concerned about a number of issues of party and government policy which he would like to share.

Choe thinks that they have developed an incorrect and even harmful practice of selecting and assigning senior personnel. The selection of personnel is guided not by Marxist-Leninist principles, personnel are not selected for their professional and political qualities, but continue to be selected according to the principle of where they came from. In the process they continue to divide workers into groups: Soviet-Koreans who arrived together with [Former Vice Chairman of KWP

A.I.] Hegai; Chinese Koreans headed by [Former Minister of Internal Affairs] Bak Ilu, the partisans headed by Kim Il Sung, and local Koreans and Koreans who arrived from the South. The proportion of representatives of a particular group is taken into account when promoting workers. In his opinion, such a practice of selecting personnel engenders nepotism and a struggle between groups, which weakens the work of the party and government apparatus and does not promote the consolidation of the unity of party ranks.

Recently a great many people have spoken at plenums and at KWP CC Presidium meetings about Hegai, about the fact that he permitted nepotism in the selection of personnel and wrecked party organizational work. However, the party was led by the Political Council, which should be responsible for the mistakes which were made in governing the country. The leaders of the party themselves are afraid to admit the mistakes which have been made and blame Hegai for everything. There were many shortcomings in Hegai's work but he was a capable and energetic worker and he could have been set straight. The majority of senior officials correctly understand the reasons for the mistakes which have been made but are afraid to speak about this since they are held accountable for this.

At the same time Choe noted that essentially all the Soviet-Koreans are being discussed during the discussion of Hegai's mistakes, which is incorrect and harmful. Some Soviet-Koreans made a number of mistakes in their work and they needed to be set straight, which was not done in a timely fashion but it does not provide grounds for acting against all Soviet-Koreans, who for the most part carry out the responsibilities with which they are entrusted courageously and skillfully.

Choe Yonggeon, [Chief of the Party Cadre Department] Bak Geumcheol, Han Sangdu, and several other leaders are not taking into account the situation which developed after the liberation of the country when workers arrived from various places and did not know one another or have experience in party and government policy. In such a situation the KWP CC and Hegai in particular had a correct attitude toward the Soviet-Koreans who were tested and trained for party work, and this produced favorable results. It needs to be borne in mind that there were a great many resentful and dissatisfied workers at that time and now, 10 years later, Hegai, Bak Changok, and others are accused of nepotism for having promoted Soviet-Koreans to leadership posts.

Choe Changik also pointed out that he also cannot agree with the fact that Hegai's work and his mistakes are tied to the activity of [Former DPRK Foreign Minister] Bak Heonyeong and Yi Sungyeop. These are bad people, enemies of our people, and Hegai's mistakes ought not be equated with their malicious activity.

Choe expressed the opinion that at the present time a number

of workers have been elected to the KWP CC Presidium who cannot meet the demands imposed on their professional and political qualities. Jeong Ilyong, Bak Geumcheol, and [Deputy Chairman of the KWP CC] Gim Changman are regarded as such workers. They do not have the necessary education and work experience and handle the responsibilities with which they are entrusted poorly. Along with their poor training and insufficient experience they have strongly developed negative features such as sycophancy and servility. They are not able to take a principled position when discussing thorny issues. He considers the promotion of Jeon Donghyeok to the post of Deputy Prime Minister especially unjustified. His relatives worked in the Japanese police, and a number of his kinsmen are in the South at the present time. In his opinion, a majority of senior officials have a negative attitude toward the promotions of the above officials.

Choe then expressed the opinion that the work of the KWP Third Congress had not been permeated by the spirit of the CPSU Twentieth Congress. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union showed an example for all communist and workers' parties of how to disclose existing shortcomings and mistakes in [their] work and how to struggle to eliminate them. At the same time there was essentially none of the necessary criticism and self-criticism at the Third Congress which would have promoted the consolidation of our party.

Before the Congress Bak Geumcheol gave instructions not to make critical comments, reportedly under the pretext that the delegates from [foreign] Communist parties in attendance might draw the wrong conclusions about the internal political situation in the KWP. The speeches of all the speakers were examined for this purpose in the Central Committee Organizational Department and several delegates who wanted to make critical comments against the Central Committee were not permitted to speak.

Choe also considered it wrong that almost nothing was said at the Congress about the role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of Korea at the same time as a number of senior officials were essentially speaking against Soviet culture under the pretense of combating formalism and dogmatism.

The leadership of the Central Committee tried to prove that there is no cult of personality in the party and that the KWP observes Leninist principles of collective leadership. The harmful consequences of the personality cult in Korea are associated with the work of Bak Heonyeong in the South and with the work of Hegai in the North. Choe Changik thinks that this is wrong. He considers unjust the accusations made against Minister of Culture Ho Dongsuk that allegedly for sycophantic reasons, monuments and busts of Kim Il Sung were set up in the country at his instruction or that at his initiative squares and parks were named for him or that he was extolled in the press and literature. In fact there was a deci-

sion of the Political Council about these issues and the editor of the journal *Novaya Koreya* [New Korea] was removed and expelled from the party for reducing the excessive praise of the personality of Kim Il Sung.

There were attempts at the Congress to discuss the issue of the personality cult in the KWP. For example, [DPRK Ambassador to the USSR] Li Sangjo sent a note to the Presidium of the Congress that much work is being done in the Soviet Union to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult of Stalin and that it would be desirable to examine this question with regard to the KWP. However no steps were taken about this note.

At the present time all of Kim Il Sung's proposals at meetings of the Central Committee Presidium and the Cabinet of Ministers are adopted without question and therefore no opportunity is given to other officials to make proposals and if anyone tries to speak his comments are called into question and impossible working conditions are created for him.

Speaking of the difficult economic situation of the population, Choe expressed the hope that the DPRK would be given the necessary aid during the trip of the Korean government delegation to the countries of the people's democracies and the Soviet Union.

At the same time Choe Changik thinks that the situation which has been created in the party urgently requires that the CPSU CC help improve the situation, for he does not see the necessary forces inside the party which could put the situation right and ensure the further development of our party and country.

Choe said that the CPSU CC and the Soviet government have enormous experience in building Communism which the KWP lacks and therefore they ought to learn from the CPSU. He also expressed a desire that Kim Il Sung be given the necessary advice. He noted in the process that Kim Il Sung takes a close look at such advice and it would produce favorable results.

At the end of the conversation Choe expressed his desire to visit the Soviet Union and requested that he be given assistance in this.



DOCUMENT No. 10

Memorandum of a Conversation with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Li Sangjo, 16 June 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 238-241, Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Distributed by order of
Cde. A. A. Gromyko

Copy

from the journal of
I. F. Kurdyukov

TOP SECRET. Copy. N° 22
21 June 1956

N° 0898/dv

[Stamp:
CPSU CC
23080

[23 JUN 56]

subject to return to
the CPSU CC General Department]

[Handwritten at the bottom of the first page: "To the archives. The document was used in a report to the CPSU CC in connection with the arrival in Moscow of DPRK leaders. I. Shcherbakov. 23-VII-56. [one illegible signature]."

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH DPRK AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR, LI SANGJO

16 June 1956

I received Li Sangjo at his request.

1. I familiarized the ambassador with the basic events included in the draft program of the visit of the DPRK government delegation to the USSR and asked him if he had any additional wishes to be included in the program. Li Sangjo said that he did not have any wishes except those previously expressed and already taken into consideration in the program.

2. Li Sangjo then said that if questions of a military and political nature are discussed along with economic issues in the conversations held between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Korean delegation, then in his personal opinion, they ought to be discussed with the involvement of the largest possible number of members of the Korean delegation, for example, with all the members of the Korean Workers' Party who are in the delegation. If the discussion is to be held in a narrow circle with only Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il then, in Li Sangjo's opinion, the results of the conversation will be less

than they ought to be since other leading Party officials will not be properly informed of the substance of the comments and the advice of the CPSU CC.

Li Sangjo said that the Workers' Party and its leadership need serious ideological help from the CPSU CC.

In reply to my question about the condition of the population in South Korea, Li Sangjo said that the economic situation in the South is somewhat better than in the North.

The standard of living of a worker in South Korea (assuming that he has work), is higher than the standard of living of a DPRK worker; however, the real wages of workers in the South are somewhat less than they were under the Japanese. Li Sangjo then said that, according to his observations, the material well-being of the workers in the DPRK is about 10 times less than in the Soviet Union.

In connection with this, Li Sangjo said, the incorrect direction of the propaganda being waged in the DPRK draws attention to itself. Day after day this propaganda tries to convince the people of the considerable increase in their standard of living, which in reality isn't there. As a result, the people might stop believing such propaganda, which is divorced from reality, and it can cause irritation and unrest.

Returning to the questions of the situation in the KWP, Li Sangjo said that obvious distortions in the description of the history of the revolutionary struggle are permitted for the benefit of the personality cult in Korea. The Museum of the History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Korean People has been turned into a museum of the history on the revolutionary struggle of Kim Il Sung.

The partisan detachment of Kim Il Sung was only one unit of the revolutionary forces in the country and, moreover, far from the largest unit. Besides it, there was the partisan formation of [Former Minister of Industry] Gim Chaek and the partisan forces under the command of the Communist Party of China, and the latter were 10 times larger than the detachment of Kim Il Sung. Therefore, when the participants of the revolutionary movement in Korea see that all the efforts are ascribed to one man, Kim Il Sung, they have a feeling of bewilderment.

The ideological value of such a museum and such an incorrect interpretation of the history of the revolutionary movement in Korea, said Li Sangjo, is quite dubious. Praising the role and efforts of Kim Il Sung sometimes has an anecdotal nature.

We expected, Li Sangjo continued, that a study of the materials of the CPSU Twentieth Congress within the Workers' Party would serve as an impetus to improving the intra-party situation and to correcting the existing mistakes of the KWP

leadership. However, unfortunately the study of the materials of the Twentieth Congress in the KWP was done hastily and without the necessary depth. The shortcomings of the intra-party life of the KWP were neither criticized at the Congress nor after the Congress. Many members of the Workers' Party see and understand these shortcomings. They are inwardly dissatisfied with the situation in the party but decide not to openly criticize these shortcomings, fearing persecution.

Therefore, continued Li Sangjo, help is needed from the outside, and it would be best if Cde. Khrushchev or Cde. Mao Zedong talked with the KWP leadership about this issue. When doing so it is advisable that critical comments by Cde. Khrushchev or Cde. Mao Zedong become known not only to Kim Il Sung and the people close to him, but to a broader circle of KWP officials.

The statements of several comrades of the KWP leadership that there were no violations of legality in the DPRK are incorrect, Li Sangjo continued. In 1954, for example, many serious excesses and incorrect pressure on the peasants and low-level cadres took place during the collection of taxes in kind. In conditions where only 5% of the peasants had extra bread, almost everyone was forced to hand over grain. There were many cases of suicide among low-level party cadres in the countryside in connection with this, after which they were expelled from the party for their "inability" to ensure the fulfillment of tax in kind assignments. For example, in the province of North Pyeongyang where Bak Jeongae went and where there were many people expelled, 130 people committed suicide.

Serious violations of legality were also committed in the security organs and "Japanese" methods were employed.

In connection with this, Li Sangjo said, it is very important that they work closely with the DPRK MIA delegation in the USSR at the present time and familiarize it with the goals concerning the strictest observation of revolutionary legality.

It would also be very important, Li Sangjo pointed out, to exert appropriate ideological influence on the delegation of Korean journalists arriving in the USSR. This could facilitate a correction of the tone of DPRK press propaganda on the issue of the attitude toward the South.

At the present time this tone abounds in useless cursing and does not have the needed flexibility, which harms the cause.

Speaking of the reasons for the large number of mistakes committed by the KWP leadership and Kim Il Sung, Li Sangjo said that to a considerable degree they might be explained by Kim Il Sung's insufficient theoretical training.

Kim Il Sung, said Li Sangjo, is a young leader with a good

revolutionary past, but he studied little and does not have sufficient ideological training, and this leads him to mistakes.

B. N. Vereshchagin, adviser to the DVO, was present at the conversation.

Signed CHIEF OF THE FAR EAST DEPARTMENT
OF THE USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
I. KURDYUKOV

Authenticated: [illegible signature]

23 copies were issued
Distributed according to a list
N° 1557-dv
22.VI.56



DOCUMENT No. 11

Memorandum of Conversation with the Head of the Department of Construction Materials under the Cabinet of Ministers, Li Pilgyu, 20 July 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 304-308. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Top Secret
Copy No. 3

DIARY

Charge d' Affairs of the USSR in the DPRK

Petrov A.M

For the period from 20 July to 3 August 1956

20 July

The meeting took place in the embassy at the initiative of Li Pilgyu. At the beginning of the discussion Li explained the following about himself.

From the age of 16 he took part in the revolutionary movement in China. Later, he came to Korea illegally, where he continued his underground revolutionary work. When in his twenties, he was arrested by Japanese Gendarme and sat in prison for 12 years.

After the liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army, he worked as the head of the department of state security under the Soviet military administration. From 1948 to 1950 he studied in the Party College under the CPSU CC. After returning from Moscow he worked as the Korean Peoples' Army General Staff deputy director, and later commanded the 6th Army. From the army he was sent to the Interior Ministry in the capacity of

first deputy minister. At one time he carried out the duties of the Minister of the Interior. He worked for a long time with [Former Minister of Internal Affairs] Bak Ilu and knows him well.

Further, Li Pilgyu said that in connection with the Bak Ilu affair, he was 'sacked' from the organs of the Interior Ministry and sent to the Chemical Industries Ministry as the head of administration, and later as deputy minister.

At the present moment he is working as the head of the department of construction materials.

Li claimed that he wanted to candidly express his thoughts on the leadership of the KWP and government, i.e. Kim Il Sung.

Li said that he knew about Kim Il Sung only in the 1930s when he, Li, was in prison. Li emphasized with much indignation that at the present moment, the history of the struggle of the Korean people for their liberation is being distorted. Li claimed that an opera called '*solgaegol*' is currently being staged in which one act portrays the liberation of political prisoners by the partisan army. This, according to Li, contradicts reality. The Soviet Army freed political prisoners. Furthermore, Li indicated that it is presently being alleged that '*Gwangbokhoe*' (The Korean Restoration Association in Manchuria) was in fact an early form of the Korean Communist Party. These claims are completely untrue. That is a falsification of history. '*Gwangbokhoe*' was a society of the democratic front. It is Li's opinion that the revolutionaries located in Korea worked completely independently, without the influence of Koreans located in China during that period. He said that the Comintern, Kim, and the Profintern sent people and directives to Korea only until 1936. In his opinion, if '*Gwangbokhoe*,' [which was] organized by Kim Il Sung, [who was at that time] a member at that time of the Chinese Communist Party, really played a large role in the revolutionary movement in Korea, then the Comintern should have concerned itself with that organization through the Chinese Communist Party. But that just didn't happen.

Further, Li stopped on the problem of Kim Il Sung's personality cult.

Li Pilgyu said that Kim Il Sung's personality cult has obtained an intolerable character. He does not tolerate any criticism or self-criticism. The word of Kim Il Sung is law. He has surrounded himself with sycophants and lackeys in the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. It would be safe to say that of the 18 ministers, 9 of them have a shadowy past. To this number is related, according to Li, the Minister of Metallurgical Industry, Gang Youngchan, the Minister of Light Industry, Mun Manok, the Minister of Chemical Industry, Yi Changho, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Yi Changok, Minister of Education, Han Seolya and others.

Nothing is known of their struggle in the past for the freedom and independence of Korea to the Korean people. Li Pilgyu said further, that at the present moment an extraordinarily difficult atmosphere has been created. The Central Committee is spreading distrust between functionaries. Functionaries follow one another. There is absolutely no trust and friendship between functionaries in the KWP CC and Council of Ministers. In his opinion, a group of officials consider it necessary to undertake certain actions against Kim Il Sung and his closest associates at the earliest possible opportunity.

In response to my question about what exactly those actions would consist of, Li answered that the group sets before itself the task of replacing the present leadership of the KWP CC and government. In his opinion, there are two ways of doing this. The first way—that is sharp and decisive criticism within the party and self-criticism. However, Li said, Kim Il Sung will not likely be in favor of that way and he doubts the success of such an approach. The second way is forcible upheaval. That is a difficult path, Li said, involving sacrifice. In the DPRK there are such people who can embark on that course and who are currently making appropriate preparations.

To my question, could he name any from that group, Li evaded answering.

I asked him, in his opinion, which of the executives respectfully displays himself in work. Li gave the names of [Vice Chairman of the KWP] Choe Yonggeon and [Deputy Prime Minister] Choe Changik.

Choe Yonggeon, Li said, has recently demonstrated dissatisfaction with the activities of Kim Il Sung. Choe Changik—a person with an impressive revolutionary past. If a struggle with Kim Il Sung begins, then he would stand on the side of his opponents.

To my question on what position Li takes in connection to the abovementioned underground group, Li again evaded answering, but from the tone of his comments, I have surmised that he plays a significant role in that group.

I asked Li what the objective of that information was and he answered that it comes from the desire to alert the Soviet embassy to the fact that there is a possibility of one or another development taking place in the DPRK.

Regarding the life of the masses, Li explained that 80% of the population of Korea consisted of peasants. After the liberation of Korea, peasants were given everything possible for a better life, but they live very poorly. The government has carried out improper fiscal policies. Instead of 23-27%, more than 50% of tax in kind has been practically seized from the peasants. At present, this policy is continuing. There is nothing to say about the methods of collecting tax in kind in 1954-1955.

The collection was accompanied by beatings, murder and repression. On the spot party work is based not on persuasion, but on violence, collectivization occurs on the basis of violence. Workers live very poorly; there is not enough cereal and soy. The intelligentsia and students live under very difficult conditions. In the opinion of Li Pilgyu, the party must sincerely admit its mistakes in front of the peasant masses; honestly tell them that times are very tough. At the same time, tell them about the perspective future. Now they write in the newspapers and announce on the radio only one laudation; that everything is fine in the DPRK. That is an improper method of working.

Regarding individual members of the party leadership and government, Li Pilgyu said: [Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly] Gim Dubong was not a communist before and the Chinese Communist Party did not pay much attention to him. In general he is very quiet, industrious, but aware of his position. He will not blindly follow Kim Il Sung.

Choe Yonggeon was not with Kim Il Sung. They were together only in the USSR. Choe Yonggeon has a brilliant revolutionary record. By rank he was higher than Kim Il Sung. Choe Yonggeon is a person with his own intelligence. He has recently demonstrated dissatisfaction with several of Kim Il Sung’s activities.

Gim Il—Kim Il Sung’s protégé. He will always side with Kim Il Sung.

[Chief of the Party Cadre Department] Bak Geumcheol—he is a young worker. It would not be worth promoting him too high at all.

Bak Jeongae—she will be content with the present situation since she is afraid of her past. Many have doubts as to why the Japanese allowed a person who graduated from communist schools in the Soviet Union to be left in peace. This means that she pledged to the Japanese not to become engaged in revolutionary activities.

Choe Changik—a person with a revolutionary past and independent wit. If a struggle against Kim Il Sung ensues, he would come to the side of Kim Il Sung’s opponents.

Bak Changok—he still has a lot to do to make up for his faults. He was the very first to exalt Kim Il Sung as matchless, praising him to high heaven. He is the founder of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult.

[Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry] Bak Uiwan—a good person. He possesses good qualities in his work, has authority among the leading functionaries.

[Deputy Chairman of the KWP CC] Gim Changman—he

is the most hateful person. He persistently demanded shooting Bak Ilu.

Han Seolya—he should be shot. He should be put away for his book *History*. He is a very ghastly, injurious man. A Kim Il Sung sycophant.

Li requested that I consider the contents of our conversation strictly confidential and to not, under any conditions, inform the Korean leadership of them.

The discussion lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes. The translator of the discussion was the embassy interpreter, Gim Dubong.

Charge d’ Affaires
Of the USSR in the DPRK /A. Petrov/

4 Copies issued
1- Cde. Shepilov
2- Cde. Federenko
3- Cde. Kurdyukov
No. 850
4.VIII.56



DOCUMENT No. 12

Memorandum of Conversation with DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs Nam Il, 24 July 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 301-303. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Top Secret
Copy No. 3

DIARY

Charge d’ Affaires of the USSR in the DPRK
Petrov A.M
For the period from 20 July to 3 August 1956

24 July

I met with Nam Il at his suggestion, who explained in the meeting that on the very first day after the return of the government delegation to the DPRK, i.e. 20 July, he met in his apartment with [Chairman of the State Planning Committee] Bak Changok who before that had never come to him at his apartment.

Bak told Nam Il that a group of leading functionaries, including Choe Changik, Gim Seunghwa and a number of others are prepared, in the coming plenum of the Central Committee, to speak out with severe criticism of Kim Il Sung.

The main issues of criticism will be the erroneous methods of leadership of the KWP CC and of Kim Il Sung personally, Kim Il Sung's personality cult, incorrect dealings with the Soviet-Koreans, and other issues in party and state life. Bak expressed confidence that if he and also if Choe Changik and Gim Seunghwa speak out with that criticism, then he will receive support from individual members of the presidium and also from several heads of local party organizations. Bak said that it would be desirable for Nam Il to join that group and speak out with sharp criticism of Kim Il Sung at the KWP CC Presidium and at the Central Committee Plenum. The possibility of [Vice Chairman of the KWP] Choe Yonggeon taking part in the criticism of Kim Il Sung has not been ruled out.

In connection with this, Nam Il, in his own words, wanted to seek advice on what position he should take. He thinks that serious criticism of Kim Il Sung from Bak Changok and others would be improper. Such sharp criticism of the problem of the personality cult in the Korean context as Bak Changok and others are preparing to do would lead to undesirable consequences. It might undermine the authority of the existing leadership of the party and government, discredit Kim Il Sung in the eyes of party members and the entire nation and stimulate considerable discussion within the party.

Further, Nam Il noted that the observations of the KWP CC about several shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the KWP were correctly and frankly perceived by Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung told Nam Il and several other members of the government delegation that he would take measures in order to completely and fully amend these errors and shortcomings, including the issue of the personality cult. In the opinion of Kim Il Sung, these shortcomings and errors will not be eliminated immediately, not by discussing these issues in a full-scale investigation in the Central Committee Plenums or in discussions in party organs, but little by little without involving the entire party in the discussion of these issues.

He, Nam Il, and additional members of the Presidium render Kim Il Sung all kinds of assistance in eliminating errors and deficiencies and take measures to regularly prompt Kim Il Sung to quickly and in the most appropriate manner rectify them. Nam Il stressed that in spite of all of Kim Il Sung's shortcomings and mistakes, there is nobody in the DPRK who could replace him, Kim Il Sung was always quite correct in relation to Marxism-Leninism, the general line of the KWP Central Committee is correct, and Kim Il Sung personally, although a bit distressed, correctly perceived the criticisms directed at him by the leadership of the CPSU CC.

In connection with the visit of Bak Changok, he, Nam Il, feels himself in a very awkward position. On the one hand, he should, as a member of the Central Committee Presidium, inform Kim Il Sung about the conversation that took place with Bak Changok and identify him as one of those active-

ly preparing to speak out against Kim Il Sung, while on the other hand, since Bak Changok is a Soviet-Korean, he would not like to inform Kim Il Sung, since he, Kim Il Sung, might improperly connect the demonstration against him with the Soviet-Koreans.

I expressed my personal feelings that the danger of Nam Il in connection with the severe criticism of Kim Il Sung deserves a great deal of attention, that the position taken by Bak Changok on that issue is clearly incorrect, that initiating severe criticism of Kim Il Sung from the Soviet-Koreans may be interpreted incorrectly and it may cause an undesired reaction both inside the country and on the international arena. I said that he should in some way influence Bak Changok, Gim Seunghwa and other Soviet-Koreans so that they reject the urge to speak out against Kim Il Sung.

Regarding the question of Nam Il informing Kim Il Sung about the above-mentioned conversation with Bak Changok, that, as I explained, was his own business, but that it would be expedient to refrain for now from naming Bak Changok and Gim Seunghwa.

Nam Il agreed with me. He thinks that it would be good to warn Kim Il Sung and the Central Committee Presidium now so that Kim Il Sung would engage in self-criticism at the Plenum in connection with his report about the results of the government delegation's trip to the USSR and People's Republics.

Nam Il again stressed that he and other members of the Presidium will help Kim Il Sung in every possible way to prepare a speech containing self criticism.

The discussion lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes.

Charge d' Affaires
Of the USSR in the DPRK

/A. Petrov/

4 Copies issued

- 1- Cde. Shepilov
- 2- Cde. Federenko
- 3- Cde. Kurdyukov
- No. 850
- 4.VIII.56



DOCUMENT No. 13

Memorandum of Conversation with Charge d' Affaires of the Chinese Embassy, Chao Kaelyan, 4 August 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 313-314. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Top Secret

Copy No. 3

DIARY

Charge d' Affaires of the USSR in the DPRK
Petrov A.M

For the period from 20 July to 3 August 1956

3 August

I met with the charge d' affaires of the Chinese embassy, comrade Chao Kaelyan at his initiative.

Cde. Chao asked me to inform him about the results of the trip of the DPRK government delegation to the USSR. I explained about the additional economic aid of the USSR to the DPRK and then in turn asked Chao if the Korean friends had not asked the Chinese government about granting additional economic aid. Chao replied in the negative, though noted that in conversations with individual workers in the State Planning Committee, a proposal from the DPRK government, after being examined by the DPRK government, will be given to the government of the People's Republic of China. As far as Chao knows, the embassy of the DPRK in Beijing submitted a draft protocol for the deliveries of commodities for 1957 between the PRC and the DPRK. According to this draft, the PRC must send to Korea various commodities totaling 200 million yuan in 1957, while, according to the draft it is proposed that from the side of the DPRK, goods totaling 40 million yuan will be sent. In Chao's opinion, they plan to cover over the gap, as aid from China which they of course plan to ask for.

During the discussion, cde. Chao further mentioned that individual Korean comrades show interest in how matters stand with the cult of personality in China in their discussions with officials at the Chinese embassy. In response to my question, how the Chinese comrades answered that question, Chao said that in answering they quote the well known decree of the CC Chinese Communist Party, published at that time in the newspaper *Renmin Ribao*.¹

The character of the meeting was friendly.

Charge d' Affaires
Of the USSR in the DPRK

/A. Petrov/

4 Copies issued

- 1- Cde. Shepilov
- 2- Cde. Federenko
- 3- Cde. Kurdyukov
- No. 850
- 4.VIII.56

1. *Editor's Note:* Chao is likely referring to the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" published in *Renmin Ribao* on 5 April 1956.



DOCUMENT No. 14

Memorandum of Conversation with Bak Uiwan, 29 August 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 317-319. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK
No. 251
"15" September 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 3

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for the period from 29 August to 14 September 1956

Pyeongyang

29 August

[Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry] Bak Uiwan visited the embassy and said that on 28 August the draft report of Kim Il Sung to the CC Plenum to be held on 30 August was examined at a meeting of the KWP CC Presidium.

Kim Il Sung's written report is estimated at 1 hour and 10 minutes and consists of three sections: the results of the trip to the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracies; the economic situation of the DPRK, and party and government measures for the five-year plan to expand industry and agriculture and improve the economic situation of the population; and the intra-party situation and the tasks of the KWP.

Bak said that in the section of the report about the intra-party situation, as in the first two sections, great attention was devoted to the party ensuring the early fulfillment of the three-year plan, and great achievements and successes are being stressed. However the serious economic situation in the country is also noted. The enormous importance of the Twentieth Congress in overcoming the cult of personality of Stalin and

its consequences not only for the CPSU but for all fraternal parties is also noted in this section. In following the CPSU, the KWP did not have a critical attitude toward the cult of personality and therefore the cult of personality was widely practiced in the KWP. It was expressed in the glorification of the person of [Former DPRK Foreign Minister] Bak Heonyeong and has been retained to the present time in various aspects of ideological work. The KWP CC is correcting the consequences of the personality cult, but not everything has yet been done. Bureaucratism and other shortcomings in intra-party work are also pointed out.

At the end of the report the existence of the remnants of cliquishness [*gruppyrovshchina*] and factional activity are noted, in view of which it contains calls to struggle against these influences and to strengthen party vigilance.

The draft report was adopted. [Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly] Gim Dubong and Choe Changik made comments about the need to speak more sharply about the existence of the personality cult in the KWP and to weaken the formulations about factionalism, explaining this by the fact that the situation in the party demands that less be said about factionalism and more about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.

In giving an assessment of the report Bak Uiwan said that the report in the form in which it was adopted at the Presidium meeting did not touch on the main, pressing issues of intra-party life and party members were waiting for a solution to them. But the report will provide grounds to begin a discussion on these issues at the Plenum inasmuch as they were raised in one form or another.

Bak Uiwan then said that during these days Kim Il Sung, [Chairman of the Central Committee for the Election of the Second Supreme People's Assembly] Bak Jeongae, and Gim Il had each called him twice and [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Nam Il and Minister of Internal Affairs Ban [Haksae] once. They tried strongly to get Bak to refrain from speaking at the Plenum, presenting pressing issues and, in their expression, "not getting involved in a dirty business." Other senior officials who were of a mind to expose the shortcomings and mistakes of the leadership were also subjected to such treatment.

Bak noted that at the present time cases of reprisals against dissenting officials are already being observed. Just two days before the Plenum, Minister of Construction Gim Seunghwa was sent to the Academy of Social Science in Moscow to study so that he did not make critical remarks. Kim Il Sung refused to receive him for a conversation because Gim Seunghwa "had gotten involved in some unsavory business and had to leave."

During a meeting with Bak Uiwan, Gim Dubong said that Kim Il Sung and those close to him are going in the wrong

direction. They view all the pressing issues like the existence of the personality cult, the shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee, and the serious economic situation in the country only as the result of intrigues, cliquishness, and the factional activity of individual people.

Gim Dubong, in Bak's words, expressed resentment at the state of affairs where, knowing that matters in the KWP are going in the wrong direction, comrades from the CPSU CC do not want to come and help them figure things out and set them right. In reply to Bak's comments that the CPSU cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the KWP, Gim Dubong declared that it was not a matter of government interference but relations between two fraternal parties.

Describing his opinion, Bak said that the progressive forces inside the KWP needed to forge a path. Kim Il Sung does not want to boldly undertake a struggle against the shortcomings and will exert every effort to keep malcontents in check.

On 28 August Kim Il Sung threatened Bak Uiwan that if the malcontents continued to speak against the leadership there was a lot of compromising material on them in the KWP CC and that he, Kim Il Sung, was well known in Moscow and that he would receive support there.

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK

/V. IVANOV/

4 Copies issued

No. 1-Cde. Shepilov

No. 2-Cde. Federenko

No. 3-Cde. Kurdyukov

No. 4- to the files

Drafted by Ivanov

Typed by Alekseev

No. 940



DOCUMENT No. 15

Memorandum of Conversation with Kim Il Sung, 1 September 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listi 319-321. Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK

No. 251

"15" September 1956

Top Secret

Copy No. 3

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for the

period from 29 August to 14
September 1956

Pyeongyang

1 September

Today Kim Il Sung invited me and told me about the results of the KWP Plenum which was held 30-31 August.

Kim said that in personal conversations during the course of the preparations for the plenum with Choe Changik, [Trade Union Federation Central Committee Chairman] Seo Hwi, and others dissatisfied with the KWP leadership, the issues they would be raising were identified: the incorrect assignment of personnel, the cult of personality, and some others. As a result of the exchange of opinions in the private conversations and the discussion of pressing issues in the Presidium, we came to a unanimous opinion and no contentious issues remained.

They decided to hold the Plenum with a report about the trip of the government delegation to the USSR and countries of the people's democracies. The report included the issues about the results of the trip of the government delegation; the economic situation in the DPRK in light of the economic policy experience of fraternal republics; and the improvement of party work in the KWP. The report covered the issues of the personality cult, the improvement of intra-party democracy, the struggle against bureaucratism, and the improvement of intra-Party work. Choe Changik even thought that the issue of the personality cult had been formulated very strongly. [Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly] Gim Dubong agreed with the content of the report.

The central issue of the Plenum was that of personnel, not the cult of personality. During study of this issue it turned out that the arguments of the discontented personnel were not well-founded. The accusations against Bak Jeongae and [Chief of the Party Cadre Department] Bak Geumcheol were not borne out. Therefore Gim Dubong, who had raised the issue about personnel, agreed not to raise it for plenum discussion. The Central Committee Presidium came to the conclusion that the accusations against the individuals had been directed at undermining the leadership. Kim further said: taking advantage of your presence, I would like to tell you that in a conversation with me, Gim Dubong referred to the fact that a fraternal communist party shares the formulation of the question about personnel. In response to my question about which communist party he was talking about, Kim Il Sung replied that Gim Dubong did not say, but commented that "don't think anything bad about the Soviet Embassy." Kim Il Sung allegedly explained to Gim Dubong that the fraternal communist party is sending its opinion to us officially. [*Translator's Note*: "us" was not specified, but only makes sense here if it means the Koreans.]

At the Plenum, after the report, the question of [Minister of Trade] Yun Gongheum arose. In his speech he brought accusations that the Workers' Party had rejected the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and does not follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism; he described matters such that the very serious consequences of the personality cult are being retained inside the KWP and had repudiated the general line of the party.

In Kim's words, the participants of the plenum were outraged at the provocative nature of Yun's speech at the plenum and demanded that the floor be taken away from him. Choe Changik supported Yun. Others who spoke exposed the anti-party nature of Yun's speech at the plenum and cited instances of his anti-party conduct before the plenum.

Seo Hwi, Li Pilgyu, and Deputy Minister of Culture Gim Changil who, according to Kim's statement, left the plenum, crossed the border, and at the present time are being detained by Chinese border guards in Andong [Dandong], [and] had engaged in behind the scenes anti-party activity along with Yun.

