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PEACE AND SECURITY IN COLOMBIA

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Cover photograph: Colombian government soldier on patrol in a poor neighborhood of Barrancabermeja, Santander. ©Rober Nickelsberg/Getty Images

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INTRODUCTION

On June 20, 2002, the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the International Crisis Group, and the United States Institute of Peace, with the collaboration of the Inter-American Dialogue, jointly sponsored a conference on "Peace and Security in Colombia." The purpose of the conference was to explore the economic, security, and political dimensions of conflict resolution in Colombia. The conference was held against three important backdrops: the May 26, 2002, first-round presidential victory of Álvaro Uribe Vélez; burgeoning conflict between guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and the state in the aftermath of failed peace processes with the largest guerrilla group, the FARC, as well as the smaller ELN; and the prospect of deepening U.S. involvement in Colombian as the focus of U.S. assistance changed from counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism.

This report provides a summary of presentations by Colombian, U.S., and other international experts, both analysts and practitioners, concerned with developments in Colombia. Where available, the report includes the written statements of several participants, as well as a summary of their remarks.

We wish to thank Latin American Program intern Craig Fagan and Natascha González of ICG's Bogotá office for their assistance with the organization of the conference. We are grateful to the United States Institute of Peace, the Ford Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their generous support of the conference and this publication.

We also extend sincere thanks to our expert presenters for sharing their views as a way of contributing to peacemaking in Colombia.

Cynthia J. Arnson
Charles E. Nelson
Mark L. Schneider
Margarita S. Studemeister

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Opening the conference, **Gareth Evans,** President and CEO of the International Crisis Group and former Foreign Minister of Australia, remarked that many of the questions that newly-elected President Uribe would face constituted the subject matter for the three panels of the conference: the economic as well as military and security foundations of peace, and the basis for negotiating peace, including the involvement of the international community.

Lino Gutiérrez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, described new authorities the Bush Administration was asking of Congress that would recognize "the cross-cutting relation between narcotics trafficking and terrorism." The new authority would permit the use of counter-narcotics funds for counter-terrorism operations against the FARC and ELN guerrillas and paramilitaries of the AUC.

Nancy Birdsall of the Center for Global Development emphasized that the economic dimensions of peace have been in place for 20-30 years, including low inflation, steady growth, sound macro-economic management, and progress in reforms including liberalization, privatization, and decentralization. **David de Ferranti** of the World Bank described causal links in both directions between violence and economic performance, highlighting the need to enhance security and reduce violence, address social needs and spur economic growth, including by improving the investment climate for farmers and households as well as larger entrepreneurs. **Eduardo Aninat** of the International Monetary Fund called violence an "explicit development constraint" and said that economic policy should be designed to boost growth and mitigate poverty and social dislocation as well as lay the groundwork for the consolidation of peace. **Fernando Cepeda** of the Universidad de los Andes decried Colombia's economic model over the last fifty years, which had excluded large sectors of the population, including entire regions, providing an opening to drug traffickers, and added that U.S. policy continued to focus on counter-drug units of the army and police, at the expense of the institutions as a whole.

Security analyst **Alfredo Rangel** underscored the difficulties of achieving peace at a time when the Colombian electorate had given a clear mandate to President Uribe to confront the guerrillas and paramilitaries. Rangel called Uribe's plan to double the number of combat troops insufficient to reassert government control of the national territory, and faulted the Pastrana administration for failing to design a strategy to contain paramilitary and guerrilla expansion that could put future negotiations on a more solid footing. Senator **Rafael Pardo** argued that reasserting territorial control entailed providing security as well as basic services to communities, and warned that signing a peace agreement would not solve Colombia's security problems, as the vast majority of homicides took place outside the armed conflict. Colombian Defense Attaché **General Nestor Ramírez** emphasized the relationship between military capacity and peace, arguing that violent actors needed to be convinced of the futility of armed struggle before an accord could be reached. General Ramírez expressed his personal view that the military need not participate directly in a new peace process at its initial stage, but left open the possibility of participation as the process advanced.

Canadian Ambassador to Colombia **Guillermo Rishchynski** stated that despite the failure of the peace process during the Pastrana years, certain broad lines would serve as a foundation for the future. These included the involvement of a third party from the international community (the United Nations and a facilitating group of friendly countries), whose role grew from passive observation to a more catalytic effort to keep the process from collapsing. **María Emma Mejía,** a participant in peace talks with both the FARC and the ELN, outlined several essential bases for putting future negotiations on a more solid footing, including the strengthening and modernization of the armed forces, the implementation of confidence-building measures such as a prisoner exchange, and the re-design and strengthening of the state apparatus for seeking peace. Both, Mejía and Rishchynski agreed that political reforms and poverty alleviation programs were needed to broaden democratic participation and combat social exclusion in Colombian society.

The prepared papers of several presenters, as well as the rapporteur's report on the conference, can be found on the Woodrow Wilson Center's website at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/lap/.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA

Ambassador Lino Gutiérrez,[1] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, detailed and explained U.S. policy toward Colombia. He described what the Bush administration is doing or plans to do to support progress toward the resolution of the tremendous challenges—increasing security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting economic recovery, and improving the observance of human rights—facing the new government of Álvaro Uribe. United States policy, according to Gutiérrez, is aimed at helping Colombia "establish control over its national territory in order to develop a prosperous democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law and is free from narcotics trafficking and terrorism." The basis for this approach is the realistic recognition that solutions to these problems are neither easy nor quick and that no single explanation fully accounts for the deep roots of Colombia's current troubles.

Gutiérrez explained that in 1999, with strong U.S. support, the administration of Andrés Pastrana embarked on "Plan Colombia" in an effort to deal comprehensively and holistically with many mutually reinforcing problems facing the country. Pastrana's goals were to promote peace and combat the drug trade while also reviving the economy and strengthening democratic and social institutions. All candidates in the recent presidential election generally accepted these proposals. According to Gutiérrez, however, President Uribe won a landslide election in the first round because he campaigned on a platform of more aggressively combating drug trafficking and terrorism. Uribe's message resonated with the public, as it had become clear that the FARC had no interest in serious peace negotiations. Gutiérrez added that Bush administration officials were currently engaged in meeting with Uribe, learning of his plans, and discussing future U.S. support.

The key components of U.S. policy, as discussed by Gutiérrez, include helping bolster Colombian exports through passage of the Andean Trade

1. The full text of Ambassador Gutiérrez's remarks appears as Appendix I of this report.

Preferences Act, a continued commitment to alternative development, increased assistance for the police and military, and new congressional authority allowing the use of military equipment to fight terrorism. The security situation and the frequent absence of alternative agricultural production that can match coca production revenue has limited the results of alternative development and forced adjustments to the program, such as funding activities aimed at improving economic potential in isolated regions. Gutiérrez also pointed out the recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, which concluded that without the disincentives of interdiction and eradication, growers are unlikely to abandon relatively easy and lucrative coca production for licit crops and legal employment.

Gutiérrez pointed out that the Bush administration received a $380.5 congressional appropriation in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to combat drug trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democratic institutions, improve human rights, promote socioeconomic development, and mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombia's civilian population. Congress was currently considering the emergency FY 2002 request of an additional $35 million for strengthening the Colombian National Police presence, antiterrorism, anti-kidnapping efforts, and training of army units to protect a vital oil pipeline that has suffered costly attacks. In addition, the State Department is requesting $439 million in FY 2003 assistance for the programs noted above and $98 million to train the military and police and equip them to protect the Caño Limón-Covenas pipeline.

The Bush administration's March 21 request to Congress to authorize Colombians to use U.S.-provided helicopters and a U.S.-trained and supported battalion for counter-terrorism as well as counter-narcotics operations has proven most controversial, Gutierrez remarked. This new authority, he added, would allow the flexibility needed to help the Colombian government respond to the threat of terrorism more efficiently and effectively. The Bush administration believes, however, that the link between terrorism and the drug trade, especially as seen in the operations of the FARC and AUC, is undeniable.

Gutiérrez insisted that this new counter-terrorism initiative means neither a retreat from the Bush administration's concern about human rights nor an open-ended U.S. commitment to Colombia. The administration would not, he asserted, halt the vetting on human rights grounds of all Colombian military units receiving U.S. assistance, exceed the 400-person ceilings on U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors, or send U.S. combat troops to Colombia. On the contrary, in various meetings with President Uribe and senior Colombian officials, administration officials

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have expressed the need for improved human rights performance and a severing of military-paramilitary ties. Indeed, according to Gutiérrez, the Bush administration's human rights message has made a difference in a number of ways, such as the Colombian military's capture and killing in combat three times the number of paramilitary members in 2001 than in 2000. State security forces or those who collude with them to commit abuses must be brought to justice. In addition, Gutiérrez emphasized, Secretary of State Powell takes very seriously his obligation to certify under the FY 2002 foreign aid appropriations bill the Colombian government's progress in three key human rights areas. After careful consideration, the first of two such certifications, required for the release of 60 percent of U.S. assistance, was made on May 1, 2002.

To conclude, Gutiérrez pointed out that President Uribe now has a strong electoral mandate to establish government authority throughout Colombia. Uribe has stated that he intends to boost defense spending, increase the number of soldiers and police, and create a civilian defense force to collect intelligence. From the perspective of the Bush administration, though consideration of the details is always essential, this appears to be a good beginning.

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE

David de Ferranti, World Bank Vice-President for Latin America and the Caribbean, focused his remarks on two central questions related to Colombia's future economic policy. First, he asked: If Colombia continues on the same path internally, including the continuing conflict, and if the external environment remains roughly the same, then what should be the economic policy priorities of the new Uribe government? Second, de Ferranti asked: If significant progress is achieved in reducing or resolving the conflict, then what should be the economic priorities of the incoming government? De Ferranti added that his recommendations would likely still apply if the Colombian economic situation mildly deteriorated; if the economy radically deteriorated, there is really no way to tell what can or should happen.

In response to the first question, De Ferranti prescribed ten areas of focus for improving the Colombian economy, repeatedly pointing out that these areas were all intimately related to one another. The ten priorities were:

1. Improve security and reduce the violence. This critical item is already on the Colombian economic team's list, de Ferranti pointed out.

2. Address social needs. This is also a critical point that the economic team recognizes. Critical progress in reducing poverty over the past two decades has been wiped out, de Ferranti added, by the recent recession and the armed conflict. Therefore, the past few years have been painful. The solid foundation for poverty reduction has been erased and a little less than two million Colombians have been pushed into poverty. The poverty level in Colombia, at 55 percent of the population, is high.

3. Restore economic growth. Colombia needs a return to significant, sustainable growth, de Ferranti argued. Growth, without which job creation and development is impossible, is essential for addressing social needs.

4. Restore internal and external confidence. In the external market context, it is important to reverse the downgrading of Colombian invest-

ment ratings; the higher ratings of the past need to return. Good ratings, de Ferranti emphasized, are crucial to attracting both domestic and international investment, reducing capital flight, and cutting the cost of financing. They would prompt public and private economic actors to begin investing in Colombia again, making growth, security, and an improved social situation possible.

5. Improve the investment climate through institutional reform. Reform should include not just the immediate investment-related issues, but also judicial reform and other improvements in the rule of law that allow contracts to flow and encourage small entrepreneurs to invest. As is always the case, de Ferranti stated, the most important investor is the farmer and household at the micro level of the economy. Because their actions critically affect the poor especially, restoring confidence among small entrepreneurs is every bit as important as it is for large investors.

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6. Bring the fiscal situation under better control. Some observers estimate, according to de Ferranti, that Colombia will need a primary surplus (net public revenue before interest payments are taken into account) of 3.5 percent over an extended period. Ensuring sufficient revenues to cover expenditures and also manage the debt is absolutely critical to all of the above. The resources for attacking poverty cannot be put to use, de Ferranti explained, if the house is burning down.

7. Tackle the large-scale problems of institutional reform. As former President Pastrana and President Uribe recognize, current systems are creating liabilities that are unaffordable. In particular, de Ferranti argued, Colombia needs a reformed pension system and a restructuring of the tax system. Like many countries, Colombia could generate substantially more revenue simply by closing tax loopholes and improving collection efficiency—without raising rates. New revenue could eventually reach an estimated 3 percent of GDP each year. Such efforts should be explicitly tied to other key goals. The Uribe government needs to develop a message based on basic equity, according to de Ferranti, and explain to the Colombian people that their country cannot address education and other needs without making better use of its resources. The message should be that it's only fair that those who can afford to pay should pay. Colombians should know that the idea is not to fiddle with the tax system but, rather, to make improvements that can lead to significant social gains in a number of areas.

8. Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure in general. The revenue that is spent can and should produce greater benefits than it has been providing.

9. Improve health care delivery. Over roughly the last eight years, Colombia has significantly increased health care spending—from 3.5 percent to 5.5 percent of GDP. And this has been helpful, as health care coverage has increased from 13 percent to 58 percent. Yet, de Ferranti argued, if the same level of resources were more effectively used, coverage could reach 100 percent.

10. Improve education. Colombia has witnessed major progress in increasing enrollment, but results have lagged behind. As in the health sector, better use of existing resources could achieve much more.

With regard to the second question—what the Uribe team should do if peace emerges on the horizon—de Ferranti raised the prospect of a large peace dividend. That dividend has been estimated at 4 percent of GDP, he said. With the war at or near an end, the dividend would be the result of saving lives and reduced spending on private and public sector security. Public security outlays are currently estimated at 3.5 percent of GDP; the level was at 2 percent not long ago. Private outlays are estimated at 1.4 percent of GDP, and one-fifth of total private sector investment is dedicated to security. Unleashing this money for use elsewhere would provide a tremendous economic benefit to Colombia. Investment is now a low 15 percent of GDP, for example. If that level could be doubled to 30 percent, the rate of previous investment, the gains in productivity, among other areas, would be dramatic.

As for government policy under such circumstances, de Ferranti argued that Colombia should focus on the same ten priorities described above. The same issues need to be addressed under both scenarios. De Ferranti provided one caveat, however: the peace dividend must not be squandered. Other countries facing similar experiences have diverted the peace dividend to other, less essential areas. In fact, should a dividend emerge, Colombia must guard against an opening of the spending floodgates that can lead to a worsening of the social situation, especially poverty.

Nancy Birdsall, President of the Center for Global Development, opened with a basic message, which is that the economic foundations for peace in Colombia have been in place for the last two to three decades. The problem is that the civil conflict has been compounded by drug related corruption and other non-economic issues. The solutions are often non-economic as well.

As Birdsall emphasized, from 1970-2000, Colombia had one of the most stable inflation rates in Latin America, and the country demonstrated one of the best records of macroeconomic management. Price volatility is especially difficult on the poor, so there is a sense that Colombia protected its lowest income citizens with its sound fiscal and monetary management. Colombia is also one of the countries in Latin America—if not the only one—that had steady growth through the 1980s and 1990s. Peru, Mexico, and Brazil, for example, witnessed much greater growth volatility. Compared to its neighbors in the region, Colombia has been much better in instituting the key economic reforms that the international financial institutions advocate, such as privatization, trade liberalization, and decentralization. The fiscal deterioration of recent years is a result of larger, non-economic problems; it is obviously not the cause of these problems.

Social indicators in Colombia are much like the rest of Latin America. Inequality is somewhat above the average, Birdsall continued, but has not reached the levels of Brazil or Chile. Moreover, Colombian policymakers have been among the most innovative in designing social policy, especially with respect to education and the provision of day care.

In this light, then, U.S. policy toward Colombia has been perhaps well-intentioned, Birdsall argued, but distracted and incoherent. In the past, for example, the United States vetoed concessional loans and grants from the Inter-American Bank because Colombia failed to meet the U.S. drug certification requirement. The United States was using this sanction in a crude way, yet fighting itself for failing to support the institutional foundations of the state. Allowing the Andean Trade Preferences Act to lapse [it was reauthorized in the summer of 2002] is a clear example of how U.S. policy was distracted. U.S. policy is incoherent, Birdsall concluded, when one considers that the U.S. national drug control budget for the past three to four years has been $19 billion annually, while the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia had originally been about $1 billion over several years. These figures suggest that the U.S. government must make a much larger effort to address the non-economic crisis in Colombia.

In addressing the economic foundations for peace in Colombia, Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund **Eduardo Aninat**[2] offered a series of policy prescriptions that he felt would provide the basis for economic stability and peace. Colombia is not only one of the

2. The full text of Eduardo Aninat's remarks appears as Appendix II of this report.

oldest democracies in South America, Aninat explained, but also the site of the region's longest internal armed confrontation. Until the mid-1990s, the impact of the conflict on the Colombian economy was rather moderate. The country had long maintained relatively strong growth within a context of fiscal and external stability. Since the last half of the 1990s, however, an increase in the scale and intensity of the violence has been coupled with a deterioration of economic performance. The result is that "the conflict has become an explicit development constraint for Colombia."

Not since the 1930s has Colombia suffered an economic crisis as severe as it endured in the late 1990s, Aninat emphasized. A number of severe economic imbalances, including large increases in spending that revenue growth could not cover, a widening trade deficit, and rising external debt, were to blame. Taking on the crisis, the Pastrana government, with the support of the IMF and multilateral organizations, embarked on an extensive adjustment program that has been relatively successful in bringing a return to macroeconomic stability despite the security situation. Renewed growth and access to private external financing followed from a series of new measures, including an 11 percent cut in inflation from 1998 to 2002, installation of a floating exchange rate regime, and broad structural reforms.

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According to Aninat, however, the momentum of Colombia's recovery has been slowed by the escalation of violence and the deteriorating external environment, primarily the global economic slowdown. The increasing demands for security and social spending as growth and exports have weakened have placed extraordinary pressure on the economy. Social conditions in particular have grown severe as urban unemployment is reaching 20 percent.

Under such circumstances, Aninat advocated two equally important objectives for economic policy: 1) the implementation of policies that can boost economic growth and mitigate poverty and social dislocation; and 2) the preparation of policies that will support the consolidation of peace should a negotiated settlement of the conflict be reached. He fully recognized the tremendous difficulty of policy adjustment in the current Colombian environment, though he noted that President Uribe had clearly expressed his desire to address these issues and that the new president's strong popular support may prove to be the key asset.

To achieve the first objective, Aninat explained, the Colombian government needed to proceed forcefully in at least three areas. First is the achievement of medium-term fiscal sustainability so as to maintain macro-

economic stability and investor confidence. Extensive structural reforms are essential. These reforms include completion of a comprehensive pension reform, which can stem the expansion of the public debt, and the adoption of a fiscal responsibility and transparency law, so as to increase accountability and limit administrative inefficiency and corruption. A reduction of revenue earmarking arrangements would, furthermore, increase the flexibility of fiscal policy and promote sound fiscal management.

A second key area is the preservation of external competitiveness, according to Aninat. The appreciation of the peso in early to mid-2002 threatens the growth of Colombia's non-traditional exports, which are most important for fostering productive employment opportunities. Aninat recognized that Colombian authorities have correctly eased monetary policy in response to the appreciation. He also advocated pressing ahead with fiscal adjustment and expressed his encouragement at the progress of the Andean Trade Preference Act in the U.S. Congress, which has the potential to broaden considerably Colombia's exports. Third, in the social area, the goal, according to Aninat, should be to regenerate employment growth. This requires eliminating rigidities, including an unduly restrictive labor market.

Achieving the second major objective—preparing policies for a post-conflict period—requires consideration of two variables: the peace dividend and the costs of peace. The economic costs of the violence in Colombia are substantial, Aninat argued. It is estimated, for example, that the conflict cut the country's annual growth rate by 1 1/2-2 percent—before its intensification in the late 1990s. An end to the conflict would surely produce a significant peace dividend, according to Aninat, freeing up substantial private and public resources now allocated to the conflict or conflict-related costs and fostering business confidence. The costs of peace—or the cost of investments required for post-conflict programs—will be sizable, he added. Damaged physical and institutional infrastructure will need to be repaired, large groups of people who have survived on the economy of conflict will have to be reintegrated into peaceful productive activities, and deep institutional reforms, including the replenishment of social capital, will require close attention. Initially, at least, the fiscal costs of peace will be greater than the available resources, Aninat argued. To secure sufficient resources, Colombia's options include taking advantage of proceeds from privatization projects that have been delayed, enhancing tax collection, and giving priority to investments that generate synergies with pro-peace programs, such as targeted social expenditure. Finally, Aninat

concluded, peace in Colombia should be considered a global public good that will provide benefits to nations well beyond its borders. The international community should thus be prepared to contribute resources to the post-conflict transition and work to ensure that its assistance is as effective as possible.

Addressing a number of political and judicial issues closely related to the economic concerns, **Professor Fernando Cepeda** of the Universidad de los Andes strongly argued that Colombia now finally must focus on resolving its problems in an integral and comprehensive way. He argued that Colombia does not need a *Plan Colombia* but rather, a comprehensive, cohesive "Plan *for* Colombia," developed along the lines discussed by David de Ferranti and Eduardo Aninat above. Considering that Colombia had demonstrated such strong fundamentals of economic management for so long, Cepeda asked, how is it that the country has reached the multifaceted crisis it now faces? What happened?

Colombia has been following a flawed economic model developed with the help of the World Bank and instituted since the 1950s, according to Cepeda. The model lacks balance, is selective in its approach, and has excluded an important social and geographic segment of Colombian life from access to development assistance. In particular, the national territories—or departments—to the east and south have not been the targets of development programs because the cost-benefit ratio—the rate of return—has never been considered favorable. It was not deemed worth investing in areas such as, for example, Arauca, Meta, Putumayo, or Caquetá. These areas of the country had basically been abandoned and depopulated; state presence was minimal. Other well-known groups, however, saw an opportunity, began to cultivate coca and poppy, and then converted the venture into a highly profitable drug trafficking operation. The size and impact of this criminal economy, moreover, is not captured in the national accounts or economic statistics of any kind. The situation has grown to become a serious challenge to the legal economy, to legal institutions, to Colombia's development potential, and to the survival of the country's democratic system.

Cepeda emphasized that a fragmented or selective approach to development produces an equally fragmented or selective approach to governing in Colombia. Governance improved, he stated, in those institutions that received loans from the World Bank or Inter-American Development Bank, while it grew weaker in the rest. This explains why all sectors in Colombia—the armed forces, national police, the administration of justice

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system, municipal and departmental governments, among others—became fertile ground for clientelism, corruption, waste, and poor institutional management. These became institutions without the basic ingredients for good governance.

Cepeda added that Colombia continues to be subject to an incremental approach—Plan Colombia is an example—that is fragmented and selective. Plan Colombia is not--despite what its architects contend—well-articulated, comprehensive, cohesive, or self-reinforcing. For example, Plan Colombia calls for the formation of three anti-narcotics battalions, a selective approach that does not address the question of modernizing the armed forces as an institution. A report published by the Inter-American Dialogue and Council on Foreign Relations, to which Colombians, including President Uribe, contributed, criticizes this selective approach, which is focused only on resolving a specific issue of concern to the United States and Colombia: the drug problem.

The same approach is taken with many of Colombia's institutions, from the police, municipalities, and departments to those that manage the economy and public policy. Colombia may have the best anti-narcotics police force in the world, for example, but the rest of the police—the institution as such—fails to function. Plan Colombia was initially sold as a comprehensive, cohesive initiative, but now the new idea is to make it "flexible," which actually means extending it to include additional elements, the latest of which is to fight the guerrillas. Individually tackling each problem without examining the larger institutional picture, Cepeda argued, is a recipe for fragmentation not only of the armed forces, but many other institutions. It is this approach that has Colombia suffering from a "multiple schizophrenia" that does not resolve the problems that need resolution.

Similarly, Cepeda added, protecting one bridge or electric tower causes the guerrillas to move to attack another bridge or tower. Under Plan Colombia, destroying the crops of coca growers in Putumayo pushes the planters into the coffee-growing zones of the country. One of the most successful political and socioeconomic experiments undertaken by an elite in Latin America is Colombian coffee growing. Now this experiment, however, is a disaster, as prices for coffee are miserable, the supply of good coffee for Colombians is limited, and the crisis of coffee is now being converted into a problem of coca and poppy cultivation and insurgency. Colombia thus needs to adopt a comprehensive approach, and Cepeda emphasized the responsibility of Colombians to take on this challenge. Yet, the overwhelming presence of international development organizations—the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S.

Agency for International Development—distracts Colombia from addressing the central problems.

Cepeda further explained that the existence of two economies—one legal and one illegal—as many as three tax systems (government, guerrilla, and paramilitary), and the tremendous daily suffering caused by the security problem, all demonstrate the weak condition of the Colombian state. To strengthen the state, rather than continuing with fragmented political, social, economic and other strategies, there must be real sense of the complexity of the problems the country faces. Simplistic solutions resolve specific problems. They also complicate matters and impede resolution of the fundamental issues.

MILITARY AND SECURITY FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE

Colombian defense analyst and former security adviser **Alfredo Rangel** opened his presentation by noting that never before in the decades-long history of the conflict have the two sides been so far apart in their stated positions for initiating peace negotiations. The contrasting demands are so firmly presented and held that one can say with considerable certainty that the initiation of dialogue is not going to come soon or easily. On the one hand, the guerrillas, particularly the FARC, are demanding the creation of a second demilitarized zone for the resumption of talks that is three times the size of the zone created by the Pastrana government. They want to maintain, according to Rangel, the broad-based agenda for negotiations agreed to with the previous government, and the FARC does not see its strategic interests protected by the institution of a cease-fire prior to beginning negotiations. The Uribe government, on the other hand, demands an unconditional cease-fire as a precondition for the initiation of peace talks and is inclined to hold negotiations outside the country—thereby making the creation of a demilitarized zone unnecessary. The government's objective is the demobilization and disarmament of the guerrillas and the facilitation of their legal participation in the political life of the country.

With regard to military strategy, according to Rangel, the gulf between the FARC and the Uribe government is no less daunting. Rangel predicted an escalation of the conflict in near- and medium-term as the two sides attempt to impose their conditions on one another. As this renewed military confrontation plays out, it "is very likely that peace talks will not be reinitiated for one or two years." The FARC is trying to generate a crisis of governance by, first, preventing a return to stable economic growth that would provide the financing for stronger action against the guerrillas. The political violence, economic uncertainty, and lower economic expectations—all of which have been in increasingly evident in recent months—could have significant economic repercussions. Second, the FARC is provoking a crisis by attacking the presence of the state in the regions—by threatening and killing mayors, creating liberated zones, and otherwise weakening institutional structures. Meanwhile, Rangel pointed out, the Uribe government has "an absolutely clear mandate from the majority of

the population" to strengthen the state and protect public security. Most Colombians feel that the government must first confront the guerrillas for the country to be viable and develop economically. Never before has the use of military force been so central to determining the conditions for the re-initiation of peace negotiations.