Seo Hwi, Yun Gongheum, Li Pilgyu, and Gim Changil have been expelled from the party for anti-party activity. Choe Changik has been removed from the Central Committee Presidium. Bak Changok has been removed from the post of Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and removed from membership in the Central Committee. The question about him has been referred to the Central Committee Party Commission for a decision. At this point Kim declared that the party leadership had not intended to take such steps with respect to Choe Changik and Bak Changok; however, having exposed their anti-party activity, the participants of the Plenum demanded that organizational conclusions be adopted with respect to these officials.

With regard to Gim Dubong, Kim Il Sung said that they think that, having been deceived, he was under the influence of this anti-party group. At the present time Gim Dubong holds correct party positions and proof of this is allegedly Gim Dubong's demand for the removal of Choe Changik from CC membership which he made even before the Plenum, to which Kim Il Sung then did not agree.

Kim Il Sung then declared that, having studied the activities of the anti-party group, we could not have acted otherwise and think that our decision was correct. We have consolidated our forces in this struggle and achieved party unity. Thus the complex issues which surfaced in our party are now solved.

The state of health care was examined at the Plenum where the issues of public health education, the construction of a network of medical institutions, and the improvement of medical work were discussed.

In conclusion, Kim Il Sung pointed out that during a meeting with Embassy Counselor Petrov on 2 August, the latter expressed the concern which the CPSU CC is displaying in connection with the situation in the KWP. Kim Il Sung asked that the CPSU CC be informed of the decisions that were adopted. The report and the decisions will be sent to the Embassy after they are translated.

In connection with Kim Il Sung's report concerning Gim Dubong's comment about a fraternal Communist Party, [Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry] Bak Uiwan explained to us that Gim Dubong's remark in the Presidium had been distorted by Kim Il Sung. Gim Dubong only said that it was not imperative to engage in questioning witnesses at the Presidium and that Kim Il Sung could be charged with talking with them; such methods are feasible and they are employed in fraternal parties.

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK

/V. IVANOV/

4 Copies issued

No. 1-Cde. Shepilov

No. 2-Cde. Federenko

No. 3-Cde. Kurdyukov

No. 4- to the files

Drafted by Ivanov

Typed by Alekseev

No. 940



DOCUMENT No. 16

Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiaoguang, 4 September 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 322-325. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK

No. 251

“15” September 1956

Top Secret

Copy No. 3

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for the period from 29 August to 14 September 1956

Pyeongyang

4 September

During a reception on 2 September organized by the Vietnamese Embassy in the DPRK on the event of the 11th

anniversary of the declaration of the Republic, I approached the PRC ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiaoguang with a request to meet for a discussion. The meeting took place on 4 September at the embassy.

Qiao said that he came to share his thoughts on two issues. Regarding the issue of providing further support to the DPRK from the PRC, he said that on 21 August of this year, Kim Il Sung told him in a conversation that the Korean government could not accommodate the material needs of the people in the new Five-Year Plan and requested further support from the PRC. Concrete figures of the amount of support that the Korean friends would like to receive from the PRC in the coming Five-Year Plan were not mentioned in the discussion. However, while specifying the plan for trade between the two countries for 1957, it became known that the aggregate output of supplies to the DPRK from the PRC in 1957 must consist of 185 million yuan, from which 85 million should be used to cover commodity circulation, 50 million to the expense of remaining unpaid labor, and the PRC government requested to allocate 50 million yuan.

Qiao said that the question that was advanced by the Korean side related to additional assistance was transmitted to the government and that he had still not received an answer.

Coming to the second issue, Qiao told me that during the work of the KWP CC Plenum an extremely serious event occurred concerning the relations between the DPRK and the PRC. On 3 September, the DPRK Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yi Donggon explained that on the night of 30-31 August of this year, 4 Korean citizens: the Minister of Trade Yun Gongheum; the United Unions CC Chairman Seo Hwi; the Deputy Minister of Culture Gim Changil; and the Department of Construction Materials Head Li Pilgyu crossed the Korean—Chinese border in the region of Andong [Dandong] and were detained by Chinese border guards. Yi Donggon lodged a petition from the Korean government about returning the guilty individuals to the DPRK.

Qiao said the government of the PRC was immediately informed about what occurred. Korean border guards urged the above-mentioned individuals to return to the DPRK; however, they all categorically refused.

In response to the request of the Korean government, it was announced that the noted individuals are not simple border crossers and that their forcible return was impossible.

At the same time, Qiao said that on 1 September he was invited by Choe Yonggeon and Gim Changman, who told him about the course of events at the plenum. Minister of Trade Yun Gongheum spoke during the discussion of Kim Il Sung's address. His speech contained malicious and libelous attacks on the leadership of the KWP. He accused the leadership of

the KWP of poorly implementing the decree of the CPSU Twentieth Congress about the personality cult, and as a result the leadership of the KWP has supposedly committed serious mistakes by incorrectly distributing cadres in the absence of intra-party democracy, and by incompetently handling the difficult welfare situation of the Korean people. Yun's speech was cut short, and after lunch, he, together with the three other above-mentioned individuals did not show up at the meeting, and, as has become known, ran away to China. At the demand of the participants, Yun was expelled from the ranks of the Party.

Qiao also told me that he was informed that the anti-party activities of the abovementioned individuals were noticed before the departure of the government delegation to the Peoples' Democratic Republics, however, they became more obvious during Kim Il Sung's absence. Before the plenum, Gim Changil traveled several times to the town of Haeju supposedly to prepare for escaping to South Korea. However, after being convinced that it would be difficult to carry out, he fled to China.

Qiao asked what my thoughts were on the course of the work of the plenum, and also about the four individuals.

In answering, I informed Qiao that Korean functionaries shared several sides of the work of the plenum in talks. They said that even before the opening of the plenum, Seo Hwi and other individuals spoke with a series of rather serious accusations directed at the KWP CC and in particular about the issue of cadres. However, all of these issues were touched upon in the address of Kim Il Sung and approved by all members of the Presidium. Nonetheless, at the plenum these issues were once again raised. Yun Gongheum raised the issues, about which Qiao spoke.

Choe Yonggeon and Gim Changman also informed him that several disgruntled functionaries who visited the Soviet Embassy claimed that the CPSU CC sent a special official to the Soviet Embassy who was entrusted with the task of investigating the status of overcoming the personality cult in the KWP. At the beginning of the conversation, the incorrectness of such a message was explained to Qiao and also that the Korean leadership was informed of this by the Charge d' Affaires, with which it [the KWP leadership] agreed.

Concerning the course of the work of the plenum and answering Qiao's question about my thoughts on all of the incidents, I said that the issues which arose in the KWP are serious and were not stimulated by any outside factors, Soviet or Chinese, but were a domestic process taking place within the KWP.

Qiao expressed total agreement with the observations I made, at the same time asking a second time about my thoughts

on the individuals who fled to the PRC. I commented that since the mentioned individuals are located in the PRC, the Chinese side is apparently more aware of their reason for leaving. I added that I do not know those individuals personally and do not yet have anything to say about the reason for their fleeing. I also know that the Korean government accuses them not only of anti-party activities, but also of disrupting work, of amoral crimes, and of embezzling state funds.

Qiao commented that from the moment of his arrival in the DPRK, he had meetings with Seo Hwi and Yun Gongheum, and added that he was also aware that the embezzlement of about a million Won has been attributed to Yun Gongheum and others.

The meeting was attended by and translated by Attaché Kurbatskii M.N. and translator Wang Baomin.

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK
/V. IVANOV/

4 Copies issued
No. 1-Cde. Shepilov
No. 2-Cde. Federenko
No. 3-Cde. Kurdyukov
No. 4- to the files
Drafted by Ivanov
Typed by Alekseev
No. 940



DOCUMENT No. 17

Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a Conversation with Li Sangjo, Ambassador of the DPRK to the USSR, 5 September 1956

[Source: RGANI, Delo 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 224-228. Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

[Stamp:
CPSU CC
32165
[11 Sep 56]
subject to return to
the CPSU CC General Department]

FROM THE JOURNAL OF
N. T. FEDORENKO

Top Secret Copy N° 10
5 September 1956
N° 134/nf

[Handwritten at the bottom of the first page: "To the archives. The letter of Li Sangjo was distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium. See of 6 and 15 September 1956 [SIC, a caret at the bottom of the reproduced page suggests that a document reference was inserted at this point] for the decision on the question of the situation in the DPRK [signatures and dates are off the reproduced page]."]

RECEPTION

of LI SANGJO, Ambassador of the DPRK to the USSR

5 September 1956

[handwritten in the left margin:
"To Cde. Ponomarev; [M. Suslov]"]

I received Li Sangjo at his request.

1. Li Sangjo made a request to pass to N. S. Khrushchev his personal written statement about the situation in the KWP in connection with the plenum that was held. Li Sangjo added at the same time that if N. S. Khrushchev is not in Moscow, he asks that this statement be passed to A. I. Mikoyan.

Having noted that the statement he delivered contained a request for N. S. Khrushchev or A. I. Mikoyan to receive him, Li Sangjo said that in the event such a conversation took place, KWP CC member Gim Seunghwa, who had come to Moscow to study at the Higher Party School, could serve as interpreter.

Li Sangjo expressed the hope that the CPSU CC and CCP CC will help the Korean Workers' Party in the difficult situation that has arisen as a result of the hasty and unjustified repressions committed by the leadership of the KWP CC against comrades who expressed criticism.

2. Li Sangjo asked whether it was true that the CPSU CC had sent instructions to Nam Il via Ambassador Cde. Ivanov forbidding criticism of Kim Il Sung in view of the fact that this would damage the authority of Kim Il Sung and indicate criticism of the political line of the KWP. In response to my question as to where and when Nam Il spoke about such instructions, Li Sangjo replied that Nam Il referred to the existence of these instructions at presidium meetings and at the KWP CC Plenum.

Li Sangjo replied that he personally knew nothing about such CPSU CC instructions.

3. Li Sangjo repeated with indignation that Nam Il and Bak Jeongae deceitfully used the name of the CPSU CC in order to help Kim Il Sung and Choe Yonggeon take revenge on the comrades who criticized the leadership of the KWP CC.

He added that a situation of threats and terror has been created in the party. For example, Kim Il Sung told Bak Uiwan that he has many compromising materials against him, Bak Uiwan, about the squandering of government resources and threatened to circulate these materials if Bak Uiwan criticized the KWP leadership.

4. Li Sangjo told how he had heard that it was admitted at the KWP CC plenum that many displays of the personality cult had occurred in propaganda but at the same time Kim Il Sung and Choe Yonggeon declared that there were no harmful consequences of the personality cult in Korea. Such a statement is sharply contradicted by the facts, Li Sangjo pointed out. For example, people were arrested in the DPRK for printing portraits of Kim Il Sung on paper of insufficient quality or [doing so] carelessly, and there were cases of an arrest of a person for wrapping a book in a newspaper with a portrait of Kim Il Sung. Several thousand people have been arrested for things of a similar nature.

All this, Li Sangjo stressed, testifies to the existence of the most negative consequences of the personality cult in the DPRK.

5. Li Sangjo then said that he had received a second summons to Pyeongyang and obviously he would have to go there for some time. Meanwhile, he had informed the DPRK MFA that he was ill. Li Sangjo added that had still not decided about the question of visiting China for some time. He did not explain how the Chinese comrades would view such a request by him. Li Sangjo added that he had decided to return to the DPRK although he knows that reprisals await him there. Kim Il Sung, in Li Sangjo's words, has given instructions that any citizen might be given any punishment for any deed on the testimony of two witnesses, even so far as execution.

In reply to my question about the possible date of his return, Li Sangjo said that he intended to wait until the CPSU CC's attitude toward his statement was clear.

B. N. Vereshchagin, adviser to the Far Eastern Division, was present at the conversation.

Attachment: copy of Li Sangjo's letter to Cde. N. S. Khrushchev.

DEPUTY USSR MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

/N. FEDORENKO/

[signature]

30 copies were issued/ng

N° 286-nf
5.IX.56

Dear Comrade N. S. KHRUSHCHEV!

I hope you have received a report from Pyeongyang in which you were informed of those serious events that are occurring in the Korean Workers' Party. You probably know well that our party has committed serious mistakes and blunders in its activity. Therefore, some comrades pointed out his shortcomings to Cde. Kim Il Sung in the form of comradely criticism in order to eliminate the mistakes and shortcomings. He was also subjected to comradely criticism at the Central Committee Presidium meeting. However, he did not take the opinions of the comrades into consideration. Then this issue was raised at the Central Committee Plenum held on 30 August, at which severe party criticism developed.

The substance of the criticism at the plenum comes down to the following:

The cult of personality in our party was subjected to criticism at the plenum in order to overcome the consequences of Kim Il Sung's personality cult.

Those sycophants and careerists who spread the cult of personality in every way were subjected [to criticism] at the plenum. Workers on the ideological front who falsified the history of our party under the influence of the personality cult were also subjected to criticism at the plenum. The comrades who were critical at the plenum pursued only one goal: to eliminate the serious consequences of the personality cult in our party and completely ensure intra-party democracy and collective leadership in complete accordance with the statutes of our party.

However, the comrades who were in power took revenge on those who courageously and in a party way offered criticism directed at the elimination of the consequences of the personality cult and the elimination of the serious shortcomings in our party.

Several Central Committee members, including Central Committee Presidium members who had a wealth of experience in revolutionary struggle were unjustifiably expelled from the party. These events created a serious and complex situation inside the party.

In those conditions where intra-party democracy is not being ensured, it has become impossible not only to eliminate the shortcomings in the party through internal strength but also [has become] impossible to prevent events that very negatively reflect on the activity of the party.

In connection with the above, I submit my personal rec-

ommendations to the CPSU CC, which I request be seriously considered. Please send a senior official of the CPSU CC to Korea to convene a Workers' Party Central Committee Plenum at which all members of the CC should be present, including those who were expelled. The intra-party situation is to be studied at such a plenum more deeply and comprehensively and specific steps worked out directed at removing the shortcomings in our party.

If such a possibility is precluded, then please invite to Moscow senior representatives of the Workers' Party Central Committee and those comrades who were expelled, who will examine the current situation in the Workers' Party together with members of the CPSU CC Presidium and will work out specific steps to remove the shortcomings in the party.

If this possibility, too, is precluded, then please send a written appeal to the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee in the name of the CPSU CC that would describe the substance of the issue. Such a comradely comment would be more effective if the Chinese Communist Party CC were to subscribe to it.

If these steps are possible, then please receive me and I will describe the situation in Korea in more detail.

[DPRK Ambassador to the USSR]
/LI SANGJO/

3.IX.56



DOCUMENT No. 18

CPSU CC Presidium Protocol "On the Situation in the KWP," 6 September 1956

[Source: *RGANI, Fond 3, Opis 14, Delo 410, List 3, published in AA. Fursenko ed., Arkhivi Kremlya (Archives of the Kremlin), The Presidium of the CPSU CC, 1954-1964: Resolutions, 1954-1958 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006) 421-422. Translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.*]

Protocol No. 39 from 6 September
71.0

Resolution of the Presidium CPSU CC
"On the Situation in the Korean Workers' Party"

P39/VIII

6 September 1956
Strictly secret

1. Having attached serious importance to the events that occurred at the plenum of the KWP CC, the CPSU

CC considers it necessary to exchange opinions on these matters with the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party and with the CC Chinese Communist Party.

2. The CPSU delegation to the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has been entrusted with exchanging thoughts with the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party and the Chinese Communist Party in connection with the situation in the Korean Workers' Party.
3. Cdes. Suslov and Pomarev are entrusted to, within three days, prepare and deliver to the CPSU CC a draft declaration of the CPSU delegation to the Chinese Communist Party Eighth Congress on the Korean question.



DOCUMENT No. 19

Memorandum of Conversation with Bak Uiwan, 6 September 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 327-332. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person]

Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK Top Secret
 No. 251 Copy No. 3
 "15" September 1956

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for the period from 29 August to 14 September 1956

Pyeongyang

6 September

[Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry] Bak Uiwan told me the following about the work of the KWP CC Plenum:

In Kim Il Sung's address, the problem of the personality cult was touched upon only in connection with the status of work in the area of propaganda. It was mentioned by Bak that both with and without any reason, many cried "hurray" to the leader and also glorified him in various textbooks and literature.

In the discussion on the speeches, the first to speak was the Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Yi Jongok, who spoke in a sycophantic tone about the massive feats achieved

in the DPRK.

The second to speak was party provincial committee secretary from the province of Northern Hamgyeong, Gim Daegong. He also talked about the successes achieved in the provinces under the leadership of the KWP. It merits mentioning the fact that he singled out and sharply criticized the work of the Ministry of Trade and the activities of the unions in his speech. It was clear that the speech was prepared well in advance.

The third to speak was the Minister of Trade, Yun Gongheum who excitedly and in a harsh tone declared that the spirit of the CPSU Twentieth Congress was absent from the KWP Third Congress. Kim Il Sung immediately cut him off, accusing him of slandering the party. Continuing, Yun said that the KWP CC does not put the ideas of Marxism-Leninism into practice with integrity and dedication. From the Presidium came remarks such as "what are you slandering" and "is the KWP a fascist or bourgeois party[?]."

Further, Yun declared that Choe Yonggeon is the leader of another party and was immediately named to the post of KWP Deputy Chairman, a clear violation of party democracy. At that point Choe Yonggeon stood and called Yun a dog and insulted him in every manner.

Choe Changik came forward to the defense of Yun, however, as everything was prepared to finish off Yun, Choe Changik could not speak, not being permitted to talk.

At the evening session, Minister of Finance Yi Dyuyyeong spoke. He illuminated the victory and success attained thanks to the policies of the Workers' Party. In particular, he said that there is not one country in the Socialist camp other than the DPRK that could raise the wages of workers at once by 35%. Regarding Yun's speech, he said that the statement deviates and is factionalist and characterized him as counterrevolutionary and anti-party.

The next to speak was Nam Il. He spoke in general phrases, simply pointing out the truth that unfortunately the decree of the CC March Plenum, where Kim Il Sung talked about the personality cult, was not brought to the attention of the members of the party. Repeating the well known party slogans about the need to expand party democracy and struggle with the personality cult, he didn't say anything of substance on that issue in the KWP. At the same time, he rained down on Yun with crushing criticism.

The Union of Democratic Youth Central Committee chairman, Bak Yongguk spoke for a very long time, stating that the KWP Third Congress, guided by the decree of the Twentieth Congress, successfully put into effect the principles of Marxism-Leninism. He stressed that the cult of personality was spread and supported not by Kim Il Sung, but by Bak

Heonyeong who was practically compared with God. He also said that there was no need to belittle. Talking about democratic perversions inside the party, he pointed out that they are the legacy of Heo Gai [A.I. Hegai] and do not pertain to the practical work of Kim Il Sung. He characterized Yun's speech as counterrevolutionary, directed against the existing state structure, and suggested removing Yun from the ranks of the Central Committee, expelling him from the party and putting him on trial.

There was nothing negative in Choe Changik's speech. He pointed out that the policies of the party were correct, but that it is necessary to talk about the personality cult, a sore issue for the party. He also pointed out that the KWP CC made individual errors in its work. He was given a large number of questions, from which it became clear that he subscribes to the ideology of the factional group.

The Southern Pyeongan party committee chairman Gim Mangeum talked about the condition of the economy in the provinces and expressed his full support for the speech of the Union of Democratic Youth Central Committee chairman. He also noted that Yun's speech was a planned speech of the anti-party group headed by Choe Changik and that that group should be investigated and all of them jailed.

In his speech, Gim Changman said that all activities of the leadership of the KWP have been correct. He characterized Yun not only as anti-party, but also as a person who is morally corrupt, who does not eat any meat other than veal, who squanders large sums of money, and who is a thief and a swindler.

Speaking next, Kim Il Sung recounted the history of the rise of discontent with the leadership of the KWP, underlining that Choe Changik and Bak Changok lead the group of malcontent. He also said that rumors reached the leadership of the KWP before the meeting that, apparently, a person who leads the malcontent and considers the policies of the KWP incorrect is at the Soviet Embassy. The leadership of the KWP was obliged to send Bak Jeongae and Nam Il to the Soviet embassy to clarify the situation. It turned out that those rumors were antagonistic and spread by the anti-party gang. Following that, a letter of the CPSU arrived in which it was indicated that in individual countries where the problem of the personality cult was being examined, certain individuals took advantage of that, expressing their discontent with the leaders. He did not speak about the intra-party problems that were coming to a head, but only concentrated on the anti-party group, making it their aim to overthrow the leadership and seize power in their hands.

The speech of the province of South Hamgyeong Party Committee chairman Hwang Dongmin was directed against those who expressed discontent.

The KWP CC department of propaganda and agitation head Yi Ilgyeong pointed out that the Third Congress was completely guided by the ideas of the Twentieth Congress and following it, the KWP CC in turn resolved the shortcomings connected with the personality cult. Several individuals accused us of discontinuing radio programming from the Soviet Union. However, it is well known to all that in those countries, which developed and matured, absolutely nothing is transmitted from the Soviet Union. We have also grown, and therefore discontinued broadcasts from the Union.

In his speech Choe Yonggeon pointed out that Yun presented to the plenum a concentrated program against the party and government. In a truncated form, the factionalists presented to the plenum all issues of the party: its history; the issues of the country's economic conditions; the personality cult and the placement of cadres. The factional activities of those individuals are a continuation of the principal work of the group of Bak Ilu. Choe Yonggeon pointed out that it was Yun Gongheum, Choe Changik and others who mounted the campaign against the Soviet-Koreans, starting to thrash out at Soviet-Koreans. They prepared this in a bomb shelter at Central Committee Agricultural Department director Bak Hunil's [home] in 1952, where Bak Ilu, Choe Changik and others were, in order to work out a program of activities against Kim Il Sung. To do that they had to unite with Bak Heonyeong, and they united. Seo Hwi told two Koreans coming from China that they would work for ten years in the DPRK not getting a higher title than Major-General.

Choe Yonggeon said that Li Pilgyu came to the KWP CC and said that they were led by Choe Changik and Bak Changok and that if measures to improve welfare standards were not taken, then there would be major dissatisfaction and that they would have another Poznan on their hands. He was indignant at the fact that Bak Ilu, to this day, is being held in jail.

Choe Yonggeon also named Gim Changkil, the Minister of Communication, whom he cautioned so that others would not consider him a representative of any faction, while at the same time attacking individual leaders of the party and state. Of Bak Changok, he said that this person is a deep-seated factionalist and in connection with that gang, and that he sent Yun to the Soviet Embassy.

Following that, Bak Changok spoke, explaining that he thinks that the KWP CC December Plenum took a very strict and unfair position in relation to him. He indicated that he is not connected with any group. He was interrupted by the remarks coming from the Presidium and from the hall and was not permitted to continue speaking.

In closing, Kim Il Sung spoke, suggesting organizational measures in relation to Choe Changik, Bak Changok and

other individuals about whom the plenum accepted a well known decree.

In closing Bak Uiwan said that the Plenum was held under very trying and oppressive conditions. In the country a massive battle has begun, severe repression is called for in the questioning of security workers, drivers and servants. Essential issues in the party were distorted and matters were presented before the members of the party in such a manner that the malcontent, it would seem, prepared a serious conspiracy, something similar to a palace coup. At present, the discontent have been driven deep down, by its inner strength the atmosphere in the party, he said, will not be relaxed.

Bak noted that the functionaries, against whom organizational measures were taken, were bad people. But it is impossible to work under conditions of systematic mutual mistrust of leading functionaries toward one another, things don't get done and the work is not close to your heart. He said that knowing his feelings, although he recently switched over to Korean citizenship, he requests that I relay to the Soviet government, that after he returns he would like to be granted Soviet citizenship once again and restored to the ranks of the CPSU.

Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK

/V. IVANOV/

4 Copies issued

No. 1-Cde. Shepilov

No. 2-Cde. Federenko

No. 3-Cde. Kurdyukov

No. 4- to the files

Drafted by Ivanov

Typed by Alekseev

No. 940



DOCUMENT No. 20

Memorandum of a Conversation with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Li Sangjo, 10 September 1956

[Source: *RGANI, Delo 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 230-232. Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.*]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

with Cde. Li Sangjo, DPRK ambassador in Moscow and candidate member of the Central Committee of the Korean

Workers Party, held in the CPSU CC Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties on 10 September 1956

Cde. Li Sangjo asked that his thanks be sent to the CPSU CC for the help given the Korean Workers' Party and said that he basically wants to report the same thing that he said in a conversation with Cde. Fedorenko and wrote in a letter to Cde. Khrushchev. In addition, said Li Sangjo, I sent a letter to Cde. Mao Zedong.

Li Sangjo then expressed the opinion that at the present time the issues with which the party is now faced cannot be solved by the internal forces of the Workers' Party itself. It is difficult to generate criticism in conditions when honest, good communists are expelled from the party for criticism. For example, all critical comments about the cult of personality are viewed as anti-party statements. I hope, said Li Sangjo, that the CPSU and the Communist Party of China will look into Korean affairs together and help correct the current abnormal situation in the KWP.

There are many shortcomings in the Workers' Party, said Li Sangjo, and this is what is to be criticized. Cde. Kim Il Sung has by no means given an account of the CPSU CC recommendations to the KWP CC. I know about this from Central Committee members. At a conversation in the CPSU CC in July of this year, Bak Jeongae and Nam Il were present besides Kim Il Sung; the remaining Central Committee members do not fully know the substance of the conversation. Kim Il Sung, said Li Sangjo, admitted to the CPSU CC the correctness of the comments addressed to the KWP leadership but on return to Korea he began to act to the contrary.

Li Sangjo reported that he intended to send a letter to the KWP CC Plenum with a description of his point of view on the state of affairs in the party, but Nam Il informed him that Kim Il Sung's report at the Central Committee Plenum was well prepared and on the advice of several Korean comrades, said Li Sangjo, I did not send this letter.

Li Sangjo stated that, as Nam Il informed him, the CPSU CC letter, which discussed the statements of several Soviet communists after the CPSU Twentieth Congress (meaning the CPSU CC letter about the results of the discussion and fulfillment of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress), was described at the KWP CC plenum. In connection with the one-sided interpretation of the CPSU CC letter by Nam Il, Li Sangjo asked that he be familiarized with the contents of this letter.

The contents of that part of the CPSU CC letter about the results of the discussion and fulfillment of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress in which it talked about the individual incorrect statements that occurred after the Twentieth Congress were explained to Li Sangjo.

Cde. Li Sangjo was told that his report about the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Plenum and also the information that we have from the Communist Party of China

Central Committee about the transfer of four senior DPRK officials to the PRC and the reports of our ambassador in Pyeongyang deserve the most serious attention. We are alarmed by all the events that have taken place. A CPSU delegation to the Communist Party of China Eighth Congress has instructions to discuss this issue with the Korean delegation and talk with the Chinese comrades about the situation in the Korean Workers' Party.

Li Sangjo was told that, as he obviously knows, during Cde. Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow, a conversation was held with him in the CPSU CC Presidium. Cde. Kim Il Sung stated that he agreed with the CPSU CC advice about the need to overcome the cult of personality in the DPRK and develop intra-party democracy and self-criticism.

In connection with the fact that Cde. Li Sangjo is raising the question about the need for advice and recommendations on the part of the CPSU and the Communist Party of China to the leadership of the Workers' Party about intra-party issues, he was told that in principle fraternal communist parties can give advice and recommendations, but it needs to be borne in mind that the Korean Workers' Party is an independent party. Therefore, there cannot be interference in its affairs and internal life, and the complexity of the situation needs to be understood when determining the steps and measures by the CPSU and CCP with regard to advice to the Korean Workers' Party.

Cde. Li Sangjo then said that it would be useful to speak out in the press in whatever form, where the shortcomings in the activity of the Workers' Party and the critical comments could be described, even if only in general form.

Cde. Li Sangjo was told in reply that the issue of the critical statements by Cde. Li Sangjo or any other statements about the leadership of the KWP CC ought not to be discussed in this conversation.

In conclusion Cde. Li Sangjo expressed gratitude for the reception and the conversation in the CPSU CC.

The conversation was recorded by [signature] I. Shcherbakov

3KK



DOCUMENT No. 21

Letter from Li Sangjo to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, 5 October 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 233-295. Obtained for CWIHP by Nobuo Shimotomai and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

[Stamp:
CPSU CC
35293
5 Oct 56

subject to return to
the CPSU CC General Department]

TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Cde. Li Sangjo delivered to Cde. Fedorenko, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Russian translation of a letter to the Korea Workers' Party CC with a request to send the translation of this letter to the CPSU CC Department [for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties].

Cde. Li Sangjo reported at the same time that he intends to send the original of the letter to Pyeongyang in the middle [v *desyatykh chislakh*] of October.

I thereby submit the Russian text of the letter of Cde. Li Sangjo to the Korean Workers' Party CC.

Chief of the CPSU CC Department for /signature/
Relations with Foreign Communist Parties I. Vinogradov

5 October 1956

Nº 25-S-2136 [handwritten]: Seen
I. Shcherbakov
31.X.56

[to the] archives

Reported to Cde. I. T. Vinogradov [illegible signature]
V. [Voronin] 31/X.56
13 X 56 [illegible signature]

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

of the letter of Cde. Li Sangjo, Candidate Member of the Korean Workers' Party CC and DPRK Ambassador to the USSR to the Korean Workers' Party CC

In his letter, Cde. Li Sangjo basically describes the issues of the situation of the Korean Workers' Party already known to the CPSU CC and adds some new facts.

Cde. Li Sangjo expresses his disagreement with the decisions of the KWP CC Plenum held in August 1956. He thinks that the following questions should have received solutions at the plenum:

1. A review of previous plans to restore and develop the economy in order to stress the development of [practical] measures directed at the material improvement of the population.

2. The elimination of the consequences of Kim Il Sung's personality cult in order to ensure genuine intra-party democracy and collective leadership in the party.

3. Restoration of the history of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people that was falsified under the influence of Kim Il Sung's personality cult.

4. The elimination of the shortcomings in the field of party propaganda, which even today is divorced from the reality of the party.

5. The removal from leadership positions of a number of people who are interfering with the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the party.

However, these questions did not receive solutions and with regard to the comrades who tried to raise them, they were subjected to repressive measures.

Cde. Li Sangjo tells how the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung developed and that a majority of the "works" of Kim Il Sung were not written by him, but by other comrades. Thanks to the spread of the personality cult, Cde. Kim Il Sung has concentrated all power in his hands and has ended up above the party and the government.

If intra-party democracy is not ensured and Leninist principles of collective leadership are not completely restored, Cde. Li Sangjo concludes, then still more honest communists will become victims of tyranny and lawlessness.

In the opinion of Cde. Li Sangjo, at the Central Committee Plenum, Cdes. Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il did not make known the valuable advice which was given them at the CPSU CC. Comrades who spoke critically at the Plenum were declared "conspirators" trying to overthrow the leadership of the party and the government. At the same time a rumor was spread in the KWP that supposedly the CPSU CC had sent a letter to the KWP CC that expressed a desire that Cde. Kim Il Sung not be subjected to criticism.

Even before the Plenum, several comrades in a private conversation with Cde. Kim Il Sung told him their critical comments and he gave assurances that he accepted their comradely comments, but at the same time a "case" about factional activity was created against them. Covert surveillance of many officials has been instituted and therefore they are afraid to visit one another lest they be accused of "conspiracy."

KWP CC member Cde. Gim Seunghwa, who had planned to speak critically at the August plenum, was quickly sent to Moscow to study.

More than 500 career officials occupying posts of chief of a directorate or department of ministries and other [organizations] are being accused of belonging to the "Yan'an group." All were old communist cadres who fought in Korea in the past. They have been characterized under various names by groups, casting the shadow of anti-party activity on them. Korean Communists who had come from the USSR were called "the nepotist group" and those from China "the Yan'an group." Only the partisans who had fought under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and members of the "Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria" did not belong to groups and comprise the main backbone of the party.

It appears, writes Li Sangjo, that all the revolutionaries who do not have ties with Kim Il Sung must wear the stigma of factionalist.

Cde. Li Sangjo then pointed out that at the KWP Third Congress, it was declared that the cult of personality in the Workers' Party had not spread; however, at the August plenum, in view of the discontent of a considerable number of party members, in the decision about the report of Kim Il Sung, it was written "...the cult of personality has spread to a negligible degree in the ranks of the Workers' Party. It has found its expression chiefly in the ideological work of our party where one personality has been excessively glorified. However, the cult of personality could not have influenced the highest principle of party leadership, the collective nature of the leadership which the Central Committee has consistently upheld, nor the line or policy of the Workers' Party."

Cde. Li Sangjo cites other incidents of the violation of the party statutes and socialist legality.

In violation of a requirement of the party statutes, a number of officials were coopted into membership in the Central Committee without the permission of the Congress, and several of them then became members of the Politburo and deputy chairmen of the Central Committee. This was the case with Cde. Choe Yonggeon, who was Democratic Party Central Committee chairman.

An atmosphere of pressure and Kim Il Sung's tyranny pre-

dominates in the party. Even the most senior officials have been forced to work in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. The texts of speeches at Central Committee Plenums are being strictly monitored in order that the speaker says what “is necessary.” This is also being done for deputies. The texts of the speeches of the delegates of the KWP Third Congress were carefully checked and unceremoniously corrected without asking for the opinions of the delegates.

The Constitution is being violated in the country, writes Cde. Li Sangjo. A majority of the representatives of provincial people’s committees are not deputies of local people’s committees, but according to regulation they must be elected.

There are more than 30,000 people in prisons as a result of the violation of socialist legality. In the army alone the number of those arrested is more than one division. Eight thousand have been accused of counterrevolution and about 10,000 have been convicted of other crimes. Thus, one out of every 300 people in North Korea is a criminal.

This fact tells what “counterrevolutionaries” are. Two thousand people were released from confinement before the plenum, among whom there was a “criminal” sentenced to five years for only having made a book cover from a piece of newspaper containing Kim Il Sung’s portrait.

Kim Il Sung gave instructions according to which the existence of two witnesses is sufficient to convict a person for any term of punishment, including the death penalty.

Cde. Li Sangjo then writes that Cde. Bak Ilu (a former member of the Politburo) was arrested and his family expelled from Pyeongyang for daring to object to Kim Il Sung about the issues of the tax in kind and the party policy about reactionaries, declaring that severe repressive measures cannot be employed without review.

The letter talks about the distortion of the history of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people in contemporary literature. The role of the partisan detachments of Kim Il Sung, which actually ceased to exist in 1940, is exaggerated. The personal merits of Kim Il Sung are inflated and the routine partisan raid at Bocheonbo is presented as a great battle. The role of the “Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria,” whose membership did not exceed 100 men, is also exaggerated.

In addition, the activity of the Korean communists who fought together with the Chinese against the Japanese, Jiang Jieshi’s forces, and the American interventionists is ignored.

Enormous mistakes have been made in economic policy and in the issue of increasing the material and cultural level of the population. For example, the construction of an automobile

plant, the Pyeongyang meat-packing plant, a cannery, etc. was planned, but there were no raw materials for these plants in the country. At the same time, the country is experiencing great difficulties with food, housing, and essential goods.

Cde. Li Sangjo writes about his conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong during the first period of the war in Korea, when the People’s Army had successfully advanced into the south of Korea. Cde. Mao Zedong was then already alarmed about the possibility of an invasion by a large force of American troops. Cde. Li Sangjo reported this to Kim Il Sung, to which the latter replied that we do not expect to make a retreat and therefore there is no need to listen to this advice.

At the end of the letter Cde. Li Sangjo states that he is not against Cde. Kim Il Sung remaining in the party leadership, but inasmuch as the questions of principle that he pointed out were not properly resolved at the August Central Committee Plenum, he requests that the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee inform the members and candidate members of the Central Committee of this written statement.

Translation from the Korean

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY

The recently held Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee Plenum attracted the universal attention both of Korean communists as well as fraternal communist and workers’ parties. The discussion of issues at this plenum about the visit of our government delegation to fraternal countries and other issues, did not achieve resolution at the Korean Workers’ Party Third Congress, the resolution of which would have permitted the elimination of the serious shortcomings in party and government work. In particular, a discussion of the issue about overcoming the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung and its consequences which have become widespread in our country was expected at the plenum. In doing this we should have relied on the historical decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress which decisively spoke out against the cult of personality and the other decisions that exerted an enormous positive influence on the international workers’ movement. All the fraternal parties have launched a broad ideological struggle to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences on the basis of the historic decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress.

As more specifically regards those issues which required their resolution at the plenum, they boiled down to the following:

1. The issue of reviewing previous plans to restore and develop the economy in order to stress the working out of practical steps directed at an improvement of the material

well-being of the population.

2. The issue of the elimination of the consequences of Kim Il Sung's personality cult in order to ensure genuine intra-party democracy and collective leadership in the party.

3. The issue of the restoration of the history of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people that had been falsified under pressure of Kim Il Sung's personality cult, whose merits were incredibly inflated.

4. The issue of the elimination of the shortcomings in the field of party propaganda, which even today is divorced from the reality of the people.

5. The issue of the removal from leadership positions of sycophants who are preventing the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the party.

These issues might naturally evoke a lively discussion and the opinions of many party members might not agree with the opinions of individual sycophants and careerists. By no means can administrative and organizational measures be used to solve these issues. On the contrary, an opportunity needs to be given to everyone to express themselves on the issues [I] have touched on since they are of principal importance both from the viewpoint of theory and the viewpoint of practical activity.

Only through a comprehensive collective discussion of the issues can the correct solution be found to strengthen the organizational and ideological unity of the party.

In bringing up these issues I am by no means belittling the merits of our party and individual leaders in the cause of strengthening people's power and in leading the struggle of our people against foreign invaders during the war years. Our party was and remains the guiding force of the Korean people in its struggle for a bright future. In addition, I do not deny a certain positive role for Cde. Kim Il Sung in the revolutionary struggle of the Korean people.

The essence of the issues is to reveal the shortcomings that undoubtedly exist in our activity and multiply the indisputable successes achieved by the workers of our country. It is for this reason that party members should in every way reveal and eliminate shortcomings in the work and not get drunk on success and then ascribe these successes to the merits of one personality.

However, the results of the plenum not only did not justify the hopes of Korean communists and other fraternal parties but, on the contrary, led to the completely opposite result.

All those comrades who, guided by Leninist organizational

principles, expressed principled criticism of Kim Il Sung's personality cult, who harmed our party, were classed as "anti-party factionalists" trying to overthrow the government and the leadership of the party. But at the same time, it is clear that these comrades were setting the goal of expanding intra-party democracy in order to ensure collective leadership in the party, restore the history of our party that was falsified under the influence of the personality cult, remove the careerists and sycophants from the leadership of the party and the country, and work out specific steps directed at increasing the standard of living of the population.

Under crude pressure from those comrades against whom the criticism was directed, those who spoke in the midst of discussions were deprived of their say and therefore they could not fully describe their ideas at the plenum. The "leading" comrades managed to expel from the ranks of the party honest communists who had courageously and openly spoken against the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, through deception and threats against Central Committee members.

Is this really not a "strange" matter?

All the repressed comrades are senior officials of our party and state. Among them were: Choe Changik, member of the KWP CC Presidium and Deputy Prime Minister of the DPRK, and Bak Changok, member of the KWP CC and Deputy Prime Minister, who were removed from all their posts and whose case was sent to the KWP CC Party Control Committee for examination. Yun Gongheum, member of the KWP CC and Minister of Trade; Seo Hwi, Chairman of the Trade Unions CC; Li Pilgyu, candidate member of the KWP CC, and others were expelled from the party. Inasmuch as they were not given an opportunity at the plenum to finish speaking, the other comrades who had also planned to speak on this issue were deprived of their say.

Thus, a gross outrage was committed in violation of the statutes of our party.

They say that these [people] criticized Cde. Kim Il Sung privately or at a Central Committee Presidium meeting: Gim Dubong, DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium Chairman; Bak Uiwan, Deputy Prime Minister of the DPRK; Gim Seunghwa, former Minister of Construction; Gim Changhup, Minister of Communications; and others. Crudely trampling on the intra-party democracy guaranteed by the statutes of the party, Kim Il Sung and his supporters through unceremonious pressure have managed to get the comrades who spoke critically against Kim Il Sung classed as "anti-party" elements and "criminals" who tried to "overthrow" the government and the party.

After this can one agree without remorse with the argument of Kim Il Sung and [his] sycophants, who said at the Third

Party Congress and afterwards that there is no cult of personality in our party and the specific vehicle [*nositel'*] of the personality cult is Bak Heonyeong?

Can we say that only the Korean Workers' Party can avoid those serious errors that resulted from the cult of personality, which became widespread in the worker's movement? It is clear that the Korean Workers' Party, like other fraternal parties, could not avoid such errors. Nevertheless, our delegation that attended the CPSU Twentieth Congress, in its report about the CPSU Twentieth Congress, declared upon return to our Motherland that the cult of personality had become widespread in the activity of the CPSU. However, as indicated in this report, there can be no cult of personality in the ranks of a genuinely Marxist-Leninist party, but the KWP is one in which the cult of personality is supposedly absent and therefore it has avoided those errors which result from it. Such a statement does not correspond to reality and is aimed at deceiving party members. It cannot fail to be classed as an action that ignores the opinion of an overwhelming majority of party members.

I. The formation of Kim Il Sung's personality cult in Korea and its expression in various areas of public life. Can one really agree with that arrogant argument that, as Kim Il Sung and his supporters put it, "favorable" conditions have developed in Korea that permit the Workers' Party, being a genuinely Marxist-Leninist party, to avoid the cult of personality in its ranks? If one agrees with such an argument, then one ought to think that the remaining fraternal parties are not genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.

Isn't this really a laughable theory?

To tell the truth, in Korea historical conditions have developed which have facilitated the formation of Kim Il Sung's personality cult, not to mention that we did not have such exceptional conditions that permitted [us] to avoid serious errors from the cult of personality.

It is well known that Korea, which for a long time was under the yoke of Japanese colonial domination, did not know what a democratic way of life was. The Japanese colonizers "educated" the population of Korea in the spirit of unquestioning obedience to Japanese bureaucrats in every way. All this became routine for Koreans. After the liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army, power passed into the hands of the people.

In a situation where there were not enough senior officials in the country who had received revolutionary hardening in the course of the liberation struggle, new cadres were promoted to senior positions who had not yet received a sufficient revolutionary education. One cannot fail to recognize that this fact, which is an objective condition, facilitated the spread of bureaucratism, sycophancy, and the cult of personality in Korea. In Korean conditions, where vestiges of a feu-

dal education were deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people, there was fertile ground for the cult of personality to flower. Who can deny that the basis of feudal education was unquestioning obedience to the king and his cult? The king embodied the state. Someone who spoke against the king was declared a traitorous "criminal." All these vestiges still find their expression in Korean reality. According to the "theory" of sycophants, it turns out that someone who criticizes Kim Il Sung is trying to "overthrow" the government and the party. Then what is the difference between a "theory" that "the king embodies the state" and what the sycophants of Kim Il Sung stubbornly preach? Such an idea has become widespread in our party. Is it really not a vestige of consciousness formed in the epoch of feudalism and colonial domination? In other words, it is an accursed legacy of feudalism and Japanese colonial domination. It has "the absolute obedience of the people to bureaucratic power" at its base. All these circumstances could not fail to promote the formation and development of a cult of personality in Korea. It should be added that by the time of the liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army, there was no united communist party in the country representing the working class and acting as the recognized leader of the revolution. The underground communist groups who were fighting at that time in the conditions of the brutal police repression of Japanese imperialism did not have fixed communications among themselves. Thus each communist group had its own leaders and Kim Il Sung was one of them. Cde. Kim Il Sung, who returned to the Motherland with our liberators, the Soviet Army, enjoyed the universal support of the population at that time. This is understandable. We communists who felt whole-hearted trust in the Soviet comrades warmly welcomed and defended Kim Il Sung, whom the Soviet comrades also supported.

If one considers the issue of the leadership cadre who joined the various revolutionary organizations at that time, then it ought to be said that they basically were divided into four groups. The first group included the Communists who fought in Korea itself. The second group was Korean Communists who were in the USSR and operated under the leadership of the CPSU. The third group was the Communists who participated in the partisan movement in Manchuria, which ceased in 1940. The fourth group was Communists who fought in China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This was the situation at the moment of Korea's liberation. Although there were those among the communists who fought in Korea itself who opposed promoting Kim Il Sung as the leader, nevertheless a considerable social force supported Kim Il Sung and measures were developed that were directed at increasing and strengthening his authority. His portraits hung everywhere next to the portrait of Stalin, and many articles were published in the name of Kim Il Sung, including a 20 point program for the revival of the country.

And at the present time, when the historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress have rocked the entire world, there are

still officials who try to ascribe all credit to one “boss.” These circumstances played a decisive role in the formation and development of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult. All power was concentrated in the hands of one personality, in violation of Leninist organizational principles. All power was concentrated in the hands of Kim Il Sung, especially during the war when the foreign invaders who had intervened in the Korean War expanded the scale of [their] military operations.

In wartime conditions, an excuse was found for a restriction on democratic principles in the party and in the country. But when the country entered the period of peaceful development, such a restriction gave rise to negative consequences for the party and the country. Nevertheless, in our country the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung has not only not been overcome, but on the contrary, attempts have been made to reinforce it. As a result, Cde. Kim Il Sung has set himself above the party, the government, and the people, and he himself has ended up as an untouchable personality.

In light of these facts, might it be said that there were exceptionally favorable historical conditions in Korea that allowed [it] to avoid those errors which give rise to a cult of personality? It needs to be recognized that in Korea not only were there no such conditions, but on the contrary all the objective conditions in our country facilitated the formation and spread of the personality cult in greater measure than in other fraternal countries. However, instead of respecting the opinion of those comrades who had worked in various communist groups in the past in order to assure and strengthen party unity, Cde. Kim Il Sung has such a high opinion of himself that he has completely stopped considering the opinions of comrades.

With the appearance of the personality cult, as night follows day, all kinds of careerists and sycophants follow Kim Il Sung who try to fight their way to power at any price. They have raised the name of Kim Il Sung to an unattainable height by all permissible and impermissible means. If one explains one aspect of the personality cult by the presence of sycophants, then another invariable condition for the existence of a cult of personality is the encouragement of sycophants by leaders. When we analyze the cult of personality from these two aspects then we must recognize that there are sycophants and careerists in our party and that Cde. Kim Il Sung, as leader, has encouraged them and thereby facilitated their emergence. Can one assume that the words “Great leader,” “military leader of genius,” “outstanding leader,” and similar words of praise appeared in the pages of the press without the knowledge and consent of Kim Il Sung?

Can one believe what was said at the Third Congress of our party about the issue of the personality cult?

It was said that there is no cult of personality in the theory and the practice of the Workers’ Party.

To deny the existence of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult in the Workers’ Party means to embark on the road to a conscious deception of the party and the people, and it means ignoring the opinions of party members.


If one analyzes newspaper and magazine materials, school textbooks, fictional literature, and works of art, then we easily see the cult of personality here, there, and everywhere, that is, the name of Kim Il Sung is raised higher than the names of kings in bourgeois countries. The name of Kim Il Sung is celebrated in many songs. The democratic reforms carried out in Korea have been described as if the people received liberty and the peasants received land by the will of Kim Il Sung. He is still relatively young and living a busy life but his name has been given to Pyeongyang University, and streets and squares of cities. And as if this weren’t enough, the young Kim Il Sung is called the father of Korean youth. Is all this not a manifestation of the personality cult in our party? We must vigorously oppose attempts to depict Kim Il Sung as suffering from immodesty as the “Korean” Lenin or the “Korean” Mao Zedong.

Is it not funny when Kim Il Sung is compared with the great Lenin or with Cde. Mao Zedong? Only one who has finally got a high opinion of himself or has lost all conscience can compare himself with the great Lenin or Mao Zedong.

Let’s talk about the works of Kim Il Sung published in his collected works. The fact that the overwhelming majority of his “works” were written by other comrades who are active advocates of the personality cult is no secret to anyone. People ask, how much did Kim Il Sung write himself?

I don’t even intend to give an assessment of the quality of these works. Whoever studies party and government materials closely and systematically knows that many documents drawn up on the basis of a report or a speech by Kim Il Sung did not consider the immediate prospects for the development of events. Therefore, they had to make many efforts to draw up additional reports that could correct the mistakes in the main report. This is what Cde. Kim Il Sung, who considered himself above everyone and played an important role in the management of the country, did. We can identify many such government documents that contain statements which are contradictory. But meanwhile, the sycophants and careerists promoted these works of Kim Il Sung as outstanding creations having no equal. I suggest that highly qualified party officials and researchers reexamine the works of Kim Il Sung in order to identify the positive and the negative and then publish them as collections of party reports and not as works of Kim Il Sung. The remaining materials ought to be called upon as a textbook for studying the politics of the party.

In connection with the cult of personality one cannot fail to cite anecdotal facts that shed light on the spread of the person-



Cover note from the CPSU Foreign Ministry to the Central Committee, forwarding the asylum request of Li Sangjo, former DPRK Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was recalled to Pyongyang in September 1956

ality cult in Korea. Until recently there was a rule to issue as a booklet all the speeches of Kim Il Sung that touched on even minor issues. Statements about insignificant issues put forward in the publications immediately became political slogans of the party. The statements he made without any preparation became a party appeal that they hung on every street. For example, the words “rice is socialism” or “spinning is an art” which he threw out became party slogans. Artists were mobilized to reflect these slogans in paintings. All this provokes laughter from sensible people. It is not enough that these slogans are hung on city streets, but dramatists have been found who have written a play on the basis of the slogan “spinning is an art,” which was staged in Pyeongyang. Similar facts not only provoke laughter but also pain.

Thanks to the spread of the personality cult Cde. Kim Il Sung has concentrated all power in his hands and his authority has turned out to be above the party, government, and the people. Any speech of his at any meeting, whether it expresses the opinion of a majority of party members or not, is considered an “ultimate truth.” Even if his final decision contradicted the party statutes and established law, no one would be so bold as to oppose it. As the recent plenum has just shown, Kim Il Sung and his supporters crudely trampled on the party statutes and other norms of intra-party democracy. Therefore, the fact that the Central Committee Deputy Chairman openly declared that

“whoever is against Kim Il Sung, their political life is over; the doors of the prisons where they put enemies of the people are open to them” is no accident. Does this really cause no serious alarm in the party? Does this all really not undermine the unity of our party?

We all remember well how at every conference and meeting Cde. Kim Il Sung abused the name of one comrade who was known in the past for his active factional activity. But at one party activists’ meeting after the CPSU Twentieth Congress he had only to declare that Cde. Kim Il Sung is the true pupil of Lenin, after which he was immediately appointed a minister. Where is the party fidelity to principle here? It is no great difficulty for Cde. Kim Il Sung to violate the party statutes, government laws, and communist principles. He never seriously listens to the voice of the party members, not to mention that he does not consider the opinions of the overwhelming majority of party members. If we say that “force is truth” for Cde. Kim Il Sung and that his opinion is more authoritative than any government law, then this would not be a great exaggeration. If such an idea had predominated before the CPSU Twentieth Congress, then after it everyone began to understand that this is not the party style of operation. The popular masses, who blindly believed in Kim Il Sung as a god, have gradually begun to purge their consciousness of the personality cult. Some leading comrades, in defending the position of fidelity to party principles, expressed their critical remarks to Kim Il Sung and organized criticism of the personality cult.

Instead of heeding the comradely criticism as befits a communist, he embarked on the path to merciless reprisals against those who bravely and openly criticized the cult of personality. For Kim Il Sung and his supporters, the documents of the CPSU Twentieth Congress about the issue of overcoming the cult of personality have become scarier than a tiger and therefore they hate them.

Can a real Communist regard the most important document of the CPSU Twentieth Congress this way? If we do not eliminate a negative phenomenon in our life like this, if we do not ensure intra-party democracy, and finally, if we do not completely restore the Leninist principle of collective leadership, then many more honest communists will become victims of tyranny and lawlessness.

II. The August Central Committee Plenum did not resolve the principal issues about overcoming the consequences of the personality cult in our party.

It is well known that the August Central Committee Plenum should have become a plenum of vigorous struggle against the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung and overcoming its consequences. But it did not become such a plenum.

During a visit to fraternal countries, our government del-



**Roundtable Discussion: The Cold War in Asia
National University of Singapore, November 2006**

Anthony Reid, director of the Asia Research Institute (NUS), chairs a roundtable discussion on the Cold War in Asia. The roundtable, held from 6-7 November 2006, included scholars based in China and Southeast Asia. Christian Ostermann participated on behalf of CWIHP.

egation had a full opportunity to familiarize itself with the life of the people of these countries which are building socialism. They met often with party and government leaders who directly and indirectly informed our delegation of the issue that disturbs all honest party members, the issue of overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.

The leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, as has become known to me, expressed extraordinarily important comradely comments to our party. These comments touched on the issues of an increase in the standard of living of the population, overcoming the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, and also other [issues]. The Soviet leaders noted that one needs to be on one's guard against sycophants and careerists, that you can't present the history of the person Kim Il Sung as the history of the party, and finally they told of the harm of party propaganda divorced from reality. The value of these comments is without doubt. Every time shortcomings are observed in fraternal parties, another fraternal party criticizes from a position of communist principle in order to eliminate the shortcomings. The Soviet leaders expressed their valuable comradely wishes to the Workers Party Central Committee, and not to Kim Il Sung himself. It is clear that Cde. Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il, knowing of these wishes, were obliged to report them to the Central Committee Plenum in order to discuss them and eliminate those serious shortcomings that exist in our party and government work. But meanwhile, there was an attempt to conceal these CPSU wishes from the party Central Committee. In this regard, we ought to follow the example of the practical activity of the Soviet comrades after the CPSU Twentieth Congress.

I cite one instance as an example.

For example, in the Soviet Union, after the trip of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and N. A. Bulganin, their formal report about the talks with the leaders of Great Britain was communicated to primary party organizations. So why do we not inform our party organizations of the comradely wishes of the CPSU?

This is evidence of the desire of the Soviet leaders to broadly inform the party community [*obshchestvennost*] of the most important issues of government and party activity and to rely on the energy of the masses. Every party member knows what issues were discussed during the talks and were raised by the British leaders and what answers were given by the Soviet leaders in reply to the questions that were raised.

All this says that the activity of Soviet leaders relies on the creative initiative of the popular masses and their desire to receive a proper assessment from the party masses. Such a work style is one of the specific manifestations of Leninist principles in party organizational work. So why can we not imitate such a Leninist style of party work? The reply to this question can be found in only one thing: either our leaders openly ignore the interests of the party or they are afraid to communicate the valuable comradely wishes of the CPSU to the broad party community.

In addition, we should clearly realize that the CPSU wishes were addressed to our Central Committee. However, there are people who think that the Workers' Party Central Committee is Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il, or that the entire party is embodied in them. It would be a big mistake to take such a position. Every honest party member cannot fail to agree with these comradely comments which were made to our Central Committee by the Soviet leaders.

The recently concluded KWP CC Plenum had a serious nature and because it was held after the valuable comradely comments by the CPSU were made to us, and after our government delegation visited fraternal countries. During their stay in Moscow, our comrades assured the CPSU CC that they took note of the comradely comments by the CPSU and would consider them. But as the Central Committee Plenum shows, they deceived the CPSU CC: not only did they not take effective steps to correct the mistakes that have been made, but they took revenge against those who criticized the cult of personality.

Perhaps all this can be forgiven. The comrades who spoke at the discussions criticized Cde. Kim Il Sung and various sycophants in the spirit of those comments that were made by the CPSU. In response to such healthy criticism, Cde. Kim Il Sung and his supporters took revenge on the comrades who spoke, declaring them "the anti-party Yan'an group" and "conspirators" trying to overthrow the party and the government.

Thus the so-called Yan'an group, which opposed the cult of personality and which in fact did not exist in nature, was

fabricated. As a result, intra-party democracy and party unity were undermined even more.

It is well known that some comrades have already criticized Cde. Kim Il Sung privately and he assured [them] that he accepts these comradely comments. And somewhere behind the backs of these comrades, fictitious “cases” were created about their factional activity, calling them the Yan’an “group.” Therefore, at the Central Committee Plenum an open intra-party political struggle developed instead of a discussion of pressing issues.

In conditions when the elementary norms of intra-party democracy are not observed, the comrades who openly criticized Kim Il Sung and his sycophants performed a genuinely courageous act. In spite of the threat that hung over their fate, in the interest of the party and the people they bravely and openly criticized Cde. Kim Il Sung and various sycophants. By no means can their actions be assessed as an attempt to seize the posts of prime minister or chairman of the party Central Committee, although there are people who have lost all conscience and are representing their actions as such an attempt.

The comrades who spoke knew that the automatic majority of the plenum collected by threats and intimidation would expel them from the party. Already on the eve of the plenum supporters of Kim Il Sung openly declared that those who criticized the “leadership” of the party would be expelled. Were the comrades who spoke really concerned about their own personal interests? No. Those who criticized the cult of personality were only guided by the interests of the party and were trying to restore the truth.

These repressive measures on the part of Kim Il Sung and his small number of supporters have added a shameful page to the history of our party that is unprecedented in the history of the international workers’ movement. Can such reprisals be considered measures taken in the interest of the party and in the interest of strengthening international ties with other fraternal communist and workers’ parties?

It needs to be said frankly that such measures promote neither the strengthening of party unity nor international ties with other fraternal parties. These repressive measures weaken the ties with other fraternal parties and run counter to Marxist-Leninist truth.

By their unprecedented actions, Kim Il Sung and his supporters have ignored the valuable comradely wishes of the CPSU. Moreover, they have spread rumors that the CPSU CC supposedly sent a letter to the KWP CC in which it expressed a desire that Cde. Kim Il Sung not be subjected to criticism. The letter needs to be read closely. Where did it say there that it was not necessary to oppose the cult of personality? On the contrary, it states the correctness and need to struggle against

the cult of personality, during which great success has been achieved in all fraternal parties. These shameful acts were committed by Nam Il, who spread the false rumor, and Gim Changman, who supported him on this issue.

Can all these really not be classed as the acts of a coward, a deceiver? Kim Il Sung and his supporters stated that the Korean communists who returned to the motherland from China have formed their own “group,” which they called the “Yan’an group.” The absurdity of such statements is so obvious that they are not worth refuting.

One can only be surprised at their political shortsightedness when they associate “factional activity” in the Korean Workers’ Party with Yan’an, the revolutionary base of the Chinese Revolution, which enjoys the deep love of 600 million Chinese people and the universal respect of communists of the entire world. Let’s look at the arguments with the aid of which they accused honest communists of factional activity. The supporters of Cde. Kim Il Sung say that the comrades who spoke at the plenum had discussed questions of party policy long before the plenum, behind the back of the Central Committee. Such statements do not withstand criticism. Everyone knows well that even before the plenum, the now-repressed comrades made critical remarks to Kim Il Sung in a private conversation with him and then spoke at the Central Committee Plenum. In view of the lack of intra-party democracy, the comrades who spoke in the discussions were deprived of their say at the Central Committee Plenum. Some other comrades could not participate in the discussions for this reason. Can one find traces of a “plot” against the government and the party here? After this, how can one say that the elementary norms of intra-party democracy are being observed in our party?

Their other favorite arguments are that criticism of senior party and government leaders unavoidably leads to “plotting” in the interests of “overthrowing” the party and government. Is it really a “crime” when a party member expresses criticism directed at eliminating the shortcomings which exist in the actions of senior comrades?

The statutes of our party provides for intra-party democracy. It permits criticism of any party member regardless of the post he holds if it, the criticism, is supported by facts. Not one Communist or workers’ party accepts such a situation where individual leaders who have become untouchable prove to be beyond party criticism.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism do not consider it a “crime” when an individual party member criticizes a leader. Where can you see party members, who comprise the party, almost go on their knees before the authority of an individual leader? It is even impossible to display comradely criticism inside the Central Committee and, what is more, inside the Central Committee Presidium. Even in the era of feudalism,

in order to strengthen their dominance, bring public opinion to their side, and head off extreme anti-people activities on the part of individual bureaucrats, individual kings created a state council in their court whose members had the right to speak out against unjustified actions of the king.

So it is asked, why can we party members not initiate criticism directed against individual leaders? Those leaders who persecute criticism from below are trying to subjugate all party members and with the aid of authority demand unquestioning obedience. For it is clear that Kim Il Sung and his supporters are not yet the entire party and not the entire government.

Let's even assume that someone spoke openly against Kim Il Sung and individual leaders. Can such an act be called an act directed at overthrowing the party and government? Of course not. To overthrow the party and the government in the true sense means a change of the existing people's democratic system. If one takes such a position then one ought to explain the changes in the leadership in a number of fraternal parties as an overthrow of the previous parties and governments. If one thinks that Kim Il Sung is the Leader [*vozhd*] and should be in the post of prime minister and chairman of the Central Committee for life, then what is the difference between him and a king? Who appointed him to the post of prime minister and chairman of the Central Committee for life? And if someone had suggested releasing Cde. Kim Il Sung from the posts he holds in order to eliminate the shortcomings that exist in improving the material situation and cultural life of the population, in order to overcome the cult of personality and its consequences, in order to correct the falsification of the history of the liberation struggle of the Korean people, and in order to ensure the collective leadership of the party and country in practice, then there is nothing anti-party or criminal here. However, the comrades who were expelled did not advance such a demand, but limited themselves to a suggestion to release several sycophants from the positions they hold who are harming the party and the people by their improper actions. What is criminal and anti-party here?

The supporters of Kim Il Sung say that one ought not to hold private conversations on political topics. Is this really not an absurd demand? Are there political leaders who do not hold private conversations amongst themselves on political topics? There are no such leaders. Is there a communist or workers' party that prohibits holding private conversations on political topics? There are no such parties. Does Kim Il Sung himself really not hold private conversations on political topics? I have personally talked privately with Kim Il Sung about politics over a dinner table on more than one occasion. Can such an act be classed as factional activity? Every party member feeling a responsibility for his party cannot agree with such a classification of factional activity. With the exception of Cde. Kim Il Sung and several of his supporters, each of us has been afraid to meet together in order to eat dinner or celebrate some

occasion, since they have been searching for signs of a "plot" in any "assemblage." Does the covert surveillance of career officials really serve the basic principles of party organization work? Cde. Li Pilgyu privately expressed critical comments to Kim Il Sung even before the plenum. When this became known to KWP CC Organizational Instructors Department Deputy Chief, Cde. Gim Yeongju (he is a younger brother of Kim Il Sung), the latter demanded that the primary party organization chairman in which Cde. Li Pilgyu was registered establish unremitting monitoring of him and then suggested expelling him from the party, although Cde. Li Pilgyu is a candidate member of the Central Committee, whom according to the statutes only a Central Committee Plenum has the right to expel from the party. Can such demands be called justified? On the eve of the Central Committee Plenum it became known that Central Committee member Cde. Gim Seunghwa intended to speak at the plenum on the question of the personality cult and he was then immediately sent to Moscow to study in order to get rid of him.

Let's take another case.

Even before the start of the plenum Cde. Kim Il Sung called Deputy Prime Minister and candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium Bak Uiwan to his office, who also expressed critical comments to Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung intimidated him, saying that he had economic materials that supposedly compromised Bak Uiwan. Was Kim Il Sung really acting in a party manner? If there really are materials which compromise Cde. Bak Uiwan then it was hardly necessary to wait until the materials were examined with the expectation of using them for the purposes of intimidation at a "suitable" moment. And here is the tragedy of the Korean Workers' Party.

At a time when the slogan "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let all Schools of Thought Contend" was disseminated throughout the whole world, why were completely opposite events unfolding in Korea? It is true that Workers' Party Central Committee Deputy Chairman Gim Changman, who was responsible for ideological work, fought everywhere for party members to speak about everything without fear. But who will dare to speak when they are expelled from the party for the slightest critical statement to strengthen party unity, as in these circumstances?

Rumors are already spreading that more than 500 career officials who occupy posts of chiefs of directorates and departments of Ministries and higher are being accused of belonging to the Yan'an "group."

In conditions when they shout from all the rooftops that they need to root out the Yan'an "group," who will dare to tell the truth directly? We think that many more than 500 people in our Party oppose the cult of personality. And when the mil-

lion-member party vigorously opposes the cult of personality, the time will come when all party members will be free of the personality cult. It is possible in this event that the entire party (more than 1 million members) will be accused of “forming cliques [*gruppirovshchina*].” Of course, this is impossible. The entire seriousness of the issue is contained in this. The current intra-party struggle clearly expresses the collision of progressive ideas with an old idea. As a result, a so-called Yan’an “group,” unprecedented in the history of the party, was artificially created. But this could not fail to weaken the organizational and ideological unity of our ranks.

Why in our time should we close [our] mouths, ears, and eyes to party members, including members of the Central Committee Presidium and the party Central Committee?

Many of us embarked upon the path of revolutionary struggle without sparing our lives, and fought in the name of personal freedom, in the name of eliminating the exploitation of man by man, and in the name of improving the life of the working people. This is the primary goal of the people’s revolution. If there is one person in our party like a king he will pompously mouth the truth and concentrate power in his hands but the rest will go on their knees before his power and then many honest party members will be found who will fight this without sparing their lives. Then such a struggle will not be limited to the Workers’ Party but will be unleashed on the international level as a constituent part of the ideological struggle.

The supporters of Kim Il Sung are opposed to a private meeting with Soviet and Chinese comrades. They have spread the rumor that one of the expelled comrades had written a private letter to the CPSU CC and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. How can a private meeting of Korean communists with Soviet or Chinese Communists be classed as an anti-party act?

Can it really be accepted as a crime when an individual party member writes a letter to a senior leader of a fraternal party?

We still do not know of such a case when a foreign communist who wrote a letter to Kim Il Sung was accused of an anti-party, anti-government crime.

Cde. Kim Il Sung needs to think a little about the fact that many honest party members who know well the shortcomings and mistakes of our Central Committee are sick at heart and are afraid to speak, since repression follows such an act.

The imaginary case fabricated against the now-repressed comrades shows what the “case” against the group that received the name Yan’an [actually] is. As a result of this, all the communist groups that fought in the past in Korea have been classified under various names: (the Hwayohoe [Tuesday Society]

group, the M-L group, the Northern group, the Communist group, and the Hamnam group).

The Korean Communists who returned from the USSR were called the nepotist group and those from China, the Yan’an group.

Thus only the partisans who fought under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and members of the “Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria” did not belong to a group, and they compose the base of our party.

Can one agree with such a classification? Of course not. It turns out that all the revolutionaries who did not have ties with Kim Il Sung must bear the stigma of factionalists. I think that this issue ought to be resolved from a position of principle. Finally, it is necessary to distinguish honest party members from real factionalists in order to assess their revolutionary merits correctly and in a party way.

Even in Korean conditions, where intra-party democracy is not assured, where the rights of party members are being trampled, and arbitrariness is permitted with respect to individual party members, the comradely comments and wishes of the CPSU CC could not fail to evoke a certain reaction on the part of the sycophants who, having formally accepted these wishes, in fact do not contemplate putting them into effect.