President Uribe has consistently put forth his plan to increase defense and security spending by $1 billion through a so-called war tax or other revenue generating measures, Rangel added. Uribe plans to double the size of the national police and the number of professional soldiers in the armed forces. In Rangel's view, these measures will not address the fundamental problem presented by the guerrillas and paramilitary forces: precarious control of the national territory. Strengthening territorial control could be more effectively accomplished by simply increasing the size of the army by adding more regular soldiers. The Uribe government's strategy also includes, according to Rangel, enactment of an anti-terrorism law that will allow more effective handling of the emergency, creation of a one-million strong civilian network of support for the army and security forces, and convincing the guerrillas to participate seriously in a peace process. Ultimately, the present situation is a race between the two sides to develop a strategy, impede the adversary's strategy, and therefore impose its conditions on future talks.

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It is urgent, Rangel argued, that the Colombian government reconsider its plans for confronting the growth of the guerrillas and paramilitary forces. In the past four years, the paramilitary forces have doubled in size to about 11,000 members, while the FARC has grown about 30 percent. The expansion of weaponry and explosives has also been considerable. As these irregular forces have spread across the country and confronted one another, Rangel stated, the Colombian state has acted as an observer rather than an active participant engaged in controlling, dissuading, and containing the armed groups.

For the short to medium-term, Rangel suggested, the Colombian government must, first, ensure that the guerrillas fail in their effort to destabilize the country economically and territorially. Second, the new administration needs to look to restructure the armed forces to convince the guerrillas that their plans for taking power by force—their goal of reaching a strategic balance through a doubling of their size within five years—is not an option.

If the Colombian state is going to control the situation and secure peace as quickly as possible under much more favorable conditions than seen today, Rangel added, the size of the armed forces must be dramatically

increased. The number of military personnel and police is far too low to provide territorial presence. In addition, the government must be much more rigorous in ensuring that the armed forces effectively react to the guerrillas and paramilitary groups; for a variety of reasons, including a lack of equipment and resources, the military arrives days late to an area that has seen action by these groups. Finally, the armed forces must develop the capacity to stay in the jungle and remain on the offensive to a much greater degree than they do today. They must be able to proactively seek out the guerrilla and paramilitary forces and sustain attacks against them.

The legitimacy of the power of the state is at issue in three respects, Rangel continued. The first is the question of the use of military and police force. Rangel noted that the armed forces continue to enjoy great credibility with the public; public support for the military is strong and its efforts are viewed as legitimate. With respect to human rights, the armed forces have made improvement, yet the institution must continue to make progress. Second, the Colombian state needs a strategy to combat the paramilitary forces. The new government must hit the paramilitaries "very hard and very soon" to address immediately the challenge they pose. Finally, the government must reorient its strategy for fighting drug trafficking. The current strategy has hardly been effective in reducing the amount of coca production in the country, according to Rangel. Because it has been ineffective and because it has created conflict between the state and growers, the chemical war against the coca growers should be discontinued. Air interdiction in particular has been much more effective in other countries as a disincentive to coca cultivation and processing and as a means to induce a decline in coca prices. Such an approach is more expensive, but it is more likely to produce results, more palatable politically, and more environmentally sound.

To conclude, Rangel argued that the Colombian government must ensure the stability and governance of the country. The Uribe administration must also ensure the re-initiation of peace negotiations through firm and determined action against all armed groups—guerrillas and paramilitaries alike. These efforts will require, above all, a clear definition of the realities and dynamics of the problems facing the country, which will in turn help preclude the adoption of mistaken strategies for resolving the conflict.

Colombian **Senator Rafael Pardo** further addressed the security issues and challenges facing his country. Pardo argued that there is a direct relation between the war against drugs being fought in the Andean region and

the escalation of the Colombia conflict since the mid-1990s. Before 1994-1995, Colombia's coca cultivation covered 20-30 thousand hectares; since then, Colombia has been cultivating between 100-150 hectares, although estimates vary. This jump in cultivation has logically followed, Pardo argued, the success in the U.S.-backed fight against drug production in Peru and Bolivia. Successful drug interdiction in Peru, Bolivia, and parts of the Amazon River made the transport of coca paste along the river more difficult. The drug eradication policy was successful as well, as crop substitution proved fruitful in Peru's Huallaga Valley. The result was that prospective drug traffickers found it easier to establish coca plantations in Colombia and quickly established themselves in the southeast, where the state's presence is extremely weak and the FARC is strong.

These developments gave rise to a new phase in the war, Pardo continued, because the new areas of coca cultivation gave the FARC new financial strength. This financial growth in turn allowed the guerrillas to greatly improve their military capacity, as evidenced by their continued military successes from 1996 onward and the offensive they engaged in from 1997 to 1998. By 1998, then, what to do about the FARC was a determining issue in the presidential elections. The candidate who offered dialogue with the FARC or promised some other progress against them had a better chance to win, and the idea of creating a demilitarized zone was accepted by all candidates as a means of dealing with the FARC in a new way. Ultimately, Pardo argued, the movement of coca cultivation into Colombia led to the FARC's injection into the political arena, which subsequently produced a negotiation process and the eventual demilitarization of five municipalities, which lasted until early 2002.

According to Pardo, the surge of coca cultivation had another major impact, namely, the adaptation of the anti-drug strategy to the reality of the drug situation at the end of the 1990s—or the creation of Plan Colombia. A decade ago, Peru and Bolivia produced 90 percent of the coca and paste in the world, Colombia did 90 percent of the processing, and the U.S. consumed 90 percent of the drugs. The Colombian cartels—criminal organizations based in Colombia and led by Colombian nationals—controlled access to the North American market. Today, however, Colombia manages 50 percent of the paste, U.S. consumption has declined, in Europe and elsewhere consumption has increased, and the Mexican cartels control access to North America. Given this new business structure, Pardo added, and because the strategy is aimed at controlling the growth of coca over a 250,000 square kilometer area, Plan Colombia is appropriately designed. The plan requires a strengthening of the capacity of the armed forces to act

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against the FARC; eradication alone is simply not sufficient. The idea is not to modernize the army but, rather, to create three battalions with sufficient mobility, training, and intelligence to support anti-drug operations, especially in the southeastern part of the country.

Pardo also asserted that the reality of the security situation of the past four years has given rise to delusions on the part of the Colombian leadership. One of the most counterproductive of these, which is widely accepted among Colombia's elites, is the notion that the United States is poised to finance the war against armed groups, while the children of Colombia's poor are to do the fighting. Under Plan Colombia, the U.S. is hardly providing massive and substantial support for the Colombian army (it amounts to aid to three of eighty battalions and one of twenty-two brigades). Rather, the United States is supporting the potential to act in a focused, specific way.

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Pardo said that the mistaken perception that the U.S. administration and the U.S. Congress will provide massive support has led to particularly prejudicial and harmful policies. Among them is the elimination of obligatory military service and the attempt to fight the war with U.S.-trained battalions, rapid response units, helicopters, and other tactics that are inappropriate given the conditions. All government and judicial decision making, moreover, assures that only regular soldiers, as opposed to soldiers who have received their college degrees, are actively involved in the fighting. The Colombian soldiers who do not have their degrees are from the poorest families in the country.

As for the conduct of the war itself, Pardo continued, the issue that rises above all others is territorial control. Of the 9,500 or so towns (populated areas of more than 1,000 people) in Colombia, only about 3,000 receive adequate public services (police, telephones, postal service, government administration, etc.) from the state. These are isolated, lightly populated areas that are not representative of the country as a whole. Yet, because control over the national territory is insufficient, these towns provide the fuel for the conflict. Pardo pointed out that the state has no permanent presence in about 20 percent of Colombia's 1,100 municipalities; some 100 municipalities, those in which public officials are subject to threats, do not have mayors.

Territorial control can only be accomplished, Pardo asserted, by increasing the size of the armed forces—by putting more people in the field. The size of the police force, for example, should be doubled in six years, while the number of professional soldiers should be raised by 50,000 over three years. This latter recommendation would cost some $600-700

million per year: enhancing territorial control is expensive. But a reliance on rapid response forces, helicopters, or combat planes merely demonstrates the mistaken priorities of the government—notably the Ministry of Defense—which only delays resolution of the problems. Solutions require a focus on the origins of the problem, Pardo advised.

Territorial control also requires the presence of political authorities and a judicial system in isolated zones, Pardo continued. With the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Colombia has established twenty pilot *casas de justicia*—sites where people can work to resolve problems or conflicts peacefully. Colombia needs at least 1,000 more of these *casas*, however—just to begin addressing the sources of conflict in the country. The hundreds of millions of dollars required to improve territorial control will not be paid by the U.S. Congress, and Colombia's fiscal situation severely limits the amount of resources it can contribute. Getting priorities right, therefore, will be critical. Finally, Pardo concluded, it must be recalled that Colombia's security needs will not end with a peace agreement, as some 80 percent of its murders have nothing to do with the war. Rather, they reflect high levels of crime and social violence, themselves the result of poor public security and a weak judiciary.

General Néstor Ramírez Mejía,[3] Defense Attaché of the Colombian Embassy in Washington, spoke about the role of the Colombian armed forces in the search for peace. He addressed the role and effectiveness of the armed forces during the recently concluded government of Andrés Pastrana, examined their prospective role during the new Uribe administration, and explained how victory—a return to serious negotiations—could be achieved.

Colombians elected President Pastrana, Ramírez argued, because they wanted a leader who was committed to peace. The centerpiece of the peace effort was the creation of a demilitarized zone so as to guarantee the security of the guerrilla groups during the negotiations. The Pastrana government also restructured the armed forces with the aim of giving them the strength to dissuade their armed opponents from war and to lend support to the peace process. The military high command consequently developed a defense strategy characterized by five basic elements: be offensive-minded, better prepare and modernize, strengthen respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, obtain the support of the civil-

3. The full text of General Ramírez's remarks appears as Appendix III of this report.

ian population and international community, and develop effective interinstitutional integration. By 2000, the number of professional soldiers in the Colombian army increased 150 percent, and in 2001 there was another major increase.

Ramírez detailed a number of the accomplishments of the armed forces during this period. The armed forces improved their intelligence-gathering technology and strengthened communications, for example, and they activated several more operational units, such as four mobile brigades and a rapid deployment force. The coast guard, naval power, and air combat capability were strengthened as well. Ultimately, Ramírez argued, the armed forces effectively realized their four main objectives, which were to weaken illegal armed groups so they would accept a government peace plan, weaken the economic basis for armed opposition, strengthen their own operational capacity, and protect the civilian population and its resources.

The FARC responded, according to Ramírez, with a notorious lack of interest in peace and the failure to comply with any of the 2000-2001 agreements with the government. The demilitarized zone was used to conduct kidnappings and secure ransoms, establish new drug labs and storage facilities, increase illegal production of coca, and, among other activities, steal and stow vehicles. Nonetheless, during this period, Ramírez argued, the armed forces were able to restructure and sufficiently take the offensive and force the FARC, in a sign of weakness, to abandon battles of positions and turn to terrorism.

Having won the presidency with a historic 52 percent of the vote, President Uribe will continue the difficult search for peace, Ramírez stated. President Uribe will not, however, be deterred from strengthening the armed forces, using other mechanisms to achieve peace, and preventing the guerrillas from using negotiations as a tactic to gain power. The armed forces will continue increasing their offensive capacity, supporting the national government in furthering the political defeat of the guerrillas, and reducing the income they derive from the drug trade. One of the great proposals of recent years, moreover, has been the creation of a professional military that respects human rights and has a sound appreciation of operative and tactical strategy. Although this is an important objective, Ramírez argued, it is more important to assist the government in definitively providing for public security, without which development that improves the lives of Colombians cannot be achieved.

The national government understands that it must make use of past lessons as it pursues peace, and international oversight of the process is a log-

ical step, Ramírez added. He said that he felt that the military, to ensure governmental unity, should not participate in the peace process until the process is more advanced, as has occurred in other countries.

Achieving victory by revolutionary means, as seen in China, Cuba, and Iran, is impossible in Colombia, Ramírez argued, because the socioeconomic conditions do not exist. The idea of exploiting inequality and systemic failure to achieve revolution has failed to carry weight with Colombians. On the contrary, they have suffered greatly as an insurgency that was supposed to protect them has been converted into armed organizations surviving on the drug trade and terrorism. Popular support for the guerrillas is a mere 2 percent; the armed forces enjoy 72 percent support. Thus it is an error to characterize the conflict as a civil war, Ramírez asserted.

Victory by the Colombia government requires an integrated strategy that brings the nation's power, as opposed to military power alone, to bear on the conflict. The strategy should include political, economic, psychosocial, and other elements, Ramírez added. In the past, Colombia has been accused internationally of lacking the commitment to resolve the conflict. The problem is, however, that increased defense spending would create further social and economic disruption and fuel the violence. Given that narco-trafficking and terrorism are international problems, international assistance is imperative. As Colombian history has repeatedly demonstrated, achieving peace will be achieved by demonstrating to the guerrillas the futility of war.

THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE

Guillermo Rishchynski,[4] departing Canadian Ambassador to Colombia, discussed his experiences and observations while serving in Bogotá during the "turbulent four-year odyssey" that was the search for peace beginning in 1998. Colombia made some progress in the search for peace over the past twenty years, Rishchynski began, as two major insurgent groups were reincorporated into political life and as a new, albeit problematic, political framework was enshrined in the 1991 constitution. Yet despite the progress, inequality and violence fueled by illegal drug trafficking have shaken Colombia's institutions and undermined the security of its citizens. Many Colombians have grown deeply bitter and cynical, Rishchynski pointed out, and the country seems to be "retreating into darkness."

In August 1999, when Rishchynski arrived at his post in Bogotá, any mention of the idea that the peace process would dominate his term as ambassador would have been considered absurd. According to the ambassador, given the current context and the realities on the ground, "it was the last thing my colleagues and I ever expected." Those realities included Colombia's difficult relationship with the international community because of drug-related issues, an army poorly trained and equipped to take on a three-front (and sometimes four-front) conflict; and an ELN (National Liberation Army) reeling from the death of its leader. The FARC was emboldened by recent military successes and demonstrating its force in and around Bogotá, while the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) was growing in power and exerting greater territorial control. Nonetheless, the process, however flawed, emerged from the initial FARC-Pastrana government talks at Caquetania and then involved the ELN through the delicate diplomacy of Ambassador Julio Londoño.

A skeptical international community served merely as an interested spectator. The 2000 Havana Accords with the ELN, however, and the February 2001 Los Pozos Agreement with the FARC gave rise to the Group of Ten ("G10") "Facilitator Countries," including Canada.

4. The full text of Ambassador Rishchynski's remarks appears as Appendix IV of this report.

Considering that at the start of both discussions any type of international participation had been categorically rejected by all sides, Rishchynski argued, the G10's establishment represented considerable progress. The dynamics for successful negotiations had not changed—they remained slow and characterized by a lack of trust between the parties—but the important element of third-party accompaniment had been introduced. The international community's presence, Rishchynski added, was the result of both parties requesting it; it was the fruit of negotiation among the protagonists, not any external imposition.

The G1O attempted to respond to the challenge with objectivity and creativity, according to Rishchynski (who was most involved in the FARC talks). Ultimately, the only instrument of participation was moral suasion aimed at keeping the process moving forward. The reality was that the facilitators found themselves on a roller coaster ride as external forces—continuing violence, massacres by all sides, increased illicit cultivation, and further aerial eradication—pulled the talks in a variety of directions. Most important, the lack of confidence between the parties "made potential positive results from the talks ever more remote."

As the first coordinator of the G10, Rishchynski continued, Canada was faced with the difficult task of identifying the basis for working with the parties to the conflict. The G10 decided to focus its efforts on bringing humanitarian issues into the talks, specifically encouraging the exchange of sick detainees and then attempting to get the parties to consider a humanitarian agreement as their top priority. The latter effort failed, as both sides were committed to a socioeconomic agenda as a beginning and end point to the discussions. The idea of exchanging detainees, which occurred in Macarena in June 2001 with the cooperation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proved to be a success. As the erosion of what confidence remained between the parties continued and as the conflict intensified amid fruitless negotiations, this exchange also proved to be the pinnacle of the peace process.

Rishchynski did assert, however, that some modest progress was nonetheless evident in the end. All the agreements signed by both parties, culminating in the January 2002 Timetable Agreement, demonstrated some movement in the positions of both parties toward prioritizing, sequencing, and ordering of negotiations for potential use should a real peace effort come about. Coupled with the more vigorous, catalytic role of international third parties, the process, Rishchynski argued, offers a glimpse of the foundation for a future peace process. Colombians needed to experience the failure of the past four years, and their ability to under-

stand the progress and learn from mistakes will open a path to more serious efforts in the coming years. According to Rishchynski, success at peacemaking will require dispelling at least three myths:

- The illusion that negotiations can be successful while conflict rages around the talks and as violence is used to influence the discussions. This proved unworkable.
- The idea that the establishment of demilitarized zones can somehow provide the confidence required for successful talks to occur. In fact, the opposite was true, as the zone itself eroded the trust between the parties.
- The notion of the "particularity" of Colombia's conflict and denigration of the idea that third parties can play a useful role in domestic dialogue. It is now safe to say that third parties will be central to future dialogue efforts.

Success at peacemaking will require dispelling at least three myths, including the idea that the establishment of demilitarized zones can somehow provide the confidence required for successful talks to occur. In fact, the opposite was true, as the zone itself eroded the trust between the parties.

Rishchynski also made it clear that he does not think a new effort at dialogue will occur any time soon, although he was optimistic that a solution would eventually be found. Not until a new military, political, and diplomatic *conyuntura* and a new set of incentives emerge among the warring parties will behavior begin to shift in favor of peace. Until then, there will be a "test of strength" that only the good offices of institutions like the Catholic Church and quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomatic work can help alleviate. In the meantime, Rishchynski stressed, the Colombia government must embark upon a series of internal reforms aimed at strengthening institutions, alleviating poverty and societal exclusion, and improving the state's capacity to address socioeconomic needs in particular. Wealthy Colombians must make a great contribution to the effort to strengthen the state, and civil society must take a leading role in generating a national consensus. The international community, for its part, needs to help build the country's institutions, address humanitarian needs, and protect human rights. It should also, Rishchynski advocated, work with Colombia on the supply and demand sides of the drug trafficking problem and build technical models for negotiations that can eventually help resolve the conflict.

María Emma Mejía, former Foreign Minister of Colombia and former peace negotiator, opened her presentation with a discussion of four major difficulties associated with any attempt to reinitiate negotiations in the short or medium-term. First, the failure of the most recent effort to achieve peace in February 2002 has seriously damaged the confidence Colombians have in the possibility of achieving a negotiated peace. This

was clearly demonstrated by President Uribe's overwhelming electoral victory: over half the electorate chose the candidate who had never participated in a peace process, not even at the start when the nation enthusiastically supported it. Uribe's rejection of one of the guerrilla forces' key conditions for negotiation—the creation of a demilitarized zone—is further evidence of the decline in confidence.

The failure of the talks had produced an escalation of the conflict, Mejía continued. Threats against local authorities and the kidnapping of politicians—a presidential candidate, assembly deputies from the department of Valle, and the former governor of Meta department—have increased in dramatic fashion. In Bogotá and especially Medellín, guerrilla forces of the ELN and FARC have established an unprecedented operational presence, just as they would, for example, in their traditional stronghold of San Vicente del Caguán. For the first time, the guerrilla forces have opted for a strategy of establishing control in local areas and an active presence in city neighborhoods, Bogotá and Medellín in particular.

The second difficulty concerning efforts to resume negotiations is that the failure of the talks discredited the idea of international mediation. President Pastrana himself may have called for the passive participation of the international community, either through the "Group of Friends" or the United Nations. The solicitation was perhaps an effort to rescue a peace process on the verge of collapse at the last moment, which, at the time of the request, was a matter of seeking the impossible. The failure of the effort then generated a serious lack of confidence among Colombians in the possibility of a negotiated solution with the help of a third party. Given the insurgency and the country's weak international status, yet increasingly open approach to foreign affairs, this is a grave development.

A third issue complicating future efforts at negotiations is the failure of Plan Colombia. According to Mejía, and contrary to the opinions of other panelists, Plan Colombia initially involved a much more comprehensive vision. When the first phase of negotiations began, the United States was directly involved, sending the State Department's director of Andean Affairs to meet with top FARC negotiators on issues including that of crop substitution. At issue was a pilot socioeconomic development project providing for the investment of resources directly managed by the FARC and for the continuation of the campaign to control illicit cultivation. Plan Colombia's failure impedes the effort to break the all-important economic link—drug trafficking—that sustains the FARC and the paramilitaries. This dependence on the drug trade, Mejía explained, is what changed the FARC's entire political program and its military and social structure in its areas of influence.

Mejía stated that the prospects for a resumption of negotiations are made much more difficult by the new international scenario—the global war against terrorism. One tends to feel obligated to find some link to this new context. The surprise announcement by President Uribe the night of his election victory that he would seek to negotiate with the illegal groups allows him—if his intentions are real and his conditions are seen as the point of departure for talks and possible concessions—the chance to find a solution. This would be progress. Uribe said he would seek dialogue with the insurgents on the condition that they abandon terrorism and facilitate a cease-fire. The FARC responded by refusing to speculate on whether the group would reach a negotiated solution with the government. Rather, for the FARC the key issue is the desire of the Colombian elites to change—to accept power-sharing, remove corrupt politicians, and give up their many privileges—as part of any peace agreement. As noted above, then, the visions of both sides remain wide apart.

It is important, Mejía added, that, despite their increased demands, the core structure of the guerrillas' positions has remained the same since they first presented their historic proposal for talks in 1953. The guerrillas have consistently sought in all peace processes—as evidenced in their calls for demilitarized zones, prisoner exchanges, amnesties, local police, and oversight mechanisms for compliance, and, of course, land reform—a real sharing of institutional and territorial power. Over the past fifty years, Mejía continued, these demands have heavily reflected a territorial, rural campesino conception of the state. They amount to a call for social equity—the establishment of the fundamental elements for a new social structure and rule of law in the countryside. Together they demonstrate how the Colombian state has historically failed to meet the needs of the rural population. These same demands, which remain "absolutely pertinent" today, continue to inform the FARC proposals.

Mejía made reference to a U.N. paper describing the possible future mediation role of the international organization. It calls for the U.N. to begin as an advisor and to serve as a more formal mediator in the medium term. As seen in the example of El Salvador, however, when the U.N. establishes "good offices" between the warring sides, the talks must be accompanied by sympathetic personalities or countries. Formal mediation of the Central American style is not the appropriate role for Colombia; the smaller advisory role is best. A formal U.N. role would eventually move the dispute into the Security Council, Mejía asserted, and Colombians "know who normally makes the decisions in the Security Council."

Two proposals could be quite helpful in leading Colombia back to the path of negotiations, Mejía argued. Implementing them would demonstrate

President Uribe's desire to expend political capital. The first proposal is that the president unilaterally offer a prisoner exchange or humanitarian accord. He could offer to liberate all persons as demanded by the insurgents in their detainee lists. The FARC would then have to respond accordingly. This would be a one-time event and a humanitarian concession that could legitimize the president's plans for the future and obligate the FARC to respond. Second, the president could ensure the continuation of the conversations with the ELN. In meetings in Havana, the ELN and Pastrana government were accompanied by a separate "Group of Friends." Although it is difficult to talk about peace processes at this point, Mejía pointed out, the development of a "transition agenda" in this instance could help keep the negotiations alive. Talks could continue outside the country until they become viewed by the Colombia public as legitimate, which would allow further advance.

Achieving a cease-fire is the most difficult problem, Mejía continued, and the job of the U.N. now is to convince the FARC to cease hostilities. A cessation could perhaps emerge in response to a prisoner exchange or to the environment created by continuing to work with the ELN, ensuring that the group is not co-opted by the FARC. More than any other president, Álvaro Uribe has the opportunity to utilize pilot efforts—laboratories for social and military change and exercises in peace—at the regional level. The war has a national reach, but it has historically had specific regional and local expressions and dynamics. The initiation of focused, integrated programs for social development in the most conflictive rural areas would be a large step forward. Efforts should not only address the military, judicial system, or police; there must also be social investment. The weak state presence in these isolated rural zones illustrates not only a lack of security; it also reflects the gross failure to provide schools, health centers, and other social services. President Uribe can institute a regional development process that could assist in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table and opening the way for local communities and authorities to make some progress.

Ultimately, the Colombian government must share power, Mejía concluded. This point is very difficult for President Uribe, who is offering the guerrillas only an unfettered reinsertion into society, to concede. From the perspective of the FARC leadership, no peace process is going to advance without concessions from the Colombian establishment, government, and economic elites. The FARC sees no vision for the future or plan for redesigning the country from which peace can emerge. President Uribe may decide in favor of confrontation, Mejía stated. Finding a political solution to the crisis will require, however, an institutional and social about-face for a group of citizens who are insensitive to a large part of the Colombian population.

The war has a national reach, but it has historically had specific regional and local expressions and dynamics. The initiation of focused, integrated programs for social development in the most conflictive rural areas would be a large step forward. Efforts should not only address the military, judicial system, or police; there must also be social investment.

APPENDIX I

Lino Gutiérrez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs

I understand that the purpose of this meeting is to explore the security, economic and political dimensions of conflict resolution in Colombia. Building on the progress made under President Pastrana, the incoming Uribe administration faces tremendous challenges. It must provide for increased security, strengthen democratic institutions, promote economic recovery and improve the observance of human rights. It must also find the increased resources that will be needed to do this.

This conference contributes to those goals by providing an opportunity to exchange views on how we can best help Colombia and the incoming administration of President-elect Uribe to address the tremendous challenges that he and his country face. To explore these issues, I want to describe what the Administration is doing and hopes to do in order to support progress towards their resolution.

Note that I said "progress toward their resolution," and we intend to work with the Colombian government for this, but with the realistic recognition that there are no easy or quick solutions.

The first thing that needs to be recognized is that no single explanation fully addresses the deep roots of Colombia's present-day troubles, but they include limited government presence in large areas of the interior, the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, endemic violence and social inequities.

The United States policy towards Colombia seeks to help Colombia establish control over its national territory in order to develop a prosperous democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law and is free from narcotics production and trafficking and terrorism.

With strong support from the United States, the administration of Andrés Pastrana embarked on its "Plan Colombia" in 1999 to address these multiple ills. Although widely described as a counternarcotics program, "Plan Colombia" was a comprehensive effort by Colombia to deal in a holistic way with the country's longstanding, mutually reinforcing problems. The primary objectives of "Plan Colombia" were to promote peace, combat the narcotics industry, revive the Colombian economy, improve respect for human rights and strengthen the democratic and social institu-

tions of the country. The Pastrana administration deserves credit for its articulation of these goals and its programs to implement them; these programs were generally accepted by all the candidates in the recent elections as the basis for many of their own proposals.