Everyone knows that at the Third Party Congress, where representatives of a number of fraternal parties were present, Cde. Kim Il Sung and his supporters openly declared that the cult of personality had not spread in the Workers’ Party.

At the August Plenum they admitted that in reality the cult of personality had spread somewhat in the Workers’ Party. Was this really not a deception of the party? They say one thing at the Congress and another at the plenum. Can one believe their words after this?

At the August Central Committee Plenum they were forced to record in the Central Committee Resolution what was not said openly in front of the party at the Third Party Congress, in order to suppress the dissatisfaction of a considerable number of party members. It is interesting to go over this section in our letter:

“As the March Central Committee Plenum of our party recognized (referring to the Central Committee Plenum at which the report of the CPSU Twentieth Congress was heard), the cult of personality has spread in the ranks of the Workers’ Party to a negligible degree. It found its expression mainly in the ideological work of our party where one personality has been exalted above what is proper. However it, the cult of personality, could not exert an influence on the highest principle of party leadership, the collective principle in leadership which

the Central Committee has consistently upheld, and on the line and policy of the Workers' Party." This is what was recorded in the Resolution of the August Central Committee Plenum of our party.

On the basis of this Resolution it seems that the cult of personality has spread in the activity of the Workers' Party to a negligible degree, but as regards its consequences, there are none. Thus, having formally accepted the existence of the personality cult, in fact they have refused to eliminate its consequences.

Those facts that we have already used are sufficient to show how the cult of personality, which became more widespread than in other fraternal parties, has exerted a pernicious influence on the activity of the party.

Can we accept the actions of those senior comrades who spoke at the August Central Committee Plenum in spite of threats and intimidation as anti-party acts directed at "overthrowing" the party and government and as acts directed at forging an anti-party group? The more so because they were inspired to these deeds by the historic decisions of the CPSU Twentieth Congress and the measures of fraternal parties directed at overcoming the harmful consequences of the personality cult in their ranks.

By their crude tyranny the supporters of Kim Il Sung have trampled on the Leninist principles of party life—intra-party democracy and the principle of collective leadership in the party.

Can such tyranny in the party be accepted?

Below we try to show the pernicious consequences of the personality cult in the activity of our party.

III. The consequences of Kim Il Sung's personality cult.

Sycophants say that the cult of personality has not spread in our party and therefore the party is not experiencing its consequences. But this does not correspond to reality.

I will cite some cases that attest to the gross violations of the party statutes and socialist legality. It often occurs in our experience that people are coopted into Central Committee membership without the approval of party statutes, in violation of a requirement of the party statutes, and then such a comrade immediately becomes a member of the Politburo and deputy chairman of the Central Committee, even though he was not a candidate member of the Central Committee.

I will cite only one case which is no secret to anyone.

All Koreans know well that Cde. Choe Yonggeon is

Democratic Party Central Committee Chairman. But at the Workers' Party Central Committee Plenum he was elected a Central Committee member and then a member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee. Was there a need to elect him a Central Committee member if one considers the situation that Korea is divided into two parts and that our party is pursuing a policy of a united front of all patriotic forces? All these illegal decisions were made at the suggestion and insistence of Cde. Kim Il Sung, who has concentrated all power in his hands. All the party members are aware that such a decision violates the party statutes. Such a decision was made not because Central Committee members are ignoramuses but because the atmosphere of Kim Il Sung's pressure and tyranny dominates the party. Even Politburo members, Deputy Prime Ministers, and ministers are appointed and released from [their] posts at the will of Kim Il Sung. And therefore even the most senior officials have been forced to work in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. Can it be said after this that there were no consequences of the personality cult in our party?

There is no possibility of recounting all the cases of violations of the Constitution of our country. I will only cite one case that sheds light on this gross violation.

The overwhelming majority of the chairmen of provincial People's Committees at the present time are not deputies of local people's committees, whereas according to a regulation only a deputy can be elected People's Committee Chairman. For Cde. Kim Il Sung and his supporters, the Central Committee elected by the Congress and the Supreme People's Assembly are some "democratic ornament." Their lofty phrases about Central Committee members actively participating in party work and monitoring the activity of party organizations in accordance with the party statutes, or a deputy of the Supreme People's Assembly exercising his authority in accordance with the constitution as the elected representative of the people, are indeed empty words.

During the Third Congress, the texts of the delegates' speeches were subjected to careful inspection and unceremoniously corrected without asking the opinion of the authors. Cde. Bak Changok, who played a major role in the past in the creation of Kim Il Sung's personality cult, planned to offer self-criticism at the Congress. When this became known he was not given an opportunity to speak at the Congress. Can all these be called legitimate acts?

Where can one exhibit creative initiative if others at the discussions even write the text for a speech so that a Central Committee member and deputy says what is "necessary." If someone does the writing himself, such a text is subjected to careful inspection and correction by Central Committee officials beforehand. One can often hear complaints by comrades who always half-jokingly say that they were performing the role of parrots.

In conditions where the basic norms of intra-party democracy are lacking, any speech differing from the opinion of the leading comrades is viewed as factional activity and “anti-State” crimes. Where is the creative initiative of ordinary party members here? Can collective leadership be ensured in the party in the conditions of an absence of freedom of speech? It will be no exaggeration if we say that in the past, at meetings of a leading party body one person pompously mouthed the truth and others just listened and supported him.

When they began to stress the need to strengthen the principles of collective leadership after the Twentieth Congress, Cde. Kim Il Sung said one day: “Collective leadership is not like that. No one favors it.” In fact, who dares to oppose a suggestion of Kim Il Sung with their own opinion? It is clear to everyone that after such a critical statement it is hard to stay in one’s job. Naturally, Kim Il Sung, who considers himself above everyone, increased his opinion of himself and began to take on airs.

After the CPSU Twentieth Congress, Cde. Kim Il Sung began to say that holding meetings ensures collective leadership in the party. In a situation where intra-party democracy is not assured, it is impossible even to consider holding a thousand formal meetings as a sign of collective leadership.

The cult of personality in Korea has also led to a gross violation of socialist legality, as a result of which thousands of people have been illegally arrested and put in prison. At the present time, the number of prisoners in Korea is more than 30,000 people. It has been established that in the army alone the number of those arrested is more than one division. In addition, 8,000 people have been accused of crimes stipulated in Articles 72-76 of the DPRK Criminal Code, on the basis of which people are convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes. It will not be a big mistake if we say that besides this number, about 1,000 people have been convicted of other crimes. If one compares the total number of the population of North Korea (9 million people) with the number of people convicted then every 300th person is a criminal. Is this not a striking fact?

I will cite several facts that describe a “counterrevolutionary.” Two thousand people were released before the plenum under pressure from comrades recently expelled from the party, and also [from] public opinion. Among them was a “criminal” who had been sentenced to five years only because he made a book cover from a magazine page on which a portrait of Kim Il Sung was drawn. There was even a case where an honest comrade, from good motives, corrected a badly drawn portrait of Kim Il Sung. For this he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Is this not a scandalous matter?

There is no way that these cases can be put in the framework of ordinary court cases. All these facts are confirmed by reliable materials that were reported by the Deputy Minister of

Justice in the course of a conversation with one senior leader. (Cde. Gim Dubong informed Deputy Minister of Justice Gim Taehyon of this). There was an order from Kim Il Sung according to which the presence of two witnesses was sufficient to convict a person for any term of punishment, including the death penalty. The nature of the crime and the degree of reliability were not taken into consideration in the process. Can one call such an order correct from a standpoint of maintaining socialist legality?

After all these facts, can we believe the words of Kim Il Sung, Gim Changman, Bak Geumcheol, Han Sangdu, Yi Ilgyeong, and others that there are no consequences of the personality cult in the Workers’ Party?

I cannot fail to cite one more scandalous case of lawlessness.

During the grain purchases of 1954-1955 grain was taken from peasants by force with the aid of threats. One peasant, who had had his last bit of grain taken away, could not restrain his indignation and went to the district people’s committee. A portrait of Kim Il Sung hung there. The peasant, pointing his finger at the portrait, loudly shouted: “You are poorly informed about the condition of the people, you are tormenting the people in vain.” He paid dearly for this. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. After this how can one say that we have observed socialist legality? Now everyone knows well for what Cde. Bak Ilu, who was a member of the Central Committee Politburo, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Deputy Chief of the Joint Command of the Korean People’s Army and Chinese Volunteers, was repressed. His entire “criminal” activity consisted of his daring to object to Kim Il Sung about the issue of the tax in kind and the Party policy with respect to reactionaries. For this he was expelled from the party and was accused of [being part of] an anti-party group. The court materials that were carefully examined did not confirm his anti-party crimes. A case against him was then fabricated about a waste of physical assets and now he has to bear legal responsibility for this. Judging from rumors that he supposedly tried to seize the post of Prime Minister, one can expect a new legal case against him. His family has also been repressed and expelled from Pyeongyang to a coal mining region. Before and during the war, Bak Ilu played the role of Kim Il Sung’s right-hand man. During the retreat of our troops in 1950, I had to retreat together with Cde. Kim Il Sung and Bak Ilu. We all ate together at one stop and talked among ourselves. Then we were the very closest of friends. But as soon as Bak Ilu expressed critical comments to Kim Il Sung, he was immediately arrested and put in a prison run by the same ministry which he himself had headed. These facts give a picture of how much socialist legality is observed in Korea. Is all this not the result of the personality cult? If not, how can one explain it?

According to our contemporary literature, only the partisan

movement of Kim Il Sung and the activity of the “Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland” constitute the history of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people.

However, the facts say otherwise. An armed anti-Japanese struggle broke out even before the appearance in Korea of the partisan detachment of Cde. Kim Il Sung. A workers’, peasants’, and students’ movement developed under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution [in Russia]. The [1919] March First Movement, the unending wave of peasant unrest (uprisings in Dongcheon, Myeongcheon, Yeonri, Hwangwan, Dokcheon, and other [locations]), inspiring a strike movement of workers (Wonsan, Hanam, Seoul, Busan, Pyeongyang, and other [locations]) - serve as indicators of the growth of the national liberation struggle.

As everyone knows, these events were in no way connected with the name of Kim Il Sung. But as regards the armed struggle, it sprang up in Northeast China after the “righteous army” [*uibyong*] and “army of independence” movement. This armed struggle did not spring up under the leadership of Kim Il Sung but as an element of the armed anti-Japanese struggle headed by the Chinese Communist Party.

An entire constellation of leaders of the partisan movements arose as a result of this struggle.

Kim Il Sung became better known inasmuch as the operations of his detachment were associated with Korea. This struggle undoubtedly has great importance. But to identify this movement with the name of Kim Il Sung alone and to ignore the role of the party leadership means to distort the facts.

It is well known that the operations of the partisan detachment of Kim Il Sung had ceased by 1940 for all practical purposes.

When we analyze any movement, especially the anti-Japanese armed struggle, from the standpoint of a principled revolutionary, then we also must stress those shortcomings that were inherent to it along with the positive aspects of this movement.

From this standpoint, the anti-Japanese armed struggle in Northeast China suffered from certain shortcomings, one of which was that the combat operations of the Korean partisans had essentially ceased by 1940. Of course, in so doing we cannot deny a number of objective facts that did not allow this struggle to continue. This was a time when the Japanese imperialists who occupied Northeast China were attacking China on a broad front and preparing for a great war against the USSR. In order to “strengthen” their rear, the Japanese imperialists undertook severe punitive measures, which created a threat to the existence of partisan units.

At the same time, another issue also arises. Were all opportunities used in the existing conditions to strengthen and expand the partisan movement? I think that not all the opportunities were fully used.

One needs to search for the main reasons that led to the cessation of combat operations by the partisans by 1940 in the organization of partisan detachments itself and in the leadership of this movement.

It is known that in the more difficult conditions of China, (not meaning the Northeast) where unlike Northeast China there were no mountains and no forests, an anti-Japanese base was created and, in addition, the Chinese comrades defended this base to the end in a difficult struggle with Japanese troops.

It is asked where lies the reason for the cessation of the activity of the partisan detachment of Cde. Kim Il Sung. The fact that the partisan movement of Kim Il Sung was not associated with a mass movement and did not have deep roots in the people ought to be considered as one of the most important reasons for this. In contrast with this, the partisan movement in China had the closest contact with the people and was supported by them.

The partisan detachment of Kim Il Sung ceased to exist at a time when the underground struggle of patriotic forces in Northeast China continued.

Many comrades under the leadership of the party took an active part in the underground struggle until liberation.

At the request of the party, beginning in 1942, I worked in Northeast China. Other comrades who participated in the underground struggle in Korea could testify to the existence of the underground in Korea.

One cannot distort history.

There is a need to briefly examine the actual events at Bocheonbo and the activity of the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria, for these events and facts are falsely described by such people as Bak Geumcheol, Han Sangdu, Yi Ilgyeong, Ha Angcheon, Yi Chongwon, and others.

The battle at Bocheonbo is presented in fact as an attack by a partisan detachment on a police station, as a result of which three policemen were killed. As is clear, this was a small clash between partisans and police forces. During the retreat of the partisans after the clash, 10 more Japanese soldiers were killed, according to the newspaper reports of that period. And the above falsifiers of history are trying to present this clash as a great battle having important strategic significance in the

Korean revolutionary movement. While conceding the entire political significance of this raid by Korean partisans, it is however impossible to agree with such an assessment, as we want to remain in the framework of Marxist-Leninist historical science.

All these facts testify to the excessive inflation of the personal merits of Cde. Kim Il Sung and the attempts to create a personal history of Kim Il Sung.

For an example we again turn to the materials of the Pyongyang Museum of the National Liberation Struggle.

The entire territory of Manchuria and Northeast China was shown as an area of combat operations of the partisan detachment of Kim Il Sung. This does not correspond to reality.

Some words about the “Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria.” The matter is presented this way, as though the Society exercised overall leadership in the Korean revolution, but again this is incorrect. Further, the platform of the Society is called a general platform of the principles of Kim Il Sung. The historical facts say that the Society’s platform was based on the decisions of the Comintern about a united people’s front and of the Chinese Communist Party about a united national front. How can these documents be called the creation of Kim Il Sung?

To say this means to falsify history. The supporters of Cde. Kim Il Sung are trying to depict the matter this way, as though “Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria” had its local organizations in all corners of Korea. This also does not correspond to historical reality. Who does not know that this society contained an extremely insignificant number of revolutionaries? Let those people tell of this who were really in the society. Then it will be clear to everyone.

If one is to believe Kim Il Sung and his supporters, then it turns out that this Society united tens of thousands of revolutionaries around itself.

At the same time, whoever acted at the instructions of this Society in villages and district centers (and this fact needs to be viewed as exaggerated), the number of its members did not exceed 100.

There was no organization in the history of the underground revolutionary movement in Korea that would have united tens of thousands of revolutionaries. In addition, one needs to consider that in the conditions of an underground struggle, a revolutionary organization does not have the task so much of increasing its membership as of increasing the combat effectiveness of the organization.

Every historian describing the issue of the activity of the

“Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland” is obliged from a Marxist standpoint to cover such questions as the length of time this society existed, how many members were in this society, what kind of movement it developed, and how long it continued. After taking these facts into account, a historian will be able to give a proper assessment of the activity of this society. In bringing up these questions about the history of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people, we want the partisan movement headed by Cde. Kim Il Sung, a constituent part of the anti-Japanese struggle of the popular masses of Korea, to receive a correct historical assessment. Are we doing the correct thing when we represent the anti-Japanese partisan movement headed by Cde. Kim Il Sung as the story of the entire liberation struggle of the Korean people of 30 years? As regards the anti-Japanese armed struggle of the Korean people, we cannot discount the armed struggle of the Koreans in China against the Japanese imperialists. Korean military subunits not only fought against the Japanese, but also fought against Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi] troops and the American interventionists. Five divisions of these Koreans participated in the Korean War, not to mention others who performed important work in Korea and China.

The entire Korean people know about the heroism and courage of the Korean divisions who arrived from China. This fact testifies to this: almost all the commanders of these divisions received the rank of Hero of the DPRK and high state awards, not to mention the corps commanders. However, a negligible number of these people remained in the army after the war. But if someone remained in the army, then he is in a less responsible post.

How are we to accept as correct such cases as the falsification of the history of the liberation struggle of the Korean people and the disregard of the revolutionary struggle of a number of comrades who fought in China, in Korea itself, and in other countries? Such actions not only do not strengthen the organizational unity of the party but, on the contrary, weaken it. In order to elevate the name of Kim Il Sung, sycophants have created the so-called Gapsan plan [*skhema*], according to which the partisan detachment of Kim Il Sung and the “Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland” actively operated in the region of North Korea. According to this plan the “Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland” also included those comrades who had no connection with it.

A small clash of a local nature was presented as an event having an all-Korea nature. Matters have come to the point that some comrades were instantly promoted only for their names figuring in the Gapsan plan.

We did not hear earlier about such scandalous cases of the falsification of history from real factionalists whom we not only do not support, but even hate.

When I was at the Third Party Congress, I went especially to the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum. During the visit to the Museum, I asked the Museum director: "Who drew up the Gapsan plan and did Cde. Kim Il Sung see it personally?" The director replied that the plan was drawn up in the Central Committee, and as regards Cde. Kim Il Sung, he recently visited the Museum and was satisfied with the exhibits and the materials. I was seized with indignation when I heard about this. After the Third Party Congress they were forced to remove this plan from the wall of the Museum under the pressure of public opinion.

Thus the history of the liberation struggle of the Korean people has been unceremoniously falsified. The reasons that caused Bak Geumcheol, KWP CC Deputy Chairman, Han Sangdu, Central Committee Organizational Instruction Department Chief, Yi Ilgyeong, Central Committee Department of Agitation and Propaganda Chief, Ha Angcheon, Central Committee Department of Social Sciences Chief, and Cde. Yi Chongwon to systematically describe our history in a distorted and anti-historical manner ought to be cleared up.

I propose the creation of an authoritative commission composed of party members having a wealth of experience in the revolutionary struggle and who would be engaged in the restoration of the genuine history of the liberation struggle from the standpoint of scientific Marxism-Leninism.

As a result of the dominance of the personality cult, which precludes collective leadership and intra-party democracy and promotes the spread of bureaucratism, we have committed enormous mistakes in economic development and in the issue of increasing the cultural and material standard of living of the population. I will cite some facts.

The mistakes committed in economic development in the last two years are great, not to mention our oversights in the past. Let's take the question of grain purchasing. We drew up a bureaucratic plan to carry out grain purchases without proper scientific assessment and inspection in the provinces, as a result of which serious mistakes were made. The forcible collection of grain from peasants led to 300 people committing suicide. And what a response these events received among the peasantry of our country.

Are these not serious oversights in our work? It was proposed to collect 3 million tons of grain as a result of this mistaken campaign.

This event unfolded two months after Cde. Kim Il Sung boastfully declared to one senior foreign comrade that we were in a position to solve the grain problem.

Any person who has the slightest understanding of politics realizes that under the conditions of an acute shortage of miner-

al fertilizers and labor force, and a reduction of cultivated land, it is impossible to gather a harvest of 3 million tons of grain, which is equal to the amount of grain in the highest prewar harvest year. To this ought to be added the fact that in that year the peasants in the provinces of North and South Hamgyeong were left without grain as a result of natural disasters.

At the instruction of Cde. Kim Il Sung, a forcible campaign of grain purchasing was begun, disregarding the real situation in the provinces. It soon became clear that the peasantry was vigorously opposing this campaign. People committed suicide and handbills appeared calling for resistance to this campaign, but in spite of all this the campaign of forcible collection of grain continued, as a result of which 20,000 tons of grain were collected. This campaign led to the peasants in some places even being deprived of seed stock, and as regards domestic animals, they died from a shortage of feed. The sycophants continued their anti-people activity in this forcible campaign in order to display their "merits" in this scandalous affair.

When it became clear that the event was serious, the Government was forced to issue grain to peasants from its own reserves. How can such actions be assessed? In the direct sense of the word, they undermined the very basis of our system, the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry.

Many peasant families ended up on the threshold of starvation as a result of all this. The Chinese people's volunteers came to the aid of the peasants, saving a certain amount of grain each day from their own rations to help the Korean peasants. The Korean people will never forget this noble international act of the Chinese volunteers.

We know that in this difficult time, the command of the Chinese volunteers issued an order which gave instructions to each unit and subunit commander that in case of the death of a Korean peasant from starvation the commander whose unit was stationed in that locality would bear responsibility. And in spite of this entire tragic picture, some leaders, including Cde. Kim Il Sung, continue to maintain that "the policy was correct, but the responsible officials [*ispolniteli*] misinterpreted our correct line."

Therefore the party responsibility was borne by those officials who carried out this mistaken instruction in the provinces. While working in the military armistice commission, I had to encounter the difficult situation of the peasants in the area of Gaeseong. I engaged in an investigation of the real situation of the peasants in this area. On the basis of the materials I collected and the investigation, I came to the conclusion that after deducting for food and the tax in kind, each peasant had 0.5% of marketable grain left.

Based on this numerical data we made a calculation that showed that in the course of the grain purchases, the peasants

could get only 150,000 tons of grain (instead of the 3 million tons provided by the plan).

I reported to Cde. Kim Il Sung personally about this serious situation of the peasants and expressed my opinion that in the event the grain purchase campaign was carried out in the area of Gaeseong, this campaign could only be conducted here by force. In addition, I added, the forcible grain purchase in newly liberated areas was leading to some weakening of the ties between the party and government and the popular masses and causing unrest among broad sections of peasants. They agreed with my argument and the grain purchase campaign was not conducted in the area of Gaeseong. Can this policy be called a correct Marxist one, meeting the interests of the people and the state? Of course not. Nevertheless, Cde. Kim Il Sung and some other leaders continue to maintain that “the policy was basically correct.” In spite of this obvious fact, Cde. Kim Il Sung still has not once spoken self-critically on this issue. He thereby is ignoring the interests of the party and state and once again shows himself to be a party member standing above everyone and not subject to party criticism.

I recently asked a question of a DPRK Deputy Minister of Agriculture: “How many days in a year do peasants work for labor service [*trudovaya povinnost*] without compensation?” He replied that on average the peasants work 50-60 days a year for the labor service. But this year they will work somewhat more than 40 days. If one does the calculation, it turns out that the peasants work once a week for the labor service. All this is being done after the end of the war in Korea, and after this, how is one to believe the statements of those leaders who say that the peasants are voluntarily going to work for the labor service?

I want to touch on another question, the question of tax policy. A tax policy directed at eliminating private commercial and industrial enterprises has been implemented without any preparatory work or consideration of the real conditions in the country. Has it really become easier for the people and the state that our statistics mention the 100% socialist sector economy? Not at all. In conditions where the country is divided into two parts, such a policy should be implemented on the basis of a deep, comprehensive study of the problem. After some time the Cabinet of Ministers was forced to adopt another solution to this problem, inasmuch as this decision did not correspond to the real state of affairs in the country. In publicizing such facts, I am not at all undertaking the task of classifying these acts as a leftist deviation in our policy. I only want to say that any decision made by the government needs to be discussed collectively and prudently with consideration for all the circumstances of putting the government decision into effect. But these facts are evidence that the decisions were made solely by Cde. Kim Il Sung with the support of several comrades. They can [not] object to the fact that the decisions I am talking about were made at meetings of the Central Committee Politburo

and the Cabinet of Ministers.

But in an atmosphere of fear for one’s future fate, who is bold enough to express his opinions in opposition to Cde. Kim Il Sung?

This whole tragedy is a result of the personality cult, sycophancy, and bureaucratism. Can one expect that these officials have radically changed their style of work in the conditions of an atmosphere of fear and unquestioning obedience?

The consequences of the personality cult have also caused great harm to economic development in our country.

After the conclusion of the armistice in Korea the Soviet government decided to give free aid to the Korean people in the sum of 1 billion rubles. At that time several leaders, including Cde. Kim Il Sung, made decisions about the construction and restoration of factories and mills in [their] offices on the basis of subjective opinions and without proper consultation with specialists. The construction of an automobile plant, the Pyeongyang Automobile Plant, a cannery, and other [facilities] was planned at the initiative of Cde. Kim Il Sung and several other leaders. Of course, Korea needed these plants. Of this there is no doubt. However, it is known that in deciding any question it is necessary to proceed from the objective state of affairs and not make your plans on the basis of subjective opinions.

It is clear to everyone that in Korea, where the industrial sectors that supply the automobile industry with the necessary material are poorly developed, the construction of the plant was a wasted effort; if you build one it cannot manufacture products for long. Was there a need to design such a plant whose production cost is neither in keeping with our capabilities nor with the interests of our economy?

Here’s another example. The construction of a meatpacking plant, a cannery, and other [facilities] was planned in Korea. But meanwhile everyone knows that in Korean conditions, where animal husbandry is poorly developed, the construction of such plants was also a big mistake. The meatpacking plant built in Pyeongyang is not able to supply itself with raw material for even one month, since there is no such quantity of meat in Korea. To this it needs to be added that a kilogram of meat costs 400-500 won in the market even though workers receive an average of 600-1000 won a month. Based on this, one can imagine how much sausage made at this plant would cost. All these facts are evidence of how much damage the hasty decisions of the leaders, which take into account neither the real standard of living of the population nor the objective situation of the country, cause the economy of the country.

These facts testify that they are all a result of the personality cult, with whose dominance there is no genuine intra-party

democracy and which promotes a spread of bureaucratism in the party. After this, how can one deny the existence of the personality cult in the theory and practice of our party?

Everyone knows that the standard of living of our people is extremely low. Of course, this is explained by the fact that a considerable part of industry was ruined and agriculture suffered serious damage in the course of the fierce three-year war that was inflicted on us from without. At the same time, we ought to say that our party is displaying insufficient concern about improvement of the life of the population. There is no need to mention that our manual laborers, peasants, and office workers are experiencing enormous difficulty in the problem of food and industrial goods. But we know that certain efforts are being undertaken in this direction after the return of the government delegation to the motherland and after the wishes of the CPSU were expressed to our party.

We are also experiencing great difficulty in the housing issue. It is sufficient to say that a considerable number of the population are huddled together in hovels, warehouses, and mud huts that are completely unsuitable for housing. The housing conditions of industrial workers are such that there are 7.5 square meters for each family of three people, in other words, there are 2.5 square meters per person. Speaking of the material condition of the people, we cannot fail to note that right now in Korea there is an average of 5.4 meters of fabric and 2.1 shoes a year for each person. All these issues require a quick resolution, for in current conditions, considering the existing division of our country, they are acquiring special political and social importance. The wishes of the CPSU CC expressed on this issue are completely justified and it is necessary to implement them as quickly as possible. In raising these issues we are not at all thinking of belittling the importance of heavy industry in the construction of the foundations of socialism. Unquestionably [we] ought to continue to direct attention to the construction of heavy industry. But [we] need to approach the solution of this issue reasonably and with consideration for [our] real capabilities. But the tragedy is that we are directing a considerable amount of capital to the construction of heavy industry and thereby disrupting the planned character of the proportional development of all industrial sectors. Cde. Kim Il Sung is not averse to giving lip service to the effect that we are developing both heavy industrial sectors and light industry in a smooth manner. But when we analyze the total amount of capital investment in various industrial sectors and the number of workers employed in heavy and light industrial enterprises we easily see a shocking disproportion.

Economic development in our country is also determined by the fact that Korea is in the socialist camp system and this dictates the need to keep in step with all the socialist countries. A very close economic and cultural policy [*stroitel'stvo*] has now been established between the socialist countries, which permits the coordination of their own economic plans with

the plans of the other countries. In light of this, are we acting correctly when we take a so-called "independent" position on the issue of economic planning? It seems to me that all these issues need to be decided from the standpoint of the interest of the state and the entire socialist camp.

We have already said above that some of our leading comrades have a disdainful attitude toward the valuable comradely wishes of fraternal communist parties.

Critical comments and comradely wishes were expressed from the CPSU CC to our party through Cdes. Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il in time. These comments and wishes touched on the issues of improving the material situation of the population, overcoming the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung in our party, the elimination of sycophants and careerists, the history of our party, and party propaganda.

There is no need to demonstrate the seriousness of these issues. Only a quick elimination of all these shortcomings in our party work will permit us to strengthen the organizational and ideological unity of the party and our ties with the popular masses. However, as the facts indicate, we have formally accepted these desires of the CPSU while in fact we are essentially ignoring them.

I have found out that the Chinese Communist Party also expressed its own wishes to our party during the war. But these valuable wishes were concealed in every way under the pretext of party secrecy and not turned into reality. Or a narrow circle of people knew about them but the entire party did not know about this.

As soon as the war began, at the instruction of Cde. Kim Il Sung I went to Beijing, where I had a long conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong. During this conversation Cde. Mao Zedong expressed valuable wishes to the senior officials of the Central Committee.

I think that as a candidate member of the Central Committee, I was obligated to report this fact to the Central Committee since this issue is of great importance. This was a time when our People's Army had pushed the enemy to the Nakdong River. It seems that there were only several days until victory. In these conditions, in our conversation Cde. Mao Zedong expressed valuable strategic and tactical ideas about the issue of military operations. When I informed him about the overall situation on our fronts he said the following: first, he stressed that there was a strong enemy in front of the Korean people, American imperialism, which heads the camp of world imperialism. This ought not to be forgotten. He stated three possible alternatives concerning the prospects for military operations in Korea. In the course of the conversation he asked me whether the leaders of the Central Committee allowed for the possibility of a strategic retreat of the KPA [Korean Peoples' Army].

First, there was the possibility of throwing the invaders from the Busan bridgehead into the sea and completely liberating all of Korea. But it was extraordinary limited.

Second, Cde. Mao Zedong expressed the thought that after concentrating his forces, the enemy would undertake a large counteroffensive in the area of Busan.

Third, he said, there existed a direct threat of a landing operation in the rear of the Peoples' Army. Then a further offensive on the Busan bridgehead is precluded and the enemy will try to cut the lines of communications of the Peoples' Army in order to perform an encirclement of the units of the Peoples' Army. At the same time he pointed out that plans for military operations need to be drawn up on the [basis of the] most likely possibility. Therefore, corresponding organizational work needs to be conducted in the entire party.

He expressed a specific wish for the restructuring [*perestroika*] of our work in a direction according to which all the senior officials of the party and the officers and soldiers of the army be imbued with the realization of a possible strategic retreat.

To do this, as he said, it is necessary for the party to correctly and comprehensively explain to the popular masses the possible danger.

Only in this way can the people's morale be prepared for any eventualities.

In the conditions that developed, where units of the Peoples' Army could not advance a step in the area of Nakdong, it was necessary to make a strategic retreat so that the enemy dispersed his forces when advancing. Where it's harder for a clenched fist to break through than for an unclenched one is when strikes can be launched on each finger. When the enemy is concentrated at one point and is waging defensive battles, that is the same as a clenched fist, and then it's necessary to launch strikes on it. But when the enemy unclenches his fist, that is, disperses his forces, then it's easier to launch strikes on each group of the enemy. It seems to me, Cde. Mao Zedong continued, that this proven tactic needs to be used in the Korean War.

After some time, the words of Cde. Mao Zedong came true. Actually, the course of military operations in Korea completely confirmed his hypothesis, the Incheon operation in particular. Our former ambassador in China, Cde. Yi Jooyong knows this well.

I reported the substance of the conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong to Cde. Kim Il Sung in detail, but the latter replied to me that we are not thinking of making a strategic withdrawal and therefore there is no need to listen to this advice. But then

Cde. Kim Il Sung warned me not to tell anyone of this. Now we picture the value of this advice more distinctly.

I am in some doubt that the members of the former Central Committee Politburo know about this fact, not to mention the members of the Central Committee of our Party.

We made serious mistakes during the war, especially during the retreat of our troops. As a result of ignoring the advice of Cde. Mao Zedong, we were not prepared for a strategic retreat. The American invaders who landed in the rear of our troops immediately cut the lines of communication of the Peoples' Army. Our troops ended up surrounded, lost combat effectiveness, and began to crumble. The enemy had struck a serious blow to our troops. There were no party organizations in the KPA troops at that time, with the exception of the Korean divisions arriving from China.

But this event played a fatal role in the matter of the collapse of the troops of the Peoples' Army that ended up surrounded. Completely untrained divisions without clothing and sometimes without weapons were sent to the front in order to hold back the enemy. All these divisions crumbled from the first blow of the enemy and a considerable number of wounded and sick [troops] became enemy prisoners. The number of Peoples' Army soldiers who became prisoners was over 100,000 men. This number exceeds the number of prisoners we took by several times.

One of the main reasons that brought such great losses to our army was that Cde. Kim Il Sung rejected the comments and wishes of Cde. Mao Zedong without taking the real conditions at the front into account. Judging from how easily and irresponsibly Cde. Kim Il Sung rejected the valuable comradely comments and wishes of authoritative fraternal parties and their outstanding leaders, one can understand why the repressed comrades criticized Kim Il Sung so courageously and openly.

All these issues take on special importance when we examine them from the principled positions of a defender of Leninist organizational principles and a supporter of expanding intra-party democracy.

It is for this reason that I think that all these issues take on political importance not only for the Korean Workers' Party but also for the international worker's movement. Can we allow a situation in our own party where party members pursue their own activity contrary to the truth and refuse to eliminate the serious shortcomings that exist in party work?

Those who violate Leninist principles of party work should be condemned both inside our party as well as in the international worker's movement. By consistently upholding Leninist norms of party life, expanding intra-party democracy, stead-

fastly ensuring collective leadership in the party, and eliminating bureaucratism in the country, we [will be] in a position to correct all our mistakes and eliminate the shortcomings. Based on this, I think that the repressed comrades need to be supported.

I vigorously oppose the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung in order to support the main principles of party life, the collective nature of the leadership, and intra-party democracy.