Having said that, it is also important to note that Alvaro Uribe won election without a runoff — a first in recent Colombian history – by campaigning on a platform that promised a more vigorous program to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism. His message quite clearly resonated with the Colombian electorate. By the end of the peace process with the FARC in February, it had become clear to all that the FARC had no interest in a real peace or serious negotiations.

Our meeting here today comes as a number of developments are taking place. The Administration continues to urge early adoption by the Congress of renewed Andean trade preferences and is optimistic of its passage.

More immediately, President-elect Uribe is completing a week in the United States where he will have met in New York with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and here in Washington with President Bush, National Security Adviser Rice, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and ONDCP Director Walters, Assistant Secretary Reich, as well as congressional leaders. This has given us an opportunity to learn more of his plans and to discuss the role of future U.S. support.

Before talking about that role, let me review what has been accomplished with Colombia so far:

- The United States has trained and equipped the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigade, which has destroyed over 800 coca base laboratories and 21 HCL (hydrochloride) laboratories and provided security for aerial eradication operations in southern Colombia. With Colombia, we sprayed a record 84,000 hectares of coca cultivation in 2001 and have set a goal of 150,000 hectares in 2002.

- In 2001, the Colombian government extradited for trial in the United States 23 Colombian nationals here on serious narcotics charges.

- Through Colombia's Ministry of Interior, we have funded a program that has provided protection to nearly 1700 Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists and journalists.

- The U.S. government-funded Early Warning System alerts Colombian authorities to threats of potential massacres or other human rights abuses. While still incomplete and not perfect, it has made a difference.

- Working with non-governmental organizations and international agencies, the U.S. has provided assistance to 330,000 Colombians displaced by violence since mid-2001.
- Our program to demobilize child soldiers has helped 272 children to re-integrate into society; this is a small beginning but one that we hope will grow. One of the most egregious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law is the forced recruitment of children, especially by the FARC.
- We have helped the Colombian government implement programs to reform its administration of justice and strengthen local government. We have opened 20 "Casas de Justicia" to provide cost-effective legal services in poor neighborhoods.
- And we are helping the Prosecutor General's Office set up human rights units throughout the country to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses.

We also remain committed to alternative development as a key component of our overall effort in Colombia. Promoting alternative development has not been easy. The security situation is a major obstacle and in most cases there is no alternative agricultural production that can match the income derived from coca production.

We also remain committed to alternative development as a key component of our overall effort in Colombia. Promoting alternative development has not been easy. The security situation is a major obstacle and in most cases there is no alternative agricultural production that can match the income derived from coca production. Because the results we had hoped for were not being achieved, we are now making adjustments to our program. This includes working more closely with individual communities to tailor programs to help with needs they identify or to fund activities which improve the economic potential of isolated regions, such as Putumayo, and boost the temporary employment and income of rural residents.

As we move forward on these refocused programs, we will need to keep in mind the recent GAO report on alternative development in Colombia, which noted: "without interdiction and eradication as disincentives, growers are unlikely to abandon more lucrative and easily cultivated coca crops in favor of less profitable and harder-to-grow licit corps or to pursue legal employment."

U.S. support has been a key component of Colombian efforts. Since July 2000, the United States has provided Colombia with $1.7 billion to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democratic institutions and human rights, foster socio-economic development and mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombian civilians. This includes $380.5 million approved by Congress in the FY-02 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to continue these programs.

The Department of State has asked for $439 million in its FY-03 budget request, again for these and similar programs. Also, in the FY-02 emergency supplemental, the Department of State has requested $35 million for three initiatives in Colombia: $4 million to support re-establishment of a Colombian National Police presence in areas it had been forced to abandon; $25 million in anti-terrorism and anti-kidnapping program funding and $6 million to jump-start training for Colombian army units designated to protect a vital oil pipeline. The House and the Senate are shortly to meet in a conference committee to reconcile differences in the emergency supplemental legislation each has passed.

In addition to the $439 million for FY-03 I mentioned just a moment ago, we are also asking Congress for $98 million to train and equip Colombian military and police units protecting the Caño Limón-Covenas pipeline. This proposal, which goes beyond our already established programs in Colombia, is intended to help the Colombian government defend a vital economic asset threatened by terrorist attacks and whose closure for over 240 days during 2001 resulted in nearly $500 million in foregone revenues and royalties lost, funds that otherwise would have contributed to the country's legitimate economy and to social and economic development programs. Often overlooked, oil spills as a result of attacks on the pipeline have caused serious environmental damage.

The proposed change that has caused the most commentary is the Administration's March 21 request to the Congress for new legal authorities to address the intertwined terrorist and narcotics problems, the relation being something that perhaps we had not previously appreciated adequately.

As you know, Colombia's 40-million-plus citizens and its democracy are under sustained assault by three narco-terrorist groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the National Liberation Army (ELN); and the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces (AUC). These three groups in varying degrees regularly engage in massacres, kidnappings and attacks on key infrastructure. To support their terrorist activities they — and the FARC and AUC especially — are intimately involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing and transportation.

President Bush recognized this link when he stated on April 18, after meeting with President Pastrana, that "we've put the FARC, AUC on our terrorist list. We've called them for what they are. These are killers, who use killing and intimidation to foster political means ... by fighting narcotrafficking we're fighting the funding sources for these political terrorists."

Along these lines, I would note that yesterday the State Department expressed its appreciation to the Government of Suriname for having expelled into the custody of the United States a Colombian narcotics trafficker and member of the FARC 16th Front who had been indicted in March 2002 for being engaged in cocaine trafficking into the United States.

Polls in Colombia have consistently shown that these groups have only minimal public support. As in Africa, where the proceeds from illicit diamond sales have been used to fund violence and intimidation, in Colombia it is narcotics that provides the fuel. This is why a unified approach, one that recognizes the cross-cutting relation between narcotics trafficking and terrorism, is needed.

The new authorities the Administration is asking of Congress would allow us to:

- address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as vigorously as we currently address narcotics; and
- help the Colombian government confront the heightened terrorist risk that has resulted from the end of the FARC demilitarized zone.

The primary difference between what we do now and what we hope to do is that we are asking Congress to authorize the use of equipment previously made available to Colombia for counternarcotics purposes — and in particular, helicopters and the battalion the U.S. has trained and supported – for counterterrorism operations.

Expanding the authorities for the use of aircraft and other assets to cover terrorist and other threats to Colombia's democracy does not promise a short-term solution. It is not a silver bullet. However, if approved, this will give us the flexibility we need to help the Colombian government respond to this threat more efficiently and more effectively in the shortest possible time, with resources already in Colombia.

This new initiative does not mean a retreat from our concern about human rights, nor does it mean an open-ended U.S. commitment in Colombia. Specifically:

- We will not stop the human rights vetting of all Colombian military units receiving U.S. assistance;
- We will not exceed the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel providing support to Plan Colombia nor the 400-person cap on U.S. civilian contractors;

- We will not send U.S. combat troops to Colombia. President Bush has made this crystal-clear.

Human rights concerns have been and will remain a central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia. In meetings in Colombia with senior civilian and military officials, including with President-elect Uribe, U.S. officials, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lorne Craner, and Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich have regularly stressed the need for Colombia to improve its human rights performance and sever remaining military-paramilitary ties.

We believe our human rights message is making a difference.

- The counternarcotics brigade that we trained and equipped has compiled an unblemished human rights record to date.
- President Pastrana and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have repeatedly denounced collusion between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitary terrorists.
- The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitaries and killed 92 in combat last year, three times more than the previous year.

Human rights concerns have been and will remain a central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia.

Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with them. Those responsible for such actions must be brought to justice. The establishment of the rule of law and personal security for all Colombians will not be created through human rights abuses or impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes.

Under Section 567 of the FY-02 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the Secretary of State is required to certify as to the Government of Colombia's progress in meeting three human rights-related conditions:

- that Colombian Armed Forces members who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups are being suspended;
- that the Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts those members of the Colombian Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups; and

- that the Colombian Armed Forces are taking effective measures to sever links with paramilitary groups, and to execute outstanding orders for capture for members of such groups.

The Secretary takes very seriously his responsibilities under the Act and carefully weighed all the facts before certifying on May 1, thereby releasing 60 percent of the funds appropriated in the FY-02 Foreign Operations Act for the Colombian military. A second certification is required before the remaining 40 percent can be released, and it too will be carefully considered.

The United States believes Colombia needs to continue a strong counternarcotics program, including interdiction, spraying, alternative development and extradition. Colombia must also make solid advances on human rights and ending ties to paramilitary groups, increase GOC revenues to meet increased needs and undertake to increase security spending, but not at the expense of socio-economic development programs.

The commitment we have made to Colombia — to sustain our counternarcotics programs, step up our counterterrorism assistance, strengthen programs to protect human rights, and help to foment alternative development, among other areas — cannot succeed absent a sustained commitment of even greater magnitude by the Government of Colombia.

President-elect Uribe received a solid electoral mandate for his pledge to establish government authority throughout Colombia and has said he intends to increase defense spending, add soldiers and police and create a civilian defense force for intelligence collection. He has also said he would call on the United Nations to provide assistance in peace negotiations.

The devil is always in the details, but this strikes us as a good beginning.

As you look at the issues to be posed by the three scheduled panels –Economic Foundations for Peace; Military and Security Foundations for Peace; and the Basis for Negotiating Peace — I hope you will find that the programs and policies I have outlined contribute to these goals.

The Colombian people have fought long and hard for peace. I remember when I lived in Colombia as a child, reading in the newspaper about atrocities committed in the countryside, in what was then described as "La Violencia." Some of these guerrillas may have had ideological motivations at that time. But in today's world, there is no justification for a movement that kills, kidnaps, terrorizes or relies on narcotics trafficking to fund their goals. The Colombian nation-state, Colombian democracy, has to win this war for the good of the country and the region. And the United States is committed to helping our Colombian friends.

APPENDIX II

Eduardo Aninat, Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Colombia is one of the oldest and most enduring democracies in South America, but also the stage for the region's longest internal armed confrontation. Until the mid-1990s the conflict appeared to have had a relatively moderate impact on Colombia's economy, which had grown for years at a relatively fast pace in a context of fiscal and external stability. From the last half of the 1990s, however, both the scale and intensity of violence have increased at the same time as the economic performance has deteriorated, and the conflict has become an explicit development constraint for Colombia. President-elect Uribe has expressed his intent to address steadfastly this issue, and I certainly wish him all possible success in this endeavor.

Given these circumstances, economic policy design in present-day Colombia should address at the same time two equally important objectives:

- On the one hand, implement policies that can boost economic growth and mitigate poverty and social dislocation against the background of a continuation of the conflict;
- On the other, lay the ground for policies that will support the consolidation of peace in the hopeful event of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

POLICIES TO PROMOTE GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT IN COLOMBIA

I will start with the immediate policy challenges, and the background upon which they might be addressed. Colombia suffered in the late 1990s its deepest economic crisis since the 1930s. The crisis was rooted in a number of severe imbalances that eventually undermined financial stability, including a growing fiscal gap—as the large increase in spending outpaced the growth of tax revenue—and a weakening external position—with the currency appreciating in real terms, contributing to the widening of the trade deficit and the accumulation of external debt. To correct these imbalances, the administration of President Pastrana implemented, with

the support of the IMF and other multilateral organizations, an extensive adjustment program that has been relatively successful in restoring macroeconomic stability in spite of the very difficult security situation: inflation was reduced from 17 percent in 1998 to 6 percent in May 2002, the international reserve position was reinforced considerably in the context of a floating exchange rate regime, and the fiscal deficit reduced from more of 5 percent of GDP in 1999 to 3 percent last year. Wide-ranging structural reforms were also initiated with the aim of boosting economic efficiency. As a result, growth was restored, and the country regained access to substantial flows of private external financing.

Nonetheless, developments in the last months have reduced the momentum of Colombia's recovery. The escalation of violence, combined with a deteriorating external environment, including the global slowdown, has trimmed near term prospects, and is putting renewed pressure on the fiscal and external positions. In the fiscal area, the conflict increases demands for security and social spending, while sluggish growth reduces tax revenues and complicates the implementation of structural reforms. On the external front, the slowdown in the two main trade partners, especially in Venezuela, has weakened exports. At the same time, social conditions have deteriorated significantly, with urban unemployment now close to 20 percent. Policies must thus be reinforced promptly to revert this process and strengthen economic performance.

I am fully aware that policy adjustment in Colombia's current adverse circumstances is a very difficult task. In particular, it may entail delicate negotiations with interest groups that in the past have successfully blocked or delayed reforms. However, it is to be hoped that the incoming administration, benefiting from large popular support, will be in a position to proceed forcefully in at least three important areas: fiscal, external, and social.

- In the fiscal area, it is essential to put the public finances on a sustainable path so as to maintain investor confidence and financial stability. This result will in turn hinge on the implementation of extensive structural fiscal reforms.
- In the external area, the key objective must be the preservation of external competitiveness.
- In the social area, the goal should be to rekindle employment growth, which depends on the elimination of existing rigidities, including an unduly restrictive labor market.

Let me elaborate briefly on some of these issues.