I am confident that party members who oppose the cult of personality and bureaucratism will enjoy support and sympathy inside our party and the international worker's movement. I submit my following suggestions for the consideration of the Central Committee:

Inasmuch as these questions of principle did not receive a proper resolution at the Central Committee Plenum that was held, I request that the Central Committee convey my written statement to the members and candidate members of the Central Committee.

In offering this suggestion, I am guided by the 3rd point of the 2nd section (subparagraphs b, c, and e) of our party statutes.

As regards myself, I am ready with all party responsibility to accept all critical comments addressed to me if there are any.



DOCUMENT No. 22

CPSU CC Report on 8 October Conversation between Ambassador Ivanov and Kim Il Sung, 15 October 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 296. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Ambassador of the USSR in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cde. Ivanov, reported that on 8 October of this year he had a discussion with Cde. Kim Il Sung in connection with the matter of publishing the decree of the KWP CC September Plenum.

From the report of Cde. Ivanov, it is clear that Kim Il Sung essentially rejected the advice concerning the publication of the entire text of the decree of the KWP CC Plenum. Kim Il Sung requested that Ivanov convey to Cde. Mikoyan that there is no need to publish the entire decree of the September Plenum, which would be circulated to party organizations for discussion. Furthermore, the leadership of the KWP considers

it pointless to give wide publicity to the decree of the plenum. Kim Il Sung alleged that there was not, apparently, a special agreement with comrades Mikoyan and [Chinese Minister of Defense] Peng Dehuai about publishing the complete text of the decree.

Ambassador Comrade Ivanov suggested familiarizing the Chinese ambassador in the DPRK with the contents of the discussion with Kim Il Sung on 8 October.

We consider it expedient to agree with the opinion of Comrade Ivanov.

A draft of the telegram to the ambassador in Korea is attached.

Deputy Director of the Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties.

(I. Vinogradov)

“15” October 1956
No. 25-C-2236
Zab



DOCUMENT No. 23

CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, (no date specified)

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 297. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Pyeongyang

Ambassador

678-685. You may briefly familiarize the Chinese ambassador in the DPRK with the contents of your discussion with Kim Il Sung on 8 October, without referring in this case to the instructions of Moscow.



DOCUMENT No. 24

CPSU CC Memo on the Situation in the KWP, 17 October 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 298.
Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for
CWIHP by Yuliya Zeynalova.]

To the Central Committee of the CPSU

In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Cde. Ivanov, Cde. Kim Il Sung revealed that the decisions of the August and September plenums of the KWP CC on questions of intra-party conditions had been sent to all party organizations, and at the present moment are under review in the plenary sessions of provincial party committees, where these decisions are being widely discussed.

For the time being, Cde. Ivanov has not reported on the course of the discussion in the KWP on the abovementioned decisions and of the conditions within the party after the August and September plenary sessions of the KWP CC.

I consider it imperative to inquire with the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang regarding this question.

Deputy Director of CPSU CC Department of Relations with International Communist Parties.

(I. Vinogradov)

“17” October 1956

No. 25-C-2261



DOCUMENT No. 25

CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassador Ivanov (no date specified)

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 299.
Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for
CWIHP by Yuliya Zeynalova.]

PYEONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

According to your report, Comrade Kim Il Sung has declared that the full text of the decision of the September plenary session of the KWP CC will be sent to party organs for thorough discussion. You further reported that the provincial

party committees are currently conducting plenary sessions, in which the results of the August and September plenary sessions of the KWP CC are being discussed. Until this time no [new] information regarding this question has been received from you.

Report urgently; has the full text of the decisions of the September plenary session of the KWP CC been sent to the party organs, how are the discussions of these decisions proceeding. Henceforth, please send regular reports on this question.



DOCUMENT No. 26

Letter, Li Sangjo to the KWP CC, 12 October 1956

[Source: Library of Congress, DK949.32 K6 Korea Cage.
Obtained for CWIHP by James F. Person and translated for
CWIHP by Choe Lyong.]

Dear Comrades who attend the Central Committee Plenum:

This year our government delegation visited the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries and received large amounts of international aid.

These huge amounts of aid are important since they will improve the material well-being of our people. In particular, the support of the Soviet Union demonstrates once again how much the Communist Party, government and people of the Soviet Union have a great interest in lives of the people of North Korea.

As a member of the government delegation, an ambassador delegated from the party, nation and people, and a candidate member of the Central Committee elected during the party congress, I feel the need to introduce to our comrades the aid from the Soviet Union.

I am presenting these issues in writing because it is possible that some delegates of our government will pay no attention to several important issues, nor even mention several fundamental issues in presentations to the party's Central Committee..

This year, in addition to financial support, the Communist Party and government of the Soviet Union gave us valuable advice about camaraderie and political and ideological problems.

Government delegates were supposed to forthrightly present the friendly advice from the Communist Party of the USSR to our party's Central Committee and publicly correct the problems. When we refer to these problems, we need to cite the work of our Soviet comrades after the 20th Party Congress.

The records of the meetings of comrade [CPSU First Secretary Nikita Sergeevich] Khrushchev and [Prime Minister Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin] with British political leaders during Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to the United Kingdom have been conveyed and even publicly read by party cells.

In general, notifying [the people] what our leaders, elected by the members of the Korean Workers' Party, say to someone, and how others respond to our leaders is important since party members need to be aware of the leaders' daily activities, supervise them, subject them to friendly criticism, and evaluate them. This is one of the principles of party organization handed down from Leninist ideology. Why, then, can't our government delegation disclose the advice from the Soviet Union's Central Committee to the members of our communist party and publicly correct the defects in our party's work?

I will now tell you what kind of friendly criticism we received from the Soviet party.

First of all, we do not pay enough attention to improving the lives of our people. We collect too much from farmers while providing them with few resources, and workers live under extremely harsh conditions.

Considering that our nation is divided, improving the lives of the North Korean people in particular is in our interests as well as those of the Korean people. I will not talk about this issue at length here because it was discussed after the return of our delegation.

The second and most important ideological problem for all communists, which has caught the attention of all fraternal parties and is presently being discussed around the world in the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU CC, is the problem of the personality cult. According to the report from the [Korean Workers' Party] Third Party Congress and discussions among [the party] leadership, there is no cult of personality other than that of Bak Heonyeong in the [former] South Korean Workers' Party. During a meeting on this issue, attended by all of the members of the Soviet Presidium and comrades Kim Il Sung, Bak Jeongae, and Nam Il, the Soviet comrades declared that there is no cult of personality of Bak Heongyeong among members of [the former] South Korean Workers' Party, but there is the cult of personality of comrade Kim Il Sung. I endorse this reasonable claim.

In terms of both theory and practice, it is difficult to explain how we do not have a cult of personality at the same time this is being discussed among fraternal parties.

Can we say that we have unique conditions that make us evade errors that prevail in the international communist movement?

We, as Marxist-Leninists, have to openly and frankly clarify this problem. In this regard, I must admit that unique conditions do not exist [in the DPRK] that help us avoid these errors.

Rather, we cannot help but admit that the cult of per-

sonality of comrade Kim Il Sung has gradually developed because of internal factors.

Anyone who read the historic decision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) Central Committee (30 June 1956) can see how the conditions that made the cult of personality of [CPSU General Secretary Josef Vissarionovich] Stalin possible first developed. In our case, the factors include the timing of the beginning and process of our revolution and the hardships of invasion from foreign countries, all of which forced us to delegate all national powers to one individual and limit the democratic right of our people. These factors have led to the gradual promotion and development of Kim Il Sung's personality cult.

At this time in particular, it is our party's policy that although everyone works, all honor is given to the leader.

At the present, all fraternal parties are discussing the cult of personality and its consequences in order to eradicate problems, which were unrelated to Leninism. We cannot further develop the creativity and revolutionary zeal of the masses without first practically and theoretically eradicating the cult of personality.

Under the present conditions, both theoretically and practically, a significant cult of personality exists in the work of our party, and as Bolsheviks, we should admit and correct the effects of this problem, which only serves to weaken our practical work, collective leadership, and creative zeal.

Can we deny the fact that we have a cult of personality after looking through all of our magazines, newspapers, and propaganda materials?

If we deny this fact, then we are simply ignoring all members of the party and deceiving ourselves.

How can we say that our party did not commit any errors when, with the exception of a few fraternal parties where democracy and collective leadership are guaranteed, other ruling fraternal [communist] parties are correcting their mistakes with the cult of personality after mechanically importing Stalin's method of operating.

We can figure out this fact from simple several examples. What do the titles of the great leader, gifted general, etc, mean? And how we can explain the fact that we considered our war for independence the victory and one individual's accomplishment when it cost the lives of countless young men and women and was the result of the whole people's endeavor?

Surely, this is not a denial of the role and achievements of comrade Kim Il Sung in our party.

Recalling the damage caused by the cult of personality, I present this problem in order to correct mistakes that have not yet been overcome. Can we guarantee that no comrade has been imprisoned because of his opinion of our leaders or criticism of our leaders' policies?

How can one be considered a dissenter against the Workers' Party simply because one's opinion is not the same as that of the leader? This is just as unreasonable as the claim that someone is anti-Soviet only because he or

she said that some Soviet goods are not very high quality.

Under these conditions, can we say that collective leadership is guaranteed in the party? Even if we hold meetings more than one million times, the number of meetings does not guarantee the quality of the collective leadership itself. As long as there is a significant cult of personality, guaranteeing collective leadership is almost a miracle in the twentieth century. Under the conditions that expressing an opinion that differs from that of the leader makes that individual a factionalist, how can people propose creative opinions?

One comrade who attended a lowest level party meeting was punished for stating that any party member can criticize anyone, including the prime minister. Yet he only mentioned a right guaranteed by the party statutes.

Considering just this one case, we can estimate to what degree Lenin's criteria for party-life has been guaranteed. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in our past meetings, one person spoke while others simply praised and admired him.

It is an enormous mistake if some leaders consider the members of the party's central committee and representatives elected by our people as mere democratic decorations who simply pass drafts of the leaders' decisions.

Members elected to the Central Committee can participate in all work, have their own opinions, and have different views from those of the leader on concrete issues!

Issues on which people have different views must be resolved through debates involving many members of the central committee. We should prevent the top leaders from arbitrarily deciding to ignore the proposals of others during meetings.

Can we say that there was no such phenomenon in our party in the past? Are you aware of the fact that numerous appointments of members to the central committee (including members of Standing Committee) had been passed only by the proposal of comrade Kim Il Sung, in violation of articles strictly regulated in the party statutes? Can we say that Lenin's criteria for party-life have been well observed?

To be sure, the stigma of the personality cult has been stamped on our faces and can not be removed. Disclosing and correcting the defects are absolutely necessary. If I am considered a factionalist or anti-party just for suggesting this, then the law is absurd.

Why do we simply regard the attempts of all communists to return to Leninist roots as other's business and not make any efforts to eliminate the defects of our party by admitting that the bloody experience of USSR is relevant to our party's work?

If we achieve the reunification of Korea without first eliminating the bureaucratic remains and consequences of the personality cult and improving the lives of the people, then it will be very risky.

Many people may not follow us if we subjectively and bureaucratically conduct all businesses with simple administrative orders when each party develops business on the

basis of equality.

Therefore, I desire that this plenum will be a critical meeting at which we do away with bureaucratism by riding ourselves of the personality cult.

How can we say that the fact that the power of the party, government and military is ruled by one individual, and how can we say that this is normal, and that this is not related to the cult of personality?

I, on behalf of the Soviet party, think that we should pay attention to our Soviet comrades' advice.

However, opposite to our assertion, in the Pyeongyang city party committee, comrade Bak Geumcheol, the vice chairman of party central committee responsible for workers' committees and in the central party school, comrade Li Ilgyeong emphasized yet again that we do not have a cult of personality.

I was so angry when I heard their words because many conscientious communists cannot agree with them.

It is unpardonable behavior to ignore the party and the party central committee of the Soviet Union.

There was no Marxist who expected that the communist party deifies one figure while punishing those who question the deified one.

Regarding a get-together of four or five leaders for dinner as scheming and spying can not be part of the party's business.

Traditional Marxists certify the integral freedom of speech in the party and expect democracy managed by communists, based on the human rights of all people, except rebels.

For this reason, in socialist society, democracy respects the proletariat, and numerous people sacrificed themselves for that democracy. When we revolutionaries participated in the struggle for revolution, our fundamental aims were to realize human freedom which guarantees human rights and puts a stop to the exploitation of humans by other humans. We need to remember that we have fought and are fighting for these aims in order to improve the people's living standards. Based on this principle, is it reasonable that we deify one individual and submit to one's power?

I emphasize that in our party's plenum we should make the right conclusion on this important and fundamental problem.

The second problem is the problem of party history. According to the Soviet comrades, the party history, described in *Moggun Joseon*, is just the history of comrade Kim Il Sung, not the history of the party.

I entirely agree to this opinion. In our Joseon past, there were glorious anti-Japan struggles, numerous labor movements which supported the interests of the proletariat, peasant movements, student movements, and feminist movements. Can we ignore all of these revolutionary movements and only regard Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese partisan campaign and the association of independent nation as our tradition? When it comes to armed campaigns, besides Kim Il

Sung's anti-Japan partisan campaign, there were numerous anti-Japanese movements performed by Choe Yonggeon, Gim Chaek, and Yi Honggwang whose Korean militias fought against Japan in China, as well as other militias in Korea. In spite of this fact, how can we ignore all of them and only consider Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese partisan militia as the basis and tradition of our party and communists forces? Describing this history (just describing the history of Kim Il Sung and his campaign) does not coincide with the truth. How many surviving comrades [are there] in our party who participated in the campaign of Kim Il Sung and the association of an independent nation? There are very few!

Before the independence of Korea, there were so many communist fighters who did not have any relations with comrade Kim Il Sung who had worked in Korea or other countries, China, the USSR, and Japan. Why are their struggles ignored?

Ignoring their struggles is ignoring and fabricating our history!

Therefore, we, communists, cannot consent to this.

We need to clarify the incorrect aspects of our history made up by Bak Geumcheol, Han Sangdu, Yi Ilkyeong, Yi Cheongwon. This unjust behavior can destruct the unity of the party and lead to discontent among party members.

To be sure, the campaign of the Northeastern anti-Japanese partisan movement was glorious and deserves to be respected. However, that campaign must be fairly evaluated and must not be described as the accomplishment of one individual.

We should equally evaluate the role of Choe Yongjin, Gim Chaek and other comrades with that of comrade Kim Il Sung. In contrast, we need to indicate the defects of anti-Japanese partisan campaign.

We can point out that even though the campaign was glorious, it also had some defects in terms of the principles of a communist revolutionary campaign. Technically, in actual fact, the Northeastern anti-Japan partisan campaign was finished in 1940. Clearly, we cannot deny the internal and external conditions that resulted in the end of the campaign in actual fact. Related to that, the Japanese imperialists invaded China and prepared to attack the Soviet Union, Japan increased the military pressure on the Northeastern anti-Japan partisan campaign, and this was a serious threat to the existence of the campaign.

Then, did the anti-Japanese partisan group completely disappear? I do not think so. We need to look for the reasons that the group stopped its campaign in 1940. That is, it was because that the campaign was not able to run parallel with people's movements, so the group did not get enough support from people. Namely, the group was not able to organize a broad-based people's movement.

Then, after 1940, do you think that there were no underground campaigns against Japan in the Northeastern part of China? There were! I was also a member of them who

experienced how much people required the leadership of revolutionary groups.

Who can deny that at that time, even in Korea, there were so many underground movements, and people who evaded being drafted by Japanese troops formed mountain troops even though they were relatively small and unsystematic groups?

The surviving revolutionaries and comrades who attend this convention can confirm my claim.

I urge some of our comrades to stop the stupid behavior of fabricating history. And I also propose that they should change the contents in the museum of the revolution, or just change the name of museum to the museum of Kim Il Sung's revolution.

According to the rumor that I heard, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee has the documents about Northeastern anti-Japanese partisans. We need to review the documents and correct the distorted history. I assert that we should dismiss the comrades working in Central Committee with the wrong point of view and appoint comrades, real Marxists, who write the real history of our party. Do you think that this is not the result of the personality cult? If not, how can you explain this distorted history?

Third, the Soviet comrades talked about the faction of flatterers. Where there is the cult of personality, there is also the faction of flatters, just a shadow of the personality cult. It is no coincidence that if power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, there will be some people who flatter the individual in order to succeed in life. As comrade Khrushchev said, the words of flatterers are sweet, but not helpful to the work of communists. Who can disagree that these people succeed in their lives by harming good comrades with calculated malice? Is it wrong of me to say that there is a faction of flatterers in officialdom where the cult of personality exists?

I advise the party central committee to investigate these flatters and appoint comrades who can represent the interests of party and most of party members.

Fourth, the Soviet comrades talked about the propaganda of our party. Is it necessary to cover wrong things up and beautify the poor lives of our people? On this issue, we have numerous defects and theoretical problems.

I will not refer this issue so much but will hypothesize that this is closely related to the cult of personality and that there are serious problems caused by the cult of personality. It is unnecessary that our party achieved so many accomplishments thanks to the endeavors of party members and people. In order for today's meeting to be more fruitful, we need to point out our mistakes and try not to make those mistakes [again], rather than to emphasize our accomplishments in the past.

Even the mistakes that we made in the construction of the economy and culture over the past two or three years are serious. The procurement of grain is an example of

those mistakes. Do you know how serious of a problem we are confronted with as a result of procuring grains without any scientific method?

Since our party was founded, there had been no cases where our party was estranged from our people. As you know, about 300 people committed suicide because of coercion to get too much grain from people. In this case, can we say that the policy was right but carried out incorrectly? If the policy was reasonable, then why did it make 300 people commit suicide, and why should the government release more grain from the national storage than it procured? Except those not free from the cult of personality, do you think that people regard this as a policy for people?

If we insist that this is the reasonable policy, then this behavior must be the expression of an officialdom that ignores all people.

If we consider what the leader decided was the true and obvious behavior before the Twentieth Party Congress, today we should criticize this problem by ourselves in front of the party's members. The all-party workers on the battlefield know that if there have been no reinforcements on the battlefield, numerous peasants would have died of starvation.

Who does not know that someone led our society to confusion by using the unreasonable tax policy in order to eliminate private companies? We do not intend to evaluate this policy in order to determine if it is a left-wing or right-wing opportunistic policy. As our fraternal parties did, we should review our work by publicly introducing the facts that some people deify one person by ignoring the laws of socialism, [introduce] what the few schemers raised by the cult of personality did, and [introduce] what flatterers plotted to do to harm good comrades. We have to identify how many people have been imprisoned and executed illegally in our work. Comrade Brezhnev said to comrade Kim Il Sung that if there are leaders in prison, you need to reconsider their crimes. Yet, we did not yet start this task.

Who believes that there is no one imprisoned secretly in our internal organizations exactly replicating Stalin's gulag system and that we have observed the socialist law?

In Germany, 20,000 imprisoned people were set free, and other fraternal parties [illegible]. And then why are we not able to reform our internal organizations?

Can we accept that so many people are imprisoned illegally in order to maintain one individual's dignity, that people had been executed under the pretext that their behavior was anti-party and anti-nation, and that their families have been punished because of them? Why can't these problems be discussed in the Central Committee plenum every term? We need to disagree to this abnormal idea and eagerly discuss it.

I propose that we delegate one person to begin working on this, giving this individual the authority which allows him to work without any interference.

I assert that we should do away with the old method that

allows only a few leaders to know of our work under the pretext that they are internal party secrets.

Right after the start of the Korean War, I visited Beijing under the instructions of comrade Kim Il Sung. I cannot forget the friendly advice of Mao Zedong for our party at that time. I consider it my duty to report his advice to you. Comrade Mao Zedong gave us valuable strategic and tactical advice when we carried the fighting to the Nakdong river.

The following is the advice from Mao who heard about the progress of war at that time: Above all, he mentioned that the enemy who Korean people confront is the powerful American imperialists and explained three possible situations regarding the progress of war. He asked, "Is there any possibility that Korean leaders retreat?" and said, [illegible]

The second possibility is that we cannot push the enemy down to Busan, and with reinforcements, the enemy can orchestrate a counterattack against our forces. Third, Mao also said that it is also possible that we cannot advance any more, and the enemies can try to make a raid behind our lines and cut our supply routes. About this possibility, he indicated that we should organize our works premised on the worst-case scenario.

His concrete opinion was that we should recognize that most of the leaders and combatants of our party could retreat strategically, that we should prepare the ideological work based on the whole party's efforts, that we should loosen our siege around the Nakdong river in order to let our enemy disperse and then crush them since the defense of a clustered enemy is as firm as a firmly clenched fist, while to attack a dispersed enemy is as easy as attacking each finger. His advice was confirmed by the development of the war, especially by the enemy's landing in Incheon. I believe that you know this already since the Korean ambassador to China, comrade Li, already told you.

When I reported this valuable advice to Kim Il Sung, he said to me that we do not have any plan to retreat, that we do not need to do so, and that I should not let other people know about this advice.

How valuable was the advice? I doubt that it was informed to the government committee, not to mention the Central Committee.

I publicly announced this fact because there are so many classes in our party, that we conceal so many of our defects, and we ignore the valuable advice from our fraternal allies.

I, as the individual who conveyed the friendly advice of the Soviet Union, propose to the committee that we should specify the individual faults of those who intend to conceal the facts, and press them because this way is neither the way of the party nor the way of Bolsheviks.

During plenums, I suggest we correct all of our defects, especially the non-Marxist way of the personality cult by engaging in self-criticism. We can correct our errors and defects only through sharp criticism and self-criticism.

In order to get the best results from self-criticism, high-level leaders should criticize the defects in their own work. I think that the problem in which the leaders decide the construction and destruction of factories based on their own subjective views and not based on professional advice should be discussed in terms of national interests. Instead of calculating the potential, we planned the construction of an automobile plant and meat-processing complex based on the wrong idea of leaders. Even people who do not know much about politics can recognize that the construction of a meat-processing complex is meaningless when the livestock industry is undeveloped. When the Soviet Union decided to give us one billion rubles, the government delegation made so many decisions to build such plants and provide training in the Soviet Union.

I am really curious as to how the meat-processing plants they decided to build are doing now.

Comrades! We should review the criticism of the Soviet party that pointed out our problems based on the international level of ideology and resolve them based on an elevated level of politics. We, as communists, must strengthen our union with other fraternal parties since the strong solidarity with them is regarded as one of the conditions for victory in the war for a unified Korea. The enemies disagree with the ideas of socialism and peace and try to split the international labor movement and confuse the communist party and workers party by using the criticism of the personality cult. However, we should punish our enemies by strengthening solidarity with other socialists.

In order to overcome the cult of personality, we should adopt the proposal that supports collective leadership, one of the fundamental truths of party life, in our party.

This, in particular, is closely related to the Presidium of the Central Committee. As you well know, only in Korea does one person hold the three posts of prime minister, chairman of the Central Committee and commander.

According to the old Korean proverb, the wisdom of ten people is better than that of Zhuge Liang.

We should consider ways to support collective leadership in the party and national activities. Some comrades justify the cult of personality since Korea has developed artificially. I think that this assertion, not based on Marxism, is not even worth criticizing and is even harmful. To us, communists, the most important issue is strengthening relations with people. In order to get the overall support of the people and earn their confidence, we should report all of our problems to the members of the party.

We should struggle against the endeavor to deify one person, earn the wholehearted support of the people and connect with them, and strive to demonstrate to the people that we, members of the Korean Workers' Party, always support workers and believe in the perpetuity of Marxism.

We can realize the ideological and systematic union of our party and strengthen the relations with our brothers in the world only based on this principle.

We, who overcame the dogs of war for three years against invaders, have the power to conscientiously and frankly recognize our mistakes and faults. Moreover, this is the direction of the Great Lenin who built the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the world.

Dear respectful comrades!!

I would like for you to review all that I have proposed in this meeting. Because of my thoughts discussed by the central committee, some people will try to accuse me of being a reactionary. However, a truth cannot be concealed. I guess that my written discussion causes different responses among the members of the committee. Yet, even people who praise or praised the cult of personality cannot help accept my words. I think that there are three cases in which some comrades try to correct their faults.

First, they can engage in harsh self-criticize for their faults in order to free themselves.

Second, they can protect the status quo by formally recognizing their own faults in the national activities.

Third, they can illegally detain comrades struggling in the interests of the party or damage other groups of such comrades.

In terms of their political careers, this kind of behavior is surely suicidal to them.

Comrades!! I implore you, full and candidate members of the Central Committee, to actively participate in discussions and resolve this important matter in our activities.

Finally, I, a member of the party, do not mind any criticism from you comrades.

1956. 10. 12



DOCUMENT No. 27

Memorandum of Conversation with the Charge d' Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK, Chao Kaelyan, 26 October 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 344-346. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person.]

Embassy of the USSR
In the DPRK
No. 318
"31" October 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 3

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR In the DPRK, Comrade Ivanov V.I.
for the period from 11 to 29 October 1956

Pyeongyang

26 October

I received the charge d' affaires of the PRC in the DPRK, Comrade Chao Kaelyan with the aim of informing him about a meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung on matters related to the unofficial visit of A.I. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to the DPRK. I told Chao Kaelyan that in spite of promises of the Korean leadership given to Comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to publish the decrees of the KWP CC August and September Plenums, the Korean comrades published a pithy summary of the KWP CC September Plenum only after five days following the September Plenum, on 28 September. Two important items were discussed in this summary. The first item concerns self-criticism of the KWP where it was pointed out that the decree on organizational issues of the KWP CC August Plenum was decided successfully, but the course of reaching this decision was absent. The second item contained a call to the party to observe Leninist norms and principles in party life.

Kim Il Sung explained that the first item was omitted consciously since the decree of the August Plenum was not published and in his opinion there is no need to report in the press that these decrees were rash. The KWP CC has never published its decrees on organizational issues and for this reason it is necessary to start publication with a good decree and not with a bad one. Regarding the second question related to the instructions of Leninist norms in party life, Comrade Kim Il Sung declared that the report about the CC September Plenum was published without his involvement while he was away on vacation and that he regrets that the second issue was omitted.

In response to my observation that all that was omitted can be resolved by publishing the decrees of the August and September Plenums, Kim Il Sung answered that the decrees of these plenums and his speech at the September Plenum will be published in a separate brochure and distributed for discussion in party organizations, adding that the section in which he quotes from Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai will be omitted from his speech, that on the council of the latter the decrees of the August Plenum will be reviewed. By this, according to Kim Il Sung, the aim of not revealing the very fact of the visit of Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to Korea is achieved, not giving the party masses reason to believe that the decree of the September Plenum was passed under pressure from fraternal parties and that fraternal parties were interfering in our internal affairs.

I informed Chao Kaelyan of the claim of Kim Il Sung that he supposedly did not promise Comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to publish the decrees of the August and September Plenums of the KWP CC, but only promised to consider the matter, moreover Kim Il Sung said that while discussing the overall results of the September Central Committee Plenum among provincial party activists many party functionaries expressed doubts in the advisability of commuting the sentences of Choe Changik, Bak Changok and others.

Chao Kaelyan was interested in where Bak Changok and Choe Changik are now. I answered that Bak Changok works as the deputy director of a saw-mill in the town of Hyesanjin, while Choe Changik, it seems, at the present moment is ill.

Chao Kaelyan in turn said that he had not held any special meetings with the Korean leadership on these issues; however, the Chinese embassy learned several facts related to these matters, the authenticity of which he is not convinced. Like, for example, in a meeting of the Pyeongyang city party activists dedicated to the discussion of the results of the September Plenum, the party Pyeongyang City Committee department of agitation and propaganda deputy director gave a speech, criticizing the breach of democratic centralism in defense of those comrades restored to the party and Central Committee, after which he was excluded from the party. Party Pyeongyang City Committee Chairman Yi Songwook incorrectly spoke out, declaring that comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai came to Pyeongyang to find mistakes and shortcomings in the Workers' Party, but were convinced of the opposite. Chao said also that rumors reached the Chinese embassy that Gim Changman belligerently declared to the opposition that no matter how hard they tried, we have a MIA [Ministry of International Affairs] and an army.

I asked Chao what the Korean comrades undertook with regards to the request of comrade Peng Dehuai to release from confinement and send to China for studies Bak Ilu who was locked up in prison. Chao responded that so far, it seems nothing is known. Comrade Peng Dehuai, being with Kim Il Sung, communicated to him that if the Korean comrades do not require, but on the contrary, are troubled by the arrival of Bak Ilu and Ban Hosan in Korea, then the Chinese government agrees to their return to China. To the question where Ban Hosan is, Chao answered that [Commandant of the War College] Ban Hosan also, like Bak Ilu is a Chinese Korean. He has major accomplishments in revolutionary activities in North-eastern China, later he served in the Korean Peoples' Army and commanded one of the armies. Presently, he works as a simple laborer in a mine.

Chao informed me also that presently, those who fled to China, Yun Gongheum, Seo Hwi, Gim Changil and Li Pilgyu do not receive rations. The wife of Gim Changil turned to the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda but the minister did not receive her and directed her to the chief of the economic section, who performed her wedding, but he too refused to give rations.

I thanked Chao for the discussion.

In the evening I attended a reception organized by Kim Il Sung in honor of the Mongolian government delegation headed by Tsendenbal.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE DPRK
/V. IVANOV/

4 Copies issued
1-Cde. Shepilov
2-Cde. Federenko
3-Cde. Kurdyukov
4-To the files
No. 1065
Issued by Kondratev
31.X.56



DOCUMENT No. 28

Memorandum of Conversation with the PRC Ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiaoguang, 5 November 1956

[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 367-369. Obtained and translated for CWHIP by James F. Person.]

Embassy of the USSR
In the DPRK
No. 318
“31” October 1956

Top Secret
Copy No. 3

DIARY

Ambassador of the USSR In the DPRK, Comrade Ivanov V.I.
for the period from 11 to 29 October 1956

Pyeongyang

5 November

I received the ambassador of the PRC, Qiao Xiaoguang at his request. After a brief procedural conversation, Qiao asked if I knew anything new about measures of the Korean friends to carry out the decision of the September Plenum. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party shows great interest in this question according to Qiao.

I said that for the period that has passed after my conversation with the charge d' affaires of the embassy of the PRC in the DPRK, Chao Kaelyan, I don't know anything substantial about measures of the friends on the stated question. According to the existing communications of the unofficial order it is known that the Korean leadership intends to make Choe Changik director of the state committee on preserving monuments of material culture and Bak Changok the director of construction at a cement factory in Madong. From the same communication it is also known that not long ago a meeting of the KWP CC Presidium was held where it was decided to release Bak Ilu from imprisonment.

To Qiao's request that I say something to the effect of how the Korean friends view the visit of Comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to the DPRK, I responded that to judge by the course of the September Plenum, the reaction of the friends should be considered positive, however to confirm this categorically would be premature.

In my turn I was interested in the opinion of Qiao Xiaoguang in this regard. He answered that he so far has not yet reached a specific conclusion regarding the reaction of the friends to the visit of comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai.

I asked Qiao if Yun Gongheum, Li Pilgyu, Seo Hwi, and Gim Changil, located in China, know about their rehabilitation to the KWP and if they intend to return to the DPRK.

Qiao said that they are aware of that decision. Not wishing to return to the DPRK, they want to ask the government of the DPRK to allow their families to depart to China since they know also that the Korean government is not pressing for their return to the DPRK. Qiao said further that in receiving Yun Gongheum, Seo Hwi, Gim Changil and Li Pilgyu in an address to the CCP CC and CPSU CC they blamed the Korean leadership for destroying a number of notable party actors in the period after liberation and during the war; for leading the country and party with anti-democratic methods; for incorrectly appointing and cultivating leading cadres. In connection with this they consider [Chairman of the CC for the Election of the Second Supreme People's Assembly] Bak Jeongae, Bak Geumcheol, Gim Changman, and Han Sangdu individuals unqualified to occupy leading posts in the party; finally, they charge that the leadership does not carry out a struggle with the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung.

Qiao added that without having any materials confirming these statements, the CCP CC displays understandable caution with respect to the indicated letter.

I informed Qiao Xiaoguang that the Korean leadership released Li Sangjo from his duties as ambassador of the DPRK in Moscow and requested from the Soviet government an agreement on Yi Sungpal, working nowadays as the director of the educational department of the KWP CC. According to the Korean friends, Li Sangjo refuses to return to the DPRK and in all likelihood will remain in the PRC.

To my question if the Chinese embassy has a decree of the August Plenum of the KWP CC on organizational matters, Qiao answered that they do not have it, but the delegation of the KWP to the CCP Eighth Congress delivered the abovementioned decree to Mao Zedong.

Present at the meeting was the first secretary of the embassy, Samsanov G.E.

questions keenly troubled a certain portion of senior KWP officials. Gim Dubong, Choe Changik, Bak Changok, Bak Uiwan, Seo Hwi, Yun Gongheum, Gim Seunghwa, and other important officials thought that it was impossible to tolerate the great shortcomings in the leadership of the party and the country any longer. The dissatisfaction with the situation which has developed in the party also included a certain portion of the senior officials of the army and trade unions. Discontent with the KWP leadership especially increased during the visit of a DPRK delegation to the countries of the people's democracies and in connection with the well-known events in Poznan.

At the KWP CC August Plenum this group of officials proposed to sharply criticize the main shortcomings of the activity of the leadership and Kim Il Sung personally, pointing out that the spread of the personality cult and the assignment of party personnel according to the principle of personal devotion fettered initiative and diminished the responsibility of government and party bodies; as before an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion predominates; collegiality at work is essentially lacking; and a serious material situation for the working masses has been created in the country.

The emergence of dissatisfaction with the situation which has developed among a certain part of senior KWP officials testifies to the growth in the party of national cadres who have made increased demands of the party leadership. The above officials were trying to expose the serious shortcomings which exist through sharp and bold criticism.

As is well known, at the August plenum Kim Il Sung did not lead the criticism of the shortcomings in the work of the party, as the CPSU CC had advised him and which many senior officials inside the KWP had expected. The KWP leadership did not go the route of self-criticism and took every step to isolate those who intended to criticize the shortcomings and mistakes. For the forthright and courageous opinions about the situation in the party expressed by a number of officials who had exhibited dissatisfaction with the KWP leadership they were regarded as a "hostile anti-party group which had set as their goal the seizure of power in the party and the country" and subjected to party repression. Some of these officials, fearing further persecution, left for China (nine people) and Li Sangjo, the former Korean ambassador to Moscow, refused to return to the DPRK.

Thus, a difficult situation arose in the KWP when the serious shortcomings and mistakes of the party leadership were not exposed and the correct measures were not taken to eliminate them.

As a result of an exchange of opinions about the situation in the KWP which took place between the CPSU CC and the KWP CC it was decided to send Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to Pyongyang to discuss situation which had devel-

oped with the KWP leadership.

The KWP CC Plenum held in September during their visit to the DPRK reexamined the decisions of the August plenum with respect to Choe Changik, Bak Changok, and others, admitting that "when considering the question concerning these comrades at the August Plenum the proper seriousness was insufficiently exhibited and the approach to the decision was oversimplified." The plenum restored Choe Changik and Bak Changok to CC membership and those who left for China to party membership.

At the same time, the need was recognized in the decisions of the plenum to create an atmosphere in the party which facilitates the holding of more lively organizational discussions which arise in party life and to ascertain the truth through a broad expansion of criticism without resorting to organizational administrative measures. The plenum pointed out that party organizations should gradually organize a campaign for the further expansion and development of intra-party democracy and intensify criticism and self-criticism inside the party, especially criticism from below.

The preparation and adoption of the decisions by the KWP CC September Plenum was the result of the influence of fraternal parties on the KWP CC leadership. Kim Il Sung and a majority of the members of the KWP CC Presidium reluctantly agreed to reexamine the decisions of the August Central Committee Plenum. A desire to show the guilt of Choe Changik, Bak Changok, and the others and [to show] the justification for the measures and organizational conclusions taken toward them at the August Plenum was exhibited in the process of preparing for the September Plenum.

At the present time, as before, the opinion continues to exist in the KWP that the hostile anti-party group of Choe Changik and Bak Changok who had set as their goal the seizure of power had been exposed at the August Plenum and that, in spite of this, the party had displayed magnanimity toward them and had restored Choe Changik and Bak Changok to Central Committee membership and the rest to party membership.

The reluctance to reexamine the decisions of the August Central Committee Plenum about the organizational conclusions with respect to Choe Changik, Bak Changok, and the others was also reflected in the fact that, in spite of an agreement between Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai on the one hand and Kim Il Sung on the other about publishing the complete text of the decision of the September plenum about the above question in the press, this text was nevertheless not published. The KWP CC limited itself to publication in the press of a brief informational report in which it omitted the two important sections of the decision regarding the assessment of the measures which had been taken at the August plenum with respect to Choe Changik and the others and also the questions of the need

to develop intra-party democracy, criticism, and self-criticism.

During the visit to the DPRK by Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai it was arranged with the KWP leadership that there would be a reexamination of the decisions of party committees with respect to other party members who were called to account in connection with the Choe Changik and Bak Changok matter. However the Korean leadership is beginning these steps very slowly. After the September Plenum senior officials of the KWP Pyeongyang City Committee and also the Secretaries of the State University Party Committee, the construction department, and the Central Committee of the united trade unions, and the Ministry of Trade were removed from the posts they had occupied and sent to the provinces from where they, too, left for China.

With respect to former Political Council member Bak Ilu, who is under arrest, an agreement about his release was reached between Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung. It was decided in October at the KWP CC Presidium to release him from confinement under house arrest and suggest that he go to China to study if he wishes. However, this decision has not yet been carried out, which is explained by the general aggravation of the political situation.

In the opinion of Ban Hakse, Minister of Internal Affairs, considering the current international situation, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of undesirable statements by some senior officials in the capital and in the provinces who favor more democratic methods of leading the Party and country although the August Central Committee Plenum also condemned such statements as factional and anti-party and took severe measures with regard to these kinds of officials. In the first place such statements might come from Choe Changik, a Central Committee member who counts on the support of General-Lieutenant Gim Un (Deputy Minister of National Defense), Ban Hosan (formerly a General-Lieutenant and front commanding general and now working as deputy director of a mine), and Go Bonggi, Central Committee member, (Chairman of the KWP South Hwanghae Provincial Committee). In Ban's opinion, at a critical moment one can expect a comparable statement from Gim Dubong.

The above is evidence that Kim Il Sung, having repeatedly resorted in the past to the removal of his political opponents in order to strengthen his position and having sometimes indulged in repressive measures, is at the present time still slowly changing [his] methods of leadership, reluctantly correcting past mistakes, and switching halfheartedly to measures to convince and educate.

It ought to be noted along with this that the events of this year in both the international and domestic life of the DPRK, especially the above manifestations of acute dissatisfaction by a certain number of officials with the KWP leadership and

also Kim Il Sung's summer trip to the countries of the people's democracy; his visit to the Soviet Union and the conversations held in Moscow with CPSU and Soviet government leaders about questions of party policy; the advice received in Moscow about improving the economic management of the country and increasing attention toward questions of the material support of the workers; and work done in Pyeongyang by Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, could not have failed to reflect a certain positive influence on the KWP leadership.

As is well known, the KWP Third Congress pointed out that the main task of the upcoming five-year plan should be the creation of a firm foundation of a socialist economy, the industrialization of the country, and the completion of the organization of agriculture into cooperatives. At the present time party political, economic, and organizational work are being done in this direction.

In the area of industry the three-year plan of postwar recovery and development of the DPRK economy (1954-1956) was fulfilled four and a half months ahead of schedule, and in the area of agriculture the plan will basically be fulfilled. In spite of a bad harvest in some northern provinces the gross grain harvest throughout the country is about 2.7 million tons, or about the 1949 level.

Some significant changes were made at the August plenum to the drafts of the first five-year plan after the trip of the DPRK government delegation to the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracy. The plenum pointed to the need to consider the experience of fraternal countries in developing an economy in the process of building the foundations of socialism and to be guided by resulting principle of cooperation and division of effort between the socialist countries.

In this connection the Workers' Party Central Committee recognized that it is advisable to temporarily defer the construction of the large industrial facilities planned by the KWP Third Congress which require large capital investment and lengthy periods of construction and concentrate attention on the construction of the enterprises of those industrial sectors where it might be most beneficial to use the country's natural and economic resources.

Decisions were also made to abandon the construction of a large electrical equipment plant in Pyeongyang, the further restoration of the Gim Chang metallurgical plant in Chongjin, the construction of a perfume factory in Pyeongyang, and several other facilities.

The Party Central Committee and the DPRK leadership recently devoted greater attention to increasing the production of fertilizer for agricultural recovery and primarily to solve the grain problem. A task was set to reduce the period for the construction of new workshops to produce ammonium nitrate at

the Hungnam chemical fertilizer plant.

The party and government are doing a great deal of work to organize agriculture into cooperatives. At the end of October of this year 79% of all peasant farms had been formed into cooperatives. It can be assumed that the organization of agriculture into cooperatives will be mainly finished by spring of next year.

The implementation of a number of economic measures in industry and agriculture is evidence that after the government delegation's visit to the USSR and the countries of the people's democracies the Central Committee leadership has begun to more realistically approach the question of the rates of growth and economic possibilities of industrialization and to display great concern about increasing the standard of living of the country's population.

The Party Central Committee has recently planned and implemented a number of measures in this area. Beginning on 1 November 1956 the wages of manual laborers and office workers were increased by 35%. New wage scales have been developed and introduced, according to which the minimum monthly wage was set at 1000 won whereas previously it had been 600 won.

In August and September of this year another [*ocherednoe*] reduction of state commercial prices for several important kinds of industrial goods was made, by an average 10 percent. As a result of the wage increase and the reduction of retail prices the population is getting a benefit of approximately 12 billion won a year. For this sum the population could get 120,000 tons of rice at current market prices.

In implementing these measures the Korean leadership, besides its own resources, is also counting on aid from the USSR and the countries of the people's democracies in consumer goods which are to begin to arrive in 1957. Without an increase in the quantity of goods for sale the wage increase and price reduction will not produce the proper result.

In order to ease the tax liability to the state of peasants in the cooperatives and individual peasant farmers a decree has been adopted to reduce the payments in kind and release the peasants from returning grain loans in 1956 and arrears for past years. According to this decree agricultural cooperatives and individual peasant farmers who had abatements for taxation in kind which did not exceed 10-12% of the harvest for them; peasants who received a poor harvest because of drought; poor people in a serious material situation; peasants living in the demilitarized zone; and also peasants in regions which suffered from natural disasters are released from payment of taxes in kind for the current year. Underdeveloped cooperatives and the families of servicemen, resettlers, and refugees are completely or partially released from returning seed and food loans

in 1956 and arrears for previous years.

However, the granting of these abatements to the peasants for 1956 should not exceed the stock of 26,000 tons of grain designated for these purposes.

A decree was also adopted about reducing the tax in kind for the use of an irrigation system by an average of four percent.

In October the government adopted a decree to reduce by 50% the income and local tax for small merchants and entrepreneurs, craftsmen, and people in the free professions whose average monthly income does not exceed 10,000 won.

By another government decree local bodies of people's power and department managers are obligated to supply entrepreneurs with the necessary raw material to produce consumer goods. Private merchants are permitted to sell goods to state industries where there is no state or cooperative trade, granting them the necessary funds to do this. Private entrepreneurs are permitted to develop gold deposits in order to increase the population's income and accumulate foreign currency.

The above party and government measures carried out after the KWP Third Congress improved the population's standard of living somewhat and promoted the strengthening of the people's democratic system of government. However the material situation of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia has not reached the prewar level.

About 40% in the Republic are on rationed provisions. Manual laborers and white collar workers are given from 700 to 900 grams of grain a day and students and dependents [are given] from 400 to 500 grams of grain. All categories receive 50% of the rice ration and 50% of the ration for other cereals. At the same time only 4% of all those working (of category 1) receive 900 grams, 22% receive 800 grams, and the rest of the workers, 74%, receive 700 grams of grain a day.

Depending on the supply category manual laborers and office workers receive from 15 to 28 meters of cotton per year, from 3 to 12 pairs of socks, from 2 to 12 bars of soap, from 2 to 6 pairs of *komusin* [Korean rubber shoes], 3 kilograms of vegetable oil, 7 liters of liquid soybeans, 7 kilograms of hard soy, and 12 kilograms of salt. One percent are supplied at the 1st, highest, category; 6% at the second category; 17% at the 3rd category, and 73% of those working are in the 4th, 5th, and 6th, the lowest supply categories.

The goods issued through ration cards are far from being sufficient to meet the needs of the families of manual laborers and office workers in food and clothing.

The overwhelming majority of the urban population gets almost no meat, fats, and sugar through ration cards. Fish

products are also issued irregularly.

Market prices for foodstuffs are extraordinarily high. For example, one kilogram of meat costs 250-300 won, fish - 100-200, rice 100, potatoes - 30-40, a liter of bean oil - 600 won, 10 eggs - 130-150 won, etc. It is also the same situation with prices for manufactured goods. Market and commercial prices for textiles, clothing, and shoes are very high and almost unaffordable for the majority of the country's population.

In the three postwar years the state built more than 3,500,000 [square] meters of housing. Nevertheless, about one-third of the urban population continues to live in half-dugouts and flimsy [*legkogo tipa*] houses made of stalks of kaoliang and clay. In the winter the urban population experiences an acute need for fuel and school buildings and some institutions are almost unheated.

The material situation of the peasants improved somewhat this year; however, after settling accounts with the state for taxes in kind for land, water, and MPS [machine rental] work, for two or three months a considerable number of the peasants of the northern regions nevertheless do not have enough food until the next harvest.

Thus the conclusion should be drawn that, in spite of some improvement in the material condition in the country, the standard of living of the population is extremely low. Many families of manual laborers, office workers, and peasants are chronically underfed, do not have an opportunity to obtain warm clothing, and are in difficult living conditions.

The difficult situation of the workers takes on especial seriousness in conditions where the country is divided. It should be kept in mind in this context that in South Korea, a mainly agricultural country, the food situation of the population is better than in North Korea. The supply of the population with essential goods is also higher in the South as a consequence of the fact that the economy suffered less damage during the war and also as a result of the flooding of the South Korean market with American-made goods.

The difficulties being experienced at the present time by the DPRK population are being more correctly assessed by the KWP leadership. The fact that the consequences of the serious destruction caused by the war have still not been overcome and also the previous mistakes made by friends when restoring sectors of the economy, especially the underestimation of the need for a very rapid recovery of agriculture and the development of light industry, are the reasons for these difficulties.

In spite of the serious difficulties in the country the policy of the Korean Workers' Party is supported by the working masses of the city and the countryside, who in the past had been under foreign oppression and experienced more [difficulties] in com-

parison to the present deprivation and poverty.

However, in connection with the British and French aggression against Egypt and the events in Hungary, the KWP CC and the DPRK government took some precautionary measures in the event of possible provocations from the South Korean authorities and the hostile espionage network inside the country. KWP CC Presidium members and members of the government went to the grass roots to strengthen mass political work among the population. More attention began to be paid to the deeper study of the political morale condition of the personnel of the KPA and the mood of the population.

The Americans and the South Korean authorities stepped up subversive activity against the DPRK in connection with the events in Poland and Hungary. During this period there were occurrences of the insertion of enemy espionage networks and the dropping of leaflets, and the aggressive tone of radio propaganda was intensified. In November meetings and demonstrations were organized in Seoul and several other cities of South Korea calling for the population of North Korea to rise up against the people's democratic system of government and the KWP leadership. At the end of November several hundred students from Seoul were brought to the line of demarcation in automobiles for a provocation and who called upon the population of the North "to follow the example of Hungary."

It ought to be noted that the increased provocations from the South did not meet with any significant response among the DPRK population. No statements against people's power took place in the KWP.

The meetings of manual laborers and office workers which were held at this time at enterprises and institutions, the large demonstration of the population of Pyeongyang in support of the struggle of the Egyptian people against aggression, and the protest against the provocation of the counterrevolution in Hungary were evidence that the population of the DPRK supports the people's democratic system of government of its country.

The KWP leadership has been recently devoting more attention to political work in the Party and among the population. This is especially necessary because the Party is to a certain degree flabby: the party numbers 1,160,000 members and candidate members in its ranks, and this means that every eighth person in the country is a member or candidate member of the party. Also considering that in the party 60% of its members are peasants and 28% are manual laborers, 86% [SIC] of the members and candidate members of the Party are semi-literate and have a primary education and only 0.8% have a higher education. The KWP CC is paying special attention to improving the quality of the party and the Marxist-Leninist education of its members.

Admission into the party was actually halted beginning in 1954, the same year that a campaign was conducted to verify party membership; an exchange of party documents is being carried out in the current year.

After the Third Party Congress, the Central Committee carried out a number of measures to restructure ideological work. Secondary school and higher educational study programs are being reexamined, especially the socioeconomic disciplines, and work has begun to republish textbook and training aids in order to remove statements in them explaining the events of public life from the position of the personality cult.

Having condemned dogmatism in ideological work and the practice of mechanically borrowing everything Soviet to Korean practice, the KWP CC is devoting more attention to the study and incorporation of the revolutionary and progressive past of the Korean people, restructuring ideological work on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings.

At the same time when restructuring ideological work various materials have begun to be published more often in the press to correct the mistakes which have been made; the plays of Russian and Soviet authors have again begun to be included in the repertoire of Korean theaters; and the experience of the Soviet Union in party, government, economic, and cultural policy is being more fully popularized.

In October of this year a congress of Korean writers was held and in November a congress of the Union of Democratic Youth [was held, both of] which displayed the unity of the intelligentsia and youth around the KWP. The congresses expressed support for the political and economic policy of the party in developing the DPRK along the path of socialism.

The leadership core of the party changed considerably after the Third Congress. The newly-elected Central Committee Presidium was double the size of the previous Political Council. Its membership was augmented with people from among those who had actively participated in the national liberation struggle and have experience in party and government policy. Only five of the previous leaders remained, including Cdes. Kim Il Sung, Gim Dubong, Bak Cheongae, Kim Il, and Bak Geumcheol. The roles of Gim Dubong and Bak Cheongae were reduced. At the same time the role and influence of re-elected Presidium members Cdes. Choe Yonggeon, Gim Changman (Deputy Chairman of the KWP CC), Cheong Ilyeong (Deputy Prime Minister), and Gim Gwanheop (Chief of Staff of the KPA) were increased.

The Central Committee Presidium and especially Cdes. Choe Yonggeon, Bak Geumcheol, and Gim Changman are taking a not altogether correct position in the area of personnel assignments. For example, exaggerating the mistakes of a number of officials who came from China and the USSR,

they have sought to get them removed from senior positions in the Party and the government. They acted this way with former Political Council members Hegai and Bak Ilu and then with Bak Changok, Bak Yeongbin, and Choe Changik, adopting severe measures against them (the arrest of Bak Ilu, the replacement of Choe Changik). Until very recently critical statements against the leadership were viewed as a manifestation of factionalism and an anti-party attitude.

It ought to be said that the situation eased somewhat after the September Plenum. Choe Changik returned to Pyeongyang and the question of his work was again examined; Bak Changok was appointed chief of the construction of a cement plant; and a number of KWP members were readmitted to the party and the attitude of the KWP leadership toward former Soviet-Koreans changed for the better. Some of them began to be restored to previous positions and even promoted to diplomatic work in foreign institutions.

In accordance with decisions of the August and September KWP CC Plenums explanatory work is being carried out and materials of the September Plenum - the report, the closing remarks of Kim Il Sung, and the complete text of the Decree about Reexamining the Decision of the August Plenum Concerning an Organizational Question - were distributed to the provincial, city, district, and primary party organizations for discussion and to carry out appropriate explanatory work among Party members.

In a number of places the discussion of the materials of the September Plenum occurred in plenary meetings along with a discussion of the August Plenum. Meetings in party organizations, especially in ministries and other large enterprises and institutions, proceeded tumultuously for two, three, or even four days. According to the reports of friends they had to perform much organizational and explanatory work in party organizations in order to show party members the need to decide to rehabilitate Choe Changik, Yun Gongheum, and others and convince them that the methods of patient education and a comradely attitude toward mistaken party members ought to prevail in the party, and not the methods of punishment and management by decree; they had to show the mistakenness of some statements which contained demands to severely condemn Choe Changik and the others.

At plenary meetings, meetings of party activists, and meetings about the results of the August and September Central Committee Plenum at which party and government leaders were present more critical comments were made against local party leaders and local government leaders who exhibit insufficient concern about meeting the material needs of the workers. In particular, demands were expressed to accelerate housing construction, improve the supply of food and manufactured goods, etc. It was also suggested that the workers' opinions be taken into account when promoting people to the positions

of skilled worker and foreman at enterprises. The awarding of bonuses to leading production workers also ought to be at the recommendation of worker's collectives.

All the demands and critical comments of party members which came to light during the discussion of the decision of the September Plenum are being summarized in the KWP CC and will be taken into consideration in practical work.

Criticism in the party from below is become somewhat bolder. However, it is still weak against higher party bodies. The principle of collective leadership is started to be exhibited more often in the practical work of party committees and management by decree and command has become less frequent. The ties between the masses and party and government bodies are being strengthened.

A number of materials have been published in the national party press about the results of the October Central Committee Plenum in which special attention was paid to the need for the method of persuasion as the main method of educating party members.

In some party organizations the cases of expulsions from the party in connection with the decision of the August Plenum were reexamined after the September CC Plenum. In particular, two deputy chairmen and the chief of the organization department of the Pyeongyang City Party Committee were readmitted to the party. However [Hong Seonghwan], a former Deputy Chairman of the Pyeongyang City Party Committee, was recently again expelled from the party as not wanting "to be corrected."

We think that a shift is being noted in the party after the September KWP CC Plenum in the direction of observing Leninist principles of collective leadership and the norms of party life. However, only the first steps have been made in this question.

After the KWP Third Congress and the September CC Plenum the friends began to implement some measures to democratize the political life of the country.

Elections were held to local government bodies on 20 and 27 November 1956. An absolute majority of the population which took part in the voting gave its votes to candidates nominated by the KWP and other parties and public organizations which are allied with it. Ninety-nine and 73/100% of those who participated in the elections voted for the candidates to village people's assemblies; 99.89% to district and city [people's assemblies], and 99.98% to provincial [people's assemblies]. At the present time preparations have begun for the elections to the Supreme People's Assembly which are scheduled for April and May of 1957.

Measures to democratize the political life of the country and to restore Leninist norms of party life are understood by the Korean friends as a lengthy process during the implementation of which it is necessary to carry out appropriate steps to avoid causing negative consequences in the party and the country.

The elimination of Kim Il Sung's personality cult is being carried out slowly and the friends are observing a policy of gradualism in this question. Until recently it was indicated in the decisions and documents of the KWP that there is no cult of personality in the KWP. At the present time the existence of the KWP cult of personality is admitted by the friends but at the same time there exists the opinion that the cult of personality in the DPRK has no negative consequences. The friends have also done some work in this area. They have stopped glorifying Kim Il Sung in propaganda, and literature and art are embarking on this path. The most important party and government questions have begun to be decided collectively and patience has begun to be exhibited more often with regard to people who have criticized the leadership.

The 30 October 1956 Declaration of the Soviet government was discussed in the KWP CC Presidium and at the XII session of the Supreme People's Assembly and received the approval and support of the friends. The KWP CC Presidium declared that the DPRK government has no questions for discussion with the Soviet government in connection with the publication of the Declaration. The XII session of the Supreme People's Assembly pointed out that the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union based on Leninist principles of full equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs, and friendship and cooperation is being consistently and unswervingly followed in Korean-Soviet relations.

In spite of the fact that the Korean friends have declared that they have no complaints against the Soviet Union in connection with the declaration there are unofficial statements by some DPRK ministers about the presence of elements of inequality in individual treaties and agreements between the DPRK and the USSR which infringe on the rights of the Korean side.

Abnormal situations with respect to Soviet-Koreans and also mistakes when propagandizing the national past of the Korean people occurred at the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956, when under the pretext of the struggle against everything foreign, in a number of cases propaganda about the Soviet Union ceased. These [cases] are being eliminated at the present time.

Speaking of the advisability of the visit of Cdes. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai as representatives of fraternal parties, Kim Il Sung declared that such visits are possible and necessary in the relations between parties.

At the same time it ought to be said that relations between the DPRK and PRC leadership cannot be considered completely normal. Particularly negative events in these relations have recently appeared.

It ought to be borne in mind that the abnormality in Korean-Chinese relations has existed from the time of combat operations against the American-Syngman Rhee troops when the Chinese friends had differences with the Korean leadership about a number of important questions connected with the start and the conduct of the war.

The Korean leaders and Kim Il Sung personally have an incorrect attitude toward the Chinese friends and this attitude is not in keeping with the enormous aid which the Chinese people have given the DPRK both during the war and in the postwar period

The Korean friends are clearly insufficiently studying and propagandizing the experience of building socialism which has been accumulated in China and the dissemination of which could bring substantial benefit to DPRK party and state policy.

Up to now relations between the DPRK and PRC leadership have been of a strictly official nature. Personal contacts between party and government leaders are rarely maintained. Kim Il Sung declined to travel to the CCP Eighth Congress. Kim Il Sung does not attend festive meetings and receptions at the PRC Embassy in Pyeongyang during national holidays at the same time as he visits comparable events associated with the national holidays of the Soviet Union. The Korean friends are rarely encountered with officials of the Chinese Embassy and do not consult with them enough about questions of government and party policy.

The event of greatest importance which negatively affects Chinese-Korean relations is the departure of a number of senior DPRK personnel for China. The Korean friends were counting on the Chinese side handing over those who had fled to the DPRK leadership. However, as is well known, this did not happen. In the opinion of the Chinese friends those who fled continue to "blacken" the Korean leadership in the eyes of the Chinese friends.

Recently the refusal of the Chinese friends to grant new economic aid to the DPRK contributed to some deepening of the abnormalities in Chinese-Korean relations. No response to a request of the Chinese leadership by Kim Il Sung to grant additional free aid or credits in 1957 in the amount of 50 million yuan was given for three months and then a refusal followed. In light of this the Korean friends cancelled an already agreed visit of a trade delegation to the PRC to conclude a trade treaty for 1957 headed by Deputy Prime Minister Gim Il.

In giving a favorable assessment to the fact of the arrival in the DPRK of representatives of the CPSU and CCP in September 1956 the Korean friends expressed dissatisfaction at the same time that Peng Dehuai, who allegedly is not respected in Korea, was sent to Pyeongyang as the CCP representative.

The above is evidence that, in spite of some work which has been done by the KWP leadership to improve the situation in the party and to democratize the life of the country, the situation in the KWP and the Republic continues to remain complex, requiring the KWP CC to take gradual steps to introduce Leninist norms of party life and also for fraternal communist parties to [pay] close attention to the situation in the KWP.

Considering that the material situation of the population of the DPRK is still extremely serious, it is necessary for the KWP leadership and the DPRK to take all possible steps to constantly raise the standard of living of the workers, which is an indispensable condition for the further consolidation of the domestic political situation in the republic and the peaceful unification of the country on democratic principles.

Bearing in mind the abnormalities in relations between the Korean leadership and the Chinese friends noted above it would be advisable to direct Kim Il Sung's attention to this fact.

USSR Ambassador to the DPRK V. Ivanov

Authenticated: [illegible signature]

Distributed to
Cdes.

- | | |
|------------|-------------|
| Bulganin | Zhukov |
| Voroshilov | Brezhnev |
| Kaganovich | Mukhitdinov |
| Kirichenko | Furtseva |
| Malenkov | Shvernik |
| Mikoyan | Aristov |
| Molotov | Belyayev |
| Pervukhin | Pospelov |
| Saburov | |
| Suslov | |
| Khrushchev | |

N° 2/III
2.I.57

23 copies sent am/ts/mch
N° 3 2.I.1957



From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation, Villa Medicea “La Ferdinanda” (Artimino, Italy) 27-29 April 2006

by Duccio Basosi, Matteo Gerlini, and Angela Romano

From 27 to 29 April, 2006, the Medicean villa of Artimino, near Florence (Italy), was the seat of the international conference “From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation.” The event was organized by the Italian inter-university Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA), with CWIHP as a co-sponsor. The proceedings of the conference are currently under review for publication.

The goal of the scientific committee of the conference was “to gain a greater understanding of the fundamental shift occurred during the 1975-85 period, from the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation to a truly global one, as well as the interconnections of this process with the new industrial-technological revolution and the return of the United States to a position of global economic leadership.” Forty-four speakers, grouped into ten panels, presented papers which were first commented upon by their discussants and then debated with the floor. The ten panels covered the entire spectrum of international relations in the period concerned, from both a thematic and a geographic perspective, by addressing issues such as: the aftermath and impact of Helsinki’s Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, the Euromissile crisis of 1978-83, the Polish Crisis of 1980-81, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983, European integration, Eurocommunism, and the multiplication of conflicts involving the superpowers in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

After the opening remarks by Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo (CIMA Chairman, University of Florence, Italy), the proceedings began with a roundtable aimed at introducing the general subject of the years 1975-1985, through the presentation of the critical oral history work by James Blight (Brown University, USA) and Janet Lang (Brown University, USA): “When Empathy Failed: Why US-Soviet Détente Collapsed in the Carter-Brezhnev Years.” Commented upon by Christian Ostermann, director of CWIHP, this contribution verged mainly on the concept of “empathy, “which the authors adopted both as a methodological resource and as an explicative category for the events of the late 1970s. As a methodological resource, historians seek to empathize with the protagonists of the events they describe: hence, Blight and Lang examined the Carter-Reagan-Brezhnev years using the critical oral history method, which combines historiographical findings and primary sources with oral interviews of former policymakers. But, according to Blight and Lang, empathy should also be the “next big thing” in the study of war, peace and conflict. In substance, they claimed, no period in the history of the Cold War exceeded the late 1970s in the figurative “distance” between the stated objectives of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the actual outcome of their efforts. The erosion of empathy and the collapse of détente in the second half of the 1970s were in fact the subject of the many contributions to



Leopoldo Nuti (Roma Tre), Samuel F. Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center), Ennio Di Nolfo (Florence) and Christian Ostermann (CWIHP) at the April 2006 Artimino Conference

the conference.

The first group of panels depicted a complex picture of the many facets of the crisis of détente after 1975. The first panel, entitled “After Helsinki,” dealt with the long-term effects of the CSCE in undermining the Soviet Union’s hold on the Eastern European countries, with particular reference to the issues connected to the Third Basket on “human rights.” Patrick Vaughan (Jagellonian University of Krakow, Poland) highlighted the approach to CSCE in the Carter administration, particularly the view taken by Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who largely drove the US towards viewing Helsinki as a resource rather than as a retreat vis-à-vis the USSR. According to Vaughan, whose paper was based mainly on Brzezinski’s personal archive and on several interviews with Brzezinski himself, the national security adviser was one of the few “hardliners” in the United States who did not interpret Helsinki as a Yalta II, thereby avoiding the wholesale condemnation of the Final Act that many expected in the United States from President Ford in 1975. The possibilities opened in the following years to US foreign policy by the CSCE’s “Third Basket”, were addressed in particular by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive), who analyzed the KGB and the Soviet government’s response to the emergence of an organized human rights movement after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act. Her paper discussed Soviet interests and expectations in the CSCE negotiations, as well as the differences within the Politburo regarding the inclusion of the human rights provisions. Savranskaya presented new evidence from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, as well as from the personal diaries and memoirs of Soviet politicians and diplomats. The paper emphasized the efforts of Soviet dissidents to use the Final Act to put pressure on the repressive state apparatus and highlight human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and the authorities’ response to the new wave of dissent at home



Kristina Spohr-Readman (LSE), Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), Saki Dockrill (King's College London) and Enrico Fardella (CIMA) at the April 2006 Artimino Conference

and its foreign support. Andrzej Paczkowski (Polish Academy of Science, Poland) considered the “Helsinki effect” in his paper on the authorities and the opposition in Poland between 1976 and 1986, based on several Polish archives, including the Archive of the Institute for National Remembrance. According to Paczkowski, the belief that the Helsinki agreements could discourage the authorities from deploying repression became increasingly popular among the opposition movements since 1976. As a symptom of this perception, his paper recalled, for example, that, shortly after Helsinki, Polish party leader Gierek took care to limit the number of prisoners who could be regarded as political and proclaimed an “act of pardon,” releasing the majority of internees detained after earlier disturbances. While the objective influence played by the Helsinki agreements in undermining Soviet control in Eastern Europe was recognized by all speakers, Sarah Snyder (Georgetown University) focused on the “subjective” intentions of those that dealt with the post-Helsinki phase. In particular, she questioned the “crudely drawn dichotomy” that drew a sharp distinction between US President Jimmy Carter’s forceful support for human rights and Ronald Reagan’s scepticism about, criticism of, and supposed shift away from Carter’s human rights policy. Based on records from the Reagan Library, Snyder argued that Reagan came to support the CSCE as a meaningful forum for East-West relations, and his “unexpected” commitment to human rights facilitated change in the communist bloc, particularly after Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1984.

The second panel addressed the first dramatic confrontation that marked the end of détente in Europe, focusing on the Euromissiles crisis of 1978-83 (NATO’s deployment of the cruise missiles “Gryphon” and “Pershing II” and the Warsaw Pact’s deployment of the “SS-20” intermediate range nuclear missiles). All papers converged in showing that the crisis was not simply a US-Soviet affair. By taking a longer perspective, stretching back to the late 1960s, Leopoldo Nuti (CIMA-University of Roma Tre) was able to assess the technological side of the story, the

overall context of the transatlantic strategic debate in the early 1970s, the inter-alliance debates on NATO policies, détente and arms control in the mid-1970s, and some of the different Western national rationales for the choices of 1979. From this standpoint, NATO’s Euromissiles decision was a very difficult and unpopular choice, at a time when a large part of the public opinion of the West had become accustomed to seeing détente as a more or less permanent feature of the international system. Nuti’s most interesting conclusion was that Soviet foreign policy paradoxically ended up facilitating the implementation of a NATO policy, as the deployment of the SS-20s and the emotional impulse generated by the appearance of the new Soviet weapons systems provided the West with the necessary leverage to implement a project of weapons modernization which might as well have remained in a limbo. Helga Haftendorn (Free University of Berlin) explored the causes of how and why the ambivalent consensus within NATO on the 1967 Harmel Report broke apart. Using Cold War International History Project sources, US Congressional documents, British and German parliamentary records and the rich body of memoirs and newspapers articles of the time, she showed how the consensus did not survive the contravening domestic pressures on both sides of the Atlantic which questioned the wisdom of détente. The signature of the Helsinki Final Act was overshadowed by the heavy criticism of the SALT and ABM agreements by both defense conservatives in the US and Europeans weary of American-Soviet bilateralism. In Haftendorn’s analysis, the division was not so much between Europeans and Americans, but rather between détente-minded liberals who emphasized cooperation, and anti-communist conservatives who gave priority to containment and confrontation, in a crucial period in which détente turned sour and a “small ice age” in East-West relations occurred. The attitude taken on Euromissiles by selected groupings of countries was analyzed thoroughly in the following three papers in the panel. In particular, the Harmel Report was also considered by Vincent Dujardin (Catholic University of Louvain), although in a different fashion and on the basis of primary sources from French and Belgian state archives. In fact, while the Harmel Report had marked the high point for the international position of a small country such as Belgium within NATO structures, the Euromissiles story told a different truth: the role played by the small European countries, namely Belgium, in the unfolding of the Euromissile crisis was termed by Dujardin as nothing less than “insignificant.” Gerhard Wettig (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Cologne) focused on the Soviet attitude towards the “dual-track decision” (i.e. NATO’s counterdeployment, conditional on the SS-20 threat), concluding that only when the dual-track project was put on NATO Council’s agenda, the Kremlin began to react. The Soviet leaders were confident that it was possible to prevent NATO’s missile deployment with no concession on the SS-20s. This conviction was based on the assessment that, despite heavy US pressure, only West German, British, and Italian allies had really supported the dual-track decision, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway had tacitly opposed it. Eventually, after Chancellor Kohl’s visit to Moscow in early July

1983, there were no more doubts about the Federal Republic's and its allies' willingness to abide by NATO's decision. Marilena Gala (CIMA-University of Roma Tre) emphasized some crucial developments which occurred in the relationship between the United States and European allies after the Helsinki accords. In particular, her contribution focused on the radical transformation eventually produced by the CSCE on shared Western security priorities, bringing to the conclusion that the result of this deep transformation in Transatlantic relations emerged a decade later, when the Reagan administration engaged in the eager promotion of SDI, in spite of the doubts and uneasiness of the West Europeans.