First, achieving fiscal sustainability. As I said earlier, much has been done to reduce the fiscal deficit over the past few years, but much remains to be done to achieve medium-term fiscal sustainability. Certain structural deficiencies, including the growing deficit of the public pension system, pervasive revenue earmarking arrangements, and extensive tax exemptions, threaten to weaken the fiscal position over the coming years. Some important reforms have been initiated to address these issues, while others are still under preparation. Advancing resolutely with these reforms will be crucial to consolidate macroeconomic stability and strengthen confidence. In particular:

- A comprehensive pension reform is essential for the longer-term viability of the public finances. Without this reform, the deficit of the public pension system will continue to fuel an undesirable expansion of the public debt. The present outgoing government has initiated the reform process, and it will be important for the new government to carry on with it more forcefully and complete it.
- The adoption of a fiscal responsibility and transparency law would increase accountability and help limit the scope for the corruption and administrative inefficiencies that still characterize many Latin American tax systems, including Colombia's.
- The reduction of revenue earmarking arrangements, that now account for about 46 percent of tax revenue, would increase the flexibility of fiscal policy and the scope for sound fiscal management.

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A second key issue is the preservation of external competitiveness. The maintenance of external competitiveness is a key requisite for growth in open economies like Colombia.

The peso has appreciated by an important percentage in recent months, and this could threaten the vigorous growth of Colombia's non-traditional exports. These exports have already been key to diversifying Colombia's export base, and to fostering the growth of productive, income-generating employment opportunities. Different factors have contributed to the peso appreciation, including some over which the authorities have little control, like the sharp depreciation of the Venezuelan bolívar.

- In the event, the authorities have eased monetary policy appropriately, although with little impact on the peso so far.

- Pressing ahead with the fiscal adjustment would also help sustain the improvement in competitiveness.

In the trade policy area, I am very encouraged by the steps being taken in the U.S. Congress with regard to the Andean Trade Preference Act, since they have the clear potential to broaden considerably the range of Colombian exports that will be granted duty-free access to the United States. Trade is the engine for growth, that we all value and respect in the Americas.

POLICIES TO CONSOLIDATE PEACE IN THE EVENT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT

Let me now pass to the economic policies that will be required to consolidate peace, in the event of a negotiated settlement. These policies would be framed by two elements:

- First, the peace dividend, or the economic benefits that can be derived from peace;
- And second, the costs of peace, or the programs that would have to be implemented to make peace durable.

I will start with the peace dividend. While Colombia has managed to grow in the midst of internal conflict in the past, the late 1990s saw a slowdown in growth and a deterioration of social conditions as the conflict intensified. It is difficult to estimate what have been the economic costs of violence in Colombia, but they have clearly been substantial.

- For example, it has been estimated that the conflict took 1-2 percent off Colombia's annual growth rate before its intensification in the late 1990s. (the source for this data is Colombia's planning agency)
- Another study calculates the net costs of urban violence at about 3-4 percent of GDP every single year.
- About one-fourth of Colombia's health expenditure is attributable to intentional injuries, compared to 3 percent for the rest of Latin America. (source: Ministerio de Salud)
- It is said that some 1 million persons also have had to migrate to other regions of the country because of the conflict. Over 3 million Colombians have simply left the country since 1994.

An end to this conflict between brothers will clearly produce a significant "peace dividend," as it will free up substantial public and private resources that are now allocated to the armed conflict, to security, or to the fallout from the conflict. Peace should foster an improvement in business confidence, in private investment, and in growth.

The short-term costs of peace. But these benefits will mostly be felt over a number of years. Over the near term, however, peace will likely entail sizeable financial costs.

These costs are associated, first, with the reconstruction of physical and institutional infrastructure damaged by the conflict.

In addition, large groups of people whose main skills and experience are now related to violence will have to be reintegrated into peaceful productive activities. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries that emerged from armed conflicts in the 1990s, nonpolitical violence and urban crime in fact had increased after the peace agreements. This was partly due to the migration of former combatants from rural areas (where the armed conflict took place) to cities where jobs were scarce and underemployment widespread. Managing this transition will require extensive programs to provide intelligent retraining and job opportunities, and an active social policy structured around social protection networks in key rural areas.

Consolidating peace will also demand deep institutional reforms, and dedicated efforts to replenish the social capital that was depleted during decades of conflict and violence.

The fiscal costs of peace will likely outrun the available fiscal resources, at least in the initial transition years. There will thus be an important policy tension between maintaining the fiscal sustainability that is essential for growth, and on the other hand, funding social and economic policies essential to consolidate peace.

Several potential options can be combined to meet this challenge:

- For instance, it should be possible to finance a number of initial measures with the proceeds from privatization projects that had been put on hold because of the conflict.
- The initiatives in support of peace will make it all the most urgent to enhance tax collection, control non-essential public expenditure, and give priority to investments that generate synergies with pro-peace programs (including spending on infrastructure and housing, and focused social expenditure).

The international community must certainly be prepared to contribute. It is now recognized that the Colombian conflict concerns the regional and international community at large, and that peace in Colombia will provide benefits far beyond the country's own borders. Peace can be considered as a global public good. The international community should mobilize knowledge, financing, and international best practices to make international assistance in post-conflict situations effective. Colombia, in turn, should redouble its efforts to secure multilateral and bilateral support to help finance the peace process, and do it by designing and proposing sound programs.

It is my sincere hope that the new administration will be able to find ways to mobilize the multiple talents and goodwill of the Colombian people, and put the country back on a path of peaceful social progress.

APPENDIX III

General Néstor Ramírez Mejía, Agregado de Defensa de Colombia en Washington

Los conceptos emitidos a continuación son del autor y no comprometen al gobierno saliente o entrante ni a las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia

ROL DE LAS FUERZAS MILITARES DE COLOMBIA EN LOS PROCESOS DE PAZ

ROL EN EL PASADO PROCESO

Crear las condiciones necesarias para las negociaciones sobre la paz

Durante las elecciones para Presidente de la República del gobierno que termina, (periodo 1998-2002), el pueblo hastiado de la violencia eligió a quien se comprometiera con la paz. Después de mas de 35 años de conflicto armado, el Presidente Andrés Pastrana inició un proceso de negociación buscando lograr un acuerdo de paz negociado con la guerrilla sobre la base de integridad territorial, la democracia y los derechos humanos. Para su desarrollo se creó por ley la denominada "zona de distensión" con el propósito de garantizar la seguridad necesaria con miras a avanzar en las negociaciones con la guerrilla. Esta ley permitió en su momento que el Presidente creara o suspendiera un área de distensión como expresión de la soberanía del Estado.

El gobierno también apoyó un plan de reestructuración para las Fuerzas Militares, de tal manera que se fortalecieran con el fin de ejercer disuasión y a su vez prestar apoyo al proceso. Dicho plan se realizó a través del Comando de las Fuerzas Militares que emprendió un programa donde se lideró el desarrollo de la estrategia del sector defensa con tres líneas de acción: más y mejores hombres, más y mejores equipos y unas herramientas legales adecuadas.

Dentro de la estrategia utilizada por las Fuerzas Militares para atender el conflicto interno hay cinco elementos básicos que son:

- Poseer una actitud ofensiva.
- Prepararse y modernizarse.

- Fortalecer la cultura de los Derechos Humanos y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario.
- Obtener el apoyo de la población civil y la comunidad internacional.
- Hacer una efectiva integración interinstitucional.

Como parte de la estrategia de fortalecimiento se incrementó a 55,000 el número de soldados profesionales, es decir, en el curso de tres años se incorporaron más de 30,000 soldados profesionales, equivalente a un incremento de cerca de 150%. Adicionalmente, en desarrollo del denominado Plan Fortaleza, se incorporaron 10,000 nuevos soldados regulares para el año 2001.

Los logros obtenidos por las Fuerzas Militares durante este periodo son: En tecnificación de inteligencia y fortalecimiento de las comunicaciones:

- Fortalecimiento de los enlaces tierra-aire
- Renovación de los sistemas de intercomunicación de los vehículos blindados
- Implementación de la red de transmisión de datos de campaña
- Incremento de las dotaciones de equipos de comunicaciones en los diferentes niveles.
- Fortalecimiento de la infraestructura de mantenimiento.

En el área operativa se activaron más unidades: la Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido, la Brigada Fluvial, cuatro Brigadas Móviles, un Batallón de alta montaña, una agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales y una Brigada contra el narcotráfico. Se fortalecieron el cuerpo de guardacostas, las bases de operaciones y fortificación de bases fijas y la capacidad aerotáctica.

En medios de movilidad se adquirieron 25 helicópteros, sin contar los correspondientes al Plan Colombia. De igual manera se fortaleció el poder naval y aéreo de combate.

Para no hacer más extenso este punto, basta decir que cada uno de los cuatro objetivos, en su orden, debilitar las organizaciones armadas al margen de la ley para llevarlos a aceptar el plan de paz del gobierno, debilitar la estructura económica de la amenaza, fortalecer la capacidad operacional de las Fuerzas y proteger a la población civil y sus recursos tuvieron una realización efectiva.

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Las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia obedecieron las directrices del Gobierno Nacional sin ser un obstáculo para el desarrollo de las acciones

que se trazaron. En su cumplimiento soportaron dolorosos sacrificios como la salida del personal de las instalaciones del batallón "Cazadores", ubicado en la zona que seria escenario de los diálogos de paz y se comprometieron a no operar en una zona de 42,000 Km^2 concedida por el gobierno para llevar a cabo las conversaciones que conducirían a la paz.

Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) respondieron a los sacrificios del gobierno y del pueblo colombiano con notoria falta de voluntad para la paz, incumpliendo los acuerdos de los Pozos (9-feb-01), San Francisco (5-oct-01), y el cronograma (20-ene-02).

La zona destinada por el Presidente Pastrana con propósitos de paz fue utilizada para manejo y refugio de secuestrados, negocio y pago de rescates, pago de extorsiones "Ley 002", apoderamiento ilícito y desvío de aeronaves, establecimiento de nuevos laboratorios y almacenamiento de precursores, construcción ilegal de vías, construcción y ampliación de pistas, incremento de cultivos ilícitos de coca, robo de bienes a los pobladores, conducción de ganado robado, robo y ocultamiento de vehículos, uso de la zona como campo de entrenamiento, almacenamiento de armas y municiones, construcción de armas no convencionales, dirección y organización de expediciones delictivas e intercambio de experiencias con terroristas internacionales.

Durante el proceso, las Fuerzas Militares iniciaron su reestructuración y sin decir que ganaron la guerra avanzaron decididamente hacia una actitud ofensiva que neutralizó la guerra de movimientos de las FARC que en actitud triunfalista buscaba la rendición del Estado en la mesa de negociación. Su eficacia se aprecia con la cesación de la guerra de movimientos de la guerrilla, para retornar a su condición de terrorista como expresión de debilidad.

ROL DURANTE UN NUEVO PROCESO DE NEGOCIACIÓN

Obtener condiciones más favorables para la negociación

En 2002 el pueblo cansado por los constantes atropellos por parte de la guerrilla ha ejercido su derecho al voto, a pesar de las amenazas y prohibiciones realizadas por los terroristas y ha elegido al Doctor Álvaro Uribe Vélez, como su nuevo presidente, en una votación histórica que le dio mas del 52% del voto popular. El nuevo gobierno continuará la búsqueda de tan anhelada paz, sin que sea un inconveniente reforzar a las Fuerzas Militares y los mecanismos que obliguen a una paz verdadera. Impidiendo así el regreso a la negociación como medio estratégico de los grupos terroristas para obtener la toma del poder.

En este contexto, las Fuerzas Militares van a continuar aumentando la capacidad de la fuerza para debilitar la estructura armada de las organizaciones al margen de la ley y seguirán apoyando al gobierno nacional en mantener y acentuar la derrota política lograda por el gobierno anterior, así como reducirle a los actores generadores de violencia sus ingresos por concepto del narcotráfico, generándoles un déficit fiscal. Para obtener esto se cumplirán las directrices gubernamentales al pie de la letra.

El Gobierno Nacional seguramente buscará la paz en un nuevo escenario aprovechando las experiencias del pasado proceso y las realidades existentes en una acción integral que enfrente la combinación de los métodos de lucha de la amenaza pública.

Parece lógico que el Gobierno Nacional sea el interlocutor de la contraparte con una veeduría internacional del proceso. Personalmente pienso que los militares no deben participar al menos inicialmente como actores del proceso de paz, pues ello contribuiría a caer en el error de crear interlocutores que desvertebrarían la unidad gubernamental.

El Estado tiene como función específica la seguridad y el desarrollo para lograr la paz, en tanto que sus Fuerzas Militares tienen como función ganar las guerras, aunque su propósito final sea el logro de la paz.

En lo avanzado del proceso quizás sea útil la participación de las Fuerzas Militares, como lo ha sido la experiencia en procesos de paz de otros países.

Uno de los grandes propósitos de liderazgo en los últimos años ha sido el de obtener un ejército lo más profesional posible, que respeta los derechos humanos, que hace la correcta apreciación de la estrategia militar operativa y la táctica. Sin duda lo anterior es muy importante, sin embargo, es aún más importante ayudar al gobierno en forma definitiva para lograr la seguridad, sin la cual no es posible el desarrollo. Sin el desarrollo no es posible mejorar las condiciones de vida de los ciudadanos, sus oportunidades, su justicia, su libertad, su democracia y todo lo que cualquier miembro de una sociedad necesita para tener una calidad superior de vida.

LA VICTORIA

Una única alternativa para el regreso a negociar por la paz y no como medio para obtener la toma de poder.