The concluding panel of the first day of the conference focused on the relationship between technological and military advances and the economic bases they rely on. Dima Adamsky (Haifa University) offered the audience important insights on the "conceptual military competition," showing that the Soviet Union was probably ahead of the United States in elaborating new military concepts in the early 1980s. The analysis of a large set of US and Soviet military publications showed, according to Adamsky, that in this field of military policy the United States was able to catch up only gradually during the 1980s. John Prados (National Security Archive) highlighted how the financing of the program for the Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as "Star Wars"), involving a high budgetary exposure under the Reagan administration, was made possible under the strong pressures of a group of insiders in the Reagan White House (the "policy entrepreneurs"), who constantly and purposely overestimated the data on Soviet strategic capabilities. The use of the National Intelligence Estimates by the Reagan administration was strongly questioned by Prados' paper. Sean Kalic (Command and General Staff College), analyzed the announcement by President Reagan on SDI, the reactions it sparked, and the diplomatic activity that took place afterwards, in order to clear up the major disagreements with the Western European allies. The political meaning of the military and technological innovations that took place during the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, would be difficult to understand without a precise configuration of the economic context that made them possible. This topic was also addressed by Fiorella Favino (CIMA-University of Urbino), whose paper dealt with Washington's economic diplomacy in the second half of the 1970s. According to Favino, after 1975 the United States recovered the hegemony it had lost in the first part of the decade, thanks to the convening of a series of summits with its European and Japanese allies (which would conventionally be called the G-6 and G-7). As pointed out by the panel's chair, Tom Blanton (National Security Archive), the acceptance of the dollar as the world's main reserve currency, which came about in 1976, was indirectly at the root of Reagan's ability to finance his weapons program.

The second session opened on Friday, April 28, with a panel presenting a complex view of the European integration process after the first enlargement of 1973. The panel suggested that the

West Europeans were initially cast aside by the renewal of Cold War tensions after Helsinki. In the longer run, however, they were also able to exploit the cooperation experimented with at the CSCE in order to promote collective strengthening within the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC). The complex dynamics between national aspirations and collective interests were at the heart of the work by Ilaria Poggiolini (CIMA-University of Pavia) on Britain's role in the EEC after 1973. Poggiolini showed how British leaders first cultivated serious hopes to exert their leadership in the EEC, by taking an unprecedented pro-European stance under the Heath government. With Heath's fall in 1974, traditional Euro-skepticism made a comeback, and leadership expectations literally "ran in the sand." National rivalries notwithstanding, the European Community was strengthened in the late 1970s and early 1980s through the enhancement of monetary and political cooperation. The assumption that the EEC began to move towards ambitious goals in the global arena, although with enormous care not to upset the United States, was the backdrop of the essay by Eleonora Guasconi (CIMA-University of Urbino). Under the technical arrangements of the European Monetary System, in particular, lay the will of the European leadership to emancipate themselves from the custody of the US dollar. Based on the archival sources of the Historical Archives of the European Union, Guasconi's paper reached the conclusion that the monetary plans and the political plans, such as the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981, should be read in continuity with one another. A similar conclusion was reached also by David Burigana (CIMA-University of Padua), whose essay conducted a rigorous analysis of the consolidation of a truly European air industry between 1974 and 1984. The strategic significance of air technology, and its obvious dual-use implications, witnessed, according to Burigana, the willingness by powerful European actors to leave behind the condition of minority long played by Europe under US dominance. In this context, where military alliance coexisted with symptoms of economic rivalry, new factors came about to pose new challenges to Cold War participants: a larger – and more problematic – conception of European integration was in fact the subject of an accurate study by Werner Lippert (Indiana University of Pennsylvania, USA), which highlighted the complex issue of East-West trade. Once again, the Helsinki agreements were the necessary starting point to examine the dynamics that East-West trade brought about, at least from a Western perspective. As ties strengthened and economic interdependencies consolidated, all-European trade could be seen both as a resource and as an obstacle on the road for the elaboration of Western strategies in the late Cold War.

The sixth panel focused on the examination of one of the most dramatic crises of that period, namely the Polish Crisis of 1981-1982. Three panelists debated the events that took place in Warsaw, and produced a valuable set of documentary evidence to discuss the stance taken by several countries on the development of the Solidarnosc movement and on its repression by the Polish leadership. Petre Opris (University A. I. Cuza, Iasi)

explained the attitude taken by Romania in the course of the Polish events: the increasing social tensions in Poland and the emergence of the Polish workers' large demonstrations in the second half of August 1980 augmented the anxiety not only in Moscow, but also in Bucharest. Nicolae Ceaucescu tried to control the creeping domestic protest with an ideological make-up. But the fundamental ideas of Romanian communism continued to be Stalinist, and Ceaucescu's limited reforms amounted only to some modifications to the organization of the Party. According to Opris, the Polish events marked also the acme of a crisis in the process of sustained economic growth promoted by Ceaucescu, and the beginning of an unsolvable political crisis. Two valuable contributions discussed the stance of the two superpowers on the Polish events: Mark Kramer (Harvard University) analyzed the attitude of the USSR, while Douglas Selvage (Office of the Historian of the US Department of State) gave several insights on the position taken by the United States. According to Kramer, even though there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Politburo would have sent troops into Poland to prevent all-out civil war and the violent collapse of the communist regime, the members of the Politburo did not want to make a final decision about "extreme measures" unless a dire emergency forced them to. In Kramer's view, this calculation was amply borne out: the striking success of Jaruzelski's "internal solution" on 12-13 December 1981 spared Soviet leaders from having to make any final decision about the dispatch of Soviet troops to Poland. Nevertheless, the way Soviet restraint was implemented witnessed that "the Brezhnev Doctrine, far from having died an early death, outlived Brezhnev himself and remained in effect." Selvage examined the place of the Madrid CSCE review conference in the diplomatic tangle between the Reagan administration and its West European allies over relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the adoption of martial law in Poland. By analyzing the events of the Madrid Conference, the paper aimed at explaining why the Reagan administration agreed in 1983 to a concluding document that provided for the convocation of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, a Soviet desideratum that Washington had been resisting until then. The reason why the United States remained engaged at Madrid, Selvage concluded, was that the conference presented an opportunity to display Western unity at a time when Washington's NATO allies were publicly resisting US demands for economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. For the Europeans, going on the verbal offensive against Poland and the Soviet Union at Madrid was "the price they had to pay to ensure that the US remained at the conference, the lesser evil in comparison to other alternatives," such as joining the US in imposing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, foregoing disarmament talks, or eroding tenuous support at home for NATO's dual-track decision. While regional crises, such as the Polish, determined peaks of tension that needed to be managed politically, Robert Nation (US Army War College) addressed the underlying military doctrines of the two conflicting alliances, focusing in particular on the Warsaw Pact. The war plans prepared by NATO and the Warsaw Pact demonstrated what warfare between great power peer competi-

tors risked producing, in an age of rapid technological change and weapons of mass destruction, a kind of Armageddon that was in no one's best interest. Nation's intriguing observation is that the Soviet Union was the first to appreciate and attempt to draw lessons from this conclusion: no longer being in a position to play with scenarios for *guerre à outrance* against its dangerous Western adversaries, the USSR designed war plans that were more aligned with real national capacity, and better adapted to the exigencies of the existing security environment. The NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff in Europe shed a harsh light on the changing nature of modern war, and on the relevance of security strategies grounded in military competition and doctrines of preemption. Based on the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Beatrice Heuser (University of the Bundeswehr, Munich) offered a number of insights on the inner debate which took place within the Soviet leadership in the first half of the 1980s, between the "hysterical hawks" (among which she mentioned the Soviet Minister of Defence, Dimitri Ustinov), and the "sober civilian analysts" (such as Leonid Samyatin, Director of the Department for International Information of the Central Committee of the Communist Party). Her conclusion was that "the knot of inevitable war, of which Khrushchev had warned during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was not cut with a Gordian stroke but with the patient fiddling of many hands."

Whereas Eastern Europe lived through the crisis of legitimacy and consensus of the Soviet system, in the West Eurocommunism, centered on the Italian Communist Party (PCI), attempted to develop a Western European type of communism, distinct from the monolithic Soviet model. While Eurocommunism potentially represented a challenge for both the East and the West, in fact it was way more effective in the East. Laura Fasanaro (CIMA-University of Roma Tre) focused on the obstacles that the PCI and its Spanish and French partners in the Eurocommunist movement had to overcome, particularly those coming from the once brotherly parties of the East. Fasanaro's research, carried out in the East German archives of the ultra-orthodox Socialist Unity Party (SED), discussed two different periods. In the years 1975-79, the renewed Eurocommunist appeal for respect of liberty and human rights in the Communist countries, together with a more general criticism of the governments of the Soviet bloc, circulated in Western as well as in Eastern Europe, therefore publicly challenging the unity of the Communist bloc. In the second period, when *détente* was finally overwhelmed by NATO's "dual-track" decision on Euromissiles and by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979), the Western communists' attitude towards the issues of war and peace gained a crucial importance in their relations with the Communist parties of the East. In a sense, concluded Fasanaro, this attitude seemed to their Eastern brother parties "even more relevant—and puzzling—than the challenge already launched with Eurocommunism." A lively debate took place among the panelists on what were the reasons for the success and the early decline of the Eurocommunist proposal, particularly in relation to the Italian case. Silvio Pons (University of Roma Tor Vergata), who carried out his research in the archives

of the PCI, explained the parabola of the Eurocommunist movement, and that of the PCI in particular, as the outcome of internal factors. According to Pons, the leader of the party, Enrico Berlinguer, searched for an impossible third way between Soviet communism and West European social-democracy. This search was pursued with great skill, but failed to recognize that social-democracy was the necessary landing place for the PCI, thereby bringing the party to a deadlock before the end of the 1970s. Duccio Basosi (CIMA-University of Florence) and Giovanni Bernardini (CIMA-University of Padua) used a wide variety of sources (US Treasury and White House archives, German SPD archives, Italian State Archives, PCI public sources and memoirs), in the attempt at placing the parabola of the PCI and Eurocommunism within a broader context, allowing for international economic considerations. In their judgment, the defeat of Eurocommunism was only part of the general defeat of the working-class parties (either communist, socialist, social-democratic or dirigiste) and of Keynesian economics, at a time when neo-liberal laissez-faire solutions were beginning to change the entire landscape of politics and society in the West (first in the US, then in Europe and in the rest of the world). This theme, as seen by a prominent character of German social democracy, was also addressed by Bernd Rother (Willy Brandt Foundation, Berlin) in his paper on the activity of Willy Brandt as the president of the Socialist International after 1976. The search for a “third way,” this time between capitalism and socialism, was the leading tune of Brandt’s presidency, although with varying degrees of success. The Nicaraguan situation, with the Sandinista revolution in 1979, was of particular concern to Brandt, who did not hesitate to confront the views held by the US administration. The important role of personalities was at the core of the contribution by Oliver Bange (Mannheim University). Bange analyzed the peculiar relationship between Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker in the years between 1974 and 1982 and their attempts to keep “inner-German relations off the return of Cold War confrontation.” By using a wide range of documents from the archives of SPD, SED, and Stasi, the personal archives of Helmut Schmidt as well as British, French and American sources, Bange offered a comprehensive and coherent picture of the complicated web of interests and influences—domestic, economic, intra-party, intra-bloc and international—that conditioned the two German leaders’ action and the survival of détente in the relations between the two Germanies.

Whereas most of the aforementioned panels followed a thematic approach to the “globalization of the Cold War,” aimed at showing how the bipolar confrontation entered a time of greater complexity, the three concluding panels of the conference enlarged the scope to the “global” dimension reached by the bipolar confrontation in the geographic meaning of the term. They covered the expansion of the Cold War to Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The panel on Latin America dealt almost entirely with US policy in the area and provided a debate on the conceptualisation

of the American role in the world in the period under scrutiny. It also underscored the impact that the revived bipolar confrontation had on the choices and styles of the US presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, particularly in such a sensitive area as the Western Hemisphere. Max Guderzo (CIMA-University of Florence) examined Carter’s foreign policy in Latin America, underscoring the peculiar approach of the Democratic presidencies to Latin American issues in terms of “enlightened self-interest.” Carter’s pivotal concept included the idea that the protection of human rights was a key element of the strategic struggle against any Soviet residual hopes of regional or global supremacy. According to the evaluation of the NSC on the accomplishments of the Carter Administration in the area, it changed the way the people in Latin American and the Caribbean viewed the US. The mighty neighbor was associated with human rights, democracy and moderate peaceful social change, and this new perspective enhanced US influence in the area. Using a representative sample of documents produced by the Carter administration, Guderzo provided evidence of the presidency’s awareness of empire-building in the crucial years that the Soviet Union chose to launch its global challenge to the “free world.” In Carter’s agenda for Latin America, Venezuela was probably meant to play a focal role, as Daniela Vignati (University of Milan) suggested in her paper. Cultivating Venezuela made sense economically and ideologically. Venezuela was one of the most stable and lasting democracies in South America and had taken a bold stand against dictatorial regimes, therefore meeting Carter’s principles in foreign policy. Secondly, the Venezuelan government was among the leaders of the *terciomundismo*, and hence could be an ideal interlocutor for the American administration aspiring at establishing a global approach to Latin America in the frame of North-South economic issues. Finally, Carter’s will to provide the United States with a consistent energy policy, in order to escape vulnerability to the blackmail of the middle-Eastern producers, increased the importance of a dialogue with Venezuela. The improved relationship demonstrated its value in dealing with some important issues, such as the Panama Canal negotiations and the US Caribbean policy. On the other hand, Caracas failed to help the US in freezing oil prices. Washington overestimated its own persuasive powers and demonstrated a scant knowledge of Venezuelan oil policy and history. Carter’s foreign policy principles of human rights, multilateralism and US non-intervention abroad were at the core of the analysis proposed by William Michael Schmidli (Cornell University) on the Nicaraguan crisis in 1978-79. Supported by US archival sources, Schmidli demonstrated the failure of the Carter administration’s policy in Nicaragua, due to a myopic adherence, first and foremost, to the principle of non-intervention. Although US government analysts provided useful and precise reports on the situation, their advice was ignored by top-level policy-makers. The Carter administration, intent on avoiding US entanglement, limited its response to Somoza’s human rights violations—the most significant human rights crisis in the hemisphere—and also failed to fully account for the multilateral nature of opposition to the dictatorship. The White House actively downplayed US

involvement and limited coordinated Latin American efforts to oust Somoza, thereby giving the dictator more time to build up his armed forces and decisively contributing to the failure of the Frente Amplio Opositor, by all accounts Nicaragua's most amenable political alternative towards a democratic moderate regime. Stefano Luconi (CIMA-University of Florence) proposed an overall examination of the US intervention in Grenada as an evidence of the shift from rhetorical to military offensive in Reagan's global roll-back of communism. After Carter's setbacks in foreign affairs, Reagan aimed at restoring the power, respect and prestige of the United States in the world. He intended not only to resist Soviet expansionism, but to reverse the Communist gains that had occurred in developing countries during the 1970s. Grenada offered the Reagan administration a good opportunity for gaining the respect and support of the American public and for demonstrating to Caribbean and Central American leftist regimes that the United States was once again ready to prevent any shift to Communism in the area. By failing to consult Congress and antagonizing its major European allies, the president made it clear that he would not tolerate interference with his plans to re-establish US hegemony and to stand up to those who threatened the nation's alleged interests.

The second panel of the "geographic" set saw the African events of the late 1970s under the spotlight. Nancy Mitchell (North Carolina State University, Raleigh) previewed some considerations from her forthcoming book on Carter's policy in Africa, which will focus on the crisis in the Horn in 1977-1978. Drawing on a wide variety of sources, both from archives and collections, Mitchell concluded that the crisis in the Horn was not "a story of naked Soviet aggression and US flaccidity." Her contribution to the conference actually pointed out the intense difficulties experienced by both Washington and Moscow in the periphery of the Cold War: the US did not apparently anticipate the Cuban involvement, and did not have any leverage to restrain the Somali dictator Siad Barre, just as the USSR could not gain much from helping the Ethiopian dictator Menghistu. Sara Lorenzini (University of Trento) presented the outcomes of her carefully crafted research on the competition of the "two Germanies" in Africa, bringing about the dimension of East-South relations at a time of deep crisis in West-South ones. Her main thesis stressed how the new "international history" of the Cold War, drawing on Eastern archives as well as on the Western ones, has finally led historians to regard the foreign policy of the East European countries not simply as a proxy for the USSR. In fact, the important revelations coming from the archives of the former East German foreign ministry show that, while still relying on the USSR to achieve international recognition, the GDR actually pushed its own economic priorities in its commitment to the African continent (namely, in the mediations between Somalia and Ethiopia and in the scientific-technical relations with Angola, Zambia, Nigeria and Congo). Relying on rich documentation from the Jimmy Carter Library, Maria Stella Rognoni (CIMA-University of Florence) analyzed the role of the US government in two critical regions of the African context, namely Congo and Angola. The main argument of her contribution was that American

policy-making in Africa from the 1960s through the end of the 1970s was one of continuity: despite a desire to give rise to a new African-American partnership, local developments in Africa repeatedly called for Cold War behaviors. Rognoni's conclusions are twofold: in terms of bipolar politics the US attitude seems to have proved positive for long-range American interests. On the other hand, the persistent use of African territory by both superpowers for their own Cold War goals seems to have produced negative results as far as the state-building process of African countries was concerned, with an impact that is still visible today. Barbara Zanchetta (CIMA-University of Urbino) came to similar conclusions in her paper on Carter's policy towards the Horn of Africa (which also offered interesting insights into Carter's policy in Southwest Asia). Noting how one can distinguish between two distinct phases in Carter's presidency, Zanchetta argues that initially Carter followed Brzezinski's assessment that the international context created no reason for alarm in 1977, and therefore no direct US involvement was deemed necessary in the complex web of African problems. The shift back to the predominance of Cold War considerations arrived in 1979, with the fall of the Shah in Iran. Sources from the Jimmy Carter Library actually indicate that, after 1979, in order to achieve these objectives, the US had to assure its direct presence in the area, securing its forces' access to military facilities in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, Diego Garcia and Somalia. Massimiliano Cricco (CIMA-University of Urbino) presented a paper on Libya. Since the coming to power of colonel Qadhafi, Cricco claimed, Libya has often played the part of a pendulum, swinging sometimes towards the US, sometimes towards the USSR, and sometimes flirting with the PLO. After



Samuel Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center), Ennio Di Nolfo (Florence) and Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt University) at the April 2006 Artimino Conference

deteriorating during the Carter years, the relationship between the US and Libya became one of true tension and strain when Reagan took control of the White House. Cricco's careful assessment of the sources from the Declassified Documents Reference System shows the inability of the US president to gauge the impact of the bombing of Tripoli in 1986, which actually ended up strengthening Qadhafi's power.

The third part of the session on "Globalizing the Cold War" was chaired by Saki Dockrill (King's College, London), and focused

on Asia. Enrico Fardella (CIMA-University of Florence) focused on Carter's China policy. His paper highlighted Carter's results in building a strategic partnership between the US and China on the eve of the Sino-Vietnamese war. Within the context of the ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism—Fardella concluded—the progressive shift into a market economy of the most populated communist country in the world and its involvement in the international trade marked a massive ideological defeat for the communist bloc. The other large country of the Asian continent was analyzed by Mariele Merlati (University of Milan) in his paper on US policy towards India during the Carter years. Based on documents from the Carter Library and on a number of accounts from prominent Department of State officials, Merlati's paper gave an analysis on India's case, as part of the US government's attempt at developing a new approach to the developing countries. According to Merlati, even though the precise content of Carter's Indian policy has not been sufficiently clarified yet, the administration's North-South policy and its effort to cultivate "emerging regional influential" powers proved to be rather ineffective. Either because of the dichotomy in US foreign policy decision making between the National Security Council and the State Department, or because of the limited knowledge of the country, the United States was incapable of elaborating a broader, longer term perspective. According to Merlati, Brzezinski, who created the idea of a policy addressing "regional influential countries," was totally absent from the economic planning of that policy. As for the Middle East, Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive) offered a very insightful survey of the United States and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. Based on a variety of sources, many made available only from recent declassifications, Byrne's paper laid out new evidence on the conflict and the United States' role in it. According to Byrne, in the years of the war the Gulf Arab states were clearly an important factor in the making of events. Their enormous wealth made it possible for the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, to remain afloat even when his production capacity had been significantly reduced. Gulf Arab states were also able to keep Washington and Moscow from intervening beyond a certain point, while they tried to strike a balance between accepting military aid for defensive purposes and not appearing to be too dependent on the superpowers for domestic political reasons. Finally, the United Nations—the Security Council as well as the office of the Secretary General—deserves credit for its role in keeping the crisis from expanding and eventually bringing it to an end. The role of the Middle East in the years of the Second Cold War was also discussed in the paper of Alberto Tonini (CIMA-University of Florence). Quoting from Tonini's title, Saudi Arabia was "the precious friend" of the US in the global Cold War. The perspective that Tonini stressed was that Saudi Arabia interests were clear: oil and political stability. The main Cold War commitments of the Saudis were their assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, intervention in the Somali-Ethiopian war, and support for Eritrea. Tonini's conclusion was that, during the Carter and Reagan administrations, Saudi Arabia had no capacity to project its military forces outside the Arabian peninsula. Despite

the fact that the Saudi involvement in the global Cold War was largely financial, it was significant for the success of US policy. Soviet involvement in the Middle East after Helsinki was the focus of the paper by Maria Grazia Enardu (CIMA-University of Florence), who dealt with Jewish immigration to Israel. The exodus of more than one million Jews from the Soviet Union became massive from 1985 onwards. The main causes were the Helsinki agreements and the protests of several Jewish dissidents with links to the West that eventually became a source of serious embarrassment for the Soviet Union. According to Enardu, "unfortunately, almost all those Soviet Jews wanted to go to the United States, not to Israel," and it took some behind-the-scenes negotiations between the Israeli prime minister Shamir and president Reagan to direct the flux to Israel.

The concluding session was opened by a final round-table. Methodological and substantial conclusions were sketched out, discussing the value of the sources available to convey the sense of the complex picture of the globalization of the Cold War, as well as the extent to which the conference had achieved its goals. CIMA Chairman Ennio Di Nolfo suggested focusing on a set of keywords, the first of which was "perception." The conference presented the clear notion that the perception of the impact of the Helsinki Final Act was much higher in Eastern Europe than many in the West believed. The Western difficulty in grasping how Helsinki had been received in the East introduced another keyword, "security." Many contributions suggested that the CSCE did not enhance global security. The feeling in the Soviet leadership that its legitimacy was hitting a low point probably sparked the late Soviet attempts at playing a global policy in Africa and Asia, which elicited the American reaction and exported the contradictions of the Cold War on a truly global scale. On the other hand, Di Nolfo reminded the audience that the US, if not lacking legitimacy to the same extent as the USSR, fully exploited the relaxation of tensions in the superpower relationship in order to play an aggressive international economic policy. This caused several troubles with the West Europeans, but eventually put the US in a better economic and technological condition to cope with the globalization of the Cold War. This conclusion opened the way to the subsequent remarks by William Burr (National Security Archive), who highlighted the continuities and discontinuities of the 1975-1985 period in relation to US foreign policy after World War Two. From this standpoint, while the issue of "human rights" from Helsinki's Third Basket did mark a discontinuity, or at least a novelty, continuities seem to prevail: Burr pointed in particular to the long-standing US objective of the "open door policy." The objective of a world-scale free market, and the geopolitical assumption that free trade would prevent wars among the Western powers, pervaded the policymakers of the 1930s and 1940s as well as those from the Ford and Carter administrations. On the other hand, said Burr, the intrinsic link between the open door policy and the conception of US security remained constant throughout the decades. Burr doubted, however, that the architects of détente could nurture goals of status quo stabilization, while he thought much more probable that they

tried to modify the architecture of the USSR and the world by means of relaxation of tensions. This also sparked some clashes with European allies, which did not share the same objectives and which enjoyed, in the mid-1970s, a period of heightened political cooperation that peaked in Helsinki. This was confirmed by the oral history contribution of Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (Italian ambassador at the CSCE), who also confirmed the need to fully assess the different perceptions of the Helsinki Final Act in East and West, with the East probably developing a clearer picture of the changes that had been set in motion. Perception was also the starting point for Vojtech Mastny (Parallel History Project, Zurich), whose speech concluded the round-table: from a methodological point of view, the need to exploit new methods such as critical oral history, stressing empathy and perception, needs to be balanced by a historical outlook on the past. According to Mastny, both Helsinki and Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 were two events which are now seen as crucial turning points in history, but were simply not conceived as such by their contemporaries. From a more substantive point of view, Mastny questioned whether the conference had indeed reached a clear verdict on the "globalization of the Cold War": on the one hand, in fact, the two superpowers extended their cold-war rivalry on a global scale, but this did not necessarily imply that the Cold War had gone global, since most conflicts had local origins and finally ended with local settlements.

Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt University, Nashville) and Samuel Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center) elaborated on the prospects for future research: Schwartz focused on those subjects that still need better understanding. The reassertion of US power, well represented by the comparison he made between Robert Altman's "Nashville" of 1975 with John Milius's "Red Dawn" of 1984, still suffers from too much military triumphalism, while not enough attention has been paid so far to economics and the importance of multilateral institutions. Domestic policies and their relation with foreign policy are crucial factors, that require further investigation, from the international dimension of domestic political terrorism to the paradox of the Reagan administration, engaged in fighting the unions at home and supporting them in the East (namely in Poland). Finally, he discussed the communication revolution that, rather than globalizing politics, globalized the way politics are represented, and deeply changed the way the public thought about international affairs (from the West European peace movement against the Euromissiles, to the shock of the hostages in the US embassy in Tehran in 1979). Wells stressed the need to acquire a complex conception of the historian's job—a duty which, in his view, the conference fully addressed. After mentioning the richness of Pierre Renouvin's method and legacy in building an international history which took into account economics, technology and social affairs as well as diplomatic ones, Wells concluded by mentioning the perspectives opened by the availability of new sources and by the application of new technologies in opening, storing, accessing, and organizing documents.



Conference "From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation" (Artimino, Italy, April 2006).

Conference Program

From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation

Panel 1: When Empathy Failed:

Why US-Soviet Détente Collapsed in the Carter-Brezhnev

Years: M. Byrne, J. Blight, J. M. Lang, C. Ostermann

Panel 2: After Helsinki:

J. Hershberg, V. Zubok, P. Vaughan,
S. Savranskaya, A. Paczkowsky, S. Snyder

Panel 3: The Euromissiles Crisis:

M. Cremasco, F. Bozo, H. Haftendorn, M. Gala,
L. Nuti, G. Wettig, V. Dujardin

Panel 4: Strategic Defense and Political Problems:

T. Blanton, M. Cremasco, D. Adamsky,
J. Prados, S. Kalic, F. Favino

Panel 5: European Integration:

M. Guderzo, P. Winand, I. Poggiolini,
M.E. Guasconi, W. Lippert, D. Burigana

Panel 6: Crises, Realignments, and the Second Cold War:

S. Wells, V. Mastny, P. Opris, D. Selvage,
R. Nation, B. Heuser, M. Kramer

Panel 7: Eurocommunism:

B. Bagnato, T. Blanton, L. Fasanaro, S. Pons,
B. Rother, O. Bange, D. Basosi, G. Bernardini

Panel 8A: Globalizing the Cold War (Part One):

P. Olla, C. Ostermann, M. Guderzo,
M. Schmidli, S. Luconi, D. Vignati

Panel 8B: Globalizing the Cold War (Part Two):

L. Nuti, J. Hershberg, N. Mitchell, S. Lorenzini,
M.S. Rognoni, B. Zanchetta, M. Cricco

Panel 8C: Globalizing the Cold War (Part Three):

S. Dockrill, K. Spohr-Readman, E. Fardella, M. Merlati,
M. Byrne, A. Tonini, M.G. Enardu

Panel 9: Roundtable:

E. Di Nolfo, L.V. Ferraris, V. Mastny, W. Burr

Panel 10: Conclusions:

T. Schwartz, S. Wells

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War: A CWIHP Critical Oral History Conference

Scholars and former government officials convened for a day of discussion on the origins, conduct, and impact of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The critical oral history workshop, held on July 19, was co-sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Middle East Program, in cooperation with the National Security Archive at George Washington University. Participants discussed new historical evidence and provided a stark reminder of how closely connected the current turmoil in the Gulf is to that earlier war and the politics of the time.

To supplement the discussion and shed new light on the subject, the workshop sponsors compiled and distributed two substantial document readers, one filled with recently declassified US government materials culled from the National Security Archive's public collections, the other consisting of dozens of items gathered by CWIHP from Bulgarian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Iranian, and Russian sources especially for the conference.

In the past, CWIHP and the National Security Archive have hosted similar history workshops involving former high-level officials from several countries on such topics as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and, more recently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (See report on 2002 Afghanistan conference in *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 14/15, 139-141). But unlike their previous workshops, organizers were hindered by visa problems which prevented former Iranian and Iraqi officials from attending the meeting. Instead, the discussion focused on better understanding US, UN, and Soviet bloc perspectives of the war.

Notable panelists included former Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes; Ambassador William Eagleton, former chief of mission to a number of American embassies in the Middle East including Baghdad; George Cave, a former CIA official and chief of station in Tehran; Giandomenico Picco, the United Nations official who played the central role in obtaining the ceasefire in August 1988; and Ambassador William Miller, former US ambassador to Ukraine whose first Foreign Service post was in Iran. Two East European diplomats who served in Iran attended: Henner Fuertig from Germany and Zsigmund Kazmer from Hungary. A distinguished group of scholars provided thoughtful questions and helped guide the discussion, including Phebe Marr, Shaul Bakhsh, Judith Yaphe, and Mark Gasiorowski.

New Evidence

The discussion broke new ground in several areas. It is now clear the United States had learned of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's plans to invade Iran a full year in advance. The US Department of State had sent a CIA operative to Tehran to warn the provisional government in mid-October 1979, but the Iranian government took no action. When militants seized the US Embassy on November 4, 1979 and took 66 Americans

hostage, Washington brought that kind of cooperation to an abrupt halt. The hostage crisis lasted until January 1981 when Iran released all remaining American hostages.

These discussions also revealed new information about the origins of the US "tilt" toward Baghdad in late spring of 1982, specifically the role of Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, in bringing it about via Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. American officials viewed the export of the Islamic revolution to the Gulf as a far worse threat than that posed by Saddam Hussein's regime and went to considerable lengths to warm up to Baghdad. To that end, the Americans provided battlefield intelligence to the Iraqis and possibly acquiesced in supplying military equipment from other countries, while publicly adopting a neutral stance on the war.

From 25-28 May 1986, US National Security Adviser Robert "Bud" McFarlane secretly visited Tehran to negotiate the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The delegation was unable to meet with senior Iranian officials and left without resolving the situation. Discussions at the July conference provided new details about the failed mission and how it complicated US policy toward the war.

Although the key participants were former American officials, several new insights into Iranian and Iraqi thinking emerged during the discussion and in reviewing newly declassified documents. A key figure in the interactions with Iranian officials during 1986 explained some of the motivations and priorities of the officials with whom he interacted. For instance, he learned during those conversations, the Iranians were not initially interested in long-term relations with the United States, but were mainly seeking US weapons that conformed to the equipment the Shah had bought from the United States. But over time, it became clear that top-level Iranians saw a more substantial relationship with Washington as increasingly important to Iran's interests, a stance that could eventually have provided the basis for a genuine opening under appropriate circumstances.

The conference did garner useful insights from the international perspective. It was already known that Moscow was ambivalent about the war from the start and tried to discourage Baghdad by temporarily shutting down weapons supplies. According to a former Soviet bloc ambassador to Iran in attendance, the Soviets later renewed arms shipments to Baghdad even as they attempted to improve relations with Tehran. Giandomenico Picco discussed the vital role of the moderate Arab states—Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—both in supporting Iraq's war effort and ultimately, through his collaboration with top UN officials, Saddam Hussein, and members of the Saudi royal family, in negotiating an end to the war.

An Iranian scholar present at the conference said a turning point in Iran's thinking came with the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988 by the American cruiser USS Vincennes. That incident apparently led Ayatollah Khomeini to conclude that Iran could not risk the possibility of US open combat operations against Iran and he decided it was time to end the conflict.