Según Gerard Chaliand, experto en guerras revolucionarias de la décadas de los 60 y 70, y simpatizante de la mayoría de los movimientos revolucionarios tuvo serias dudas sobre la validez de la doctrina de la

guerra revolucionaria referida a la consecución del poder político mediante el empleo de la fuerza armada. Hizo notar que "a excepción de Cuba, (y puede que Irán), la guerra revolucionaria solo ha tenido éxitos en algunas partes de Asia, en China y Vietnam. La identidad y cohesión social nacional son mucho mas débiles en el resto de Asia, África y Latinoamérica, seguramente demasiado débiles para sobrevivir a la horrible y prolongada tensión de librar una guerra revolucionaria. En el resto del mundo las guerras revolucionarias han caído ante la represión o se han dividido en fracciones étnicas, regionales o de tribus cuya hostilidad entre ellos es mas fuerte que el objetivo común revolucionario."[1]

En efecto, las guerras de independencia han logrado la unidad nacional y fuera de ellas la de Mao, Cuba e Irán también fueron exitosas por circunstancias que no se dan en Colombia. La explotación de las desigualdades y fallas del sistema como nueva oportunidad del éxito para la guerra revolucionaria no logró aglutinar a su alrededor a los colombianos y es por ello que las guerrillas terminaron convirtiéndose en el verdugo del pueblo al que supuestamente pretendían proteger. Al no tener el apoyo popular estos movimientos que quizás inicialmente fueron insurgentes con el correr de los años se convirtieron en organizaciones que subsisten del narcotráfico y emplean el terrorismo como método, con el consiguiente desprestigio internacional y derrotados políticamente. Las estadísticas recientes reflejan un apoyo popular del 2% a la guerrilla, en contraste con un 72% de las Fuerzas Militares, razón por lo demás que demuestra que en Colombia no hay una guerra civil como frecuentemente se quiere hacer ver.

Al no tener el apoyo popular estos movimientos que quizás inicialmente fueron insurgentes con el correr de los años se convirtieron en organizaciones que subsisten del narcotráfico y emplean el terrorismo como método, con el consiguiente desprestigio internacional y derrotados políticamente.

Para poder continuar con el desarrollo de este tema a continuación quiero aclarar que la guerra revolucionaria comprende fundamentalmente acciones de tipo político, económico, psicosocial y armado. Esta última acción encarnada por la guerrilla, la cual frecuentemente se confunde con el todo.

El objetivo de la guerra revolucionaria no es otro que la toma del poder, a diferencia de los objetivos de las guerras regulares que normalmente buscan satisfacer intereses nacionales con la perspectiva de una negociación. De tal manera que una guerra revolucionaria con tal objetivo que no esta derrotada o no se cree derrotada o que engaña sobre su verdadera capacidad, igual da, es claro que la única opción es su derrota.

1. Paret, Peter, "Creadores de la Estrategia Moderna: Desde Maquiavelo a la Era Nuclear," editado y traducido por El Ministerio de Defensa de España, 1991, p. 878.

Para lograr una victoria se requiere de una estrategia integral que enfrente el poder nacional y no solo el poder militar a la combinación de los métodos de lucha, o sea, a los que hacen la guerra revolucionaria y no solo a la guerrilla.

Dicha estrategia debe abarcar estrategias en los campos político, económico, sicosocial y otros, además del militar que debe contemplar herramientas de orden constitucional y jurídico.

Frecuentemente se critica a Colombia en los círculos internacionales por una supuesta falta de compromiso en la resolución del conflicto, por ejemplo se menciona que el PIB (Producto Interno Bruto) dedicado a la confrontación es muy bajo comparado con el esfuerzo hecho por Estados Unidos en sus guerras. El problema es que como el conflicto es interno, al incrementar el presupuesto militar se podrían causar desajustes sociales y económicos que ayudarían a alimentar el conflicto aún más. Obviamente es importante que Colombia implemente una economía acorde con la situación pero así mismo es básico que obtenga ayuda internacional para luchar contra dos fenómenos que afectan al mundo entero, que son el terrorismo y el narcotráfico.

Nunca se ha visto que un gobierno pueda imponer sus condiciones sobre un enemigo que es fuerte o se cree fuerte, ya que este querrá imponerse sobre todas las cosas. Es por esto que el gobierno Colombiano debe estar en capacidad de obligar a la subversión a negociar para la paz y no para la guerra. El ejemplo vivido varias veces a través de la historia colombiana y foránea demuestra que para acercarse a la paz hay que demostrarle a los violentos la inutilidad de su lucha. Cuando ello se haya logrado habrá seguridad y con seguridad será posible el desarrollo. Así Colombia será plenamente libre como siempre debió ser.

APPENDIX IV

Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski, Canadian Ambassador to Colombia

It is an honor and privilege for me to have been invited to participate at a conference of such importance. It is humbling to be amongst the likes of Fernando Cepeda, Alfredo Rangel, Rafael Pardo, General Ramírez, and María Emma Mejía—Colombians who are real experts in the realities of their country's difficult history, who live it and know it intrinsically, in a way no resident diplomat ever can.

This conference is immensely important at this particular juncture in Colombia's history.

We have lived through a turbulent four-year odyssey in the search for peace since 1998, preceded by a number of other attempts at dialogue dating from the Presidency of Belisario Betancur in the 1980's.

Colombia has made some progress in the last 20 years' search for peace: two major insurgent groups have been reinserted into national political life; a new political framework—warts and all—has been realized by virtue of the Constitution of 1991. Despite this enviable progress, the scourge of conflict violence and inequality, fueled by the illegal drug trade, have also impacted heavily on Colombia's institutional foundations and the security and safety of her citizens.

It is difficult for many Colombians to reflect on the past without bitterness and cynicism. Despite best efforts and the application of enormous energies, talent and commitment, the country seems to be retreating into darkness, despite the wishes of one and all that a page can be turned away from violence. Que "No Más" sea una realidad.

We meet today in Washington on the eve of the assumption of the Presidency by Álvaro Uribe Vélez on August 7, 2002.

Many speakers have covered in great detail what his election, platform and prospects mean for Colombians, so I will not pass over well-trodden ground yet again.

Instead, I will speak about the search for peace; its basis in the experience of a resident foreign observer in Colombia; what we lived through in the international community as observers and participants in the drama of the last four years; how and what role we see as relevant for non-Colombians in the challenges that lie ahead for the new administration.

It is a far from authoritative assessment. These are the musings of one ambassador who, along with diplomatic colleagues has been a witness to history, first as a passive observer and, in the end, an active participant in the peace process.

I would begin by observing that if someone had told me in August 1999 when I arrived in Bogotá that the peace process would dominate my term as Canada's Ambassador to Colombia, I would have thought them mad. It was the last thing I and my colleagues ever expected, because we did not believe that peace was even a possibility given the atmospherics and "on-the-ground" realities in the country as a new government took power.

Assisting Colombia in finding a path away from violence and murder was and remains the central motivation for most countries in seeking to participate actively in the search for peace.

Colombia was in a difficult situation: a problematic relationship with the international community due to drug-related issues; an army poorly manned, trained and equipped, unable to meet the three (sometimes four) front conflict besetting them; an ELN reeling from the death of its maximum leader; a FARC emboldened by a series of high-profile military successes in the eastern part of the country, and demonstrating an ability to show force in and around Bogotá; an AUC growing in power; exerting territorial control in some regions and swelling in ranks in reaction to guerrilla violence.

This was the landscape a mere 3-4 years ago. No one thought a peace process viable, even less so when FARC leader Manuel Marulanda failed to show for the first meeting at Caguán.

Yet, despite the confluence of storm clouds, a process—however flawed in may have been—spawned from the initial FARC-Government discussions at Caquetania; and, with the ELN, through delicate, deliberate diplomacy by Ambassador Julio Londoño and others.

The international community was then, a merely interested spectator; hoping for the best from these efforts, but with some skepticism as to ultimate results.

In 2000, as discussions with the ELN accelerated a Group of Friends (GPF) was created. This later was to include an additional group of five potential "verifying" countries, following the signing of the Havana Accords later that year.

With the FARC, despite slow progress in discussions given the lack of trust and confidence between the parties, and the decision to negotiate while continuing armed confrontation, a Group of Ten "Facilitator Countries" grew out of the February 2001 Agreement at Los Pozos.

If one reflects that at the start of both discussions any/all international participation—even as observers—in these talks had been categorically

rejected by all parties, this was progress indeed. It had not changed the operative dynamics needed to conclude successful negotiations, but had introduced an element of third-party accompaniment as a minimum in the process. As we watched it happen, we all hoped we could do more; assisting Colombia in finding a path away from violence and murder was and remains the central motivation for most countries in seeking to participate actively in the search for peace, not merely self interest and economic advantage as is at times cynically reported in local media circles.

We must remember that the international community's presence in the peace process came as a function of BOTH parties requesting it. Certainly, each had different motivations, but our being at the table in both processes was a fruit of dialogue between the protagonists, not an externality imposed upon the process from any quarter.

Ostensibly, both parties saw value to this presence. We, in our part, attempted to bring objectivity and creativity to our role, using moral suasion—our only real source participation—in an effort to keep the parties moving forward.

The actual effort of facilitation—and here I refer to the process with FARC where Canada was a more active participant—proved to be a roller-coaster of *coyunturas*, as they say in Spanish, as we responded to the external forces orbiting around the process which seemed to exert a gravitational pull on the talks themselves, ongoing violence, massacres by all illegal actors, growing illicit cultivation and the expansion of aerial eradication efforts, but most of all the lack of confidence and trust between the parties made potential positive results from the talks ever more remote.

Canada, as the first coordinator of the G10 had the difficult task of trying to identify a basis for working with the parties and, at the same time, managing information flows from the G10 to other members of the international community.

In the first instance, G10 consensus established early on that we should maximize efforts on humanitarian issues as a potential input to the talks; hence our concentration on encouraging a humanitarian exchange of sick detainees, and attempting to move the parties towards the consideration of a humanitarian agreement as their Number 1 negotiating priority.

In the first case, we succeeded and, in cooperation with the ICRC, the June 2001 exchange at Macarena was probably the single most important achievement of the process. In the second, we failed. Both parties were wedded to a socio-economic agenda as a starting and end-point to the discussions. Having gotten off on this footing, neither seemed capable of considering any change in its overall strategy.

From the pinnacle of the humanitarian exchange, there was a steady erosion of the already limited confidence at the table, as the conflict's intensity rubbed more and more against the backdrop of fruitless discussions in Caguán.

That is not to say nothing was done. If one reads carefully the texts of agreements signed by the parties from Caquetania, through Los Pozos in early 2001, to the Report of the Notables, San Francisco de la Sombra later that autumn, to the Timetable Agreement of Jan 2002, we can see a progression—however modest—in the positions of both parties: not enough to have a comprehensive accord in sight (never really a possibility in the absence of at least a minimal cease-fire), but at least, in my view, the broad lines of delineating a priorization, sequencing and order to how a real negotiation might be handled. The fact that this evolution took place with the presence of a third party whose role, though limited, moved from passive observation ("human wallpaper") to a more vigorous, catalytic role in trying to keep the process from collapse—these realities offer, in my view, the glimpse of what the bases for peace may be at some point in Colombia's future.

I have walked through these experiences because I believe that, notwithstanding the failure of the previous process, the foundations for the future—through learning from mistakes, and appreciation of where progress was made, however modest—will serve as a pathfinder for any efforts in the future.

In my personal view, Colombia needed to pass through the trial of the unsuccessful process of the last four years, in order to get to the point where more serious efforts can take place in the future.

Certain mythologies needed to be dispelled.

First, the illusion that somehow one can negotiate while conflict rages around the talks, with ever increasing levels of violence brought to bear to "influence" outcomes. This is clearly unworkable, but needed to be lived to be understood by Colombians in all quarters.

Second, that the creation of demilitarized zones would somehow provide the necessary confidence for talks to take place. In fact, the opposite was true in this most recent experience, as the DMZ itself became the a source of lack of trust between the parties; in the case of the ELN, the mere suggestion of its creation scuppered the process entirely. To be fair to President Pastrana, he was not the originator of the *despeje* model - it goes back to the 1980s as an intellectual foundation for those engaged in developing negotiating strategies with insurgents. His handling of the conditions for the creation of Caguán was, however, determinant. As an experiment, the DMZ option without verification was doomed from the start.

Third, the notion of the Colombian conflict's "particularity" and denigration of the idea that third parties could usefully participate in any attempts at dialogue domestically, also proved to be false arguments. Today, I think it is safe to say that a realization that third parties—preferably of an institutional rather than "country-specific" nature—will be a mainstay of future efforts at dialogue.

So, given these realities, and notwithstanding President-elect Uribe's declarations on election night, it is my judgment that the experiment of the last four years is truly past, and we are into a new basis for considering how dialogue might be resumed in Colombia in the future.

Let me be brutally frank: I do not think this will happen any time soon. In fact, it may take the entirety of the next presidency just to get to a new beginning (I hope I am wrong), but that is the kind of sober realism we—and especially the Colombian public—need to understand and appreciate.

Nevertheless, we in the international community need to begin creating the foundations for the future from the lessons of the past, and our collective experiences globally, which might serve usefully in response to Colombian requests for assistance - ultimately, in my judgment, by all the parties to the conflict.

The conditions for a resumption of dialogue as laid out by the President-elect do not exist. They will not exist until the current "equilibrium"—military, political and diplomatic—available to the parties changes; until there are new, not currently visible incentives to alter behavior and seek new solutions to old problems.

For the present—until this test of strength concludes—good offices, perhaps by the UN, Catholic Church, and other such institutions, is probably the extent of what can be construed to be constructive. We are nowhere near any potential "mediation," a term which should be used with great caution in characterizing any short- or medium-term efforts to assist the parties in Colombia to re-engage, however modestly.

The quiet diplomatic spade-work needed to create conditions of confidence will take place outside public or media view, in the shadows, to be visible only when conditions exist for all (or in the initial instance at least most) of the parties agree to modalities for resuming a public dialogue in a real search for concrete agreements.

What happens between now and then, assuming this will take time?

Colombia's government needs to embark upon the needed reforms and strengthening of its institutions in order to alleviate poverty and exclusion as a source of bitterness for society as a whole, and create the presence and

capacities needed to better function in response to popular need in the socio-economic fields in particular.

If there is no visible, successful process of internal reform implemented by the new government, conditions for its adversaries to seize the initiative with society writ large will increase exponentially.

There must be more contribution and sacrifice from those that "have" in Colombia, in strengthening the state, and providing needed financial and human resources needed to take the initiative to its adversaries.

Civil society and the Church will need to lead in debating openly and democratically the vision of a new "national consensus" in Colombia around a change-management model.

For the international community, we need to work with Colombia in making institutions stronger, especially those associated with humanitarian needs and human rights.

The challenge of displacement, now recognized in virtually every quarter as over 2 million and growing, needs to be treated as an international emergency with concomitant resources applied. More poor and hungry in Colombia's cities is not a positive pre-condition for improved order and stability.

We need to support government efforts directed at more effective control of narco-trafficking by increased demand reduction initiatives in our own countries, and contributions to supply eradication—whether as monitors of aerial eradication, or support for alternative development programs regionally. We need to increase cooperation with police against domestic and international Mafias who control drug flows in the post-production stage.

We need to begin creating, brick-by-brick, the kind of technical model needed for how a real negotiation might work in the future, recognizing that one or all of the parties may reject it totally in the first instance but, over time, find elements attractive and sufficiently coherent with their own positions, that there is at minimum seminal interest to explore potential bases for discussion—a "build it and they will come" approach, to borrow a baseball term.

I am convinced after my own experiences of the last three years that despite the enormous challenges and at times overwhelming levels of violence, there will be a successful, negotiated solution to Colombia's conflict.

Why? Because I sense from all parties, even the most grizzled insurgent, that deep down there is recognition that military victory is nearly impossible to achieve. Colombia's size, geography and rugged individualism make this a virtual impossibility.

I also believe that even in the most successful of circumstances, some disgruntled persons or groups will remain outside the law in the far reaches of Colombia, given the baggage, fear and lack of faith characteristic of this conflict.

After 50 years, entrenched interests—licit and illicit—amongst all actors and society as a whole, have served to diminish the merits and value of peace and stability in the eyes of many. Until such time as these notions begin to change, it will be difficult to think in terms of any comprehensive approach to successful negotiations.

The international community will, in my view, respond to the call from Colombia to assist in this process. We will not be content with passive observation—human wallpaper roles—as in the past. We will require clear structure and mandate from the parties to engage in action ultimately on their behalf. We cannot, and will not, permit international institutions, agencies or countries to be utilized for narrow political gains domestically.

We will not be content with passive observation–human wallpaper roles–as in the past. We will require clear structure and mandate from the parties to engage in action ultimately on their behalf.

International participation will take into account the Colombian context, but will be guided by experiences based on global realities. Colombians might find this difficult to accept, but it is how strong foundations will be built to ensure the success of any future process. Failures cannot be countenanced due to the large amounts of energy and goodwill they expend.

I have been told by some Colombians that I am a dreamer, that this will never happen, that somehow the country will simply stumble upon solutions when all parties are exhausted. I hope they are wrong in this assessment. I do not think Colombia can bear an interminable conflict, notwithstanding the enormous capacity nationally to compartmentalize and rationalize away violence and death.

The coming years will, in my judgment, tell the tale as to what kind of Colombia will exist in the rest of this century. The Colombia of greatness, perspicacity and abilities to confront successfully its challenges, or the Colombia of despair, violence and destruction that can only hearken back to the promise of what once was.

As someone who has been engaged at some level with this country for the last 35 years, I believe firmly in the former.

It is in the lessons of history that we find the guideposts for the present. And so it will be in the reflection of these latest years in the search for peace, where Colombia will find the seed for the rich harvest of its future.

AGENDA

Peace and Security in Colombia

Thursday, June 20, 2002
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Washington, D.C.

9:00 a.m. **Introduction**

Hon. Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group

9:15–10:00 a.m. **Opening Address**

Honorable Lino Gutiérrez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs

10:00–11:30 a.m. **Panel 1: Economic Foundations for Peace**

Moderator: *Mark L. Schneider*, Senior Vice-President, International Crisis Group

David de Ferranti, Vice-President for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank

Nancy Birdsall, President, Center for Global Development

Eduardo Aninat, Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Fernando Cepeda, Facultad de Administración, Universidad de los Andes

11:30–11:45 a.m. **Break**

11:45–1:30 p.m. **Panel 2: Military and Security Foundations for Peace**

Moderator: *Colonel (ret.) USAF Michael J. Dziedzic*, U.S. Institute of Peace

Alfredo Rangel, Defense Analyst, former Security Adviser

Honorable Rafael Pardo, Senator, former Minister of Defense

General Nestor Ramírez, Defense Attaché, Colombian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

1:30–2:30 p.m. **Lunch** (invitation only)

2:30–4:00 p.m. **Panel 3: The Basis for Negotiating Peace**

Moderator: *Cynthia J. Arnson*, Deputy Director, Latin American Program, WWC

James LeMoyne, Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Colombia

Honorable María Emma Mejía, former Foreign Minister and former peace negotiator

Honorable Guillermo Rishchynski, Canadian Ambassador to Colombia

4:00–5:30 p.m. **Reception**

BIOGRAPHIES OF PARTICIPANTS

Eduardo Aninat has been Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since December 1999. A native of Chile, he has held numerous senior economic positions in the Chilean government, including that of Finance Minister (1994-1999) and chief negotiator of the bilateral Chile-Canada trade agreement. He was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the IMF and World Bank in 1995-1996, and served three years as a member of the Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF, representing Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Dr. Aninat has been a consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank and has advised a number of governments on tax policy and debt restructuring issues. He has taught public finance and economic development at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and was an Assistant Professor of economics at Boston University. Dr. Aninat holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University.

Nancy Birdsall is the founding President of the Center for Global Development. Previously, she served for three years as Senior Associate and Director of the Economic Reform Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1993-1998 Dr. Birdsall was Executive Vice-President of the Inter-American Development Bank, where she oversaw a $30 billion public and private loan portfolio. Before joining the IDB, she spent 14 years in research, policy, and management positions at the World Bank, most recently as Director of the Policy Research Department. Dr. Birdsall is the author, co-author, or editor of more than a dozen books and monographs, including most recently *Washington Contentious: Economic Policies for Social Mobility in a Changing World*. She holds an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Ph.D. in economics from Yale University.

Fernando Cepeda Ulloa is a member of the Faculty of Administration of the Universidad de los Andes, where he has also served as Vice Rector,

Acting Rector, Dean of the Law Faculty, Director of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Center for International Studies. Dr. Cepeda has represented the Government of Colombia in a number of diplomatic positions, including as Ambassador to Canada, to Great Britain, and to the United Nations, and has served as Minister of Government, Minister of Communications, and Vice-Minister of Economic Development. He is a columnist for the Bogotá daily *El Tiempo* and is author of numerous books and articles on such topics as corruption, democratic governance, campaign finance, political parties, and peace. Dr. Cepeda holds a doctorate in law and political science from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

David de Ferranti is the World Bank's Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean, and oversees the Bank's work in that region. He was previously responsible for the Bank's projects related to education, health, nutrition, population, and other social services, and also headed programs on Africa and Asia. Before joining the World Bank, Mr. de Ferranti held senior management and policy positions in the U.S. government and at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include macroeconomic policy, poverty reduction, urban and rural development, and health and sanitation issues. Dr. de Ferranti holds a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University.

Ambassador Lino Gutiérrez has held the post of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs since August 1999. Previously, he was ambassador to Nicaragua, and in that capacity coordinated the U.S. relief effort in Nicaragua following the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. A career diplomat, Ambassador Gutiérrez entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1977, and has served in a variety of posts in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, France, and Portugal, among other countries. He has received numerous awards from the Department of State, including the Superior Honor Award and the Meritorious Service Award. Born in Havana, Cuba, Ambassador Gutiérrez attended the University of Miami and the University of Alabama, where he received a B.A. in political science and an M.A. in Latin American Studies.

James LeMoyne is the Special Adviser on Colombia for United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Prior to his appointment in November 2001, Mr. LeMoyne served as Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Colombia, working with Special Adviser Jan Egeland. For the

past four years, he has served as contact for the Secretary-General with the Colombian government, the FARC, the ELN, Colombian civil society, and the international community on matters related to the peace process and the situation in Colombia. Mr. LeMoyne has worked in peace processes, complex crises, and peace-building for 20 years, in countries including Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, and Guatemala. Prior to his 11 years at the U.N., he was a senior foreign correspondent and foreign policy analyst specializing in conflicts and peace processes in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Mr. Lemoyne holds degrees from Harvard University, Oxford University, and the London School of Economics.

María Emma Mejía has played a central role in the Colombian peace process over many years, designated by President Andrés Pastrana as a negotiator in the process with the FARC in 1999 and serving as a member of the Comisión de Facilitación in the talks with the ELN. She has held numerous senior government posts, including Presidential Adviser for Security in Medellín, Ambassador to Spain, Minister of Education, and Minister of Foreign Relations. She was candidate for Vice-President during the 1998 presidential campaign of Horacio Serpa, and later served as part of an advisory commission on foreign relations appointed by President Pastrana. Ms. Mejía's work on behalf of human rights includes serving as one of twelve advisors from around the world for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Originally trained as a journalist and cinematographer, Ms. Mejía holds degrees from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana de Medellín and the Universidad del Valle.

Honorable Rafael Pardo Rueda was recently elected to the Colombian Senate for the 2002-2006 term. Over the last two decades, his distinguished career in public service has included posts as Minister of Defense, National Security Adviser, Presidential Counselor for Peace, and Director of the National Rehabilitation Plan. More recently, he served as Adviser to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C., and subsequently as news director for RCN Television and as director of C.M.&. Television. Senator Pardo also has been a professor and researcher at the Universidad de los Andes, and is the author of several books, including *De Primera Mano: Colombia 1986-1994, Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas*. Trained as an economist at the Universidad de los Andes, he has also pursued advanced studies in urban and regional plan-

ning and in international relations at the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague and at Harvard University.

General Nestor Ramírez Mejía is Colombian Defense Attaché in Washington, D.C., and head of the Colombian delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board. Immediately prior to his posting in Washington, General Ramírez served for three years as Second-in-Command of the Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army. He has served as commander of numerous military units, including the Voltígeros Battalion, the First Mobile Brigade, the United Southern Command, the Twelfth Brigade, and the Third Division. General Ramírez has been a professor at the Superior War College in Colombia and an adviser to the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, where he also served as Vice-Director. Trained as an architect at the Universidad Piloto de Colombia, he has also received military training in the United States.

Alfredo Rangel is one of Colombia's leading specialists in security affairs. He served as a Presidential Adviser for National Security during the Gaviria administration and has continued as a consultant on security matters for Colombian and international organizations. Mr. Rangel writes a regular column for the Bogotá daily, *El Tiempo*, and has been a professor and researcher at the Universidad de los Andes. He is the author of dozens of articles and essays on the armed conflict in Colombia, including most recently *Guerra Insurgente* (2001), a comparative study of insurgencies in Latin America and Asia, as well as *Reconocer la Guerra para Construir la Paz* (1999) and *Colombia: Guerra en el Fin de Siglo* (1998). He holds a degree in economics from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and M.A. in political science from the Universidad de los Andes.

Ambassador Guillermo E. Rishchynski is Ambassador of Canada to the Republic of Colombia, a position he has held since July 1999. A veteran diplomat, he has worked for the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade since 1982, serving in posts in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Amman, Melbourne, and Jakarta. In Ottawa, Ambassador Rishchynski was Deputy Director in the Latin America and Caribbean Division from 1989 to 1992. He was Director of the Team Canada Task Force from 1996 to 1997, and later served as Deputy Consul General and Senior Trade Commissioner at the Canadian Consul General in Chicago. Ambassador Rishchynski is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

MODERATORS

Cynthia J. Arnson is Deputy Director of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and director of the Project on Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. She is editor of *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1999), author of *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993* (2d ed., Penn State Press, 1993), and co-author of *State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia* (Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1993, and Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994). Prior to joining the Wilson Center in 1994, she was associate director of Human Rights Watch/Americas, with responsibility for Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. She has taught at American University's School of International Service, and served as a senior foreign policy aide in the House of Representatives during the Carter and Reagan administrations. She holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Colonel (ret.) USAF Michael J. Dziedzic is Program Officer for the Balkans Initiative, United States Institute of Peace. Immediately prior to his appointment in 2001, he was a senior military fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, where he focused on peace operations, Latin American regional security affairs, and transnational security threats. During his thirty-year career with the U.S. Air Force, he served as professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, professor of national security studies at the National War College, strategic military planner for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, political-military planner at the U.S. Department of Defense, and air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. He is co-editor of *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (1998) and author of *Mexico: Converging Challenges* (1989). Colonel Dziedzic is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a Ph.D. in government from the University of Texas, Austin.

Honorable Gareth Evans has been President and Chief Executive of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group since January 2000. He has had a long and distinguished career in Australian politics, serving in the Parliament in both the Senate and House of Representatives, and as a cab-

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