From the Archives

Documents freshly acquired for the conference from East European archives provide a wealth of new detail on East European thinking about the war, about relations with Iraq and Iran, and even about the internal situation in Baghdad.

All of the documents presented were especially relevant in gauging US policy at the time and were discussed by US officials for the first time at this conference. A 7 October 1983 State Department memo suggested a possible US shift from neutrality to prevent Iraq's collapse and improve bilateral relations. Official US policy was neutrality, in an attempt to contain the war and preserve a possible future relationship with Iran, among other goals. The United States then began considering a host of diplomatic, military, and financial efforts to help Iraq develop and restore its damaged oil capability and prevent other countries from selling weapons to Iran. Three years later, as the United States was reeling from the Iran-Contra affair, another State Department memo read: "It is difficult to refute the Iraqis' underlying accusation that the US has armed Iran to kill Iraqis."

One US document also revealed concern over chemical shipments in 1984 and a possible Iraqi intent to manufacture chemical weapons. Numerous other records spell out evidence of Iraq's chemical use and the dilemmas this posed for American policymakers. After the war, in 1989, a document from the East German archives disclosed that Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons but was working to modernize missiles acquired from the Soviet Union.

Other East European documents revealed the enormous toll the war was taking on both countries. The Iraqi leadership wanted to end the war by mid-1986, but could not successfully conclude a political settlement. As the records show, Iraq made extensive efforts to approach each government in the Soviet bloc individually, independent of the Soviet Union, and appeal for expanded economic and other ties, as well as to try to influence Moscow's thinking. Among other things, the Iraqis worked out a deal with Bulgaria to train intelligence operatives, to which they tried unsuccessfully to add a promise from the Bulgarians to provide intelligence on Iran. In general, however, the Soviets and their allies appear to have been at least as worried about the United States seeking advantage from the conflict—up to and including seizing the opportunity to move in militarily—as Washington was about Moscow.

One conclusion to take away from these materials is that each Soviet ally, while agreeing with Moscow that the war served only "imperialist" interests, did not appear to be as closely tied to Kremlin dictates, or even fully aware of Soviet policy preferences, as Western observers might have presumed at the time.

More information on this conference, including a full transcript of the discussion, will become available in the coming months on the CWIHP website at <http://www.cwihp.org>

History through Documents and Memory: Report on a CWIHP Critical Oral History Conference on the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961

By Lise Namikas

Forty-four years after the momentous events in the Congo, former officials and scholars gathered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 23-24 September 2004 to discuss the crisis. The conference on the Congo Crisis was one of a series of critical oral history workshops sponsored by the Cold War International History Project (this one co-sponsored with the Africa Program). In comparison to the others sponsored by the Project, including the July 2004 conference on the Iran-Iraq War, this conference plunged further back in time and was the first to put the spotlight on the Cold War in Africa.

A document reader, compiled in cooperation with former Kennan Institute Scholar Lise Namikas (Louisiana State University) and former CWIHP scholar Sergey Mazov (Russian Academy of Sciences), helped guide the discussion. It included documents gathered specifically for the conference from Russian, European, and US archives. Material recently declassified from US and Belgian archives, as well as several key articles on the crisis and a comprehensive chronology were also included. With few veteran voices left to share their personal accounts of events, the testimonials heard at the conference added meaningfully to the historical record. Participants at the conference included former CIA station chief in the Congo Lawrence Devlin, former Lumumba confidante and Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Kanza, and provincial president of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) Cleophas Kamitatu. Scholars from around the globe included Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences scholar Sergey Mazov, Wilson Center senior scholar and eyewitness to the events Herbert Weiss, Congolese scholar Jean Omasombo, a consultant on the Belgian Parliamentary Commission enquiry into Lumumba's assassination, Congo expert Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, currently director of the UN Development Program's Oslo Governance Center, and histo-



Ambassador Thomas Kanza of Congo (center) with Senator Cleophas Kamitatu (left) and James Hershberg (GWU)

rian Lise Namikas. Representatives from the National Security Archive at George Washington University also attended.

There were several important revelations at the conference, some of the most significant related to the events of September 1960. Lumumba's dismissal on 5 September has long remained controversial. From the memoirs of Belgian ambassador Jean van den Bosch (1986) we know that Congolese President Kasavubu began talking with Belgian advisors about revoking Lumumba's premiership as early as July 1960. It is also known that Kasavubu talked with the UN temporary representative in the Congo, Andrew Cordier, who suggested that he was not adverse to Kasavubu's proposed action. Kamitatu explained that Lumumba was told of Kasavubu's impending move at least a week before his actual dismissal. Upon learning of this threat Lumumba met with Kasavubu and tried to work things out. But then suddenly, on 5 September, Lumumba was dismissed. Cordier immediately closed the airport at Leopoldville and shut off access to the radio, abruptly stymying Lumumba's attempts to rally support. Historians have long suspected US complicity in these events, but there has been little conclusive evidence. Cooperation between US Ambassador Claire Timberlake and Cordier has long been known, but Timberlake's actions in the days before the coup are not. Timberlake, Devlin recalled, met with Kasavubu shortly before the dismissal and confirmed that he too favored revoking Lumumba, but felt that he had been ignored. Timberlake also met with Cordier before the coup, but the contents of their discussion remains unknown. Pushed by the Belgians and assured of indirect US and UN support, Kasavubu acted. Documents translated by CWIHP revealed that the Soviet Union was also working behind the scenes to urge African states, including Ghana, to put its troops serving under the United Nations operation in the Congo at the disposition of the government of the Congo or create a joint command to aid Lumumba. But before African states could discuss either option events again proved dramatic.

On 14 September 1960, Congolese Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu launched his first coup (the second would follow in late 1965). Again, current documentary evidence does not clarify the US role. But, in a blow-by-blow account of the decisive days and hours, Devlin recalled how, under pressure of events, he agreed that the United States government would recognize Mobutu's coup. The relationship between Devlin and Mobutu has long raised suspicion, but Devlin confirmed that he met with Mobutu only two times before 14 September 1960. These early meetings, nevertheless, convinced Devlin that Mobutu had leadership qualities. On the night of his first coup, Mobutu told Devlin that if the United States would guarantee recognition of his new government then the coup would go forward. Not unaware of the risks involved Devlin demurred. Impatiently Mobutu again asked what the US position would be. Devlin recounted how he stepped out on a limb and guaranteed US government support. Had the coup failed, and at least Timberlake thought Mobutu was yielding to pressure to allow Lumumba to return, the entire US position in the Congo could have been jeopardized. As it was, the coup did



CWIHP scholar Sergey Mazov (Moscow) and Lise Namikas (Louisiana State University)

not fail, but it was not an overwhelming success for Mobutu. Washington in effect countermanded the full coup by insisting on the "de-neutralization" of Kasavubu, safeguarding both the US and the UN position in the Congo. Cleophas Kamitatu surmised that the US guarantee might explain why Mobutu neutralized both Lumumba and Kasavubu, since he and others had only been aware of plans to neutralize Lumumba. The conference discussion also provided new details about the funds that Mobutu used to pay his soldiers at the end of September, thereby sealing their loyalty and the coup.

There were other revelations at the conference, particularly about Lumumba's relations with Kasavubu and the West which had deteriorated long before September. The circumstances surrounding the Congo's independence attracted much discussion at the conference, as did the relationship between Lumumba and Kasavubu. The two leaders were long time rivals and Kanza recalled that after a secret agreement with Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), Lumumba had little choice but to support Kasavubu as president. Another important misperception was corrected regarding the long-held impression that Lumumba furiously wrote his inflammatory independence day speech during Kasavubu's speech. In fact Kanza explained that it was written in the days before independence (and, as Jean Omasombo clarified, with the assistance of his European advisors) and reflected Lumumba's growing anger with Belgian attempts to deny him the position of prime minister. The whole episode, along with the many other revelations of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission enquiry, suggests that tension in relations between Belgium and Lumumba was greater than previously assumed and needs to be reassessed.

The Congolese participants explained the importance of the misunderstandings that colored Congolese foreign relations. Thomas Kanza shed light on the importance of the fiasco with Edgar Detwiler, a shady American businessman who proposed to develop and manage Congolese mineral resources. Kanza recounted how Detwiler was introduced to Lumumba by the son of Belgian minister without portfolio, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, helping at least in Lumumba's mind to reconfirm Detwiler's credibility. A disadvantageous and disingenuous contract was signed. The deal was confirmed by the Congolese parliament, although later revoked. After warnings from US



Conference participants (left to right) Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (UNDP, Oslo) and Senator Cleophas Kamitatu (Congo). Background: CWIHP Director Christian F. Ostermann

Ambassador Timberlake, the Guinean and Ghanaian representatives at the United Nations, Diallo Telli and Alex Quaison-Sackey, and even concerned US citizens in the Congo such as the young Herbert Weiss, Lumumba was still surprised that he had not signed a legitimate contract.

In light of the extensive work of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission, the conference did not spend a lot of time on the assassination of Lumumba on 17 January 1961. But it became clear that Lumumba's supporters feared the worst as the deposed prime minister remained under house arrest and then became a prisoner. Kanza revealed that in September he had discussions with Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, whom he called a "showman," and more serious discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the general topic of how to save Lumumba. Kanza learned, with disappointment, that the Soviet Union was apparently in no position to help directly. So he appealed to US President-elect John F. Kennedy through Eleanor Roosevelt. Kanza remembered an informal deal struck with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Kennedy guaranteeing that Lumumba should remain in Leopoldville at least until Kennedy took office and then be brought to Parliament. Kanza also recalled that he asked Kennedy (again via Roosevelt) to intervene to protect Lumumba after he became a prisoner, but Kennedy responded that the handling of prisoners had to be a UN decision. Lumumba was transferred out of Thysville prison on the night of 16 January, an operation conducted by Mobutu's men who carefully skirted UN guards, and assassinated the following day in Katanga.

Documents obtained for the conference from both Russian and German archives offered new details about the Soviet role in the crisis. Evidence from the former East German archives suggests that the Soviet Union supported aid to Antoine Gizenga's "legal" government from December 1960 to March 1961, but did not want to take the international risks involved in delivering that aid. A memorandum of a meeting between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser confirmed that the Soviet Union wanted to send diplomats and military advisors to Stanleyville, but Nasser suggested rather dramatically that the only way to get them into the Congo was to parachute

them. On another occasion, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky told Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's representative in Cairo, that Soviet planes were ready to fly to the Congo, but feared the United Nations forces would shoot them down. Documents also established that early in 1961 Moscow sent \$500,000 to aid Gizenga's "legal" government in Stanleyville. Devlin heard that the payment was to be made in two installments via courier through Sudan. He sent a US operative to distract the courier and snatch the suitcase with \$250,000.

The discussions revealed important details on the Lovanium conference of September 1961, called to form a new government for the Congo. The United States and the United Nations feared that Gizenga would be elected prime minister. As Kamitatu related, the nationalist bloc wanted Gizenga to take the job, but Gizenga refused, fearing a trap. The nationalists then agreed that the "moderate" Cyrille Adoula would be the "least evil" choice, not because they had a change of heart over Adoula, but because he was seen as next best leader who could help re-unify the Congo. Adoula agreed to work with the bloc and, escorted by UN representative Robert Gardiner to Kamitatu's residence, worked through the night with other nationalists forming a new government. At the last minute Gizenga surprisingly accepted the post of vice prime minister but remained in Stanleyville (after a short visit to Leopoldville), leaving his intentions open to suspicion. Gizenga's suspicions of Adoula ran deep at least partially a result of Adoula's secret connections with the (Mobutu-supporting) Binza group, of which Gizenga was aware, and which the CWIHP conference brought to light. Adoula's ties with this pro-Western group were not widely known, but diminish the importance of his former relations with the AFL-CIO. In the end, history would show that Adoula's premiership would depend heavily on the nationalist bloc. By December of 1962 Adoula, under great pressure from the nationalists, called on the United Nations to use force to end the Katanga secession. UN Secretary-General U Thant felt he had few options, and tired of the whole affair, obliged, giving Kennedy little choice but to go along or see the United Nations withdraw from the Congo altogether.

If there was a single message to take away from the conference it is that the course of events in the Congo were at least as strongly influenced by events on the ground as by decisions emanating from either Washington or Moscow. The conference confirmed that Lumumba had little western support and plans for his elimination, politically and physically, were effectively carried out at all levels, no matter what the coordination. Washington seemed to keep its distance with the result that events could force its hand at the last minute, while Khrushchev tended to be more cautious and reluctant to act without support from the Afro-Asian states. The conference also highlighted the Congolese role in the crisis but without exaggerating its influence. Clearly a general misunderstanding between the Congolese, Americans, Soviets and Belgians overlaid the tragic events of 1960 and 1961—events that still haunt the civil-war-wracked Congo today.

CWIHP Launches New Middle East International History Initiative

By Mircea Munteanu

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is pleased to announce the launch of a new CWIHP Middle East International History Initiative. This important new initiative seeks to explore new archival evidence and facilitate discussion and scholarship on the conflicted international history of a region that has been at the heart of world attention in recent years. CWIHP's efforts, as with all its other activities, are based on contributions from its global network. In particular, CWIHP seeks to obtain, translate and publish new evidence from the former Communist world archives on the Middle East conflicts. In addition, the Project is actively promoting the inclusion of authentic voices, perspectives and sources from the Middle East through collaborative projects, conferences and publications.

The new initiative is based on an increasing amount of Middle East focused CWIHP research activity in recent years. The Project has already organized a series of *Critical Oral History* conferences at the Woodrow Wilson Center on the war in Afghanistan ("Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan," April 2002), the Iran-Iraq War ("The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War," August 2004), and the Iranian Revolution (The Carter Administration and the Arc of Crisis," July 2005), co-organized with the National Security Archive and the Center's Middle East Program. They were followed by an international conference on the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and a CWIHP source workshop in June 2007. Recent CWIHP publications on the international history of the Middle East include several document briefing books, Working Papers as well as the newest addition to the CWIHP Series, *The Soviet Union and the Six Day War*, a collection of essays on the 1967 Arab-Israeli War edited by Yaacov Ro'i and Boris Morozov (Stanford University Press/Wilson Center Press, 2008). Forthcoming document additions to CWIHP's online Virtual Archive include materials provided by Israeli scholar Guy Laron (based on extensive research in the Czech archives) and German scholar Stefan Meining (based on work in the East German party archives). These documents and publications—as well as future updates on this initiative—will be available online at www.cwihp.org. CWIHP is keenly interested in contact with scholars, archivists and other working on this subject. For further information, contact CWIHP at coldwar@wilsoncenter.org.

As a sample of the rich sources the Project and affiliated scholars are working on, we present below two documents recently obtained in the Romanian National Archives in Bucharest. Nicolae Ceausescu's regime undertook several different secret diplomatic missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Vietnam, China, and the Middle East. The two conversations between Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu who in 1972 took an extended trip through North Africa and the Middle East, and Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat provide tantalizing new evidence on a previously discounted Romanian mediation initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following Ceausescu's visit to

Cairo, Israeli Premier Golda Meir visited Bucharest on 5 May 1972 at Ceausescu's invitation, something that was extensively speculated about in the Western press at the time. Quickly thereafter, official denials from all sides put the idea of a Romanian initiative to rest. Yet the documents below show that Ceausescu had indeed received a mandate from Sadat to discuss with the Israelis. The 1972 conversation foreshadowed a more active role for the Romanians in mediating between Egypt and Israel. Five years later, Ceausescu would help broker the contacts between Sadat and the newly-elected Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, that culminated in the Egyptian leader's unprecedented November 1977 visit to Jerusalem. Future issues of the *Bulletin* will discuss additional evidence from the files of Ceausescu's emissary to Tel Aviv and Cairo, George Macovescu.



Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Anwar El-Sadat, Cairo, 3 April 1972

[Source: ANIC, *CC RCP External Relations, 19/1972*, pp. 37-43. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

NOTE

Regarding the personal conversation that took place between [...] Nicolae Ceausescu and [...] Anwar El-Sadat, Monday, 3 April 1972, in Cairo.

President Sadat: Regarding the presence of the US and Russia here in the region, and the way in which they follow their interests, I think [they] are alike.

I want to tell you, President Ceausescu, that I am receiving both an American representative and a Soviet representative today. Before you leave Egypt, I will tell you the last position adopted by the US. The US suggested that we send a plenipotentiary representative to the UN, and that Israel do the same, and, together with [Joseph John] Sisco, they should hold discussions without any preconditions. I will not consider the suggestion that the conflict can be resolved in stages; presently they are only interested in opening up the Suez Canal. I told them that I will open up the Canal the day Israel withdraws from the occupied Arab territories.

I talked to Sisco openly before, for three hours. The discussions focused on three points:

[The idea] that Egyptian forces should cross the Canal to take positions on the other shore. Here I gave in, and agreed that Egyptian and Israeli forces could be stationed on the other shore under international supervision.

Israel wants an indefinite cease-fire. I said I agree to a six-month cease fire, which we can renew if the mission of [Swedish diplomat Gunnar] Jarring has any definite results. I cannot agree with an indefinite cease-fire.

Israel does not want to withdraw to the pre-war borders.

[Israeli Prime Minister] Golda Meir said that this the principle from which one must begin.

I said that I cannot concede any piece of our territory. After Sisco left for the US, he send me a written proposal concerning this. I said that I agree with 95% of the proposal. The US State Department was strongly criticized by the Israelis, and, in the end, the Americans said that the proposal was not from the State Department, but was Bergus' proposal, the special representative of US interests in Egypt. From that moment on I considered Sisco a liar, and stopped trusting him. On 1 January 1972 the State Department, through [Secretary of State William P.] Rogers, said they will provide Israel with 130 Phantom and Sky Hawk planes, even though they know the military balance favors Israel. After a week they announced that they are giving Israel permission to build American weapons and the Phantom plane. As far as Israel is concerned, it is clear that it does not want a solution. They receive weapons, money, and other help from the US, and they do not want a solution.

Regarding the Soviet Union, they helped us strengthen our armed forces, they send us weapons and missiles to defend our territory. But I agree with President Ceausescu on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. In Egypt there is a campaign against the Soviet Union. I cannot say that openly to the people, I have to seek ways to strengthen the morale of the army and the masses. We find ourselves in a difficult, complicated situation.

President Ceausescu: In 1970 I met Golda Meir and we talked for two and a half hours. Before that, my representatives had contacts with the representatives of Israel. She told me that she wants a political solution, that she is ready to make concessions and [find] an acceptable understanding. I spoke with other politicians as well, and other progressive forces that took positions in support of a rapid solution. I believe that presently conditions are not favorable to imposing a military solution. This could complicate the situation further. The US and the Soviet Union are involved in the region, and they will involve themselves [further]; they will intervene. The consequences of a war are unfathomable. The US could not accept an Israeli defeat. The Soviet Union values its prestige, and does not want to lose it. As far as Romania is concerned, we do not have special interests in the region, and we do not seek a special position in the region. We only have one interest: that peace take hold so that Egypt can develop economically and socially. As far as I know, after the discussions between my representatives and Nasser, a conclusion was reached.

The easiest way would be for the Israelis to leave the occupied territories. The prolonging of the current state of affairs is not favorable to Egypt, a certain status quo is taking hold. In 1970 I asked Golda Meir: do you have territorial aims? She told me that they want to obtain some guarantees, some small rectifications. Of course, things can evolve in one way or another. I believe that in 1967-1968 there was a much better moment for Egypt to resolve the situation. One must think of a new initiative to get things moving. I understand the sentimentality of thinking: "as long as the territories are occupied we cannot sit down at the negotiating table." A way must be found to start discus-

sions. Maybe one can consider confidential discussions.

Regarding the DR Vietnam, we appreciated it when they said that they want to resolve the situation on their own. Even though they said that they did not talk to the Americans, they had done so for two years prior [to the beginning of negotiations]. I think there will be a solution in Vietnam in the not too distant future. A solution must be found, otherwise the situation becomes permanent, the issue gets complicated, even the Arab population in the [occupied] territories will tie itself economically [to the Israelis]. Regarding the Suez Canal, its closing means you are losing 3-4 dollars per ton of petrol, which means hundreds of thousands of dollars total. The situation cannot last for too long. Maybe a year or two, but after that the negative consequences on the economy and the living standards of the Egyptian people will be seen more easily. A number of Arab countries are looking out for their own interests. I don't think it is good to give six or twelve months timeframes; this cannot have a positive influence on Egypt's position.

I spoke [on 26 October 1970] with President Nixon and he said that the US intends [to work for] and sees a solution as a positive thing. Otherwise, they lose. He does not do this out of sympathy, but out of interest. We do not want to play a role on this issue, in the conflict; we could help out with some things if we were to be asked. I am thinking; why not try something through France?

Sadat: Why don't you want to play a role? Meir says one thing, [Deputy Prime Minister Yigal] Allon another, [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba] Eban, also says something different. The US are not telling me what Israel wants specifically. After all, I'd like to know what the Israelis want.

Ceausescu: We could talk to them, but they are insisting on direct negotiations. They do not trust the Americans. They want to talk any place and under any conditions. An inflexible position is not the best choice. Secret negotiations could be carried out. We did not study the "Hussein proposal," we were in Algeria at the time, but it seems that it's worth paying attention to. Some Arab countries have done so, even if they declared publicly that they reject the proposal. You must have a concrete initiative, like in February 1971. For this, [your] friends and public opinion could be prepared. The FRG and Japan did not spend resources on the arms race and have obtained great economic power. A solution must be found. Greater international support could be obtained.

We met with [Nahum] Goldmann and believe he is reasonable. He is seeking a political solution and a series of practical actions in the international arena. I agree that the Israeli forces must be withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories, that we must discuss with the Palestinian leadership for resolving, for finding a solution to [the crisis of] the Palestinian population, so that they have normal living conditions, and if there is an agreement, maybe even to create a Palestinian state, in conformity with their national interests. Peace must take hold in the region in order for economic and social progress to happen.

In 1967, we talked to [West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt for five hours. He said that no German could assume the responsibility of recognizing two Germanies and of negoti-

ations with the Soviet Union, because that would be recognizing the status quo, including the postwar borders. We talked a lot. Now it's clear that we were right. The existence of two Germanies is recognized, a treaty with the Soviet Union was finalized. Of course, there is some opposition [to this] in the FRG, but the opposition can only say that better conditions should have been obtained in the treaty with the USSR. Formally, it seems that the recognition of the two Germanies means that their separation is permanent. Yet German reunification can happen based on a closer cooperation.

In 1968, as you well know, the Soviet Union and some socialist states invaded Czechoslovakia. Given the situation at the time, we thought that there were intentions [on their side] to intervene in Romania as well. We showed the people what the situation was, and there was a great demonstration in front of the RCP Central Committee building. We armed the people; in two days we were able to arm over 800,000 people. [Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev reproached me a few times, [asking] how could I believe that there was any intention to intervene in Romania. I told him that we acted that way to be able to face any possible imperialist threat and that I did not think specifically of the Soviet Union. Rather, I wanted to strengthen the defense capabilities of the country without having to appeal to the Soviet Union. In politics one needs a great deal of courage. In Egypt's case, a way must be found to resolve the conflict.

If Africa, if we are to look at Angola, I believe that the conditions are ripe to liquidate Portuguese colonialism through fighting. The US would not intervene, since they understand that Portuguese domination is failing, and are interested in obtaining a position [of influence] there. It is known that certain countries give aid to certain liberation movements only so that they can gain a position of influence.

I have an invitation to visit Israel, but I told them that I will go only when they will sign a peace [accord]. Yet we have contacts with their representatives, and we could discuss anything. If we can help do anything with regard to solving the Middle East problem, we are ready to do it. Of course, you must think of a solution and decide.

Sadat: I am thankful to President Ceausescu for the realistic analysis he made concerning the situation. We will have to decide on the next stage.

The conversation lasted one and a half hours.



Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Anwar El-Sadat, Cairo, 6 April 1972 [Excerpts]

[Source: ANIC, CC RCP External Relations, 19/1972, pp. 45-56. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

Minutes of Conversation

Of the separate discussion between [...] Nicolae Ceausescu and [...] Anwar El-Sadat, in Cairo, 6 April 1972. Sergiu Celac, acting director in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated.

Nicolae Ceausescu: I'll ask you that this time the conversation be carried out in English.

Anwar El-Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: We just held a short press conference. Of course, the central issue was the situation in the Middle East.

Sadat: Of course; that's the way it should be.

Ceausescu: I'd like to refer to some issues that we discussed last time, and in the second part, to inform you of the discussion we had yesterday with the representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, with Arafat and another two.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: Of course, we'll see what issues my friend, the president, would like to bring up. I thought about the issues we discussed. I now understand better the concerns that you have, the Egyptian government and people have for finding a solution to the crisis in the Middle East in the shortest possible time. I explained a series of concerns that we have, and I will come back to them. However, I want to stress once again that, in my opinion, it is difficult to see a military solution. This is why I believe that finding a political situation must be the principal concern at the moment. That is why, in my opinion, it is necessary to find a way to allow other countries, which want to help find a solution to the war, to do so and help more on this issue.

Sadat: Very true.

Ceausescu: It is necessary to act in such a way as to convince Israel to adopt a more rational position and give up the rigid position it has today.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: I believe it is necessary to act more forcefully to combat any tendencies to annex territory. This suggests a more intense diplomatic activity from other countries as well. Of course, for this to happen, Egypt and the other Arab countries should first request such help. I will tell you, honestly, I am under the impression that, presently, the world public opinion and a slew of international forces are not fully aware [*sensitate concret*] of the Middle East situation. This gives Israel, and especially the reactionary circles in Israel, the possibility to make all sorts of maneuvers. Honestly, I tell you this also applies to some reactionary Arab circles.

Sadat: Very true.

Ceausescu: This makes the policies of the imperialist countries, including the US, easier.

Sadat: True!

Ceausescu: Starting from these considerations, I think it is necessary for you to elaborate a program of specific activities for the intensification of political and diplomatic actions, so a political solution to the conflict can be found soon. This would force Israel, [also] other reactionary circles, to reveal their positions and intentions, could lead to better revealing the

progressive forces in the Arab countries, and, in the end, would offer the forces in the socialist countries, of other countries as well, of the international progressive movement, the opportunity to act resolutely in support of this issue.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: The example of Vietnam is very clear here. Of course, you have to take this step. I just wanted to tell you a few thoughts I had as I considered our discussions.

Sadat: I am in full accord!

Ceausescu: In my opinion, there are favorable conditions to do more, and with better results. As I told you last time, we are ready to do everything in our power.

Sadat: Very well!

Ceausescu: It is clear that Israel would like to find out the conclusions we reached [here]. We will inform them, we'll tell them our opinion.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: You can always count on us that we'll do everything in our power to help with your struggle. I want to mention again that, aside from all this, that the idea of secret negotiations should not be excluded [from the start]; if not for now, at least [sometime] in the future.

Sadat: That's true, very well.

Ceausescu: This is what I wanted to tell my dear friend, President Sadat.

Sadat: I have full faith in you! We have the same principles—we [support] non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, we are non-aligned, we want to build our country based on the will of our people. We have the same opinions on all issues discussed.

Personally, I have a great deal of admiration for President Ceausescu, and I wanted very much to meet you. I wanted to meet you personally, like [I did] President Tito, and to have a sincere, open discussion, like the one right now.

I want to tell my friend that I am ready to adopt any daring decision. I don't want to be the leader of the Arab world; I don't have any such personal ambitions. I clearly stated that I am ready to sign a peace treaty and recognize Israel. Not one Arab leader has dared to do so in the past 22 years. What is worse is that once I made this decision, in front of the Arab world and in front of my people, and after I obtained [the people's] approval for it, there was no reaction from Israel, with the exception of the declarations in the Knesset that they will never withdraw to the 4 June [1967] borders. This thing they presented as a principle of their policy. I said it, I don't seek to impose myself as the leader of the Arab world, I don't seek anything for myself. I seek, before all else, the good of my country.

If Israel, through your good offices, as a friend in which I have full confidence, and in which I know they too have full confidence, will tell us clearly what they want, then it will be good. I don't want to get in the same situation in which King Hussein is in now. He talked with Israel. And what was the result? They dropped him! Recently, Madam Meir, talking to some students, said some things that will finish King Hussein. And that after he did everything they wanted him to do. I

repeat, I don't seek anything for myself. But, if I can do something for my country, then I am ready. I don't seek anything for my own personal prestige. I am ready to take any decision.

I agree with my friend, the President, that a political solution is very difficult. That's what I said yesterday as well, that I am for peace, because I want what's good for my country. But peace is not only dependent on my actions. The other side must also seriously consider this thing. I am ready to walk this way, but it must be a just peace. I said this in front of the entire Arab world: I will recognize Israel and its borders, but not the new Arab territories it obtained after the invasion. This was said for the first time in the last 22 years. I said in front of the entire world that they will be allowed to use the Gulf of Aqaba. I am ready to give them guarantees in this respect, and if my guarantees are not sufficient, I am ready to accept that some UN forces be stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh. I made this statement and did not redact it in any way.

If they want this—great! But no one will ever agree to relinquish even a centimeter of Arab land. Believe me! No matter what some Arab leaders might say, the people will never accept [that]. You work with your people. I work with mine. We both know what the power of the people means. As I told my dear friend, I am ready to take any daring decision on the condition that it benefits the country. My person does not matter. But I do not want to end up as King Hussein, completely cut off from the Arab world.

Ceausescu: If I understand correctly, my friend Sadat considers it possible, however, that at some point, a meeting between representatives of Egypt and Israel will take place, under conditions that will have to be settled. (Sadat nods in agreement.) I agree that, for certain steps to be taken there must be full guarantees. This issue is so serious that rushing might ruin it. You can be sure that I will not say these things until I am convinced that all necessary conditions are ripe.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: I will not tell Israel that you are ready, until I will be convinced that they are serious about it. I will talk with them myself, and, if I reach this conclusion, I will make the next step.

Sadat: I fully agree with this way of proceeding.

Ceausescu: In this context, I will send my personal representative [Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu]. Probably it will be the same representative that had, in the past, contacts with President Nasser.

Sadat: Very well. I know him.

Ceausescu: If something develops, you can send someone to me. I will receive them.

Sadat: Very well. I will do so.

Ceausescu: If there are serious problems, a flight between Bucharest and Cairo only lasts four hours; even three with a good plane. [...]

[Section on Ceausescu's meeting with Yasser Arafat not included. For full document, visit www.cwihp.org]



CWIHP Annual Fund Contribution Form

You may also donate to CWIHP online.

Visit www.cwihip.org and click on “support CWIHP” in the right hand menu.

Name: _____

Address: _____

Enclosed is my tax-deductible gift to the CWIHP/Woodrow Wilson Center for: \$ _____

Charge my gift to MasterCard Visa AMEX

Account Number: _____

Expiration Date: _____ Signature: _____

Please mark check or form “CWIHP.”

If you would like to make your gift in the form of appreciated securities, call Claudine Gnall at (202) 691-4169 for procedural information.

My employer will match charitable contributions. I have enclosed a matching gift form.

Please return this form with your contribution to the address below.

**Development Office/CWIHP
The Woodrow Wilson
International
Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004**



We thank you for
your support.

The Cold War International History Project gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support from the following individuals and institutions:

The Henry Luce Foundation (New York)

The Korea Foundation (Seoul)

The Ratiu Family Foundation (London)

The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago)

Joseph C. Bell

Nancy Brinker

Priscilla J. McMillan

P.M. Baggaley	Joan Dobkin and	Paul Holbo	Peter Moody
Alan Ball	Ruud Van Dijk	Pat Holt	John Moore
Per Bang-Jensen	J.P. Dunbabin	Dan Jacobs	Joseph Poles
Gordon Barrass	Jerry Ennis	Don & Janice Jacobs	Staci E. Rolfe
David Barrett	Richard Faillace	Michael Karathanos	Alan Romberg
Arnold Beichman	Walter Fallaw	Andrzej Korbonski	Steven Rosswurm
Cole Blasier	Louis A. Fanning	George Lardner	John Ryan
John Bonds	Ben Fischer	John K. Lawrence	Bernd Schaefer
Lester Brune	Gerald B. Forrette	Dan Leab	Audrey H. Schewe
John Burrow	Raymond Garthoff	Melvyn P. Leffler	Robert Sharlet
Christopher Calvin	Charles Gati	James Libbey	Edward Simonsen
Yong-ho Choe	Gary Goldberg	R. Gerald Livingston	Georges Soutou
Donald Choi	Norman Graebner	Charles Maier	Moncrieff Spear
David C. Christian	K.E. Hamburger	John Matthews	Thomas Stolper
Anna Cienciala	Peter Hanratty	Martha Mautner	James Todd
Donald H. Clio	Joseph P. Harahan	Muriel McCarthy	Robert Van Meter
Stephen W. Coll	Pablo J. Hernandez-	J. Kenneth McDonald	George Veith
George Collins	Gonzalez	Alan Millett	John Stanley Zawacki
Robert A. Divine	Wilbur W. Hitchcock	Kenneth Moll	



**Woodrow Wilson
International Center
for Scholars**

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the living, national memorial to President Wilson established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. It is a nonpartisan institution, supported by public and private funds, engaged in the study of national and world affairs. The Wilson Center establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. The Center commemorates the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by: providing a link between the world of ideas and the world of policy; and fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a full spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and world affairs.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair David A. Metzner, Vice Chair

Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Tamala L. Longaberger, designated appointee within the Federal Government; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Cristián Samper, Acting Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States. *Private Citizen Members:* Robin Cook, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Sander R. Gerber, Charles L. Glazer, Susan Hutchison, Ignacio E. Sanchez

**One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20004-3027
(202) 691-4000, fax (202) 691-4001**

www.wilsoncenter.org

